					Comment	Response	Action
					Question 5 We would like to acknowledge the holistic view of resilience and the need for greater stakeholder engagement and input. This is particularly so in regards to the broader whole-of-society risks and the inclusion of Maori principles. The layout is friendly and inviting. The content and imagery is broad enough for other groups (not just CDEM) to see their place in the strategy. - no recceomendations	JH 8/12 Noted the support	None
					Question 6 This new strategy is best viewed as a forward focusing strategy that deals with the environment in which we find ourselves now, and also what future resilience looks like in our communities. This requires a much stronger focus on climate change, and the need to achieve a net carbon neutral future. We know we face more severe and more frequent major incidents because of climate change and the reference to these in the future or preparing for the future portrays a lack of urgency. These will happen every year and in many areas. We need a state of preparedness we have not seen before, especially as help from New Zealand will also constantly be required in our Pacific neighbours. The Council suggests the Ministry considers: · the use of a National Risk Agency as an implementation vehicle. If there is a timeframe for which CDEM plans must align with the strategy once it is adopted this could be included as an objective. · Both Christchurch & Wellington have joined the 100 Resilient Cities Network pioneered by the Rockefeller Foundation and could assist in the resilience planning component.	JH 8/12 Noted the support	None
					Reccomendations: Consider the use of a National Risk Agency as an implementation vehicle. Ensure that the National Disaster and Resilience Strategy be considered in conjunction with any potential changes in the 3 Waters management. The Council does not think 3 waters should be separated from the functions of strong local government.	JH 8/12 A bit beyond the remit of this document - on both counts.	None
					Council comments: Agree in principle, however consider that New Zealand is in a position to be much more aspirational with the timeframes. Risks relating to the built environment could and should continue to be managed through appropriate consenting processes and resource management as required. Specific Disaster risks should be identified and managed through the CDEM function. Ultimately, these risks should be identified and managed at the Regional CDEM level in conjunction with individual territorial authority representation along with appropriate industry experts. **Council Reccomendations:** Bring forward the timeframe to 2021 with a report back to the international conference scheduled for that year. Enable the Regional CDEM function to establish 'Disaster' risks within each regional boundary and work collaboratively with all sectors public, private and societal.	JH 8/12 Interesting suggestion. Note the CCC's assertion that all objectives should have a 2021 deadline. This isn't the duration of the Strategy, but we can put review points in the implementation graphic, and add narrative that says individual actions may be a lot sooner, and will be detailed in the Roadmap. This is the full picture of what we want to achieve in the next 10 years.	For consideration. Potential inclusion in implementation graphic
					Council Comments: Agree in principle, however consider that New Zealand is in a position to be much more aspirational with the timeframes. At local level this could include governance at Community Boards for monitoring and evaluating required outcomes. **Council reccomendations:** Bring forward the timeframe to 2021 with a report back to the international conference scheduled for that year.This strategy needs to be supported by an in-depth implementation plan that complements the minister's response to the TAG review, the National and also the Group CDEM plans.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
					council comments: Agree in principle, however consider that New Zealand is in a position to be much more aspirational with the timeframes. This is a highly aspirational target in regards to the proposed scope and will need further clarification for implementation. **council reccomendations:** Bring forward the timeframe to 2021 with a report back to the international conference scheduled for that year. Provide further clarity regarding 'products' and whether there is already a recommended system that can communicate risks in an appropriate format, and one that can receive feedback from the public regarding its effectiveness.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
					council comments: Agree in principle, however consider that New Zealand is in a position to be much more aspirational with the timeframes. Natural Hazard Coordination Groups at regional level could provide the forum from which regional alignment regarding regulation and financing could be addressed. **council reccomendations:** Bring forward the timeframe to 2021 with a report back to the international conference scheduled for that year. Enable CDEM Groups to facilitate the conversation between regional and local. This strategy needs to be supported by an in-depth implementation plan that complements the minister's response to the TAG review, the National and also the Group CDEM plans.	JH 8/12 Noted	None

					council comments / recommendations		
					council comments: Agree in principle, however consider that New Zealand is in a position to be much more aspirational with the timeframes. Earthquake Prone Buildings should be assessed and managed within agreed timeframes and standards, but also pragmatically to ensure economical impact is appropriately limited. council **reccomendations**: Bring forward the timeframe to 2021 with a report back to the international conference scheduled for that year. National legislation needs to reflect any increased requirements to building standards, and where practical, supported by development contributions that turn this target from aspirational for developers, into tangible safety and resilience outcomes for communities.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
					council comments: Agree in principle, however consider that New Zealand is in a position to be much more aspirational with the timeframes. The cost of disasters are becoming easier to track. However, it should be kept in mind that direct cost comparisons between different disasters may not be possible as each disaster is unique. **reccomendations**: Bring forward the timeframe to 2021 with a report back to the international conference scheduled for that year. Involve the private sector in any cost/benefit analysis for building in resilience. This should be lead at the national level and include conversations with insurers.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
					council comments: Agree in principle. Acknowledge the holistic view of resilience and the need for greater stakeholder engagement and input. This is particularly so in regards to the broader whole-of-society risks and the inclusion of Maori principles. The timelines for achieving some of this target are more stringent than that of providing training to Controllers. **council reccomendations**: Review target date in-line with other targets linked to technology, suggest this is 2021. Resourcing for foreign language messaging needs to be considered at regional level to ensure the capacity exists to undertake this work.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
					Council comments: Agree, but consider that New Zealand could achieve this by 2021. The national standards will need to be in place sooner to allow for further development of response capability in Controller and other functional areas. **Reccomendations** The strategy needs to be supported by an in-depth implementation plan that complements the minister's response to the TAG review, the National Plan and also the Group CDEM plan. Suggest reviewing the Strategy in line with the Council's recommended date for achieving the objectives (i.e. 2021), rather than a 10 year review, would ensure the emergency management system is effective	JH 8/12 Noted	None
					council comments: Shared service arrangements at regional levels need to be addressed before 2025 in order for any gains to be made from their implementation. Legislation will need to be in-place prior to embedding any new regional structures **Reccomendations** The strategy needs to be supported by an in-depth implementation plan that complements the minister's response to the TAG review, the National Plan and also the Group CDEM plan.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
					council comments: Agree that all controllers are trained and accredited. However, the target of 2030 is too distant given the timeline used for other and more difficult targets in this strategy. **Council reccomendations**: Reduce the deadline for Controller accreditation to no later than 2021. This needs to be supported by an in-depth implementation plan that complements the minister's response to the TAG review, the National and also the Group CDEM plans.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
					council comments: Agreed, however the target of 2025 should be brought forward. The Common Operating Picture will be essential in managing incidents at local, regional and national level. **Council reccomendation**s: It is recommended to move away from a prescriptive nationally standardised system to a system that is capable of compatibility across multiple formats that cater for a variety of uses at local level. The strategy needs to be supported by an in-depth implementation plan that complements the minister's response to the TAG review, the National Plan and also the Group CDEM plan.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
					council comments: Agree in principle. However, Recovery needs to be at the forefront of the conversation regarding resilience. The timeline of 2030 needs to be brought forward to ensure that Recovery is brought into the same space as 'Response' when dealing with emergencies. **reccomendations** The Minister's response to the TAG review, and the report itself, focuses largely on the 'Response' component of emergencies. It is recommended that 'Recovery' is given effect through this strategy. Recovery is not just the built environment. The impacts at the societal level can be buffered with good Recovery practices being an early part of the Response.	JH 8/12 Agree	Add to review of recovery provisions in the strategy
					Council comments: Agree. However, New Zealand is already building a culture of resilience, with both Christchurch and Wellington included in the 100 Resilient Cities. The timeline of this objective should be brought forward. Council reccomendations: Consider diversity and communities with particular vulnerabilities, and building innovation into our culture of resilience	JH 8/12 Agree re. comment on diversity and inclusion	For consideration

				Council comments: It would be appropriate to acknowledge our resilient communities and the work that has happened in the resilience space already. We are gaining traction, and learning more and more. For example, Point 8 in Barriers to Resilience (p42) describes a lack of translating resilience theory to action. This is already happening in Christchurch and across the country. Council reccomendations: Bring forward the target date for this objective to 021. Promote and support a community-led and understood approach to resilience.	JH 8/12 Noted. We're not saying any of this ISN'T being done anywhere. Just that it should be a priority and objective everywhere. Re. the dates - again, we can't make everything a 2021 date... not realistic or the intent of the strategy (that would make it a work programme)	None
				Council comments: Agree. Community resilience is best discussed/developed at the local level with close cooperationand involvement of all relevant stakeholders. At local level this should include the support of existing governance structures at Community Board level to ensure communities are empowered to make decisions about their future. council reccomendations: Bring forward the target date for this objective to 2021. Promote and support a community-led and understood approach to resilience.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				council comments: Agree, however the timeframes could be brought forward. There needs to be clarity provided in regards to who holds the portfolio for developing resilience goals within their communities. Group CDEM plans may try to address regional resilience, but this should be delivered by local authorities. council reccomendations: The strategy needs to be supported by an in-depth implementation plan that complements the minister's response to the TAG review, the National Plan and also the Group CDEM plan. Bring forward the target date for this objective to 2021.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				council comments: Agreed. This needs to factor in the wider ranging cultural diversity of New Zealand and not just mainstream cultures. Council reccomendations: Ensure this links into any foreign language messaging programme along with the potential for partnering with cultural entities to ensure understanding of cultures is embedded into emergency response as well as recovery. Bring forward the target date for this objective to 2021.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				council comments: Agree. Lifeline utility providers are best placed to provide an holistic understanding of critical infrastructure and its capabilities and capacities before, during and after an emergency. Council reccomendations: A national review of critical infrastructure could provide the basis for development of future work plans that increase resilience and ensure levels of service before, during and after an emergency. Bring forward the target date for this objective to 2021.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
47	Andrew Saunders, Regulatory Affairs Manager & Tim Grafton, Chief Executive	ICNZ	7/12/18	As noted above we strongly support the proposed Strategy. We do have some recommendations as to additional matters to reflect in the Strategy that relate to the role of insurance and insurers and on the importance of implementation.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				The Strategy is rightly focussed on human and societal impacts, however, it is important to remember that for people and communities to recover post an event it is critical they have homes to live in and businesses/workplaces to work from. The Strategy references the role of insurance in relation to risktransfer and the high-level of insurance penetration in New Zealand. Given that high level, in the event of any disaster most of the financial costs will be met by insurance and in a large event this will be billions of dollars. The sooner insurance can respond, the sooner the inflow of insurance settlements that are critical to restoring properties and supporting the economy can occur.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				It is critical that post-disaster the responsible authorities engage early and constructively with the insurance industry. This should occur at a general level so that government agencies leading response and recovery understand how insurance will respond and what they can do to facilitate, and avoid hindering, a swift insurance response so as to benefit their communities. There are also specific issues that require engagement and collaboration, such as facilitating access to properties to assess damage or sharing information at a regional or community level on disaster impacts, needs and vulnerabilities.	JH 8/12 Noted. More a point for the Plan	None
				Given this we consider this critical role of insurance and the need for authorities to engage and collaborate with the insurance industry should be explicitly reflected in the Strategy. The involvement of EQC should not be seen as a proxy for insurance involvement given the many differences that exist between the specific coverage provided by EQC and the more diverse and extensive coverage provided by private insurers (e.g. coverage for businesses and commercial property and in future personal contents). We also note that, as occurred in response to the 2016 Kaikōura Earthquake, insurers may continue in future to manage their customers' EQC claims on behalf of EQC in the interests of more efficient claims responses and better customer outcomes.	JH 8/12 Noted. More a point for the Plan	None

					In the section on Managing Risks on page 24, Objective 5 sensibly provides that it should be ensured that development and investment practices, particularly in the built environment, are risk-sensitive, taking care not to create any unnecessary or unacceptable new risk. We support this as increasing the resilience of buildings to disasters through improved building standards and planning plays a key role in managing risks.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
					We note the commentary to this Objective refers specifically to earthquake prone building remediation meeting required timeframes and standards. Completing this work is important but greater aspiration is required in this area and the focus needs to move from addressing the tail, strengthening the most vulnerable buildings considered "earthquake prone", to over time ensuring that all buildings are highly-resilient to earthquakes. To really improve the resilience of our built environment it is necessary to achieve a step-change in the resilience of buildings and fundamentally changing the New Building Standard (NBS) so that as well as protecting life safety, buildings are serviceable following a major seismic event, will be a critical step to achieving this. Given its risk profile this is perhaps the most important single action New Zealand can undertake to improve future resilience to disasters. The need to demolish buildings following a major earthquake has massive financial costs and means it takes years for communities to rebuild and recover.	JH 8/12 Agree in principle. May not be able to go this far (although it does fall in the aspirational, long term category)	For consideration
					As a final point, central and local authorities also need to be mindful of taking actions, particularly after a disaster, that increase moral hazard and potentially dis-incentivise the uptake of insurance in future.	JH 8/12 Agree in principle, though I think this may be a level of detail/nuance that it isn't possible to include.	None
					Effective implementation of the Strategy will be critical to achieving its objectives. There are many activities outlined in it that will require significant effort to be undertaken and implemented by a range of agencies within central government, local government and beyond. It is therefore essential that Government provides the funding and focus necessary to implement the Strategy.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
48	Phillipa Tocker, Executive Director	Museums Aotearoa	7/12/18		Purpose, vision and goal We agree with the vision and goal of this strategy.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
					Priorities, objectives and success factors We agree with the priorities in general.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
					Risk reduction Public museums and art galleries have considerable expertise in risk reduction. They actively manage the physical protection of the taonga in their care, to ensure that our national cultural heritage is maintained and continues to nurture wellbeing even after a disaster. Museums also have an active role in educating the public, for instance in the effects of disasters and how to prepare for them.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
					Response The expertise in museums and galleries has been shown to be invaluable in the wake of disasters such as the Canterbury earthquakes. There is more that could be done to coordinate this expertise nationally in response to a regionwide disaster such as this, where each institution (and all their staff) has its own immediate issues to deal with. In Canterbury some larger institutions were able to provide considerable assistance to other organisations and individuals such as artists, but the response could have been more timely and effective if a coordination plan were in place in advance. The Canterbury Disaster Salvage Team was in place, but their ability to respond quickly was limited by the personal circumstances of the individual team members, some of whom were badly affected. The Canterbury Cultural Collections Recovery Centre that operated 2013-2017 at Wigram's Air Force Museum is an exemplar of a successful response – but was only possible because of a happy coincidence of factors. If such facilities and expertise could be identified in advance their timeliness and effectiveness would be greatly enhanced.	JH 8/12 Noted	None

				Resilience The Strategy recognises the importance of strengthening societal resilience. It has been shown that cultural organisations such as museums and art galleries play a critical role in connected, culturally aware communities. Recognition of this role needs to be explicit to ensure that the resources are there to support them.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				Stakeholders We believe that disaster resilience needs to be broadly based, and is not the sole responsibility of any one agency. While the Civil Defence network and councils have a vital role, we would like to see nationally coordinated preparedness and response mechanisms which include more engagement with Ministry for Culture & Heritage and agencies such as Heritage NZ.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				Strengths of the Strategy The holistic and community-based approach to this Strategy are good, in particular recognition of the importance of social capital in times of disaster.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				Challenges In the next stage of developing this Strategy, we would like to see more detailed articulation of processes by which different agencies take responsibility in the event of a disaster, as noted in 4 and 6 above. We believe that the lack of such coordination mechanisms has lead to unnecessary and avoidable distress to individuals, destruction of heritage buildings, and damage to collections and taonga in the wake of some disasters. For example, there were individuals and institutions in other parts of the country ready and willing to assist in response and recovery of cultural heritage at the time of the Canterbury earthquakes, but no way to coordinate that assistance except one-to-one.	JH 8/12 Noted. National/regional plans	None
49	s9(2)(a) on behalf of Russell George, Chair: Coordinating Executive Group	Bay of Plenty Emergency Management	10/12/18	The Bay of Plenty CDEM Group supports in general the proposed strategy. We have particular interest in how the strategy will be operationalised to meet the challenges ahead in reducing our community's exposure and vulnerability to risks, not just hazards. The proposed strategy does not go into detail on how this will be achieved or supported, nor the implications of doing so (direct and indirect). This is our biggest concern, with the key elephant in the room being funding.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				Building sustainable resilience will cost New Zealand in the short to medium term and it is important that these costs are distributed evenly and not all passed onto local authorities and the ratepayers. It also requires leadership to not only have the essential courageous conversations, but to also make the necessary courageous decisions that cater for the needs of future generations (as reasonably foreseeable) beyond simplistic, short-term, economic impact calculations.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				There is an opportunity through this strategy to look at the current funding models for local government to help reduce the often inequitable burden placed upon smaller local authorities and to achieve more even distribution of prosperity and wellbeing for our communities. New Zealanders do not differentiate geographically how they lead the kinds of lives they value and have reason to value.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				Given the significant shift in the strategy's approach and its interdependencies with other legislation, we strongly encourage the development of a Regulatory Impact Statement so that we can all understand the probable impositions that this strategy brings and how we will collectively address them through a true shared approach.	JH 8/12 Noted. This could be an area for later work. Not strictly required.	None
				Do you agree with the purpose, vision and goal of the proposed strategy? We support the purpose, vision and goal of the strategy as proposed. They are largely consistent with the approach already underway in the Bay of Plenty through the implementation of the Bay of Plenty Regional Policy Statement and the Bay of Plenty CDEM Group Plan 2018-2022. We think it would be beneficial to expand upon the scope delineation of 'disaster resilience' (pg. 8) to create greater clarity up front in the document, rather than having to wait until Section 3.	JH 8/12 Noted.	For consideration for the Foreword or other early text
				Do you agree with the priorities of the proposed strategy? We support the priorities of the proposed strategy. They are complimentary to the legislated roles of local government required under both the Local Government Act 2002 and the Resource Management Act 1991.	JH 8/12 Noted	None

#	Name	Organisation	Date	Submission	Response	Action
				Do you agree with the objectives and success factors of the proposed strategy? We support the objectives and success factors of the proposed strategy. We understand that it is challenging at the commencement of a strategy design to state a definitive road map with progressive milestones. We encourage that the next steps in implementing the strategy includes the development of such a road map that shows how it will be progressively implemented, both holistically and programmatically within the three proposed priority action areas.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				Do you agree that a broader range of stakeholders needs to be involved in governance of the strategy? The enablement of resilience has interdependencies across multiple policy areas and responsibilities that requires a broad governance approach. We see the strategy as a specific disaster resilience lens that is complimentary to the more holistic wellbeing resilience focus that is being returned to the purpose of local government. We support in part a broader range of stakeholders being involved in governing the proposed strategy to ensure and enhance the collective impact approach required to resolve the complex societal challenges that we face in achieving equitable resilience and wellbeing for our communities. The management of policy interdependencies, especially their side-effects, should be the core aim of a broader governance model.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				Are there particular strengths of the proposed strategy that you would like to comment on? We support the specific consideration of Māori concepts of resilience, and resilience of Māori, and how that links to national resilience. This is in alignment with submissions from Bay of Plenty tangata whenua received in 2017 during consultation on the Bay of Plenty CDEM Group Plan 2018-2028.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				We support the use of clear and simple language in the document, ensuring that it is easier to read and understand. We understand why there is a need for the extensive background at the front of the strategy to expand upon the strategic setting that this particular strategy is positioned within given it is the first specific resilience strategy released by central government. Expansion on the scope delineation earlier in the strategy is essential to ensure that the reader is well positioned at the start of the strategy.	JH 8/12 Noted. This is intended in the scope para.	None
				We encourage the use of Appendix 1 as a concise and simple way of presenting the 'strategy on a page'.	JH 8/12 Noted. This is intended.	None
				We support the use of Appendix 2 as a good way to identify opportunities to implement the strategy at all levels but it might be worth highlighting that this is the start of the approach and there are likely to be many more that haven't yet been identified.	JH 8/12 Noted. Might be good to add this note somewhere on the Appendix 2 contents page	Add to appendix 2
				Are there any gaps or challenges with the current national civil defence emergency management strategy that are not addressed by the proposed strategy? The key gap of the previous strategy is the limited guidance provided to local government on how to translate legislative goals into action on the ground- This is projected to be addressed by the proposed strategy through the three priorities, especially 'managing risk'. Whilst they have not been produced yet, it is encouraging to see specification of proposed work on increasing risk literacy, specific risk reduction policies, and enhanced clarity on who is responsible for what. Similar to the previous strategy, the key challenge will be in operationalising the legislative goals through an equitable funding model that is not solely reliant on a local property-based rating system that does not take into consideration the hazardscape, geographic extent or socio-economic capability of a local authoritys rating base.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				We encourage you to continue the consultative approach to the development and implementation of this key-stone strategy that will assist in enhancing the resilience of New Zealanders, both as individuals and as a whole, to disasters.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
50	Lucy Hicks, Policy and Planning Manager	Environment Sothland	7/12/18	Environment Southland commends Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management for a well thought out strategy that promotes a holistic approach to strengthening resilience across New Zealand. Environment Southland supports the strategy's vision – "to build a safe and prosperous nation" and how it considers that national success in respect to this vision covers aspects beyond economic measures and includes providing the following: "healthy and happy life, a good education for our children, a healthy environment that protects our natural resources and taonga, family/ whanau and communities we can rely on, a safe place to live and work, opportunities to start a business or get ahead, and the freedom to be who we want to be".	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				Environment Southlands vision – to create a "thriving Southland" is considered to be consistent with the strategy's vision on a regional scale. Also, the strategy's goal of achieving "a resilient future" is reflected in Environment Southland's Long-Term Plan targets to achieve empowered and resilient communities by 2028.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				There are a few specific points we think need further explanation or clarification: • What is meant by "sustainable management of hazards" (page 7)? We are not sure if this refers to the management of natural and built resources; • A number of key terms have been defined but disruption and emergency are omitted, these might be useful to include as well; • What are considered "basic services" (page 13)?	JH 8/12 Agreed. Will add. Basic services is SFDRR terminology - presume this is essential civic services.	Definitions

#	Submitter	Organisation	Date	Comment	Response	Action
				The strategy covers various types of resilience on Page 16, of which resilience of the natural environment and governance of risk and resilience are the most relevant to Environment Southland's statutory obligation. Environment Southland is legally responsible for having communities well informed of hazards and preparing for emergencies through services such as operating flood warning systems, managing flood protection schemes and providing hazard mitigation advice to the community in the Southland region.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				There are a couple of hazards which haven't been included in the Strategy or have not been given a huge amount of 'weight'. Two of note are drought, which we are acutely of in Southland and more broad is how climate change will affect our exposure to hazards. We are party to the difficult conversations that are underway across the country about managed retreat, rebuilding of infrastructure which is damaged or destroyed in 'risky' areas, increase risk of wildfires, contaminated water supplies and mental health implications. These sorts of hazards are outside of those which might be "obvious and manifest" (page 43).	JH 8/12 Noted	Add drought and wildfire where possible - very relevant to strengthening the rural component
				While the strategy established a broad national resilience measuring and monitoring regime, Environment Southland believes that clearer direction on monitoring and measuring resilience at regional scale is necessary. Real world case studies in New Zealand supporting the log frame for resilience and monitoring and evaluation on Page 32 could help in adding more direction to Section 8.3 of the strategy.	JH 8/12 Noted. M&E.	None
				Lastly Environment Southland supports the idea of involving a broader range of stakeholders in the governance of the strategy. Some additional parties to think about would be a defined role for banks and insurance companies in managing future risks.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
51	Bruce Girdwood, Acting Divional Director	GNS Science	7/12/18	Question1: GNS Science does agree with and support the purpose, vision and goal of the proposed strategy . We believe it will assist in meeting the legislative requirements under the CDEM Act, and clearly provides the strategic direction to achieve these requirements. The scope and audience are clearly defined. The vision links strongly to the Living Standards Framework and Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, which allows a consistent approach to resilience.		
				Question 2: In general we agree with the priorities. We would like to emphasise the importance of scientific research in understanding the long-term risk posed by geological hazards. We see real value in accessing the geological record to inform the assessment of risk, and therefore priorities, and that this should be explicitly recognised in the strategy.		
				Question 3: In general we do agree with the objectives and success factors. As an enhancement of the strategy we would support the uptake of probabilistic risk assessment methodologies over time.		
				Question 4: We agree that governance of the strategy requires engagement with a broad range of stakeholders to ensure that resilience becomes part of every New Zealander's business. We would be happy to be involved in discussions with MCDEM about how the governance of resilience develops.		
				Question 5: We support the use of the Theory of Change (Figure 3), and the Figure 4 logic map. These provide clear linkages and processes required, and a good basis for evaluating the strategy in the future.		
				Question 6: We would encourage MCDEM to further consider how and when to engage with communities about risk as an integral part of the strategy. GNS Science has experience and expertise in this area and would welcome the opportunity to share this with MCDEM.		
52	s9(2)(a) on behalf of Bill Bayfield, Chair & John Sunkell, Deputy Chair	Canterbury CDEM	7/12/2018	The leading points to our submission are: • To support the expansion of the vision and goal from a focus on New Zealanders wellbeing and safety, to include the natural and financial/physical capitals. • To separate effective response and recovery into two equally important areas of focus. • To encourage further work to develop the Resilience and Te Aō Māori section of the strategy so that it acknowledges more clearly that Māori moral and relational attributes should be respected and not exploited, and that partnership should begin with co-creation of future strategies. • To more clearly reflect how the strategy will work to improve resilience in a multi-cultural society.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				Overall, the vision and goal are good, and we strongly support them. There are aspects that we feel could do with additional clarity. How do we define safe? How do we encourage prosperity, at the same time assisting vulnerable people in society and ensuring they don't fall further behind? Are we building resilience for a single nation with one cultural identity, or many cultural identities?	JH 8/12 Noted. Interesting points that we can consider during the update. I think to answer all these will add a fair degree of explanatory material.	None
				Individual wellbeing and prosperity are very important, but it takes a narrowly-focused approach to resilience – we need more than resilient individuals and households. More thinking is needed to expand and understand resilience and wellbeing as it applies to New Zealand as a single complex system. This should be followed by a more robust framework for managing risk and making risk and resilience-based decisions.	JH 8/12 Noted. No specific suggestion to act on.	None

					Comment	Response	Action
					Many facets of New Zealand life - particularly individuals, families, hapū, and community organisations – have been identified as users of the strategy, but many are not likely to have the appropriate resources to either contribute or improve their own resilience. At the same time, the focus on different aspects of New Zealand society seems to ignore taking a more holistic view of New Zealand in the strategy.	JH 8/12 Noted. This is covered to some degree.	None
					We noted a strong urban flavour and suggest that more thought needs to be given to rural New Zealand in this strategy. Following our rural community's experiences in Canterbury with the Hurunui-Kaikōura earthquake and mycoplasma bovis, we believe the strategy would be strengthened with greater disaster resilience focus for rural New Zealand.	JH 8/12 Noted. We intend to try and address this.	None
					The vision, rightly, has a strong focus on people, but this appears to have come at the cost of other fundamental disaster resilience facets such as the natural and financial/physical capitals. We would encourage expansion of the vision and goal to include resilience of the 'four capitals' and updating the CDEM Act to remove the four environments from recovery and instil the four capitals across the four Rs	JH 8/12 Interesting idea.	Review vision with this lens'
					We lack a pro-active national agency that is effectively responsible for risk management and dealing with the issues of our times – such as sea level rise and funding approaches and community buy-in for managed retreat, and complex risks that span the New Zealand system. This would be the agency responsible for the proposed national risk register and coordinating system-wide risk treatments across agencies and communities, and it must go beyond just identification, understanding and comparison of national risks, or managing policy. There needs to be active leadership and management to reduce national disaster risk.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
					We broadly support the three priorities outlined in the strategy, but we were interested in what additional priorities may have been identified in the development process and didn't make it to the proposed strategy. We found it challenging to assess the priorities and objectives without having a clearer indication of the next level of detail – for example, a draft roadmap and work programme. The focus on people through the priorities and objectives is recognised and appreciated, however we felt the other two capitals (natural and financial/physical) need more focus in the priorities and objectives	JH 8/12 Noted. Some people thought the opposite??	None
					Overall, we found the managing risk priority to be well set out and strongly support it and the associated objectives.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
					We would prefer to see regional and local identified in place of sub-national.	JH 8/12 Agree this is more usual terminology	Amend objective 1
					While robust legislation and responsibilities are in place for most risk, there is an increasingly apparent gap in national-level risk management leadership and responsibility. We would link this back to our previous comment identifying the need for a national risk management agency to act as overall coordinator for nationally significant risks.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
					We appreciate that it will take some time to have a conversation about high hazard areas, particularly those subject to sea level rise, but we believe that some parts of the country need to see actions, not just discussion, by 2030.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
					Effective Response and Recovery Recovery needs stronger priority than currently suggested, so we would encourage the separation of the three priorities into four, having response and recovery as two differing and equally important areas of focus. As we have learnt through Canterbury's response and recovery to significant events, the organisations, agencies, and approaches needed for response and recovery, and their focus, differ significantly between response and recovery. Significant detail around how we implement more effective recovery will need to be identified in the roadmap and work programme. It is much more than just 'Strategic Planning for Recovery'.	JH 8/12 Disagree with separating recovery, but agree we need to strengthen the narrative on recovery.	None
					We like the inclusion of social science but feel that the measure of "renewed levels of trust and confidence" is subjective and may be hard to quantify	JH 8/12 Agree in principle, but it does convey the purpose/aim.	Review objective 7 language
					This objective is significant yet seems to 'cherry-pick' some specific emergency management system reform actions, when true success is beyond the scope of the current objective. We are concerned of the lumping together of response and recovery and feel that the challenges of building capacity for response and recovery have different requirements and challenges. We note the timing to deliver Controller training is targeted at 2030, while many of the other related objectives are 2025. Recognition of the importance of volunteers is appreciated.	JH 8/12 Disagree.	None
					Strengthening Resilience The societal, or New Zealand-wide, approach to many aspects of the strategy, including risks, challenges, trends and resilience is appreciated, but we would highlight that it needs to be balanced with regional, and most importantly local approaches to strengthening community resilience.	JH 8/12 Agree in principle, but to repeat this frquently would be a bit pedantic.	Review whether there is a solid statement about local implementation / determination

Comment	JH Response	Action
We would like to highlight the challenge of identifying vulnerable individuals and communities, and its importance to achieving success with this objective. We are concerned that emergency supplies are still being focused on as a measure of resilience.	JH 8/12 Agree. Will review.	Review objective 14 language in this light
Strengths The approach taken to risk in the strategy is much improved from the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Strategy 2008-2019. This is evident with the discussion of the strategic context and highlighting long term trends that impact our disaster risk and resilience. The strategy goes further than the previous one, with a clear emphasis on influencing decisions to produce better disaster risk and resilience outcomes. We appreciate the transition away from a focus on Civil Defence and Emergency Management thinking towards adoption of a resilience-based approach. This will ensure that disaster resilience is the responsibility of NZ Inc. rather than Civil Defence. This will empower all levels of society to be involved and responsible for disaster resilience. The logical structure, layout, and presentation of the strategy is to be commended. Figure 1 (p15) provides a clear and visual definition of the absorption and adaptability dimensions of disaster resilience.	JH 8/12 Noted. Appreciate this support. This is a well articulated (and potentially useful!) description of the intent of the changes from the current strategy.	None - but of potential use in briefing material
We suspect there will be challenges associated with collecting global target reporting requirements for the Sendai Framework. Further, the proposed strategy seems to advance beyond the main reporting focus of the Sendai framework, which may require the development of benchmarks suited to monitor and evaluate our pathway to disaster resilience. Qualitative targets may prove challenging to benchmark against the proposed strategy.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
We note the currency of the strategy is ten years, unless replaced earlier. We would like to see it clarified that the strategy will be modified if monitoring and evaluation indicate that targets are not being met. We would like to understand better what the triggers are that may result in a strategy update before required in 2029.	JH 8/12 Noted. For consideration in any implementation graphic/narrative	Implementation graphic
The timing of the proposed emergency management system reforms does not fit well with a significant strategy shift, and the resourcing required to accommodate both emergency management system reforms and implementing a 10-year resilience strategy. This is compounded by inertia within the CDEM sector waiting for more direction and leadership for the reforms. Closely related to this is securing additional funding to implement new work as a result of the proposed strategy in addition to existing work programmes, and expected costs of emergency management system reforms implementation.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
The proposed strategy appears to lack suitable strength and focus on recovery, when compared to response. Greater thought needs to be given to the expansion of the significance of recovery in the strategy, how recovery creates "stronger post-event communit[ies]", and how recovery strategies create increased resilience and disaster risk reduction.	JH 8/12 Noted. Will be addressing.	None
Governance and Engagement We commend MCDEM on the use of a much more collaborative and engaging approach to the development of the draft strategy. The strategy seems relatively quiet on how this strategy fits within the broader range of government policy and strategy, and how other government agencies will incorporate resilience and disaster risk into their activities, and how those agencies will collectively contribute towards increasing New Zealand's resilience and reducing our disaster risk. We suspect there may be gaps in existing governance arrangements suggested in section 8.2. The focus of this strategy is far wider than CDEM, so existing National Security System and CDEM Groups arrangements may prove to be inadequate for such a wide-ranging strategy. Specifically, we are concerned about governance and engagement with community, local government and Māori/iwi.	JH 8/12 Noted. Will be addressing.	None
Māori, Iwi and the Treaty Our workshop identified various challenges with integration of Te Ao Māori into the strategy. It wasn't apparent that it was co-created with Maori, and we didn't see clear evidence of the Treaty partnership in the strategy. We would encourage further work to develop the Resilience and Te Aō Māori section of the strategy so that it acknowledges more clearly that Māori moral and relational attributes should not be exploited during an emergency response, and that partnership should begin with co-creation of future strategies. We have concerns about the relationship and involvement of Māori and Iwi in development and success of this strategy. It is not clear what role the Treaty partnership plays as part of the proposed strategy. The strategy does not appear to have been co-created with Māori. Have Māori agreed to the moral obligation presumed and accepted the guardian role, or is this lip service? Is it appropriate to be highlighting the asset base of Māori, whilst not raising other cultural/social groups in New Zealand that may have significant assets to bring to bear on disaster resilience?	JH 8/12 Noted. Will be addressing.	For consideration in questions of improving the te ao maori component; for forwarding to Cassie for opinion
We recommend clarity around the use of 'we' in the strategy. Is it referring to the writer and reader? Is it referring to emergency managers? Is it referring to the New Zealand collective?	JH 8/12 Agree.	Review 'mes' and/or add explanation

				Comment	Response	Action
				The Overview of this Strategy (p. 34) should not be buried in an appendix. It provides the best summary of the strategy and should be moved as far forward as practical.	JH 8/12 Noted. Will be addressing.	None
				We would like to see more key terms (pp. 4-5) added - including community, prosperity and wellbeing. Community is widely used through the strategy, but no definition, in the context of this strategy, is provided.	JH 8/12 Noted. Will be addressing.	None
				The goal is articulated in different ways comparing Section 4 - Our Goal (p. 14) to the Overview of the Strategy (p. 35). This should be consistent.	JH 8/12 Noted. Will be addressing.	Articulation of Goal
				In closing, we again commend the significant and positive work that has gone into developing the proposed strategy. From the initial well-attended workshop in 2016 held at Christchurch City Council, the process has produced a solid strategy that turns resilience into a way of thinking for New Zealand through to 2029. We await more detail with the roadmap and work programme, to see how the strategy is implemented by action.	JH 8/12 Noted.	None
				Reinforcing our key points, we support the strong focus taken on human and social capitals but would like to see the strategy and related documents (legislation, regulations, guidelines etc.) updated to embed the Living Standards Framework Four Capitals. We would like to see Maori involvement in the strategy treated more as a partnership and for them to be involved in co-creation. Finally, we believe that recovery needs to be separated from response into its own priority – the approaches and challenges facing recovery differ significantly from response. Congratulations to all those involved on producing the strategy.	JH 8/12 Noted.	None
53	Rod Cameron	Engage Now	7/12/18	NOTE: PDF INFO IS NOT INCLUDED BELOW		
				The Draft Strategy The structure and scope of your draft strategy is applauded. It sets out very clearly the needs for preparedness for disaster, the impacts, the needs in response and describes longer term recovery, all leading to a framing for community resilience. Included are thorough cross references to other (international) lessons framing resilience.	JH 8/12 Noted.	None
				There is a very significant element of the 'picture' where we feel that substance could be added. It is in the post-disaster rebuild of vertical and horizontal infrastructure – the built environment – and reinstatement of natural environment. Rebuild (reconstruction in your terms) is a major undertaking and a vital and significant contributor to early and best recovery.	JH 8/12 Noted. Will be addressing the recovery language.	For adding to considerations around / narrative on recovery
				The draft strategy, as with the international descriptions of disaster recovery and resilience, assumes that disaster damage is repaired promptly, whereas our experience is that it takes many years. Electricity can be restored, water become available, roads passable and people accommodated at home or for work, quite quickly after disaster. These activities can give people and communities a lift.	JH 8/12 Noted.	None
				However, the proper, permanent and lasting rebuild of services and all the other infrastructure can take a very long time and must be carefully prioritised within the wide range of rebuild demands for funds and resources.	JH 8/12 Noted.	None
				It is recommended that your strategy include more on rebuild so that resilience is based on complete foundations. • The broad scope of your four capitals – Natural, Social, Human and Financial/Physical all depend on rebuild • Risk outcomes must include rebuild, before or after disaster • All the components of resilience which you identify need to reflect the importance of rebuild.	JH 8/12 Noted.	None
				Rebuild As described in the accompanying document, there are significant problems with delivery of rebuild following a disaster – in New Zealand and in other countries of the world. These are outlined in the attachment, but not described in detail. Arising from these problems, governance, management and delivery of rebuild in the shortest possible time frames need a special approach.	JH 8/12 Noted. Good points, including in the document, but it's quite built environment focussed (though appreciate the knock ons) Still, it all seems too detailed to add anything very much to the strategy.	Read the ENGAGE doc when poss.
54	Sarah Beaven	Resilience to Nature's Challenges Rural Co-creation Laboratory	7/12/18	The Rural Co-creation Laboratory program welcomes the draft Resilience Strategy, which constitutes a really exciting step forward in the development of 'a resilient New Zealand'. The strategy is well-written, clear and accessible, and commendably aligned with cutting edge resilience practice and science in the following key areas.	JH 8/12 Noted.	None

					Comment	Response	Action
					It is exciting to see that the draft Resilience Strategy is explicitly framed with reference to the United Nations' Agenda 2030 and its three key elements: the (UNISDR) Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, the (UNDP) Sustainable Development Goals laid out in 2015 in Transforming Our World: The 2030 agenda for Sustainable Development (UN General Assembly Resolution 70/1) and the commitments made under the (UNFCCC) Paris Climate Agreement in December of the same year. By explicitly referring to the need to be resilient to the risks posed by climate change, poverty and biodiversity loss as well as those posed by natural hazards, the Resilience Strategy is able to lay the groundwork for a highly integrated approach to building a resilient New Zealand. (We noted for example that the Strategy contains 7 references to climate change, which is in line with the 8 references to climate change in the Sendai Framework.)	JH 8/12 Noted. Good! Could actually potentially strengthen references to these.	For consideration
					Most importantly, the Resilience Strategy is well aligned with the broad 'whole of society' thrust that underpins the Sendai Framework, and which is described in the preamble as follows: There has to be a broader and a more people-centred preventive approach to disaster risk. Disaster risk reduction practices need to be multi-hazard and multisectoral, inclusive and accessible in order to be efficient and effective. (Sendai: Preamble: paragraph 7 [p10]) This 'whole of society' focus is evident throughout the Resilience Strategy, and is particularly prominent in the scope and outcomes sections, which reiterate and refer back to the following passage in the foreword: The Strategy promotes a holistic approach to strengthening resilience that connects with a range of agencies and sectors to deliver improved outcomes for New Zealanders. Disaster risk and disaster impacts reach all parts of society; so, to the greatest degree possible, disaster resilience should be integrated in to all parts of society. Disaster resilience therefore requires a shared approach between governments (central and local), relevant stakeholders, and the wider public – a collective approach to a collective problem. (p.5, Foreword, Sendai Framework)	JH 8/12 Noted.	None
					We highly commend the emphasis throughout the strategy on the need for building social resilience. As drafted the strategy uses a progressive interpretation of resilience which goes some way towards addressing the main critiques of this concept. We note that this allows the strategy to be guided in part by the need to answer the key questions: resilience of what, to what, why and how? Recognising that resilience is socially contingent also requires addressing the question of 'resilience for whom?' and to what end, connecting the socially, culturally and economically determined features of society that enable or constrain resilience. While the emphasis in the strategy is on the external hazards that impact society, Page 3 of 9 the strategy is in line with current scientific and international policy developments in that it highlights the need for understanding the internal social dynamics of communities, regions, activities and institutions which may affect the degree to which disturbances result in adverse societal effects.		
					The risk-based approach that informs the Resilience Strategy is also commendably aligned with the Sendai Framework, in which 'a strong emphasis on disaster risk management as opposed to disaster management' is identified as one of 'the most significant shifts' marked by this agreement (p. 5, Foreword, Sendai Framework). We would also like to take the opportunity to welcome the alignment between the Resilience Strategy and the national risk register. The practical development and use of such a register is commendable, particularly the use of national threat scenarios aid practical application, assessment and evaluation. However, we note that probabilistic risk assessment approaches, which attempt to consider the full range of potential impacts, do need to compliment scenario (deterministic) approaches. Additionally continued horizon scanning of future emerging and unknown risks should remain a prority. Inclusive and robust utilisation of appropriate risk expertise is essential, particularly through national capability such as collaborative nationalgood entities such as National Sciences Challenges.	JH 8/12 Noted.	None

					Comment	Response	Action
					As it stands, the draft Resilience Strategy is strongly focused on 'what' resilience is, and on how that currently applies and should apply in future in the New Zealand context. As stated above, this focus aligns extremely well with both Sendai and current research developments.	JH 8/12 Noted.	None
					The current draft of the Resilience Strategy is much less well aligned, however, when it comes to 'how' to build resilience in New Zealand going forward. Where this is referenced, it indicates a 'summative' understanding of societal and national resilience – in other words, the Resilience Strategy consistently refers (in the preface, goals, outcomes) to resilience as something that results from adding together efforts that occur at different levels (individual, community, organisational, local, regional, national), in discrete sectors of society, and discrete government agencies.	JH 8/12 Noted. (will review)	Review these references
					The 'Purpose' section, for example, explains that the strategy is focused on the actions we can all take – at all levels, from individuals and families/whānau, businesses and organisations, communities and hapū, cities, districts and regions, and Government and national organisations – to contribute to a more resilient New Zealand. (Section 1.3, p.8) This list is reiterated in more detail under a series of headings in the following Section 1.4 ('Intended Audience and use of the Strategy'), which clarifies that the Resilience Strategy is intended to provide a common agenda for resilience that individual organisations, agencies, and groups can align with for collective impact (Section 1.4, p.8).	JH 8/12 Noted.	None
					This kind of 'summative' approach, in which national resilience equates to the collective impact resulting from the sum of myriad actions across levels and sectors is reiterated most explicitly in the Vision of a Resilient New Zealand: A future resilient New Zealand is a nation where resilience thinking is integrated into all aspects of life as a matter of course. There is a deep, shared understanding of a wide range of risks and the nature of the action that each of them requires. From an individual level, to families and whānau, communities and settlements, towns and cities, and at a national level, everyone understands their own share of responsibility for reducing risk and strengthening resilience. A strong understanding of risk and resilience is also an integral part of business culture. The sum of these parts builds a risk-savvy, resilient nation. (Section 4, p. 20, emphasis added).	JH 8/12 Noted.	None
					To be clear, we recognise that this 'summative' understanding of resilience is consistent with current national and international practice (and as demonstrated by the acknowledged alignment between the Model of a Resilient Nation presented in Section 4.2.4 and the list of resilient 'environments' proposed in 2011 by the International Red Cross [cited in Resilience Strategy, 4.2.4, p.15-16]).	JH 8/12 Noted.	None
					As the primary mechanism to achieve integrated approaches to resilience, however, this focus on encouraging alignment across diverse social sectors and levels diverges significantly from both Sendai and current research findings, where the emphasis has shifted to the use of mechanisms and structures to actively facilitate more coordinated approaches to building resilience.	JH 8/12 Noted. I'm not quite seeing the distinction though? Or at least a *significant* difference. It is not intended that these 'sum of actions' take place in isolation, for example.	None
					The Sendai Framework Guiding Principle (19: e), for example, states that Disaster risk reduction and management depends on coordination mechanisms within and across sectors and with relevant stakeholders at all levels, and it requires the full engagement of all State institutions of an executive and legislative nature at national and local levels and a clear articulation of responsibilities across public and private stakeholders, including business and academia, to ensure mutual outreach, partnership, complementarity in roles and accountability and follow-up The type of coordination mechanisms required are spelled out in Sendai Priority for Action 2 (Strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk), which specifies that in order to integrate cross-sector disaster risk reduction efforts it is important: To establish and strengthen government coordination forums composed of relevant stakeholders at the national and local levels, such as national and local platforms for disaster risk reduction, and a designated national focal point for implementing the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030. (Sendai 27:g, p. 17)	JH 8/12 Consider whether some of this wording could be added, though the distinction seems a little pedantic.	For consideration: coordination, integration

					We appreciate that it can be difficult to justify the establishment of a national or local platform to coordinate activity across 'all State institutions of an executive and legislative nature' from within a particular government agency, such as MCDEM. In New Zealand, as elsewhere, government agencies are required to act according to the mandates and parameters established by legislation. However it is useful to recognise that cross-agency coordinating platforms of the kind proposed in the Sendai Framework are not proposed as alternatives to current government decision-making arrangements. Instead they are put forward as supplementary structures spanning government and other sectors. The aim is to facilitate the coordination of the decision-making that will occur in any case (as per relevant mandates and operating conditions) to more effectively align efforts to engage with a manyfaceted social issue like disaster resilience.	JH 8/12 Useful narrative on governance	For consideration: governance
					We also note that an adjustment to the Resilience Strategy providing for the establishment of cross-sector, whole of government platforms would align it much more closely with Sendai, and recent research findings. An adjustment of this kind would be entirely in keeping with the spirit of the CDEM Act (2002), which as outlined in Section 1.1 encourages participation across society in disaster risk management, provides for coordination of the 4 Rs at local, regional and national levels, and encourages coordination across a wide range of agencies. Such an adjustment would still require a resilience 'champion', such as CDEM, but would require a significant broadening of the reach of the current CDEM structure, which is primarily focused on and funded for response, and which does not currently provide for the 'full engagement of all State institutions of an executive and legislative nature at national and local levels' specified in the above Sendai Guiding Principle.	JH 8/12 Useful narrative on governance	For consideration: governance
					Summary: The current draft of the resilience strategy recognises the need for crosssector all of government coordination and oversight of resilience (see p. 7, p. 16, p. 17, p. 27, p. 40, p. 41), but focuses only on desirable outcomes. In other words, the Resilience Strategy describes cross-sector and all of government coordination as part of 'what' resilience consists of, but does not give equal weight to the 'how' – i.e. the mechanisms through which this coordination and oversight might be achieved.	JH 8/12 Fair enough.	For consideration
					RECOMMENDATION: We recommend that this gap is addressed in the next draft of the Resilience Strategy though the inclusion of more concrete references (throughout) to the need to establish integrated cross-sector, all-of government (Disaster) Risk Management platforms in New Zealand, at national, regional and local levels. This would be most effective if it applied also to • Resilience Strategy scope, allowing for CDEM to lead such platforms, and so bring together the other agencies referenced there as having responsibility for social and other types of resilience • Resilience Strategy governance arrangements, to pave the way for more collaborative governance in line with the widened scope (in which each agency would retain decision-making authority as per their own mandates).	JH 8/12 We previously deliberately removed all references to this (they were there).	For consideration
					We note that there are only passing references to the resilience of rural communities and regions. Rural environments differ significantly from their urban counterparts in ways that directly impact disaster management. Populations are usually dispersed across more or less accessible landscapes, which can leave them more exposed to the impacts of compounding natural hazards (such as earthquakes and landslides, or volcanic ash-fall and subsequent lahars, etc.), and / or post-disaster isolation for prolonged periods of time as a result of infrastructure damage.	JH 8/12 Agree	For consideration: rural
					At the same time, they are often presumed to be more resilient – as individuals, families and communities – than 'city people', despite current statistics that indicate higher levels of mental illness and suicide in rural areas. Acknowledgement of these differences in the strategy would help to ensure that current CDEM messaging is rural-appropriate. Rural populations, for example, are likely to require food and water for much longer than the 3 days recommended in current messaging.	JH 8/12 Agree	For consideration: rural

					Comment	JH Response	Action
					We note that MPI has instituted a 'Rural proofing' process, which provides guidance to help policy makers address the challenges that are unique to rural communities by 'rural proofing' their policy during development and implentation (https://www.mpi.govt.nz/about-us/our-work/rural-proofing/).	JH 8/12 Agree	None
					RECOMMENDATION We recommend that the Strategy acknowledge the need for 'rural proofing' as per the MPI guidelines, and explicitly demonstrates that this has occurred with respect to the strategy. This should include, for example, addressing the gap between the public expectation of response within 3 days, in line with current MCDEM messaging, and the reality of prolonged isolation experienced by rural populations after major disasters, e.g. after the Kaikōura/Hurunui earthquake.	JH 8/12 Agree	For consideration: rural
					We also recommend that MCDEM institutes a similar 'Disaster resilience proofing' set of guidelines, to assist government policy makers during policy development and implementation.	JH 8/12 Interesting suggestion - for future consideration	None
					Recent research findings from the Rural Co-creation Laboratory focused on response and recovery to the Kaikōura/Hurunui Earthquake have confirmed that much greater coordination of response and recovery efforts is required between government agencies and across government, private and community sectors, and runanga (discussed above).	JH 8/12 Noted	None
					This acute need for disaster management coordination is driven by another difference between rural and urban disaster management: the much greater number of agencies and strong sector based private industry groups with significant rural disaster response and recovery capability and responsibility.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
					For example, CDEM, MCDEM, NZTA, MPI, MfE, and DoC all have significant disaster management roles, and carry these out largely in parallel, and alongside the discrete activities of strong sector-based private industry groups such as Dairy NZ, Beef and Lamb, Hort NZ, WGANZ, as well as tourism operators and rural insurers FMG. Researchers active in North Canterbury have noted that the lack of coordination in this complex mix of response and recovery efforts had adverse impacts on levels of trust and satisfaction in response and recovery operations among local communities, and risked compounding post-disaster stress.	JH 8/12 Agree	For consideration: rural
					Our Kaikoura research has highlghted the important role played by existing rural collaborative networks, such as the Water Zone Committee, in providing trusted networks that are able to facilitate recovery efforts. Such existing structures could usefully be drawn into resilience coordination processes through appropriate coordination platforms.	JH 8/12 Agree	For consideration: rural
					Currently there are no coordination platforms to bring even the main government players together to coordinate response and recovery efforts in disaster impacted rural areas. To be effective, such a platform would also need to incorporate private industry groups and community representatives (perhaps through existing community structures). Again, it is useful to reiterate that platforms of this kind would not diminish the decision-making authority or capacities of any of the participating entities – but would facilitate shared decision-making concerning the collaborations priorities and shared mission, reduce risk and greatly increase the coordination, transparency and accessibility of rural disaster management approaches and operations.	JH 8/12 I thought these did exist? Check with Leonie and Alex	For checking
					RECOMMENDATION We recommend that the Resilience Strategy is amended to include provision for disaster resilience coordination platforms that allow for the inclusion, where relevant, of all stakeholders active in rural disaster management.	JH 8/12 I don't think we're going to be able to go this far in this document...	None
					We note that the current Resilience Strategy references the science input from the RNCTrajectories toolbox project towards monitoring the impact of the strategy. However as it is currently, it does not include any direct references to the contribution of science in building resilience, or liaison mechanisms between scientific communities and policy makers focusing on resilience. This is in marked contrast to the Sendai Framework, which contains seven references to the role of science. Two of these focus in particular on the importance of developing a 'science/policy interface for decision-making.'	JH 8/12 Noted	None

				Sendai Priority 1: understanding disaster risk, for example, stipulated that to achieve policy making that is based on a rigorous, scientific evidence base it is necessary To promote and improve dialogue and cooperation among scientific and technological communities, other relevant stakeholders and policymakers in order to facilitate a science/policy interface for effective decision-making in disaster risk management; (24 h p.15)	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				Similarly, Sendai Section V concerning the Role of Stakeholders requires that States determine 'specific roles and responsibilities for stakeholders.' The subsection relating to science communities requires that the State determines roles and responsibilities in order to encourage: Academia, scientific and research entities and networks to focus on the disaster risk factors and scenarios, including emerging disaster risks, in the medium and long term; increase research for regional, national and local application; support action by local communities and authorities; and support the interface between policy and science for decision-making; (36 b [p.23])	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				We want to take this opportunity to acknowledge the enormous support that MCDEM and CDEM have provided to the New Zealand research community in this context, including in particular the AF8 project, and also MBIE funding for the Resilience to Nature's Challenges progamme, which has allowed us to develop the Rural Co-Creation Laboratory as a science/policy interface.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				However these Sendai provisions require that, in addition to funding and otherwise supporting and engaging in relevant research programmes, government agencies ensure that high level strategies explicitly specify liaison and other mechanisms that will support the development of a science/policy interface for decision-making going forward. In requiring both that these mechanisms are transparent and that they are structured (the term 'science/policy interface' is frequently used in academic and policy contexts to refer to a structure that brings scientists and policy makers together) Sendai is consistent with more than two decades of research findings confirming that both transparency and explicit structures are required to ensure that decisions are both informed by sound science, and policy-relevant.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				RECOMMENDATION: We recommend that: a) the current draft of the Resilience Strategy be amended to include explicit provisions for the role of the science community, and in particular including arrangements to support and structure the science/policy interface for resilience decision-making. b) such a structure is linked into (or consists of a subset of) the wider coordination platforms discussed above, given that resilience decision-making occurs across government agencies, and in view of current disaster management research funding provided by agencies such as MBIE, EQC, MPI and MoH. c) more fundamental and applied risk and resilience science (both fundamental and applied) be conducted to help mediate the making of choices and to highlight the options for policies that facilitate the inclusive social development that is essential to building resilience.	JH 8/12 Agree to a). B and c are beyond the remit of the strategy	Incorporate some references to science-policy interface
				The rural sector is a huge contributer to this country's GDP, in both tourism and primary industries. Despite this, there is very little provision for and visibility of the need for research into rural resilience, and disaster risk reduction in rural areas and communities. The Rural Co-creation Laboratory is the exception that proves the rule in this context, but it is small. However researchers in this programme have been struggling to adequately connect up the many research fields relevant to rural resilience, which includes water security & management, biosecurity & climate change adaptation, broader environmental management issues as well as disaster risk reduction. In line with recommendation 2.4 above, there is a need to effectively provision for more rural resilience science, integrated through a wider science/policy interface structure that brings researchers together with a platform or platforms that include for example DoC, MPI, MoH,Mfe, local & regional councils, and runanga as well as CDEM & MCDEM.	JH 8/12 Noted	None

				RECOMMENDATION: We recommend that: a) the current draft of the Resilience Strategy be amended to make explict provisions for rural resilience science and mātauranga Maori to be included and specified as part of wider arrangements to support and structure the science/policy interface for resilience decision-making. b) such a structure would most effectively be linked to (or a subset of) the wider coordination platforms discussed above, given that resilience decision-making occurs across government agencies (as noted above), and in view of research funding for disaster risk management research provided by agencies such as MBIE, EQC, MPI and MoH.	JH 8/12 Disagree. As important as it is to single out rural communities, I think this rec would be showing extreme preference to one workstream/platform over a vast number of others.	None
55	Bill Bayfield, Chief Executive	Environment Canterbury	7/12/2018	Question 1: We think the vision and goal should be expanded to cover all of the Four Capitals, currently Natural and Physical Capital are not strongly addressed. The current ones only strongly reflect Human and Social Capital, with only a touch on Financial / Physical Capital	JH 8/12 Disagree. All four capitals are important, but this is ultimately about people (so, being brutal/literal, financial/physical capital is only important inasmuch as it pertains to the needs of people) Environment, however, could be different...	None
				The vision could be expanded to cover all capitals by removing the words 'nation', 'New Zealanders' and 'individuals, organisations, and communities'. Using words like 'Aotearoa/New Zealand' would be preferable as this encompasses all aspects of our country and is more holistic.	JH 8/12 Noted. For consideration	For checking/ consideration
				The importance of the natural and built environment to support intergenerational wellbeing should not be underestimated. The resilience of the natural and built environment also needs to be strengthened "for the safety and wellbeing of all". "Toitū te marae o Tāne, Toitū te marae o Tangaroa, Toitū te iwi. – When the domains of Tāne and Tangaroa are nurtured and sustained, so too will people prosper and flourish."	JH 8/12 Noted. For consideration	For checking/ consideration
				We learnt through the recovery from the Canterbury earthquake series that the recovery of the natural environment of greater Christchurch was a central part of the recovery of the area2, along with the built environment which was a major programme of works.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				More thought could be given regarding the effect on agriculture and the rural economy. Following our experience with the Hurunui – Kaikōura earthquake, we believe that the strategy could be strengthened with more consideration given to rural communities.	JH 8/12 Agreed. Intended.	None
				question 2: The three priorities set out in the strategy are good: • managing risks • effective response to and recovery from emergencies • strengthening societal resilience.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				We would like to see four priorities; response and recovery are two different aspects with different goals and capacity requirements and should be separate.	JH 8/12 Disagree. There is value in recovery having equal weight with response (and not complicating the whole document)	None
				question 3: The objectives clearly reflect the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 and the Ministerial Review (2017) on Better Responses to Natural Hazards and Other Emergencies.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				The integration of the Living Standards Framework should be improved, with more focus on the Natural and Financial / Physical Capitals into the objectives. For example, the Recovery Strategy for Greater Christchurch focuses on six components of recovery: leadership and integration; economic recovery; social recovery; cultural recovery; built environment; and natural environment.	JH 8/12 Noted. I think this is covered off in the later 'model of'	None
				On page 23 "reduce disaster costs in the future" seems to prioritise financial rather than human/social/natural impacts, especially when paired with "by far the cheapest". We suggest rewording this to emphasise that resilience planning supports all the capitals.	JH 8/12 Disagree. It's important to this one section (not saying to the whole document)	None
				question 4: At a Canterbury Group CDEM level, the mana whenua of Waitaha/Canterbury are represented by the Office of Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu's Director – Earthquake Response & Recovery as a Joint Committee Member. At a Council level we have two Ngāi Tahu councillors under the Environment Canterbury (Transitional Governance Arrangements) Act 2016.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				We have found this representation at a governance level upholds the Te Ao Māori worldview in a position of authority and as an essential part of decision-making.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				We suggest that a similar approach to governance would support the delivery of the strategy. We would be happy to share our experience with our governance model with the Ministry.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				question 5: The expanded focus of the Strategy is a great improvement from the previous strategy.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				The visual format and strategy map structure are great, page 34 is particularly excellent as a stand-alone piece and could be further up in the page ordering or perhaps as a fold out A3.	JH 8/12 Noted	None

				Submission	Response	Action
				The proposed strategy is broad in scope and while 'ring-fenced' there is a lack of clarity about what the edges of the strategy are and what will be done to address the issues regarding 'wider social and economic attributes of resilience'.	JH 8/12 Noted. This will always be the case (even with a diagram depicting it)	None
				Structures: We strongly agree with the recommendations in the Technical Advisory Group's report for establishing a National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), and therefore separating the operational and policy arms. We would like to see this new agency be resourced and funded to take a proactive, assertive and directive stance.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				Rangatiratanga
We contend that to honour the principles of Treaty of Waitangi, co-creation of the strategy should have been the first step in developing a partnership approach, rather than handing this off to iwi and agencies.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				We would like the Ministry to work further on the section 4.3 Resilience and Te Ao Māori. This section implies that Te Ao Māori and Māori ways of being are a strength to use/exploit/acknowledge during disaster response and that partnership is something to be aimed for in the future without being clear on how this will be done.	JH 8/12 Disagree with this (and it's certainly not the intent)	Send to Cassie for checking
				The asset bases of other cultural / social / economic groups are not mentioned as a strength in the 'Analysis of our current state'. This highlighting of Māori asset base seems inappropriate given:
• the vulnerability of many Māori, their lands, assets to disasters, especially climate change
• the alienation of Māori lands and resources throughout the history of Aotearoa / New Zealand and therefore the loss in wellbeing and way of being.	JH 8/12 Disagree. I think there's many reasons to include this, not least of all being the strong emphasis on engaging maori, and use of marae - it's important to mention that the counter to that is, not all will be able to, or want to	None
				Natural hazards: To date there has been an increasing focus from central government on understanding and managing the increase in natural hazard risk. To further support this maturity we suggest that the Ministry encourage the Ministry for the Environment to prioritise national direction on natural hazard risk management.	JH 8/12 Noted. An offline discussion	None
				Climate change adaptation. Environment Canterbury notes that natural hazards exacerbated by climate change are being experienced by many (not just coastal) communities; this needs to be acknowledged as a national problem. Climate change is affecting the whole country and the scale of response will require the resources of the whole country. Environment Canterbury urges the Government to acknowledge and respond to the full scale of the climate change adaptation challenge.	JH 8/12 Noted. I think this is covered. But intend to check sufficiency of references to CC	For checking: climate change
				Insurance
Point 5 (page 41) highlights high insurance penetration as a strength of our current state. There is nothing in the proposed Strategy about managing the risk of insurance withdrawal from New Zealand. If there was another significant disaster like the Canterbury earthquake series, there may be the withdrawal of insurance or insurance underwriting, such as in Japan and California for earthquake damage.	JH 8/12 Noted. Intended.	For checking: insurance
56	s9(2)(a) on behlf of Stephen Town, Chief Executive	Auckland City Council	7/12/2018	.
Question 1: 21. The purpose of the draft strategy, as stated in the document, is to outline the vision and long-term goals for civil defence emergency management (CDEM) in New Zealand. Although governed and required by the CDEM Act 2002, Auckland Council is pleased that the scope and intent of the strategy recognises the intent of the legislation which is, ultimately, to build the resilience of New Zealand.		
				Linking resilience to the protection and growth of living standards for all New Zealanders is similar to the approach taken by Auckland Council in the development of the Auckland Plan which seeks to deliver a world-class city while at the same time ensuring shared prosperity for all Aucklanders. The participatory, inclusive and whole-of-society approach promoted in the proposed strategy is to be applauded and, again, is similar to the approach imbued in both the Auckland Plan and in Auckland's CDEM Group Plan.		
				The need to confine the strategy to the disaster aspects of resilience is understood but not entirely agreed with. The purpose states that 'while acknowledging the vital importance of wider social and economic attributes of disaster resilience... these issues are well-catered for by other policies and programmes across government and through society' (p8). While this may be the case, the vision of the document is far broader. Auckland Council suggests that the final strategy outlines how wider aspects of resilience may be monitored, evaluated and reported on, whether through the National Disaster Resilience Strategy or elsewhere, to ensure that progress in building resilience is properly understood across central government, local government and other stakeholders.		

					Related to the above point is the question of how directive the strategy is. The proposed strategy states that central and local government, businesses, organisations and iwi will be able to use the strategy to guide resilience building both for their own organisation, and for the people and communities they support or provide services for. Noting that Auckland Council works on investment cycles of annual, 3-year, 10-year and 30-year financial planning, particularly around infrastructure investment it is acknowledged that a directive approach will make some aspects of resilience easier to implement, but will require extensive planning and engagement. Auckland Council is able to work with the Ministry on developing achievable targets.		
					The vision of 'a safe and prosperous nation' is one that aligns well with the Auckland Plan which seeks 'opportunity and prosperity' and a safe city in its broadest sense. Given recent proposals3 to restate the promotion of social, economic, environmental and cultural well-being of communities to the statutory purpose of local government it would seem sensible that the proposed strategy considers these factors including, for example, the Four Capitals in the Living Standards Framework		
					The proposed strategy states that New Zealand is well-placed in having a 'comprehensivelegislative framework in place for risk management' including a number of pieces of legislation and regulatory instruments. While probably outside of the scope of this submission, Auckland Council would like to stress the importance of legislation in its ability to reduce risk and enable decision making that is able to properly take account of risk and improve resilience planning. New Zealand's current legislative framework , for example, still allows for housing and other developments to take place in risk-prone areas with appropriate mitigations, and is enabling both in its intent and in its openness to challenge. Thought needs to be given to allowing risk and resilience factors to be prioritised over other factors in determining such issues. Auckland Council recommends that the Ministry assesses how central government agencies can develop an integrated approach to legislation in order to enable risk reduction and investment in resilience as much as possible. This may include environmental, building and commercially focused legislation. Auckland Council believes that it is important that legislation, and indeed central government strategies and priorities, where appropriate and where possible, leverage off and support New Zealand's national disaster resilience strategy		
					Auckland Council agrees with the goals of the draft strategy in general, however, it is recommended that consideration be given to the inclusion of 'wairuatanga' (spirituality) as an additional aspect of 'resilience' in the Maori world view (p14). Maori have always recognised the significance of wairuatanga (spirituality) for wellbeing. Wairuatanga is also reflected in relationships with the natural environment, for example, whenua (land), awa (rivers, lakes) and maunga (mountains) have spiritual significance, and access to the natural environment is important for identity and sense of wellbeing.		
					From a broad perspective, Auckland Council would like to see more of a specific focus on critical infrastructure necessary to sustain quality of life. In particular, readiness to recover, or capacity to recover, is missing from the discussion at present.		
					Question 2: The draft strategy provides useful commentary on 'how our risks might change in the future'. Climate change, population trends, digital connectivity and other factors are identified. Auckland Council's Natural Hazards Risk Management Action Plan (currently being drafted) is a whole-of-council plan which identifies a range of actions with regards to natural hazard risk management and mitigation. The plan, a first-of-its-kind for New Zealand, may be a useful approach to be adopted by the Ministry and others in the CDEM sector, including CDEM Groups. The final document can be shared with the Ministry once complete.		
					The articulation of risks and hazards to communities and to all the entities who are engaged in building resilience, may be better framed in terms of impacts to communities, rather than the hazards and risks themselves.		
					Auckland Council's recent experiences responding to the significant storm event that passed through Auckland and the upper North Island in April 2018 confirmed, anecdotally at least, that some communities, and in particular some rural and remote communities, have changed and evolved as the city has changed over time. Population growth has been a major factor in Auckland's development over recent years but so too has other changes in demographics and also in other societal factors. Auckland Council recommends, therefore, that the final strategy acknowledges the importance of community engagement (of both geographic and non-geographic communities of interest) and of establishing opportunities for meaningful community engagement in resilience-building activities.		
					The acknowledgment of, and focus on, climate change and its effects on New Zealand's risk profile and of the need to consider climate risk reduction, mitigation and adaptation is to be applauded. Auckland's Climate Action Plan (to be released mid 2019) will set a path to rapidly reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help prepare Auckland for the impacts of climate change.		

					At priority 1, 'Managing risks', it is noted that 'it is critical to recognise how we inadvertently add to (risk) through development choices, including land-use and building choices' (p23). As above, Auckland Council recommends that thought be given to the legislative framework guiding these decisions and choices as the framework, as it is currently, is enabling of development, with mitigations, in most cases. In addition, managing risks across the 5Rs (with the 5th 'R' being 'Resilience') requires risks to be envisaged and articulated around recovery, including construction industry capacity, financial implications of recovery and so forth.		
					Priority 2, 'Effective response to and recovery from emergencies', is well aligned with the Government's response to the Technical Advisory Group's recommendations on the effective response to natural disaster and other emergencies and to recent legislative changes4 which have helped to embed a more strategic approach to disaster recovery. Auckland Council would like to stress the importance of recovery, and of reinforcing the need to prioritise recovery planning considerations as part of resilience.		
					The final priority; 'Strengtheningsocietal resilience' aligns closely with the approach to resilience building in Auckland through both the Auckland Plan and Auckland's CDEM Group Plan. It is, however, ambitious and it is unclear how the measures of success identified on p28 of the document will be delivered. The priority is appropriate. However, applying a methodology such as a 'theory of change logic framework,' which requires objectives to be linked with expected outputs and measurable indicators, may help to ensure a common understanding and delivery by the wide range of partners and stakeholders who would have to deliver upon the outcomes sought through this strategy. Auckland Council recommends that the insurance industry is engaged in how this priority may be taken forward across central and local government and other stakeholders, particularly since there were barriers to 'build back better' in previous rebuilds.		
					Question 3: Auckland Council broadly agrees with the objectives and success factors of the proposed strategy in principle and notes that many of these were suggested from the various rounds of consultation undertaken with stakeholders, including Auckland Council. That said, the comments above related to delivery and implementation and of maximising levels of buy-in across stakeholders apply here. Auckland Council believes that the strategy needs to ensure that steps are in place to enable the strategy to succeed. In particular, for objectives 1-6, having national data platforms will enable a number of these objectives to be more easily met, which will require a more directive and central approach than is currently the case. This is also likely the case for consolidation of financial impact data, and the impetus to respond to such financial pressures at a national level.		
					Objective 12 'Embed a strategic approach to recovery planning that takes account of risks identified, recognises long-term priorities, and ensures the needs of the affected are at the centre of recovery processes' aligns well to the current strategic approach to disaster recovery. However, Auckland Council would prefer to see the suite of objectives at 7-12 to have a higher focus on recovery and preparing for recovery. Auckland Council acknowledges that 'response' was a strong focus on the recent reviews of the sector and believes the strategy to be an opportunity to set the equivalent direction in resilience.		
					Implementation of objective 5, similarly, will require changes to legislation, and in particular to the Resource Management Act 1991, to be enabled. Auckland Council recommends that thought be given as to how best to balance the intent of this objective with other priorities including, for example, those related to infrastructure provision and housing affordability and delivery.		
					In addition, it is recommended that thought be given as to the interdependencies of each of the success factors with other developments across the sector. Objective 10, for example, which relates to the capability and capacity of the emergency management workforce identifies the training of controllers and incident management roles as a success factor but states that these factors will be in place by 2030. Given recent developments and the importance placed on the professionalism of the emergency management workforce, Auckland Council recommends that the Ministry prioritises this success factor and brings the timing of these factors in line with the priority placed on these issues through the current reforms taking place in the sector.		
					Objective 16 is related to embedding strategic objectives for resilience in key plans and strategies at the city/district/regional level. While to be applauded, again, thought needs to be given as to the practicality of this objective. Auckland Council, for example, is the only local authority in New Zealand required by legislation to develop a 'spatial plan' (the Auckland Plan) of a type where these kinds of objectives would sit comfortably. In addition, it has to be acknowledged that the priorities of local government do tend to differ across the country in relation to a number of factors including, for example, population growth, infrastructure provision or water quality. Balancing the need to consider resilience factors, for example, with other requirements such as affordability has to be considered.		

				Most of the success factors identified for each objective provide for success to be measured 'by 2030'. This timeline may be appropriate given the largely systemic nature of the objectives identified, however, without having sight of the 'action plan' that will deliver upon this strategy, it is difficult to comment. Commentary on the need to identify a 'roadmap of actions' or similar is provided below for the Ministry's consideration.		
				Auckland Council recommends that as well as identifying a 'roadmap of actions' or similar related to each objective, that the Ministry considers the practicalities of each success factor in detail. The success factors are, by and-large, ambitious and many, if fully implemented, would require significant changes, including legislative changes, to how risks are managed currently in New Zealand. Objective 4, for example, would require an all-of-government approach and strategy related to hazard risk mitigation with a view to informing what could be difficult, complex conversations with communities about risk and about some of the decisions that may have to be made about how risks may be dealt with or not in the future. A pathway for this to occur will have to be provided.		
				Question 4: The proposed strategy is light on detail as to the governance arrangements of this strategy only than to note that "the strategy will be owned and managed by existing governance mechanisms, including those through the National Security System, and at a regional level by CDEM Groups" (p30). Auckland Council recommends that more detail is required in this section including to outline what those mechanisms are, how they report and how stakeholders and the public will be informed of progress. Given the 'devolved' nature of CDEM in this country it is recommended that thought be given as to ensuring as much joint ownership of the strategy through, for example, joint central and local government governance. There are various models of joint governance and, perhaps even, joint funding that could be explored for this strategy. It is likely that current governance mechanisms will not be fit-for-purpose to deliver such an ambitious strategy. Auckland Council reiterates the value in taking a cross-agency approach to resilience-building.		
				Question 5: 44. The inclusive nature of the consultation and engagement that the Ministry carried out through the strategy development process needs to be acknowledged. It is clear that the views of the sector have been taken into account in this draft strategy.		
				The strategy is clearly ambitious, and this is to be applauded. New Zealand's emergency management sector, given the country's risk to natural hazards and other events, needs to be world-leading. It is pleasing to see that the draft strategy has taken account of recent developments including reforms to the CDEM sector, international frameworks and best-practice.		
				Question 6: The proposed strategy is, as stated above, a clear improvement on the current national strategy. That said, one thing that the current strategy does which the proposed strategy does not, is explain in detail the linkages between the national strategy, CDEM Group Plans, legislation and other mechanisms. While not perfect, thought needs to be given as to whether the proposed strategy should include this level of detail. Auckland Council recommends that central and local government collectively conducts a mapping exercise to understand current and future programmes of work that contribute to the objectives, as well as identifying any interdependencies, gaps and challenges. While this may be included elsewhere (the 'roadmap of actions', for example) Auckland Council's comments above with regards to delivery of the strategy also apply here.		
				As an urban centre, Auckland is acutely aware of the importance of societal resilience, and the complex factors which interplay. Auckland Council believes there needs to be further exploration of 'preparedness', and how government (local and national), NGOs and commercial enterprises can be encouraged to manage the provision of more resilient societal 'infrastructure', for events larger than those for which individual preparedness would suffice. The strategy document notes this is expensive and difficult. Auckland Council agrees and confirms that expense and difficulty do not detract from the need to do this, if New Zealand is to be a truly resilient country.		
				As noted in the introduction, every local authority has different organisational priorities, and financial imperatives, which are developed with public engagement on a regular basis. Auckland Council requests that consideration is given to the likely additional cost to councils of implementing the strategy by 2030, and in particular consideration as to how the timing and roll out of the strategy and road map will work alongside budgetary and political cycles.		
57	s9(2)(a) on behalf of Brett Gliddon	NZTA	7/12/18	The Agency considers that this is a strong and fit for purpose document, addressing the topic of National Disaster Resilience management and response well and comprehensively. Therefore the Agency supports the document as a whole. The Agency particularly supports the premise in the Strategy of taking an "holistic approach to strengthening resilience that connects with a range of agencies and sectors to deliver improved outcomes for New Zealanders." (page 2)		
				The Key Terms provide useful definitions for use throughout the Strategy. We would however, suggest that two areas bear further consideration and amendment.		

#	Name	Org	Date	Submission	Response	Action
				Firstly, the definition of Resilience appears focused on asset or network condition, and is well expressed from that perspective. We would suggest that there is value in also presenting Resilience in the definitions section as "societal systems enabling communities to continue undertaking activities which matter to them (or minimising the impacts on those activities), during and following disruptive events." This helps focus on the customer (or community) impacts, and is consistent with the later content that discusses linking "resilience to the protection and growth of living standards for all new Zealanders." (page 7) It is also consistent with section 4.3.3 which acknowledges that Maori world view of resilience is focussed on putting people at its centre. This could also be explored in section 4.2 as part of that sections more exploratory discussion of the meaning of Resilience. Recognition of the interaction with a range of other policies and programmes across Government as contributing to the wider social and economic attributes of society's resilience is well made.		
				Secondly, the Reconstruction and Recovery definitions which include an expectation of build-back-better and enhancement should add a condition of "where affordable and appropriate" or similar to manage a universal expectation of betterment that could occur with the current wording.		
				We found the "Vision" provided in pages 20-21 very useful but being after section 4, found it too separated from Section 2 "Our Vision" which did not appear to contain a vision statement. We acknowledge that the "Vision" on pages 20-21 could be considered to be a consolidation of sections 2-4, and if so, then we would recommend reference to it in sections 2-4 so that one knows that it is coming up.		
				The Agency supports the 18 Objectives proposed. However, we question #18 (Addressing the capacity and adequacy of critical infrastructure systems, and upgrade them as practicable, according to risk identified") being allocated to the "Strengthening Societal Resilience" priority rather than "Managing Risks"		
				We found the "What success looks like" sections supporting each of the 18 objectives as very useful. However, it was not clear to us why most were based on a 2030-based future and a few were based on a 2025-based future.		
				In addition, it is vital that the first priority following the Strategy adoption is the development of a work programme showing the staging and trajectory for achieving the desired future state (What success looks like) of each objective. The work programme would assist us, as a partner organisation, to know who would lead the development of the (national cross agency) projects and when that work may commence (compared with the other national work streams) so we can align our own programme accordingly.		
				It would also be helpful to see the opportunities highlighted in Appendix 4 referenced more directly in the strategy objectives under section 7. "Strengthening societal resilience".		
				Appendix 4 holds promise for moving forward and we would suggest there are potentially more opportunities which would benefit from a brief expose here.		
58	Mark Toner, Head of Public Policy	Vector	7/12/2018	**Question 1:** We agree that resilience includes the 3 following abilities (page 3): i. The ability to prepare for disruptive events; ii. Absorb disruptive events; and iii. Recover from disruptive events.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				We note that Civil Defence and Emergency Management's focus is naturally on preparation and recovery, however the strategy vision in Section 1 could emphasise the consideration of all three approaches, and the trade-offs between them.	JH 8/12 Unsure what this means	None
				Section 4 reduces resilience to 2 dimensions only, absorption and adaptability, and seems therefore incomplete as 'preparation' is not included in the goal of the strategy. This 'preparation' dimension seems essential as it is closely linked to the resilience priority 'managing risks' in Section 5 (and Appendix 1).	JH 8/12 This is how resilience tends to be broken down academically. Its then what you do in readiness for those two elements - the more you can do in readiness, the more you can reduce the drop.	None
				Under the resilience definition of Section 1 (see our previous comment), hardening and strengthening physical assets is a response to reduce the impact of a disruptive event through absorption. We believe the referral to 'strengthening of capacity' in Section 3.4 as a forth component of disaster risk (along with hazard, exposure and vulnerability) is inconsistent with the resilience definition and the Sendai Framework. To summarise, we believe disaster risk depends on hazard, exposure and vulnerability, while disaster impacts depend on the 3 pillars of resilience (i.e. preparation, absorption/strengthening/hardening and recovery).	JH 8/12 Disagree. It's not a fourth component of risk - as such - it's a *counter* to the three components of risk. That said, the text does refer to the fourth component, so we could remove that - for clarity.	pg 12 amend wording introducing the definition of capacity

Comment	Response	Action
A stronger alignment of the resilience definition (page 3) and the strategy in Section 1 would improve clarity. The definition refers to the effects of 'disruptive events', while the strategy mostly refers to 'disasters' (or even 'devastating events').While a disruptive event and disaster may both represent an external risk, an efficient resilience strategy minimises the impacts of a disruptive event to ideally avoid a disaster.We support the use of the term 'disruptive event', which emphasizes the importance of an efficient resilience strategy to rely on the 3 pillars of the resilience strategy in order to avoid or minimise a disaster (i.e. preparation, absorption/strengthening/hardening and recovery).	JH 8/12 Noted issue with the consistency of terminology. Will address where possible/practicable	None
We strongly agree with the future goal of intergenerational equity. We need to ensure today's resilience solutions build a resilient future while also avoiding unnecessary financial burdens on future generations. Infrastructure investments, such as electricity infrastructure assets, often have long lifetimes that need to be paid by future generations and risk being redundant in the face of rapid technology change. Wherever economically possible, flexible solutions should be favored, this will ensure intergenerational equity and strengthen societal resilience.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
Question 2 & 3: The priorities on 'strengthening societal resilience', currently Section 7, should be listed before the priorities on response, currently Section 6. This will reflect the order of the three resilience solutions identified in the definition (see our paragraph 5). We also believe a more appropriate title would be 'Strengthening Societal and Infrastructure Resilience' or 'Strengthening Resilience'. This would then reflect the range of the objectives listed under this title.	JH 8/12 Agree and disagree. I also see value in this priority coming before response/recovery, but I think, optics-wise, it wouldn't be good to put response/recovery to 'third priority' (even though they're not sequential). For a CDEM strategy, I like the optics of this being in the centre of it.	None
Priorities that fall within the 'strengthening resilience' Section 7 include both infrastructure as well as societal strengthening. In our perspective, Priority 18 on infrastructure needs to highlight that in order to ensure societal strengthening, customer-side resilience is increasingly part of developing resilience capacity (we refer to this as 'shared resilience').	JH 8/12 Noted, but not for adding	None
Sound decision-making stems on good information. With the increasing digitalisation of physical assets and appearance of the Internet of Things (IoT), we believe it is critical to harness and guarantee access to data for planning and management of critical infrastructure. The importance of information is raised as part of an emergency response (Priority 11), however needs to also be included in the sections on 'managing risks' and 'strengthening societal resilience'. Policy needs to recognise and publicly support the use of data for increasing infrastructure resilience given it is in the long-term interest of the public.	JH 8/12 Noted. I think this is covered	None
Objective 6 in Section 2 raises the importance on not exclusively valuing only economic impacts when assessing resilience solutions. However, Objective 6 seems to exclusively focus on understanding economic impacts, which we think misses important social and environmental impacts of disruptive events.	JH 8/12 Disagree. These are covered in other objectives (not every objective needs to cover everything)	None
Objective 6 includes 'financing to implement resilience solutions, we believe the importance of financing cannot be understated. For most infrastructure planners, the possibility to improve resilience depends on the regulatory framework. The regulatory framework needs to support enhancing resilience capability through better prevention, strengthening and emergency response, while balancing this intergenerational equity concerns. Under the current regulatory framework spending is based on historical benchmarking. However, past experience is not sufficient to assess resilience needs in the future as climate change materialises. In our case, regulators, such as the Electricity Authority and Commerce Commission, do not explicitly recognise resilience due to climate change, which discourages appropriate investment.	JH 8/12 Noted the support. Also note the point re. Commerce Commission (etc) - this is being dealt with separately.	None
Understanding interdependencies between critical infrastructures are essential to ensuring resilience and support effective response to an emergency. A recent study from NZ Lifeline Council1 highlights such interdependencies and notes that electricity is today required to operate most other critical infrastructures. This is partially related to Priority 9 and 16, which focusses on organisational coordination as opposed to physical interdependency.	JH 8/12 Noted.	None
As previously mentioned, the increasing digitalising of infrastructures provides huge societal opportunity but also requires new capacities to manage risks of cybersecurity. We believe this objective should be highlighted and a strategy should be proposed.	JH 8/12 Noted.	None
Question 4 As mentioned in paragraph 13, the regulatory framework and thus the regulator has a role to play in supporting the development of a resilient infrastructure. Our capital and operation expenditure allowance are strongly defined by the Commerce Commission and its regulations, so we rely on them recognising the importance of resilience and the long-term interest of customers in 'shared resilience'.	JH 8/12 Noted.	None
As previously mentioned in paragraph 11, policymakers, including data management and privacy groups, should support the use of data to increase resilience, which is in the interest of the public.	JH 8/12 Noted.	None

59	Joe Kennedy, Manager Emergency Management	Nelson Tasman Emergency Management	7/12/18	The definition of hazard does not align to the definition detailed in part 1 s 4 of the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act 2002.	JH 8/12 Noted. Will amend.	Hazard defn
				The vision of 'a safe and prosperous nation' that also features in the contents page, differs from the vision on page 14 section 4.1 and to that in the heading of page 20 'Vision of a resilient nation'. Both of these visions differ to the one on page 34 'Our Vision: New Zealand is a disaster resilient nation that acts proactively to manage risks and build resilience in a way that contributes to the wellbeing and prosperity of all New Zealanders.'	JH 8/12 Noted (by many!)	None
				There is potential for confusion with this figure. The depth of impact is clearly depicted. However there does not appear to be too much differentiation between the two lines when looking at the speed of recovery. Both lines appear to increase at roughly the same time and rate. There is potential for confusion with this figure. The depth of impact is clearly depicted. However there does not appear to be too much differentiation between the two lines when looking at the speed of recovery. Both lines appear to increase at roughly the same time and rate.	JH 8/12 Agree. We're amending this diagram	Figure 1
				Suggest the word 'have' is replaced with 'are'. The resultant sentence would then read 'This is when we are most at risk....'	JH 8/12 Agree.	Change wording as suggested
				Suggest a restructure of the first sentence to: 'This priority aims to further progress the advancements that we have made in responding to and supporting recovery from ....'	JH 8/12 Agree.	Change wording as suggested
				Amend document title from 'Ministerial Review into Better Responses to Natural Hazards and Other Emergencies' to 'Ministerial review into better responses to natural disasters and other emergencies'	JH 8/12 Agree.	Change wording as suggested
				The goal differs to the goal featured in contents page and on page 14 of 'a resilient future'	JH 8/12 Noted (by many!)	None
				A space is required in 'decisionmaking'	JH 8/12 Agree.	Change wording as suggested
60	Sheree Pell, Support Services Coordinator	SPCA	7/12/2018	**Priority 1 – Managing Risks** None of the risk reduction strategies considered for New Zealand can claim to be comprehensive if they do not include planning and preparing for animals in emergencies. The human-animal bond is proven; failure to recognise the emotional bond between many people and their companion animals has been found to have a significant impact during many disasters (Darroch & Adamson, 2016). Humans have been known to risk their lives to protect their animals or refuse to evacuate from danger without their animals (Hesterberg et al., 2012). It is impossible to properly plan for risks to New Zealand as a nation without including consideration of its animals across all spheres. For example, people living with animals are likely to be more inclined to commit to disaster risk reduction if the needs of their animals are included in the planning (Darroch & Adamson, 2016). As detailed in the Strategy, environmental disasters affect all of society, of which animals are a part. Therefore, emergency resilience must be integrated into all parts of society, including animals in homes, industries and institutions.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				There is a large body of evidence demonstrating that providing for animals within the planning, rescue and recovery of disasters is an integral component to ensure the safety of humans during an evacuation. In an emergency, saving animals also saves human lives. During previous disasters, both in New Zealand and abroad, it has been found that people are more likely to evacuate if they are able to take their companion animals (Hunt et al., 2012). Indeed, human lives have been lost when animal owners have returned home prematurely to rescue their animals (WSPA, 2014; Barlow & Shadwell, 2016). Refusal to allow companion animals to be evacuated with their owners can lead to non-compliance with evacuation orders and failure to evacuate, leading to greater risk of losing the lives of rescue workers (Irving, 2009; Heath, 2001; Glassey, 2010; Fritz Institute, 2006). In August 2005, during Hurricane Katrina, 44% of people who did not evacuate decided not to do so in part due to not wanting to leave a companion animal (Fritz Institute, 2006).	JH 8/12 Noted	None

					Priority 2 – Effective Response to and Recovery from Emergencies There is no doubt that both humans and animals are affected by disasters. Therefore, it is essential to construct an effective response to and recovery from emergencies which includes animals across species and locations, such as on farms and within the home, industry and institutions. Research shows that requiring people to evacuate without their animals can be a traumatic experience for those people affected (Awadi et al., 2008). This is exacerbated when adequate pre-planning has not been in place. For response and recovery efforts to be comprehensive, animals must be included in the detailed planning of these tasks.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
					SPCA is disappointed that, at present, the provision of animal welfare in emergencies does not appear to be considered within much of CDEM planning. This was highlighted during the Ministry for Civil Defence Emergency Management Conference that took place in Wellington in May 2018, where there were unfortunately few references to animal welfare, nor the inclusion of animal welfare in planning and preparedness. Although SPCA acknowledges that there is a lot of effort currently being focused towards general emergency preparedness of the public, there is disappointingly limited information included alongside that work to encourage preparedness regarding animals. SPCA submits that CDEM's messaging around preparedness in relation to animals must be strong, clear and consistent. There are simple actions that members of the public can take in relation to their animals that will ensure a better preparedness for disasters. Examples include having sufficient and suitable animal cages and stored food, as well as having animals microchipped (and the microchip registered) or otherwise properly identified. Such actions will help to ensure a more efficient emergency response and enable quicker and easier reunification of displaced animals with their owners post-emergency. Other response and recovery actions include ensuring that all types of animals can be housed and fed when they have been displaced and ensuring that institutions and establishments that contain large numbers of animals have sufficient planning for disasters that require relocation or recovery.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
					Priority 3 – Strengthening societal resilience Animals play an important role across all sections of society. Part of the emergency management plan of New York reads: "It is clear through analysis of these local and national disasters that planning for animal welfare is planning for human welfare." (State of New York, 2010). Many instances have been recorded where people have died while attempting to save their animals during disasters (Thompson, 2013). All sorts of species of animals are considered important members of the family which people are often very hesitant to leave during a crisis (Irvine, 2009; Glassey, 2010). It is no surprise, therefore, that there are significant negative psychological effects on the owner if an animal is left behind and/or killed during an emergency (Edmonds & Cutter, 2008; Gerwolls & Labott, 1994; Hunt et al., 2008; Leonard & Scammon, 2007). Animals can also play a positive psychosocial role in helping people cope during an emergency (Hunt et al., 2008; Heath, 1999; Glassey, 2010). When an animal dies as a result of a negative occurrence, it has been shown that the owner often feels as though they have lost a significant source of emotional support, which further complicates their recovery from the event (Evans & Gray, 2012). Ensuring that animals are properly catered for in disaster preparedness and response will help to strengthen societal resilience to emergencies. Therefore, it is essential that animals are included in planning and coordination in order to ensure effective emergency management.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
					Due to the strength of feeling that the public overwhelmingly has for animals, there is a significant risk of generating negative domestic and international media if animals are not included in emergency management provisions. A recent example of this is the negative attention that was produced over the three cows who were stranded during the 2016 earthquakes in the Kaikoura region. The images of these cows quickly garnered concern on social and traditional media, with many people focussed on their welfare and survival. During a time of emergency, such as this, emotions are heightened and societal interest increased. The three cows in this case were rescued and the story ended happily but consider the impact on society and the resilience of the nation, as well as the negative international publicity, had these cows died or been euthanased. The story of the cows has since been made into a children's book called "Moo and Moo and the Little Calf too", which demonstrates the nation's interest and empathy with animals even during times of crisis.	JH 8/12 Noted	None

					Risks to our wellbeing and prosperity Section 3 of the Strategy explains that New Zealand is committed to the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030. The Sendai Framework promotes three key ideas: • 1. A greater effort to understand risk (in all its dimensions), so that we can prioritise investment, make better risk-informed decisions, and build resilience into everyday processes. o To understand the extent of the risks that arise during an emergency, it is essential to appreciate the human-animal bond and understand the importance of animals within society. When this is not considered, the risk to human lives increase. For example, some people are prepared to risk their own lives for animals and many more will refuse to evacuate if adequate provision is not made for their animals. In addition, there is a significant economic risk to the country, particularly within the agricultural sector, if the lives of large numbers of farmed animals are lost.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
					• 2. A shift of focus from managing disasters to managing risk, including to reduce the underlying drivers of risk (exposure and vulnerability). o Due to the vast numbers of animals across all spheres of New Zealand life, the exposure and vulnerability to risk is huge when animals are not considered in emergency preparedness. It is essential that it is not just direct risks to humans that are focussed upon – there are many aspects that factor into ensuring a prosperous and happy nation.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
					• 3. A broader 'whole of society' approach to risk – everyone has a role in reducing and managing risk. o SPCA advocates that everyone must be encouraged to consider what role they could have in reducing and managing the risks associated with the animals who are part of their lives. Although animals are not able to take on responsibilities in an emergency situation, they are part of society, and so must be protected and planned for accordingly. This is the same for other members of society who are unable to take care of themselves – those responsible for vulnerable humans play an important role in reducing and managing risk on behalf of those vulnerable persons. The situation for animals parallels this requirement to reduce and manage risks for vulnerable people. There is a culture in New Zealand to help one another. This attitude shows the nation's ability and desire to step forward and embrace animals in emergencies as a 'whole of society' issue.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
					SPCA proposed additions to the Strategy SPCA agrees in principle with the objectives and success factors detailed in the Strategy. However, once again, it is disappointing to see animals omitted from this important part of the document. There are myriad places where these sections should include mention of animals and their place in the preparedness and response of disasters. Some examples for the Objectives are listed here:	JH 8/12 Noted	None
					• Objective 2: "Put in place organisational structures and identify necessary processes to understand and act on reducing risks." The "multi-sectoral views" that the vision of success for this Objective describes must include the views and representation of those within the animal welfare and management sector.	JH 8/12 Noted. Agree, but no other individual agencies or sectors are mentioned here.	None for strategy; for consideration in roadmap
					• Objective 6: "Understand the economic impact of disaster and disruption, and the need for investment in resilience. Identify and develop financial mechanisms that support resilience activities." It is important that issues involving animals are properly considered within the analysis of costs of disasters and disruption. This must include the economic impact on society when people lose or are parted from animals in their care. The most obvious cost is the financial loss when farmed animals are killed due to an emergency, but there is a broader scope which includes a wider range of species; for example, a person's emotional wellbeing and resilience to a disaster may be affected by the loss of an animal (Thompson et al., 2014; Evans & Gray, 2012).	JH 8/12 Noted. Again, agree, but no other details are mentioned here.	None for strategy; for consideration in roadmap
					• Objective 7: "Implement measures to ensure that the safety and wellbeing of people is at the heart of the emergency management system." It is stated that this Objective is successful when there are renewed levels of trust and confidence in the emergency management system. SPCA submits that levels and trust and confidence from the public will not be high if they cannot see that the emergency management system recognises and responds to the whole of society, which includes ensuring and encouraging the safety and wellbeing of animals.	JH 8/12 Noted. Again, agree, but no other details are mentioned here.	None for strategy; for consideration in roadmap
					• Objective 14: "Promote and support prepared individuals, households, organisations, and businesses." As noted in the measure of success for this Objective, emergency preparedness needs to become part of everyday life. Because animals play such a huge part of everyday life, it is impossible to achieve this goal without ensuring that animal preparedness is promoted and enacted.	JH 8/12 Noted. Again, agree, but no other details are mentioned here.	None for strategy; for consideration in roadmap
					SPCA agrees that a broad range of stakeholders need to be involved in the governance of this strategy and submits that this must include representatives of those working in the animal welfare sector.	JH 8/12 Noted.	None for strategy; for consideration in roadmap

				Submission	Response	Action
				SPCA advocates that reference to animals can be included throughout the Strategy document. Examples are given (highlighted in red) below: • Key Terms . Exposure – "People, **animals**, infrastructure, buildings, the economy and other assets that are exposed to a hazard."	JH 8/12 Tentatively agree. This is altering an internationally defined term, but, we could get away with it.	Key terms
				• Key Terms . Response – "Actions taken immediately before, during or directly after a disaster to save **humans and animal lives** and property, reduce health impacts, ensure public safety and meet the basic subsistence needs of the people affected, and to help communities recover."	JH 8/12 Tentatively agree. This is altering a definition in the National Plan, but, we could do it	Key terms
				• 1.4 Intended audience and use of the Strategy. Individuals, households and whanau – "can use it to prompt thinking on their own resilience, and what they can do to ensure they and their dependants, **such as animals,** are prepared for disruption and crises in the long term."	JH 8/12 Agree	Change wording as suggested
				• 1.4 Intended audience and use of the Strategy. "All readers are encouraged to consider what this Strategy means for them, their family/whanau, community/hapu, business or organisation, **animals in their care**, and what they can do to contribute to their own resilience or the resilience of others."	JH 8/12 Not against this in principle, but it doesn't really work in this instance - it's a standard list we use throughout	None
				• Risks to our wellbeing and prosperity. Second paragraph "These events have caused loss of **human and animal live**s, injury, damage and disruption."	JH 8/12 Agree	Change wording as suggested
				• Strengthening societal resilience. Objective 14). "Promote and support prepared individuals, households, organisations and businesses **(preparedness must include any responsibility for animals)."**	JH 8/12 Not against this in principle, but it doesn't really work here	None
				• Strengthening societal resilience. Objective 14 success measure. "By 2030, emergency preparedness for **all members of society, including animals**, is part of everyday life."	JH 8/12 Agree	Change wording as suggested
				• Appendix 1: Overview of this Strategy 3 - Strengthening Societal Resilience. Objective 14 "Promote and support prepared individuals, households, organisations, and businesses **(preparedness must be for all members of society which includes animals)."**	JH 8/12 Not against this in principle, but it doesn't really work in this instance - it's a standard list we use throughout	None
				Appendix 3: Analysis of our current state as a baseline for this Strategy. Barriers to Resilience, What is limiting our resilience? 2. "Our level of individual and household preparedness **(including preparedness for our animals)** for emergencies is not as high as it should be, given our risks".	JH 8/12 Agree	Change wording as suggested
				• Appendix 3: Analysis of our current state as a baseline for this Strategy. Barriers to Resilience, What is limiting our resilience? 3. "Our businesses and organisations **(including those involving animals)** are not as prepared as they could be, leading to loss of service and loses in the economy when severe disruption strikes."	JH 8/12 Agree	Change wording as suggested
				In addition to the above, SPCA proposes that the following areas of the Strategy need further consideration to incorporate animals in disaster resilience: • SPCA acknowledges that there are insufficient images of animals throughout the strategy. The Society advises that photos should be included across the sphere of animal use in the country.	JH 8/12 Agree we could have 1 or more pictures of animals, however we are unlikely to be able to include "across the sphere of animal use in the country".	For consideration
				• SPCA proposes that the Foreword, which discusses the nation's risks, the impact of emergencies and the whole of society approach to resilience, should be reworded to reflect the need for animals to be included within these areas.	JH 8/12 Agree	Should be able to accommodate this
				• The Four Capitalsdiscusses animals only within the Natural Capital area. SPCA feels that this is inaccurate as animals provide a variety of functions and roles in society. Animals are not solely considered to be a resource in New Zealand - many are also part of the family and/or provide an important role in society. Therefore, SPCA submits that animals should also be included under the Social Capital category.	JH 8/12 Disagree - nothing we can do about this	None
				• Similarly, SPCA believes that animals should be included in "Section 3 Risks to our wellbeing and prosperity"as they play a large part in the wellbeing and prosperity of the nation.	JH 8/12 Will include if feasible	For consideration
				• Appendix 2: What can I do? (page 36). SPCA recommends that information regarding preparedness for animals within industry, institutions and the home should be included in this part of the Strategy. SPCA would be very happy to provide detailed information that could be included on these pages.	JH 8/12 Not keen to add extensive detail here. But we will be developing a whole series of these which SPCA could be involved in (or lead one of)	None
				SPCA strongly advocates that the National Disaster Resilience Strategy must be amended so that it includes relevant references to animals throughout. It is essential that companion and farmed animals, along with those confined in captivity across all establishments, are sufficiently included in disaster risk reduction strategies. In an emergency, the inclusion of animals and animal welfare in planning, response and recovery is important to ensure human wellbeing and safety, along with economic benefits. Therefore, it is vital that preparations to ensure animal welfare during disasters is properly included in future versions of this Strategy or within other documents or plans relating to emergency management.	JH 8/12 Noted. We will make changes as specified	None

#	Name	Organisation	Date	Comment	Response	Action
				SPCA is concerned that, at present, the provision of animal welfare in emergencies is severely under-resourced and under-prepared. This means that any response which may take place is often limited in scope and inconsistently delivered. Significant lessons can be learnt from previous emergencies, both in New Zealand and abroad. Addressing these issues will help to achieve improved evacuation compliance and to enable a more efficient, effective and coordinated response which adequately addresses the safety and welfare of animals and, in turn, provides for the safety, wellbeing and financial security of people.	JH 8/12 Noted.	None
				SPCA is supportive of the formulation of a National Disaster Resilience Strategy; however, we feel that much more can be done to include advice and information regarding the management of animals in emergencies to ensure a comprehensive and inclusive approach to disaster resilience and emergency management in New Zealand.	JH 8/12 Noted. The Strategy is not the place for much of this detail though.	None
61	Rebecca O'Brien and Dean Whiting, Directors – Heritage New Zealand Pouhere Taonga	Heritage New Zealand	7/12/2018	Heritage New Zealand Pouhere Taonga welcomes the introduction of this strategy and agrees with its purpose, vision and goal. Ensuring New Zealand's Landmarks and historic heritage places are fully prepared for natural disaster and that plans are in place to restore those places in the event of a disaster must be incorporated into any national disaster resilience strategy. The importance of historic heritage to people's sense of place and well-being was exemplified during the Canterbury Earthquakes. The substantial loss of approximately 200 heritage places as a result of the Canterbury Earthquakes contributed to sense of dislocation and depression experienced by people in the immediate aftermath and the years after the quakes. The restoration of some of the surviving heritage places has been hailed as a sign of hope and recovery.	JH 8/12 Noted.	None
				The importance of ensuring the resilience of cultural heritage within communities as a way to refocus and strengthen identity post disaster to ensure that communities can rebuild with a sense of continuity and belonging. Issues of building resilience costs (earthquake prone buildings) should also be mindful of the benefits of their survival post disaster in rebuilding community and culture. Approaches of TLA's government agencies should ensure this value is factored alongside economic, public safety and functional attributes. Importantly discussions in building resilience within communities should identify what are important from a cultural heritage perspective in such a scenario.	JH 8/12 Noted.	None
				Decision making within the resilience development and response should empower local communities, particularly Iwi and hapu. Emergency provisions should take into consideration the relationship of Maori to their sites of significance, wahi tapu, wahi tupuna, building and other associations to whenua and moana. Identification and enabling systems of protection for places should be coordinated with organisations within the cultural heritage sector in particular HNZP for buildings and sites, archaeological provisions. Ministry Culture and Heritage for Taonga tuturu and Museum and Archives institutions for post disaster recovery actions to protect and secure community cultural heritage. Communication and planning in this area should be a high priority.	JH 8/12 Noted.	None
				Heritage assets and taonga fall under social capital in the Living Standards Framework. Heritage is particularly at risk in New Zealand from natural disaster as well as economic risk. Below are specific recommendations on the draft Strategy:	JH 8/12 Noted.	None
				Within the goals section we would recommend including specific mention of cultural heritage under Kaitiakitanga tūrangawaewae 'We guard and protect the places that are special to us'. For example: Protection and enhancing our cultural, historic and natural environment and ecosystems'.	JH 8/12 Agree	Change wording as suggested
				we welcomed the cultural resilience and the reference to place, history and heritage as contributing to the identity of New Zealanders	JH 8/12 Noted.	None
				We fully support the objectives set out and the aspirations to set in place consistent and widely-used practices around risk assessment and planning. We would strongly support the reference to the protection of historic heritage that is specifically considered under objective 17. We would recommend that specific mention of cultural heritage places (including marae) and historic heritage is mentioned here	JH 8/12 Agree	Change wording as suggested
				we recommend consideration is given to including the protection of heritage assets and taonga as an indicator for resilience and recovery. This would reflect the important role of heritage places in creating a sense of continuity after a disaster. Consideration of this indicator has been weighted by Statistics New Zealand as a potential indicator for the well-being budget of 2019. They found this to be a strong indicator that has an existing data set and useful measures.	JH 8/12 Agree	Change wording as suggested
				we welcome the reference to the importance of culture (item 17) and would recommend specific mention is made to the importance of cultural and historic heritage places, assets and taonga.	JH 8/12 Agree	Change wording as suggested
62	Rob Deakin, Manager Resilience	LINZ	7/12/2018	LINZ would like to reiterate its support for the Strategy in terms of its scope and connection to our own priorities and high-level outcomes. We stand by the comments we made previously on the pre-consultation draft circulated earlier in the year:	JH 8/12 Noted.	None
				• "We agree that limiting / defining the scope as it is laid out in the draft is appropriate and sensible."	JH 8/12 Noted.	None

#	Name	Organisation	Date	Comment	Response	Action
				• "We believe that the objective make sense and provide guidance to the right direction of travel. We welcome the proposed introduction of measures and monitoring to track progress on the success of the strategy."	JH 8/12 Noted.	None
				• "The strategy does support key elements of LINZ's work programme in the Resilience and Climate Change adaptation space. At a high-level LINZ has aligned key aspects of its work with the goals and priorities of the Sendai Framework, and we recognise the merit in this national strategy being prepared with the view in mind. We welcome MCDEM's openness and collaboration as we have developed these over the past two years and look forward to continuing to work together and with MCDEM and others in the same vein to implement the action plan that follows the finalisation of the strategy.	JH 8/12 Noted.	None
				• Specifically we reiterate LINZ's willingness to be part of the national emergency management system. Objective 1 is an area that we see we can play a role in helping to establish improved data and information to create an improved evidence base. We recognise the need under objectives 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 relating to clarifying roles and responsibilities, and the need for a 'Common Operating Picture', all of which are areas the we are working toward supporting."	JH 8/12 Noted.	None
				We feel that it would be strengthened if accompanied by the "Roadmap" which it refers to. Having greater clarity over the actions planned (e.g. their scheduling, dependencies and priority) to achieve the outcomes that will deliver on the goals of the Strategy would provide a greater degree of confidence in the Strategy itself, and also provide a platform for stronger engagement with collaborators.	JH 8/12 Agree. Intend to better describe the Roadmap	For consideration - roadmap
				It would help to have more commentary of how the Strategy sits with other current strategies and systems e.g. the RMA and NPS's	JH 8/12 Agree. Intend to better describe the policy landscape	For consideration - policy diagram
				Very specifically, in respect of Objective 3, and what success looks like, we believe that increasing the level of understanding of uncertainty in risk, and being able to communicate the effectively with the public is a critical part of that success, and worthy of specific mention.	JH 8/12 Noted.	None
63	Grant Heather, Senior Strategy Manager	KiwiRail	7/12/2018	(Draft awaiting approval)		
				1. Extensive engagement with a wide range of stakeholders The involvement of a wide variety of stakeholder ensures those with the knowledge can contribute in areas such as understanding economic impact, developing risk-sensitive practices, and understanding risk scenarios. For example, KiwiRail can be a key contributor due to the granularity of its knowledge regarding its infrastructure assets, helping society understand the risks to resilience of the overall New Zealand land transport network. Stakeholders have both the knowledge to help and a strong interest in ensuring New Zealand is resilient. KiwiRail therefore supports extensive stakeholder consultation from the level of large national organisations to the level of the local firm.	JH 8/12 Noted.	None
				2. Emphasis on inter-agency cooperation One key factor that can enhance the ability of organisations to improve their readiness and risk management is inter-organisational knowledge sharing. KiwiRail's experience of the Kaikoura earthquake and its work with the New Zealand Transport Agency demonstrated the necessity of inter-agency cooperation in meeting challenges posted by disasters. The benefits include allowing data and experiences to be shared more easily between organisations that stand to mutually benefit.	JH 8/12 Noted.	None
				3. A chapter dedicated to "Readiness" The "4Rs" framework (risk reduction, readiness, response and recovery) is a key framework that also sits within KiwiRail policy. It is our position that 'readiness' comprises one of the most important aspects of a resilience strategy. The greater the readiness, the better equipped the country is to respond. At present, it is unclear why risk is allotted an entire section while readiness is not. KiwiRail would like to see a paragraph allotted to readiness as a doctrine to give it a stronger focus.	JH 8/12 Disagree. Priority 2 and 3 are 'readiness' (readiness for response, readiness for recovery, broader societal readiness/resilience)	None
				4. Large goals have relatively small timeframes Many objectives entail a large amount of assessment, information gathering, reporting, and improvement of physical works which will entail devoting a lot of resources. The 6 risk management objectives, all of which KiwiRail support, entail a large task for companies that operate nationally. In addition, objective 18 involves a great deal of work to fully understand all risks and hazards and develop a plan for them. The contributions laid out in appendix 2 are also potentially highly costly for large organisations. The usage of a 2030 target – just over 11 years from now – entails a large amount of work in a relatively short period of time for a national network infrastructure manager. If large amounts of resources are not going to be spent in support of such efforts, the alternative is to reword certain objectives to be focused on ensuring progress is being made, rather than utilising a 2030 deadline.	JH 8/12 Noted.	None

				5. Support for organisations A certain degree of support will be required to support organisations in meeting some of the more ambitious targets of the Strategy outlined in the previous paragraph. This entails establishing clear lines of 'ownership', as well as a certain degree of resourcing. A clear indication of the kind of support they are likely to receive, an indication of the role the Ministry sees itself taking and where the responsibility of stewardship lies would enable organisations to begin planning their approach. In addition, costs to planning and reporting plus external benefits reduce the incentive for any single organisation to take on responsibility or initiative for itself. While organisations have a collective interest in ensuring New Zealand has an effective disaster resilience strategy, the private incentive is to give it a reduced priority than is optimal. This means consideration must be given for how the Ministry will encourage organisations, in particular, what kinds of rewards and assistance organisations are likely to receive. Given the large coordination problems involved, we foresee the Ministry taking a large organisational and coordination role as well as being a provider of resources that takes into account the specific needs of the organisations it works with. To help clarify this, a section or sections that outline what kind of role the Ministry will take in supporting and encouraging organisations could be included. Ideally, this would include clear directives of accountability and an understanding of how needs of the organisations it assists will play into the assistance it will give.	JH 8/12 Note this concern, however I don't think we can (or should?) be explicit about that in this document (not least of which is because it's getting ahead of government decisions)	None
				6. Paragraph 8.2 "Governance of this strategy" requires some clarification Related to the matter of supporting agencies, the Strategy notes "the strategy will be owned and managed by existing governance mechanisms, including those through the National Security System and at a regional level by CDEM Groups". Given the strategy outlined by the government, this paragraph needs to be expanded to provide clarity regarding who precisely will govern it and how roles will be divided between different organisations. For example, the role that organisations with 'Lifeline Obligations' will take could be outlined.	JH 8/12 Agree. Although not sure what we WILL be able to add here.	For consideration - governance
				7. Awareness is a term that appears throughout the Strategy, which correctly notes that New Zealand society already has a relatively high awareness of risk, as well as an understanding and willingness to do something about them. We would like to note that awareness of what risks exist as in objective 3 could be de-emphasised in favour of emphasising awareness of the actions citizens can take to help mitigate risk, as well as what procedures are already in place should a disaster occur and how they can be prepared to assist. These are aspects of risk awareness we also consider to be significant.	JH 8/12 Disagree. I think the action element is emphasised as well in various parts	None
				Overall, KiwiRail would like to see the ministry outline how it intends to interact and cooperate with organisations such as our own as well as other smaller stakeholders. A clearer sense of where responsibilities lie ensures a sense of ownership is retailed by those organisations with a role to play.	JH 8/12 Fair point for the implementation/resourcing of a strategy. Although not sure how much we will be able to add.	For consideration - governance
64	Andrea Grant, Risk and Resilience Social Scientist	Scion Research	7/12/2018	A decade of some significant events has changed the dynamics of emergency response based on international experience and better understanding of interactions between events and externalities. Many opportunities for learning based on past directions and new challenges, such as climate change and global responses to disaster, exist to guide the development of the 2018-2028 strategy. From this perspective, we have looked at the strategy in terms of the extent to which it responds to trends and can anticipate future changes and challenges of disaster response.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				As noted in the Ministerial review (Nov 2017) "Better ... responses" the measure of success will be the extent to which the public has trust and confidence in the emergency management system. Understanding the boundaries of that system and how it interacts with other dynamics deemed to be external to that system is critical. It is clear from the responses to the "whole-of-government" inquiries (GCG, DMPC, 2017) leading to the lessons report following the Canterbury earthquake sequence that publics want to participate in problem solving and recovery from disasters, although improvements were needed in communicating decision making roles and responsibilities and managing public expectations.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				One aspect which concerns us as community researchers is the lack of attention to the equity aspects of resilience, particularly around issues of access to resources, knowledge and its applications, as well as capacity and capability for recognizing and supporting or building resilience. The current definition of resilience used in the strategy places too much emphasis on response and recovery and needs to broaden its lens to the other two Rs in standard disaster management readiness and reduction. Many communities and their various characterizations have experienced natural hazards across New Zealand with enough awareness of the importance of increasing preparedness and reducing vulnerability. Our research indicates that if these community-based activities and initiatives are not supported and nurtured the existing community capability will diminish or at best remain the same.	JH 8/12 Noted re. first sentence in particular. Disagree with the assertion of emphasis on response and recovery	For consideration: disproportionate effects, community response/resilience

					Comment	Response	Action
					A higher level of emphasis needs to be given to the intelligence and other resources within rural communities, such as networks and localized infrastructures. Some of these have been referred to as 'soft infrastructure' (Valance et al, 2017), such as community connectedness and initiatives for shielding against adverse events opening up policy discussions with central government (Vallance and Carlton, 2015; Wothersoon et al, 2018). International and local developments show that communities are making better use of social media and additional value of community connectedness can be enhanced through better local development of information systems. At the moment, much of the emphasis is on national level research and development with the key stakeholders who are seen as decision makers within policy and agency senior management. Stronger regionalization of knowledge networks and a much improved capacity to interact with local intelligence is needed	JH 8/12 Noted	For consideration: disproportionate effects, community response/resilience, rural communities
					One concern for making a real difference to the lives, livelihoods and communities exposed to natural hazards (especially those with less buffering of cities or infrastructure intensive areas) is the opportunity that events provide for 'building back better' and supporting improvements of dysfunctional connections and support for people. There are some instances where relationships are in good shape but others where isolation and limitations of access to resources to help people through create breaking points for a weak system. Understanding such conditions and how they are created can help put the right supports in place for people who need it most and to help communities strengthen their abilities to support the most vulnerable of their residents.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
					In regards to the challenges of over promising on disaster response and recovery following the Christchurch sequence of earthquakes, we believe the direction is now more clearly understood as building upon existing community capacity to become involved in resilience planning and risk reduction. The challenges remain in ensuring efforts are focused on social justice and address issues of access, knowledge, capacity and capability for increasing resilience and improving community resilience outcomes. Beyond the need to clearly communicate decision making and rationale that incorporates public engagement and feedback, we feel the need to strengthen the monitoring and evaluation of outcomes based on this feedback is critical to lasting improvement to resilience building.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
					Two further avenues in which the strategy could be improved are the strengthening of governance arrangements towards resilience building. These are identified in the whole-of-government lessons from Christchurch: Lesson: Build in formal and regular review processes for the governance arrangements to ensure they continue to be fit-for-purpose, particularly as roles and responsibilities evolve. Lesson: Dedicate and prioritise resources to manage partnership and interagency relationships at multiple organisational levels. (DPMC, 2017, p. 27).	JH 8/12 Note these points, but these lessons/recs were specifically related to the recovery process. So though I agree with a principle of broad inclusion, the situation is not exactly the same.	For consideration: governance
					Definition of resilience offered up front needs to include the opportunity to change for the better in terms of social and environmental outcomes, otherwise run the risk of returning to normal which is inequitable and unsustainable.	JH 8/12 Disagree. The definition clearly includes the elements of 'adapt, learn, and thrive' - which are the same (without going into exactly which outcomes you're looking to thrive from)	None
					Some prioritizations need to go towards readiness and reduction. Whilst Civil Defence is a response and recovery Ministry, it is important to note that better responses and recovery come from the increased preparedness and risk reduction of communities. It is not clear how this aspects of disaster risk reduction will be realized as there is no other agency responsible for these other two elements of DRR. Thus, it is all the more important that the linking up with other areas of governing is recognized rather than 'ring fencing' CDEM disaster resilience activities.	JH 8/12 Wow. DISAGREE. We are not a response and recovery ministry, and - ironically enough - this strategy is all about risk reduction, readiness and resilience. It's just that part of that resilience includes how we response and recovery. But the strategy is about readiness for response and recovery, not exactly how we do it.	None
					There is good use of the term capacity throughout the document, however reference to capability is missing. To be able to cope with an unfolding and uncertain future of disasters further consideration needs to be given to capability, adaptability and transformation – it may be useful to include these terms in the glossary.	JH 8/12 For consideration, but I don't consider it crucial (And our key terms are getting out of hand at this point)	None

			Comment	Response	Action
			There is some inconsistency here with the document structure focusing on the first two Rs and giving limited attention to the latter two. This document needs to strengthen its articulation of delivery beyond a statement of purpose. It is difficult to find the means through which the 'integration' and 'coordination' activities are to be accomplished. Encouraging 'wide participation' requires attention to details on how this might be achieved and how the inequities of access and types of knowledge utilized for understanding and responding to risk are realized. The building of relationships and partnerships for increasing capability to coordinate and integrate a diversity of knowledge will need some structure. Capacity to learn from experience and take actions to improve resilience outcomes requires the commitment of a range players will require good processes for decision making.	JH 8/12 Disagree any action is needed here.	None
			The language of ring-fencing is not helpful for communities and individuals that experience disasters on top of existing inequities. A better approach here would be to describe coordination and cooperation with other resilience initiatives and activities in other policies and programmes.	JH 8/12 Noted, but it's the reality of the document. The new graphic might help, and we could certainly look to include some language on coordiantion and integration	Ringfencing scope
			A greater focus on the strength and weaknesses of New Zealand's current position on the OECD Better Life index could capture key elements of how the strategy can contribute to building back better. This needs to play to NZ strengths in the OECD Better Life Index currently rated at 11/38 – highlighting where we rate well, e.g., health (1), community (3) and environment (6) – and building resilience through these to increase performance in other areas, e.g., work-life balance (29), safety (24) and housing (21) (http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/countries/new-zealand/).	JH 8/12 Disagree - do not want to go into this level of detail	None
			Meeting the challenges of risk management and bringing together public and private sector contributions needs concerted effort. There is a need for structure and processes to enable such interactions at a level of commitment to community resilience that is led by the Better Life index and Living Standards Framework.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
			Footnote 2 should be elevated to the main text and given more discussion.	JH 8/12 Agree. We are doing this.	None
			Some attention should also be given to those who disproportionately benefit from disasters and the responsibility to ensure that better social and environmental outcomes are derived from recovery efforts. This may not be something specifically directed by MCDEM, however the Ministry could become a conduit for raising awareness about the equitable distribution of recovery – as part of a leadership role – specifically with attention to those with fewer resources and access to knowledge or capacity to respond.	JH 8/12 Noted. I'm not keen to emphasise this point.	None
			Footnote 5 should be incorporated in the text much earlier in this section.	JH 8/12 Noted.	Consider elevating this footnote
			The final paragraph on page 20 describes a vision where people have shared values and social norms. In an increasingly multicultural society, a single set of shared values and social norms may not be practical or wholly desirable. It would be better to have a vision for progress that accepts and allows for differences in values and social norms.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
			The text of Objective 2 does not appear to match the success description. Objective 2 should be revised to emphasise the need to enable community involvement and accountability as described in the success description.	JH 8/12 Agree	Objective 2
			It is unclear whether Objective 3 is talking about the awareness and capability among officials and managers or among the general public. If the former, Objective 3 should be revised to clarify whose capability is being referenced. If the latter, then Objective 3 should be better linked to Objectives 13-15 and place greater emphasis on enabling action over mere awareness.	JH 8/12 Noted. Do not think it's necessary to distinguish	None
			Gaps are not the only that policy can be a barrier to resilience. The objective should also include assessment and resolution of unintended consequences where existing policies, laws and institutional structures restrict or create disincentives for action.	JH 8/12 Noted. Do not think it's necessary to distinguish	None
			Earthquake remediation is not the only way that existing infrastructure will require improvement. The description of success should include remediation of existing buildings and other infrastructure to address other hazards beyond those required for earthquake prone areas.	JH 8/12 Noted. Do not think it's necessary to distinguish	None
			While it is good to offer financial support for resilience building, it is wrong to assume that finances are the only barrier to action. Interventions to improve resilience must take into account the complex influences behind decisions and actions so as to provide appropriate and effective incentives and support. The success description refers to 'funding and incentives', implying that these terms are not interchangeable. The objective should make a similar distinction and mention non-financial incentives.	JH 8/12 True, but this objective actually IS about financial incentives. Others speak to non-financial.	None
			Either Objective 10 or a new separate objective should raise the importance of investing in local relationships and lines of communication before an event occurs and then, during a response, making use of local networks to facilitate responses.	JH 8/12 Agree	New objective on community reponse

					The success description includes the sentence: "More people are able to thrive through periods of crisis and change because they have a plan to get through an emergency that they regularly practise, and have emergency supplies that are regularly checked and updated." However, simplistic plans and emergency stockpiles are only the minimum standard for personal and household preparation. True success would be a much deeper level of preparation and resilience that includes planning for flexibility, adaptation, and resources for long-term recovery (beyond short-term stockpiles). Success would be better described as: "More people are able to thrive through periods of crisis and change because they have adaptable plans to get through different emergency scenarios, access to regularly maintained resources to draw upon in an emergency, and established networks of information and support in the short and long terms."	JH 8/12 Agree	Objective 14
					The 'Theory of change' is extremely vague and only minimally discussed. As such, it is not clear what benefit this adds. Greater articulation of the change desired, e.g., through the focus on the Living Standards Framework as a guideline for ensuring the development and accountability of resilience is needed. Perhaps this is something that needs to be better articulated as readiness and reduction – through the implementation of the strategy as a starting point. As it stands the emphasis is on response for CDEM and many of the suggested measures or indicators relate to other agencies, e.g., including land use planning, soil and water health and quality. This does seem a little cursory and would look vastly different for different stakeholders. It seems that the practice of this kind of tool needs to be something embedded in a range of activities. Finally, the NDRS would be better to adopt the full UNISDR resilience definition that is inclusive of adapt to and transform for supporting necessary change or improvement to wellbeing, sustainability and social equity outcomes. Resilience The ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate, adapt to, transform and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions through risk management. Further definitions for the glossary are given, based on the Sendai Framework (UNISDR).	JH 8/12 Disagree. We do not favour the UNISDR defintion of resilience.	None
					UNISDR Whilst there is acknowledged referral to the UNISDR, with a good development of many aspects, there are some areas of the strategy that could be strengthened. Specifically we suggest inclusion of the following definition would help position the strategy for a more forward thinking resilience for NZ. We believe NZ is well positioned to take a leadership role in regards to joining up top down and bottom up approaches to resilience. We suggest the adoption of the UNISDR definitions including:	JH 8/12 Noted	None
					Building back better The use of the recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction phases after a disaster to increase the resilience of nations and communities through integrating disaster risk reduction measures into the restoration of physical infrastructure and societal systems, and into the revitalization of livelihoods, economies and the environment.	JH 8/12 Provisionally agree	Key Terms (and elsewhere)
					Capacity The combination of all the strengths, attributes and resources available within an organization, community or society to manage and reduce disaster risks and strengthen resilience. Annotation: Capacity may include infrastructure, institutions, human knowledge and skills, and collective attributes such as social relationships, leadership and management. Coping capacity is the ability of people, organizations and systems, using available skills and resources, to manage adverse conditions, risk or disasters. The capacity to cope requires continuing awareness, resources and good management, both in normal times as well as during disasters or adverse conditions. Coping capacities contribute to the reduction of disaster risks.	JH 8/12 Already included	None
					Disaster risk governance The system of institutions, mechanisms, policy and legal frameworks and other arrangements to guide, coordinate and oversee disaster risk reduction and related areas of policy. Annotation: Good governance needs to be transparent, inclusive, collective and efficient to reduce existing disaster risks and avoid creating new ones.	JH 8/12 Disagree	None

				Disaster risk reduction Disaster risk reduction is aimed at preventing new and reducing existing disaster risk and managing residual risk, all of which contribute to strengthening resilience and therefore to the achievement of sustainable development. Annotation: Disaster risk reduction is the policy objective of disaster risk management, and its goals and objectives are defined in disaster risk reduction strategies and plans.	JH 8/12 Already included	None
				Resilience The ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate, adapt to, transform and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions through risk management.	JH 8/12 Disagree with this definition	None
				Underlying disaster risk drivers Processes or conditions, often development-related, that influence the level of disaster risk by increasing levels of exposure and vulnerability or reducing capacity. Annotation: Underlying disaster risk drivers — also referred to as underlying disaster risk factors — include poverty and inequality, climate change and variability, unplanned and rapid urbanization and the lack of disaster risk considerations in land management and environmental and natural resource management, as well as compounding factors such as demographic change, non disaster risk-informed policies, the lack of regulations and incentives for private disaster risk reduction investment, complex supply chains, the limited availability of technology, unsustainable uses of natural resources, declining ecosystems, pandemics and epidemics.	JH 8/12 Disagree	None
				Vulnerability The conditions determined by physical, social, economic and environmental factors or processes which increase the susceptibility of an individual, a community, assets or systems to the impacts of hazards. Annotation: For positive factors which increase the ability of people to cope with hazards, see also the definitions of "Capacity" and "Coping capacity".	JH 8/12 Already included	None
65	Lynda Murchison, Co-Chairperson	Canterbury Rural Advisory Group	7/12/2018	Overall, the draft strategy is comprehensive and well-written. It focuses on describing resilience, and contains a vision, goal, objectives and outcomes. A strategy usually has a combination of objectives/outcomes and actions. We believe the strategy could be enhanced by providing more guidance on the work programmes and other actions which are envisaged to achieve the objectives. It is difficult to comment in any informed way on the priorities, objectives and outcomes of the strategy without knowing the actions and work programmes which are envisaged to achieve the objectives and outcomes; who will be responsible for those actions, how much they will cost, how they will be funded, and how they affect or interact with other central or local government policy and work programmes.	JH 8/12 Noted. Roadmap	None
				Identifying actions, even at a very general level, may also help clarify what is envisaged by some of the objectives and whether the objectives will be achieved through current actions or if new work programmes are required. It would also help clarify how objectives may be achieved that relate to matters which are beyond the powers and functions of CDEM under the CDEM Act 2002. For example, is Objective 5 - resilience to natural disasters is to be incorporated into development and investment practices especially in the built environment, to be achieved through further legislative changes or is it already being achieved through the recent amendments to section 6 of the Resource Management Act 1991 and the new Building Code requirements for Earthquake Strengthening?	JH 8/12 Noted. Roadmap	None
				Suggestion: · Identify key actions or work programmes to implement the objectives in the draft National Disaster Resilience Strategy, including existing actions or work programmes that will be continued and any new actions or work programmes recommended.	JH 8/12 Noted. Roadmap	None
				In our submission, the purpose of the draft strategy could be clearer; in particular the relationship between the general discussion about resilience in the draft strategy and CDEM in New Zealand. The draft strategy includes a comprehensive discussion about defining resilience and the foundation documents the Ministry has relied on in developing the concept of resilience. There is little introductory material on CDEM in New Zealand, and as such it is hard to see how the objectives for CDEM in the draft strategy relate back to the discussion on resilience or the 'vision' in section 2 and 'goal' in section 4.	JH 8/12 Noted. But do not wish (or think we need) a comprehensive description of CDEM. Other things do that.	None

	Comment	Response	
	Section 1 - Purpose of the Strategy (p.7) states 'The purpose of the strategy is to outline the vision and long-term goals for CDEM in New Zealand' (emphasis added). Section 1.2 (p.7) explains how the strategy is prepared under the CDEM Act 2002 and that this strategy will be the third such strategy. However the penultimate paragraph in the Foreword (p.2) describes the strategy as a 'three-pronged approach to improve our nation's resilience to disasters' and the last paragraph states that the draft strategy 'promotes a holistic approach to strengthening resilience'. The Foreword does not tie the strategy to the long-term goals and vision for CDEM in New Zealand. That goal and vision may be based on the principle of resilience but the purpose of the strategy is CDEM management.	JH 8/12 Noted. But I think it does, sufficiently, with the explanation that we ultimately translate the CDEM Act to "resilience"	None
	Suggestion: · Reword the Foreword to clearly identify that the draft strategy sets the long-term goals for CDEM in New Zealand, which is based on a principle of improving resilience to natural disasters.	JH 8/12 Disagree. We are rewriting the foreword to be more conversational/from the minister	None
	The daft strategy contains both a 'vision' in section 2 and a 'goal' in section 4. 'Our Vision' in section 2 (p.9) relates to a vision of nationhood not a vision for CDEM. Similarly, the goal in section 4 (p.14) also relates to the state of resilience of the nation per se, not the long term management of CDEM in New Zealand. Given the purpose of the draft strategy as set out in Section 1.2, in our submission the vision and the goal should relate to the long-term management of CDEM and how that contributes towards the resilience of New Zealand to national disasters or adverse events. To that end we are not sure the draft strategy needs a vision and a goal, as well as objectives. However if the strategy is to have both a vision and a goal, we suggest: - 'Our Vision' in Section 2 should relate to building New Zealand's resilience to national disasters or adverse events; and - 'Our Goal' in Section 4 should relate to how CDEM contributes to the vision of a disaster resilient New Zealand.	JH 8/12 Disagree. You can have a vision that's not directly tied to "your work". But your work contributes to it somehow (as in this case)	None
	Suggestions: · Combine 'Our Vision' (section 2) and 'Our Goal' (section 4) into one section so the relationship between the vision of resilience and the goal for managing CDEM are linked.	JH 8/12 Disagree. For reason above	None
	Create one vision or goal for CDEM management in New Zealand along the lines of: CDEM in New Zealand enables and enhances the resilience of people and communities to adverse events." Or · Amend the 'vision' to read something along the lines of: "Our Vision: a nation which is resilient to adverse events (or national disasters)"; and amend the 'goal' to read something along the lines of: "Our Goal: CDEM in New Zealand enables and enhances the resilience of people and communities to adverse events."	JH 8/12 Disagree. Too big a change to scope (i.e. narrower)	None
	Put the material around the living frameworks in section 2 as an appendix.	JH 8/12 Disagree. This is a key context	None
	Delete section 4 and include the material on defining resilience in the new proposed section 2 and add a discussion as to how resilience relates to the long-term vision and goals for CDEM in New Zealand. For example, how the guiding principles in section 4.1.1 apply to CDEM in New Zealand.	JH 8/12 Disagree. This is a key part of the document	None
	Key terms in the draft strategy include definitions of both disaster and hazard (p.4). Section 3.1 (p.11) of the draft strategy describes risks to our well-being and prosperity. Some of the examples cited in this section are not examples of events which have involved CDEM or would meet the definition of a disaster or even hazard as defined in the draft strategy, in that they are not incidents that have resulted in widespread damage or disruption. They have not involved a CDEM response. In saying this, we are not belittling these incidents in any way - they have been very traumatic for those involved, but it is confusing as to why they are cited in the draft strategy when they did not involve CDEM. For example, M. Bovis is being managed as a biosecurity issue; Pike River Mine Explosion is managed by the Police and Mines Rescue; and the '1080 Milk Powder scare' was a criminal act. Juxtaposingly, no mention is made in the examples in section 3.1 of the 2014-17 Canterbury and Marlborough drought – which does meet the definition of a hazard in the strategy though again it did not involve a CDEM response.	JH 8/12 Disagree. Yes they would (per definition in the Act) This is a very narrow interpretation of CDEM (insinuation: cdem is a narrow group of people who only deal with natural hazards)	None
	Canterbury RAG agrees it is important to recognise a range of potential risks to our environmental, socio-cultural and economic systems especially when focusing on resilience; but we submit that section 3 in its current form is confusing given the draft strategy is a document prepared under the CDEM Act 2002 and relates to the long-term management of CDEM in New Zealand. We suggest it may be more helpful for section 3.3 to focus on adverse events which have involved CDEM at the forefront. The section could then include a paragraph on examples of other incidents which have the potential to create national disasters to make the point that a focus on resilience involves a wider net than just looking at CDEM response to floods and earthquakes; and explain that there is other legislation that deals with risk and response in New Zealand. To that end the draft strategy could include an objective on integration between agencies working under different legislation to build a co-ordinated approach to improving resilience to adverse events in New Zealand.	JH 8/12 Noted. But I think that's explicit in the Act and Plan, and a key and accepted part of CDEM	None
	Suggestions: · Focus section 3.1 on risks and adverse events that involve CDEM.	JH 8/12 Disagree. For reasons above	None
	· Include a paragraph identifying other potential issues or hazards that may cause economic, social or environmental disruption and the other legislation and agencies that manage those risks.	JH 8/12 Disagree. For reasons above	None

				· Include a new objective to develop a programme for co-ordination between CDEM and other agencies dealing with risk management in New Zealand.	JH 8/12 Disagree. For reasons above	None
				Recognition of Rural/Farming Communities While the draft strategy talks comprehensively about resilience in all communities and the CDEM objectives are potentially quite general in their application, the Canterbury RAG is concerned that CDEM in New Zealand is becoming urban-focused. While an urban and earthquake focus in CDEM is understandable given the spate of recent events, it is important to remember that adverse natural events affect farming and rural communities as well. New Zealand's two most frequent adverse events are still flooding and drought; and the communities most frequently affected by those natural events are farming communities and the provincial townships that service and rely on them.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				The Canterbury RAG wishes to take this opportunity to submit that CDEM needs to recognise that the risk awareness, resilience, and response and recovery needs in farming communities often differ from urban areas. Recognising and providing for these differences in CDEM means that the needs of farming communities are met and that CDEM can respond more efficiently and effectively with how and where it sources and targets resources. From the Canterbury RAG's experiences and observations of adverse events in Canterbury, some of those differences are described below:	JH 8/12 Noted	For consideration: rural issues
				(i) Farming communities tend to be more self-sufficient in providing water, food, energy alternatives to electricity, temporary accommodation, and access and infrastructure alternatives in an emergency. Doing it yourself is an essential part of farming life and the more remote the community the more self-reliant they tend to be.	JH 8/12 Noted	For consideration: rural issues
				(ii) Farming communities tend to have good community and communication networks. Those communities rely on local volunteers to make many things happen in day to day life so the volunteer networks already exist, and there is usually a strong ethos of helping one another.	JH 8/12 Noted	For consideration: rural issues
				(iii) Due to their local environmental knowledge, farming communities can often quickly identify where damage is likely to have occurred as a result of an adverse natural event in their area and who in their community is likely to be vulnerable, and make contact with them. As one farmer observed in the Hurunui-Kaikoura-South Marlborough Earthquake 2016, "we don't need a whole lot of help; we just need Civil Defence to let us help ourselves."	JH 8/12 Noted	For consideration: rural issues
				(iv) Farming communities tend not to have the same ready access to internet and cell phone communications as urban areas, and these tenuous communication links are often quickly lost in an adverse event. Electricity supplies can be down for days or weeks. Communicating essential information only through web-sites or text alerts is not helpful for many farming communities, yet increasingly it is being relied on as the main form of communication by central and local government, including in adverse events. However, farming communities are very good at passing information on once they get it, and they will gather for a local meeting.	JH 8/12 Noted	For consideration: rural issues
				(v) Many farming communities do not have a permanent GP, let alone access to mental health services. Like mana whenua, face to face communication and building trusting relationships is a core component for farming communities, with people they know and who understand their way of life. That is why the Rural Support Trust was established and works so well in supporting farming communities. These characteristics of farming communities need to be borne in mind when determining how to provide health services and resources to aid recovery in farming communities.	JH 8/12 Noted	For consideration: rural issues
66	Roger Fairclough, Chair	New Zealand Lifelines (Utilities) Council	7/12/2018	**Question 1:** The New Zealand Lifelines (Utilities) Council strongly supports the purpose, vision and goal of the proposed strategy. The fact it is purposefully constrained to "disasters" both in the Cabinet paper and the Draft for Consultation is disappointing but respected. Although resilience is covered in other government documents, having an overarching, up to date, accessible and visible National Resilience Strategy that takes a systems view would help drive New Zealand more quickly to where it needs to go. It is hoped that the Government will apply future effort to a broader "National Resilience Strategy". This would provide even greater support to regional infrastructure resilience work and, for example, the New Zealand Lifelines Vulnerability Assessment" September 2017, undertaken by the New Zealand Lifelines Council.	JH 8/12 Noted	None

					Question 2: These comments are made with reference to the sections in the document under "Our priorities for improved resilience", pages 22 to 28, and more specifically: - Section 5. Managing risks, - Section 6 Effective response to and recovery from emergencies, and - Section 7. Strengthening societal resilience The overarching comment is that the value and opportunities associated with infrastructure services should be more explicitly recognised and included. The good performance of lifelines utilities and infrastructure services in a disaster is key to an effective response to and recovery from disaster e.g. to prevent the "flight" of resident populations and the associated undesirable impacts. We believe this opportunity could be handled in a more meaningful way in the proposed National Disaster Resilience Strategy. Our view is that there are numerous ways that utility and infrastructure governance and management can be improved and strengthened to add to disaster resilience to the benefit of all New Zealanders. This is especially the case when one considers the cost of infrastructure with, for example, councils spending approximately 60 to 70% of their cash flows on infrastructure alone.	JH 8/12 Noted	For consideration: infrastructure
					To be more specific: a) The intent of the CDEM Act 2002 in regard to utilities and infrastructure being as resilient as possible needs to be proactively implemented by Territorial Local Authorities (TLA's), infrastructure owners and Infrastructure operators.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
					b) Proposals for the creation of the new Independent Infrastructure Body are currently being developed by Treasury. A natural and core role of the new Independent Infrastructure Body could be the setting of standards for the management and operation of utilities and infrastructure and the proactive development of asset management skills capability in the infrastructure sector generally. This could include data management and standards that would be critical to inform robust decision making.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
					c) The government also has a major role to play in coordinating the understanding of risk and to facilitate the investment in resiliency in utilities and critical infrastructure. The oversight of this activity could also sit within the new Independent Infrastructure Body, or be an emergent new organisation based on the Treasury Infrastructure Unit but separated from Treasury, or be an enhanced role of the National Risk Unit in DPMC.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
					The Ministry of Civil Defence Emergency Management (MCDEM) should be funded and, very importantly adequately resourced, to develop a community level National Disaster Resilience Strategy (NDRS) implementation plan with a particular focus on materials and programmes for regional CDEM groups to implement.	JH 8/12 Noted. Roadmap	None
					The draft National Disaster Resilience Strategy sets out 18 objectives under three headings - managing risks, effective response to and recovery from emergency, and strengthening societal resilience. We propose that these be repackaged into three separate programmes: A. Risk and Resiliency B. Utility and Infrastructure Governance and Management – potentially part of the new Infrastructure Body (In this form it could then be easily considered / adopted by this new body). C. Improving Societal Resilience – MCDEM	JH 8/12 Disagree. Too major change, and not supported.	None
					Question 3: Managing risks Highly support all objectives and success factors. Particularly important is inclusion of "Understand the economic impact of disaster and disruption, and the need for investment in resilience. Identify and develop financial mechanisms that support resilience activities". Collectively the stated objectives should expose and reveal the importance of infrastructure not only in exposure but also mitigation and adaptation.	JH 8/12 Noted	Managing Risks - potential additional commentary
					Effective response and recovery from emergencies Highly support all objectives and success factors. Of particular note is that embedding a strategic approach to recovery planning would very clearly include being better prepared in advance to reinstate infrastructure services at the household through to national infrastructure level with tools and surge capability immediately available. In many ways, we could be in a low level state of recovery at all times, be deploying and learning at small scales and being better prepared to react for large scale.	JH 8/12 Noted	Objective 12
					Strengthening societal resilience Highly support all objectives and success factors. Most appropriately infrastructure services are identified as a strong contributor to societal resilience and Objective 18 refers to "Address the capacity and adequacy of critical infrastructure systems, upgrade them as practicable, according to risks identified." The New Zealand Lifelines have been endeavouring with limited resources to pursue these ambitions for many years but dispersed and unclear responsibilities across government including the Ministry of Civil Defence are frustrating and fail to appreciate the new challenges presented by infrastructure interdependencies, increasing exposure to hazards, cascading effects and societal impacts. Unfortunately, the current proposed scope for the new Independent Infrastructure Body does not include this.	JH 8/12 Noted	None

#	Submitter		Date	Comment	Response	Action
				Question 4: There is no need to involve a broader range of stakeholders in governance of the strategy. The strategy advocates strongly for relationship and partnership building. The New Zealand Lifelines Council totally supports this and will continue to be one of the strong partnering entities. However this is different to the "governance of the strategy". Providing the relationship and partnership building is truly implemented this will provide confidence, demonstrate action and contribute to subsequent enhancement of the strategy through regular reviews. Currently the proposed strategy is understandably light on analytics and measurement, both key to achieving demonstrable action. It is considered critical that the metrics and monitoring of progress (Section 8.) are established quickly and that transparent public reporting be strictly adhered to at no greater than 2 yearly intervals. It is highly recommended there be a willingness to review the strategy at 5 years rather than 10 years as currently prescribed. This is suggested on account of the increasingly dynamic environment we are experiencing.	JH 8/12 Noted	For consideration: implementation and governance
				Question 5: Two particular strengths of the proposed strategy are: 1) The application of the New Zealand Treasury Living Standards Framework and "The Four Capitals" of Natural Capital, Social Capital, Human Capital and Financial/Physical Capital, and 2) Figure 2, page 17, "Model of a Resilient Nation" as extremely well and succinctly representing the resilience components. Particularly notable are the concentric semi-circles spanning "Resilient Homes, Families & Whanau" through to "Enabling, Empowering & Supportive Government" as resilience does depend on one's perspective – the authors are to be very much commended for this foresight.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				Question 6: No specific gaps relative to the current strategy. New challenges are appropriate and are supported.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				Foreword, last sentence, delete surplus "... of ..."	JH 8/12 Agree	Amend
				Page 7, section 1.2 – great to see work underway "to develop a national risk register". This is well overdue and will very much help inform future priorities and activities.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				Page 11, section 3. Risks to our wellbeing and prosperity – this section is very well considered. In particular we note reference to "just-in-time supply chains" and "How our risks may change in the future".	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				Page 15, section 4.2 Resilience: a working definition – the systemic nature of risks is totally appropriate and provides the foundation to many of the comments the New Zealand Lifelines Council is making in this submission.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				Page 17, under "... has infrastructure, services ..." – should include reference to telecommunications.	JH 8/12 Agree	Amend
				Page 37, Recommend subtitle to be edited to "Make resilience a strategic objective and embed it in appropriate actions, plans and strategies"	JH 8/12 Agree	Amend
				Page 37 under Businesses and organisations, recommend addition of a new subtitle along the following lines: Supply chain vulnerability Seek specific advice and assurances from suppliers as to their business continuity plans, stock carrying policies, exposure to non-supply and supply chain alert processes.	JH 8/12 Agree	Amend
67	Peter Wood	-	8/12/2018	While I endorse, laud, and indeed promote the intent evident in the draft National Resilience Strategy, I find it reads more like a thesis than a strategy. In my view the strategy could be split into a "Backgrounder" and a "Strategy". The latter may then benefit from greater succinctness and clarity of purpose.	JH 8/12 Disagree	None
				I commend the 2016 "Biosecurity 2025 Direction Statement for New Zealand's biosecurity system" as a similar but clearer 'strategy' that fits the 'strategy' requirements of the CDEM Act.	JH 8/12 Agree it's a great document, which I wish I had seen sooner	Review for anything we could amend
				I was lost towards the end of the Introduction, and in the subsequent body of the draft, when I could not identify the Priorities (later found in the small lettering of page 22 to be: 1. Managing risks; 2. Effective response to and recovery from emergencies; 3. Strengthening societal resilience). These three priorities (rather than "prongs"?) could be made far clearer by rewording of the following Introduction paragraph, from: *This Strategy proposes a three-pronged approach to improve our nation's resilience to disasters – what we can do to minimise the risks we face and limit the impacts to be managed, building our capability and capacity to manage emergencies when they do happen, and a deliberate effort to strengthen our wider societal resilience.* to - *This Strategy proposes three Priorities (each with six objectives) to improve our nation's resilience to disasters: 1. Managing risks - what we can do to minimise the risks we face and limit the impacts to be managed; 2. Effective response to and recovery from emergencies - building our capability and capacity to manage emergencies when they do happen, and 3. Strengthening societal resilience - a deliberate effort to strengthen our wider societal resilience.*	JH 8/12 Agree	Amend

					Comment	JH Response	Action
					The repetitive use of the collective "We" abdicates responsibility from any one or any agency, so how will strategic actions be promoted, encouraged, and supported (by who)?	JH 8/12 Noted. We intend to review use of 'we'	None
					The responsibility of the Minister is not acknowledged (s31 CDEM Act); it should be.	JH 8/12 Agree	Amend
					There is no (useful) acknowledgement of the increasing resilience actions by a number of agencies (e.g the EQC Resilience Strategy, the Resilience Programme of LINZ, the growth of Community Hubs by CDEM Groups - at least by WREMO, the increasing resilience of lifeline utilities, etc)	JH 8/12 Agree	Consider where we could add these references (strengths?)
					Good that the science programmes addressing DRR and resilience are acknowledged	JH 8/12 Noted.	None
					One entity named in the draft Strategy may not be known by most readers outside of the core State Service entities is - "the Hazard Risk Board" - will that Board have responsibilities for the Strategy (has it already endorsed the draft?).Add an appropriate reference (URL?) to the Hazard Risk Board.	JH 8/12 Agree	Amend
					There are many statements that "praise the quality of life in New Zealand" - but some are provocative, e.g. "We are a first world nation that has comprehensive education, health, and social welfare systems, which build our people and look after the most vulnerable in society." However, recent Government Reports and releases (of this week) suggest otherwise, e.g. Tomorrows Schools Independent Task Force; The Inquiry into Mental Health and Addiction; Housing New Zealand's Meth Assistance Programme for those in social housing evicted needlessly; Housing shortages, affordable housing, Social Welfare matters, etc ...	JH 8/12 Agree	Amend
					The repetitive use of "...first world country .." is an unfortunate, provocative, and for some international commentators an outdated term from the era of the cold war.	JH 8/12 Agree	Amend
					I fear that the National Resilience Strategy with its holistic, all of society (socialist), approach may be unpalatable for some in the House of Representatives to accept (s35 of the CDEM Act), this may impede implementation.	JH 8/12 Noted.	None
					The reference in 'Current States', 'Strengths 5 We have a very high insurance penetration' is not in context, EQC's 98% only addresses residential property, that should be noted. Also, this current state is already changing as insurers are increasing premiums in perceived higher risk areas of New Zealand following the realities following the Canterbury and Kaikoura earthquakes. Property owners are already considering not carrying insurance. The strategy should note this.	JH 8/12 Agree	Amend
					The statement on Governance is remarkable for not spelling out all existing governance mechanisms; I recommend expanding, at least to the government agencies of the wider State Sector, in some way, to improve understanding of where/how responsibilities lie in the following - "8.2 Governance of this strategy The Strategy will be owned and managed by existing governance mechanisms, including those through the National Security System, and at a regional level by CDEM Groups."	JH 8/12 Agree	Amend
					Question 1: 1. YES, I agree with the purpose, vision, and goal. However, under the mandate of the CDEM Act, the Strategy is the Crown's Strategy. On reading the Draft National Resilience Strategy I found it very difficult to find a clarity of purpose, vision and goal in the draft strategy because of being swamped in a sea of words of good social intent but with few actionable items or commitments to action - by the principle owner - the Crown. The use of the collective "we" reduces, even removes, responsibility from any one person or any one agency. 2. I have not been able to find the roadmap of actions nor a reference to it - yet it is referred to in - "The Strategy provides the vision and strategic direction, including to outline priorities and objectives for increasing New Zealand's resilience to disasters. The detail of how those objectives are to be achieved sits in a roadmap of actions, alongside other related key documents including the National CDEM Plan and Guide, the National Security Handbook, CDEM Group Plans, and a range of other supporting policies and plans". Is this to be a future 'measurable target' (s31.2.c CDEM Act)? 3. I cannot find, in the public domain, any reference to a National Risk Register (other than financial ...). I recommend deleting this reference OR make it a measurable target to be achieved.	JH 8/12 Noted. However these seem a bit nitpicky and not actionable.	None
					Question 2: 1. the priorities are okay, but the 2025 and 2030 goals are too far out (and, if climate change mitigation actions are not already in action before those dates then this National Resilience Strategy may be but a historical reference ....). 2. The priorities should acknowledge the advances since 2002 (the CDEM Act enactment) and the work already being undertaken domestically and globally on all six priorities. New Zealand is not starting from a zero resilience baseline.	JH 8/12 Noted. Fixing the dates issue. And I don't think that the document in any way insinuates that we are starting from zero resilience (far from it)	None
					Question 3: 1. The objectives do not acknowledge the advances since 2002 (the CDEM Act enactment) and the work already being undertaken domestically and globally on all three priorities and their six objectives. New Zealand is not starting from a zero baseline.	JH 8/12 Disagree. I think it does.	None

#	Name	Org	Date	Comment	Response	Action
				Question 4: 1. YES, a broad range of stakeholders need to be involved in governance, in a tiered approach, such as A. DES; B. ODESC; C. Hazard Risk Board ; D. CE's of all other State Service agencies (to have an annual monitoring/reporting responsibility).	JH 8/12 Noted.	None
				Question 5: 1. No, rather I am concerned it's high ideals may not be palatable by the House of Representatives at this time.	JH 8/12 Noted.	None
				Question 6: 1. No, the proposed strategy is so broad that it encompasses most everything!	JH 8/12 Noted.	None
68	Jeremy Holmes	WREMO	7/12/2018	Overall we think this is a well written document that sets a new direction for emergency management. The reference to the Sendai Framework is an important and positive step. The gaps we have identified mainly relate to the 'line of sight' between the other documents that support the NDRS and how CDEM directly influences the four capitals. The four capitals do not appear to be a good fit for measuring the success of the NDRS as it is heavily reliant on other sectors. Both risk and resilience are not mentioned in any of the four capitals. We think it would be helpful to clarify if the intent of this document: is it to compliment or replace the 4R's? (there appears to be some confusion).	JH 8/12 Noted. The 4Rs are still there...	None
				We note that the definition of resilience given in the Foreword is different to that outlined in the Key Terms. In the Foreword, the 'ability to anticipate' (ie intelligence) is included. However, this is not included in the Key Terms definition. Is this an oversight? Given the variety of definitions that already exist, we think a consistent definition should be used throughout the document to help reduce confusion. The definition should also align with the general direction of the Sendai Framework and the Emergency Management Sector Reforms.	JH 8/12 Noted.	For key terms consistency check (note Foreword)
				We note that there is no definition for Reduction – even though this is one of the key areas of Sendai, Disaster Risk Management and the Emergency Management Sector Reforms. It also features prominently in section 3.5. We think there should be such a definition given the significance of the 4R's and the stronger emphasis on reduction going forward. We also note that some of the definitions listed in the Key Terms are different to the definitions that have been used previously (eg 4R's definitions). Is this a conscious decision? If so, given the significance of the 4R's, we think there should probably be conversations or material produced to understand the significance of the changes.	JH 8/12 There is - disaster risk reduction (same thing). Will change definitions to Plan defs.	Key terms - amend DRR to include RR; review other 4Rs terms with Plan
				1. Purpose of this strategy Overall we think this all reads well and makes sense. It would be good to add a definition of what the 'disaster aspects of resilience' (section 1.3) are, as this is the scope of the NDRS. Additionally, a statement emphasising why we are making this shift and that it will require the practices and emphasis that are currently in place to be reconsidered and reprioritised.	JH 8/12 For consideration - scope	Scope
				2. Our vision: a safe and prosperous nation The four capitals, in our opinion, are not a good fit. The clear influence of emergency management is not clear and is hidden amongst these. This makes it difficult to see the true value of the work and influence of the sector. The reference to wellbeing and prosperity is tenuous and does not add clear value (more work on this required if it is to be used). The Model for a Resilient Nation (section 4.2.4) is much more relevant and clearly articulates our sector's influence. It would be able to measure progress within this. If there has to be a link to the four capitals, then another diagram aligning the Model for a Resilient Nation to the four capitals (as has been provided to WREMO staff previously) should be included.	JH 8/12 Disagree. Risk and resilience is a key part of the LSF (just not in this diagram - but in concept it is). I think the link is very clear? (we frequently talk about the 4 (or 5) environments - which are very clearly the same (or similar).	None
				3. Risks to our wellbeing and prosperity Our current risks are referred to in section 3.1 but not listed in detail. Nor is there a clear correlation between the risks and the strategy. In Group Plans, the risk assessment is required to influence the strategy and this influence is to be shown. This may be in another document somewhere. If so, there should be a reference to it and an indication of where to find it. After all, section 5 talks about identifying, prioritising and managing risk, but there does not appear to be any evidence of this being done in this document.	JH 8/12 We can refer to this IF or WHEN the NRR is released.	None
				4. Our goal: a resilient future This section is well written and the Model for a Resilient Nation is an excellent inclusion. We are supportive of the addition of Cultural resilience, Governance and the emphasis on underpinning this with an evidence base. However, in section 4.2, the blue circle definition of resilience excludes anticipation, while the paragraph next to it includes it. Once again, we think there needs to be consistency here and it needs to be consistent with other parts of the document.	JH 8/12 Agree. Intend to include 'anticipate' in the definition	None
				Section 4.5 is a good summary. We suggest strengthening the second paragraph to emphasise that current CDEM practices need to evolve to address these future challenges through a co-creation process with communities. This begins with what skills sets we want to attract to the sector and how we build the capability to achieve these future goals.	JH 8/12 Agree.	Amendment to section 4.5 as suggested

					Comments	Response	Action
					Our priorities for improved resilience Overall we think the three priorities are well written. It would be good to see how these objectives link to and influence the Model for a Resilient Nation and the four capitals. We also think there is an opportunity to reference other documents that provide more detail on the 'how' and the responsibilities of key partners in delivery - as the 'how' is important for those who need to support these objectives and outcomes.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
					5. Managing Risks While the general content of this section is fine, we think there should be much stronger emphasis on anticipation (ie intelligence) to help inform decision-making in this area. Not only is this international best practice but it is consistent with the direction of the Emergency Management Sector Reforms.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
					6. Effective response to and recovery from emergencies While the "whole-of-society" approach is excellent, we think the title "effective response to a recovery from emergencies" is at odds with the following content of the "what we want to see" part which talks about "a seamless end-to-end emergency management system", "4R's" and "having the chance to reduce the impacts before they get out of control". Indeed, the content of the whole section appears to suggest that the section is about "response" in the broadest (reduction, readiness and response) sense, along with recovery. If this is the case, then we think the section should perhaps be re-titled: a seamless end-to-end emergency management system or something similar which more accurately reflects that it covers all 4R's. Given the "whole of society approach" that is outlined and the wide range of actors that are involved, we think this section could be strengthened by emphasising that the sector needs to evolve to be able to play more of a facilitation role across the 4R's. We also note that there does not appear to be a direct reference for the CDEM sector to prepare for, link to and support (ie work with) the inevitable organic community response and recovery. We think this a key oversight.	JH 8/12 Disagree with this assertion, but worth re-visiting.	None
					7. Strengthening societal resilience In Objective 13 we suggest adding empowerment after education, via a community partnership approach to emphasise that CDEM needs to find ways to proactively create a more empowered community approach across the 4R's. Apart from that, we are very supportive of the collective impact approach.	JH 8/12 Agree	Objective 13
					8. Our commitment to action We think more can be done in this section to change the emphasis from producing a strategy to the effective implementation of one. The following quotes could perhaps be used as a basis: · Without strategy, execution is aimless · Without execution, strategy is useless · It's not just about what you do but about the way in which you go about it · It's all about relationships If one accepts that strategy is the ways in which desirable ends are achieved with the available means (ie an ends, ways, means approach) then to effectively deliver a national strategy one not only needs to know what means are available, but also have the buy-in of those who are responsible for implementing it. Given the complexity of the environment and way in which knowledge and experience can now be gained through the internet, this requires a truly collaborative approach. While this may mean that some things take longer to achieve as a result, the benefit of doing so is that they are more likely to be fit-for-purpose once completed and are more likely to have the support of others when it comes to getting things done.	JH 8/12 Agree in principle	For consideration: governance and implementation
					Transparency and social accountability While transparency is key to this process - as it helps reduce suspicion and helps build trust and confidence – so too is the ability to have open and honest conversations. This includes being willing and able to have difficult conversations as and when they are required, and being genuine and authentic in all interactions with others – regardless of where they are in the system as the system requires all to play their part in the strategy if it is to be truly successful.	JH 8/12 Noted	None

#	Name	Organisation	Date	Submission	Response	Action
				Governance We note that the document states that the strategy will be owned and managed by existing governance mechanisms, including those through the National Security System and at a regional level by CDEM Groups. If effective strategy implementation requires effective governance, how do we know that the existing mechanisms are fit-for-purpose? We note that the Model of a Resilient Nation identifies Governance as a key component of the model, yet the document (section 8.2) only attributes one sentence to it. We think this a major deficiency and something that requires more work. If we accept that the strategy is, ultimately, a multi-year programme of work comprising of various projects with various stakeholders (or "partners" if we want to be truly collaborative), then we think the strategy should also include content on introducing or developing effective project and programme management skills at all levels as part of the gradual professionalisation of the sector. If the effective implementation of the strategy is dependent on these skills, then we think the introduction or development of these skills should be done as a matter of priority.	JH 8/12 Noted	For consideration: governance and implementation
				Measuring and monitoring progress Recognising that this is a new area and that the measuring of progress is under development, good programme management requires a clear 'line of sight' to be identified between the current state and the future state. To do this, one needs to have a good understanding of what both states look like (noting that thinking can evolve over time) and the ability to measure progress over time. With the four capitals we think it is very easy for individual sectors (such as emergency management) to be lost amongst all other sectors and to lose sight of emergency management actually is and how it contributes to the whole. This being eth case, we think this is an area that requires more work. There is also reference to a National Disaster Resilience road map. What is this? Where is it?	JH 8/12 Noted	For consideration: M&E
				Appendices In closing, we think there is an opportunity to include more information on or from other relevant documents in the appendices such as the relevant risk assessment document, the MCDEM Business Plan (which does not appear to be mentioned in the strategy even though it is presumably the means through which the strategy will be implemented on an annual basis) and relevant DGLs. This document does not stand alone. We think it is important to recognise this and it be captured in the overall narrative.	JH 8/12 Largely disagree. MCDEM's business plan will be MCDEM's contribution to it, but that's not the implementation plan (only their part of it)	None
69	Tristan Wadsworth, Submissions Officer	New Zealand Archaeological Association	7/12/2018	It is the opinion and concern of the New Zealand Archaeological Association that the National Disaster Resilience Strategy does not adequately consider the effect of disasters on New Zealand's heritage. The Heritage New Zealand Pouhere Taonga Act 2014 and its predecessor, the Historic Places Act 1993, provide blanket protection to all archaeological sites, specified in the recent act as "any place in New Zealand, including any building or structure (or part of a building or structure), that – (i) was associated with human activity that occurred before 1900 or is the site of the wreck of any vessel where the wreck occurred before 1900; and (ii) provides or may provide, through investigation by archaeological methods, evidence relating to the history of New Zealand;"	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				Any works that may damage or modify an archaeological site require the grant of an archaeological authority by Heritage New Zealand Pouhere Taonga under Section 44 of the act. Archaeological recording is a regular requirement of these authorities, as the archaeological record is a finite resource, and there is only ever one opportunity to excavate and record archaeological remains. Both archaeological sites, as specified under the legislation, and other significant heritage places are vulnerable to the effects of natural disasters, both due to the destruction of built structures and to the need for subsequent earthworks for repair and reconstruction.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				The 2010 and 2011 Canterbury earthquakes provide a case study for how heritage is affected in the face of a national disaster. An expedited system of granting archaeological authorities was developed under the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011, but Heritage New Zealand Pouhere Taonga was unprepared both in terms of resources and previous experience to deal with the volume of authority requests and unauthorised works that would occur over the next several years.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				In the aftermath of the earthquakes, several hundred historic buildings were demolished, often without the required authority or prior recording that is a regular condition of archaeological authorities. Christchurch City Council's Draft Heritage Strategy 2019-2029 states that "almost half of the central city's protected heritage buildings, and more than a third of all protected heritage buildings in Christchurch, were demolished", amounting to 204 of 588 protected buildings lost. In addition to these hundreds of other unlisted and unprotected 19th century buildings have been lost, the exact numbers of which are not known. Many of these buildings were demolished unnecessarily, and could have been repaired or saved.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				Numerous subsurface archaeological deposits were also destroyed as part of the post-earthquake works. The true loss of heritage fabric and archaeological remains in the city is not known, but includes the complete destruction of hundreds of archaeological sites. The Christchurch Cathedral, still in a state of partial ruin as a result of the quakes, remains a powerful symbol of the heritage that the city has lost.	JH 8/12 Noted	None

				Submission	Response	Action
				The draft resilience strategy considers tikanga and kaitiakitanga guiding principles (Section 4.1.1) and the need to "guard and protect the places that are special to us." However, this neglects to include New Zealand's unique heritage places in these principles. These places are physical manifestations of the memory of society, and can serve as markers of history, and the challenging events New Zealand has weathered. Greater consideration of how these places would be of significance in terms of social resilience, cultural resilience, and the resilience of the built environment should have been included in the production of this strategy.	JH 8/12 Noted	For consideration in values, and objective 17
				Consequently, the strategy insufficiently considers the risk of disasters to heritage or the archaeological record, and does not appear to have taken into consideration lessons from recent disasters in Canterbury and on the Kaikoura coast regarding the effects of disasters on heritage.	JH 8/12 Disagree. It has been considered (ref paper on cultural resilience), but we can't go into a lot of detail on each subject like this.	None
				The New Zealand Archaeological Association lauds the goals of the strategy, and the need for resilience in the face of a national disaster, but urges the New Zealand government to consider the importance of heritage and its role as kaitiaki of these places, which act as symbols of that resilience. It also urges the government to better plan for the ways in which this heritage can be protected and preserved in the face of disaster.	JH 8/12 Noted	For consideration in values, and objective 17
				The New Zealand Archaeological Association therefore recommends that the National Disaster Resilience Strategy include greater provision and consideration of the value of heritage in resilience, in particular including heritage under the kaitiakitanga section of Section 4.1.1 "Guiding principles for this Strategy".	JH 8/12 Noted	For consideration in values, and objective 17
70	David Wither	University of Otago | Centre for Sustainability	7/12/18	The comment made by the rural team's submission, as quoted below, sets the scene for the point to be made here. [(p.2-3 Rural team NDRS submission)] In addition to the excellent points made above, the emphasis on social resilience in the strategy is particularly exciting from a student/researcher point of view because it provides legitimacy to a new and challenging area of research within a New Zealand context. While the academic concept of 'social ecological resilience' heavily emphasises the importance of social resilience, research in the area is sparse and extremely context dependent, and the New Zealand context is unique. The signposting of the importance of social resilience in the Sendai Framework (international), the NDRS (National), and academic literature provides strong incentive for continuing research in this area in New Zealand.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				It should also be noted that the notion of social resilience is strongly aligned with the current governments focus on wellbeing, as well meshing nicely with the Treasuries Living Standards Framework. The Sendai Framework emphasises the importance of an "all-ofsociety and all-of-State institutions engagement" (p.5, Foreword, Sendai Framework). In this context, New Zealand occupies a somewhat unique position where both government policy priorities and scientific research are strongly aligned, allowing for a unique partnership between science and policy in this particular area. This could be internationally significant as New Zealand is a small country with a strong history of, and reputation for, rapid change and leading the world in certain areas (eg Women's suffrage). Research into social resilience, combined with the governments focus on wellbeing and the living standards framework could provide a unique case study and demonstration of what an "allof-society and all-of-state institutions engagement" might look like.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				Some criticisms that may be received around the notion of 'social resilience' would be questions about 'what it actually means', or accusations of it being impractical, unrealistic or idealistic - 'airy fairy' so to speak. These arguments should not prompt the removal of references to the importance of social resilience from the strategy. While those questions may not be able to be answered with firm certainty at this current point in time, it's inclusion will help ensure that research is conducted which will be able to provide those answers in time. It should also be noted that removal of the language around social resilience could have a significant negative impact, whereas there is no similar negative possibility by keeping the language in there. Thus, there is good reason to keep it, and no good reason to remove it.	JH 8/12 Noted	None

				Rural proofing the strategy This point addresses question 5 of the consultation questions "Are there any gaps or challenges with the current national civil defence emergency management strategy that are not addressed by the proposed strategy?" I would strongly recommend emphasising and strengthening the language around the importance of protecting people's livelihoods within the strategy, especially in a rural context. This is already signposted in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction expected outcome and goals section, where specific mention is paid to reducing losses in livelihoods. While some progress in building resilience and reducing losses and damages has been achieved, a substantial reduction of disaster risk requires perseverance and persistence, **with a more explicit focus on people and their health and livelihoods,** and regular follow-up. Building on the Hyogo Framework for Action, the present Framework aims to achieve the following outcome over the next 15 years: **The substantial reduction of disaster risk** and losses in lives, **livelihoods** and health and in the economic, physical, social, cultural and environmental assets of persons, businesses, communities and countries. (p.13 Sendai Framework/Expected Outcomes and Goals	JH 8/12 Noted	For consideration: rural
				To explain: from a rural point of view (and in context of the need to rural proof the strategy), a focus simply on people's lives is not enough, you also need to look at their livelihoods.	JH 8/12 Noted	None
				One thing that has come out quite strongly in my fieldwork is that farmers will not leave their stock. They love their animals, and their livelihoods depend on them. Following the 2016 Hurunui-Kaikoura earthquake, most of the attention was focused on making sure the people were ok, but no provisions were made for stock. This was particularly problematic as the earthquake hit at the apex of a four-year drought, and significant damage was done to water storage tanks. While the results of my study are yet to be published, I can say with certainty that I have had a significant number of farmers and local representative discuss the importance of, and harm caused by, animal welfare issues during the disaster period.	JH 8/12 Noted. Supports the submission of SPCA	For consideration: rural
				I understand that from an urban point of view, a focus on people's animals is not a priority. However, as this quote from the rural team's submission to the NDRS explains, rural communities differ significantly from their urban counterparts. {p.6 Rural team submission to the NDRS)	JH 8/12 Noted	For consideration: rural
				As it currently stands, there are three mentions of livelihoods in the current proposed strategy, on Page 2, 4 and 11. None of these discuss the importance of helping protect people's livelihoods, rather the focus is on rebuilding livelihoods during the reconstruction phase, post disaster, or it is descriptive in terms of how disasters impact people. It would be extremely useful to sign post the importance of helping protect livelihoods during a disaster, and in the direct aftermath, such as happened following the 2016 Hurunui/Kaikoura earthquake. This would have a significant positive impact on the resilience of our rural communities and help restore/build trust between rural communities and government responses to disasters.	JH 8/12 Noted	For consideration: rural
71	Alistair Davies	-	21/11/18	I think the wording of objective 15 is unclear in terms of what action can be taken from this objective.	JH 9/12 Noted	Objective 15
				I also think there is an opportunity to encourage the use of, and encourage participation in, participatory governance to increase resilience. For example, objective 16 writes for a whole of city/district/region approach to resilience, but disasters are inherently local and require a local perspective to increase resilience, particularly in rural communities where community members are likely to be the first line of response. Involving communities in resilience decision-making is an effective way of increasing this resilience. Another example is on page 38 of the draft, community members could be encouraged to participate in participatory governance, and pages 39 and 40 could more explicitly advocate for including community members in decision-making processes.	JH 9/12 Noted	For consideration: rural
72	Natasha Moir	Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu	10/12/18	Te Rūnanga endorses the general purpose of the proposed Strategy, to ensure that all New Zealand communities and households are as well prepared as possible to deal with natural disasters.		

					3.1. This response is made on behalf of Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu (Te Rūnanga), statutorily recognised as the representative tribal body of Ngāi Tahu whānui and established as a body corporate on 24th April 1996 under section 6 of the Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu Act 1996 (the Act). 3.2. Te Rūnanga notes for the Ministry the following relevant provisions of our constitutional documents: Section 3 of the Act States: *"This Act binds the Crown and every person (including any body politic or corporate) whose rights are affected by any provisions of this Act."* Section 15(1) of the Act states: *"Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu shall be recognised for all purposes as the representative of Ngāi Tahu Whānui."*		
					The Charter of Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu constitutes Te Rūnanga as the kaitiaki of the tribal interests. 3.4. Te Rūnanga respectfully requests that the Ministry accord this response the status and weight due to the tribal collective, Ngāi Tahu whānui, currently comprising over 62,000 members, registered in accordance with section 8 of the Act. 3.5. Notwithstanding its statutory status as the representative voice of Ngāi Tahu whānui "for all purposes", Te Rūnanga accepts and respects the right of individuals and Papatipu Rūnanga to make their own responses in relation to this matter.		
					Te Rūnanga notes the following particular interests in the Discussion Documents: Treaty Relationship • Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu have an expectation that the Crown will honour Te Tiriti o Waitangi (the Treaty) and the principles upon which the Treaty is founded. • Te Rūnanga has a specific interest by virtue of the Ngāi Tahu Claims Settlement Act 1998 (NTCSA). The Act provides for Ngāi Tahu and the Crown to enter an age of co-operation, which is the basis of the post-Settlement relationship underpinning this response. 4 Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu Te Rūnanga Interests in disaster resilience • The Crown apology to Ngāi Tahu, as shown in Appendix One, recognises the Treaty principles of rangatiratanga, partnership, active participation in decision-making, and active protection.		
					Rangatiratanga • Te Rūnanga upholds the mana of Ngāi Tahu through leadership.		
					Kaitiakitanga • Kaitiakitanga is about ensuring that future generations have the resources and ability to sustain them in the way that generations before have been sustained. We are guided always by the whakatauki: "Mō tātou, ā, mō kā uri ā muri ake nei" (For us, and those who come after us).		
					Whānaungatanga • Te Rūnanga has a responsibility to enable the social, cultural and economic wellbeing of Ngāi Tahu whānui.		
					With regards to the Ngāi Tahu takiwā, Section 5 of the Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu Act 1996 statutorily defines the Ngāi Tahu takiwā as those areas "south of the northern boundaries described in the decision of the Māori Appellate Court ..." which in effect is south of Te Parinui o Whiti on the East Coast and Kahurangi Point on the West Coast of the South Island.		
					Section 2 of the Ngāi Tahu Claims Settlement Act 1998 statutorily defines the Ngāi Tahu claim area as being: "the area shown on allocation plan NT 504 (SO 19900), being— (a) the takiwā of Ngāi Tahu Whānui; and (b) the coastal marine area adjacent to the coastal boundary of the takiwā of Ngāi Tahu Whānui; and (c) the New Zealand fisheries waters within the coastal marine area and exclusive economic zone adjacent to the seaward boundary of that coastal marine area;— and, for the purposes of this definition, the northern sea boundaries of the coastal marine area have been determined using the equidistance principle, and the northern sea boundaries of the exclusive economic zone have been determined using the perpendicular to the meridian principle from the seaward boundary of the coastal marine area (with provision to exclude part of the New Zealand fisheries waters around the Chatham Islands)." (See the map attached appendix Two) [in email attached]		
					How can we weave Te Ao Māori through the proposed strategy? Whilst Te Rūnanga commends the Ministry's recognition of the significance of Te Ao Māori to this Strategy and disaster management more broadly, we have concerns with the way this has been framed in the proposed draft.		

	Te Rūnanga consider this understandable, given the complexity of the Māori world, and the Strategy's national-level focus, however, there are some statements in the proposed Strategy regarding te Ao Māori which we find somewhat problematic. Our concern is that these will be detrimental to the Strategy's efficacy when it comes to implementation.		
	Te Rūnanga advises that the Strategy's interpretation of te Ao Māori requires revision moving forward. In order for this to be as effective and credible as possible, Te Rūnanga further notes that it is necessary for tangata whenua to be involved in the revision and drafting of those parts of the Strategy which do seek to speak to and for tangata whenua.		
	Te Rūnanga strongly recommends that the Ministry forms a small Māori working group, to sit alongside the Strategy team in order to co-design these parts of the Strategy to ensure it is fit for purpose.		
	It is our expectation that this group will include representation by those iwi which have been impacted by the disasters of recent years in their respective regions. Collaborating with those iwi which have first-hand experience of both the State processes and protocols that come into effect at these times, and of the profound physical and physiological impact these have on the ground will enhance the efficiency of the Strategy, and help to maximise its effectiveness.		
	This is further necessary as the values and priorities of iwi Māori are not homogeneous – and will differ further according to region, nature of disaster and iwi capacity during states of emergency. What a working group will be able to facilitate is a way for the Strategy to provide for the diversity of Māori communities during disasters, in order to ensure that the overall integrity of the disaster response, recovery and resilience system is maintained.		
	Te Rūnanga recommends that: • The tangata whenua-specific sections of the Strategy be revised in order to appropriately weave te Ao Māori through the Strategy; and		
	The Ministry forms a small, targeted working group of iwi advisors who have experience of significant disasters in order to co-design the parts of the Strategy which pertain to tangata whenua alongside the Strategy team.		
	Does the discussion about Māori concepts of resilience, and resilience of Māori, resonate with you? Te Rūnanga acknowledges and highly regards the inclusion of Māori resilience within the Strategy, particularly situated as this is within the context of the Treaty partnership. However, as intimated above, the discussion requires further development.		
	Te Rūnanga is concerned that there are some generalisations within 4.3 of the Strategy which do not quite portray Māori concepts fundamentally, nor Māori society. More concerning still are the assumptions we identify within the discussion as a result of the former misconstructions.		
	The means of iwi vary across the country, and vary still more at the hapū, marae and kāinga levels, which, in our experience, is where disasters are most acutely borne. In respect of our own iwi, we do not consider it appropriate for an expectation to be placed on all 60,000 of our iwi members to shoulder the brunt of the responsibility for their wider communities by virtue of their whakapapa. Te Rūnanga also consider the current descriptions of manaakitanga, whanaungatanga and mana to be particularly inappropriate, as these read as though our fundamental principles are a resource of convenience to be tapped at whim.		
	Te Rūnanga also advises that the discussion would benefit from clarifying the focus of Māori and iwi involvement during disasters to better facilitate Māori resilience. Te Rūnanga advise that this is key to ensuring the operational success of the Strategy, in line with the lessons we have all learnt since the previous Strategy was produced.		
	Te Rūnanga reiterate our earlier recommendations that a working group involving relevant iwi be established to work with the Strategy team to revise the discussion. Te Rūnanga cannot speak for other iwi affected by disasters within their own respective rohe, but for our own part, Te Rūnanga would be very glad to work with the Ministry in order to progress this, the better to advance and meaningfully give effect to our partnership.		
	The proposed strategy envisages that emergency management agencies would partner with iwi to deliver strategy objectives. At a practical level, what does that mean to you? Te Rūnanga strongly supports the Strategy regarding the proposed partnership between iwi and Emergency Management agencies. We seek a partnership where Ngāi Tahu can be involved in emergency planning, decision-making and working collaboratively with other agencies, maximising our ability to respond effectively to future natural disasters and to lessen the impact on whānau and communities.		
	Te Rūnanga recommends that: • It is essential to a meaningful partnership that relationships are formed and strengthened prior to an emergency. A meaningful partnership between emergency services and iwi will require relationships being strengthened at the local, regional and national level with emergency services as described below:		

	•Local – where not already in place, relationships need to be strengthened between Papatipu Rūnanga, marae and the local Civil Defence and territorial authorities. At a minimum this would require both parties knowing who to contact in an emergency to ask for support. Ideally, local Civil Defence and Papatipu Rūnanga would work together to prepare a marae emergency plan, develop an understanding on how they will work with each other in an emergency and to build the capability of the marae to respond in an emergency.		
	• As seen in previous emergencies, marae often become the natural gathering places for affected whānau and their wider communities. For the most part, marae are able to provide a social-wellbeing response for whānau members Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu te rūnanga responses to the ministry's questions from their area and further afield as they are well-equipped to assist in a welfare capacity during an emergency response; have established tribal networks; and have an inherent ability to manaaki large groups of people.		
	• Te Rūnanga advises that strengthening communities at the local level is the key to fostering national resilience.		
	• Regional – Te Rūnanga is currently strengthening relationships with South Island Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups to be more involved in emergency response planning and to provide an iwi perspective into region-wide emergency management.		
	• The recent agreement in the Government's response to the Targeted Advisory Group recommendations to include iwi in Co-ordinating Executive Groups (CEGs) allows iwi to input advice to the Groups, helps iwi to form relationships with the other members of the CEG, and recognises the role of iwi in an emergency.		
	• In an emergency response, if required, an iwi representative should be present at the Emergency Operations Centre/Emergency Coordination Centre to help communicate the needs of the marae/Māori community, and also to communicate iwi capability to assist in an emergency for a coordinated response.		
	• Te Rūnanga advises that both Papatipu Rūnanga and Te Rūnanga should have relationships at the regional, CDEM Group level.		
	• National – Iwi need to be recognised and acknowledged as a Treaty partner, having equivalent status to local authorities in response and recovery legislation, as the current Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act is silent on iwi involvement.		
	• Following the Christchurch earthquakes Ngāi Tahu was recognised as a statutory partner in the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act with the same status as local authorities – this was a watermark achievement of Treaty partnership recognition. It meant Ngāi Tahu were at the table, involved at both the governance and project levels, with Te Rūnanga able to be involved in all parts of the recovery, whether this was in terms of environmental, economic, cultural, social factors or leadership.		
	• In comparison, following the Kaikōura/Hurunui earthquakes, Te Rūnanga was not recognised as a Statutory Partner in legislation and therefore did not have the same legal recognition and expression of mana in the Hurunui/Kaikōura Earthquakes Recovery Act 2016. This was detrimental to the recovery process overall, as rather than actually working together with other agencies, Te Rūnanga was preoccupied having to justify playing a part in the decision-making process.		
	For Te Rūnanga, it is this contrast of experiences which particularly necessitates the provision for mana whenua in both emergency legislation and disaster management policy. Many unnecessary challenges can be mitigated by setting relationships and communication channels in place at the strategic level.		
	The Ministry establish a working group of iwi familiar with disaster response and emergency management, in order to identify the challenges previously faced by tangata whenua during such events, in order to identify what challenges and issues Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu te rūnanga responses to the ministry's questions were faced, how these were overcome, and, most importantly when we plan for resilience, how these can be avoided in the future.		
	Do you agree with the purpose, vision and goal of the proposed strategy? If not, which of these do you disagree with and what changes would you suggest? We would also appreciate your views if you do agree with these factors. Te Rūnanga agrees with the purpose, vision and goal of the proposed Strategy. Particularly the recognition of the need to build resilience and manage risks across the four capitals with a focus on wellbeing as its core goal.		
	Te Rūnanga also agrees with the Strategy's approach to promoting a wide, whole-of-society, participatory and inclusive approach where everyone has a role in reducing risk and strengthening resilience. However, the Strategy should allow for the special recognition of tangata whenua, based in the Treaty partnership.		
	Te Rūnanga recommends that: • Specific allowance be made for the Treaty partnership as between iwi, local authorities and State agencies.		

				While thoroughly endorsing the Guiding Principles of the Strategy, Te Rūnanga suggests the following additions to the values presented alongside these: 1. Kaitiakitanga, tūrangawaewae Recommendation Te Rūnanga recommends that: • The protection of areas of cultural importance be added to the 'Kaitiakitanga, tūrangawaewae' principle. Given that, for example, in the Kaikōura/Hurunui earthquake recovery, there has been competing demand between rebuilding coastal infrastructure, and the protection of and damage to culturally significant areas.		
				2. Whānaungatanga, kotahitanga Recommendation Te Rūnanga recommends that: • The Treaty Partnership be incorporated into the 'Whanaungatanga, Kotahitanga' principle. This is a		
				Strategy Priorities Te Rūnanga agrees with the proposed priorities.		
				Do you agree with the objectives and success factors of the proposed strategy? Objective 7 5.24. "A partnership approach with iwi means a collaborative approach and full engagement in relation to emergency management." Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu te rūnanga responses to the ministry's questions Te Rūnanga endorses the incorporation of this into the Objectives. However, Te Rūnanga also advise that we are concerned the significance of this message is somewhat misplaced within this particular objective.		
				Te Rūnanga recommends that: • The statement regarding the partnership approach with iwi needs to be moved from Objective 7 to another objective, the better to fulfil its aims.		
				• The Strategy facilitate relationships and channels of communication to guarantee an effective partnership between iwi and relevant authorities and agencies during emergency situations.		
				Objective 9 - Te Rūnanga recommends that: • Iwi be recognised and acknowledged as a Treaty partner, having a level of status equivalent to local authorities in response and recovery systems (including emergency legislation and disaster management policy), as the current Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act is silent on iwi involvement. Te Rūnanga advise that it is necessary for iwi to have recognition at the same level as councils in order to ensure better holistic service delivery to communities more efficiently.		
73	Elrasheid Elkhidir	–	6/12/18	In response to your Consultation Question No. 6, I would like to draw your attention to our efforts in a field that may be of great help in achieving the goals of the National Disaster Resilience Strategy. Attached is a brief summary of the project and our progress up to date.		
74	Ted Howard		10/12/18	I have not finished reading the strategy, and while only half way through, it does generally seem an excellent document, particularly in the systems approach taken in section 4.2. The one major flaw in the document is the focus in financial capital; which is now in itself a significant source of risk. I acknowledge the many very powerful things that our economic system does, particularly in the realm of network creation and maintenance (many levels), distributed trust, distributed governance, distributed risk management, and more.		
				The problem is that all market value is predicated on scarcity, and exponential increases in technology are enabling the production of universal abundance in an ever expanding set of goods and services. Thus holding on to the concept of markets causes an exponential increase in the tendency to concentrate wealth into fewer and fewer hands – which breaks all the distributed functions that markets once sustained. So it is a very complex, and very subtle set of transitions required across many dimensions; as our long term security is very much dependent upon technology and abundance, yet our existing systems are founded in human labour and scarcity.		
				Developing a sufficiently high level strategy to enable transition to a post scarcity world is (beyond any shadow of reasonable doubt in my understanding) the single greatest risk mitigation and resilience strategy possible.		

75	Jane Murray	Nelson Marlborough District Health Board	11/12/18	NMH congratulates the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency on its approach for this strategy to improve resilience to disasters by reducing disaster risk and limiting the impacts to be managed, building capability and capacity to manage emergencies and a deliberate effort to strengthen out wider societal resilience. The incorporation of the Living Standards Framework into the Strategy puts overall wellbeing at its core. Wellbeing is influenced by a wide range of environmental, social and behavioural factors. The most effective way to maximise people's wellbeing is to take these factors into account in decision making which this document has done well.		
				Question1: NMH agrees with the purpose, vision and goal of the proposed strategy. NMH supports the holistic approach the Strategy has taken and supports the focus on wellbeing. NMH agrees with the attributes of a safe and resilience community as listed on page 17. By focusing on social, cultural, economic, environmental and governmental resilience, communities in New Zealand will be more prepared to tackle future risks. It is pleasing to see that the Strategy also incorporates Maori concepts of resilience and whakaoranga1 which can build on the wider resilience across New Zealand. NMH supports the focus on developing strong ties between the government agencies because this will also build resilience. As part of recovery from an emergency it is important to work with people to have a focus on being prepared again. Resilience is important to build and facilitate in all our communities which will be very helpful should an emergency occur, however it will assist generally with all events and incidents that affect our communities. We need to ensure that recovery and support is understood to be an ongoing process across many years, eg 5 years onwards.		
				Question 2: NMH agrees with the priorities of the proposed strategy.		
				Question 3: NMH agrees with the objectives and success factors of the proposed strategy.		
				Question 4: NMH agrees that there should be a broad range of stakeholders that need to be involved in the governance of the strategy, however the document does not include a stakeholders list. Further clarification on this would be useful. It is important that people are supported primarily through primary and community networks. The secondary services and government agencies should support from behind to facilitate and meet the needs identified, led by the community themselves.		
				Question 5: Particular Strengths of the Strategy: NMH was pleased to see that the Strategy has shifted focus from managing disasters to managing risk, which enable organisations and individuals to cope more effectively when disasters strike. It is also pleasing to see that there has been a broader "whole of society" approach to risk, that everyone has a role in reducing and managing risk. It is good to emphasise that this will then support communities to be resilient and support each other for all incidents and events.		
				Question 6: Gaps in the Strategy: 10. The Strategy has given particular mention to supporting vulnerable groups and raising resilience of the overall population, however it does not acknowledge the impact disasters, specifically extreme weather events as a result of climate change, may have on an ageing population. Older people may be physically, financially and emotionally less resilient to deal with the effects of a changing climate than the rest of the population. The insecurity and heightened exposure to certain threats caused by a changing climate are compounded in old age by reduced capacity for coping independently.2 Vulnerability will be determined by exposure level, likelihood and magnitude of the threat and different coping capacities. We support that all plans should have a targeted approach for all identified vulnerable population groups, including Pasifika, Maori, migrants and refugees, older people, people with disabilities, people with mental health concerns and children. Points of contact at community level must be identified and brought into response and recovery planning. We have found community navigator roles particularly useful to support vulnerable population groups.		
				Climate change may have an effect on the health of older people. The United States Environmental Protection Agency have outlined the key health concerns as follows Increase in extreme heat events and higher temperatures can increase the risk of illness and death especially with people with congestive heart failure and diabetes. Higher temperatures have been linked to increased hospital admissions for people with heart and lung conditions. In Europe's 2003 heatwave, 70% of the 14,800 deaths were people aged over 75 years old.		
				Extreme weather events such as flooding and storms are expected to increase. Older adults again are more likely to suffer storm and flood-related deaths. Over 50% of deaths in Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Sandy were those aged over 65. If an extreme event requires evacuation, older adults have a high risk of both physical and mental health impacts. Health impacts could be exacerbated with power outages and interruptions to essential services.		
				Changing weather patterns and increased fire risk may increase the amount of pollution, dust and smoke in the air which will worsen respiratory conditions common in older adults such as asthma, heart conditions and chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder (COPD).		

				Increased temperatures could increase the number of vector borne diseases which pose a health risk to those with already weakened immune systems.		
				Social isolation and loneliness can affect between 33%-50% of the older population4 and this can affect an individuals ability to respond to disasters. It is vital that communities can build social connectedness in order to strengthen overall societal resilience to disasters.		
76	Neil Miller	Engineering New Zealand	10/12/18	He matakitenga o te Aotearoa manawaroa would appear to be the proposed strategy vision, but the document doesn't make a single vision completely clear. In our view, the initial vision of a "safe and prosperous nation" in section 2 (page 9) does not promote an informed risk conversation. 'Safe' is an absolute statement — the reality is that we can only ever be 'safe enough'. We can however be a resilient and prosperous nation, as the strategy outlines. Indeed, the strategy says in section 4 (page 14) headed "our goal: a resilient future" that the vision is of "a resilient nation". The vision is restated as "a resilient New Zealand" (page 20). Appendix 1 has yet another and presumably final version of the vision, "New Zealand is a disaster resilient nation that acts proactively to manage risks and build resilience in a way that contributes to the wellbeing and prosperity of all New Zealanders" and another statement of the goal.		
				We suggest the strategy adopt a single, strong vision that is referred to consistently throughout the document, and that this vision is focussed on resilience not safety.		
				OUTCOME INDICATORS We support and agree with the intent and much of the content of the strategy, which is a high-level document with broad objectives and descriptions of success. But there are no resilience outcome indicators. We suggest that we need a resilience index to measure resilience attributes. At this stage we would expect to see some high-level indicators as part of the proposed strategy		
				INFRASTRUCTURE RESILIENCE As we highlight in Engineering a Better New Zealand, progressively enhancing the resilience of our infrastructure is vital for the economy and wellbeing of the country. We consider this doesn't receive sufficient emphasis in the strategy, being somewhat lost within section 7 on strengthening societal resilience. We would like to see infrastructure resilience given further attention, perhaps in a dedicated section.		
				THE ROLE OF ENGINEERS Finally, we note that engineers are not identified as a strength in Appendix 3. We have led the world in many aspects of safety engineering and resilience. As is noted, we have seemingly had more than our fair share of crises, emergencies, and disasters over the last ten years. When a disaster occurs, it is our engineers who are on the ground working as a key part of the Civil Defence Emergency Management response from the outset. We are committed to doing all we can to engineer a more resilient New Zealand.		
77	s9(2)(a) of behalf of Lianne Dalziel	Christchurch City Council Mayor Addendum	12/12/18	Before I comment on the proposed strategy, Council colleagues wanted me to specifically point out the challenges that a city council faces when proposals are made to strip them of one of their core functions. In everything we do, whether it's infrastructure or community development, there is a connection. When a major component of our responsibility is removed or centralised, then this can impact in more far-reaching ways than may be apparent. I use the example of the Government considering the future of Three Waters, which make up around 60% of Council spend. The centralisation of this function could impact on our city's resilience in ways that a strategy such as this couldn't even begin to address. Although it is not a focus of the proposed Strategy, it is important that the whole of government takes note of the significance of the impact that their decisions may have with respect to resilience.		
				When reading the proposed strategy I was concerned about two things. First was the loss of the principles that guided the last strategy and which I've attached. The proposed strategy doesn't capture or recognise the importance of self-reliance and empowerment as do the previous ones. Principle One is headed: Individual and community responsibility and self-reliance. This is as vital for building resilience as it is in all aspects of response and recovery.		
				The second was, despite the focus on resilience and a good understanding of the true definition of what resilience is, there is a lack of understanding of how much the community can and should be empowered to do for themselves. This is related to the first point about the lack of focus on community responsibility and self-reliance.		
				I was invited to become a member of the UNISDR Parliamentarians Advisory Group on Disaster Risk Reduction and Christchurch was one of the founding members of the 100 Resilient Cities Network pioneered by the Rockefeller Foundation. This is an area I feel we can lead the world on, and which is why I don't believe we should allow this strategy to exist for 10 years (1.5 Currency of Strategy) - make it 3 years or 5 years (max) so that we are forced to return to it and reconsider it in light of what we achieve.		

					In section 1.3 "Ring-fencing the scope of this Strategy", it is stated that the proposed strategy is confined to the disaster aspects of resilience, and states that the other attributes of resilience are well-catered for by other policies and programmes across government and through society.		
					I believe that this underestimates the value of resilience and the grassroots up approach that is core critical to success. I would workshop this draft with the groups that emerged as community leaders in the post disaster environment in Christchurch – e.g. the Student Volunteer Army, Project Lyttelton, CanCERN.		
					In section 3.4 we are asked 'What is disaster risk?'. The answer talks about the combination of hazard/exposure/vulnerability. It then says that these three components can be countered by a fourth component, capacity, which refers to the strengths, attributes and resources available to reduce or manage the risks associated with the combination of the other three factors. Tha's a big YES. Absolutely spot on.		
					However Section 3.5 says since we cannot usually reduce the likelihood of hazards, the main opportunity for reducing risk lies in reducing exposure and vulnerability. What happened to building capacity? This undermines the excellent statement in 4.5 Co-creating a resilient society. Without building capacity, we won't build resilience. Resilience is not a destination. It is a journey!		
					We actually know this stuff and yet we keep ignoring it. "Resilient communities adapt through creating innovative approaches to collective governance, seizing unexpected opportunities to decide for themselves how to respond, organising to work with government agencies in new ways, and accepting both the promise and responsibility of joint decision-making."		
					The thing that excites me most about what Robert L Bach, (writing in the 2012 MCDEM Journal Tephra after the Canterbury Earthquakes), is saying is the seemingly boundless possibility that is presented by empowering communities to participate in 'collective governance'.		
					If we in government – central and local – helped our communities to develop their own capacity to engage in local governance in a meaningful way, communities would not only be better prepared for disaster should one strike, but would also of themselves be better and safer places to live. The potential is enormous. Not only does it bring the promise of a better way of life, it also gives meaning to democracy in the true sense of the word.		
					Robert L Bach also says: "The need to support new forms of local governance through collaborative efforts has become an essential dimension of resilient communities. Resilience involves transformation of the role of citizen and grassroots organisations from that of stakeholders, who are able at best to advise governments, to full equity partners. Equity partners are full shareholders, equally able to participate in the design and implementation of disaster-related efforts. The challenge for governments is to find ways to embrace these innovations and redesign their own structures and processes to incorporate the changes."		
					At the time of the earthquakes, New Zealand was a signatory to the Hyogo Framework for Action: Building the resilience of nations and communities to disasters and was actively engaged in the Multinational Community Resilience working Group.		
					Despite New Zealand's endorsement of the approach, we still have not seized the opportunity that the disastrous impact of the Canterbury earthquakes presents to build resilience in the true sense of the word.		
					4 We need to build a partnership between government and society which sees the people, not as consumers but as engaged citizens actively involved in decision-making and becoming more resilient individually and collectively. The role of government – both central and local – changes as well and we become: Enablers within a framework of collective responsibility; Partners who use their power and that of the State to support the contributions of others; partnership depending as it does on trust, goodwill and mutual respect; Facilitators who convene citizens and organisations to build communities of purpose; Collaborative actors who work with others to coordinate decisions and to achieve concerted actions; Stewards of the collective interest with the power to intervene and to course-correct when the public interest demands it; Leaders to achieve convergence and a common sense of purpose; I have forgotten where I found those words, but they inspire me to think that a legacy of our experience will be such a partnership.		

					The UK government's guidance on resilience is unequivocal: "In times of need, individuals and communities often already help each other. Volunteering and spontaneously helping each other does not need to be organised by central or local government. Local people and communities who are prepared and who, working with the emergency services, are able to respond effectively and recover quickly from emergencies, show us how successful community resilience can work... By building on existing local relationships, using local knowledge and preparing for risks your community will be better able to cope during and after an emergency."		
					"Preparedness and resilience both depend on identifying and strengthening the people, processes, and institutions that work in a community under normal conditions, before an incident. "The strategic foundation of all hazards resilience, therefore, involves engagement with neighbourhood associations, businesses, schools, faith-based community groups, trade groups, fraternal organizations, ethnic centres, and other civic-minded organizations that have routine, direct ties to local communities. In a real sense, they are the community. Local collective action, by, with and for the individuals who live in local areas, becomes the leading edge of efforts to protect and sustain the nation."		
					These quotes comes from an unpublished FEMA memorandum, 2010. Cited in London paper. Please rewrite 4.5 Conclusion: co-creating a resilient society with this in mind. "Today's world is turbulent and is likely to be so in the future. However, it is also dynamic, and characterised by huge opportunities for leadership and innovation. A critical question for the next 10 years will be how to enable and use those opportunities to effectively build resilience and address the many challenges that will continue to confront us.		
					We know from our experience in Christchurch that we need to look to our communities for the leadership we know is there, and we don't need to wait for a disaster to happen for that leadership to come to the fore. Building capacity is one of the strands of Disaster Risk Reduction, which makes the resilience journey absolutely embedded in the community. As Robert Bach said, in summing up the Canterbury experience: "Resilient communities adapt through creating innovative approaches to collective governance, seizing unexpected opportunities to decide for themselves how to respond, organising to work with government agencies in new ways, and accepting both the promise and responsibility of joint decision-making."		
					One of the key messages is that we need to look to a range of sources for inspiration and relevance as we adapt to a shifting, and increasingly challenging environment. These include exploring new opportunities for engagement and action through technology, new sources of inspiration and activity driven by younger generations, and new methods for measuring and demonstrating impact. We need to embody agility and flexibility. We need to monitor risks and trends, maintain a learning, growth mind-set, and adapt and transform our organisations and ourselves as necessary. Within this, it is important to focus on adaptive capabilities – the skills, abilities, and knowledge that allow us to react constructively to any given situation.		
					We need to work out how we build our resilience in a smart, cost-effective way, so that it's realistic and affordable, and so it isn't a 'sunk' cost, like stockpiles for a bad day – but rather enables better living standards today.		
					Above all, we need to work together. Building resilience as siloed sectors is not enough – government, the private sector, and civil society need to be more joined up. More effective ways of tackling challenges are required, which, by necessity, will transcend traditional sector barriers.		
					This includes employing new business models that combine the resources and expertise of multiple sectors of society to address common challenges, as well as creating opportunities that enable leaders across all sectors to participate effectively in decision-making. It is in this cross-sectoral space that we have the opportunity and ability to underpin the resilience dynamism that we need, by engaging in ways that inspire, support and shape a change agenda that is needed for improved resilience at both the national and local levels. By developing these cross-sectoral opportunities, we can build powerful networks built on trust, commitment, and a focus on the collective good, which can be translated into positive outcomes for society.		
					"There is no ultimate or end state of resilience. But, by working together to build resilience to the greatest degree possible, we can reduce our reliance on crisis as a driver of change and, instead, deliberately take the future into our own hands – for the well-being of our families, our communities, our cities, and indeed, the planet we all share." (Judith Rodin, the then chair of the Rockefeller Foundation 'The Resilience Dividend')		

Item 4: Draft National Disaster Resilience Strategy - For Consultation

New Zealand Government
Te Kāwanatanga o Aotearoa

National Disaster Resilience Strategy

Rautaki Manawaroa Aituā ā-Motu

We all have a role in a disaster resilient nation
He wāhanga tō tātau katoa i roto i te iwi manawaroa aituā

FINAL DRAFT FOR MINISTERIAL
& AGENCY CONSULTATION
DECEMBER 2018

Foreword
Kōrero whakapuaki

Hon Kris Faafoi
Minister of Civil Defence

New Zealand faces some of the highest natural hazard risks of any country in the world. Increasingly, we also face a range of hazards and risks from other sources, from plant and animal diseases, to human health, to technological disruptions and security threats. Many of these have the potential to be exacerbated with the increased risks posed by climate change impacts. Other trends in our society and the broader international context means our risk landscape is increasingly complex and uncertain.

The role of this Strategy – a national civil defence emergency management (CDEM) strategy under the CDEM Act – is to set out our goals and objectives for CDEM over the next 10 years. The current Strategy is over 10 years old – predating the Canterbury and Kaikoura earthquakes. This new Strategy aims to incorporate lessons learned from events in New Zealand and overseas, and takes a fresh look at our priorities for the next 10 years. It has been given the title of National Disaster Resilience Strategy to reflect the more inclusive approach we want to take.

The Strategy has a strong focus on wellbeing. It incorporates the Treasury's Living Standards Framework, and considers the types of resilience needed to protect and grow our wellbeing. The Strategy reflects our increased understanding of national risks, and responds to increased community expectations of our emergency management system. It also builds on the Government's work to reform the Emergency Management System to improve how New Zealand responds to natural disasters and other emergencies.

The objectives set out in this Strategy acknowledge the particular challenges faced by many New Zealand communities associated with their geographic location, their vulnerabilities, or their hazards. It seeks to enable and empower communities everywhere to take action to look after themselves and others in times of crisis, while still ensuring strong local, regional, and national leadership and support when needed.

On behalf of the Government, I acknowledge the efforts of everyone around the country who contributed to the development of this Strategy – the next step towards creating a more resilient New Zealand.

Executive Summary
He whakarāpopototanga

Globally, the economic cost of disasters has increased steadily over the last 40 years, in large part because of the expansion to the built environment: damage to infrastructure and buildings cause huge cost – public and private – when impacted.

It is the impact on wellbeing that can have the most profound effect. In 2011 New Zealand suffered one of its worst ever disasters in the 22 February Canterbury earthquake. New Zealand Treasury in 2013 estimated the capital costs to be over $40 billion, the equivalent of 20% of gross domestic product. Beyond the tangible costs of damage and rebuild, lay a web of social and economic disruption and upheaval: flow-on effects to business and employment, psychological trauma, dislocation of communities, creation or exacerbation of existing social issues, disruption to normal lives and livelihoods, and uncertainty in the future.

New Zealand enjoys a relatively high standard of living, regularly coming high in global prosperity rankings with qualities such as an open market, free people and strong sense of society.

Of course, we have areas we need to work on, including to address inequalities in the distribution of living standards, improve areas of weakness or decline, such as housing availability and affordability, and regain our standing as a clean, green, environmentally friendly and responsible nation.

We also face risks to our standard of living. Increasingly complex and uncertain risks that represent a threat to our way of life, and to our wellbeing and prosperity. If realised, these risks can be extremely costly. Many of the risks we face both now and in the future can be readily identified. However, we also need to recognise that the future is uncertain: significant, unexpected, and hard-to-predict events are inevitable. Moreover, the further we probe into the future, the deeper the level of uncertainty we encounter. Within this uncertain future environment, **resilience** is an important requirement for success. Resilience is the ability to anticipate and resist disruptive events, minimise adverse impacts, respond effectively, maintain or recover functionality, and adapt in a way that allows for learning and thriving. In essence, it's about developing a wide zone of tolerance – the ability to remain effective across a range of future conditions.

Given our risk landscape, and the uncertainty of the wider domestic and global environment, it is important for us to take deliberate steps to improve our resilience and protect the prosperity and wellbeing of New Zealand – of individuals, communities, businesses, our society, the economy, and the nation as a whole.

This Strategy proposes three priorities to improve our nation's resilience to disasters:

1. **Managing risks** – what we can do to minimise the risks we face and limit the impacts to be managed

2. **Effective response to and recovery from emergencies** – building our capability and capacity to manage emergencies when they do happen, and

3. **Enabling, empowering, and supporting community resilience** – a deliberate effort to build a culture of resilience in New Zealand whereby everyone can participate in and contribute to more resilient communities.

Each priority has six objectives to focus effort on the critical issues and drive progress (shown on the next page).

The Strategy promotes a holistic approach to strengthening resilience that connects with a range of agencies and sectors to deliver improved outcomes for New Zealanders. Disaster risk and disaster impacts reach all parts of society; so, to the greatest degree possible, disaster resilience should be integrated in to all parts of society. Disaster resilience therefore requires a shared approach between governments (central and local), relevant stakeholders, and the wider public – a collective approach to a collective problem. The goodwill, knowledge, experience, and commitment of all of parts of society are needed to make a difference.

What can I do?

All readers of this Strategy are encouraged to consider what the priorities and objectives mean for them, their family/whānau, business or organisation, community/hapū, and what they can do to contribute to their own resilience or the resilience of others.

Appendix 1 takes the priorities, high-level objectives and success measures of the Strategy, and translates them into a range of recommended actions for different audiences: individuals and families/whānau, businesses and organisations, communities and hapū, cities and districts, and government and national organisations.

This is just the start. A range of resources can be found online at www.civildefence.govt.nz, including more one-pagers aimed at supporting specific groups in their resilience endeavours. It also includes pointers on how to find more information and support, and how you can participate in building our nation's resilience to disasters.

National Disaster Resilience Strategy

Working together to manage risk and build resilience

Our Vision

New Zealand is a disaster resilient nation that acts proactively to manage risks and build resilience in a way that contributes to the wellbeing and prosperity of all New Zealanders

Our Goal

To strengthen the resilience of the nation by managing risks, being ready to respond to and recover from emergencies, and by enabling, empowering and supporting individuals, organisations, and communities to act for themselves and others, for the safety and wellbeing of all.

We will do this through:

1 Managing Risks	**2** Effective Response to and Recovery from Emergencies	**3** Enabling, Empowering, and Supporting Community Resilience

OUR OBJECTIVES

1. Identify and understand risk scenarios (including the components of hazard, exposure, vulnerability, and capacity), and use this knowledge to inform decision-making	7. Ensure that the safety and wellbeing of people is at the heart of the emergency management system	13. Enable and empower individuals, households, organisations, and businesses to build their resilience, paying particular attention to those people and groups who may be disproportionately affected by disaster
2. Put in place organisational structures and identify necessary processes - including being informed by community perspectives - to understand and act on reducing risks	8. Build the relationship between emergency management organisations and iwi/groups representing Maori, to ensure great recognition, understanding, and integration of iwi/Maori perspectives and tikanga in emergency management	14. Cultivate an environment for social connectedness which promotes a culture of mutual help; embed a collective impact approach to building community resilience
3. Build risk awareness, risk literacy, and risk management capability, including the ability to assess risk	9. Strengthen the national leadership of the emergency management system to provide clearer direction and more consistent response to and recovery from emergencies	15. Take a whole of city/district/region approach to resilience, including to embed strategic objectives for resilience in key plans and strategies
4. Address gaps in risk reduction policy (particularly in the light of climate change adaptation)	10. Ensure it is clear who is responsible for what, nationally, regionally, and locally, in response and recovery; empower and enable community-level response, and ensure it is connected into wider coordinated responses, where necessary	16. Address the capacity and adequacy of critical infrastructure systems, and upgrade them as practicable, according to risks identified
5. Ensure development and investment practices, particularly in the built and natural environments, are risk-aware, taking care not to create any unnecessary or unacceptable new risk	11. Build the capability and capacity of the emergency management workforce for response and recovery	17 Embed a strategic, resilience approach to recovery planning that takes account of risks identified, recognises long-term priorities and opportunities to build back better, and ensures the needs of the affected are at the centre of recovery processes
6. Understand the economic impact of disaster and disruption, and the need for investment in resilience; identify and develop financial mechanisms that support resilience activities	12. Improve the information and intelligence system that supports decision-making in emergencies to enable informed, timely, and consistent decisions by stakeholders and the public	18. Recognise the importance of culture to resilience, including to support the continuity of cultural places, institutions and activities, and to enable the participation of different cultures in resilience

The Legend of Ruaumoko

Ranginui and Papatuanuku were finally separated and light entered the world after the time of darkness. Their tears of sadness flooded the lakes and rivers.

Their children looked at one another and decided to help their mother overcome her grief. They thought they would turn her over, so she would no longer have to weep upon seeing her partner.

However, one of the brothers noticed their baby brother Ruaumoko was still too young to be alone. To help Ruaumoko, they placed him underground with his mother. As he would be away from the sun, they gave him the gift of fire, or te ahi komau, to keep him warm. But as they turned Papatuanuku over, Ruaumoko was trapped underneath her and left isolated in Rarohenga – the underworld.

As Ruaumoko grew up, he realised that he was alone and captive in Rarohenga against his will. This made Ruaumoko angry and shake with rage. He became the atua, or god, of earthquakes and the angrier he got, the more tremors he caused. The ahi his brothers gave him turned into volcanic lava, which spewed onto his mother's body when he became enraged.

Ruaumoko's lava and earthquakes left scars on his mother's body, creating mountains and lakes. His older brothers could see him maiming their mother and felt deep aroha for her. Tangaroa, the atua of the sea, decided to blanket his mother in water, to cool her – but he couldn't reach over her entire body. Tangaroa asked his brothers Wai o Ki Te Rangi, the atua of steam, and Te Ihorangi, the atua of rain, for help. When Ruaumoko's lava met the sea, Wai o Ki Te Rangi would take the steam into the sky, and Te Ihorangi and his four children of the clouds, Te Ao Tu, Te Ao Hore, Te Ao Matakata and Te Ao Taruaitu, would turn the steam to rain. The rain would fall onto Papatuanuku's burning flesh and flow down the rivers to the sea, to calm and cool the pain that Ruaumoko was causing his mother.

To resolve their problems, the atua understood they could not act alone. They depended on one another to soothe their mother.

In an emergency, we are often met with difficult problems and feelings of sadness, anger, resentment or isolation. This story is a reminder that when we are in trying situations, to trust in the relationships and community you build around you.

Retold by s9(2)(a)
Mataora – Te Rākau Whakamarumaru ki Te Matau a Māui
Hawkes Bay CDEM Group

Contents
Ripanga ihirangi

Key terms
Ngā kupu hira

Capacity [1]

The combination of all the strengths, attributes and resources available within an organization, community or society to manage and reduce disaster risks and strengthen resilience.

Community [2]

A group of people who:

- live in a particular area or place ('geographic' or 'place-based' community)
- are similar in some way ('relational' or 'population-based' community)
- have friendships, or a sense of having something in common ('community of interest').

People can belong to more than one community, and communities can be any size. With increasing use of social media and digital technologies, communities can also be virtual.

Disaster [1]

A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society at any scale due to hazardous events interacting with conditions of exposure, vulnerability and capacity, leading to one or more of the following: human, material, social, cultural, economic and environmental losses and impacts.

Disaster risk [1]

The potential loss of life, injury, or destroyed or damaged assets which could occur to a system, society or a community in a specific period of time, determined as a function of hazard, exposure, vulnerability and capacity.

Disaster risk management [1]

Disaster risk management is the application of disaster risk reduction policies and strategies to prevent new disaster risk, reduce existing disaster risk and manage residual risk, contributing to the strengthening of resilience and reduction of disaster losses.

Disaster risk reduction [1]

Disaster risk reduction is aimed at preventing new and reducing existing disaster risk and managing residual risk, all of which contribute to strengthening resilience.

Disruption [2]

An event that considerably interrupts normal life, business, functions, operations, or processes, whether anticipated, or unanticipated.

Emergency [3]

A situation that a) is the result of any happening, whether natural or otherwise, including, without limitation, any explosion, earthquake, eruption, tsunami, land movement, flood, storm, tornado, cyclone, serious fire, leakage or spillage of any dangerous gas or substance, technological failure, infestation, plague, epidemic, failure or disruption to an emergency service or lifeline utility, or actual or imminent attack or warlike act; and b) causes or may cause loss of life or injury or illness or distress or in any way endangers the safety of the public or property in New Zealand or any part of New Zealand; and c) cannot be dealt with by emergency services or otherwise requires a significant and coordinated response.

Emergency management [3]

The application of knowledge, measures, and practices that are necessary or desirable for the safety of the public or property, and are designed to guard against, prevent, reduce, recover from, or overcome any hazard or harm or loss that may be associated with any emergency, including the planning, organisation, co-ordination, and implementation of those measures, knowledge, and practices.

Exposure [1]

People, infrastructure, buildings, the economy, and other assets that are exposed to a hazard.

Hazard [3]

Something that may cause, or contribute substantially to the cause of, an emergency.

Prosperity [2]

The condition of being successful or thriving, particularly financially.

Readiness [4]

Developing operational systems and capabilities before an emergency happens, including making arrangements with emergency services, lifeline utilities, and other agencies, and developing self-help and response arrangements for the general public.

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[1] *UNISDR Report of the open-ended intergovernmental expert working group on indicators and terminology relating to disaster risk reduction (2017)*

[2] *This Strategy*

[3] *Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002*

[4] *National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan Order 2015*

Reconstruction [1]

The medium and long-term rebuilding and restoration of critical infrastructures, services, housing, facilities and livelihoods required for the full functioning of a community or a society affected by a disaster, aligning with the principles of sustainable development and "build back better", to avoid or reduce future disaster risk.

Recovery [3]

The coordinated efforts and processes used to bring about the immediate, medium-term, and long-term holistic regeneration and enhancement of a community following an emergency.

Response [4]

Actions taken immediately before, during or directly after a disaster to save human and animal lives and property, and to help communities begin to recover.

Residual risk [1]

The disaster risk that remains in unmanaged form, even when effective disaster risk reduction measures are in place, and for which emergency response and recovery capacities must be maintained.

Resilience [2]

The ability to anticipate and resist the effects of a disruptive event, minimise adverse impacts, respond effectively post-event, maintain or recover functionality, and adapt in a way that allows for learning and thriving.

Risk assessment [1]

An assessment of the nature and extent of risk by analysing potential hazards and evaluating existing conditions of exposure and vulnerability to determine likely consequences.

Risk transfer [1]

The process of formally or informally shifting the financial consequences of particular risks from one party to another, e.g. via insurance.

Wellbeing [2]

Our quality of life, including: civic and human rights, culture and identity, housing, knowledge and skills, leisure and recreation, material standard of living, employment status and job satisfaction, the physical and natural environment, safety and security, health and social connectedness.

Vulnerability [1]

The conditions determined by physical, social, economic and environmental factors or processes which increase the susceptibility of an individual, a community, assets or systems to the impacts of hazards.

Our vision and goal
Tā mātau matakitenga me te uaratanga

Purpose of this Strategy
Protecting our wellbeing and prosperity
Risks to our wellbeing and prosperity
A resilient future

1. Purpose of this Strategy
Te kaupapa o tēnei Rautaki

1.1 Delivering on the intent and purpose of the CDEM Act 2002

The purpose of this Strategy is to outline the vision and long-term goals for civil defence emergency management (CDEM) in New Zealand. CDEM in New Zealand is governed by the CDEM Act, which:

- promotes the sustainable management of hazards in a way that contributes to safety and wellbeing
- encourages wide participation, including communities, in the process to manage risk
- provides for planning and preparation for emergencies, and for response and recover
- requires local authorities to co-ordinate reduction, readiness, response and recovery activities through regional groups
- provides a basis for the integration of national and local planning and activity through a national strategy and plan
- encourages coordination across a wide range of agencies, recognising that emergencies are multi-agency events affecting all parts of society.

This reflects an overarching intent for a resilient New Zealand.

This is important because New Zealanders are, and will continue to be, at risk from a broad range of hazards.

We can do much to reduce our risks, through both a risk management approach, and by building broader societal resilience. We can also ensure we have effective processes in place for responding to and recovering from emergencies and other types of disruption when they do happen.

The Strategy sets out what we as New Zealanders expect of a resilient New Zealand, and what we want to achieve over the next 10 years. It explicitly links resilience to the protection and growth of living standards for all New Zealanders, and promotes a wide, whole-of-society, participatory and inclusive approach.

The Strategy provides the vision and strategic direction, including to outline priorities and objectives for increasing New Zealand's resilience to disasters. The detail of *how* those objectives are to be achieved sits in a roadmap of actions, alongside other related key documents including the *National CDEM Plan and Guide,* the *National Security Handbook,* CDEM Group Plans, and a range of other supporting policies and plans.

1.2 This is the third Strategy made under the Act

The first Strategy was made in 2003; the second in 2007. They were aimed at embedding the (then) new approach to emergency management in New Zealand, which was to take a comprehensive and integrated approach, utilising the '4Rs' of risk reduction, readiness, response, and recovery.

In 2018 we have reached a level of maturity where we are ready for the next step. A number of things have influenced our thinking on what that step should be:

- 16 years of lessons from incidents and emergencies since the CDEM Act came into effect;
- work to develop a national risk register, which aims to support better information identification, understanding and comparison of national risks;
- global agreements such as the *Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030* that outlines how nations should approach their wider societal risk from disasters;
- a Ministerial Review (2017) on *Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies*, and the Government's decisions relating to it, and
- a two-year long strategy development process with a wide range of stakeholders to analyse our current state and determine vision, goals, and objectives.

We have identified areas where we can do more – to be more effective, more capable, fit-for-purpose, to have all the information we need to make the smartest choices, to keep pace with changing risks, and changes in society. This Strategy details the conclusions, and the areas we need to focus on for a more resilient New Zealand.

1.3 Scope of this Strategy

While acknowledging broad societal resilience is desirable for achieving higher living standards and optimal prosperity and wellbeing, this Strategy is confined to the *disaster* aspects of resilience.

Furthermore, while acknowledging the vital importance of wider social and economic attributes of disaster resilience (such as high levels of health and education, reduced inequalities and social deprivation, the building of fiscal and macro-economic strength, etc.), these issues are well-catered for by other policies and programmes across government and through society, and will not be duplicated here.

1.4 Links with other policy and practice

The Strategy is informed by policy and practice across other key sectors of society, and in turn, promotes or requires resilient practices in each of these sectors. Some work sits firmly in the remit of the Strategy (and CDEM Act), while others are driven by one or more other drivers and span mandates.

Particular care has been taken to ensure alignment in these areas of cross over, and ensure that policy and practice on key issues is mutually reinforcing.

1.5 Intended audience and use of the Strategy

This Strategy is for all New Zealanders, and all those who live, work or visit here.

It is intended to provide a common agenda for resilience that individual organisations, agencies, and groups can align with for collective impact.

Central government, local government, businesses, organisations, and iwi can use it to guide them in building resilience both for their own organisation, and for the people and communities they support or provide services for.

Hapū and community organisations can use it to support community wellbeing and resilience, and to understand the wider network of agencies and organisations working towards common goals.

Individuals, households and whānau can use it to prompt thinking on their own resilience, and what they can do to ensure they and their dependants, such as animals, are prepared for disruption and emergencies in the long term. The Strategy hopefully gives assurance of the wider network of actors supporting them at a community, local, regional, and national level.

All readers are encouraged to consider what this Strategy means for them, their family/whānau, community/hapū, business or organisation, and what they can do to contribute to their own resilience or the resilience of others.

1.6 Currency of the Strategy

This Strategy will be current for a period of 10 years from the date it comes into effect. Reporting will take place biennially, with a significant review of progress in year 4.

Figure 1 The policy context of the National Disaster Resilience Strategy

2. Protecting our wellbeing and prosperity
[translation to come]

National success is about more than just economic measures. It is about a healthy and happy life, a good education for our children, a healthy environment that protects our natural resources and taonga, family/whānau and communities we can rely on, a safe place to live and work, opportunities to start a business or get ahead, and the freedom to be who we want to be. This is prosperity.

New Zealand has seen much success over the past decade in global indices designed to measure wellbeing and prosperity. We hold up well in most categories of measurement, including in economic quality, business environment, and governance; for our health and education systems, our natural environment, and – in particular – for our personal freedoms and social capital.

However, while we do well, we certainly cannot afford to be complacent. New Zealand must continually adapt and evolve if it is to see prosperity grow.

For us to secure wellbeing and prosperity for all our people – in this generation and for future generations – we must think about prosperity in more than in economic terms. The New Zealand Treasury, in developing the Living Standards Framework, has initiated a shift of focus. The Living Standards Framework is based on an economic model, but puts intergenerational wellbeing as its core goal.

Wealth matters, but as a means, not an end: wealth is only useful if it translates into higher living standards for everyone. Protecting and growing those living standards is paramount for securing a prosperous future. This Strategy is centred on how it can contribute to that vision.

2.1 The Living Standards Framework

The Living Standards Framework is a New Zealand-specific framework that draws on a range of national and international approaches to wellbeing. In particular, it builds on the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD's) approach to wellbeing, the How's Life?/Better Life model.

The framework conceives of wellbeing as being comprised of a number of aspects of life experience, such as housing, income, employment, education, community engagement, enjoyment of environmental amenity and health and safety. Measures of these aspects provide a snapshot of current wellbeing. The wellbeing of future generations is represented by four 'capital stocks' – financial/physical, social, human, and natural capital.

The Four Capitals

Intergenerational wellbeing relies on the growth, distribution, and sustainability of the Four Capitals. The Capitals are interdependent and work together to support wellbeing. The Māori-Crown relationship is integral to all four capitals. The LSF is being continually developed and the next iteration of the framework will consider the role of culture, including Māori culture, as part of the capitals approach in more detail.

Natural Capital
This refers to all aspects of the natural environment needed to support life and human activity. It includes land, soil, water, plants and animals, as well as minerals and energy resources.

Human Capital
This encompasses people's skills, knowledge and physical and mental health. These are the things which enable people to participate fully in work, study, recreation and in society more broadly.

Social Capital
This describes the norms and values that underpin society. It includes things like trust, the rule of law, cultural identity, and the connections between people and communities.

Financial / Physical Capital
This includes things like houses, roads, buildings, hospitals, factories, equipment and vehicles. These are the things which make up the country's physical and financial assets which have a direct role in supporting incomes and material living conditions.

06/18

The capitals are seen as 'value stocks', which jointly produce wellbeing outcomes over time. Each of the dimensions of wellbeing is the result of all of the different capital stocks. Investments in the capital stocks will result in the levels of the relevant stocks increasing, while depreciation, resource depletion, pollution or waste – or other shocks or stresses – may result in capital stock levels declining.

The four capitals in the Living Standards Framework help us to take into account the range of impacts that a policy option or practice may have on the material and non-material factors that affect New Zealanders' wellbeing, now and in the future. The underlying principle of the capitals framework is that good public policy and practice enhances the capacity of natural, social, human and financial/physical capital to improve wellbeing for New Zealanders.

Wellbeing

Our quality of life, including: civic and human rights, culture and identity, housing, knowledge and skills, leisure and recreation, material standard of living, employment status and job satisfaction, the physical and natural environment, safety and security, health and social connectedness.

2.2 Risk and resilience, and our future wellbeing

Safety and security are integral to attaining wellbeing and prosperity. People's wellbeing is dependent on having secure living conditions, personal safety, trust and confidence in authorities, and an ability to manage threats and dangers. A secure and stable environment is necessary for securing freedoms, and for attracting investment and sustaining economic growth. In short, a nation can prosper only in an environment of safety and security for its citizens.

To this end, it is imperative that we look to risk management and resilience for all four capitals.

New Zealand is relatively well placed in this regard with a comprehensive legislative framework in place for risk management, including the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002, the Resource Management Act 1991, the Building Act 2004, the Local Government Act 2002, and a range of other legislation and regulatory instruments. We have a system of managing, coordinating, and overseeing national security (the National Security System) and emergency management arrangements at the local, regional, and national level.

Today, however, risk management is increasingly challenged by complexity in which multiple systems simultaneously impact on the four living standards capitals. Risk management in this setting requires a greater acknowledgement of uncertainty and a shift from reactive to proactive risk management. Decision-makers in both the public and private sectors require more comprehensive strategies that combine the active management of specific risks with enhancement of generic resilience in society.

This Strategy combines these elements and considers ways to improve our resilience across the four capitals.

3. Risks to our wellbeing and prosperity
Ngā mōrea ki tō tātau oranga, tōnuitanga hoki

From the lower North Island floods (2004), the Canterbury (2010-2011) and Kaikōura (2016) earthquakes, MV Rena grounding (2011), 1080 milk powder crisis (2015), Havelock North campylobacter outbreak (2016), Port Hills fires (2017), and M. Bovis disease outbreak (2018) − and many storms, floods, and droughts in between − New Zealand has had its fair share of disruptive events in recent years.

These events have caused loss of human and animal lives, injury, damage and disruption. Some have caused impacts in the built and natural environments; they have cost millions of dollars in repair and reconstruction. Other events have caused lost productivity, lost livelihoods, and lost income. More than that, these events have caused untold suffering and social disruption to individuals, family/whānau, communities and hapū, the effects and costs of which we might never fully know. In short, disasters, or other highly stressful events, impact all four capitals in a profound and costly way.

Disasters may seem inevitable and intractable, but there is much we can do to reduce the chance that hazards will affect us, and much we can do to lessen the impacts if and when they do.

This section explores some key concepts so that we have a common understanding about our key risks and how we can manage them.

3.1 What is disaster risk?

Disaster risk is the chance that a hazard could impact us in a significant way.

Disaster risk is a function of three interlinked components: hazard, exposure, and vulnerability.

Hazard refers to the likelihood and severity of something that could cause us harm, such as ground shaking induced by an earthquake, extreme winds associated with a cyclone, or a pathogen caused by a food safety issue or biological agent.

Exposure refers to the location, attributes, and value of people, infrastructure, buildings, the economy, and other assets that are exposed to a hazard.

Vulnerability is the potential extent to which an individual, a community, assets or systems become susceptible to the impacts of hazards. Vulnerability includes physical vulnerability, which refers to the level of damage sustained by built structures due to the physical load imparted by a hazard event. It also includes social vulnerability, which refers to damage as it relates to livelihood, social connections, gender, and other factors that influence a community's ability to respond to, cope with, and recover from a disaster.

These three components can be countered by a fourth component, **capacity**, which refers to the strengths, attributes and resources available to reduce or manage the risks associated with the combination of the other three components.

When these potential impacts are determined probabilistically, that is, are multiplied by how likely the hazardous event is to occur, we can determine our risk – the chance of significant impacts.

3.2 Our current risks

New Zealand is exposed to a range of significant hazards and threats. Natural hazards, such as earthquakes, volcanoes, or extreme weather, is only one type; our economy relies heavily on primary production and is thus vulnerable to adverse impacts from pests and diseases; the potential for an infectious disease pandemic has been highlighted in recent years through the SARS, bird flu and swine flu crises; heavy reliance on technology and just-in-time supply chains means we are vulnerable to disruption from a wide range of domestic and international sources; and the global geopolitical environment means threats to our security and economy are complex and often unpredictable.

In New Zealand, we classify these in five categories: natural hazard risks, biological hazard risks, technological risks, security risks, and economic risks.

3.3 How our risks might change in the future

In assessing our risks, we can learn from past events and emergencies, but we also need to consider broader and longer-term societal trends. Trends such as these have the potential to be both a source of risk and opportunity - sometimes in equal measure. They include:

- **Climate change and environmental degradation**, which could impact on, or accelerate, a wide range of our risks owing to their effects on sea level rise, the frequency and severity of natural hazards and extreme weather, biodiversity, biosecurity, and the availability and quality of ecosystems and their services.

- **Population trends**, including that New Zealand society is becoming older and more ethnically diverse, with changing levels of income inequality, and changing geographic distribution of population. This has implications for how organisations engage inclusively, and what needs must be met.

- **Global economic growth and productivity**, which have implications for both the health and resilience of our economy, and how much we can afford to invest in risk management and resilience.

- **Digital connectivity and technological change**, in terms of the risks it poses (for example, cyber-crime) or opportunities it provides (for example, by enhancing our ability to collect and analyse complex data about risks).

- **Challenges to the rules-based international order**, which have the greatest effect on some of our economic and security risks, but could have further-reaching implications.

3.4 Cost of disasters

Disasters over the last decade or more, both in New Zealand and overseas, have shown the magnitude of costs that are involved in these events, both in terms of damage (the market value of losses), and in the response to and recovery from such events. It is important to note that the reported costs are often only direct costs. Less well defined are the flow-on, indirect costs, and – even less so – the cost of other, longer-term outcomes (also known as 'intangible costs'). A recent Australian study found that the indirect and intangible costs, when calculated, more than *doubled* the total reported cost of each of the three events studied.[5]

While we intuitively know that the impact of disasters is much larger than the direct economic cost, it is only when we start to consider the economic cost of these indirect and intangible impacts that we can see what these events really cost us. This multi-capital accounting – at an individual, community, or national level – shows us just how critical it is to try to minimise these costs, financial and social, as far as we possibly can.

3.5 Disaster risk reduction

Disaster risk reduction is the discipline concerned with reducing our risks of and from disasters.

Disaster risk reduction can be seen as a policy objective, a risk management process, or a social aspiration. Successful disaster risk reduction tends to result from the integration of institutional strategies and policies, and grassroots, local and community-based approaches.

Historically, dealing with disasters focused on emergency response. Towards the end of the 20th century, it was increasingly recognised that disasters are not 'inevitable' and that it is by reducing and managing conditions of hazard, exposure and vulnerability – and building capacity – we can prevent losses and alleviate the impacts of disasters.

Since we cannot usually reduce the likelihood of hazards occurring, the main opportunity for reducing risk lies in reducing exposure and vulnerability, and building capacity. Addressing these components of risk requires us to identify the underlying drivers of risk, which can include: economic, urban and rural development choices and practice, degradation of the environment, poverty and inequality, and climate change. These, and a myriad of other factors, all create and exacerbate conditions of hazard, exposure and vulnerability. Addressing these underlying risk drivers, and building our capacity to manage them, will reduce disaster risk, lessen impacts if they do happen, and, consequently, maintain development and growth.

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[5] *The Economic Cost of the Social Impact of Natural Disasters (2016) Australian Business Roundtable.*

3.6 Reducing vulnerability, pursuing equitable outcomes

The impact of hazards and threats is likely to exacerbate existing inequities that exist across New Zealand. This means that some populations are disproportionately affected by many of the social and economic impacts of risks. This includes Māori, as well as Pasifika, and any people for whom English is not their first language; those living with high levels of social and economic deprivation, or those who face challenges such as disability, ill health, or social or geographic isolation.

Obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi as well as commitments to improving wellbeing, including in existing strategies and action plans, such as the New Zealand Disability Strategy, mean we need to ensure that any action toward reducing risk is cognisant of different types of vulnerability, and the disproportionate effect disasters can have. Policy, plans, and practices should be aimed at pursuing equitable outcomes, as well as planning for, and taking opportunities to build back better in recovery in order to reduce vulnerability and improve living standards.

3.7 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030

In 2015 New Zealand signalled its commitment to the *Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030* (the 'Sendai Framework'). The Sendai Framework is one of three global agreements developed as part of the 'post-2015 sustainable development agenda'. Together with the Sustainable Development Goals and the *Paris Agreement on Climate Change*, the Sendai Framework aims to be a blueprint for how nations should approach risks to their development – in this case, from disasters.

Three key ideas are central to the Framework:

1. A greater effort to **understand risk** (in all its dimensions), so that we can prioritise investment, make better risk-informed decisions, and build resilience into everyday processes.

2. A shift of focus **from managing disasters to managing risk**, including to reduce the underlying drivers of risk (exposure and vulnerability).

3. A broader **'whole-of-society' approach** to risk – everyone has a role in reducing and managing risk.

The Framework has four priorities, and a series of recommended actions at the global, regional, national, and local levels.

It sets seven global targets for improved disaster risk reduction, which nations are asked to report on annually. The targets are:

1	Substantially reduce disaster mortality by 2030, aiming to lower average per 100,000 mortality between 2020-2030 compared with 2005-2015.
2	Substantially reduce the number of affected people by 2030, aiming to lower the average figure per 100,000 between 2020-2030 compared with 2005-2015.
3	Reduce disaster economic loss in relation to gross domestic product (GDP) between 2020-2030 compared with 2005-2015.
4	Substantially reduce disaster damage to critical infrastructure and disruption of basic services, among them health and educational facilities, including through developing their resilience by 2030.
5	Substantially increase the number of countries with national/local disaster risk reduction strategies by 2020.
6	Substantially enhance international cooperation to developing countries through adequate and sustainable support to complement their national actions for implementation of [the] framework by 2030.
7	Substantially increase the availability of and access to multi-hazard early warning systems and disaster risk information and assessments to the people by 2030.

The Sendai Framework has been a key influence in the development of this Strategy. The principles and priorities of the Sendai Framework have been incorporated into it; many of the national and local recommended actions have been instrumental in developing the Strategy objectives.

4. A resilient future
He anamata manawaroa

In an effort to address our current known risks, manage uncertainty, and be ready for any events that may occur in the future, it is generally agreed that the overarching goal is resilience. But – what does resilience mean to us, as New Zealanders? How do we define it, what are the attributes of resilience, and how do we improve it?

4.1 Vision of a resilient nation

Resilience can mean a lot of different things to different people. In a series of workshops, participants were asked to describe what a resilient nation meant to them and the aspirations they have for New Zealand in respect of its disaster resilience. The result is a description of our desired 'future state' – the end goal, 'what success looks like' for this Strategy. This is shown on pages 26-27.

4.1.1 Guiding principles for this Strategy

Within this vision of a resilient nation, participants specifically looked at what principles and values are important to us in pursuing a resilience goal. We agreed that it is important to act with the following in mind:

Manaakitanga	**We respect and care for others** • Wellbeing, health and safety • Hospitality, kindness, goodwill
Whanaungatanga, kotahitanga	**We nurture positive relationships and partnerships** • Engagement, communication, and shared experiences • A sense of belonging • Collaboration and collective action
Kaitiakitanga, tūrangawaewae	**We guard and protect the places that are special to us** • Protecting and enhancing our cultural, historic, and natural environment • Intergenerational equity • Stewarding our place in the world • Feeling enabled and connected
Matauranga	**We value knowledge and understanding** • Using scientific, historic, local, and traditional knowledge • Striving for a common understanding • Accountability and transparency
Tikanga	**Our customs and cultural practices are central to who we are** • Cultural identity and expression • Ethical and values-based • Accountability and transparency
Rangatiratanga	**We lead by example** • Values-based leadership • Self-determination, principle of subsidiarity

4.2 Resilience: a working definition

In the wake of unprecedented disasters in recent years, "resilience" has become a popular buzzword across a wide range of disciplines, with each discipline attributing its own definition to the term. A definition that has long been used in engineering is that resilience is the capacity for "bouncing back faster after stress, enduring greater stresses, and being disturbed less by a given amount of stress". This definition is commonly applied to objects, such as bridges or buildings. However, most risks are systemic in nature, and a system – unlike an object – may show resilience not by returning exactly to its previous state, but instead by finding different ways to carry out essential functions; that is, by adapting and transforming to meet challenges.

In terms of disaster resilience, an important quality is also to anticipate and minimise risks as far as possible, such that any impacts are manageable and recoverable.

The working definition of resilience for this strategy is therefore *"the ability to anticipate and resist the effects of a disruptive event, minimise adverse impacts, respond effectively, maintain or recover functionality, and adapt in a way that allows for learning and thriving."*

Below are two additional explanations: one, a more technical explanation, and one, a simplified approach.

4.2.1 Getting more technical...

While risks tend to focus on the negative consequences from uncertainty, the concept of resilience encourages us to build capacity to help protect us from vulnerability, and to be able to better deal with the impact from shocks and stresses as they occur. The degree of vulnerability we have then depends on the nature, magnitude and duration of the shocks or stresses that are experienced as well as the level of resilience to these shocks.

Under this interpretation, resilience has two dimensions:

- an **absorption** dimension, which comprises resistance and buffers that can reduce the depth of impact, and

- an **adaptability** dimension, which focuses on elements of adaptability and innovation that maximise the speed of recovery.

Resilience

The ability to anticipate and resist the effects of a disruptive event, minimise adverse impacts, respond effectively, maintain or recover functionality, and adapt in a way that allows for learning and thriving.

Figure 2 below illustrates this idea. When a system is subject to a shock or stress, the level of functioning declines, and can fall rapidly. The depth of the fall in functioning can be thought of as the absorption capacity of the system. A system with a high absorption capacity experiences only a small loss in functioning (e.g., because it has sufficient buffers to resist the stress or shock to ensure it continues to achieve desired outcomes). The speed of recovery dimension is captured by the time lag between the stress or shock and when functioning returns to a steady-state level. Systems that have high adaptability are able to recover faster than is otherwise the case. The two dimensions together acknowledge that the total impact of a shock is a function of both the depth of the impact and the time it takes to recover.


Figure 2 Two dimensions of resilience: absorption and adaptability

4.2.2 Simplifying resilience...

A simpler way of thinking about resilience is our *tolerance for disruption* – how much disruption, in the form of hazards, that we, or the system, can cope with before it negatively impacts on our wellbeing.

This implies that as we are able to remove, avoid, or minimise more risk factors, and build our people, assets, and systems to be responsive and adaptable, so our tolerance for disruption grows. We can deal with a wider range and size of shocks and stresses, without them becoming an emergency, and recover fast – and well – without significantly affecting our quality of life. The greater our range of tolerance for disruption, the better off we are.

4.2.3 Types of resilience

Resilience as a concept has wide applicability to a range of disciplines, and has become a popular area of academic study and organisational pursuit over recent years. As a result, it is routine to hear about many different types of resilience, for example ecological, environmental, institutional, infrastructural, organisational, economic, social, community, family, and individual resilience – to name just a few.

Within this context, it is particularly important to be clear about our goals and objectives; in particular:

Resilience of what, to what, why, and how?

In terms of this Strategy, we have talked about *of what, to what, and why* – to protect and grow our capitals, including all our people, in the face of shocks, stresses, and uncertainty, in order to advance the wellbeing and prosperity of New Zealand. The remainder of this Strategy is about how we do that.

Resilience

Tolerance for disruption

4.2.4 Model of a resilient nation: protecting our capitals from shocks and stresses

The literature review and engagement process to develop this Strategy has identified the following types of resilience are important for protecting our capitals – our future wellbeing – from shocks and stresses:

Social resilience: this includes promoting social connectedness and cohesion, and the effective operation of key social support functions, such as health, education, welfare, and justice, for the protection and strengthening of our social and human capital.

Cultural resilience: including aspects such as cultural values, places, institutions, and practices; our identity as New Zealanders, and our history and heritage.

Economic resilience: this includes the protection and continuity of the macroeconomic environment, businesses, livelihoods, financial markets, financial management practices (including through insurance), thereby protecting our financial capital.

Resilience of the built environment: this includes the resilience of critical infrastructure (namely communications, energy, transport, and water), buildings and housing, effective urban design and planning, and the engineering and construction disciplines, for the protection of our physical capital.

Resilience of the natural environment: including the sustainable use of natural resources, land-use, and the ecological system; managing long-term climate resilience, and improved understanding of both how hazards impact the environment and how the environment can protect society from hazards.

Governance of risk and resilience: including leadership, policy, strategy, security, and the rule of law, for effective oversight, coordination, collaboration, and coherence of resilience activity.

Underpinning knowledge: including indigenous and scientific knowledge, and up-to-date information on risks and effective resilience practices.

These are shown in the diagram on the next page.

Figure 3 Model of a Resilient Nation

These types of resilience can operate – in some form – at a range of levels, from individuals and families/whānau, to businesses and organisations, comunities and hapū, cities and districts, and at a national level.

For example, at a community level, the attributes of a safe and resilient community are that it:

... is connected: it has relationships within its network, and with external actors who provide a wider supportive environment, and supply goods and services when needed.

... is healthy: it has a good level of individual and population health, access to medical treatment, education, and a range of other social welfare support, when needed.

... has cultural norms: it has a strong identity, attachment to place, and sense of civic responsibility. It is inclusive, and looks to cultural norms and values to sustain it in times of upheaval.

... has economic opportunities: it has a diverse range of employment opportunities, income, and financial services. It is flexible, resourceful, and has the capacity to accept uncertainty and respond to change.

... has infrastructure, services, and safe buildings: it has strong housing, transport, power, telecommunications, water, and sanitation systems. It also has the ability to maintain, repair, and renovate them.

... can manage its natural assets: it recognises the value of natural resources and indigenous ecosystems, and has the ability to protect, enhance, and maintain them.

... is organised: it has the capacity to identify problems, establish priorities, coordinate, collaborate, and act.

... is knowledgeable: it has the ability to assess, manage, and monitor its risks. It can learn new skills, build on past experiences, and plan for its future.

Adapted from: Characteristics of a Safe and Resilient Community, International Federation of the Red Cross (2011)

This Strategy asserts that broad attention to resilient practices within and across each of these environments - and enabling individuals, families/whānau, businesses/organisations, and communities/hapū to do the same - is critical to the overall resilience of the nation, and protection of our capitals and future wellbeing.

The model is not a strategy itself, but a checklist, of kinds, to ensure we pay attention to the range of things that are important. It can also operate as a basis for assessment, or as a decision-making tool, for example, to evaluate whether options or investment are meeting, or are sensitive to, multiple needs.

4.3 Resilience and Te Ao Māori

Any comprehensive framework for resilience in New Zealand needs to consider both the resilience of Māori and Māori concepts of resilience. This reflects the status of Māori as the indigenous population of New Zealand and the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi.

4.3.1 Tangata whenua and resilience

Māori share a holistic and community perspective on resilience, which can be characterised as the social, physical, familial, spiritual and environmental wellbeing of whānau, the unit of cultural capital in Te Ao Māori. Sustainable wellbeing is achieved through having a secure Māori identity, that is intergenerationally linked through whānau, local communities, and different iwi, to the earth mother Papatūānuku (the land), from whom all Māori descend. This genealogy imposes moral obligations on Māori to enact guardianship roles and responsibilities to ensure the oranga – ongoing wellbeing, or more broadly the resilience – of all residents, flora, fauna and the wider environment (lands, rivers and seas) of New Zealand.

4.3.2 Tangata whenua and disaster risk reduction

When a disaster occurs, the responsibility of caring for others and Te Ao Tūroa (the natural world), falls to whānau, hapū and iwi with historical ties to the areas impacted by the disaster. Whakapapa creates a kinship-based form of capital understood by Māori as whanaungatanga (close relationships), that may be drawn on to aid whānau, hapū, and, potentially, wider communities, during times of adversity. Whānau, hapū and iwi respond quickly and collectively to provide support and address the immediate needs of their communities as well as to institute practices that will aid the recovery, and the development of disaster resilience in affected regions.

This process is considered whakaoranga[6] – the rescue, recovery and restoration of sustainable wellbeing and may be applied to whānau, hapū, and iwi, tribal homelands as well as all communities and parts of New Zealand impacted by disasters. The whakaoranga process is underpinned by kaupapa Māori (cultural values), informed by mātauranga Māori (cultural knowledge and science) and carried out as

tikanga Māori (cultural practices). These cultural attributes interact to co-create community and environmental resilience in the context of disasters.

Key values that shape Māori inter-generational practices for facilitating whakaoranga (restoration and resilience) include kotahitanga (unity), whānau (family), whakapapa (genealogy), marae (meeting grounds), whakawhanaungatanga (building/maintaining relationships), manaakitanga (respect/support/hospitality), and kaitiakitanga (guardianship). From a Māori perspective, such values link with a set of practices that must be learnt and enacted through giving time and support for the collective good rather than the wellbeing of oneself.

4.3.3 Tangata whenua and a resilient nation

The effective response and significant community support facilitated by Māori in the aftermath of the Canterbury and Kaikōura earthquakes, the floods in Edgecumbe, as well as in other emergencies, has generated considerable interest in Māori disaster resilience. Māori moral and relational attributes applied to creating community resilience promote a collaborative response to disaster recovery, commitment to environmental restoration, and the extension of hospitality to others experiencing adversity. Māori also have assets and places, which have, and will again be mobilised to secure community wellbeing in the aftermath of disasters[7].

These strengths are highly relevant to developing a resilient New Zealand, and partnering with Māori to build disaster resilience is essential to ensuring that outcome.

This Strategy recognises the importance of whakaoranga, the Māori-Crown relationship, and Māori worldviews generally: it is committed to an inclusive, community approach to resilience; it is focussed on putting people at the centre of resilience, including an emphasis on manaakitanga and wellbeing; it aims to build the relationship between iwi and agencies with roles in the emergency management system, and it seeks to build recognition of the role culture – including kaupapa Māori and tikanga Māori – plays in our wider resilience.

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[6] Acknowledgement: The concept and application of the term whakaoranga to disaster resilience were developed in the National Science Challenge Resilience to Nature's Challenges' research project: Whakaoranga marae, led by Dr Christine Kenney.

[7] It is important to note that while many Māori may share a similar worldview, there is still a need to recognise different dynamics both within and between iwi/hapū, and to engage with each on an individual basis. There is also a need to recognise that different iwi, hapū and marae have different resource constraints and asset bases and their ability to respond is dependent on this; not all iwi/hapū will have the same resilience or capacity to respond.

4.4 Resilience and people disproportionately affected by disaster

Building resilience across all parts of society requires broad engagement and partnerships. It also requires empowerment, and inclusive, accessible and non-discriminatory participation, paying special attention to people disproportionately affected by disasters.

Section 3.6 promotes the importance of reducing vulnerability and pursuing equitable outcomes. Paying special attention to different vulnerabilities is important for reducing risks and ensuring particular needs are met in response and recovery. However, it is also important to recognise that many people and groups who face hardship or challenges in their everyday lives, also have tremendous capacity and capability. A strengths-based approach identifying different protective and adaptive factors and opportunities, can enable, empower, and give agency to groups who might otherwise be disproportionately affected. It can also significantly add to the richness and effectiveness of emergency management planning, and ensure the outcomes from disasters are as equitable as possible.

4.4.1. Resilience and disabled people

Disabled people can face particular challenges during and after disasters. These include lack of access to information and communications, inaccessible facilities and services, lack of access to needed support resources, disintegration of social connections, degradation of the environment, and lack of inclusive and responsive policy frameworks.

Internationally, there is an increasing drive to design and implement disability-inclusive disaster risk reduction and resilience practices.

The New Zealand Disability Strategy 2016-2026 promotes a twin-track approach to inclusion: ensuring that all mainstream services and supports are inclusive of, and accessible to, disabled people, and ensuring that there are disability-specific specialised support or services for those who need them.

Several factors have been identified that support the resilience of disabled people. These include:

- **Preparedness**: supporting the design and implementation of resilience-focused emergency preparedness that includes disabled people, their family/whānau, care givers and key people and/or groups in their community

- **Participation and inclusion**: sustainable solutions that benefit everyone in communities emerge if people with disabilities are included in emergency management planning and implementation.

- **Diversity within disability**: effective disability-inclusive emergency management strategies require recognition of the needs and capabilities of the diverse range of lived experiences of people with disabilities.

- **Collaboration**: following disasters, disability-inclusive response, recovery and regeneration activities require the contributions of a diverse range of stakeholders for collective impact and effective recovery.

- **Build back better**: using disasters as an opportunity to enhance the social, economic, environmental and physical conditions of local communities, including to incorporate universal design.

In addition to these factors, it is important that emergency managers, emergency responders, and those supporting communities generally, are aware of and competent in disability-inclusive planning, response, and recovery, so that disabled people can participate in resilience, response, and recovery on the same basis as others.

4.4.2. Resilience and CALD communities

Culturally and linguistically diverse communities (or 'CALD' communities) make up a significant and growing proportion of New Zealand's population. Over the past two decades, New Zealand has become one of a small number of culturally and linguistically 'superdiverse' countries. There are 213 ethnicities in New Zealand as at Census 2013, and New Zealand is now home to 160 languages. In addition to people who have migrated to New Zealand, or who are living here temporarily, New Zealand also has a thriving tourist economy, that brings around 5 million short-term visitors to the country annually.

This diversity brings richness, innovation, knowledge and experience, and a wider, and more diverse customer and employee base (the 'diversity dividend'). It also brings some challenges; notably, a large number of new migrants or visitors in New Zealand, some of whom come from very different linguistic and cultural backgrounds.

It is imperative that the vulnerability – and resilience – of CALD communities are considered across all 4Rs.

4.4.3. Resilience and rural communities

Rural environments differ significantly from their urban counterparts in ways that directly impact emergency management. Populations are usually dispersed across less accessible landscapes, which can leave them more exposed to the impacts of hazards, and isolated for prolonged periods of time as a result of infrastructure damage.