

ART Week One Snapshot

The ARTs deployed for the first time at 0700hrs on Monday morning the 28th of October.

As at 1200hrs Friday, the six ART units across the three Pilot Districts have attended 360 CARD events.

These events include responding to:

- Family Harm matters x 19
- Conducting Bail Checks x 77
- Stopping Suspicious or Dangerously Drive Motor Vehicles x 111
- Executing Search warrants x 16
- Supporting the Front Line by backing them up at violent incidents.
- Arrests were made at 27 of these events either by PST staff supported by ART, or ART staff directly.

Of those 360 events:

- 35 have been recorded in the ART CheckPoint App which is used to record specific AOS ART Tactical tasking's
- 18 would have required some level of traditional AOS response prior to the rollout of ARTs.

A breakdown of those 18 jobs show that:

- 15 were AOS Blue Role
- 3 AOS Black

Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982

All 360 events have been resolved without incident.

Sample ART Job from each District

Canterbury: Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982


Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982

Waikato: ART first on scene to stabbing, provide immediate advanced AOS first aid to victim before ambo arrive.


Counties / Manukau: ART respond to multiple shots fired at residential address. OP & Cordon established, offender comes out and arrested on firearms, meth and unlawful taking charges.

Inspector Steve Mather
Acting Commander Tactical Groups
Response & Operations


Was the event a AOS blue-role or black-role deployment?




Deployed By




Deployment Role




Deployment Type




Offence Codes (High Level, all that apply)




Incident type that best described the events









Team Leader PCA



Tactic used





ART Week Two Snapshot

The ARTs deployed for the first time at 0700hrs on Monday morning the 28th of October.

As at 1200hrs on Wednesday the 6th of November, the six ART units across the three Pilot Districts have attended 883 Comms Centre CARD events.

These events include responding to:

- Family Harm matters x 52
- Conducting Bail Checks x 100
- Stopping Suspicious or Dangerously Drive Motor Vehicles x 232
- Executing Search warrants x 39
- Supporting the Front Line by backing them up at violent incidents.
- Arrests were made at 93 of these events either by PST staff supported by ART, or ART staff directly.

Of those 883 events:

- 89 have been recorded in the ART CheckPoint App which is used to record specific AOS ART Tactical tasking's
- 38 would have required some level of traditional AOS response prior to the trial rollout of ARTs.

A breakdown of those 89 jobs show that:

- 33 were AOS Blue Role
- 5 AOS Black Role
- 51 PST level Response

Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982

All 883 events have been resolved without incident.

Sample ART Jobs from each District

Canterbury: Ambo receive a call that a male has been seriously stabbed at a local dwelling. Ambo held at an SFP. The ART went forward and located victim inside with multiple stab wounds. ART member provides advanced medical care while rest of team search house, locating female offender hiding in rear bedroom.


Waikato: Serious family harm investigation, target property search but S. 9(2)(a) offender not located, ART and Dogs search adjoining properties and locate offender in one of bedroom

Counties / Manukau: Serious family harm offender with multiple alerts and danger flags, wanted to arrest. ART conducted door knock and searched address, finding aggressive offender in the ceiling space.

Community Engagement: Counties Manukau ART staff have visited a local mosque and youth sports tournament and engaged with those present explaining the ART role. This has been very well received.

Inspector Steve Mather
Response & Operations


Offence Codes (High level, all that apply)




Incident type that best describes the events







Team Leader PCA




Was there a reportable use of force requiring a TOR?






Who was the primary unit?



Unit Responsible for Arrest



CHECKPOINT ART DATA TO 1200hrs 6th November 2019

Was the event a AOS blue-role or black-role deployment?	Count
Blue role	33
Black role	5
PST	51
Total	89

Deployed by	Count
Deployed by Comms	15
Self-deployed	42
DCC	8
Full AOS	3
Other	21

Deployment type	Count
Deployment Request Declined	3
Emergency	35
Preplanned - Partial Deployment	13
Preplanned - Full Squad	0

Deployment role	Count
Command/Control	9
Support/Assist	68
Sole Attendee	11
Other	1

Was the AOS Commander consulted?	Count
Yes	18
No	71

Type of Job	Count
Mobile	8
Static	35

Offence Codes (High Level)	Count
1200 Kidnapping	2

1300 Robbery	1
1400 Grievous Assaults	4
1500 Serious Assaults	6
1600 Minor Assaults	1
1700 Intimidation and Threats	7
1800 Group Assemblies	1
1M Mental Illness	3
1X Suicidal	4
2600 Sexual Attacks	2
2700 Abnormal Sex	1
3200 Drugs/Cannabis	1
3500 Disorder	7
3700 Family Offences	3
3800 Family Offences	5
4100 Burglary	1
4200 Car Conversion	3
4400 Receiving	1
5100 Destruction of Property	2
6800 Firearms Offences	7
7100 Against Justice	1
7600 By Law Breaches	1
7900 Justice (special)	2
A-W Traffic Offences	2
Incident type that BEST DESCRIBES these events	Count
1C	7
1K	1
1M	1
1R	3
1U	2
1V	1
1X	5
2W	15
3T	2
5F	22

5K	2
6D	3
Other	25

TL PCA	Count
Cooperative	39
Passive resistant	10
Active resistant	11
Assaultive	15
GBH/death	14

Was there a reportable use of force requiring a TOR?	Count
Yes	3
No	86

Tactic used	Count
Announced Forced entry	2
Breach and Hold	1
Cordon/Contain/ Appeal	8
Door knock/ Direct approach to target	57
Emergency action	2
Open-air arrest	9
Other (Describe in Team Leader comments)	17
Vehicle Stop - compliant	6

Incident resolved by	Count
Prior to Negotiation	16
Tactical Only	21
Negotiation Only	21
Combined Negotiation/ Tactical	12
Offender not contacted/ located	19

Result code	Count
K1	17
K3	2


K6 33
 K9 36

Resolution
 Arrested – charged 29
 Arrested – no charge 2
 Released without charge 6
 Subject decamped scene 8
 Subject returned to caregiver 1
 Transport to hospital (medical) 1
 Transport to hospital (1M) 4
 Refer to Youth Aid 1
 Other 27


Who was the primary unit?
 ART 25
 Public Safety Team 47
 Road Policing 2
 Specialist (non-ART) 2
 Investigation 9
 Prevention 3
 Other 1

Which unit was responsible for the arrest?
 ART 14
 Other 52


Was the event a AOS blue-role or black-role deployment?




Deployed by?



Deployment Role





Deployment Type








ID#	Title	Time of Event	Event Description	District	LOI	Situation Status
44	ART <small>to view</small>	5/11/2019 11:35	OPT identified location for Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 ART teams deployed around the address before making an approach and locating Section 9(2)(a) inside, arrested without incident. 3 x WTA and wanted for assaults police.	Canterbury		Yes
42	ART deployed to support PST in HRX offender apprehension	4/11/2019 11:20	ART contacted by Otahuhu staff who were planning to locate and apprehend Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 has active FH charges of strangulation and current BOB. PST planning on conducting routine door knock which was assessed as inadequate by ART. Offender has firearm alerts and serious violence history. ART assisted with plan and this was supported by a recon by Eagle. ART conducted door knock and search of address. Offender located hiding in ceiling space and apprehended. Offender aggressive initially but calmed down enroute to Manukau. Debrief conducted with all staff. PST staff appreciated support and coaching.	Counties Manukau		No
41	ART support PST in attempting HRX offender apprehension	4/11/2019 10:15	AT requested by Manurewa PST to assist in locating and apprehending Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 for a 21W Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 . Active charges with firearms and attempted murder history. Several locations cleared but not located.	Counties Manukau		No
40	ART support frontline with arrest of HRX offender LAUPATA	4/11/2019 08:30	ART requested by Manurewa PST staff to support them in apprehending Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 in actives for Agg Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 (firearm), U/L possession firearm, and injuring. Approach conducted by ART and PST. Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 found at address and when spoken to he confronted staff and was verbally aggressive and challenging. Taken into custody without issue.	Counties Manukau		No
39	ART - Deployment	4/11/2019 15:29	Below is a brief summary of some events ART4 were able to assist with over the weekend late shifts, outside of the standard assisting PST staff with angry people. PST4 and 5 were the late shift teams working over the 3 late shifts. Saturday PST4 observed who they believed to be Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 on foot on Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 had multiple WTAs and is believed to be an outstanding offender from rural burglaries relating to an AOS callout in Waipara last Monday where a 3030 rifle and 50rmds of ammunition had been stolen. He was also the subject of a 5F at Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 street the night before, but had not been located. ART units were close by, enabling the PST i-car to maintain an O.P. Multiple units arrived simultaneously, enabling a swift arrest to take place without incident. Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 2200 hrs Sunday night, Ambos report that someone had been stabbed at Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 . 2 ART units attend, speak to Ambos at their SFP and ascertain Ambos believe someone had been stabbed in the chest and the offender was still present. ART2 took trauma kit forward and approached the address. Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 Further voice appeal made contact with a male, who called early and held by PST Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 . Further voice appeal made contact with a male, who called out that he had been stabbed but was unable to come to the front door, and that he couldn't stop the bleeding. He told police that he was the only person left at the address. Entry made by ART4, and used rescue tactic until victim located with substantial wounds in the living room. 1 member remained with victim while other members cleared the remaining room. During a the clearance the female offender was located hiding in a rear bedroom. ART units were able to provide immediate trauma care to the arterial bleed, applying a tourniquet and Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 field dressing to the large slice (to the bone) on the victims arm. A secondary survey located a second puncture wound to the lower back of the victim. Ambos were called forward and victim handover conducted. As a result it is believed the offender located at the address has made a full confession, victim received swift medical care and two witnesses were also located at the scene.	Canterbury		Yes

38	ART deployed to offender shooting at houses	2/11/2019 15:15	ART deployed to incident where a male offender was firing a gun at nearby houses smashing windows. ART and PST coordinated armed approach and took four males and one female into custody. Gun found to be gas powered BB gun. One offender referred to Ait resolution.	Counties Manukau	No
36	ART deployed to 12 males smashing up property with weapons	3/11/2019 19:10	ART deployed to support PST after reports of 12 males smashing up a property in Manurewa. Unknown males armed with a mix of weapons. Windows and doors smashed. Upon police arrival several males approached police aggressively and three males arrested.	Counties Manukau	No
35	ART deployed to support PST in apprehending HRX offender	2/11/2019 15:15	Papakura PST staff called ART to support them executing 2W at residence. PST, Delta, and ART coordinated entry and search and cleared address. Offender not located.	Counties Manukau	No
34	ART deployed in support of PST at FH Incident	2/11/2019 13:40	ART deployed to support PST at Papatoetoe where a male was being no compliant and aggressive towards family members and staff. ART supported PST in removing male from address and placing him into custody. Nil issues.	Counties Manukau	No
33	Community Reassurance - Softball tournament	2/11/2019 10:30	ART attended under 12's youth softball tournament and spoke to adults and children at event. Lots of positive support towards police and the ART concept. Photos of ART team, vehicle and kids available if required.	Counties Manukau	No
32	ART deployed to Offender seen with pistol, Mangere	3/11/2019 01:05	ART deployed to street fighting in Mangere where offender seen with pistol on beltline. Ongoing fighting and disorder in and around vicinity. ART provided direction to PST staff on approach to take if offender sighted whilst patrolling area. Offender not located.	Counties Manukau	Yes
31	ART deployed to Gang related egg burglary	3/11/2019 02:15	ART deployed to Manurewa where reports of five Black Power members armed with firearms breaking into suspected drug selling house. Enroute offending vehicle left. Area Enquiries conducted but nil located.	Counties Manukau	No
30	ART deployed to 1X with knife	2/11/2019 19:35	ART responded to call from father reporting son attempting suicide armed with a knife. ART arrived first and approached male and detained him until PST arrival. Male fairly compliant.	Counties Manukau	Yes
29	Mosque visit - reassurance	2/11/2019 17:50	ART explained ART concept. All very pleased to see Police and support ART concept.	Counties Manukau	Yes
28	Waikato Saturday swing	3/11/2019 07:21	Good News Stories: (Include E#) Assist PST with Burgs on two males use hammers to smash into store in the Base, ART provide delta cover man and recover property on dog track, second ART unit whilst doing wider areas locate two males fitting the description. Males detained, then arrested and searched, stolen property located in bags and spontaneous admissions made. View of their snapchat locates images of them committing offence.	Waikato	Yes
27	Waikato ART-Sunday Late	4/11/2019 07:19	Assist PST with S8 search at [redacted] member who had slashed a whanau member in the chest with baring knife the previous night. House searched and not located but indications were he was not far away as house open and TV on with wallet and cellphone in open house. ART members assisted Delta in casting and no track located. Through enquiries made the neighbour's house was identified as belonging to Whanau, this was entered with consent and searched. [redacted] located in one of the bedrooms. PST very happy that ART were there to assist.	Waikato	Yes

125	ART deployment	3/11/2019 09:50	09:50hrs ART deployed- re serious assault from 02/11/2019 reported to be at [redacted] PST placed cordons in place and confirming with informant [redacted] was asleep. ART have made foot approach locating front room K9 d. Seriously affected by drugs taken by ambulance to hospital status 2. Vehicle used by [redacted] located on Shortland St and held for CIB	Canterbury	Yes
22	ART respond to males shooting BB gun	2/11/2019 21:15	CMD West 15:13 Hrs Neighbour Firing Pellet Gun at informant house and window broken. Assist PST staff with inquiry at [redacted] Official Information Act 1982 to locate 16 year old offender. GSEMAC briefing given by A/Sgt on PST. ART approached address to conduct a door. 5 males were spoken to at rear of address. These males were compliant and admitted shooting targets on the fence with a plastic pallet gun. Gun handed over by male [redacted] Official Information Act 1982 He admitted firing the pallet gun. He was spoken to by PST.	Counties Manukau	Yes
Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982					
Units attended: [redacted] Official Information Act 1982					
22	Discharge firearm	2/11/2019 03:40	Holden Executive vehicle [redacted] Official Information Act 1982 struck barrier on southbound lane, Great South Rd, HUNTLY and driver decamped on foot yelling and swearing. Further reports of the 1K driver walking with a long black gun and fired 4 shots into the air. Seen to head into pub. 3 cartridges found on ground. and [redacted] tracking. not located. 4C's identify vehicle previously linked to address of [redacted] Official Information Act 1982	Waikato	Yes
21	Counties Manukau West P039663993	2/11/2019 02:42	0036hrs. ART respond to event at [redacted] Official Information Act 1982 where informant states male knocking at their door had a firearm demanding to see her brother. He was told he wasn't there and subsequently went outside and began smashing property. 3 suspects located by 1 car but unable to link to event. Nil firearm located.	Counties Manukau	Yes
20	ART apprehend HRX offender from Waikato	28/10/2019 09:37	CMD received request from Waikato District to assist in apprehending HRX offender for firearms offences. ART took lead and conducted cordon and contain and subsequently located [redacted] Official Information Act 1982 inside. Arrested without issue. KB to Enquiry staff.	Counties Manukau	Yes
19	ART supports front line staff - gang member 2W	31/10/2019 14:06	ART contacted by Manurewa Area Prevention Unit for support to locate gang member Significant violence history. ART attended briefing and found APU staff not prepared or planned for execution and assisted with plan development. ART and APU staff approach to offenders address and cleared address. Offender not located. Good example of ART staff being able to provide planning, risk assessment, and execution support to front line.	Counties Manukau	Yes
18	ART deployed to S & S Munwai	30/10/2019 12:43	ART contacted by Waitemata District staff requesting assistance to execute S & S search for manufacturing meth enquiry. After briefing it was determined a full AOS deployment would be enacted due to offender [redacted] Official Information Act 1982 history of clan labs, firearms, and gangs. Early and late shift ART staff deployed in AOS role and 4X executed in Muriwai. Evidence of manufacturing located. Offender [redacted] Official Information Act 1982 not located. KB to Enquiry team.	Counties Manukau	Yes
17	ART apprehend HRX offender	30/10/2019 10:40	ART asked to support Ormiston PST staff locating HRX offender firearms offences for a breach of release conditions warrant. Several enquiries conducted and offender subsequently located by ART staff whilst walking his dog.	Counties Manukau	Yes
16	ART first on scene - Burglary	28/10/2019 22:05	ART deployed to prevention patrolling in hotspot areas and first on scene to commercial burglary in Otahuhu. Offenders attempted to drive vehicle through fence but initial efforts unsuccessful. Vehicle abandoned and offenders on foot before ART arrival. Delta and ART cleared large commercial site, no offenders located. KB to PST staff.	Counties Manukau	Yes
15	ART respond to Agg Robbery	29/10/2019 18:33	ART conducting prevention patrolling in tasked hotspot area and first on the scene to an attempted aggravated robbery at a laundromat in Otara. Offender had attacked tourist with machete but unsuccessfully taken anything. Offender decamped in vehicle before ART arrived. Scene controlled and handed over to incoming PST and Crime Squad staff.	Counties Manukau	Yes





CHECKPOINT ART DATA to 1200hrs 12th November 2019

Was the event a AOS blue-role or black-role deployment?	Count
Blue role	48
Black role	5
Neither	75

Deployed by	
Deployed by Comms	21
Self-deployed	65
DCC	13
Full AOS	3
Other	26

Deployment type	
Deployment Request Declined	3
Emergency	50
Preplanned - Partial Deployment	22

Deployment role	
Command/Control	12
Support/Assist	98
Sole Attendee	17
Other	1

Section 9(2)(b) Official Information Act 1982
[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Type of Job

Mobile	11
Static	56

Offence Codes (High Level)

1200 Kidnapping	2
1300 Robbery	1
1400 Grievous Assaults	4
1500 Serious Assaults	8
1600 Minor Assaults	3
1700 Intimidation and Threats	15
1800 Group Assemblies	1
1M Mental Illness	5
1X Suicidal	5
2200 Sexual Affronts	1
2600 Sexual Attacks	3
2700 Abnormal Sex	1
3200 Drugs/Cannabis	2
3500 Disorder	8
3700 Family Offences	4
3800 Family Offences	10
4100 Burglary	1
4200 Car Conversion	4
4400 Receiving	1
5100 Destruction of Property	2
6800 Firearms Offences	9
7100 Against Justice	1
7600 By Law Breaches	3
7900 Justice (special)	4
A-W Traffic Offences	3
	101

Incident type that BEST DESCRIBES these events

1C	9
1K	1
1M	1
1R	5
1U	2
1V	1
1X	8
2W	21
3T	2
5F	34
5K	2
6D	3
Other	39

TL PCA

Cooperative	57
Passive resistant	13
Active resistant	16
Assaultive	20
GBH/death	22

Was there a reportable use of force requiring a TOR?

Yes	4
No	124

Tactic used

Announced Forced entry	4
Breach and Hold	2
Cordon/Contain/Appeal	13

Cover Port	1
Door knock/Direct approach to target	89
Emergency action	3
Open-air arrest	12
Other (Describe in Team Leader comments)	17
Ruse/deception	1
Vehicle Stop - compliant	6

Incident resolved by

Prior to Negotiation	24
Tactical Only	30
Negotiation Only	31
Combined Negotiation/Tactical	17
Offender not contacted/located	26

Result code

K1	27
K3	2
K6	49
K9	49

Resolution

Arrested – charged	40
Arrested – no charge	5
Released without charge	9
Subject decamped scene	12
Subject returned to caregiver	1
Transport to hospital (medical)	1
Transport to hospital (1M)	5
Refer to Youth Aid	1

Other	42
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Who was the primary unit?

ART	37
-----	----

Public Safety Team	68
--------------------	----

Road Policing	2
---------------	---

Specialist (non-ART)	2
----------------------	---

Investigation	11
---------------	----

Prevention	4
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Other	4
-------	---

Which unit was responsible for the arrest?

ART	23
-----	----

Other	78
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ART Week Three Snapshot

The ARTs deployed for the first time at 0700hrs on Monday morning the 28th of October.

As at 1200hrs on Wednesday the 13th of November, the six ART units across the three Pilot Districts have attended 1381 Comms Centre CARD events.

These events include responding to:

- Family Harm matters x 84 (last 7 days = 30)
- Conducting Bail Checks x 155 (last 7 days = 23)
- Stopping Suspicious or Dangerously Drive Motor Vehicles (3T and 1U) x 383 (last 7 days 125)
- Executing Search warrants x 64 (last 7 days = 10)
- Supporting the Front Line by backing them up at violent incidents.
- Arrests were made at 141 of these events either by PST staff supported by ART, or ART staff directly.

Of those 1381 events:

- 128 have been recorded in the ART CheckPoint App which is used to record specific AOS ART Tactical tasking's
- 53 would have required some level of traditional AOS response prior to the trial rollout of ARTs.

A breakdown of those 53 jobs show that:

- 48 were AOS Blue Role
- 5 AOS Black Role
- 75 PST level Response

Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982

All 1381 events have been resolved without incident.

Sample ART Jobs from each District

Canterbury: Priority offender Tasking: 2W visits for Top 5 offender Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 Assist RSPCA with the uplift of a dog from a **S. 9(2)(a)** address.

Waikato: P039778480. 5F event. Self-directed due to flags on POI Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act. Clearance of environs at a Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982). Located male hiding in drainage. Quote "I was going to fight but saw your duns so gave up". Male arrested on 2W and custody handed to attending I car.

Counties / Manukau: Non-fatal shooting occurred in Otara overnight. Enquiry team requested ART support at POI's address. ART requests Eagle flyover for POI's vehicle. Zero Alpha briefed. Decision to make door knock approach to address. ART planned approach and escalation if required. Door Knock conducted and upon clearing the house ART located POI in bedroom. Handed to enquiry team.

Community Engagement: All three pilot Districts are patrolling in high risk areas. Waikato has been undertaking prevention visits to dairy's that have been the victim of robbery. CM conducted high viz patrols at Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 after 1C person activity, supporting PST and Community.

Inspector Freda Grace
Response & Operations

ART Week Four Snapshot

The ARTs deployed for the first time at 0700hrs on Monday morning the 28th of October.

As at 1200hrs on Tuesday the 19th of November, the six ART units across the three Pilot Districts have attended 1692 Comms Centre CARD events.

These events include responding to:

- Family Harm matters x 134 (last 7 days = 28)
- Conducting Bail Checks x 180 (last 7 days = 31)
- Stopping Suspicious or Dangerously Drive Motor Vehicles (3T and 1U) x 438 (last 7 days 64)
- Executing Search warrants x 76 (last 7 days = 12)
- Supporting the Front Line by backing them up at violent incidents.
- Arrests were made at 179 of these events either by PST staff supported by ART, or ART staff directly.

Of those 1692 events:

- 182 have been recorded in the ART CheckPoint App which is used to record specific AOS ART Tactical tasking's

Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982

A breakdown of the checkpoint data is attached to this report.

Community Engagement Plans for Waikato and Counties Manukau are attached in RIOD. All districts have an Engagement Plan and a plan for to deploy to Prevention activity.

There continues to be a steady number of *'have you say'* emails, one positive one and seven not so positive.


Five OIA's relating to ART have also been received.

Commentary in the job text loaded to RIOD and anecdotal commentary is that the frontline feel well supported by the ART working in their areas.

Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act

Inspector Freda Grace
Response & Operations

Armed Response Team Deployment Report



Deployment Summary

As of November 19, 2019, Armed Response Teams (ARTs) have attended 182 incidents across the Tamaki Makaurau, Waikato, and Canterbury districts. Numbers are based upon Checkpoint data only, where district information is available.



ARTs self-deployed to **46%** of all incidents.



ARTs acted in a support role at **78%** of incidents attended.



74% of PST-like activity involved emergency deployments.




AOS Commander consulted on **23%** of all incidents attended.




Section 9(2)(ba) Official Information Act 1982

Top 5 closure codes that best described the event/incident.



Perceived Cumulative Assessment (PCA) for all incidents attended.



Offenders were perceived as cooperative in **37%** of all incidents.



31% of all incidents were resolved using negotiation only.




Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982

Result Summary

The public safety team were the primary unit for most incidents attended by ARTs, with 40% of incidents receiving a K9 result code.



33% of incidents resulted in an arrest, with ART officers responsible for **16%** of arrests.



Deployment Report

Summary

Deployment reporting is based upon the number of End of Deployment (EOD) form submissions received by the Evidence Based Policing Centre. These forms are completed via Checkpoint. This brief report provides a high-level analysis on the deployment and use of ARTs across the trial districts.

As of November 19, 2019, the Armed Response Team (ART) have responded to a total of **182** incidents.

Deployments

The majority of deployments have involved the ARTs operating in a **PST-like role** (59.3%). Of the 182 incidents, ARTs were primarily **self-deployed** (45.6%). At present, the EOD form only asks for a specification around the deployment type if the ART is operating in a PST-like role. Accordingly, of the 108 incidents attended in this capacity, 74.1% were **emergency deployments**. Where attended, ARTs most often **support and assistance** (76.9%). ART deployment required consultation with the AOS commander 24.2% of the time. When consulted, deployments predominantly involved Blue or Black roles.

Incident

The code that best described the incident was **Other** (33%), followed next by **5F** (see Figure for finer breakdown of recorded incident codes). Common alternative codes listed by officers were 6820 and 4X. The top five offence codes listed by ART officers were **1700 Intimidation and Threats, 1500 Serious Assaults, 3800 Family Offences, 6800 Firearms Offences, and 3500 Disorder**.


Tactics

Across all incidents, offenders were mostly perceived as **cooperative** (37.5%) and incidents were often resolved **using negotiation only** (30.7%). The offender was not contacted or located 23.9% of the time. The primary tactic employed was **door knock/direct approach to target** (68.1%). To date, 7 incidents have required the submission of a Tactical Options Report (TOR).


Result

The result code most often recorded by ART officers was **K9** (41.4%) and the most reported resolution was **arrested (charged)** (32.4%). The **public safety team** was most often listed as the primary unit (57%), with the ART being responsible for 29.7% of arrests.


Deployment




Incident



Tactics



Result



103	ART support Crime Car with NS of King Cobra member	17/11/2019 13:00	Informant reports that 20 yr old son threatened by 2x Patched gang members presenting firearm. Departed after returning to home address. In hour later, identified vehicle (distinctive) was located in Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 matching nearby RC's address. Due to male occupant fully aware of Police SFP and wearing an Eagle overhead, Crime Squad led approach with ART in close support. Member met police on lawn admitting involvement and was taken to the Crime Squad where ART and member passively cleared address for enquiries. Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 briefly attempted to question his arrest and appeared to consider stanching up to Crime Squad - noticeably became distracted by presence of ART staff stepping forward and changed his attitude towards the Detectives.	Counties Manukau	No	POLICE/VP358
102	ART support Papakura PST to conduct search warrant	17/11/2019 12:35	Section 9(2)(k) Domestic incident had occurred whereby the assault victim was in Middlemore hospital. PST wishing to visit offending husband at rural home address. Victim described a firearm within the caravan at address and husband is an expired licence holder. At the station, ART drew out a concept plan of action from PST and strongly advocated the advantages of a structured approach. ART then demonstrated an on the spot 2-4 min SFP. Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982	Counties Manukau	No	POLICE/VP363
88	Waikato ART Late	17/11/2019 07:48	Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 Section 9(2)(k) Male with knife threatens stab male partner Section 9(2)(k) very close by and Huntly units tied up in Ngauruhia Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982	Waikato	No	POLICE/GP641
87	Waikato-ART Late	17/11/2019 07:47	Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 Section 9(2)(k) Member assaulting female partner on street and threatens to kill Section 9(2)(k) attend and detain male for PSO, hand over to PST.	Waikato	No	POLICE/GP641
85	ART - KIOD Log	16/11/2019 23:55	Operators: Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 was KSD for disorder from the Main south rd party by an ART member. (PCW given) Other Taskings: Assist PST with a vehicle stop and search outside of Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 following a SFP between an ex-partner who was refusing to leave the address. The informant made mention that the male refusing to leave had access to firearms and potentially had them in his vehicle. ART liaised with PST staff at an SFP and was briefed, ART went forward and located the male in his car outside the address, he was spoken too and his vehicle searched after he gave verbal permission for the search. No firearms were located, but a small axe and machete were located under the backseat. Male was handed over to PST staff for further questioning. Tasked by DCC to make ourselves aware of a scene at Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 where a violent gang rape had taken place overnight. The primary offender is Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 There is an armed scene guard currently holding the address, we did a recon on the address in case we were called to it to provide support. Other Prevention Activities: Prevention patrolling in Hoonhey area following police in theft ex car and burglary. Incidents of Note: (Include EP) Section 9(2)(k) Large party on Main south rd, consisting of around 100-150 intoxicated students. PST staff were called to the address and were asked by the landlord to shut down the party. PST staff were very tight on the ground and were asked for any units that were available to attend. ART members attended and assisted suspect was not located, no weapons or stolen property located after vehicle clearance	Canterbury	Yes	DEARFARG, Andrew
108	ART respond to armed offender threatening police	18/11/2019 18:30	Section 9(2)(k) Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 threatening 1x within garage of rural residential block. Firearms believed to be present. ART provided SFP & incident controller with a portable whiteboard and a discussed plan before deploying to a Forward Op/Vehicle block option and cordon of black sector. Male threatened to "shoot the next pig I see.". When male declined to fully engage with PWT cells, ART's karaoke persuaded male to comply. Male agreed to exit to awaiting staff. 2x air rifles located by Eng Team including a High powered scoped version.	Counties Manukau	No	POLICE/VP357
107	ART Waikato Early	18/11/2019 07:14	Section 9(2)(k) - SFP Section 9(2)(a) reported as male attacking a car with a knife. ART support 2 x 1-cars, Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 on arrival so assisted speaking to parties, searching car and issuing PCO. Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 1x 13-year-old male, police check for female, recent history from male at the address of aggression to police. SFP Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 PST attending on her own so provided back up for this check to be done. Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 - 3850 - Amanda Ave - Male offender left the scene prior to police arrival. Vehicle description given out, ART staff heading to the scene to back up attending PST staff spotted a vehicle matching the description and SFP, it was the offender driving away, K9 made by ART, PST dealing with the matter. Patched Hoonhey message.	Waikato	No	POLICE/GP641
106	Waikato ART Late	18/11/2019 07:11	Male 1x at address and has gone to shed with a knife, approach the shed and CRT shed and house male not located on scene but picked up by 1 car around the corner and S109 DMale 2x at address and 1ss gone to shed with a knife, approach the shed and CRT shed and house male not located on scene but picked up by 1 car around the corner and S109	Waikato	No	POLICE/GP641
103	Waikato ART Late	18/11/2019 07:10	Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 was reported to be wearing camouflage clothing and intimidating members of the Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 refused to speak with Police at home address and later reported to station. Spoken to at front counter by ART and immediate concerns were raised about Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 current mental health. Detained by ART and assessed by DAO's. Taken to HEC.	Waikato	Yes	POLICE/GP641
101	ART support PST in search warrant	17/11/2019 20:00	Papakura PST requested ART support after 2 x KD from a burglary. The offenders confessed to taking the stolen property to Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 PK551 was seeking assistance from Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 to execute Warrantless Search as there are links to gang members at the address. Approach made to address and door knock made. Occupant was compliant and admitted having the stolen property inside the unit. Also located was a in the address was a unipack container containing meth. Scene and suspects handed over to enquiry team.	Counties Manukau	No	POLICE/VP358
86	ART Early Shift Report	17/11/2019 16:11	Operators: Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 Amalaki: Priority Offender Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 Other Taskings: 13280 - Tasked to provide visible reassurance at a Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 Other Prevention Activities: 3M - Lyttelton Jim - Sumner Jim - Hurunui/Horony Incidents of Note: (Include EP) Section 9(2)(k) PST dispatched job for Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 who had a WTA. Information received was that he was asleep in a lounge at Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 and had information that he also has a pistol in his possession. Insp. MATHER consulted with prior to making the approach. Initial plan to make entry via an insecure door following a shield approach. Utilised PST and dogs as hard cordons on the property. All doors were locked at the address so overt door knock and voice appeal was used. Still no response and curtains were drawn so decision made to breach the back door. Clearance conducted of the address and target was located in bed. Taken into custody with no issues. 5 and 4 included for Drugs. Methamphetamine utensils located however no firearms were found. Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982 Amalaki: modes conducted with Family Harm at Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 looking for following a serious assault against his ex-partner. Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 not located. Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 (Amh/PCW) 1 x Written traffic warning	Canterbury	Yes	POLICE/BP355
104	Canterbury ART Late Shift Report Nov 19	19/11/2019 00:00	Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982 Tasked to assist at Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 in relation to Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 Information did not confirm that he was present at the hotel so stood down. Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 Involved in conducting area enquiries relating to car sightings in the Bishopdale/Papanui area. Also assisted following a pursuit, with one of the stolen vehicles that ended in Oxford. Provided 3 x cover men to 3 x dog units in the foreground the Waimakariri Gorge for a considerable period of time. Offenders not located. Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982 Tasked to assist with a Parole Recall warrant for Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 Unknown to Police (Amh/PCW) Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 was already in custody. Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 assisted with the arrest of Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 after he had been sending photo messages to his ex-partner intimating that he was armed to use himself. He decamped when a unit attended before he was arrested by Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 and Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982. Assist with a street robbery where a male PM Member has assisted a female and stolen her cell phone. Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982 Assist GDB with incident where a female screaming for someone to stop hitting her. Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982 Assist GDB at the Fendaton BP where a male driving a stolen vehicle got the vehicle stuck and did a massive burn out in the forecourt. ART secured the scene, spoke to witnesses, took photos and looked after towing the vehicle to enable GDB to deal with the offender. Assist with an armed assault for the firearms buy back team from Gun City to Central.	Canterbury	Yes	POLICE/VP361
110	ART support Delta during track of 110X offender	18/11/2019 21:55	Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982 ART responded to 110X (detamping driver)/breach of SFP that left where driver had decamped from vehicle. Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 believed to be violent offender. Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 currently with firearms alerts. Supported Delta 14 with an ART cover person during tracking phase. Remainder of ART was proximate enough to immediately assist Delta in detaining suspect as he was located trying to enter a stranger's address. Offender handed over to PST staff.	Counties Manukau	No	POLICE/VP362
109	ART approach offenders for aggravated robbery	18/11/2019 19:40	Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982 and Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982 three offenders presented long barrel weapon & pistol during aggravated robbery of dairy before decamping. Eagle and GDB vehicles following vehicle Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 from Mt Wellington with ART en route from Papakura. As ART caught up with units in Portage Rd, Otahuhu a 19 GDB vehicle made way for ART to pass to front unit. Speeding target vehicle abruptly and compliantly stopped for ART red & blue lights and the two occupants immediately put hands up/out the window before ART staff could even walk and appeal the armed 3T. Co-ordinating instructions were needed by ART to calm the secondary units from yelling at occupants over ART's voice appeals and from covering from behind ART staff with pistols. Arrest team was directed off the footpath and to a better arrest location behind the ART vehicle. Unfortunately an original 3rd suspect was not located, no weapons or stolen property located after vehicle clearance	Counties Manukau	No	POLICE/VP362

92	Waikato ART Early	16/11/2019 07:52	Good News Stories: (Include Es) Asst PST with Burgs on two males use hammers to smash into store in the Base, ART provide delta cover man and recover property on dog track, second ART unit whilst doing wider areas locate two males fitting the description. Males detained, then arrested and searched, stolen property located in bags and spontaneous admissions made. View of their snapchat locates images of them committing offence.	Waikato	No	POLICE/DP641
91	Waikato ART Early	16/11/2019 07:51	Section 9(2)(a) Official Inform In ART report Kidnap flatmate over a debt, holds loaded cross bow to his body and brandishes a knife and tomahawk, handcuffs flatmate and walks him from the address, flatmate runs off to a local store and calls police. Section 9(2)(b) Contacted by phone and states he has left address but will come back, OP on address, male seen by neighbour jumping fences, house voice appeased and comes out and lo'd. House cleared utilising CRT.	Waikato	Yes	POLICE/DP641
90	Waikato ART Swing	16/11/2019 07:50	Section 9(2)(a) Official Inform at 3F emergency alarm - PST took the k9 and 3F	Waikato	No	POLICE/DP641
89	Waikato ART Swing	16/11/2019 07:49	Section 9(2)(a) Off Argument about trespass, chair thrown through window and knife presented. Asst 1 car to resolve via a CCA and clear address. x1 k9 for DOB, Section 9(2)(b) O	Waikato	No	POLICE/DP641
84	ART end of Shift Report	15/11/2019 12:55	Operative Section 9(2)(a) Official Inform Armed: Section 9(2)(a) Official Inform (Poss offensive weapon, Disorderly, 1K) ART attended to reports of male chasing a female along street with a knife, male located and cuffed by ART before being handed over to PST. Section 9(2)(a) Official Inform (Threatening behaviour, 1K) ART attended to reports of next door neighbour trying to force himself into neighbouring address with a knife, male located by ART before being handed over to PST Offensive Weapon Taskings: Section 9(2)(a) Official Inform FHM alarm activated by ex-partner at her home address, cordons established by PST while ART with dogs 10 made a direct approach to the door, spoke with female who confirmed she had received a message from Section 9(2)(a) Official Inform saying it was coming round to smash her windows. Address cleared and robot used to clear roof space Other Taskings: Asst: PST with door knock at Tribesman address Section 9(2)(a) Off following a 1V where the rider of a motor cycle registered to Section 9(2)(a) Official Inform has decamped uncommitted who was rider, passenger was injured but refused to give details to Police Other Prevention Activities: Prevention patrolling in Itom-Hay area following spike in theft ex car and burglary	Canterbury	Yes	BSAUPARK, Andy
82	ART supporting frontline at possible serious assault involving firearm	15/11/2019 21:00	Section 9(2)(b) O Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 17:53hrs - 21:00hrs Section 9(2)(a) Official Info reported that their father had been seriously assaulted by two males from the neighbouring property. Advised that a firearm had also been presented with threats to shoot. ART dispatched along with Section 9(2)(a) Official Inform (Incident Controller) to support sole 1-car who established an SFP. Plan developed by IC to secure victim and the scene address in order to confirm offenders location while the long right of way driveway to suspects address was blocked. On moving into location a vehicle matching the suspect vehicle sighted by ART who ascended a vehicle block on the driveway. Male occupants removed from vehicle and advised that an altercation had occurred with their neighbour and that at the time of this incident a slug gun was in possession of one of the boys in the vehicle but was not used in the altercation. Police ART along with one PST unit pushed down the driveway to the gate at the property before making an approach on foot. Occupants located at the rear of the property and very co-operative with Police. Firearm (slug-gun) located as per brief and secured. Interviews with both parties confirmed ongoing issues between neighbours due to spraying and that the altercation resulted in a physical assault. Firearm was not used in the offence and nor was it presented or threatened to be used. PST units in attendance continuing to investigate and non firearm related charges likely.	Counties Manukau	No	POLICE/DP652
100	ART responds to aggravated burglary - firearm presented	16/11/2019 15:30	Informant reports 20+ Patched gang members on bikes at a address with firearms and handgun in his car and entered address confronting Mother & 27 yr old son. Section 9(2)(a) Official Inform Offenders gone upon ART arrival but neighbours roughly verified event. Area CIB investigating.	Counties Manukau	No	POLICE/DP652
99	AUT oversight of violent family harm event	16/11/2019 15:00	Section 9(2)(a) Official Inform Section 9(2)(a) Official Inform Partner was damaging the dwelling and had threatened to shoot. Section 9(2)(a) Official Inform family still present at address. Section 9(2)(a) Official Inform reported seeing a small black gun in his pants and a machete in his vehicle. Considering presence of multiple at risk occupants within address and apparent no presentation of firearms as yet to occupants, ART recommended slowing down rushing into address until inner cordons in place and more cautious approach made balanced with urgent action plan in event of escalation. Nil answer or 1c activity at address, further enquiries with Section 9(2)(a) Official Inform confident de-escalation of address and hand over to PST.	Counties Manukau	No	POLICE/DP652
97	ART 2T vehicle - offender located for firearms offences	16/11/2019 12:14	Section 9(2)(a) Official Inform Central, whilst mobile patrolling conducted 3T on Great South Rd, Manurewa with Reg Section 9(2)(a) Official Inform vehicle flagged firearms in May 2019 R/O presented a shot gun. Section 9(2)(a) Official Inform located in vehicle and taken into custody without issue. Section 9(2)(a) Official Inform k9 and handed to Manurewa 1 car for transport and enquiry.	Counties Manukau	No	POLICE/DP652
96	ART supports PST with Detention breach entry	16/11/2019 09:00	CHD South, 6E, 0900 hrs. Section 9(2)(a) Official Inform Asst PST with door knock for Section 9(2)(a) Official Inform who was located with no issues, ART provided ladder for obstructing fence entry and breaching kit if needed. Encouraged staff to consider using GSMEAC often on lesser jobs as a rehearsal for critical incidents and provided a PDF aide memoir.	Counties Manukau	No	POLICE/DP652
92	Waikato ART Early	16/11/2019 07:52	Good News Stories: (Include Es) Asst PST with Burgs on two males use hammers to smash into store in the Base, ART provide delta cover man and recover property on dog track, second ART unit whilst doing wider areas locate two males fitting the description. Males detained, then arrested and searched, stolen property located in bags and spontaneous admissions made. View of their snapchat locates images of them committing offence.	Waikato	No	POLICE/DP641
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90	Waikato ART Swing	16/11/2019 07:50	Section 9(2)(a) Official Inform at 3F emergency alarm - PST took the k9 and 3F	Waikato	No	POLICE/DP641
89	Waikato ART Swing	16/11/2019 07:49	Section 9(2)(a) Off Argument about trespass, chair thrown through window and knife presented. Asst 1 car to resolve via a CCA and clear address. x1 k9 for DOB, Section 9(2)(b) O	Waikato	No	POLICE/DP641

ART respond to information that male enroute to school with firearm	14/11/2019 12:12	Section 9(2)(k) Or Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982	ART responds to information that [redacted] was driving from Huntly with the intention of enroute at [redacted] and he was in possession of a firearm. Limited information from informant about intent or background. Armed cordons put in place at school and coordinated search conducted to locate offender. PST unit located him in Pukekohe's town square with some students. Armed approach undertaken and [redacted] taken into custody by ART. NI weapons located, [redacted] handed over to enquiry team. Update: original information third hand and misunderstood and potentially exaggerated. No evidence of [redacted] having firearm or intending on school shooting.	Counties Manukau	No	POLICEUPH561
Waikato ART Thursday Friday Cody Hunt 4177	14/11/2019 07:56	Section 9(2)(a) Or Section 9(2)(k) Or Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982	Other Taskings: Known offender [redacted] (multiple serious flags) engages in pursuit on Waikato side of Kaimai ranges by pos cam. pursuit initially abandoned but followed at road speed. Driver behaviour escalated with Section 9(2)(a) attempting to reverse into multiple units, members of the public and narrowly avoiding hitting officer attempting to lay spikes. Highly motivated offender potentially armed. Further information suggested offender motivated to seek retribution against another person in relation to his daughter being raped. Suggests behaviour would escalate rather than diminish and action was required to locate the offender. Responses: ART respond to officers with all licensed staff take place at Matamata station to form a plan. Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 Plan devised by ART to conduct CCA at hotel unit including a clearance of subject vehicle enroute. Eagle 10-7 and did not see anyone in vehicle but calling movement around the unit (not seen). ART with delta set up hard cordon on white and conduct cca in unit. 2x males extracted from address and held. Call pst unit forward to detain males. Conduct cca for approx 5 minutes and debrief occupants. NI signs of Section 9(2)(k) Conduct CRT clearance of address with dog handler capability. 1x kg for v/ta (unrelated) Shotgun shells found in suspect vehicle Offender not located. Response 2: Loose link to address at Section 9(2)(a) Or Door knock conducted with delta [redacted] on black. NI located. Response 3.	Waikato	Yes	POLICEUPH401
ART Waikato Thursday Swing 0140	14/11/2019 07:52	Section 9(2)(k) Or Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982	Section 9(2)(k) Or - Know offender in [redacted] stole parent's motor vehicle and .22 rifle. Stated he would be back to shoot his father. Went to girlfriend's address and altercation occurred. Stole her vehicle and decamped from the immediate area. ART [redacted] by DCC. 10-7 [redacted] and begin working through spots nominated by local staff as locations subject would be. Locate initial stolen vehicle with firearm inside. Te Awamutu staff assist with securing firearm while ART, Delta and TAS continue search for Subject. Subject turns up at Te Awamutu unit's location and armed ST conducted by them and assisted a short time later by ART. Great awareness and drills by the TA 1-Car.	Waikato	No	POLICEUPH641
74	Canterbury ART Late Shift - 14/11/19	15/11/2019 03:16	Other Taskings: Attended reports of person outside address with F/A linked with early shift made approach to address; secured address and occupants. Assisted PST with areas alter violent MAF on street multiple address checks for suspects. Attended SF with male threatening family with a softball bat, secured male and weapon. NI PST available so dealt with SF. Liaised with rural, crime and OI re SF with a male reported to be in possession of high powered firearm call made with all interested parties to hold off and reassess in the morning as address is in driveway and no imminent threat. Other Prevention Activities: Multiple curfew checks all v/ta breaches	Canterbury	No	STW006_Sec 9
79	ART approach two youth for attempted ULT	14/11/2019 22:45	ACD West. Section 9(2)(k) Or Intimidate interference with MV. Ranfur Avenue, Sandringham. 2340hrs. ART returning to base from CMD and respond to report of two males unlawfully interfering with vehicle on Ranfur Avenue. ART located both 1) offenders on Kaitika Street and take into custody. Both males handed access to PST unit.	Counties Manukau	No	POLICEUPH562
81	ART first on scene to Family Harassment event	14/11/2019 21:22	CMD Central. Section 9(2)(k) Or Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982. 2125hrs. ART respond to SF due to proximity to scene and first car 10/7, joked shortly after by PST unit. Located scene address down a long shared drive with multiple dwellings. ART staff entered the house, getting the female safely outside where she was dealt with by PST staff. ART then got the male to come outside who was aggressive and reluctant at first but was persuaded to comply without any use of force. Male patched Head Number -Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1; PST issue a PSO to Section 9(2)(k) for 72 hours.	Counties Manukau	No	POLICEUPH562
96	ART responds to children shown firearm by neighbour, Rangere.	15/11/2019 20:20	Section 9(2)(k) Or Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982. CMD WEST. [redacted] reported their children were shown a firearm by the occupants of [redacted] male located at address is Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982. [redacted] flags issue carries firearm. Execution: Door knock made by CMH11 and DWS11. ART+1 and delta in overwatch position. Firearm located was an air rifle. Enquiries to follow up.	Counties Manukau	No	POLICEUPH610
95	AIT Support Search Warrant Execution - HRK TOLONGAE	15/11/2019 19:45	Section 9(2)(k) Or Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982. CMD EAST. Section 9(2)(k) Or Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982. Assist [redacted] team to execute search warrant to locate stolen Ford Falcon [redacted] which was parked in the driveway of the address. The offender was [redacted] Patched member [redacted] He has 4 x firearms alerts believed to be in possession of firearm. 3 x Vehicle stop contingencies in place on nearby cordons. ART conducted briefing at Manukau Hub. Execution: Vehicle block of driveway, CCA, voice appeal conducted via [redacted] phone call made by PNT simultaneously as voice appeal commenced. Zero Aloha D/I [redacted] one else inside the dwelling. House cleared [redacted] ART's rated dog, then ART and CIB entered [redacted] by way of CRT. Target not located. Section 9(2)(g) to conduct more inquiries.	Counties Manukau	No	POLICEUPH382
83	Canterbury ART Early Shift 15/11/2019	15/11/2019 17:11	Section 9(2)(k) Or Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982. Central City Informant reports approx. 20 persons fighting in compound of [redacted] which is a large group of Housing NZ flats. Informant stated that knives were involved and that ambulance is required. On arrival PST had arrived and were dealing with one of the parties and arrested him for trespass. Compound secured by ART and all parties who were initially [redacted] and handed down. All persons handed over to PST who were continuing with enquiries. Section 9(2)(k) Or Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982. [redacted] S. 9(2)(a) [redacted] are locked in a toilet at the address and fear for their safety as their partner is outside and coming down from Meth. PST dispatched and ART respond to assist. On arrival PST dealing with [redacted] S. 9(2)(a) [redacted] refusing to allow Police to enter address, and a further male wearing [redacted] S. 9(2)(a) [redacted] parked in a vehicle at the front of the address. PST eventually negotiated with [redacted] S. 9(2)(a) [redacted] and allowed access to male address safe. CRT Clearance by ART and some PST, while one other held the [redacted] S. 9(2)(a) [redacted] in a cleared bedroom. ART hand over scene to PST with enquiries continuing. Section 9(2)(k) Or Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982. [redacted] appear to have been arguing and are parked in the [redacted] S. 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982. Informant states she didn't see any physical assaults however believes the female to be distressed and looked like she didn't want to be there. PST units unavailable. ART self-assign to hold the fort until a unit is available. On arrival speak with male and female who appeared to be having sex in the car. Once they had made themselves decent separated them and confirmed they had a small amount but were in the middle of "making up". No physical [redacted] S. 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982. All verbal dispute. NI [redacted] S. 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982. Informant lives at [redacted] he has found a .22 rifle wrapped in a towel along with empty point bags, hanging on his boundary fence with [redacted] S. 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982. [redacted] believed to belong to a male who is on an EP Bail living at [redacted] S. 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982. Deployed along with PST and Dogs 9. Direct approach door knock by AOS Staff, 2x occupants extracted and handed off to PST. CRT Clearance of main dwelling and outbuildings. Nothing else of interest located during clearance. Firearm recovered from [redacted] S. 9(2)(a) [redacted] Scene handed over to PST for enquiries to be made as to ownership of firearm.	Canterbury	Yes	WEBLEY, TWH

ART Highlights – 12th November to 19th November

ID	Location/Shift	Date/Time	Description	County	Officer	Outcome	Notes
58	Canterbury Armed Response Team Late shift	12/11/2019 00:11	<p>Operators: Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982</p> <p>2W Section 9(2)(a) Ofc Section 9(2)(a) Ofc</p> <p>Priority Offender Taskings: Reports Top 5 offenders Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 has taken his ex against her will and traveling in a blue Holden, unit have followed updates on location. When vehicle finally located female reports Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 had become suicidal and jumped from vehicle approx. 2 km earlier, arrest conducted and search of last known address of Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982</p> <p>Other Taskings: • Assisted PST with door knocks re 1 wanted offenders from an incident were offenders have assaulted Police and escaped custody, not located. • Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 abandoned from his release address, known child sex offender, located by ART walking towards a primary school, K9ed for breach of release conditions and passed over to PST. • Multiple assists over shift for PST</p> <p>Other Prevention Activities: X7 IONS, X2 Notings Incidents of Note: (Include EA) Good News Stories: (Include EA) Alternative Resolutions: (Awh/PCW) NIL Other: ART2 working late shift to assist ART1 who only had 2 staff</p> <p>REPORT 2</p> <p>Operator: Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982</p> <p>Arrests: 2W Section 9(2)(a) Ofc</p> <p>Priority Offender Taskings: NIL</p> <p>Other Taskings: • Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 dispatched the ART unit to a call of disorder on St Asaph Street with a group of seven patched Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 members arguing over a cigarette debt that was owed. Upon arrival, we located three males standing outside Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 no further disorder as the other unidentified party had left before police arrived. One of the males spoken to at the address Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982, who was subsequently arrested for a 2W. • Called to assist Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 PTT at Flat Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 with a 2W, be required assistance with making entry. Upon arrival, it was discussed in depth with Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 and due to the definite confirmation of the wanted person being inside the address, it was decided that a breach would not be conducted and all units left the address. • IA discovered by ART unit at Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982, no break discovered and alarm company called.</p> <p>Other Prevention Activities: NIL Incidents of Note: (Include EA) NIL Good News Stories: (Include EA) NIL Alternative Resolutions: (Awh/PCW) NIL</p>	Canterbury	Yes	POLICE\BGG368	
75	ART support: TCU to MNRs, search (VARI)	14/11/2019 05:30	<p>Officer: Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982</p> <p>Request from DCC to complete enquiries at nominated addresses from probation after Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 has breached release conditions and removed the EM bracelet. Multiple addresses checked confirmed has been visiting Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982. Occupant has rung Police to advise Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 had returned approx. 1 hour later. Eventually confirmed informant has actually given her bank card to a mutual associate - he has given it to Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 who is now messaging her.</p> <p>Other Taskings: Assisting TCU with service of protection order and lifting firearms and licence from end address, required multiple visits but completed with nil issues Other Prevention Activities: Multiple TJs and patrolling around target areas for Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 and Waitakiri Drive Other: Quiet shift, will attempt to obtain a sniffer to enable NBT to be completed</p>	Counties Manukau	No	POLICE\BGG140	
72	ART support: Customs/Police at Search Warrant	13/11/2019 05:00	<p>West Area Enquiry: staff and Customs executed search warrant at address in relation to tobacco importation. Offender had history of violence, firearms, and drug use. Current member of local gang. ART utilized for entry team and search. Entry and apprehension of offender completed, nil issues.</p>	Counties Manukau	No	POLICE\BGG362	
69	ART support fronting in PRW entry/search	12/11/2019 18:30	<p>Assist Rangitoto DCC with planning and executing SW at the residential address for Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 who has history for being in possession of restricted weapons (Taser) and methamphetamine supply. SW planned and executed without issue. Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 confirmed as not being at the address upon conclusion of consensual search. Confirmation made that he still resides at the address with parents who are very cooperative with Police.</p>	Counties Manukau	No	POLICE\BGG362	
71	ART Waitakia Late Shift	12/11/2019 08:45	<p>Assist Cambridge staff for Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 who was required to arrest from a SF the previous night. Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 had assaulted his sister and stolen his father's vehicle. Vehicle sighted at an address on Robinson Road, Cambridge. Authority to spike vehicle when the vehicle went mobile. Vehicle went mobile and was spiked as ART Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 conducted ST and arrested Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 for unlawful taking.</p>	Waikato	No	POLICE\BGG641	
70	ART Waikato	12/11/2019 08:44	<p>ART initiated Vehicle Pursuit Mystery Creek, Hamilton. Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 arrested for failing to stop / possession of offensive weapons / possession methamphetamine utensils / possession of ammunition</p>	Waikato	No	POLICE\BGG654	
66	Waikato ART SF	12/11/2019 07:43	<p>Clearance of vehicles at large dairy farm (woodlands road) Located male hiding in drainage. Quote: "I was going to fight but saw your guns so gave up". Female not willing to make any complaint. Male arrested on 2W and custody handed to attending I-car.</p>	Waikato	No	POLICE\BGG641	
65	ART Waikato	12/11/2019 07:39	<p>Good news Staff engagement. Job Title reads: Gun shot through window. Scene on Whitianga Tairua Road (Whitianga). Confirmed bullet through window (slug recovered for identification for 1982). Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982. Tact door knock at address nominated by local staff. Spoken to end address searched for firearms via consent - nil located. Nil evidence to proceed with investigation. Follow up 4Qs to be conducted by local staff. Email received from staff member</p>	Waikato	No	POLICE\BGG654	



MEMORANDUM

TO: Assistant Commissioner PENNY
Response and Operations

CC: Superintendent SISSONS
National Manager Response and Operations

FROM: Inspector Freda GRACE
Commander: Operations Support

DATE: 27th November 2019

SUBJECT: ART SNAP SHOT – WEEK 5

The ARTs deployed for the first time at 0700hrs on Monday morning the 28th of October 2019.

Incidents and Events

As at 1200hrs on Tuesday the 26th of November, the ART units across the three Pilot Districts have attended 2141 Comms Centre CARD events.

These events include responding to:

- Family Harm matters x 160 (last 7 days = 26)
- Conducting Bail Checks x 207 (last 7 days = 21)
- Stopping Suspicious or Dangerously Drive Motor Vehicles (3T and 1U) x 608 (last 7 days 63)
- Executing Search warrants x 78 (last 7 days = 2)
- Supporting the Front Line by backing them up at violent incidents.
- Arrests were made at 220 of these events either by PST staff supported by ART, or ART staff directly.

Of those 2141 events:

- 244 have been recorded in the ART CheckPoint App which is used to record specific AOS ART Tactical tasking's

Checkpoint

A breakdown of the checkpoint data is attached to this report.

Tactical Options Reports

Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982

Feedback

'Have you say' emails; 11 have been received (between 19 -22 November), all negative. Two formal positive emails from Districts on the benefits Districts are seeing.


Official Information Requests

Row Labels	Collation	No Draft	Total	
ART		3	6	9

Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 19

**Inspector Freda Grace
Response & Operations
PNHQ**

Armed Response Team Deployment Report



Deployment Summary

As of November 26, 2019, Armed Response Teams (ARTs) have attended 244 incidents across the Tamaki Makaurau, Waikato, and Canterbury districts. Numbers are based upon Checkpoint data only, where district information is available.



ARTs self-deployed to **51%** of all incidents.




ARTs acted in a support role at **74%** of incidents attended.



81% of PST-like activity involved emergency deployments.



AOS Commander consulted on **23%** of all incidents attended.



Incident & Tactics Summary


Frequent offence codes listed by ART officers were 1700 Intimidation and Threats, 1500 Serious Assaults, 3800 Family Offences, and 7100 Against Justice*.




9% of all incidents were assigned a 6800 Firearms Offences code.

* Note that multiple offence codes may be listed for a single incident.

Top 5 closure codes that best described the event/incident.



Perceived Cumulative Assessment (PCA) for all incidents attended.



Offenders were perceived as cooperative in **42%** of all incidents.



33% of all incidents were resolved using negotiation only.



Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982

Result Summary

The public safety team were the primary unit for most incidents attended by ARTs, with **42%** of incidents receiving a K9 result code.



35% of incidents resulted in an arrest, with ART officers responsible for **20%** of arrests.



WEEK 5 SNAP SHOT OF GOOD NEWS STORIES

Canterbury

Canterbury ART report	26/11/2019 23:45	<p>Incidents of Note: (Include E#)</p> <p>Dispatched to a Parole Recall warrant at Odyssey House where male, was being discharged from their care. Male assessed as flight risk and violent. ART called tactics en-route and assisted PST with dogs after male walked from address north on Greens Road. Male arrested without issue with ART assisting PST.</p> <p>Self-initiated 3W at attempting to locate. Top 5 Offender after he had been breaching conditions of his court bail conditions of failing to reside at a residential address. He was located at above address after ART door knocked with no power of entry. was overheard from outside the address and was called to the door where he was arrested, allowing entry to the unit. Some resistance from an obstructive brother who was warned and re-directed after confronting police. removed from the address without issue and handed off to PST.</p> <p>2W at Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 was believed to be residing. Info received from moteler that was in his room. ART and dogs 3 conducted low key door-knock and arrested Edward without issue. Transported him to central after shifting some tactical equipment as street staff were busy. He is a gang member and was handed over to ClB to carry-out further enquiries into serious violence and 2 x MTIs.</p> <p>Dispatched to a male at New Brighton, out on street with knives threatening to kill himself. Address of well-known vagrant. Arrived at address to find at home 1K. Still stating he wanted to kill himself but not with the knives. Info from informant stated had knives on the street. Knives were located close by on a grass verge and was arrested for Possession of Knives in a Public Place and 1X, with the intent to detox and get him assessed by DAO. Detoxed and PCW'd for knives to PST. Assist YST with transport.</p> <p>Assist Mental Health in detaining serious IM from address. Multiple alerts for violence toward police, possession/concealing knives and long list of mental health issues. ART with PST and Mental Health went to address and located in driveway working on a vehicle. Detained for psych assessment without issue. Very anti police and IM. PST transport to Hillmorton to be sectioned.</p> <p>Dispatched to reports of shots fired at the reports of 6-10 shots heard. ART responded in 2mins with 4 man team clearing through the. Spoke to the boss of the and confirmed he heard sounds similar to fireworks. No concerns, no further action required.</p> <p>2W at Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 decamped from address and tracked across central city by PST including ART until he was arrested on Fitzgerald Ave without issue. PST arrest with ART assisting.</p> <p>S. 9(2)(a) assisted in arresting male for assaulting a female. Male also damaging property punching holes in walls in front of children. K9d by ART and handed over to PST without issue.</p> <p>31d vehicle on Johns Rd Passenger. ATI for Burg and receiving WTIIs handed over to PST for interview and interview.</p> <p>Male arrested by ART yesterday. RIC after Superb Op to Bail by ART on Breach of EM Bail and consideration on serious domestic Charges.</p> <p>Attended Group 3 Papanui line up for nightshift and spread the ARK. hearing only positive responses to ART and their assistance with PST.</p>	Canterbury	Yes
ART respond to potential hostage event	26/11/2019 07:30	<p>Male victim called Police stating has was being held against his will for the past two days at the scene address which is a panel beaters work shop has living area on level one. 5PP set up. ART arrived took control as toward remainder. Briefed PST/TCU, ART Staff and 3 x dog handlers. GSNARC plan to approach the address and rescue the victim.</p> <p>Tactics: Vehicle block of drive TCU members staged or white face in close proximity to receive any occupants inside the address.</p> <p>Contact immediately made with victim who presented himself at a window on level one. He came immediately outside and handed to inquiry team. Entry made address cleared. CRU cover clearance conducted. 3 other occupants were unaware of Police presence until we entered the dwelling. Handed over to Enquiries.</p>	Counties Manukau	No
ART Report	25/11/2019 03:55	<p>Served Harassment order on male at who is on active charges for U/L Possess FAs and ongoing issues with police and Lawyers. No issues other than a severe dislike for police.</p> <p>Attended 5K Cuffs Road where male had assaulted female and thrown her in a nearby hedge. K9d male, high risk FV target who was driving a stolen vehicle. Female provided statement to police of offending and male charged with multiple offences. Handed off to PST. ART on scene at event occurring no issues.</p> <p>Parole Recall warrant for issued after further offending. GPs from Probations had him at the Ctr Court. Updates provided to police where he was believed to be at on hours. located but updates later provided to police had him at his home address at where he was located and arrested by ART without issue. PST handed arrest after assisting ART with Dogs also in attendance.</p> <p>Attended 6800 job where victim believed to have been lashed by unknown male later believed to be areas around Lincoln road resulted in 3T of vehicle with likely assessment but not the case. Occupants all drug users and unco-operative. PST for follow up.</p> <p>ART 3M on Stanmore Rd observed female known to be victim of serious domestic assault 23334 by had cut off his EM Bail bracelet after the assault and decamped. admitted to hospital after the assault. with male believed to be ART followed for short distance before Decamped thru properties.</p> <p>Short foot chase and taken into custody on Stanmore Rd near Swanns Rd after attempting to get into random vehicle. K9d for EM Bail breach, Possession of a hunting knife, warned for possession of Prescription Meds, bail opposed and consideration to serious FV charges. awaiting statement from and two children. ART arrest and file.</p> <p>ART 3M on Pages Road after mobile check revealed it to be stolen. Male driver found in possession of a knife, ammunition (.270) and firearms parts and confirmed car to be stolen. Charged with U/L Takes MV, Breach of Bail, Driving Whilst Suspended, Possess Ammo, Possess Knife, Bail Opposed.</p>	Canterbury	Yes

Centerbury ART Late Shift 25/11/2019 00:35 Operators: Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 EVENTS: Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act Canterbury Yes

CRART has information that the offender from yesterday's shooting was possibly staying at a [redacted] A [redacted] was done of the address last night where it was believed a white Commodore which was involved in the incident was parked. The CRART [redacted] and [redacted] observed a white Commodore parked up the driveway. We drove around the block to try and verify what the registration of the vehicle was. A silver vehicle then drove up the driveway as we drove past the address. That silver vehicle then obscured the number plate of the Holden Commodore. We parked up the road and observed. A short time later the silver vehicle drove past with four occupants in it. CRART [redacted] the vehicle and confirmed identity of the suspect from the yesterday's shooting in the back seat of the vehicle. [redacted] was subsequently arrested for a electronic monitored hall breach. The other three occupants were spoken to in the vehicle. A second male [redacted] was also arrested on a WTI for a serious family harm incident. A further female was taken back for questioning by the CIB and is believed to be the driver of the vehicle at the time of the shooting. [redacted] cleared the address. There were four occupants at the address. One adult female and three children. The target Holden Commodore was parked in the driveway. A search of the vehicle located a cut down .22 pump action firearm with ammunition. [redacted] ART [redacted] was actively patrolling around the Hel Hel area noticed a Pitbull dog attacking another dog which had a young kid walking a. Constable [redacted] took swift action by spraying the pit bull and allowing the young kid to run away. Dog control was rung and will be attending to deal with the pit bull as it had no tags on it but is roaming the streets loose. The mother of the child flagged us down soon after and was very thankful and very appreciative of the help.

ART-Report 24/11/2019 17:13 Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982 Canterbury Yes

2P welfare check and FH hall breach check at [redacted] Female assaulted by [redacted] 23/11 and admitted to hospital re facial injuries. Self-discharged early hours of 24th and back to above address [redacted] previously resided at this address. Welfare check on female resulted in positive response from victim and children at address and [redacted] not located at address [redacted] has multiple alerts and threats incl violence and [redacted] Has cut of his EM bracelet. [redacted] had FA presented at her 23/11 [redacted] 4Q at Parklands address after female [redacted] pointed a [redacted] at [redacted] (ex-partner) in Christchurch City. Witnesses allege [redacted] initially make contact with [redacted] but not confirmed at this point. [redacted] in Parklands, her home address. ART ascended complain but located her [redacted] in Parklands, her home address. ART accompanied PST due to FA threat from ex-partner [redacted] 4300 job attended where male used a hammer to smash a large donation box at the [redacted] during opening hours and while church had patrons. Areas conducted by ART and PST located male at a nearby location and arrested without incident. Returned a dog to the pound and provided some much appreciated reassurance at the Cathedral after this incident where a number of patrons were traumatised. [redacted] - 5F at [redacted] where male smashing up motel room after domestic with female partner who has since left the address. [redacted] who has multiple alerts and flags. P50 in place for [redacted] and in breach, k0 no ART and handed over to PST. Damage to Motorhome at the motel. [redacted] after landlord reported locating 50 bags of Meth at the above location whilst clearing out ex-tenant's property. After further enquiries established bags were empty and some only contained residue. Majority bags empty. PST further enquiries to established R/O and his whereabouts.

Centerbury ART SOS report Late Shift 23/11/19 24/11/2019 02:39 Operators: Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act Canterbury No

Arrests:
Priority Offender Taskings:
Conduct multiple enquiries
Reece (conducted on [redacted] vehicle) [redacted] Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 for the
Possible sighting of the target vehicle at number [redacted] but cannot confirm the vehicle [redacted] Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982

Occupants called police to say that 3-4 [redacted] S. 9(2)(a) members had turned up their address and made threats of having a firearm with them. They have allegedly left in a vehicle and headed towards Mobil Bealey. CRART checked and cleared the Mobil garage. CRART liaised with the central sergeants and searched in [redacted] The address of [redacted] Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982

Event: [redacted] Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982

Female informant rang Commis stating male had taken her car and had a firearm in the vehicle with him. Vehicle registration given as [redacted] Informant states firearm had a scope and tripod but unsure what calibre. Suspect given as [redacted] Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982

THREAT:
Male in vehicle with firearm, unknown calibre. No threats made to a/c informant or police by suspect.

INTENT (OPPORTUNITY):
Intent unknown.

ENVIRONMENT:
Suspect believed to be mobile in informant's vehicle.

EXPOSURE:
Informant and members of the public exposed to risk of firearm.
Informant provided an associates address close to her property. Associate spoken to and his dwelling cleared by consent. Male not located.

ACTIONS TAKEN:
Area enquires conducted by ART in informant's vehicle. Not located.
Associate's address at [redacted] cleared by ART [redacted] suspect not located.
Informant states she thinks suspect will go to an address in Linton but does not know what the address is.

ART Daily Report	23/11/2019 18:01	<p>Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982 - 1M Female Yaldhurst threatening to stab herself. Husband informant phoned police stating female has knife and is 1M. Assist PST no further involvement. No issues and taken into custody.</p> <p>Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 - Vehicle 3T on Carisbrook Street with three MM Notorious male passengers and female driver. Male passenger arrested by ART for WTA, Fines Warrant and Burglary re WTI. Bail imposed and with bail available. No issues.</p> <p>Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982 - Assist PST with domestic job at [redacted] after female aggressor and left property with children after smashing several windows. 2 Man door knock with PST assist. Spoke to [redacted] at front of house who was co-operative and happy to speak to police. Couldn't get in front door so went to back door where [redacted] spoken to. Early info from anonymous caller that a long black object was observed at earlier domestic possibly a FA hat could have been a bat. Little info regarding SF as reported by passer by not subjects. Well known to police and only recognised at front door after approach. Invoked sec 18 55 act at back door after info received. Searched through house low key first lounge and located cannabis. PST followed and spoke to [redacted] while ART cleared [redacted]. House made safe and located loaded shotgun under sheets in main bedroom after [redacted] informed 55 Act search under sec 20 admitted FA in bedroom. FA photographed in situ and cleared to make safe for PST staff. Meth also located and small ornamental axe. Info later found in job box male swinging long black object around in street prior to police arrival and likely to be FA located in bedroom.</p> <p>Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982 - 1M female at hospital from earlier job at Devon Cres. Assaulting hospital staff by biting female doctor. Attended to assist PST. Restrained female and marched to 1-car for transport to psych hospital under supervision by hospital staff. No issues.</p> <p>Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982 - SF attended at [redacted] to assist PST staff. Offender transported to station so PST unit could undertake enquiries as no other staff available. Offender transported and interviewed for PST while statements taken from address and secondary address.</p> <p>Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982 - 1X attended at [redacted] for male threatening to kill himself. Paranoic about persons on his property. Heavy synthetic user and was at hospital two days ago. Passed to PST for transport to hospital.</p> <p>Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982 - 6800 job at [redacted] after informant thought she heard a gunshot from address, a female scream and a vehicle seen to decamp from the address at speed. Later reports a female had presented at hospital [redacted] wound to the leg. Cordons put in place and Dogs [redacted] deployed forward with [redacted] in a close OP on the target address. History to June 2019 AOS black roll job for [redacted] who was located in the roof-space and gun parts also located at the address. Consultation with ZA and deployed forward with four man team and shield to clear address after three males from rear address spoken to and heard no shots. Cleared address. CRT, breached internal door and cleared roof space. Located spent .22 cartridge on door mat at entry point. Info received CRC, female been shot thru and thru to her upper thigh with possible .22 round but initially believed to be a slug gun round.</p>	Canterbury	Yes
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Canterbury ART end of shift report - Early Shift 22/11/19	22/11/2019 16:41	<p>Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982</p> <p>Operators</p> <p>Arrests</p> <p>Other Taskings</p> <p>Blue role deployment for 2W [redacted] utilised eagle and dogs, leading to very effective deployment but not located</p> <p>Other Prevention activities:</p> <p>Attended SF due to male holding knife. All PST staff available so job completed by ART</p> <p>Attended burglary as no units available completed attendance and arranged SOCO</p> <p>Initial unit for EBA after member of public got driver's keys when he has stopped for more alcohol. Help until PST could transport result 1196mcg</p> <p>Incidents of Note (Include EA)</p> <p>Good News Stories (Include EA)</p> <p>Eagle has been available for a part of the shift, it was an invaluable resource when making approach and clearing house for [redacted]</p> <p>Alternative Resolutions:</p> <p>Other</p> <p>Assist with PTT with operation planning, units prepped and briefed along with DA II triggered, monitored surveillance teams until op stood down by O/C</p>	Canterbury	No
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Counties Manukau

ART support CIB with firearms related search warrant	26/11/2019 08:15	<p>ART Blue role Search Warrant [redacted] Section 6(c) Official Information Act 1982</p> <p>Section 6(c) Official Information Act 1982</p>	Counties Manukau	No
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ART support PST in arrest of active offender	25/11/2019 21:35	<p>Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982 - PST unit tasked to locate male offender for a serious assault. Incident occurred earlier in the evening when the offender and an associate had driven to the victims address where he assaulted the victim with a weapon believed to be a sock filled with rocks. Victim received an injury to the head and he further stated that the passenger had waved around what he believed to be a black pistol, no further description. Offender known to the victim and has considerable violence history, gang connections and his father is in prison for murder. Contacted the PST car and advised them that we would assist them in apprehension. Rv'd with the PST unit and Sergeant and went over the ground including tactics. Parked up several houses back from the target address and then approached on foot, cordoned the address and conducted a door knock. Offender came to front door and was initially aggressive and non compliant and attempted to go back inside but was directed to remain and then step outside which he did. Handcuffed and taken away from the front door and then a female and child were voice appealed outside. Questioned the target as well as the female with both stating that there was no one else inside. Continued to voice appeal at the front door for another minute or so and then a clearance team was put together, briefed and the address was cleared. No other person or items of interest located. Offender [redacted] Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982. Arrested for Assault offences.</p>	Counties Manukau	No
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ART assist in apprehension of HRX Top 5 Offender	25/11/2019 18:35	<p>Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982 information that Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 was at the above address which was in the industrial area of Manurewa and was a mechanics shop. Address cordoned using late shift and elements of ART training section. Hard cordon adopted with several person outside and near the entrance to the premises. Section 9(2)(a) was in a vehicle outside the main door but off the road and quickly decamped into the premises. All occupants were voice appealed outside, however Section 9(2)(a) barricaded himself inside the upstairs office and refused to exit. More AOS staff brought in to assist including PNT and zero alpha. During negotiations Section 9(2)(a) exited the upstairs office through windows on the front of address (white) and climbed onto the roof. After some time he eventually came down from the roof, jumping onto a container beside the premises and then onto the ground and was taken into custody. During the negotiations Section 9(2)(a) appeared to be openly consuming drugs in front of Police staff which he later stated was GBL. He also stated that he had injected meth and he was observed at one stage with a syringe in his hand. When arrested and searched he was wearing a vest which had hard armour in the back although low down and which wouldn't offer any protection from rounds mid regions to higher up. There was no plate in the front, however he believed that the vest would offer protection from bullets. The vest did not appear to be constructed from kevlar and looked like it was designed to be over hard armour as opposed to having it fitted inside.</p> <p>Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982</p>	Counties Manukau	No
ART support PSY at high risk family harm event - male armed with nail gun	24/11/2019 19:05	<p>Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982 offender Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 arrived at his partners address and threatened her with a nail gun before discharging it into the air. Section 9(2)(a) has then fled the address in the Silver Volvo motor vehicle with his two sisters aged 19 & 21 approx. Text messages have then been sent from the sisters to other family members advising that Section 9(2)(a) was looking for a knife and had told his sisters that he intended on killing both them and himself. Section 9(2)(a) described as being in a highly agitated, emotional state and under the influence of methamphetamine. Information from his partner was that he had also sent her a image of himself with a revolver three weeks ago. ART attended the scene and oversaw the evacuation of its residents in the event that Section 9(2)(a) attempted a return to the address. Once complete ART established an OP on the address while inquiries were being made to locate the vehicle. An ANPR hit on the vehicle resulted in ART giving up the ground and relocating to the secondary address of Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 in Mangeru. OP put in place after the occupants at this location were evacuated for a short period. While OP in place information received that both sisters had separated from their brother and that one was now in possession of the vehicle and was returning back to the address. Vehicle arrived at around midnight and ART completed a vehicle block of the driveway. Section 9(2)(a) and vehicles sole occupant as the sister and recovered the nail gun. Sister advised that Section 9(2)(a) had calmed down considerably and was with family at an address in Manurewa. Due to both sisters being confirmed as safe and the nail gun being recovered the inquiry team advised that they were happy for ART to stand down while the inquiry continued on its natural course.</p>	Counties Manukau	No
ART assisted in search warrant/risk assessment planning	24/11/2019 16:30	<p>Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982 (breach of Home Detention) - ART contacted by Graham PST Sergeant Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 for breaching home detention. Section 9(2)(a) had left his home detention address and returned to his ex partner Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982. Both Section 9(2)(a) have previous history for being in possession of firearms and both have significant gang linkages with the killer bee. Section 9(2)(a) himself being a patched member. HIA alerts sign flag Section 9(2)(a) as being in possession of firearms as recent as August 2019. After applying Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 was determined that an opportunity existed to be able to complete the arrest of Section 9(2)(a) when Section 9(2)(a) was away from the address and at his scheduled court appearance for the 25/11/2019. Given the low level offence Section 9(2)(a) is required to be arrested for it was decided to delay the arrest in order to maximise staff safety. Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 oncoming teams to make contact with the ART to assist with the arrest of Section 9(2)(a) failed to appear at court and was therefore still a factor to be considered when planning Section 9(2)(a) arrest.</p>	Counties Manukau	No
ART staff prevent suicide attempt	23/11/2019 15:00	<p>Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982 1x St George's Road, Avondale. At 2330hrs ART respond to breach of the peace on St George's Road. Reports of male yelling and hitting vehicles. Upon arrival members of public provide registration of vehicle male has left in. Vehicle located by ART and occupants spoken to. While conducting 3T attention was drawn to a male screaming in industrial area. Male sighted attempting to hang himself from the razor wire utilising his jersey. ART approached and took control of the male who was in an extremely agitated state. Male identified as Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 a 35 year old 111 male in breach of bail. Section 9(2)(a) confirmed as being the male from the previous disorder incident. Handed over to 1-car for ongoing care and protection.</p>	Counties Manukau	No
WRY support PST with male threatening to shoot himself	23/11/2019 14:51	<p>Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982 SF, Art Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 Informant advised that she had recently split up with husband and had moved out. She contacted him this morning with a view to retrieving some of her property and was told by him that he was burning her stuff and that he was going to shoot himself. Informant further advised that he had been drinking, had a firearms licence and was in possession of several firearms. SFP set up. PNT requested. On arrival conducted operational briefing with PST and Traffic units and then moved forward to cordon address. PNT unsuccessful with phone contact and Section 9(2)(a) initiated. Movement called and male subsequently answered phone however, he quickly discarded phone before instructions could be given. Male exited address, taken into custody, clearance team put together, dog used, 1st and then address cleared. Firearms located beside back door and in gun safe and remnants of a fire behind main structure. Brief on clearance held with clearance team inside address and a walk through conducted again on clearance methods as a proactive means to teach and upskill PST staff, well received and appreciated. Male detained for mental health assessment.</p>	Counties Manukau	No
ART assist PSY at suspicious shots fired event - Great Barrier	23/11/2019 14:40	<p>Relieving Police member advised DCC that he received two separate reports in close succession to each other of a firearm being discharged twice at Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982. Unknown whether the firearm had been discharged inside or outside the address however, both informants (neighbours) observed one of the male occupiers (son) with a long barreled firearm in the back section and then quickly leave the address in a black A3 Audi station wagon. Relieving member advised DCC that he was going to clear the address as he had concerns about the possibility of someone being shot especially as he was unable to raise contact with the second occupier of the address (father). DCC advised him not to do that and ART units subsequently advised. Deployed to barrier via eagle with AOS delta unit and met and briefed by relieving member at airport. Moved to target address and quickly cleared, all persons located and no obvious signs of a firearm being used. Whilst at address target (son) called police and was subsequently advised to come back to address. Target returned and taken into custody. Interview conducted however his version of events was dubious. He did state that an associate of his who owned the firearms had test fired the weapon at Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982. He further advised that his associate had had an argument with his wife, was clearing out his weapons and was attempting to leave the island with his daughter. Female partner contacted, did not show much concern but did disclose SF matters which she had not reported. 2nd male contacted by phone and advised to meet us at police station with firearms. Sentry / OP put in place, male arrived in vehicle and taken into custody, four firearms including bolts, ammunition and firearms license seized. The weapon which was discharged was also recovered. Both targets transported back to the mainland via deodar and handed off to GDB staff. Arrested for unlawfully discharging a firearm near a dwelling house.</p>	Counties Manukau	No

ART supports unit with response to male seen with pistol 22/11/2019 16:00 ART 204 ART 204 attended and assisted PST Waitemata in regards to male seen entering a property carrying a black pistol. PST staff and ANN set up SFP and waited for ART arrival. Phone call made to address, all occupants walked from address. Male occupant stated he had a slug gun in his room. House cleared utilising PST staff and delta. Firearm located, occupant warned by PST staff. Firearm was destroyed by owners consent. Counties Manukau No

ART support AND CIB in simultaneous search warrants 22/11/2019 08:08 Search Warrant 3 x vehicles parked at Auckland Domain. Information has been received that Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982. No one will have been supplying persons around the Auckland Central area with cannabis from vehicle Registration Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 in which they have been living. Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982. Targets have recently moved out of Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 although are attempting to move back in. Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 is believed to be a member of the BBB "Blood Bank Brothers" Group or "Bloodz". He has a history of producing/supplying methamphetamine. Tactic: Blue role vehicle assault on all three vehicles which were parked next to each other in the Auckland Domain carpark. Five ART staff + 1 AOS rated dog handler drove into the carpark and blocked all three vehicles. Teams bomb burst from patrol cars and dominated all cars simultaneously. Occupants were CIB blocked off both entry and exits to carpark with vehicles and spikes. Occupants were sleeping in their vehicles, they were woken and taken into custody, nil issues, nil injuries, nil damage. Counties Manukau No

Waikato (from ESR this week)

Incidents of Note (Include E#)

Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982 10 4211 Assist PST Valour Street, ART locate male who's just injected his methadone and found by public with needle in his arm, taken to hospital.
 Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982 1X Hula Street, assist PST with female who has cut her wrists requiring ED admittance.

Good News Stories (Include E#)

TCU assist - without ART they wouldn't have been able to complete enquiries for priority offender this evening. PST too busy.

Incidents of Note (Include E#)

Firearms job in Kawhia. Male fired a shot through a window where a female was standing. Assist Te Awamutu units and local Kawhia officer with arrest of Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982, and subsequent clearances of addresses and search for firearm.

Assist PST Hamilton with threats job made by Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982. Job came in a Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 threatenign to damage recent work done at Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 after a dispute with his ex-employer. Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 checked, occupant fine. Further enquiries required to locate Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 which will be looked at by ART Late Shift.

Firearms buyback assist in Te Rapa.

Shoplifter decamping Pak n Save Mill Street. Offender arrested and handed over to PST.

Incidents of Note (Include E#)

Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982 10 4211 Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982 Pursuit: Car crashes 2 X occupants take to Waikato river to evade police. Effective use of tac comms convinces them to climb up river bank into the waiting arms of ART. KS Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 Handed to PST.

Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982 5F Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 Assaults grandfather. Drives across paddocks with lights off to avoid police and in general police direction on occasion. Informant suggests he will ram police so attending 1 car back off and await ART = delta assistance. ART KS and transport to central.

Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982 2P Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 Caller wants police to uplift his firearms (15 x) due to his emotional state dealing with separation. Initial attendance with PST.

Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982 5F Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 Mention of a screwdriver as a weapon, mother/daughter, no units available so ART attended and dealt with 5F.

Incidents of Note (Include E#)

1X threatened to shoot himself to ex partner. Ex partner had seen a pistol in his vehicle in last few days. Vehicle located parked at building site where he works. ART made approach and detained Male for assessment. PST received hand over. No firearm located.

Incidents of Note (Include E#)

- 3T Harley Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 Nothing submitted.
- Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982 6110 Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 trespassed from add. Very high on meth.
- Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982 5F re Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982
- Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982 Areas Op Riverton. 5 juvenes seen leaving area following attempted 4211 central city.
- Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982 1X threatening self harm. Support PST.
- Assist PST look for RTA 5F offender Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 - propensity for violence. Door knocks at several address.

Incidents of Note (Include E#)

Section 9(2)(k) Off - 2x males seen on the roof of the Chartwell medical centre with pistols. Transpired they were 12 year old boys playing with soft dark guns. 4L home. Patient details obtained and report created.

Pursuit - 2x Motorcycle Hamilton - Abandoned

Section 9(2)(k) Off - T Gordonon Road, disqualified driver Section 9(2)(a) Official Informa patched BOP S. 9(2)(a) member. Vehicle impounded, summonsed to Court.

Section 9(2)(k) Off - Assist PST with stabbing at Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 located and arrested offender. Cleared address and rendered first aid of victim. Victim suffered stab wound to shoulder. Taken to Waikato Hospital, Status 3, by Ambulance.

Section 9(2)(k) Off - TS - EBA 697/400 patched S. 9(2)(a) member. KB to JFF to attend stabbing at Puket Street.

Section 9(2)(k) Off - Sutherland Street, blue sticker, Section 9(2)(a) Official Info

Section 9(2)(k) Off - S Grandview Road, SnS 12 for drugs. Locate bong, pipe, cannabis. Also charge for burglary.

Personnel forbidden to discuss

Incidents of Note (Include E#)

Section 9(2)(k) Off - ART deployment - Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 threatening to D with a knife, mother barricaded herself in the bedroom and he was trying to break in and threatened to stab police when they got there. 5 ART staff and CBQ attended. Shield approach with taser left, 40mm right and 2 behind with spray and comms. Voice appear from front door and he came out without any trouble. Section 48 by CBQ.

Section 9(2)(k) Off - Assist PST EMT Bail Breach - Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 no issues.

Section 9(2)(k) Off - Assist PST 5F Offender - search Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act for offender, not located after search of house done by PST and ART.

Section 9(2)(a) Official Informa - assist PST with attendance, multiple people fighting in the street.

5F assist - help PST a Section 9(2)(a) Official Info lot of background noise and numbers and ART assist with initial deployment.

Assist PST with Eviction with Emergency Housing Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 requested police assistance with perceived risks due to gang member associations.

Good News Stories (Include E#)

3M - Op Waiharoa - Local residents extremely happy to see police out in their town with simmering tension. They had noticed armed staff in town the last two nights (ART) and doing a checkpoint and were happy to see police coming for a chat today and discussing our purpose in trying to keep the town safe. Thanked us for our help.

Incidents of Note (Include E#)

Section 9(2)(k) Official - Art deployment re Section 9(2)(a) Official Info Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act

ART deployment for Section 9(2)(a) Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act due to Section 9(2)(a) O history and wanted re firearms offence.

Good News Stories (Include E#)

Whilst 3R in Waiharoa S. 9(2)(a) calls to say can you keep an eye out for a red hatchback that has just tried to break into cars in Matamata, whilst on the phone to them the said red hatchback is being turned over by ART staff at 3K after a large knife is seen on the drivers floorwell. 2 by persons KS'd

Rōpū whakahaere (SLT) Cover Sheet

Reference	SLT/19/61
Paper title	Armed Response Vehicles – Options for Proof of Concept Model
Sponsor	Assistant Commissioner Tusha Penny
Presenter/s	District Commander Tony Hill
Prepared by	Principal Advisor Kelly Wyse
Meeting date	2 October 2019

Consultation

Tick	Group / individual	Specify, if required
<input type="checkbox"/>	Relevant Deputy Commissioner / Deputy Chief Executive	
<input type="checkbox"/>	Email <i>DL_Consultation ELB and SLT Papers</i>	
<input type="checkbox"/>	District staff (specify)	
<input type="checkbox"/>	Relevant workgroup/s (specify)	
<input type="checkbox"/>	External (specify)	
<input type="checkbox"/>	Other (specify)	

While a sponsor can exempt a paper from seeking consultation this should be an extremely rare occurrence. If your Sponsor deems consultation to be unnecessary, a full explanation must be provided below:

At ELB's request, a Working Group has been established to develop the proposals in this paper.

People consulted as the proposals were developed included the Assistant Commissioner Response and Operations, Assistant Commissioner Districts, National Manager Response and Operations, AOS Commanders (PNHQ, Tāmaki Makaurau, & Canterbury), District Commanders of Northland, Counties Manukau, Waikato and Canterbury (and briefly, the District Commanders Forum), and the ARV Working Group members which includes representatives from EBPC, District Operations and Prevention Managers, Dogs, Fleet, Finance, Human Resources, and Media and Communications.

Paper for Rōpū whakahaere (SLT)

Reference SLT/19/61
Title Armed Response Vehicles – Options for Proof of Concept Model

30 September 2019

Purpose

1. This paper proposes three potential models for the Armed Response Vehicles (ARVs) proof of concept as sought by the Executive Leadership Board (ELB).
2. It also suggests reconsidering the term “ARV” to manage perceptions around risk, presents the evaluation plan for endorsement, and outlines next steps once the preferred operating model has been agreed.

Background

3. On 30 August 2019, the ELB approved a proof of concept for ARVs in Counties Manukau, Waikato and Canterbury. These districts have some of the highest Gun Safe data and returns (together they receive more than 50% of national Gun Safe notifications), and the largest Armed Offender Squads (AOS) to support a proof of concept.
4. The purpose of the proof of concept is to consider whether and how ARVs could be introduced on a permanent basis to provide enhanced tactical support to the frontline in real time, thereby increasing the safety of our staff and communities.
5. As part of ELB’s approval of the proof of concept, ELB outlined a number of parameters for consideration (refer **Attachment 1**) and requested the proof of concept be led, supported and monitored by an ARV Working Group and that the evaluation be evidence-based.
6. The ARV Working Group has been established and contains representatives from across the Police including Districts, National Operations, Finance, Policy, Fleet, Evidence-based Policing Centre (EBPC), Human Resources (HR), and Media & Communications (refer **Attachment 2**). The Group meets weekly and has held a number of full day workshops in the last month for robust discussions to support the development of this paper. We have recently invited Safer People and the Communications Centres to join the Working Group to support implementation.
7. The three models proposed for the proof of concept are based on our own experience and knowledge, as well as evidence from the international policing landscape (in particular, the specialist armed tactical response models used in the United Kingdom and Australia). The options take into account the following elements:
 - a) the parameters set out by ELB;
 - b) the desire to commence the trial as soon as practicable;
 - c) current AOS capacity, other duties, and the need to maintain on call capacity for AOS;
 - d) pre-approved leave over the Christmas period;
 - e) experiential knowledge from the three Districts on AOS demand;
 - f) lessons learned from Canterbury;
 - g) the health, safety and wellbeing of our people and our communities; and
 - h) the need to balance other organisational priorities as outlined in Our Business and in accordance with the Commissioner’s intent.

Alignment with strategic priorities

8. Following the events of March 15 and the last six months' of Gun Safe data, it is clear that our staff are operating in a higher-risk environment than previously. Our staff are requesting more tactical support for the high-risk situations they are encountering and this is a key priority for Districts. Our staff, and the public, expect us to keep them safe.
9. The trial of ARVs is part of an ongoing programme of work to better align our operational response to our operating environment. Through this, it is intended to ensure our people have the tools, capacity, and capability to perform their roles safely and to ensure our communities are, and feel, safe. This means having the right people with the right tools, skills and knowledge with the ability to rapidly respond at all times.
10. The key strategic drivers for this are achieving our purpose of "Be safe, feel safe" and to achieve our vision of having "the trust and confidence of all". These drivers have influenced the proof of concept model options presented in this paper.

Deployment of ARVs


11. The primary role of ARVs is to provide an enhanced tactical supporting role to our frontline staff while also ensuring that Districts continue to receive AOS support throughout the trial. ARVs will support our frontline staff in apprehending offenders that pose a significant risk to the public or staff, and bring a greater range of tactical options in real time to other high risk situations.
12. To maximise the value and capability that ARVs will provide, it is proposed the following roles and duties will guide deployment:
 - a) High risk events where a person poses a significant risk to the public, staff, or themselves (e.g. Priority 1 events or through organised crime);
 - b) Supporting investigations in pre-planned and high-risk search warrants;
 - c) Apprehension of high-risk/priority offenders including Top Five National and District priority offenders, and parole recall warrants;
 - d) Enhanced situational command and control;
 - e) Active Armed Offenders;
 - f) High profile public events with an associated risk profile (e.g. APEC) or where appropriate and proportionate (in limited circumstances this may include events outside of the trial Districts at the discretion of the Commissioner);
 - g) Emergencies where an enhanced trauma response is required;
 - h) Preventative activity including:
 - a. 3M/3F/3R/3C/3T/5K
 - b. Road policing / contribute to RIDS
 - c. Lead/POI visits
 - i) Daily tasking as assigned by tasking and coordination (DCC).
13. **Section 6(c) Official Information Act 1982**
14. To ensure the availability of ARVs to attend high-risk events, ARV staff will not routinely undertake roles such as: scene guards, file holders as investigators, TCRs, or own

responsibility for the Top 5 priority offenders. It is proposed they adopt a similar deployment approach as Dog Handlers.

15. As the ARVs will be manned by AOS qualified staff, it is proposed they operate in accordance with the standard operating procedures of AOS in tactical situations. This includes the policy statements and principles in police instructions, including the Police Firearms Chapter.
16. However, as this is trialing a new model, policy parameters may need to be adjusted as required to maximise the benefits of the trial and keep staff and communities safe. Through the proof of concept, we will review these procedures to ensure they remain fit-for-purpose, including considering whether unique ARV standard operating procedures are required.
17. The Working Group has considered in detail whether PNT should form part of the ARV model for the pilot. To ensure we test the value of an ARV as a tool in its own right, the Working Group has determined that PNT and other resources will remain separate to the trial. The AOS Commander will call on any additional resources (e.g. PNT, AOS on call, STG, Eagle, etc) on a case-by-case basis as required in accordance with current practice.
18. Therefore, PNT and other unique resources will not form part of the proof of concept but, as part of the evaluation and other activity underway (e.g. review of AOG/STG and the Deployment Model), we will need to consider whether there are opportunities to better align these responses to deliver improved outcomes.
19. The overall intent is to align dogs with the ARVs to maximise outcomes, however it is acknowledged that there are insufficient general purpose and AOS dog handlers to support a 24/7 ARV response and meet other business requirements. For this reason, Dogs will maintain their normal rosters and reporting lines but be available to work alongside the ARV.

Command and Control

20. Currently, AOS Commanders have slightly different reporting lines in each of the trial Districts due to different resourcing models and AOS demand requirements. To provide consistency and impetus for the trial, and ensure the District Commanders have full visibility of the impact of the trial on their District, the following model is proposed:



21. As indicated above, ARV staff will report through to the ARV Team Leader, who in turn will report to the AOS Commander. The AOS Commander will approve tactical decision-making in accordance with current AOS protocols/delegations.
22. The ARV Team Leader will have delegated authority from the AOS Commander to approve basic blue role deployments using the rostered ARV staff and are authorised to undertake urgent action to save lives. Events requiring additional tactical staff, or more complex tasks, will require AOS Commander approval.
23. To provide reassurance that the ARVs are deploying according to the aforementioned deployment model, the ARV Team Leader will produce an end of shift report throughout the proof of concept (and any artefacts required for the evaluation as directed by EBPC).
24. Overseeing the trial at a national level is the ARV Working Group (including EBPC) and the Firearms Transformation Executive Steering Group (Governance).
25. Note this section relates to Command and Control from a *reporting line perspective* for the purposes of the trial. In terms of Command and Control from a deployment perspective, the ARVs will generally be directed by Communications Centre will direct this in the normal way and therefore Communications will have Incident Control. Call signs are currently being developed.
26. Importantly, it is acknowledged that the ARVs in Counties Manukau may be deployed to Waitematā or Auckland City if required (and the frequency of this need would be measured as part of the evaluation).

Rostering and Resource Requirements

27. The Working Group has given significant consideration to the rostering and resourcing requirements for ARVs to support the tasks outlined above and achieve the desired outcome of ensuring that the public and our staff feel safe and are safe..

Section 6(c) Official Information Act 1982

Section 6

Section 6(c) Official Information Act 1982

32. In addition, we note that Police Scotland's roll out of a nationwide ARV model significantly underestimated the number of staff required to support their demand and rostering requirements (specifically, they underestimated staff requirements by about 100 people nationally across a similar population).

AOS Call Outs

33. During the trial, AOS Commanders will still need to call in additional AOS staff for significant incidents that cannot be safely resolved within on duty resources. The Working Group has indicated a preference to allow ARV staff to maximise their rostered days off by ensuring any additional call outs are first managed by those on shift staying late/starting early.

Alignment with PST and Dogs

34. The Working Group has indicated a preference for ARV rosters to be designed to align with current PST shifts where possible (allowing ARV teams to attend daily musters etc. to enhance integration). As mentioned above, it is intended Dog Handlers' rosters will be managed in the normal way but aligned to ARVs where possible.

Rostered Hours

35. Given that ARVs are to support PST requirements first and foremost, we have considered the general demand pattern of calls for service that ARVs are likely to respond to. Lessons learned from Canterbury indicated that generally the hours of midnight-0600 were the quietest for AOS call outs periods in terms of demand for AOS/quasi-ARVs.
36. There was a rise in demand for search warrants on early shifts mid-week, and intuitively a daily pattern with increased demand on Thursdays, Fridays and Saturdays. Similar demands were found by Queensland Police when they evaluated their Mobile Response Capability in Brisbane. This evidence indicates flexibility in rostered hours might be appropriate.
37. Pending a decision made on the model for the proof of concept, the Working Group is exploring several roster combinations that account for the options we are presenting. We are developing a five-week 24/7, a three-week 24/7 and 16-19/7 and a four-week 16-19/7 proposal, all of which can be scaled/adjusted as required. If a 24/7 model is not adopted, the Working Group recommends a 0200 or 0300 finish.
38. Any new roster would be run through the FAID programme in WFM to determine its suitability and minimise the effect of fatigue on our staff, particularly given the intention for additional callouts to be managed by rostered staff staying late/starting early in the first instance. Once rosters are finalised, we would need to formally consult with staff or with the Police Association to ensure that it meets all our obligations.
39. For SLT's information, examples of roster options are included as **Attachment 3**. The roster will factor in training requirements (this includes standard AOS training and will provide some flexibility for CIB training also). Where possible, rosters/deployment will accommodate the high levels of TOIL/DDO already held by AOS staff (to reduce risk to the 45 day maximum leave requirement).

Look and Feel of ARVs

40. Three vehicles (one per each District) have been purchased for the trial. These are currently being fitted out by the Wade Group to ensure they meet business requirements and will be available in late October on current estimates. The costs of these vehicles are currently being met between the three pilot Districts and Fleet Group, while a funding model is developed.
41. A defibrillator and other emergency/fit aid equipment is proposed for each vehicle to enable the ARVs to provide an improved level of immediate trauma response if required.
42. To enable a seamless integration of ARV staff from the public's perspective, standard blue uniforms will be worn in addition to Glock and Tasers (there may be limited occasions where it is appropriate for weapons to be removed at the AOS Commander's discretion). ARV staff will wear the new Stab Resistant Board Armour (SRBA) with Body Armour Suit (BAS) which is being accelerated in the three trial Districts to ensure the same look and feel. **Section 6(c) Official Information Act 1982**

Name of ARVs/ARV Teams

43. **Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982**

45. **Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982**

Communications

47. To ensure we appropriately manage public and staff expectations, a comprehensive Communications Plan is being developed by Media and Communications in consultation with the Working Group. The key components are:
- a) The Commissioner will lead internal and external communications;
 - b) Will be underpinned by insights from EBPC and our own experience;
 - c) The Police Association, Police Guild, and the IPCA will be consulted on the trial;
 - d) The public and our staff are well-informed of the trial and perceptions are managed (particularly concerns that this might be a militarised response or arming by stealth);
 - e) Our frontline clearly understand the role of ARVs and the distinction in roles (importantly, they understand that ARVs are to provide additional support to enable them, rather than as a result of concerns about their own capability); and
 - f) Good news stories will be circulated internally and externally during the trial.
48. The plan will be kept updated and modified as required during the trial.
49. There will also be a need to comprehensively brief directly affected staff, particularly ARV staff, PST and those in the Communications Centres. Where required, appropriate material will be developed. This may include clear guidance and direction for Comms Shift Commanders as to business rules to be followed etc.

Length of Proof of Concept

50. The Working Group has considered an appropriate length for the proof of concept, to ensure we gather meaningful data, manage the expectations of staff, and have an opportunity for a comprehensive review of the results.
51. On advice from the EBPC and District representatives, it is proposed that the trial runs for a period of six months with an interim three month review. This will be the commitment made to staff (particularly those seconded into the ARV roles of whom many, based on consultation to date, have a preference to return to their BAU roles following the trial).
52. In addition to the interim three month review, the EBPC will produce monthly reports on lessons learned, enabling adjustments to be made during the trial as required.
53. Throughout the trial period, consideration will be given to opportunities to roll out ARVs more broadly (for example, to respond to changing demand in other locations or to test the use of ARVs in more rural locations e.g. Tasman). This will be balanced against any risk identified throughout the trial (e.g. a fall in Our Business performance) and health and safety risks to staff (particularly to the ARV staff in a full-time hypersensitive state) which may result in decisions to change, reduce, or differently resource the trial.

Section 6(c) Official Information Act 1982

Evaluation

55. Following a comprehensive literature review, the EBPC has developed an evaluation plan (refer **Attachment 4**) to assess the learnings from the proof of concept. The plan is provided for SLT's endorsement.
56. The premise and foundation for the evaluation is to ascertain whether the use of ARVs make our staff and communities be, and feel, safe, and if so, on what basis we could consider a broader roll out. This means quantifying (where possible) any actual or perceived minimisation of risk of harm to the staff and the public.
57. The evaluation will focus on five key questions:
- How were ARVs deployed [and what tactics were used]?
 - Did our people feel, or were they, safer in the trial Districts as a result of the presence of ARVs?
 - Was external trust and confidence impacted in the trial Districts as a result of the presence of ARVs?
 - What would a fit-for-purpose ARV model look like nationally?
 - What impact did the pilot have on Our Business performance?
58. Given timeframes, EBPC will need to rely on baseline data that already exists. This will be consolidated prior to the commencement of the proof of concept to ensure the validity and robustness of the evaluation. Methods for obtaining additional information may include structured interviews with staff.
59. **Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982**
[Redacted]
- [Redacted]
61. EPBC has advised it will not be able to provide comprehensive evidence for, or make any strong recommendations on, the roll out of ARVs on a national scale. The immediate commencement of the trial, the short length, and lack of baseline data to make a determination on the total effectiveness of ARVs means EBPC will only be in a position to make recommendations on where improvements might be made.



Risks

- 65. As with any pilot, there are a number of risks that will need to be actively managed by the Working Group, including:
 - a) High external and internal interest in the trial, including risk of negative perceptions – mitigated through comprehensive Communications Plan and ongoing engagement with communities and staff;
 - b) Impacts on affected staff – mitigated through advanced notice and meaningful consultation, through rostering decisions (including prioritisation of rostered days off for staff), through alignment with PST shifts (where possible to improve alignment and integration), and through ongoing monitoring of staff wellbeing;
 - c) Training requirements – immediate training requirements will be provided prior to commencement of the trial, and ongoing requirements are factored into the rosters. If Option A or B are selected, certification training courses will be required prior to the launch of the trial;

- d) Timing of the trial - with Christmas/the holiday season coming up there will be additional pressure on Districts including significant pre-approved staff leave; this will be closely managed by Districts;
- e) Risk of setting a precedent internally/externally for a broader roll out – managed through a comprehensive Evaluation Plan so future decisions are evidence-based. There may be a need to move quickly to a provincial centre to see if ARVs are effective and on what basis;
- f) Reallocation of existing AOS resource will create a BAU gap which will be significant - District Commanders will determine how to reallocate/backfill/deprioritise existing BAU activities. Support may be required from other Districts which will have flow on effects;
- g) Policies and processes will need to be monitored and reviewed to ensure alignment;
- h) Impacts on performance against Our Business will be monitored as part of the evaluation;
- i) Leadership and culture within the ARV team and its integration with PST and other specialised resources will be closely monitored – but initially managed through comprehensive communications with PST and ARV regarding expectations.

66. **Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982**

Dependencies

- 67. A detailed review of our national AOS and STG model is underway to ensure it remains fit for purpose. The proof of concept will inform, and be informed by, the review.
- 68. Ultimately any decisions made around a broader roll out will need to holistically consider our service expectations and broader deployment model, including the integration of these resources with PST, other frontline staff, and specialised resources, including organised crime.

Next Steps

- 69. The Working Group's current key milestones are as follows (subject to approval of the proof of concept model and evaluation plan by SLT on 2 October and ELB on 7 October):
 - a) Proof of concept commences on 28 October 2019 if Option C is selected (if Option A or B is selected, an appropriate date will be determined by the Working Group);
 - c) Mid-point three month evaluation presented to SLT in February;
 - d) Proof of concept completion 27 April 2020 (subject to agreement of start date);
 - e) Day light period and collection of evaluation data followed by presentation of findings to SLT in late May.
- 70. To achieve the timelines outlined above, the following steps are currently being undertaken:
 - a) Human resource requirements:
 - a. Rosters to be finalised and socialised
 - b. Creation of positions
 - c. Consultation and provision of notice provided to affected staff
 - d. Consultation with Police Association and Police Guild

- b) Equipment requirements
 - a. Delivery of the three fitted out ARV vehicles
 - b. Fast track of SRBA and BAS
 - c. Defibrillator provided for each ARV vehicle
- c) Training requirements (subject to proof of concept model selected)
 - a. Extra AOS Operators for pilot (Selection and Qualifying)
 - b. Training for current staff who have passed selection or have re-joined – short term course to get capable for the trial PoC
 - c. Requalification of ex members – standards/how to manage delivery
 - d. Team Leaders Course
 - e. Commanders Course
- d) Communications
 - a. Development and delivery of a comprehensive communications plan – encompassing both internally and external communications – to manage the perceptions and expectations of the trial for our people and the public
 - b. Consultation with IPCA
- e) Evaluation
 - a. Collection of baseline data
 - b. An end of shift report template and/or other evaluation artefacts to be developed for use by ARV Team Leaders during the proof of concept period

71. Longer-term requirements that will be managed during the proof of concept period include:
- a) review of SOPs and MOPs;
 - b) development of an application to speed up / ease data entry requirements on callouts;
 - c) the need to increase training / recruitment for AOS trained staff, AOS dog handlers, and AOS qualified dogs in anticipation of a broader roll out.

Consultation

72. This paper has been developed in consultation with the Assistant Commissioner Response and Operations, Assistant Commissioner Districts, National Manager Response and Operations, AOS Commanders (PNHQ, Tāmaki Makaurau, & Canterbury), District Commanders of Northland, Counties Manukau, Waikato and Canterbury (and briefly, the District Commanders Forum), and the ARV Working Group members which includes representatives from EBPC, District Operations and Prevention Managers, Dogs, Fleet, Finance, Human Resources, and Media and Communications.
73. It was also consulted via the standard Distribution List for SLT papers and the consolidated feedback is provided in **Attachment 5**.

Recommendations

74. It is recommended that the Senior Leadership Team:
- a) **Approve** a proof of concept model for the use of ARVs in Counties Manukau, Waikato, and Canterbury either:
 - a. Option A (24/7)
 - b. Option B (24/7 but reduced capacity)
 - c. Option C (16-19/7) (preferred by majority of Working Group)
 - b) **Approve** the Evaluation Plan for the proof of concept
 - c) **Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982**
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
 - d) **Approve** ARV staff being included in Wellchecks
 - e) **Approve** costs associated with the trial to be allocated as (but monitored and addressed appropriate)
 - a. Vehicles and Fit Out – Fleet
 - b. Training – Training
 - c. Equipment – Response and Operations
 - d. Working Group costs – Response and Operations
 - e. Staff Costs / Allowances – Districts
 - f. Evaluation – EBPC
 - g. Wellchecks – Health & Safety.
 - f) **Note** the following key milestones (subject to approval of the proof of concept model by SLT on 25 September):
 - a. Proof of concept commences on 28 October 2019
 - b. Mid-point three month evaluation presented to SLT in February
 - c. Proof of concept completion 27 April 2020.
 - d. Day light period and collection of evaluation data followed by presentation of findings to SLT in late May
 - g) **Note** there are a significant number of moving parts to be managed in order to commence the trial in a safe and sustainable manner, and a number of risks to the proof of concept that will be closely monitored by the Working Group and escalated to SLT regularly together with lessons learned.

Tusha Penny
Assistant Commissioner Response and Operations

Attachments

Attachment 1: Key parameters outlined 31 August 2019 ELB paper

The development of a single operating model in consultation with the three District Commanders within the following parameters:

- a) 24/7 ARV capability in each of the three Districts
- b) the ARVs must be crewed by AOS members, with at least two per vehicle
- c) the ARVs must be resourced within baseline and exclude Special Tactics Group (STG) resource
- d) dogs should be utilised where possible – with a preference towards AOS qualified dogs
- e) ARV deployment should be focused on providing tactical support to frontline response roles, and to situations presenting as high risk specific and unique threat and safety risks or as part of pre-planned operations and
- f) ARVs will be used for routine policing activities in 'down time' to maximise operational benefits (but not to the extent they are unavailable for immediate AOS deployment).
- g) independent evaluation be undertaken, led by the Evidence Based Policing Centre
- h) a preliminary evaluation report to be provided to the Senior Leadership Team (SLT) on Wednesday 15 January 2020, with a report on findings, recommendations and next steps to be presented to ELB on Tuesday 21 January 2020¹
- i) a report back to SLT by 25 September 2019, regarding the operating model that will be used including standard operating procedures, roles and responsibilities, and key milestones.

¹ As outlined in this paper, the proposed report back has been shifted to February to enable the proof of concept to run for a three month period and allow time to collect the required evidence.

Attachment 2: Working Group members

Membership	Name
SRO	AC Tusha Penny
ARV Proof of Concept Lead / Working Group Chair	Andrew Sissons
Assistant Commissioner Districts	Bill Searle
Principal Advisor to Police Executive	Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982
Evidence Based Policing Centre	Bruce O'Brien Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982
National Manager Infrastructure	Paul Jermy
District Prevention Manager	Jared Pirret
District Operations Manager Deployment	Bryan Buck
Commander Operations Support AOS Training and Development	Freda Grace Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982
District Commander Northland	Tony Hill
Director Policy & Partnerships	Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982
Finance	Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982
District Manager Investigations	Graham Pitkethley
District Manager Investigations	Uraia Vakaruru
Media and Communications	Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982
Human Resources	Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982
Legal	Scott Spackman
Safer People	TBC
Communications Centres	TBC
National Coordinator Police Dogs	Todd Southall

Section 6(c) Official Information Act 1982

Section 6(c) Official Information Act 1982

Section 6(c) Official Information Act 1982



Section 6(c) Official Information Act 1982

Section 6(c) Official Information Act 1982

Section 6(c) Official Information Act 1982

Attachment 5: Consolidated Feedback

The paper has been widely consulted (though at some pace) including to the standard Distribution List. Given the wide range of feedback received, this has been consolidated in the table below. Much of the feedback received around clarity/further information has been incorporated in this iteration of the paper. Itemised feedback can be provided if required.

Feedback provided	Action taken or recommended following the feedback
<p>Overall Feedback</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overall there is support from the business to undertake the trial, subject to mitigation of the risks (particularly around capacity, health and safety, and evaluation) outlined in this paper. • It is considered timely, and appropriate, that we would ultimately have real time enhanced tactical capability 24/7 where there is demand. 	<p>For noting by SLT.</p>
<p>Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982</p> 	<p>Noted for SLT's consideration.</p>
	<p>Subject to SLT's approval of the paper on 2 October, and ELB's subsequent approval on the following Monday, it is recommended that the start date of 28 October is retained if Option C is approved. If Option A or B is selected, a start date will need to be determined.</p> <p>This balances the desire to start as soon as possible (and manage staff expectations), with the need for sufficient time to balance HR requirements, all communications needed (internally and externally), and to address equipment requirements etc.</p>

<p>Name of ARVs</p> <p>Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982</p>	<p>On consideration of all feedback, the Working Group recommends “Tactical Response [Group/Vehicle/Unit]”</p> <p>SLT to discuss.</p>
<p>Colour of Vehicles</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A number of people from across the business, particularly Districts, have raised a concern regarding the proposed colour of the vehicles. • Advice is that matching the colour to incident cars would be preferable to manage public perceptions around arming, and to demonstrate a seamless integration between PST and ARVs (particularly when performing blue role tasks). • Given they will stand out, there is a risk the vehicles may become targets for vandalism or theft. 	<p>The vehicles have already been coloured, so this will need to be assessed as part of the trial.</p>

Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982



<p>Evaluation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluation should include a review the suitability of the type of vehicle being used for the ARV. • Evaluation should consider the public (and staff) perception of using ARVs for preventative/blue role activities. • Evaluation will need to monitor injuries which must be reported via My Police in the normal way. • Evaluation period is generally supported at 6 months, though the pressure on Districts to manage BAU and the impact on ARV staff is noted and will need to be closely monitored. • Any review and evaluation should also have input collated from Comms Shift Commanders as to their qualitative assessments of the effectiveness of ARVs. • One area to consider during the assessment is resolution of incidents by the ARV and its impact on AOS activations (that is, are incidents being resolved at a “lower” level and thus reducing the requirement for AOS call-outs). • Another is whether there is a reduction in the number of times non-ARV or AOS staff present a firearm at an offender – does this approach mean that we reduce the number of times our frontline staff are placed in a position where they have to confront an offender with a firearm? • Tactical options assessment - is there an increase in use of beanbags given that tactical option will now be more freely available to resolve incidents (and hopefully a lower rate of firearms being used – effectively an increase in some forms of tactical options but hopefully a decrease in resultant harm). 	<p>EBPC have noted this feedback and it will be captured in the evaluation undertaken by the Working Group as feasible.</p>
<p>Staff Wellbeing and Health & Safety</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Staff wellbeing is paramount. This needs to be closely monitored. 	<p>The wellbeing of staff will be monitored through a variety of avenues including internal surveys and regular engagement with the Safer People Group. It is recommended to SLT that ARV staff are included in Wellcheck.</p> <p>On a day to day basis the ARV Team Leaders and AOS Commanders will be responsible for the wellbeing of the ARV staff. DCCs are also expected to remain cognisant of the hypervigilant state ARV staff are under.</p> <p>From a health and safety perspective, the ARVs will be operating within standard and AOS operating procedures so all known hazards, risks, and control measures apply.</p>
<p>Working Group</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Safer People representation should be at the Working Group. • The Communications Centres should have representation at the Working Group. 	<p>Agreed and apologies – they have been invited to future meetings.</p>

<p>Data Use</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Issues of anonymity and retention of the data in the survey (and assuming the responses will remain anonymous) ought to be considered. 	<p>No identifying information will be disseminated in any report relating to the ARV pilot and all data will be appropriately anonymised. Data will be held for a pre-specified period of time (usually 5-7 years) should further analysis be required. However, provisions will usually be in place to backwardly identify personal data should any participant wish to have their data removed from the record (typically a security encoded key is used to achieve this). In this case, all data will be destroyed and no longer be accessible.</p> <p>Moreover, prior to any data collection informed consent must be obtained. Accordingly, individuals are asked to read an information sheet that details the scope of the evaluation and how their data will be handled.</p>
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Executive Leadership Board Cover Sheet

Reference	ELB/19/29
Paper title	Operating Model Enhancements including Proof of Concept trial for ARVs
Sponsor	Deputy Commissioner Mike Clement
Presenter/s	Assistant Commissioner Tusha Penny
Prepared by	Principal Advisor to Police Executive Section 9(2)(a) Official
Date paper agreed by ELB	30 August 2019

Consultation required

Unless specifically directed by the paper's Sponsor, papers should be presented to the SLT in the first instance, using the SLT paper template.

If the contents of this paper are such that they are to be presented to the ELB only, consultation may still need to be undertaken with other work groups / service centres / districts to ensure their views have been sought and are accurately reflected in this paper.

For consultation purposes, please use the following group email addresses: '**DL_Assistant Commissioners**' and '**DL_ Consultation Group (ELB&SLT Papers)**'. These email lists are frequently updated.

Please double click the boxes to tick which groups / individuals have been consulted regarding this paper and include their feedback in the Feedback Received section.

Tick	Group / individual	Specify, if required
<input type="checkbox"/>	Assistant Commissioners	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Consultation Group (ELB&SLT Papers)	NOSG
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	District staff (specify)	District Commanders
<input type="checkbox"/>	External (specify)	
<input type="checkbox"/>	Other (specify)	

While a sponsor can exempt a paper from seeking consultation this should be an extremely rare occurrence. If your Sponsor deems consultation to be unnecessary, a full explanation must be provided below:

Reference ELB/19/29
Title Operating Model Enhancements including Proof of Concept trial for ARVs

6 August 2019

Purpose

1. This paper discusses opportunities for ensuring our operational response capability reflects our new operating environment and that the health and safety of our people remains paramount. Our focus is on ensuring our people continue to remain equipped and enabled to perform their roles safely post-March 15.
2. Our key priority is a detailed review of our national Armed Offender Squad (AOS) and Special Tactics Group (STG) model to ensure it remains fit for purpose. While this review is underway, an immediate opportunity available is the use of armed response vehicles (ARV) as one of our initiatives.
3. This paper seeks the Executive Leadership Board's (ELB's) approval to trial ARVs via a proof of concept. If approved, the trial will run in Counties Manukau, Waikato and Canterbury.
4. The proof of concept trial will be closely monitored by an ARV Working Group¹ and evaluated by the Evidence Based Policing Centre (EBPC). A preliminary evaluation report will be provided to SLT on Wednesday 15 January 2020, with a Report on findings, recommendations and next steps to be presented to ELB on Tuesday 21 January 2020.

Background

Operating Environment

5. The events of March 15 have significantly changed the environment we are operating within. Our people need specialist tools, capacity and capability to perform their roles safely and to ensure our communities are, and feel, safe.
6. Though we have made significant process in recent months to better equip and enable our people², Our Business and our operating environment requires us to do more as part of a broader programme of work. Importantly, a detailed review of our AOS and STG model is required.
7. The AOS operating model has changed little since its inception in 1964, which was before frontline staff had ready access to firearms in their vehicles, and in an environment where general duties staff encountered fewer firearms and other weapons.
8. While this review is underway, we propose a proof of concept trial for the use of ARVs as to improve the safety of the public and our people, as part of our continuous and ongoing improvement. Testing the benefits of ARVs is particularly important in light of our decision to refrain from general arming of our frontline based on our domestic and international experience to date.

¹ This working group is currently being established by National Manager Response and Operations.

² Improvements include: increasing the frequency and duration of Firearms Training to significantly improve optimum ratios.

ARV Definition

9. The ARV concept involves having full-time AOS members deployed in one or more dedicated vehicles fitted with tactical equipment, and ideally with dog support, to enable immediate support at critical incidents or in pre-planned high-risk situations.
10. For the purposes of the proof of concept, ARVs:
 - a) are broadly defined as vehicles which are able to contain specialised tactical equipment (including ballistic shields and sponge round launchers) and crewed by AOS members in sufficient numbers to meet the demands their facing at the time of deployment (e.g. at least two people per vehicle);
 - b) will operate 24/7;
 - c) will be deployed in line with the (soon to be developed) proof of concept operating model, which will be focused on deployment to specific and unique threat and safety risks or as part of pre-planned operations,³ and
 - d) will be used for routine policing activities in 'down time' to maximise operational benefits (but not to the extent they are unavailable for immediate ARV deployment).

Use of ARVs in New Zealand to date

11. In New Zealand, the use of ARVs has been proposed and considered as far back as 2010. On March 15, it was a quasi-ARV capability that enabled AOS members to rapidly arrive on the scene after the first reports – they were already equipped, mobile and readily deployable. This capability provided substantial operational and safety benefits in an event that was extreme in every aspect including the prolonged and extreme violence committed, the consequential demand in all emergency service providers, the scale of casualties, and ongoing community impacts.
12. Post-March 15 this capability was deployed in Canterbury seven days a week (but not 24/7). Staff involved have now returned to regular duties. The Canterbury District's experience of ARVs was positive, with increased feelings (and perceptions) of safety for our people by providing specialised support in high risk situations (e.g. search warrants). In addition, ARVs were deployed across Tāmaki Makaurā in support of both Operations Unity and Whakahaumanu. Likewise the staff involved have now returned to regular duties.
13. We would like to further test the validity of ARVs as one of our tools, by more deliberately and broadly trialing their use in a larger metro city (Counties Manukau) and in provincial New Zealand (Waikato), as well as re-commencing and formally evaluating their use in Canterbury.

International Experience

14. ARVs are already a feature of the international policing landscape. Both the United Kingdom, and Australia have specialist armed tactical response as relatively standard components of their operational capability within their major cities.⁴ To ensure we achieve our mission to be the safest country, we must ensure we continue to adapt and respond to international standards as appropriate for our environment.

Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982

⁴ For an example of the perceived benefits of ARVs in Scotland, see: HM Inspectorate of Constabulary in Scotland - Review of Standing Firearms Authority for Armed Response Vehicle Crews within Police Scotland, October 2014

Proposal

Review of our AOS/STG Model

15. As part of enhancing our operational capability, we will undertake a detailed review of our national AOS/STG model to ensure it remains fit for purpose.
16. An initial and localised review of the AOS model has already commenced in Tāmaki Makaurau but further action on the recommendations is pending a national review. Of note the localised review highlights the risk currently presented to the organisation from critical incidents and the lack of rapid support from tactical specialists. This is resulting in PST staff dealing with some situations that an ARV would have better tactical acumen to respond to (for example, unexpected behaviour in higher-risk search warrants).
17. A national Review of the AOS/STG model will be conducted as a separate (but related) initiative to the proposed ARV trials. The Review will be led by Deputy Commissioner Clement, with the Terms of Reference being agreed between the Deputy and the Commissioner. The ELB will be kept informed and apprised of developments once these are finalised.

ARV Proof of Concept

18. While the AOS/STG model review is underway, it is proposed that we undertake proof of concept for the use of ARVs in Counties Manukau, Waikato and Canterbury. The purpose of the trial is to consider whether and how ARVs could be introduced on a permanent basis to enable a more responsive tactical option. These districts have some of the highest Gun Safe data and returns.
19. There will be a single operating model for the proof of concept, developed by the ARV Working Group in consultation with the three District Commanders. This will take into account:
 - a) the definition of ARVs for the purpose of the proof of concept (as set out in para 10 above)
 - b) current STG resource is excluded and cannot be utilised for this trial - the frequent and specialist nature of their duties remove their ability to be rostered. Although they will continue to support escalated events through direct support to AOS;
 - c) District Commanders will determine how to reallocate existing BAU activities previously allocated to AOS members who form part of the trial including what to deprioritise;
 - d) the underlying intent of the trial is to ensure Police make our people and the public feel, and be, safe. In the event the trial may compromise this it will be immediately adjusted or suspended.
20. It is proposed the trial will be led, supported and monitored by an ARV Working Group which is in the process of being formed. The ARV Working Group will report back to SLT by Wednesday 25 September 2019, regarding the operating model that will be used including standard operating procedures, roles and responsibilities, and key milestones.
21. It is also proposed an independent evaluation should be undertaken for the ARV proof of concept trial led by the EBPC. This evaluation will consider such matters as:
 - a) impacts on district deployment;
 - b) staff wellbeing and ability to meet day to day policing demands;
 - c) impact on AOS response and possible approaches to better align ARV, AOS, and STG responses;
 - d) impact on PST response to all situations requiring an armed response;

- e) real or perceived impacts on community and police safety;
 - f) assist in the escalation of additional AOS resources through direct and relevant communication with the AOS Commander; and
 - g) the benefits and implications of different operating models, including in different geographical locations.
22. It is expected that a detailed report on the findings of formally trialling ARVs will be provided to SLT on Wednesday 15 January 2020, with a Report on findings, recommendations and next steps to be presented to ELB on Tuesday 21 January 2020.

Opportunities and Benefits

23. PST staff operate in a dynamic and unpredictable environment that regularly requires a timely response to violent events and events where violence is likely to occur, and therefore require ready access and availability to firearms and other essential tactical assets.
24. We anticipate that testing the ARVs will provide our staff with specialist tactical assets and capability that will:
- a) reduce the likelihood that PST responders will undertake or contemplate an urgent tactical intervention that may exceed their realistic and safe capability threshold, tactical training, skill sets or practical experience. This will likely provide Police wellness and safety benefits;
 - b) keep people safe and feeling safe by providing the knowledge and reassurance that an enhanced specialist tactical response capability is more readily available;
 - c) allow timely mitigation of safety risks at violent critical incidents and execution of high risk searches (with or without warrant);
 - d) have the potential to reduce police shootings where other tactical options are unavailable⁵; and
 - e) strengthen and encourage a greater focus on containment and de-escalation, through enhanced command and control and tactical decision making.
25. It is also envisaged that the proposed duties of an ARV would be expanded beyond the duties normally performed by AOS staff to include such things as targeted 3T's. This is aligned with Gun Safe data to date which shows that vehicle stops made up 18% of seizure events where the offender/suspect had gang links.

Risks and Implications

26. A potential risk attributable to the term ARV is that public perceptions may assume Police have assumed a more "militarised" capability; when in reality that is not the case. This could be mitigated through proactive communications with the community regarding the use of ARVs. A Communications Strategy will be developed in consultation with District Commanders and DCE Media and Communications.
27. To be effective, national and district intelligence must be capable of supporting evidence-based ARV deployment to enable a targeted, precision approach, triage competing risks, and keep staff and communities safe. Through the trial, the ARV Working Group and EBPC will need to ascertain the evidence required to best achieve this outcome.
28. Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982

need to be closely monitored (including to determine the effect on staff and the capacity of Police to respond to routine incidents). Similarly, the potential psychological impact of working as full time AOS - without the perspective or escape of a “day job” at a less tactical level – will need to be considered.

29. **Section 9(2)(b) Official Information Act 1982**

30. Analysis of these risks and implications will be undertaken by the EBPC and form part of the December report.

Consultation

31. The proposals in this paper have been developed and consulted with the AOS Commanders (PNHQ, Tāmaki Makaurau, Wellington & Canterbury), District Commanders of Counties Manukau, Waikato and Canterbury, NM: Communication Centres, DC Operations, DC Districts, DCE Service Delivery, DCE Media and Communications, and NM: Response and Operations Group.

Recommendations

32. It is recommended that the Executive Leadership Board:

- a) **Approve** the detailed review of the AOS and STG model to ensure it remains fit for purpose; ELB will be kept informed regarding the approach and key milestones once this has been fully scoped and resourced.
- b) **Approve** a proof of concept trial (trial) for the use of ARVs in Counties Manukau, Waikato, and Canterbury.
- c) **Note** the purpose of the trial is to consider whether and how ARVs could be introduced to enable a more responsive tactical model for deployment.
- d) **Note** the trial will be led, supported and monitored by an ARV Working Group which is in the process of being formed.
- e) **Note** a single deployment model will be developed by the ARV Working Group as part of next steps, noting that the trial will be resourced within baseline, and excludes STG staff.
- f) **Direct** the ARV Working Group to report back to SLT by 25 September 2019 regarding the operating model that will be undertaken including standard operating procedures, roles and responsibilities, and key milestones.
- g) **Direct** independent evaluation of the ARV proof of concept trial led by the EBPC.
- h) **Direct** a detailed report back on the findings of of the ARV proof of concept to SLT on Wednesday 15 January 2020, with a Report on findings, recommendations and next steps to be presented to ELB on Tuesday 21 January 2020.
- i) **Direct** a Communications Plan be developed in consultation with District Commanders and DCE Media and Communications.

Mike Clement
Deputy Commissioner: National Operations

ENHANCING THE SAFETY OF ALL

Armed Response Teams Communications Plan



Document information

Programme name	ARTs
Author	[redacted]
[reference]	2019ARTs

Revision history

Version	Date	Author	Description of changes
V0.1	October	[redacted]	N/A
V0.2	October	[redacted]	Changes following DCE feedback
V0.3	October	[redacted]	Changes following COP feedback

Distribution list

Name	Position	Group/Office
ART Working Group	N/A	NZ Police
Strategic Comms Team	N/A	Media & Communications
Police Media Team	N/A	Media & Communications

Document approval

	Name	Signature	Date
Prepared by	[redacted]		
Endorsed by	AC Tusha Penny		
Approved by	DCE Jane Archibald		

ARTs improve Police's ability to respond to rapidly evolving situations with specialist skills and expertise, minimising risks to our people and the public.

Purpose

The purpose of this document is to describe the overarching communications approach to support the announcement, piloting, and evaluation of the Armed Response Teams (ARTs).

Background

On 30 August 2019, Police's ELB approved a proof of concept pilot for ARTs in Counties Manukau, Waikato and Canterbury. These districts have some of the highest Op Gun Safe returns (together they receive more than 50% of national Gun Safe notifications), and have the largest Armed Offender Squads (AOS) to support a proof of concept.

The purpose of the proof of concept is to consider whether and how ARTs could be introduced on a permanent basis to provide enhanced tactical support to the frontline in real time, thereby increasing the safety of our staff and communities.

Objectives

How the public interprets ARTs may have wider impacts on their perceptions on Police and therefore needs to be managed appropriately.

The primary objective of this plan is to provide a communications framework to assist with the successful announcement, implementation and evaluation of ARTs.

A successful proof of concept will see ARTs improving the safety, and feeling of safety, among Police and members of the public, in doing so retaining or increasing both internal and external trust and confidence.

Measures

The following measures will be used to evaluate the impact of this communications plan towards the overall project objectives:

- 5 neutral/positive national news/opinion pieces;
- 1 positive local news/opinion pieces per district;
- 2000 page views on Ten One internal story;
- High level (70 per cent) of relevant staff engage with real time evaluation process;
- ARTs appear to have a neutral/positive impact on trust and confidence;
- An average CTR-All (click-through rate) on Facebook posts of 4%.

Approach

This communications plan focuses on the announcement of the proof of concept, its implementation and evaluation.

Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982



Police will proactively publically announce their intention to trial ARTs ahead of the proof of concept commencing at the end of October. Employees and stakeholders will be advised prior to the public announcement.

Communication to our People

During the proof of concept, internal communication within Police is to be proactive - communicating as and when significant decisions, milestones or progress are achieved. Communications will also highlight any lessons learnt requiring immediate attention and action.

It is mandated that all District communication be vetted by the project team prior to any internal or external release (including related OIAs).

Internal stakeholders include Police Executive, District Commanders, District Leadership Teams (DLTs), Communications Centre staff, AOS commanders, ART teams, supervisors and frontline staff.

Emails, Panui notices, Ten One stories, vlogs and line-ups will be utilised as channels to connect with our people throughout the proof of concept.

Communication to our Partners

General arming of New Zealand Police has been a controversial issue in recent decades. Twenty-nine police officers have been killed in the line of duty since 1890, 21 by gunshot.

A survey of Police Association members in 2017 found 67 per cent supported general arming; that was up 6 per cent on 2015 and 18 per cent on 2008. Meanwhile, public

support has been static: 55 per cent were in favour in 2018, the same number as in 2008.

Following the events of March 15, Police regularly receive media queries about whether staff are armed. AOS deployments are also frequently reported in the media and it is unlikely that this interest will dissipate any time soon.

Public advocates are also becoming more vocal around their concerns that Police is becoming more likely to use force against the public than we have historically, citing Police's Tactical Option Reporting reports.

As a result, it is important that key stakeholders (IPCA, Police Association, and Managers Guild) and partners (Muslim community leaders and Commissioner's Iwi Advisory Forum) are advised of the details of the pilot, including the rationale behind the trial, prior to the public announcement.

It is likely our stakeholders and partners will be approached by the media for comment on the pilot. Early engagement provides the opportunity to promote supportive messaging of the pilot with our partners.

Communication to the Public

Police enjoys a unique relationship with the public based on high levels of trust and confidence, allowing policing by consent. Any perceived increase in arming of police will have a fundamental impact on this relationship.

ARTs will be announced to the media and public through a launch event, attended by the Commissioner of Police.

The launch event will be supported by a press release, FAQs, social media posts (nationally and relevant district pages) and updated information on police.govt.nz.

Localised press releases will be issued when the teams commence operation in each district. General on-going communication during the proof of concept phase is most likely to be reactive, with media enquiries managed through the Police Media Centre.

Communication to Ministers and their officials will be provided by way of formal communication channels. As ARTs have potential trust and confidence implications and are likely to be highly visible, Ministers and officials will need to be kept up-to-date in order to ensure compliance with the 'no surprises' convention.

Key messages

The following key messaging has been developed.

The Why

- Following the events of March 15, Police has reviewed our operating environment and have concluded that it is higher risk than previously considered.
- In March 2019, Police implemented Op Gun Safe which has enabled us to generate a clearer understanding of our operating environment in respect to risks being posed by firearms.
- Our staff are requesting more tactical support for the high-risk situations they are encountering. Our staff, and the public, expect us to keep them safe.

The What

- In recognition of this, Police intends to trial deploying Armed Response Teams (ARTs) in Counties Manukau, Waikato and Canterbury for six months.
- ARTs will be staffed by existing specialist Armed Offender Squad personnel. Where in the past these staff would have to be called out to attend events which involves going to a central station for equipping prior to deployment, ART staff will be on duty, equipped, mobile and ready to be respond.
- The three trial districts have some of the highest number of firearms seized, located and surrendered as part of Op Gun Safe, and have the largest Armed Offender Squads (AOS) to support the trial.
- The introduction of ARTs improves our ability to respond to rapidly evolving situations with specialist skills and expertise, minimising risks to our people and the public.
- The purpose of the trial is to consider whether and how ARTs could provide enhanced tactical support to the frontline in real time, thereby increasing the safety of our staff and communities.
- The trial of ARTs is part of an ongoing programme of work to better align our operational response to our operating environment. ARTs are a standard feature across policing jurisdictions internationally.

The How

- Police must ensure our people have the tools, capacity, and capability to perform their roles safely and to ensure our communities are, and feel, safe. This means having the right people with the right tools, skills and knowledge with the ability to readily respond at all times.

- ART staff will have access to a range of tactical options and on average they will consist of a team of three specialist AOS personnel. At times they may be supported by additional staff.
- ARTs will be focused on responding to events where a significant risk is posed to the public or staff. They will also support terminations of pre-planned and high-risk search warrants; high-profile public events with an associated risk profile; and prevention activity.
- ARTs will be focused on responding to events where a significant risk is posed to the public or staff. They will also support terminations of pre-planned and high-risk search warrants; high-profile public events with an associated risk profile; and prevention activity.
- Police’s Evidence Based Policing Centre will lead an evaluation to ascertain whether the use of ARTs make our staff and communities be, and feel, safe. This means quantifying (where possible) any actual or perceived minimisation of risk of harm to the staff and the public. The EBPC uses practitioner-based research, information, crime-science, theory, and problem-solving methods to inform practice, implement measures to prevent crime and improve the allocation of Police resources to better protect the public.

Audience

The following have been identified as audiences that will be targeted by communications activity.

Internal		
Audience	What they need to know	Responsibility for communication
ART Staff	The what and the why. Detailed information on how ARTs will be operationalised, any policy changes they need to be aware of, direct impacts on them, where to get more information.	District Commanders and Project Team
AOS Staff (non ART)	The what and the why, direct impacts on them, where to get more information. High level information on how ARTs will be operationalised.	District Commanders and Project Team
Frontline District Staff	The what and the why, direct impacts on them, where to get more information. High	District Commanders and Project Team

	level information on how ARTs will be operationalised.	
Frontline District Leaders	The what and the why. Detailed information on how ARTs will be operationalised, any policy changes they need to be aware of, direct impacts on them, where to get more information.	District Commanders and Project Team
Dispatchers, Shift Commanders, DCCs	The what and the why. Detailed information on how ARTs will be operationalised, any policy changes they need to be aware of, direct impacts on them, where to get more information.	District Commanders, National Communications and Project Team
District Commanders and Communication Centre Management	Relevant updates on significant project developments as they occur, information required to be passed on to staff. Early evaluation findings.	Project Team
Police Executive	Relevant updates on significant project developments as they occur. Early evaluation findings.	Project Team

External

Audience	What they need to know	Responsibility for communication
Public – direct interaction with ARTs	The what, why and how. Possible follow up evaluation contact.	Media Communications, EBPC
Wider public	The what, why and how.	Media Communications
Media Outlets	The what, why and how. When to expect communication about further updates.	Media Communications
Minister's Office	Relevant updates on significant project developments as they occur. Early evaluation findings.	Project Team
Police Association	Relevant updates on significant project	Project Team

	developments as they occur. Early evaluation findings.	
Managers Guild	Relevant updates on significant project developments as they occur. Early evaluation findings.	Project Team
Partner Communities (including main Islamic and Jewish associations and Maori Focus Forum)	The what, why and how. Possible follow up evaluation contact.	District Commanders, MPES, Commissioner

The following channels will be used to communicate key messages:

Channels		
Channel	Purpose	Audience
Ten One (stories)	To provide high level project information with a complete narrative	All staff
Ten One (information pages)	To provide specific and detailed information about pilot, operating model, FAQs	All staff
Comms intranet (MSOPs and news)	To provide specific and detailed information about pilot, operating model, FAQs	Comms staff
Panui (Bully Board) and line up briefs	To provide key critical updates	All staff
One off emails	To provide targeted specific details, background of project implementation	All staff, ART staff, Exec, DCs, Comms centres
Regular email updates Eg: Updates to AOS Commander	To provide relevant updates on implement as they occur	ART staff, Exec, DCs, Comms centres
Stakeholder engagement briefings	To provide background details and progress	Exec, Minister of Police, Police Association, Managers' Guild, IPCA
Media releases	To provide relevant updates on significant programme developments as they occur	Media, Public

Ten One stories (public)	To provide relevant updates on significant programme developments as they occur	Public
Social media	To provide relevant updates on significant programme developments as they occur	Public
Police.govt.nz	To provide high level project information	Public

Risks/issues and mitigation

The following risks have been identified.

Risk	Mitigation
<p>False understanding of threat environment <i>A perception is generated that Police is hiding the existence of a defined or immediate threat resulting in a loss of trust.</i></p>	<p>Products will clearly articulate that there is no immediate threat to the public in the areas where the POC is underway. However we will note that threat environment has changed, we continued to have a national security risk of medium, as such our capability and resourcing needs to.</p>
<p>Public believing that ARTs are a step to general arming</p>	<p>Products will highlight that the Commissioner has made it clear that we will not have general arming while he is Commissioner. If ARTs result in staff feeling safer, they may be less likely to opt to carry a firearm into an event.</p>
<p>Discontent in districts that do not get an ART pilot <i>Districts not involved in the POC feel left out and may operate their own 'off the books' ART.</i></p>	<p>Comms will highlight that this is a trial, and that if the POC is successful these will be deployed on a need basis.</p>
<p>Confusion over role of ARTs <i>Mixed messages, internal peer-to-peer conversations resulting in staff confusion and disengagement.</i></p>	<p>Ten One will serve as the 'single source of truth', with all communications collateral and activity referring staff to the ART information pages on the site. The pages will be reviewed regularly to ensure the information remains accurate and relevant.</p>
<p>Limited time to effectively communicate change <i>Due to the short timeframe between ELB approval of the POC's operating model and the launch of the ARTs, there will be limited opportunity to get key</i></p>	<p>Support will be provided by the wider Media & Communications team</p>

messages in front of staff and the public.

Conflicting perceptions of ARTs contribution to safety

The public and staff may have conflicting perceptions on ARTs and the impact of the pilot on their safety.

Highlight that this is a pilot and the role of evaluation, before any final decisions.

Perception of an elitist attitude

Highlight internally that ARTs are just AOS staff deployed via roster vs on call

ARTs will escalate events and lead to more police shootings

Only a very small percentage of events currently attended by AOS staff result in a shot being fired. AOS are trained to deescalate situations and minimise risks to all involved.

ARTs will be a new force to use against Maori

Unfortunately Maori are over-represented in the criminal justice system and this is reflected in the Tactical Options Reporting each year. Police is actively working with our communities, our partners, and the justice sector to improve outcomes for Maori.

Police has a target of a 25 percent reduction in reoffending by Māori by 2025 and we are committed to achieving this.

Police works with individuals, community partners, iwi, and agencies to assist people to access the support they need. We work in partnership with iwi Māori to deliver Te Pae Oranga / iwi community panels in communities around the country to reduce reoffending and provide ongoing support for people to create new pathways to education, employment, and health.

Evaluation

The underlying intent of the Armed Response Vehicle (ART) pilot is to improve safety, and feelings of safety, among Police and members of the public. The key evaluation objective is to provide an independent evaluation of whether the introduction of ARTs within the current operating environment achieves this objective.

There is a body of literature that suggests that ineffective communication can erode the public's trust in confidence in police. Section 9(2)(ba) Official Information Act 1982

In addition to evaluating the measures outlined in this paper, it is important that public perceptions of ARTs are measured during the trial. While the current Citizen Satisfaction Survey (Gravitas, 2018) could be used to baseline current levels of trust and confidence, it is unlikely to detect any shift in public perceptions on the area and community scale.

Moreover, any change that is detectable may not be observed until after the pilot has finished.

As a result it is recommended that Police engage either EBPC or a third party provider to undertake an evaluation of public perceptions of the trial.

Sign off process

This strategy was approved by the ART Working Group on ## October 2019.

Approval of communications activity relating to the ART Project is delegated to Assistant Commissioner Response and Operations. Prior to being submitted to the AC:RO, products will be reviewed and approved by the National Manager: Response and Operations.

Key Communication Milestones

	Activity	Date	Person responsible
1.	Early communications plan circulated	10 Oct 2019	Section 9(2)(a) OIA
2.	Launch comms product pack 1 circulated	12 Oct 2019	Section 9(2)(a) OIA
3.	Briefing to Minister of Police	14 Oct 2019	Commissioner of Police
4.	Feedback due on plan and product pack 1	14 Oct 2019	Working group
5.	Affected communities leaders contacted	15 Oct 2019	District Commanders/MPES/Commissioner
6.	IPCA/Police Association and Managers Guild advised via letter	15 Oct 2019	Assistant Commissioner: R&O
7.	Impact staff contacted about reassignment	15 Oct 2019	Human Resources / District Commanders
8.	Launch comms product pack 2 circulated	16 Oct 2019	Section 9(2)(a) OIA
9.	CoP Blog – early visibility of announcement to staff	16 Oct 2019	Media & Communications
10.	Launch comms finalised	1400 - 17 Oct 2019	Section 9(2)(a) OIA
11.	Internal launch go live	0700 – 18 Oct 2019	Media & Communications
12.	Public launch event + media release + website content go live	1000 – 18 Oct 2019	Media & Communications

13.	Key operational information circulated to impacted districts	21 Oct 2019	District Commanders
14.	Commencement reminder – Pauni	TBC	Section 52(2)(a)
15.	Comms centre MSOPs loaded	TBC	National Comms
16.	ARTs POC commences	TBC	N/A
17.	[TO BE UPDATED AS POC PROGRESSES]		

Communication products required

Pre-announcement

- Letters to IPCA, Police Assn, Manager Guild*
- Talking points for DCs*
- HR letters to affected staff
- 2 pager operational guidance*

Announcement

- Press release + public FAQs*
- CoP talking points
- Police.govt.nz content
- Tenone news story
- Tenone static information pages
- Back pocket FAQs
- Social media posts

Post Announcement/Pre-commencement

- MSOPs
- Information pack for Comms Centres

Commencement

- Line up packs
- Local press releases

***Included in comms product pack 1**

*

Appendix – Communications Products Log

Core content for *Tenone*,

- [Products yet to be drafted]

Panui (Bully Board) Content

- [Products yet to be drafted]

Questions and Answers

- [Products yet to be drafted]

Media release

- [Products yet to be drafted]

Staff emails and letters (if required)

- [Products yet to be drafted]

Prepared reactive communications

- [Products yet to be drafted]

Armed Response Team Trial

Date Published:

November 2019

New Zealand Police's mission is for New Zealand to be the safest country. Following recent events, our threat environment has changed. Our staff are encountering more violent and unpredictable events, where a significant danger is posed to the public or staff.

We must ensure our people are equipped and enabled to perform their roles safely and to ensure our communities are, and feel, safe. This means having the right people with the right tools, skills and knowledge ready to respond at all times.

To help achieve this, Police is currently conducting a trial of Armed Response Teams (ARTs) as a new way of deploying the existing armed response provided by the Armed Offenders Squad (AOS).

Police is essentially an unarmed service and there is determination both within Police and in the public to keep it that way. But the AOSs provide Police with the means of effectively and more safely responding to and resolving situations that pose a high risk.

The basic methods of operating are to cordon, contain and appeal to armed offenders. These tactics are successful in the vast majority of incidents, which are resolved without the use of force. AOSs are also used for some pre-planned operations where there is a high risk, for example large cash escorts or helping other Police with search warrants. They must qualify at a rigorous national selection and induction course and receive regular additional training in their districts.

ARTs have access to a range of tactical options and on average they consist of a minimum of three specialist AOS personnel. At times ARTs may be supported by additional staff, such as our specialist dog units.

ARTs are being trailed in three Police districts (Counties Manukau, Waikato and Canterbury). These districts have been chosen to host the trial as they have the highest number of firearms seized, located and surrendered, and have the largest AOS groups to support the trial.

As part of the trial, Police wants to seek the public's views on whether or not ARTs make our communities feel safer, whether they should be established across New Zealand, and if so any changes you'd like to see.

Your feedback will help shape the future of ARTs, including whether or not ARTs should be introduced permanently. Have a read of the below information on ARTs and let us know what you think. To share your thoughts please email: haveyoursay@police.govt.nz.

Summary of Police's Armed Response Teams

Armed Response Teams are:

- teams of a minimum of three armed, AOS trained staff with a specialist vehicle equipped with tactical options.
- operating seven days a week.
- focused on responding to events where a significant risk is posed to the public or staff and supporting the execution of pre-planned and high-risk search warrants, high-profile public events and prevention activities.
- being trailed for a period of six months in Counties Manukau, Waikato and Canterbury Police Districts.
- being evaluated by Police's Evidence Based Policing Centre to see whether the use of ARTs make staff and communities be, and feel, safe.

Question and Answers

1. Is there an immediate threat Police is responding to?

There is no immediate threat. However, we must recognise that the environment has changed and Police's capability and resourcing needs to reflect this to ensure New Zealanders feel, and are, safe. We are undertaking the trial to assess whether ARTs improve Police's ability to keep our staff and the public safe through their ability to respond to situations with specialist skills and expertise, minimising risks to the public and our people.

2. Will ARTs operate 24/7?

During the pilot ARTs will operate during peak demand times, seven days a week with AOS squads continuing to provide support outside these hours.

3. What will the ARTs look like?

ARTs will use a specialist vehicle, which has a colour scheme as our other specialist teams (e.g.: Eagle helicopter). Staff will wear standard blue operational uniform with Police's new Body Armour System.

4. How have you measured the risk in the trial locations?

The risk has been measured through a Police programme called Gun Safe that records incidents and details when Police encounter firearms. This programme was initially trialled across Tamaki Makaurau in late 2018 to ensure it was something every Police district could easily use. Nationwide rollout then began gradually from December 2018, with every Police district being on board by March 2019. Counties Manukau, Waikato and Canterbury have the highest number of firearms seized, located and surrendered.

5. What is the Evidence Based Policing Centre (EBPC)?

The EBPC uses practitioner-based research, information, crime-science, theory, and problem-solving methods to inform practice, implement measures to prevent crime and improve the allocation of Police resources to better protect our staff and the public.

[Tell us what you think](#) [opens email client]

NOTE: Consultation submissions are official information

Your submission will only be used by Police for the purpose of consideration of the impacts of Armed Response Teams.

Please note your submission will become official information. This means Police may be required to release all or part of the information contained in your submission in response to a request under the Official Information Act 1982.

Police may, however, withhold all or parts of your submission if it is necessary to protect your privacy or if it has been supplied subject to an obligation of confidence. Please tell us if you do not want all or specific parts of your submission released, and the reasons why.

Your views will be taken into account in deciding whether to withhold or release any information requested under the Official Information Act, and in deciding if, and how, to refer to your submission in any possible subsequent paper prepared by the Police.

Next steps

The ART trial will run for a period of six months. The trial will be evaluated to see what impact, ARTs have on staff and public safety. The evaluation will be undertaken by the Evidence Based Policing Centre (EBPC). Police will keep the public informed on the findings of the Evaluation.



Armed Response Team (ARTs)

Unpublished**Draft****Moderate**

Needs review

**Status** Draft**Log message****Apply**

Police is about to commence a pilot of Armed Response Teams (ARTs), which are expected to improve Police's ability to respond to rapidly evolving situations with specialist skills and expertise, minimising risks to our people and the public.



On 30 August 2019, Police's Executive Leadership Board approved a pilot for ARTs in Counties Manukau, Waikato and Canterbury. These districts have some of the highest Op Gun Safe returns (together they receive more than 50% of national Gun Safe notifications), and have the largest Armed Offender Squads (AOS) to support a pilot.

The purpose of the pilot is to consider whether and how ARTs could be introduced on a permanent basis to provide enhanced tactical support to the frontline in real time, thereby increasing the safety of our staff and communities.

The pilot will operate for six months, beginning 28 October.

Where in the past these staff would have to be called out to attend events which involves going to a central station for equipping prior to deployment, ART staff will be on duty, equipped, mobile and ready to be respond.

Police must ensure our people have the tools, capacity, and capability to perform their roles safely and to ensure our communities are, and feel, safe. This means having the right people with the right tools, skills and knowledge with the ability to readily respond at all times.

ART staff will have access to a range of tactical options and on average they will consist of a minimum team of three specialist AOS personnel. At times they may be supported by additional staff.

ARTs will be focused on responding to events where a significant risk is posed to the public or staff. They will also support terminations of pre-planned and high-risk search warrants; high-profile public events with an associated risk profile; and prevention activity.

Finally, it is important to note that there is no immediate threat. However, we must recognise that the environment has changed and our capability and resourcing needs to reflect this. We expect the pilot will show that ARTs improve Police's ability to respond to rapidly evolving situations with specialist skills and expertise, minimising risks to the public and our people.

The trial will be evaluated to see what impact, ARTs have on staff and public safety. The evaluation will be undertaken by the Evidence Based Policing Centre (EBPC).

Armed Response Teams - FAQs

Section 6(d) Official Information Act 1982



Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982



Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982



Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982



What events will ARTs attend?

The following roles and duties will guide ARTs deployment:

- Active Armed Offender incidents
- High risk events where a person poses a significant risk to the public, staff, or themselves (e.g. Priority 1 events)
- Emergencies where an enhanced trauma response is required
- Apprehension of high-risk/priority offenders including top five and parole recall warrants
- Supporting investigations in pre-planned and high risk search warrants
- Enhanced situational command and control
- High profile public events with an associated risk profile
- Preventative activity

Are ART's a step towards general arming?

ARTs do not represent a shift towards general arming of frontline police staff, but a new way of deploying the existing armed response provided by the AOS.

How will the pilot be evaluated?

Police's Evidence Based Policing Centre will lead an evaluation to ascertain whether the use of ARTs make our staff and communities be, and feel, safe. This means quantifying (where possible) any actual or perceived minimisation of risk of harm to the staff and the public. The EBPC uses practitioner-based research, information, crime-science, theory, and problem-solving methods to inform practice, implement measures to prevent crime and improve the allocation of Police resources to better protect the public.

Last modified: 16/10/2019

Facebook post – NATIONAL, CM, WAIKATO, CANT



New Zealand Police ✓

Written by Jess Bovey [?] · 1 min · 🌐

Police Commissioner Mike Bush has today announced a trial of Armed Response Teams (ARTs) to support Police's response to high-risk situations.

ARTs will complement our initial response to critical or high risk incidents by being on duty at peak demand times, seven days a week.

ARTs are specialist police personnel who are routinely armed, equipped, mobile and ready to respond to significant events. They are a standard feature across policing jurisdictions internationally.

Following the events of March 15, Police must ensure our people have the tools, capacity, and capability to perform their roles safely and to ensure our communities are, and feel, safe. This means having the right people with the right tools, skills and knowledge ready to respond at all times.

ARTs will have access to a range of tactical options and on average they will consist of three specialist AOS personnel. At times they may be supported by additional staff.

The introduction of ARTs improves our ability to respond to rapidly evolving situations with specialist skills and expertise, minimising risks to our people and the public.

ARTs will be trialled in Counties Manukau, Waikato and Canterbury for six months. These three districts have been chosen to host the trial as they have the highest number of firearms seized, located and surrendered, and have the largest AOS groups to support the trial.

During the trial, ARTs will be focused on responding to events where a significant risk is posed to the public or staff.

They will also support the execution of pre-planned and high-risk search warrants; high-profile public events; and prevention activities.

The trial will be evaluated to see what impact, ARTs have on staff and public safety.



Twitter – COP (retweeted by NZP)



Today I announced a trial of Armed Response Teams (ARTs) to support Police's response to high-risk situations.

ARTs are specialist police personnel who are routinely armed, equipped, mobile and ready to respond to significant events.

MORE: <http://bit.ly/32kaic2>



Tag people

Police to pilot Armed Response Teams – Issued at 0930 18/10/19

Police Commissioner Mike Bush has today announced a trial of Armed Response Teams (ARTs) to support Police's tactical capabilities on the frontline to minimise the risk of harm to the New Zealand public and our staff.

ARTs will complement our initial response to critical or high risk incidents by being on duty at peak demand times, seven days a week.

ARTs are specialist police personnel who are part of our Armed Offenders Squad (AOS). Our AOS is normally on call 24/7, but for the trial they will be routinely armed, equipped, mobile and ready to support our frontline with any events or incidents that require enhanced tactical capabilities. They are a standard feature across policing jurisdictions internationally.

"The Police's mission is that New Zealand is the safest country. Following the events of March 15 in Christchurch, our operating environment has changed," says Commissioner Bush.

"The threat level remains at medium and we are continuously reviewing our tools, training, and capabilities we use to provide Policing services to ensure we remain fit for purpose."

ARTs will have access to a range of tactical options and on average they will consist of a minimum of three specialist AOS personnel. At times they may be supported by additional staff such as our specialist Dog units.

"Police must ensure our people are equipped and enabled to perform their roles safely and to ensure our communities are, and feel, safe. This means having the right people with the right tools, skills and knowledge ready to respond at all times.

"The introduction of ARTs improves our ability to respond to rapidly evolving events and incidents with highly-trained specialist skills and expertise, minimising risks to our people and the public." says Commissioner Bush

"ARTs will be trialled in in Counties Manukau, Waikato and Canterbury for six months. These three Police districts have been chosen to host the trial as they have the highest number of firearms seized, located and surrendered, and have the largest AOS groups to support the trial.

"During the trial, ARTs will be focused on responding to events where a significant risk is posed to the public or staff.

"They will also support the execution of pre-planned and high-risk search warrants; high-profile public events; and prevention activities."

The trial will be evaluated to see what impact, ARTs have on staff and public safety. The evaluation will be undertaken by the Evidence Based Policing Centre (EBPC).

Summary of Police's Armed Response Teams

Armed Response Teams will be:

- teams of a minimum of three armed, AOS trained staff with a specialist vehicle equipped with tactical options;
- operating seven days a week;

- focused on responding to events where a significant risk is posed to the public or staff and supporting the execution of pre-planned and high-risk search warrants, high-profile public events and prevention activities;
- trialled for a period of six months in Counties Manukau, Waikato and Canterbury Police Districts;
- evaluated by Police's Evidence Based Policing Centre to see whether the use of ARTs make staff and communities be, and feel, safe.

Question and Answers

1. Is there an immediate threat Police is responding to?

There is no immediate threat. However, we must recognise that the environment has changed and Police's capability and resourcing needs to reflect this to ensure New Zealanders feel, and are, safe. We are undertaking the trial to assess whether ARTs improve Police's ability to keep our staff and the public safe through their ability to respond to situations with specialist skills and expertise, minimising risks to the public and our people.

2. Will ARTs operate 24/7?

During the pilot ARTs will operate during peak demand times, seven days a week with AOS squads continuing to provide support outside these hours.

3. What will the ARTs look like?

ARTs will use a specialist vehicle, which has a colour scheme as our other specialist teams (e.g.: Eagle helicopter). Staff will wear standard blue operational uniform with [Police's new Body Armour System](#).

4. How have you measured the risk in the trial locations?

The risk has been measured through a Police programme called Gun Safe that records incidents and details when Police encounter firearms. This programme was initially trialled across Tamaki Makaurau in late 2018 to ensure it was something every Police district could easily use. Nationwide rollout then began gradually from December 2018, with every Police district being on board by March 2019. Counties Manukau, Waikato and Canterbury have the highest number of firearms seized, located and surrendered.

5. What is the Evidence Based Policing Centre (EBPC)?

The EBPC uses practitioner-based research, information, crime-science, theory, and problem-solving methods to inform practice, implement measures to prevent crime and improve the allocation of Police resources to better protect our staff and the public.

Section 9(2)(a) Official Information

President
Police Association

17 October
In-Confidence

Dear Section 9(2)(a),

I am writing to advise you that Police intends to announce that the organisation is going to conduct a trial of Armed Response Teams (ARTs) to support Police's response to high-risk situations.

ARTs will complement our initial response to critical or high risk incidents and follows requests from our staff for more tactical support for the high-risk situations they are encountering. Our staff, and the public, expect us to keep them safe.

ARTs are specialist police personnel who are routinely armed, equipped, mobile and ready to respond to significant events. They are a standard feature across policing jurisdictions internationally.

Following the events of March 15, our operating environment has changed. Our threat level remains at medium and we are continuously reviewing our operating model to ensure it is fit for purpose.

Police must ensure our people have the tools, capacity, and capability to perform their roles safely and to ensure our communities are, and feel, safe. This means having the right people with the right tools, skills and knowledge ready to respond at all times.

The introduction of ARTs improves our ability to respond to rapidly evolving situations with specialist skills and expertise, minimising risks to our people and the public.

ARTs will be trialled in in Counties Manukau, Waikato and Canterbury for six months. These three districts have been chosen to host the trial as they have the highest number of firearms seized, located and surrendered, and have the largest trained personnel to support the trial.

ARTs will utilise a specialist vehicle, which has a colour scheme as our other specialist teams (eg: eagle). Staff will wear standard blue operational uniform with Police's new Stab Resistant Body Armour.

The staff involved in the trial are all Armed Offender Squad (AOS) trained and certified.

During the trial ARTs will be focused on responding to events where a significant risk is posed to the public or staff. They will also support the execution of pre-planned and high-risk search warrants; high-profile public events; and prevention activities.

The trial will be evaluated to see what impact, ARTs have on staff and public safety. The evaluation will be undertaken by the Evidence Based Policing Centre.

ARTs do not represent a shift towards general arming of frontline police staff, but a new way of deploying the existing armed response provided by the AOS.

Police will publically announce the trial of ARTs on Friday, 18 October 2019.

Finally, I welcome and encourage any feedback or views you have on ARTs and public safety during the trial.

Please contact me should you have any concerns.

Regards

Tusha Penny

Assistant Commissioner: Response and Operations

ARTs – Letters to MPs

Dear Colleagues,

As you may be aware, Police Commissioner Mike Bush has today announced that Police intends to conduct a trial of Armed Response Teams (ARTs) to support Police's response to high-risk situations.

ARTs will complement Police's initial response to critical or high risk incidents.

ARTs are specialist police personnel who are routinely armed, equipped, mobile and ready to respond to significant events. They are a standard feature across policing jurisdictions internationally.

Following the events of March 15, our operating environment has changed. New Zealand's threat level remains at medium and Police is continuously reviewing their operating model to ensure it is fit for purpose.

Police must ensure their people have the tools, capacity, and capability to perform their roles safely and to ensure our communities are, and feel, safe. This means having the right people with the right tools, skills and knowledge ready to respond at all times.

The introduction of ARTs improves our ability to respond to rapidly evolving situations with specialist skills and expertise, minimising risks to our people and the public.

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The staff involved in the trial are all Armed Offender Squad (AOS) trained and certified.

During the trial ARTs will be focused on responding to events where a significant risk is posed to the public or staff. They will also support the execution of pre-planned and high-risk search warrants; high-profile public events; and prevention activities.

The trial will be evaluated to see what impact, ARTs have on staff and public safety. The evaluation will be undertaken by the Evidence Based Policing Centre.

ARTs do not represent a shift towards general arming of frontline police staff, but a new way of deploying the existing armed response provided by the AOS.

Finally, I welcome and encourage any feedback or views you have on ARTs and public safety during the trial.

Please contact my office or your local Police District Commander should you have any concerns.

Regards

Stuart

Minister of Police

Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act

President
Police Managers Guild

17 October
In-Confidence

Dear Section 9(2)(a) OI,

I am writing to advise you that Police intends to announce that the organisation is going to conduct a trial of Armed Response Teams (ARTs) to support Police's response to high-risk situations.

ARTs will complement our initial response to critical or high risk incidents and follows requests from our staff for more tactical support for the high-risk situations they are encountering. Our staff, and the public, expect us to keep them safe.

ARTs are specialist police personnel who are routinely armed, equipped, mobile and ready to respond to significant events. They are a standard feature across policing jurisdictions internationally.

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The staff involved in the trial are all Armed Offender Squad (AOS) trained and certified.

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ARTs do not represent a shift towards general arming of frontline police staff, but a new way of deploying the existing armed response provided by the AOS.

Police will publically announce the trial of ARTs on Friday, 18 October 2019.

Finally, I welcome and encourage any feedback or views you have on ARTs and public safety during the trial.

Please contact me should you have any concerns.

Regards

Tusha Penny

Assistant Commissioner: Response and Operations

Media Advisory: Commissioner to announce enhanced response capability

Media are invited to an announcement and Q+A by Commissioner Mike Bush on Friday 18 October.

Please note the Commissioner will not be available for individual interviews later in the day.

EVENT DETAILS:

Time: 9:30am – Friday 18 October, 2019

Location: Counties Manukau Police Station, 42 Manukau Station Rd, Manukau

Media are requested to arrive by 9.15am on the day. RSVPs are essential by 7pm on 17 October

to **Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982**



ART Launch Event
18 October 2019 – 0930 – Counties Manukau DHQ

Event details

Name of host organisation	NZ Police
Type (e.g. conference, launch, function) and title of event	Launch of Armed Response Teams
Date	18 October 2019
Timeframe of Commissioner's attendance	0925-1030
Venue (exact room, building and full physical address)	Counties Manukau DHQ Carpark
Is there parking available? (can a park be coned off?)	Yes
Purpose of event (objectives, planned outcomes)	The purpose of the event is to publically launch the pilot of Armed Response Teams
Contact person for organisational issues (include cell phone number)	Event Management – <small>Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 198</small> <small>Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 198</small> CM – District Commander Jill Rogers <small>Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 198</small>
Are any other organisations involved with this event?	No
Is there to be a fundraising element to this event?	No
Dress code (Uniform, black tie/business attire/smart casual/other – please state)	Uniform
Are there any safety requirements in terms of attire? (please be very specific and consider accompanying staff)	Nil
Please provide a run sheet for the event, particularly indicating what is scheduled to take place before and after the Commissioner's speech	Below

Facilities

How will the venue be set up? (e.g. lecture style with podium; or informal, people standing)	Podium next to ART vehicle (possibly two) + ART staff standing next to vehicle in uniform with tactical options, AOS commanders standing behind.
Please indicate the facilities available to assist the Commissioner deliver the speech (e.g., data show, overhead projector, etc.)	

Key Personnel/Attendees

Who will meet the Commissioner on arrival? (include cell phone number)	District Commander Jill Rogers
Please provide a guest list if possible, or indicate the makeup/expected size of the audience	Deputy Commissioner John Tims District Commander Jill Rogers District Commander Karyn Malthus District Commander Naila Hassan
Who will be the MC for the event?	N/A
Are there Ministers and/or MPs being invited to attend? If so, who?	No
Please indicate any other important guests the Commissioner should be aware of	

Speeches

Length of speech requested	5
Do you intend to hold a Question and Answer session following the speech? If so, how long will this session be?	5
Who else has been invited to speak?	N/A
Who will be introducing and thanking the Commissioner?	N/A

Who should the Commissioner acknowledge at the start of the speech?	N/A
If the Commissioner is being asked to make a presentation to someone (e.g. an award), please provide details of what the presentation is, what the Commissioner is required to do, and who the presentation is to. The information on recipients will be kept confidential if necessary	N/A
Content of Commissioner's speech – please indicate what issues you consider will be of most interest to the audience	Talking points are provided
What topics are being covered by other speakers/presenters?	N/A

Multi-cultural dimension

Please indicate whether it would be appropriate for the Commissioner to include a Māori, Pacific or other ethnic greeting at the start of his speech	N/A
Are there any other cultural aspects to the event?	N/A

Media/Publicity

Are media being invited; and if so, who?	Yes
Will there be a press release or media advisory about the event?	Yes – see attached pack
If you are planning to send out invitations that mention the Commissioner, these must also be approved by the Commissioner's office	
Will we have an in-house photographer present?	Yes

Any other information

Please provide any other relevant information	
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Run sheet

Time	Description
0800	Set up commences: vehicles in position
0830	Staff participating in launch arrive, are briefed and await their position. COP Vlog goes to staff + tenone pages live.
0900	Media arrive – escorted to stand up area by Police media team
0925	CoP arrives, is greeted by District Commander Jill Rogers
0930	Commissioner commences stand up
0935	Q+A with Commissioner
0940	Commissioner leaves + Media provided with the opportunity to film vehicle (Waikato vehicle only)
0950	Media escorted out of station
1000	Pack down

24 October 2019

ARMED RESPONSE TEAMS – Radio Waatea

KEY LINES

- Our operating environment has changed, Police need the ability to respond to rapidly evolving situations with specialist skills and expertise, minimising risks to our people and the public.
- ART staff will be on duty, equipped, mobile and ready to be respond.
- We are evaluating the pilot see whether the use of ARTs make staff and communities be, and feel, safe.

The Why

- Following the events of March 15, our operating environment has changed. Our threat level remains at medium and Police are continuously reviewing our operating model to ensure it is fit for purpose.
- In March 2019, Police implemented Op Gun Safe which has enabled us to generate a clearer understanding of our operating environment in respect to risks being posed by firearms.
- In the last six months, 1,354 events involving firearms were recorded. 40% of those events resulted in firearms being seized – a total of 1,206 firearms were seized, recovered and surrendered.
- Of all Gun Safe seizures, approximately 22% of seized firearms were loaded, and around 45% of national seizures occurred in Counties Manukau, Waikato and Canterbury.
- Our staff are also requesting more tactical support for the high-risk situations they are encountering. Our staff, and the public, expect us to keep them safe.

The What

- In recognition of this, Police intends to trial deploying Armed Response Teams or A-R-Ts in Counties Manukau, Waikato and Canterbury for six months.
- ARTs will be staffed by existing specialist Armed Offender Squad personnel.
- Where in the past these staff would have to be called out to attend events which involves going to a central station for equipping prior to deployment, ART staff will be on duty, equipped, mobile and ready to be respond.

- The three trial districts have some of the highest number of firearms seized, located and surrendered as part of Op Gun Safe, and have the largest Armed Offender Squads (AOS) to support the trial.
- The introduction of ARTs improves our ability to respond to rapidly evolving situations with specialist skills and expertise, minimising risks to our people and the public.
- The purpose of the trial is to consider whether and how ARTs could provide enhanced tactical support to the frontline in real time, thereby increasing the safety of our staff and communities.
- The trial of ARTs is part of an ongoing programme of work to better align our operational response to our operating environment. ARTs are a standard feature across policing jurisdictions internationally.
- We expect the pilot will show that ARTs improve Police's ability to respond to rapidly evolving situations with specialist skills and expertise, minimising risks to the public and our people.

The How

- During the pilot ARTs will operate during peak demand times, seven days a week with AOS squads continuing to provide support outside these hours.
- ARTs will utilise a specialist vehicle, which has a colour scheme as our other specialist teams for example the Eagle helicopter.
- Staff will wear standard blue operational uniform with Police's new Stab Resistant Body Armour.
- Police must ensure our people have the tools, capacity, and capability to perform their roles safely and to ensure our communities are, and feel, safe. This means having the right people with the right tools, skills and knowledge with the ability to readily respond at all times.
- ART staff will have access to a range of tactical options and on average they will consist of a minimum team of three specialist AOS personnel. At times they may be supported by additional staff.
- ARTs will be focused on responding to events where a significant risk is posed to the public or staff. They will also support terminations of pre-planned and high-risk search warrants; high-profile public events with an associated risk profile; and prevention activity.
- Finally, it is important to note that there is no immediate threat. However, we must recognise that the environment has changed and our capability and resourcing needs to reflect this. We expect the pilot will show that ARTs improve Police's ability to respond to rapidly evolving situations with specialist skills and expertise, minimising risks to the public and our people.
- Any questions?

Section 9(2)(a) Official
Information Act 1982
Chair

Independent Police Conduct Authority

17 October
In-Confidence

Dear Section 9(2)(a)
Official Information,

I am writing to advise you that Police intends to announce that the organisation is going to conduct a trial of Armed Response Teams (ARTs) to support Police's response to high-risk situations.

ARTs will complement our initial response to critical or high risk incidents and follows requests from our staff for more tactical support for the high-risk situations they are encountering. Our staff, and the public, expect us to keep them safe.

ARTs are specialist police personnel who are routinely armed, equipped, mobile and ready to respond to significant events. They are a standard feature across policing jurisdictions internationally.

Following the events of March 15, our operating environment has changed. Our threat level remains at medium and we are continuously reviewing our operating model to ensure it is fit for purpose.

Police must ensure our people have the tools, capacity, and capability to perform their roles safely and to ensure our communities are, and feel, safe. This means having the right people with the right tools, skills and knowledge ready to respond at all times.

The introduction of ARTs improves our ability to respond to rapidly evolving situations with specialist skills and expertise, minimising risks to our people and the public.

ARTs will be trialled in in Counties Manukau, Waikato and Canterbury for six months. These three districts have been chosen to host the trial as they have the highest number of firearms seized, located and surrendered, and have the largest trained personnel to support the trial.

ARTs will utilise a specialist vehicle, which has a colour scheme as our other specialist teams (eg: eagle). Staff will wear standard blue operational uniform with Police's new Stab Resistant Body Armour.

The staff involved in the trial are all Armed Offender Squad (AOS) trained and certified.

During the trial ARTs will be focused on responding to events where a significant risk is posed to the public or staff. They will also support the execution of pre-planned and high-risk search warrants; high-profile public events; and prevention activities.

The trial will be evaluated to see what impact, ARTs have on staff and public safety. The evaluation will be undertaken by the Evidence Based Policing Centre.

ARTs do not represent a shift towards general arming of frontline police staff, but a new way of deploying the existing armed response provided by the AOS.

Police will publically announce the trial of ARTs on Friday, 18 October 2019.

Finally, I welcome and encourage any feedback or views you have on ARTs and public safety during the trial.

Please contact me should you have any concerns.

Regards

Tusha Penny

Assistant Commissioner: Response and Operations

ARTs – District Commander Talking Points

The following key messaging has been developed to support your engagement with local Iwi and Muslim community leaders about Armed Response Teams (ARTs).

Background

Having an armed team continuously deployed without an immediate or defined threat is likely to raise questions about the threat environment in New Zealand.

The media and public will view ARTs in the context of March 15. Police can expect questions about whether ARTs would have made a difference to events on that day or to previous significant events. Communities impacted most by March 15 are likely to be approached for comment on ARTs. Therefore, it is important that these communities are well briefed on the reasons behind ARTs and we have an understanding of how they will respond to questions.

ARTs could also raise questions around whether New Zealand Police is transitioning to a routinely armed service, and what implications this may have for populations who are more likely to interact with Police (in-particular Maori).

Police will proactively publically announce their intention to trial ARTs ahead of the proof of concept commencing at the end of October.

The Why

- Following the events of March 15, Police has reviewed our operating environment. Our threat level remains at medium and we are continuously reviewing our operating model to ensure it is fit for purpose.
- In March 2019, Police implemented Op Gun Safe which has enabled us to generate a clearer understanding of our operating environment in respect to risks being posed by firearms.
- Our staff are requesting more tactical support for the high-risk situations they are encountering. Our staff, and the public, expect us to keep them safe.
- It is important to note that there is no immediate threat. However, we must recognise that the environment has changed and our capability and resourcing needs to reflect this. We expect the pilot will show that ARTs improve Police's ability to respond to rapidly evolving situations with specialist skills and expertise, minimising risks to the public and our people.

The What

- In recognition of this, Police intends to trial deploying Armed Response Teams (ARTs) in Counties Manukau, Waikato and Canterbury for six months.

- ARTs will be staffed by existing specialist Armed Offender Squad personnel. Where in the past these staff would have to be called out to attend events which involves going to a central station for equipping prior to deployment, ART staff will be on duty, equipped, mobile and ready to be respond.
- The three trial districts have some of the highest number of firearms seized, located and surrendered, and have the largest Armed Offender Squads (AOS) to support the trial.
- The introduction of ARTs improves our ability to respond to rapidly evolving situations with specialist skills and expertise, minimising risks to our people and the public.
- The purpose of the trial is to consider whether and how ARTs could provide enhanced tactical support to the frontline in real time, thereby increasing the safety of our staff and communities.
- The trial of ARTs is part of an ongoing programme of work to better align our operational response to our operating environment. ARTs are a standard feature across policing jurisdictions internationally.

The How

- Police must ensure our people have the tools, capacity, and capability to perform their roles safely and to ensure our communities are, and feel, safe. This means having the right people with the right tools, skills and knowledge with the ability to readily respond at all times.
- ART staff will have access to a range of tactical options and on average they will consist of a minimum team of three specialist AOS personnel. At times they may be supported by additional staff.
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- ARTs will utilise a specialist vehicle, which has a colour scheme as our other specialist teams (eg: eagle). Staff will wear standard blue operational uniform with [Police's new Stab Resistant Body Armour \(SRBA\)](#).

- Police's Evidence Based Policing Centre will lead an evaluation to ascertain whether the use of ARTs make our staff and communities be, and feel, safe. This means quantifying (where possible) any actual or perceived minimisation of risk of harm to the staff and the public. The EBPC uses practitioner-based research, information, crime-science, theory, and problem-solving methods to inform practice, implement measures to prevent crime and improve the allocation of Police resources to better protect the public.

ARTs – Letters to key district stakeholders

Eg: - Iwi, Muslim communities, Emergency service partners, MPs (post announcement)

[NAME]

[TITLE]

[ORGANISATION]

[DATE]

In-Confidence

Dear [NAME],

I am writing to advise you that Police intends to announce that the organisation is going to conduct a trial of Armed Response Teams (ARTs) to support Police's response to high-risk situations.

ARTs will complement our initial response to critical or high risk incidents.

ARTs are specialist police personnel who are routinely armed, equipped, mobile and ready to respond to significant events. They are a standard feature across policing jurisdictions internationally.

Following the events of March 15, our operating environment has changed. Our threat level remains at medium and we are continuously reviewing our operating model to ensure it is fit for purpose.

Police must ensure our people have the tools, capacity, and capability to perform their roles safely and to ensure our communities are, and feel, safe. This means having the right people with the right tools, skills and knowledge ready to respond at all times.

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The staff involved in the trial are all Armed Offender Squad (AOS) trained and certified.

During the trial ARTs will be focused on responding to events where a significant risk is posed to the public or staff. They will also support the execution of pre-planned and high-risk search warrants; high-profile public events; and prevention activities.

The trial will be evaluated to see what impact, ARTs have on staff and public safety. The evaluation will be undertaken by the Evidence Based Policing Centre.

ARTs do not represent a shift towards general arming of frontline police staff, but a new way of deploying the existing armed response provided by the AOS.

Police will publically announce the trial of ARTs on Friday, 18 October 2019.

Finally, I welcome and encourage any feedback or views you have on ARTs and public safety during the trial.

Please contact my office should you have any concerns.

Regards

[NAME]

District Commander

[DISTRICT]

ARTs – Letters to key stakeholders – DC Haumaha

[NAME]
[TITLE]
[ORGANISATION]

[DATE]

Kia ora [NAME],

As you may be aware, Police has announced a plan to trial Armed Response Teams (ARTs) to support Police's response to high-risk situations. The following outlines what ARTs are, why we intend to trial them, and how they will operate. I welcome and encourage any feedback or views you have on ARTs and public safety during the trial.

ARTs will complement our initial response to critical or high risk incidents.

ARTs are specialist police personnel who are routinely armed, equipped, mobile and ready to respond to significant events. They are a standard feature across policing jurisdictions internationally.

Following recent events, our operating environment has changed. Our threat level is now at medium, our staff are attending more incidents involving firearms and we are continuously reviewing our operating model to ensure it is fit for purpose.

Police must ensure our people have the tools, capacity, and capability to perform their roles safely and to ensure our communities are, and feel, safe. This means having the right people with the right tools, skills and knowledge ready to respond at all times.

The introduction of ARTs improves our ability to respond to rapidly evolving situations with specialist skills and expertise, minimising risks to our people and the public.

ARTs will be trialled in Counties Manukau, Waikato and Canterbury for six months. These three districts have been chosen to host the trial as they have the highest number of firearms seized, located and surrendered, and have the largest trained personnel to support the trial.

ARTs will utilise a specialist vehicle, which has a colour scheme as our other specialist teams (eg: eagle). Staff will wear standard blue operational uniform with Police's new Body Armour Systems.

The staff involved in the trial are all Armed Offender Squad (AOS) trained and certified.

During the trial ARTs will be focused on responding to events where a significant risk is posed to the public or staff. They will also support the execution of pre-planned and high-risk search warrants; high-profile public events; and prevention activities.

Police is aware that some people may have concerns about the deployment of ARTs. However, we must recognise that the environment has changed and Police's capability and resourcing needs to reflect this. Police expects the pilot will show that ARTs improve Police's ability to respond to rapidly evolving situations with specialist skills and expertise, minimising risks and enhancing safety of all communities.

Unfortunately, Māori are over-represented in the criminal justice system as both victims and offenders and this is reflected in the Tactical Options Reporting each year. Police is actively working with our communities, our partners, and the justice sector to improve outcomes for Māori.

Police has a target of a 25 percent reduction in reoffending by Māori by 2025 and we are committed to achieving this. As you know, Police works with individuals, community partners, iwi, and agencies to assist people to access the support they need. We will continue to work in partnership with Iwi to deliver Te Pae Oranga in communities around the country to reduce reoffending and provide ongoing support for people to create new pathways to education, employment, and health.

The trial will be evaluated to see what impact, ARTs have on staff and public safety. The evaluation will be undertaken by the Evidence Based Policing Centre.

ARTs do not represent a shift towards general arming of frontline police staff, but a new way of deploying the existing armed response provided by the AOS.

As stated previously, I welcome and encourage any feedback or views you have on ARTs and public safety during the trial.

Please contact my office should you have any concerns or questions.

Ngā mihi

Wallace Haumaha
Deputy Commissioner
New Zealand Police

18 October 2019

Armed Response Teams (ARTs)

Counties Manukau DHQ 0930-1000

KEY LINES

- Our operating environment has changed, Police need the ability to respond to rapidly evolving situations with specialist skills and expertise, minimising risks to our people and the public.
- ART staff will be on duty, equipped, mobile and ready to be respond.
- We are evaluating the pilot see whether the use of ARTs make staff and communities be, and feel, safe.

INTRODUCTION

- [Mihi if desired]
- Welcome to Counties Manukau DHQ.
- Acknowledge Deputy Commissioner Tim, District Commanders Rogers, Hassan and Malthus.

TALKING POINTS

- Following the events of March 15, our operating environment has changed. Our threat level remains at medium and Police are continuously reviewing our operating model to ensure it is fit for purpose.
- In March 2019, Police implemented Op Gun Safe which has enabled us to generate a clearer understanding of our operating environment in respect to risks being posed by firearms.
- Our staff are also requesting more tactical support for the high-risk situations they are encountering. Our staff, and the public, expect us to keep them safe.
- In recognition of this, Police intends to trial deploying Armed Response Teams or A-R-Ts in Counties Manukau, Waikato and Canterbury for six months.
- ARTs will be staffed by existing specialist Armed Offender Squad personnel.

- Where in the past these staff would have to be called out to attend events which involves going to a central station for equipping prior to deployment, ART staff will be on duty, equipped, mobile and ready to be respond.
- The three trial districts have some of the highest number of firearms seized, located and surrendered as part of Op Gun Safe, and have the largest Armed Offender Squads (AOS) to support the trial.
- The introduction of ARTs improves our ability to respond to rapidly evolving situations with specialist skills and expertise, minimising risks to our people and the public.
- The purpose of the trial is to consider whether and how ARTs could provide enhanced tactical support to the frontline in real time, thereby increasing the safety of our staff and communities.
- The trial of ARTs is part of an ongoing programme of work to better align our operational response to our operating environment. ARTs are a standard feature across policing jurisdictions internationally.
- We expect the pilot will show that ARTs improve Police's ability to respond to rapidly evolving situations with specialist skills and expertise, minimising risks to the public and our people.
- During the pilot ARTs will operate during peak demand times, seven days a week with AOS squads continuing to provide support outside these hours.
- ARTs will utilise a specialist vehicle, which has a colour scheme as our other specialist teams for example the Eagle helicopter.
- Staff will wear standard blue operational uniform with Police's new Stab Resistant Body Armour.
- Police must ensure our people have the tools, capacity, and capability to perform their roles safely and to ensure our communities are, and feel, safe. This means having the right people with the right tools, skills and knowledge with the ability to readily respond at all times.
- ART staff will have access to a range of tactical options and on average they will consist of a minimum team of three specialist AOS personnel. At times they may be supported by additional staff.
- ARTs will be focused on responding to events where a significant risk is posed to the public or staff. They will also support terminations of pre-planned and high-risk search warrants; high-profile public events with an associated risk profile; and prevention activity.
- Finally, it is important to note that there is no immediate threat. However, we must recognise that the environment has changed and our capability and resourcing needs to reflect this. We expect the pilot will show that ARTs improve Police's ability to respond to rapidly evolving situations with specialist skills and expertise, minimising risks to the public and our people.

- Any questions?

Strategic Communications

ARTs: COMMUNITY COMMS

Attention: Supt. Andrew Sissons, National Manager: Response & Operations,

Date: 1 November 2019

Prepared by: [Redacted], Senior Communications Advisor

Purpose:

1. This note details what engagement was undertaken with communities prior to and since the launch of Armed Response Teams (ARTs) on 18 October.

Important points to note

2. Given the nature of the launch event and the compressed timeframes, the decision was made for limited communication to occur to groups outside Police, prior to the launch of ARTs.
3. District Commanders and key members of the Police Executive have received documents to support their communications with key stakeholder groups.

There has been limited community engagement

4. On the day before the launch (17 October) key stakeholders (IPCA, Manager's Guild and Police Association) were advised of Police's intention to launch ARTs. There was no planned community engagement concerning the launch of ARTs prior to this. Police had opted for the communications approach where:
 - The Commissioner will lead internal and external communications;
 - It will be underpinned by insights from EBPC and our own experience;
 - The Police Association, Police Guild, and the IPCA will be consulted on the trial;
 - The public and our staff are well-informed of the trial and perceptions are managed (particularly concerns that this might be a militarised response, arming by stealth, or that their communities are more dangerous);
 - Our frontline clearly understand the role of ARTs and the distinction in roles (importantly, they understand that ARTs are to provide additional support to enable them, rather than as a result of concerns about their own capability); and
 - Good news stories will be circulated internally and externally during the trial.

Material provided to support communications

5. On 17 October, Media & Communications provided a communications pack to District Commanders to support their engagement with staff, key stakeholders and the public. This pack included:
 - Talking points
 - A draft letter to stakeholders – with possible stakeholders listed
 - Final Press release
 - Reactive Q+As.
6. A communications pack was also provided to the Minister of Police and to Deputy Commissioner Haumaha to support his discussions with key Iwi leaders. Media & Communications has continued to provide key messaging on ARTs as and when required.

7. There is no central register of communications with stakeholders at a district level.

Sentiment analysis

8. Media & Communications has begun manually analysing public sentiment from the first week of ARTs. This analysis is focus on social media and press coverage of ARTs. Due to this being conducted manually, it is expected to be completed mid next week.

Recommendations

9. It is recommended that you:
- a) **note** the contents of this paper.

Prepared by	Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act , Senior Communications Advisor	Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 198
Approved by	Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 National Manager	Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act

ARTs BACK POCKET Q+As

1. Is there an immediate threat Police is responding to?

There is no immediate threat. However, we must recognise that the environment has changed and Police's capability and resourcing needs to reflect this. We expect the pilot will show that ARTs improve Police's ability to respond to rapidly evolving situations with specialist skills and expertise, minimising risks (enhancing safety) to the public and our people.

2. Is this is a Response to increased gang tensions?

There is no immediate threat, however, we must recognise that the environment has changed and Police's capability and resourcing needs to reflect this. We expect the pilot will show that ARTs improve Police's ability to respond to rapidly evolving situations with specialist skills and expertise, minimising risks to the public and our people.

3. Will your special armoured vehicles be used for ARTs?

Not primarily, but the special armoured vehicles may be called in to support an ART unit during significant incidents once they are operational. I'll have more to say about these vehicles at a later time.

4. What other initiatives are Police undertaking?

ARTs are part of a suite of initiatives that are designed to ensure our people have the skills and resources they need to keep our communities and themselves safe. These include, additional live fire training, our intelligence transformation programme and Gun Safe.

5. Will ARTs operate 24/7? Why aren't ARTs 24/7?

During the pilot ARTs will operate during peak demand times, seven days a week with AOS squads continuing to provide support outside these hours. This approach will be assessed as part of our evaluation.

6. What will the ARTs look like?

ARTs will utilise a specialist vehicle, which has a colour scheme as our other specialist teams (e.g.: Eagle helicopter).
Staff will wear standard blue operational uniform with Police's new Stab Resistant Body Armour (SRBA).

7. Are ARTs a step towards general arming?

ARTs do not represent a shift towards general arming of frontline police staff, but a new way of deploying the existing armed response provided by the AOS. If ARTs result in staff feeling safer, they may be less likely to opt to carry a firearm into an event.

8. How will the pilot be evaluated?

Police's Evidence Based Policing Centre will lead an evaluation to ascertain whether the use of ARTs make our staff and communities be, and feel, safe. This means quantifying (where possible) any actual or perceived minimisation of risk of harm to the staff and the public. The EBPC uses practitioner-based research, information, crime-science, theory, and problem-solving methods to inform practice, implement measures to prevent crime and improve the allocation of Police resources to better protect the public.

9. Will the evaluation be made public?

We will keep the public informed on results of the pilot.

10. How many staff are needed and where are they are coming from?

In practical terms, the pilot means that effectively majority of our AOS staff in the three pilot districts will be rostered on regular shifts rather than being on call. For the pilot those affected staff will be removed from their substantive roles and the appropriate back fill or reprioritisation of activity will be undertaken. Remembering that the ART staff will be undertaking service delivery, as well as an enhanced response.

11. Will they be rolled out to other communities?

No further expansion of ARTs is planned until we have fully evaluated the impact of the teams through this pilot.

12. What will they be doing when not attending incidents?

When ARTs are not attending high risk events they will be supporting investigations in pre-planned activity (such as search warrant operations) and prevention activity.

13. Does the public get a say?

I encourage the public to get in contact with their local Police should they have any concerns or questions about ARTs. If they are approached to provide feedback on the teams during the pilot, I hope they will take that up that opportunity.

14. When will a decision be made on keeping them or rolling out more?

It's too soon to say, the evaluation will impact any potential further roll out and it's timing.

15. How much do they cost? Vehicle, equipment, staff time.

You can't put a dollar figure on the safety of our staff or our communities. The costs of the trial relate primarily to acquisition and fit out of vehicles; personnel and evaluation costs. Exact costs are commercially sensitive but will be assessed as part of the evaluation.

16. Have we used these teams before?

No, however districts have deployed similar models on an adhoc basis for short periods when the threat environment has deemed it appropriate – for example in Christchurch after March 15.

17. Will the presence of ARTs escalate events and lead to more police shootings?

Only a very small percentage of events currently attended by AOS staff result in a shot being fired. AOS are trained to deescalate situations and minimise risks to all involved.

18. Will ARTs be a new tactical that may be disproportionately used against Maori?

Police is aware that some people may have concerns about the deployment of ARTs. However, we must recognise that the environment has changed and Police’s capability and resourcing needs to reflect this. Police expects the pilot will show that ARTs improve Police’s ability to respond to rapidly evolving situations with specialist skills and expertise, minimising risks and enhancing safety of all communities.

Unfortunately Māori are over-represented in the criminal justice system as both victims and offenders and this is reflected in the Tactical Options Reporting each year. Police is actively working with our communities, our partners, and the justice sector to improve outcomes for M āori.


Police has a target of a 25 percent reduction in reoffending by Māori by 2025 and we are committed to achieving this. Police works with individuals, community partners, iwi, and agencies to assist people to access the support they need. We work in partnership with iwi Māori to deliver Te Pae Oranga / iwi community panels in communities around the country to reduce reoffending and provide ongoing support for people to create new pathways to education, employment, and health.

NON ART QUESTIONS

Outside of scope



Outside of scope



A Trial of Armed Response Teams in New Zealand

(Note: Time and resource constraints have prevented a more comprehensive assessment, so the results reported in this document must be taken as initial and indicative, and not as output of a complete literature review.)

Executive Summary

New Zealand Police's Executive Leadership Board (ELB) has approved a pilot of Armed Response Teams (ARTs), an initiative intended to improve safety, and feelings of safety, among police staff and the public. The pilot is intended to run for a period of six months and will be monitored by an ARV Working group established by National Response and Operations. The Evidence Based Policing Centre (EBPC) has been tasked with providing an independent evaluation of a pilot.

To place the pilot in context, this document provides a high level summary of the current operational environment facing New Zealand Police. Comparisons are then drawn between New Zealand Police's armed response capabilities and those used throughout the United Kingdom and Australia. Case examples are provided that demonstrate where New Zealand Police could make operational improvements via a mobile armed response capability.

The review then considers perceptions of safety around the use of armed responses, from both the perspective of the public and police. There is evidence that changes in arming policies have been mismanaged in the past and that care should be taken when communicating change to the public. Finally, recommendations are provided on where an evaluation should focus its efforts.

Background

The Christchurch mosque attacks surpassed the 1990 Aramoana Massacre as New Zealand's deadliest mass shooting. Despite the low frequency of such extreme events, it is nevertheless essential that New Zealand Police (NZ Police) remain capable to respond to critical incidents while also ensuring that communities feel, and be, safe. Perceptions of safety, along with the capability of police to reduce real or

perceived threats, are critical in maintaining trust and legitimacy between the police and communities. For these reasons, the requirement of highly trained specialists to respond, both quickly and effectively, to incidents that pose a significant threat to life is a legitimate one.

The operational demands of frontline staff are also shifting. NZ Police is one of only four countries in the OECD that do not routinely carry firearms (the United Kingdom – which includes England, Wales, and Scotland, the Republic of Ireland, and Norway make up the others). Nevertheless, the decision to arm frontline officers has been the subject of ongoing debate and remains a controversial issue (Anonymous, 2019a, 2019b; Barry, 2019; Cook & Russell, 2019). Though similar debates have occurred throughout the United Kingdom and Norway, the discourse in New Zealand has predominantly been couched as a matter of police health and safety (Hendy, 2012).

Indeed, Operation Gun Safe – a recent initiative by NZ Police to track firearm related events and seizures – has started to quantify the prevalence of firearms in New Zealand. Since its inception in March 2019, over 1000 events have been lodged, with approximately 40% of events resulting in the seizure of a firearm. In particular, the number of seizures from vehicle stops, search warrants, and family harm incidents, corroborate previously anecdotal evidence that frontline staff increasingly encounter firearms at these events (NZ Police, 2018a).

While concerns about safety appear entirely reasonable, the decision to arm frontline staff will necessarily impact the relationship between the NZ Police and public. There remains little public support for the routine arming of police, despite the effective armament of all NZ Police staff; officers have access to firearms stowed in their vehicles and may choose to carry a sidearm if circumstances require. The potential matter at stake, then, is the *routine carriage* of firearms and the perception this configuration could

elicit within the public's eye. With this in mind, Police Commissioner Mike Bush has stated that there is no intention to routinely arm frontline staff, citing the need to protect the good relationship that currently exists between the NZ Police and the public (Anonymous, 2019a).

Yet, the public need to be reassured that Police are capable of effectively responding to violent, and potentially terror-related, threats. Notably, since 2016, members of the Armed Offenders Squad (AOS) have been embedded within Christchurch's Offender Prevention Team (OPT). This small team of armed officers deploy in blue uniforms - as opposed to the prototypical black uniforms - to provide support across several tasks, including tactical assistance at high risk search warrants and for high risk offenders. Critically, this mobile armed response team facilitated the rapid response to the Al Noor Mosque, arriving just six minutes after the reports of shots fired was first received.

Apparent changes to the operating environment accordingly warranted a review of the national Armed Offenders Squad (AOS) and Special Tactics Group (STG) model to ensure it remains fit for purpose. Accordingly, on 30th August, 2019, the Executive Leadership Board (ELB) approved a pilot for Armed Response Teams (ARTs) - an armed response model similar to that used in the United Kingdom - to explore whether small teams of armed specialists can improve operational responsiveness, particularly to critical and life threatening incidents, and the safety of both frontline officers and the public. The pilot is intended to run for six months.

In principle, the pilot introduces a slight change to the operating procedures of NZ Police's armed branch (i.e., the AOS; the STG reflect a separate unit that are unaffected by the ART pilot) and will see mobile AOS teams operating across Counties Manakau, Waikato, and Christchurch. These districts were selected because, collectively, they accounted for more than 50% of all Operation Gun Safe notifications.

Nevertheless, there are two central issues that must be considered. The first is the need for Police to meet changing operational demands and address perceived issues of safety. The second concerns how any policy change around the use and/or training of firearms specialists affects the relationship between the public and their perceptions around safety. It is important to realise that these issues are intrinsically linked. The ability to provide an effective response will of course build trust and confidence with the public; however, if the deployment of ARTs is intended to

improve public safety, it is absolutely necessary to understand how the public view the carriage of weapons by NZ Police.

Unfortunately, these issues have largely played out in the public arena and there is a frustrating lack of academic research on how these factors interact. The research that is available, however, has not focussed on evaluating whether the arming of police represents the best approach to effectively reduce crime. This is largely compounded by most police forces throughout the world already bearing arms, providing little opportunity to observe and measure how changes in arming polices affect crime statistics. Instead, research has centred more upon the public response to firearms use and how this affects trust and confidence (Hendy, 2012; HMICS, 2014a; Yesberg & Bradford, 2018).

In what follows, a qualitative comparison of the armed response capabilities between the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand will be made. This places the ART pilot within the broader context of international armed response models. It will be seen that the implementation of highly mobile armed responses have largely occurred as a matter of operational necessity rather than having a solid empirical evidence base. This is then followed by an overview of how changes to policies around the arming of police may affect public perceptions of safety and trust with Police.

Armed Responses Capabilities in the United Kingdom and Australia

This section provides a summary of the armed response capabilities used throughout the United Kingdom and Australia. Much like New Zealand, forces in the United Kingdom are unarmed but have specialist firearms officers capable of responding to high risk events. These officers are deployed in Armed Response Vehicles (ARV) which are on routine patrol throughout metropolitan areas. In comparison, police forces in Australia are routinely armed, and thereby operate according to a different set of procedures. Nevertheless, several states utilise mobile armed units for rapid responding so it is informative to consider how these units are deployed.

Firearms use in the United Kingdom

Police forces throughout the United Kingdom (specifically, England, Wales, and Scotland) do not routinely carry firearms, nor is firearms training a mandatory part of police officer training. Instead,



officers may apply to become an Authorised Firearms Officer (AFO) and receive specialist training that permits the carriage and use of firearms.

An AFO role is volunteer based and requires candidates to undergo a series of examinations, including psychological testing, before training commences. Once selected, candidates are trained to respond to a range of armed and high risk incidents. The use of force is legislated and must only be used when there is an imminent threat to life¹. British officers may choose to undertake further training to become a Specialist Firearms Officer (SFO) where training focuses more of the use of special tactics. Once authorised, AFOs are required to undertake regular refresher courses. The vast majority of AFOs are deployed in Armed Response Vehicles (ARV) which are designed to provide a rapid armed response to critical incidents².

Armed Response Vehicles

Armed response vehicles have existed, in various forms, throughout the United Kingdom since the introduction of instant response cars by West Yorkshire police in 1977 (Waldren, 2007). Early ARVs routinely transported firearms (a handgun and a rifle) in a mobile armoury located within the patrol car. If an immediate threat to life was posed, officers would then require authorisation to access their firearms. Reform introduced in 1994 established a standing authority for the overt carriage of a sidearm and use of firearms for all ARV officers. Several forces readily adopted the change (Waldren, 2007) with police Scotland granting a nationwide standing authority in 2014 (HMICS, 2014a). Officers are also armed with OC spray and a Taser, though rifles remain locked in the mobile armoury while in transit.

The vehicles are usually crewed with 2-3 full-time AFOs, though configurations may vary to meet operational demands (Hampshire Constabulary, 2018; West Yorkshire Police, n.d.) and are adapted to accommodate specialist equipment. This might include the carriage of projectile launchers, baton rounds, as well as bulletproof riot shields, battering ram, and crowbars. Vehicles may further be equipped with collision equipment such as signs, cones, as well as enhanced first aid equipment such as blood and airway management, an automatic external defibrillator (AED), and oxygen.

¹ The police use of firearms is governed by Section 55 of The Firearms Act 1968. This establishes the legal basis for the lawful possession of firearms throughout the United Kingdom and grants legal authority to Chief Constables for the use of firearms within their area.

Deployment of Armed Response Vehicles

Armed response vehicles routinely patrol metropolitan areas, enabling the swift transport of officers in response to ongoing incidents. However, resource constraints necessarily determine how extensively ARVs are deployed. For major metropolitan areas ARVs are rostered to patrol on a full-time basis (i.e., 24 hours a day, seven days a week; Hendy, 2012) but moderate the number of vehicles according to force size. For example, London have approximately 20 ARVs (crewed with three officers) on full time patrol whereas West Yorkshire Police only operate five double crewed ARVs on a full time basis (West Yorkshire Police, n.d.).

In comparison, more provincial forces typically have fewer ARVs, along with larger regions to patrol, and must carefully manage resource allocation to ensure immediate availability for deployments. For example, Thames Valley Police operate 12 double crewed ARVs, but only between the hours of 0700 and 0200 Monday to Thursday, and 0300 over Friday, Saturday, and Sunday (Hampshire Constabulary, 2018).

Throughout England and Wales ARVs proactively patrol on tasked deployments (e.g., pre-planned operations) though may assist with road policing, community/educational engagement, force operations and proactive targeting of hotspots, and firearms licensing (Hampshire Constabulary, 2018). During the period 2013-2018, Police Scotland only deployed ARVs to firearms related incidents and were not used for routine policing matters (HMICS, 2014a). This decision was overturned in May 2018 which has now seen armed officers attending a large number of routine incidents (Foote & Cook, 2019).

While the deployment of ARVs will vary by force there are typically a set of standard operating procedures. Chiefly, the National Decision Model (NDM; College of Policing, 2014, 2018) is designed to assist operational officers, commanders, planners and advisors to manage their response to a situation in a reasonable and proportionate way. It is intended to provide a simple, logical and evidenced based approach to making decisions and is suitable for all decisions whether the incident is spontaneous or planned.

Firearms use in Australia

The operational use of firearms in Australia differs from both the United Kingdom and New Zealand.

² ARV officers have been selected, trained, accredited to national standards to use weapons requiring special authorisation but receive additional training in specialist weapons and tactics. These include rifle, close protection, and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear.

Australian officers are routinely armed though do employ the use of mobile armed units to attend critical and life threatening incidents. The following provides examples of some of the specialised teams used in Australia.

Special Emergency Response Team (SERT)

Based in Queensland, SERT is a specialist unit that allows the Queensland Police Service (QPS) to rapidly respond to high risk situations state wide. Bases are located in Brisbane and Cairns and are intended to provide support to police throughout Queensland. SERT operate in a similar capacity to the AOS - though on a full time basis - and include among their capabilities negotiation teams and dog squads. They are typically deployed in counter terrorism operations, armed offenders and siege/hostage situations, undertaking searches of high risk premises, the arrest of armed offenders, among other highly specialised tactical responses (e.g., water and airborne operations). While SERT have a small number of armed response vehicles in operation, their operating procedures do not align with the ARV model used in the United Kingdom.

The Public Safety Response Team (PRST), however, trialled a Mobile Response Capability (MRC) between July 2015 and January 2016 that was modelled on the Critical Incident Response Team (CIRT) used in Melbourne, Victoria (see below). The primary role of the MRC was to provide rapid assistance to frontline officers at high risk situations, and, depending upon the severity of the incident, may cordon and contain until SERT arrive on scene. Like all frontline staff, MRC officers have a standing authority for the carriage of firearms, though have less lethal tactical options available to them. A review following the trial period concluded that the MRC enhanced operational responsiveness and has accordingly been retained (Queensland Police, 2016).

Critical Incidents Response Team (CIRT)

Based in Melbourne, Victoria, the CIRT is a specialist unit of the Victorian Police that assist frontline officers to resolve high risk incidents using specialist tactics. CIRT were, in part, created to relieve a growing call out demand for the Special Operations Group (SOG) – the elite tactical group within the Victoria police – who were attending a number of incidents that did not explicitly meet their call out criteria. CIRT provide a rapid response to high risk incidents such as armed offenders, siege and hostage situations, and high risk, life threatening incidents, though are also deployed to undertake pre-planned operations, high risk searches, and arrests. Additionally, some highly threatening

incidents may require CIRT to cordon and contain, taking control of high risk situations before the SOG arrive on scene.

The CIRT concept was based upon the ARV model used in the United Kingdom and patrol of on a full time basis within the Melbourne metropolitan area. CIRT provide a similar operational function as the AOS, can be called upon at any point in time, and are equipped with less lethal tactical options which mitigate the risk of police shooting from frontline officers. Notably, a large proportion of incidents attended by CIRT involve individuals with mental health issues so the availability of non-lethal options has been viewed favourably.

Summary

A rapid and highly mobile response to critical, and potentially life threatening, incidents is a core operational capability for several international police forces. In the United Kingdom, a smaller cohort of specialist firearms officers routinely patrol in armed response vehicles on a regular basis, providing rapid armed support to frontline staff who are unarmed when on patrol. In comparison, Australian forces are routinely armed and necessarily provide an armed response whenever the frontline respond to an incident.

The advantage, in each case, is the presence of highly trained staff with access to a number of tactical options that are not available to frontline officers. They are also better trained to cordon and contain incidents and bring about effective resolutions without necessarily having to resort to lethal force.

Armed Response Capabilities in New Zealand

The armed response capabilities in New Zealand are reviewed next. What will become apparent is that the response to armed offenders in New Zealand share many similarities with the models described above, though there are also some notable differences. The section will conclude with a qualitative comparison between the models used abroad with that used in New Zealand.

Firearms use in New Zealand

Despite the routine carriage of firearms being prohibited in New Zealand, all sworn officers will have undertaken two weeks firearms training during their time at the Royal New Zealand Police College (RNZPC). Following completion, officers are then expected to complete three days of weapons training



annually. Much like the United Kingdom, the use of firearms is regulated by law and members of NZ Police are criminally liable for any excessive use of force³. Officers may also undergo further training to become a member of the Armed Offenders Squad (AOS).

Armed Offenders Squad

The AOS are a part-time specialist unit within the NZ Police that respond to high risk incidents using specialist tactics and equipment. There are 17 armed offenders squads based around the country and are made up of approximately 300 volunteer members. The primary role of the AOS is to provide NZ Police with an effective, and safe, means of responding to and resolving incidents where the threat, or use, of firearms presents a real risk to members of the public and Police. The principle method is to cordon, contain, and appeal to armed offenders (New Zealand Police, 2018).

Candidates must first pass a one-day local selection course, completion of which qualifies them for a three day national selection course. Successful completion of the second stage will then allow a candidate to complete a three week national qualification course. Qualified members then receive district level training once a month but must also attend a three day refresher course every year (New Zealand Police, 2018).

Deployment of the Armed Offenders Squad

If a sufficient threat has been identified (e.g., a firearm has been used to threaten either an officer or a member of the public) the district AOS Commander is notified of the incident and an assessment is made that considers the degree of violence and other relevant factors (e.g., whether alcohol is involved, mental health issues). The decision to deploy relies upon a continued threat assessment using the TENR framework⁴. If the decision to deploy is confirmed AOS officers are typically paged via their phones. Once received, officers will leave their location, or home, and travel to the nearest squad base to dress, collect equipment, and receive a brief. Once on scene, continued assessment of the situation is undertaken.

The time to reach an incident (i.e., response times) are subject to a number of variables. These include (but are not limited to) the time of day the incident occurs,

the distance each member must travel to reach the base, and the urgency of the situation. For example, following the shooting of Constable Len Snee in 2009, AOS officers deploying from the Napier base were on scene within 11 minutes (Weekes & Livingston, 2016). For such smaller provincial cities response times will likely be faster than larger metropolitan areas where heavy traffic may need to be negotiated when traveling to base. In particularly urgent situations, response time may be reduced by members deploying straight from their homes, avoiding the squad room altogether and simply kitting up over their civilian dress.

Such issues notwithstanding, on March 15 the AOS arrived on the scene within 10 minutes following the first emergency call (Kenny, 2019). However, the rapid response observed in Christchurch was facilitated by having AOS members mobile in a quasi-ARV capacity (New Zealand Police, 2019). These examples aside, AOS deployments have been estimated to fall anywhere between 30-60 minutes (R. Spooner, personal communication, August 21, 2019). Any combination of factors will mean that no single deployment will look the same, making it very difficult to determine what a “typical” AOS response is.

The AOS also provide support for routine policing matters and are often used for pre-planned operations where there is a high risk; for example, the AOS may aid Police with search warrants. As of 2018, the bulk of AOS deployments (approximately 65%; New Zealand Police, 2018) were pre-planned, with the remaining proportion tending to critical and/or emergency incidents. The latter typically require a rapid and dynamic response to events that evolve in real time.

A Comparison of Armed Response Capabilities

The policing model used in New Zealand is most similar to that used in United Kingdom, so it is prudent to consider the armed response capabilities between these two countries.

Deployment

Deployment of armed officers depends critically upon an ongoing assessment of the risk posed to both police and to the public (i.e., the NDM in the United Kingdom or the TENR framework in New Zealand). The decision to use force must further be weighed and

³ The police use of firearms is governed by Crimes Act 1961. Under this law a strict set of criteria must be satisfied – known as fire orders – to justify the carriage and use of firearms (New Zealand Police, 2007).

⁴ This decision-making framework considers four key elements: Threat: The subject's intent, capability or opportunity along with the

physical environment; Exposure: Awareness of safety, security or public trust and confidence issues around a particular use of force; Necessity: Assessment of the need to intervene now, later, or not at all; and Response: Proportionate, timely, reasonable, and lawful Police actions using tactics and tactical options.



matched against the perceived risks while considering the associated legal ramifications for any excessive use of force. However, unlike the United Kingdom ARV model, the AOS is a part-time role and officers are not performing routine armed patrols. This may result in significant time delays in reaching incidents and the need for frontline officers to resolve potentially life threatening situations.

Use of Force

The use of lethal force is rare in both New Zealand (New Zealand Police, 2018) and the United Kingdom (UK Home Office, 2019). To place this in context, less than 1% of face-to-face interactions between NZ Police and the public require the use of a Tactical Option (TO⁵), of which only 7% of those events required the use of firearms. Specifically, of the 321 incidents reported where firearms were used, discharges were recorded on only 10 occasions. These numbers, however, do not delineate between discharges from frontline officers or AOS members. Comparatively, ARVs respond to the vast majority of firearms related incidents (88%). In absolute numbers, ARVs attended 17,742 police firearms operations, but in only 13 incidents was a firearm discharged (UK Home Office, 2019). This is a remarkably low number of discharges given the number of incidents attended.

Training

Both countries also provide specialist training to a small number of officers that builds an enhanced tactical skillset. It is at this point, however, that the models start to diverge. All police officers in New Zealand undergo firearms training. This contrasts sharply with the United Kingdom. As of 2019 approximately 5% of all officers are trained as AFOs across England and Wales (UK Home Office, 2019). The numbers are slightly higher in the London Metropolitan area, with approximately 8% of the force being firearms trained. Police Scotland similarly train only a small number of AFOs, with approximately 3% of the Scottish force trained as AFOs (Anonymous, 2016).

In addition, the training of AFOs remains a strong focus within the United Kingdom. For example, despite recorded increases in knife crime (20%), gun crime (23%), and violent crime (18%), the Police Federation continue to push for more officers to be trained specifically as AFOs, rather than routinely arming all frontline officers (UK Police Federation, 2019). As of 2017, just over a third (34%) of UK Police

Federation members favour the routine arming of police officers (compared to 23% in 2006). The greatest support (42.5%) was for officers to receive more training in the use of firearms and be issued with them as and when is needed (UK Police Federation, 2019).

While reasonable comparisons may be made between the training of British AFOs and members of the AOS, firearms training for New Zealand frontline officers is comparatively poorer and has drawn recent criticism (Newman, 2019). This raises questions around the absolute need for all frontline officers to receive firearms training and the extent to which a model similar to that used in the United Kingdom ought to be considered. The selection and training of a smaller number of officers – but to a much higher standard – could provide a viable alternative to improve New Zealand's armed response capability.

Summary

It could quite reasonably be argued that NZ Police already have an ARV-like model in operation, with a sizeable armed response capability relative to the size of the population. The routine transport of firearms in New Zealand very closely resembles the early ARV framework used throughout the United Kingdom before the standing authority was issued. All patrol cars in New Zealand are equipped for armed responses. Each contains a mobile armoury that stores a Glock 17 pistol and Bushmaster rifle. The decision to arm follows a risk based assessment and the officer must believe there to be a significant threat of death or grievous bodily harm, to either themselves, or a member of the public.

At present, the NZ Police do not currently have the capacity to provide an immediate tactical response to critical incidents. The lack of a standing authority necessitates time to access firearms from the mobile armoury, potentially placing officers at risk. Moreover, if the AOS are required, an operational bottleneck is the time required for AOS staff to arrive at base, deploy, and ultimately reach the incident. Viewed together, the absence of a full-time armed response capability could be argued as operationally ineffective.

In addition, frontline officers in New Zealand have received considerably less training than their AOS counterparts yet are required to respond to critical events. Moreover, they have a limited number of tactical options available to them which may result in

⁵ Tactical options include: empty hand tactics, handcuffs and restraints, OC spray, TASER, firearms, dogs, baton, and "other" tactical options (New Zealand Police, 2017).

Table 1: Total number of police shootings in NZ (%) broken down by unit.

	Non-Fatal	Fatal	Total
PST	17 (0.36)	13 (0.28)	30 (0.64)
AOS	7 (0.15)	10 (0.21)	17 (0.36)
Total	24 (0.51)	23 (0.49)	47 (1.00)

a use of force that, though justified by the appropriate risk assessment, may have been avoided had alternative options been available. To provide some insight into this possibility, the next section reviews police shootings in New Zealand to examine whether frontline officers are more often involved in than are AOS members.

Police Shootings in New Zealand

The AOS deployment model currently in operation implies that frontline officers may be called upon to manage incidents until the AOS arrive. An analysis was undertaken that looked at incidents where NZ Police fired upon an offender. The data were sourced from reviews published by the Independent Police Conduct Authority (IPCA). The data covers shooting over the period September 1994 to February 2018. During this period there was a total of 47 police shootings reviewed by the IPCA. It is worth noting that only two of these reviews found that the actions of the officers' involved were unjustified.

The analysis indicates that frontline officers are involved in nearly two-thirds of all police shootings (the odds sit at approximately $O = 1.8$ times; see Table 1). This finding likely reflects two factors: a) the rapidity with which critical incidents unfold in time and b) the time required for the AOS to become mobile and reach the scene. Though the frontline are involved in more police shootings, the odds of being fatally shot by a frontline officer are somewhat lower ($O = .76$; i.e., an offender is $1/.76 = 1.3$ times more likely to survive) when compared to incidents where the AOS fired upon the offender ($O = 1.43$; i.e., an offender is 1.43 times more likely to be killed if the AOS are involved). These findings imply that there is an elevated risk of death if the AOS have determined that the use of a firearm is the appropriate tactical response despite frontline officers shooting more often. The risk, however, is more apparent than real. Overall, there is

⁶ Fishers Exact Test for count data. Note: O = Odds; OR = Odds Ratio.

Case Study 1:

Fatal Shooting of Christopher Brown, Porirua.

Background

On the evening of the 25th February 2017, Police were called to an address in Waikanae where an altercation had occurred between the subject **S. 9(2)(a)** and his ex-partner. **S. 9(2)(a)** left in a stolen vehicle, carrying a large knife. He was reported to be suicidal. Police in the area were alerted to the incident and patrols were keeping a lookout for the car. **S. 9(2)(a)** was also thought to be carrying a slug gun and as a result of this and the report of the knife, some of the staff actively involved in locating his vehicle decided to arm-up.

Police Action & Outcome

The AOS were not called because the offenders' location was unknown. Police eventually located **S. 9(2)(a)** and his vehicle was followed until more staff **S. 9(2)(a)** were available. A plan to spike the vehicle was developed, however **S. 9(2)(a)** made an unexpected turn into a service lane where Police initiated a traffic stop. **S. 9(2)(a)** exited the vehicle and approached the police car brandishing a machete like knife. With the machete raised he advanced on the officer in his vehicle (the driver side door was open at this stage). The officer fired at **S. 9(2)(a)** fearing he would be attacked with the machete. **S. 9(2)(a)** died of his injuries.

Could the Outcome have been Different?

AOS have the capability to use non-lethal 40mm sponge rounds. Had a mobile AOS unit been available to actively search for this offender (by way of an ARV unit) this outcome could potentially have been different. However, please note that the sponge round would have had to be considered as a tactical option during the search for the offender. There was little time for Police to react once the offender exited his vehicle, therefore it would have had to be immediately available.

no statistically significant association between the fatality of the incident and the individual involved in the shooting ($OR = 1.84, p = .37^6$). Accordingly, the odds

Case Study 2:

Breach of the Peace, Christchurch.

Background

Post March 15 Christchurch was running ARV units on two shifts per day. The ARV team comprised a Supervisor, four AOS staff and a dog unit. The ARV vehicles were equipped with the specialist equipment only available to AOS trained staff. At about 1250 hours on the 24th May 2019, Police were called to a “suspicious person” **S. 9(2)(a)** **S. 9(2)(a)** in Christchurch. At the location there were retail and café premises with pedestrian presence. The suspicious person was a male carrying two knives, acting aggressively on the street. A female was with him, trying to get him to relinquish the knives.

Police Action

The ARV units were the first responders to the incident. The Male was in a populated public location carrying two boning knives, threatening suicide. The AOS responders completed a risk assessment and determined that it was necessary that they act quickly to disarm the male due to the potential threat to the public. Using equipment only available to AOS trained staff, a ballistic shield and a Sponge round, the ARV staff safely and effectively neutralised the male. They did this by using a sponge round from 15 meters. This type of round effectively “punches the offender in the chest” and caused him to fall to the ground. Once he began to fall the officers closed the gap (using the ballistic shield as protection) and were able to use a TASER to achieve NMI (Neuromuscular incapacitation) allowing the male to be disarmed of his weapons and arrested.

Outcome

Without this specialist equipment, and in a public area where the need to act was high given the potential for a member of the public to be harmed, it is *probable* that a responding PST may have had to use a firearm to resolve the situation. The only Tactical options available for a PST unit is the TASER (optimal distance is between 2 -4.5m) and a firearm. Due to the risk of death or grievous bodily harm the best tactical option in this case would have been a firearm.

of being fatally shot by either an AOS or frontline officer do not reliably deviate from chance.

This analysis does suggest that there is room for improvement in the way NZ Police respond to critical incidents. The tactical options available to frontline officers are limited and increase the possibility that an offender sustains a life threatening injury. The availability of officers that are equipped with less-lethal tactical options and can rapidly respond to critical incidents could mitigate the potential for offender injury, or death (for example, see Case Study 1 on previous page).

Armed Response Vehicles in New Zealand

The use of ARV-like capabilities in New Zealand has been limited. In response to the March 15th events a quasi-ARV unit was deployed that enabled AOS members to rapidly arrive on the scene after first reports were received. Prior to the attacks, the AOS had been embedded within the Offender Prevention team (OPT) since 2016 wherein the quasi-ARV team provided a number of support roles, including tactical assistance at high risk search warrants and for high risk offenders.

Perceptions around the regular deployment of this capability post-March 15th were largely positive, and increased feelings of safety were experienced by police staff (New Zealand Police, 2019). Moreover, the deployment of quasi-ARVs produced case examples that highlight how less-than-lethal force can be used to resolve an incident; tactics that ordinarily are not available to frontline staff (for example, see Case Study 2). An overall reduction in full AOS callouts was also noted during the quasi-ARV operation. However, no figures have been provided to corroborate these points and as such remain anecdotal in nature.

There is indeed an intuitive sense that ARVs will improve Police response capabilities and safety; though while the introduction of ARVs may be justified from an operational standpoint, to date the use of ARVs in New Zealand - or the armed response capability as a whole - has not been systematically evaluated by either NZ Police or any external body. This raises questions around whether there is enough of an evidence base to justify the wholesale restructure of New Zealand’s response to armed offenders.

The additional demands placed upon AOS members also need to be appropriately considered. The quasi-ARV model operating throughout Christchurch were unable to sustain a 24/7 deployment, instead operating off a truncated roster to meet high demand periods only. Both the number of available AOS officers and service demand will vary across districts.

Currently, the AOS is a part-time role, with members completing general duties roles when not on call. Accordingly, any decision that requires AOS members shifting into a full-time role will need to consider whether additional staff are employed to backfill the vacancies created, or whether duties can be reasonably redistributed. The wellbeing of both general duties and AOS staff will likely be affected.

Finally, whether there is a genuine need to improve Police capabilities or not, any change to the operating procedures of armed police in New Zealand cannot ignore the potential for public fallout. This issue is considered next.

Perceptions around Public Safety and Trust

The New Zealand Police Association continue to call for the routine arming of Police as a matter of health and safety, citing the influx of illegal firearms throughout the country as a real and present threat to frontline staff (Anonymous, 2019a). The association's 2017 member survey indicated that, between the years 2015-2017, the number of officers threatened with a firearm rose by 38%. The survey further indicated that during the year 2017 one in five frontline officers were threatened (21%); however, officers who were threatened did not report the incident approximately 36% of the time. Further discrepancies between the reporting and recording of firearms related incidents have introduced inaccuracies within the National Intelligence Application (NIA; New Zealand Police Association, 2018). Reported incidents rates will therefore underestimate the prevalence of gun crime in New Zealand.

Though the introduction of ARTs will not see the routine arming of all frontline staff, having armed officers on full-time patrol will necessarily affect public perception around the level and seriousness of crime in their communities. From the New Zealand public's point of view, armed officers attend only the most extreme of incidents. For a nation that is used to seeing their Police officers unarmed, this may skew how armed officers attending routine policing matters is viewed. Moreover, this could further compound

already strained relationships with Maori and Pacifica communities. Unfortunately, though the discourse around the armament of police typically cite public safety as a factor, decisions are often unilateral - involving only the Police - and preclude public (or democratic) scrutiny and/or opinion.

The introduction of a standing firearms authority in United Kingdom followed exactly this trajectory. During the mid-1990's there was speculation of a general favouring for routine arming of frontline officers among members of the UK Police Federation (Squires, 1998). However, a postal survey issued to all federation members instead revealed that only 21% of officers were in favour (the numbers in London were much higher, sitting at 35%). The Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police at the time, Paul Condon, struck a compromise that saw the number of trained AFOs increase to boost the number of ARV deployments while also introducing a standing authority for all AFOs to overtly carry and use firearms. The Commissioner, however, had not considered how the decision would be viewed by the public. The media response was not favourable and the decision to routinely arm AFOs was heavily criticised.

Police Scotland

More recently, Police Scotland granted a standing authority for ARV officers in 2013 following the establishment of Police Scotland under the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012 (HMICS, 2014a). The act saw the merger of eight regional police forces into a single force and is now the second largest police force in the United Kingdom, after the Metropolitan Police Service.

Prior to the merger, the deployment of ARVs in Scotland did not rely upon a single set of criteria. Notably, one of the eight legacy forces did not possess an ARV capability before the merger. In particular, some forces deployed ARVs for both firearms incidents and for road policing purposes, whereas others deployed ARVs to critical incidents only. The visibility of firearms varied across forces also, with some adopting a standing authority and others requiring that firearms be secured in the vehicle. Following the restructure, a universal standing authority was issued and granted the routine carriage of a pistol and Taser by all ARV officers in Scotland. Accordingly, in some areas, this brought about a stark contrast in the way officers presented themselves.

Police Scotland invited Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary in Scotland (HMICS) to provide an objective professional assessment of their existing



standing firearms authority for ARVs. The review indicated that ARV officers felt that improvements to officer and public safety had been made as a result of the current ARV model. Nevertheless, a key finding was that public concern about the presence of ARV officers at non-firearm incidents was underestimated. The HMICS review found that a significant contributor was a lack of community understanding about the involvement of armed officers at routine incidents and the absence of an established deployment criteria.

To compare, operating procedures set out West Yorkshire police state that officers should consider stowing their handgun and Taser in the vehicles mobile armoury when responding to incidents such as public disorder (West Yorkshire Police, n.d.). As a result, the Chief Constable recommended that ARVs only be deployed to firearm incidents, or where there is a threat to life.

The review further noted that gaps existed in the public understanding around the nature and extent of armed policing. Despite media coverage surrounding the use of ARVs, just under half the population were aware of the change in firearms policy (HMICS, 2014b). Critically, those aware of the change were informed via the media rather than through engagement by Police Scotland. Moreover, only one in five were aware of the correct level of armed officers in Scotland (HMICS, 2014b).

The report concluded that the relationship between police services and communities had not strengthened as a result. Though there are perceived benefits in the use of ARVs as a standard operating procedure, the research strongly suggests that perceptions around safety are linked to how firearms policies are communicated to the public.

Summary

A central focus for NZ Police is building safer communities. Therefore, maintaining trust and confidence between the police and public is essential. However, the extent to which communities feel safer with armed officers correlates directly with the relationship those communities have with the police.

There is an intrinsic trade-off between the issues of police safety and public trust. Police are feeling more threatened on the job and require means to effectively protect themselves. However, this need must also be weighed against how changes to the way police are armed will affect public trust and confidence. With the decision to keep NZ Police an unarmed force already made, attention must be given to how the deployment

of ARTs is communicated and how this could impact trust with the public. Such considerations are not foreign, yet history would suggest they have not been appropriately addressed.

Moreover, there is evidence that the increasing militarisation of police forces does not necessarily increase feelings of safety, particularly within ethnic and minority communities (Mummolo, 2018). In addition, there is suggestion that armed police do not ensure that the police and public are safer (Cook & Russell, 2019) and evidence that armed police will resort to more extreme tactical options simply because they are available (Ariel et al., 2019).

In effect, clear and transparent communication will be necessary so that community, and indeed police, perceptions and expectations can be appropriately managed. Accordingly, there is an opportunity to learn from the mistakes made in the United Kingdom and introduce appropriate measures to gauge the public, and police, perceptions around trust and safety.

Recommendations and Discussion Points

The proposed timescales for the ART pilot necessarily preclude a comprehensive evaluation. Ideally, a formal comparison of deployment models is required to fully track where an ART model improves upon operational effectiveness.

Unfortunately, there is insufficient time to establish a thorough baseline on current armed response operations and AOS deployments. This means that a detailed pre/post analyses will not be possible, leaving only the possibility for descriptive level analyses. Accordingly, with respect to evaluation efforts, the following recommendations are made:

- It is recommended that evaluation of the ART pilot focus on perceptions around safety from the perspective of both police officers and the public;
- It is recommended that a descriptive summary of the deployment and use of ARTs within the selected districts be undertaken. This analysis can create case studies to draw illustrative examples and comparisons around the ARVs operational capabilities, providing some focus on types of tactics used and the types of incidents attended.



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Risk Identified	Consequence (Impact)	Likelihood	Mitigation
Pilot implementation deadlines not met	Negligible	Unlikely	ART WG meet regularly with weekly District reports to Ins Grace.
That the ART PoC doesn't align with the principles of evidence-based policing centre (evaluation data is limited due to short timeframes therefore limiting the ability to gather a suitable baseline / provide sufficient evidence to determine if the pilot could be rolled out on a national scale.)	Major	Almost certain	ART Working Group and EBPC will need to ascertain the evidence required to best achieve this. EBPC are to utilise data points which is already available such as TOR. Any items which require creating as such are to be raised with ART WG. EPBC has advised it will not be able to provide comprehensive evidence for, or make any strong recommendations on, the roll out of ARTs on a national scale. SLT notified of the impact of this, highlighting the timeframe and availability of data.
Negative impacts on performance against Our Business	Minor	Possible	Will be monitored as part of the evaluation.
Operational cost overruns	Major	Almost certain	Costings will also need to be worked through as specific deployment proposals / decisions evolve. Budget developed and reviewed regularly.
Capital cost overruns	Major	Almost certain	Budget developed and reviewed regularly Three Districts will use an SUV vehicle within their existing fleet, together with their existing tactical equipment.
Increased financial burden and implications for Districts	Moderate	Likely	Budget developed and reviewed regularly. Any significant costs are to be raised to the ART WG.
Vehicles not fit for purpose	Moderate	Likely	Preferred fit out developed by ART WG. Bull-bars/nudge-bars are being investigated for inclusion. Vehicle collision technology/ABS impact on staff and public safety is being investigated. National guidelines are followed. High risk vehicle stops not included in key tasks. Evaluation to consider vehicle suitability.
Unforeseen vehicle damage	Negligible	Rare	If damage occurs to the vehicles, districts will utilise other suitable and available vehicles from that district as required. Districts to notify and escalate and issues with vehicles.
Black-role and critical incident deployment gear not available and/or cannot be stored in vehicle	Moderate	Unlikely	Staff black-role gear ready and available on hand, to be taken to ART team.
Impact of the special services vehicles rollout	Negligible	Rare	ART WG to discuss implications further if/when they arise.

CONSEQUENCE: Severe, Major, Moderate, Minor, Negligible. LIKELIHOOD: almost certain >95%, likely >65, possible >35%, unlikely <35%, rare <5%.

Risk Identified	Consequence (Impact)	Likelihood	Mitigation
Vehicle seen as a militarised vehicle and the public perceptions that the Police have assumed a more 'militarised' capability	Severe	Possible	Comprehensive communications and media plan developed in consultation with District Commanders and DCE. Evaluation to take into account public perception of vehicle. Vehicle concerns raised with SLT/ELB. Staff are well-informed of the trial and perceptions are managed (particularly concerns that this might be a militarised response or arming by stealth).
Vehicles easily identifiable and therefore targeted (potential theft or damage of vehicle and/or tactical gear)	Moderate	Rare	SOPs apply and vehicle security procedures are to be followed. Staff orientation to include refresher on related SOPs. Vehicle safes fitted. Consideration given to the colour and style of the vehicle, recommendation put forward to SLT regarding this.
High external and internal interest in the trial, including risk of negative perceptions	Major	Almost Certain	Comprehensive Communications Plan and ongoing engagement with communities and staff.
Confusion around the terminology used of ARV	Minor	Possible	Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982
Negative impact of utilising the Armed wording within the title and description	Severe	possible	Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982
Negative impact on AOS branding	Negligible	Unlikely	Communications Strategy – Proactive communications with the community. SLT has asked ELB to consider what ARTs mean for the Police brand. Blue role uniform now being used.
Unclear definition of Blue-role	Negligible	Unlikely	ART WG to discuss further.
Staff buy-in (AOS staff)	Negligible	Unlikely	Communications Strategy – to include internal coms. Good news stories will be circulated internally and externally during the trial.
Staff buy in (all staff)	Moderate	Possible	Communications Strategy – to include internal coms.
Staff perception that the current AOS model works and there isn't a need to change this.	Moderate	Rare	Communications Strategy – to include internal coms and highlight the benefits of the model. Reinforcing this is a POC and that it's undertaken on a temporary basis with an AOS review.

Risk Identified	Consequence (Impact)	Likelihood	Mitigation
Staff concerns and or perceptions regarding the speed at which the PoC pilot is being implemented(all staff), managers, dcs, leaders	Severe	Likely	Communications Strategy – to include internal coms. Any issues can be escalated to ART WG, Insp Grace and Project Lead.
Staff perceptions regarding the speed at which the PoC pilot is being implemented (AOS/STG)	Negligible	Unlikely	Communications Strategy – to include internal coms.
Limited time and ability to consult with Māori, Muslim and other ethnic communities	Severe	Likely	Proactive coms plan, discussions to occur with key community leaders prior to launch.
False understanding of threat environment. A perception is generated that Police is hiding the existence of a defined or immediate threat resulting in a loss of trust.	Severe	Possible	Repeated clear and consistent messaging
Discontent in districts that do not get an ART pilot	Negligible	Likely	Good coms with DCs
Confusion over role of ARTs Mixed messages, internal peer-to-peer conversations resulting in staff confusion and disengagement	Severe	Unlikely	TenOne will serve as the 'single source of truth', with all communications collateral and activity referring staff to the ART information pages on the site. The pages will be reviewed regularly to ensure the information remains accurate and relevant.
Limited time to effectively communicate change Due to the short timeframe between ELB approval of the POC's operating model and the launch of the ARTs, there will be limited opportunity to get key messages in front of staff and the public.	Severe	Possible	Coms plan
Conflicting perceptions of ARTs contribution to safety The public and staff may have conflicting perceptions on ARTs and the impact of the pilot on their safety.	Severe	Unlikely	Coms plan
Perception of an elitist attitude	Moderate	Possible	Managed through team leaders and DCs
ARTs will escalate events and lead to more police shootings	Severe	Unlikely	Evaluation will help capture this story

CONSEQUENCE: Severe, Major, Moderate, Minor, Negligible. LIKELIHOOD: almost certain >95%, likely >65, possible >35%, unlikely <35%, rare <5%.

Risk Identified	Consequence (Impact)	Likelihood	Mitigation
ARTs could be seen to disadvantage Māori	Severe	Likely	Training and education to consider holding bias training
ART staff access and use of firearms on a more frequent basis (given they will be working more often and for longer periods of time if 24/7). Ensuring staff they are confident when handling firearms.	Negligible	Rare	Staff orientation to include refresher on related SOPs. Training made available to those participating on the pilot as required.
Training requirements including AOS certification/qualifications courses not being available	Moderate	Unlikely	Immediate training requirements will be provided prior to commencement of the trial and ongoing requirements are factored into the rosters. Recommended model to take this into consideration. Recommendation that training courses are held earlier. Districts to identify the staff who require training.
HR requirements	Moderate	Rare	HR representative to join ART WG. Standardised templates to be utilised and provided by HR.
Key staff resign	Negligible	Unlikely	Proactive engagement with staff.
Impacts negatively on affected staff	Negligible	Unlikely	Advanced notice and meaningful consultation to occur (through rostering decisions (including prioritisation of rostered days off for staff), through alignment with PST shifts (where possible to improve alignment and integration), and through ongoing monitoring of staff wellbeing. Leadership and culture within the ART team and its integration with PST and other specialised resources will be closely monitored – but initially managed through comprehensive communications with PST and ART regarding expectations.
Timing of the trial and the impact of significant Christmas leave on the pilot and BAU	Medium	Unlikely	Pre-approved staff leave will be monitored closely and managed by Districts. EBPC will assess the impact of ARTs over our busiest period ensuring the evaluation is robust.
The organisations culture is impacted by the ART pilot	Medium	Unlikely	AOS Commanders and District Commanders to proactively manage the integration with ART & PST. The communication plan highlights the importance of driving a positive culture within the ART team and organisation.
Staff safety	Negligible	Unlikely	Roster is to take this into consideration and is to include rostered days off and down time for staff. Any new roster would be run through the FAID programme in WFM to determine its suitability and minimise the effect of fatigue on our staff. Once rosters are finalised, formal consultation to occur with staff or with the Police Association to ensure that it meets all our obligations.

CONSEQUENCE: Severe, Major, Moderate, Minor, Negligible. LIKELIHOOD: almost certain >95%, likely >65, possible >35%, unlikely <35%, rare <5%.

Risk Identified	Consequence (Impact)	Likelihood	Mitigation
			<p>Training days are to be included on roster.</p> <p>Ability for staff to raise concerns as per normal channels, ability for these to be escalated to ART WG, Insp Grace and Project Lead.</p> <p>Evaluation to take this into consideration.</p> <p>Safer Peoples Group representative invited to attend ART WG.</p>
The proposed model doesn't fit with the current front-line capability	Negligible	Unlikely	<p>Model is to take into consideration the current capability.</p> <p>Team leaders are to identify and know their team's capabilities and task work as appropriate.</p>
The limited or reduced staffing model stretches safety (2 person patrols and the limited tactical restrictions)	Negligible	Unlikely	<p>SOPs are to be followed as per normal.</p> <p>AOS Commanders will escalate risk as appropriate.</p>
A serious and high profile incident occurs with the pilot	Moderate	Unlikely	SOP and communications, media policies will apply.
Current AOS Policies do not align with the ART Model	Moderate	Possible	<p>Policy & Legal representative invited to attend ART WG.</p> <p>All AOS policies to be reviewed for compatibility.</p> <p>Policies and processes will need to be monitored and reviewed to ensure alignment.</p>
Coms and deployment issues for non-ART roles, delegated authorities require clarity, 2IC roles	Negligible	Unlikely	<p>Task and Coordination representative to be invited to ART WG.</p> <p>Command flowchart to be developed.</p> <p>Affected staff, particularly ART staff, PST and those in the Communications Centres to receive a comprehensive brief.</p> <p>Where required, appropriate material will be developed. This may include clear guidance and direction for Comms Shift Commanders as to business rules to be followed etc.</p> <p>Model in place.</p>
<p>BAU tasks are impacted by reduced staff availability.</p> <p>Reallocation of existing AOS resource will create a BAU gap which will be significant (reduced BAU capability).</p> <p>ART PoC Pilot negatively effects BAU.</p>	Moderate	Almost Certain	<p>These will be closely monitored by each district and issues escalated at the earliest possible time to District Leads and where suitable ART WG.</p> <p>District Commanders will determine how to reallocate/backfill/deprioritise existing BAU activities. Support may be required from other Districts which may have flow on effects.</p> <p>Close monitoring will be required to determine the effect on staff and the capacity of Police to respond to routine incident, with issues or concerns are to be immediately raised to the Project Lead.</p> <p>Regular meetings and reporting from districts to occur.</p>
A detailed review of our national AOS and the affects the ART PoC Pilot may have on it	Negligible	Unlikely	The proof of concept will inform, and be informed by, the review.

Risk Identified	Consequence (Impact)	Likelihood	Mitigation
ART pilot period is extended and exceeds the pilot timeframe (i.e. that once the pilot is in place it won't be able to be ended).	Negligible	Possible	<p>Clear timelines and timeline expectations set and highlighted to those concerned through a comprehensive communications plan.</p> <p>ALT have requested that a commitment be made to ART staff that they can return to their substantive roles in 6 months.</p> <p>Interim three month review to take place, the EBPC will produce monthly reports on lessons learned to enabling adjustments to be made during the trial as required.</p> <p>Transition plan for the end of the pilot or alternative options identified post 3 month review.</p> <p>Regular meetings and reporting from districts to occur. If there is a need to extend the pilot period that this is identified early and evidence compiled to support this consideration.</p>
Risk of setting a precedent internally/ externally for a broader roll out	Moderate	Possible	Managed through a comprehensive communications plan and evaluation plan will ensure future decisions are evidence-based. There may be a need to move quickly to a provincial centre to see if ARTs are effective and on what basis.
ART Pilot is placed on hold once started to meet other high-priority requirements	Severe	Unlikely	<p>Districts to ensure that a remediation solution can be put in place within a short time frame.</p> <p>ART Working group to consider issues around this.</p>
Limited number of trained AOS Dogs (Smaller regions have limited access to dog related resources)	Negligible	Almost certain	<p>Patrol dogs utilised as necessary.</p> <p>National Dog Coordinator invited to attend ART WG.</p>

ARV WORKING GROUP Meeting Minutes

**4 September 2019, 12:00 to 13:00 hours
Level 3, Video Conference Room, PNHQ**

Chair	A/Superintendent Andrew Sissons	
Attendees	Assistant Commissioner Tusha Penny Superintendent Paul Jermy A/Superintendent Andrew Sissons Detective Inspector Uraia Vakaruru Inspector Freda Grace <small>Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act</small> Principal Advisor	Assistant Commissioner William Searle Superintendent Anthony Hill Detective Inspector Graham Pitkethley Inspector Bryan Buck Inspector Jared Pirret
In-Attendance	<small>Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act</small> , Advisor, Evidence Based Policing Group (Representing Superintendent Bruce O'Brien) <small>Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982</small> , Deputy Director, Policy Team (representing <small>Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act</small>) <small>Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act</small> (R&O, Recorder)	<small>Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act</small> , Evaluation Advisor, Evidence Based Policing Group (Representing Superintendent Bruce O'Brien) Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982
Apologies	Superintendent Bruce O'Brien <small>Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982</small>	A/Inspector <small>Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act</small> <small>Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act</small>

1. Welcome/Administration

- A/Supt Sissons opened the meeting and welcomed all of those present.
- Apologies were received and accepted as noted above.

2. Introduction

- AC Penny provided an in-depth introduction and background overview of the ARV Working Group.
- The 15 March events highlighted the importance of response times for such events and how the environment we now operate in calls for specialist tools, capacity and capability to be readily available to help ensure our communities continue to feel safe.
- The ARV pilot is an innovative approach and response to enable support at critical incidents or in pre-planned high-risk situations.
- The use of ARVs has been proposed in NZ since 2010. A model was deployed in Canterbury seven days a week post 15 March.
- The working group have been tasked with developing a 24/7 single operating model which will be trialled in Counties Manukau, Waikato and Canterbury.
- Timelines for the roll out of the pilot and the model development are tight, therefore meetings will take place weekly for the next 6 weeks and the related ARV work will need to be prioritised.
- The first Senior Leadership Team (SLT) report regarding the operating model that will be used is required by the working group on 25 September, with a more comprehensive evaluation report required by 15 January 2020. The working group will therefore need to have this signed-off by 20 December 2019.

Action: SLT report to be compiled and signed-off by 25 September – ARV Working Group.

Action: SLT evaluation report to be compiled and signed-off by 20 December – ARV Working Group.

3. Deployment Model Overview

- A presentation was received and accepted on the ARV deployment model utilised in Canterbury.

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- The model helped to provide an armed response capability whilst AOS operations were being utilised for the Canterbury 2010 Earthquake response.
- Post the events of 15 March 2019 the model provided a response capability during the period of heightened security status. It also gave reassurance to the community and response staff through enhanced response capability.
- The AOS was embedded within the Offender Prevention Team and provided high level tactical support and guidance at high risk search warrants, high risk offender apprehensions and they had the ability to escalate AOS Black Role deployments as required.
- Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982



Action: Confirmation of the data-points used for the 80% reduction of full AOS deployments – Canterbury, Inspector Bryan Buck.

4. Report from ELB

- The document Operating Model Enhancements including Proof of Concept trial for ARVs 6 August 2019 was received and accepted.
- It was noted that a review of the national AOS/STG model is to take place separate of this working group.
- Three pilots sites will be used, Counties Manukau, Waikato and Canterbury. These districts were chosen due to the similarities in staffing capacity (19-22 staff) and capability, along with Gun Safe evidence and the high presence of firearm-related incidents.
- Brief discussion occurred around the potential risks, points raised included public and staff perception, staff burnout and downtime.

Action: Face-to-face workshop (for the regions) to discuss and develop a potential working model, held PNHQ, 10-11 September – Secretariat.

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- The workshop is to include:
 - An overview of the international ARV related models and lessons learnt from the Scotland programme.
 - Current AOS model and any potential implications for this.
 - Discussion around the optimal 24/7 models for each region.
 - Develop a draft 24/7 ARV model for the pilot.
 - Identify any key risks and potential mitigation strategies.

5. Terms of Reference

- The terms of reference were received and accepted.
- Meetings to take place each week for an hour for the next 6 weeks.

6. Business

- Districts – Members to consider an ideal model for their region to report back to the workshop.

Action: Representatives are to liaise with their District Commanders around a preferred district ARV model.

- Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982

Action: Vehicle fit-out specs to be discussed further by the working group.

Action: Vehicle acquisition details are to be finalised for each region – Paul and William.

- Policy – Work is underway around AOS, SOP and health and safety.
- Evaluation – Discussion occurred around international ARV models, which included the Scotland models.

Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982

Action: Discuss potential evaluation data-points and anecdotal evidence from the Canterbury ARV model – Evaluation Team/Canterbury.

Action: Draft evaluation document to be reviewed by the working group at the 25 September working group meeting.

- Finance – Discussion around the budget and incremental financial impact is required once a model is drafted.

Action: Discussion around the incremental costs of the ARV vehicle fleet to occur between Finance and Paul Jermy. A budget forecast is to be developed.

- Communications – to be discussed further at a later stage.

Next meeting scheduled for 12 September, 12 noon – 1pm.

Sub-working group to meet face to face 11-12 September.

The meeting Closed at 1pm.

ARV WORKING GROUP Meeting Minutes

**11 September 2019, 12:00 to 13:00 hours
Level 3, Video Conference Room, PNHQ**

Chair	A/Superintendent Andrew Sissons	
Attendees	Assistant Commissioner William Searle Superintendent Anthony Hill Detective Inspector Uraia Vakaruru Inspector Freda Grace Inspector Jared Pirret	Superintendent Paul Jermy A/Superintendent Andrew Sissons Detective Inspector Graham Pitkethley Inspector Bryan Buck <small>Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982</small> Principal Advisor
In-Attendance	<small>Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982</small> Evaluation Advisor, Evidence Based Policing Group <small>Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982</small> (R&O, Recorder)	<small>Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982</small> Senior Finance Analyst <small>Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982</small>
Apologies	<small>Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982</small> Evaluation Advisor, Evidence Based Policing Group Assistant Commissioner Tusha Penny A/Inspector <small>Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982</small> <small>Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982</small> Advisor, Evidence Based Policing Group	Superintendent Bruce O'Brien <small>Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982</small>

1. WELCOME / ADMINISTRATION

- A/Supt Sissons opened the meeting and welcomed all of those present.
- The Apologies were received and accepted as noted above.
- The minutes of the previous meeting were received and accepted.

2. PREVIOUS ACTIONS / MATTERS ARISING

Previous Action's	Update
SLT report to be compiled and signed-off by 25 September – ARV Working Group. <small>Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982</small>	Ongoing – on track for 25 Sep. A brief ARV Working Group update was provided to the District Commanders via video-conference this morning. A full District Commanders forum is scheduled for next week, ARV will be included as a topic for discussion.
Confirmation of the data-points used for the 80% reduction of full AOS deployments – Canterbury, Inspector Bryan Buck.	Completed. The data point's show that on average 2 emergency black role deployments occurred each week. During the period that the ARV's were active (March, April and May) only 6 emergency black role deployments occurred.
Face-to-face workshop (for the regions) to discuss and develop a potential working model, held PNHQ, 10-11 September – Secretariat.	Completed. Workshop held 10-11 Sep, update as provided below.

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<i>Representatives are to liaise with their District Commanders around a preferred district ARV model.</i>	Completed. <i>Canterbury: An update was provided. Particulars around BAU and the working numbers are still to be teased out.</i> <i>Manukau - The three team District Commanders have received an update, further information around the workshop outcomes will be provided in due course.</i> <i>Waikato - The District Commanders and DRT have received an update. DLC was raised as an area of concern. A plan which includes BAU work has been developed to help mitigate this and will be provided to the DCs shortly.</i>
<i>Vehicle fit-out specs to be discussed further by the working group.</i>	Ongoing – working group to discuss this afternoon.
<i>Vehicle acquisition details are to be finalised for each region – [REDACTED].</i>	Ongoing.
<i>Information is to be sourced regarding the Scotland ARV Model currently being used and any other relevant models. This is to include lessons learnt – Evaluation Team.</i>	Completed.
<i>Discuss potential evaluation data-points and anecdotal evidence from the Canterbury ARV model – Evaluation Team/Canterbury.</i>	Ongoing.
<i>Draft evaluation document to be reviewed by the working group at the 25 September working group meeting.</i>	Ongoing.

3. Section 9(2)(ba) Official Information Act 1982

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Action: Evaluation Team is to provide a copy of the draft Scotland ARV literature review to the ARV Working Group.

4. WORKSHOP UPDATE

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- An update from the ARV sub-working group was received. The group met over the past couple of days and drafted the following items for feedback and discussion:
- **Purpose:**
 - *To provide reassurance to staff and the community by providing an armed response (AOS/ARV) tactical capability in real-time to support the front line.*
- **Key Tasks:**
 - 1.1. Response Activity
 - a) Active Armed Offenders
 - b) Non-compliant vehicle stops
 - c) Deploying to high risk events where a person poses a significant risk to the public, staff or themselves (P1 events)
 - d) Supporting investigations in pre-planned and high risk search warrants
 - e) Apprehension of high risk/priority offenders including top five and PRW
 - f) Enhanced command and control
 - g) An ability to provide enhanced trauma first aid to both the community and staff
 - 1.2. Prevention activity through task and coordination by District prevention management
 - a) Prevention activity 3M/3F/3R/3C/3T/5K
 - b) Road Policing / Contribute to RIDS
 - c) High visibility and public events as appropriate
 - d) Lead/POI visits
 - e) Tasking's assigned via District tasking and coordination process

Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982

Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982

- Training provision was identified with AOS training courses needing to be brought forward.
- Delegated authority was discussed and it noted that the current AOS SOPs will continue to apply. Brief discussion occurred around what tactics will the ARV be able to provide, and what will require delegated authority.
- Districts will need to consider what resource is available for BAU and general task and coordination.
- Rostering was still being worked through.
- The draft command structure was received.

5. Business

- Districts – options currently being worked through.
- **Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982**

Action: [redacted] to follow up about the installation of bullbars/nudgebars on the ARV vehicles.

Action: ARV working group to discuss in more detail the ARV vehicle fit out requirements.

Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982

Action: [redacted] to follow-up with Neil around the design for the firearms safe.

- Policy – Work is underway around AOS, SOP and health and safety.
- Evaluation – Discussion occurred around international ARV models, which included the Scotland models, information will be provided on this for the next meeting.

Action: Evaluation team to meet with the the ARV working group to discuss and evaluation items raised during workshop.

- Finance – further work required around the development of a draft budget.

Action: Discussion around the incremental costs of the ARV vehicle fleet to occur between Finance and Paul Jermy. A budget forecast is to be developed.

- Communications – to be discussed further at a later stage.

ARV WORKING GROUP Meeting Minutes

Next meeting scheduled for 18 September, 12 noon – 1pm.
The meeting Closed at 1pm.

ARV WORKING GROUP Meeting Minutes

18 September 2019, 1200 noon – 1300 hours
Level 6, Conference Room, PNHQ

Chair	A/Superintendent Andrew Sissons	
Attendees	Assistant Commissioner William Searle Superintendent Bruce O'Brien A/Superintendent Andrew Sissons Inspector Freda Grace Inspector Jared Pirret <small>Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982</small> , Evaluation Advisor, Evidence Based Policing Group <small>Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982</small> , Principal Advisor	Superintendent Anthony Hill Superintendent Paul Jermy Detective Inspector Uraia Vakaruru Inspector Bryan Buck <small>Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982</small> , Senior Finance Analyst (<small>Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982</small>) Travis Mills, Senior Media Advisor <small>Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982</small> Secretariat
Apologies	Assistant Commissioner Tusha Penny A/Inspector <small>Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982</small>	<small>Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982</small> Detective Inspector Graham Pitkethley

1. WELCOME / ADMINISTRATION

- All of those present were welcomed to the meeting, the apologies were received and accepted as noted above.
- The minutes of the previous meeting were received and accepted.

2. PREVIOUS ACTIONS / MATTERS ARISING

- See Actions list 18 September 2019 for an update on the previous actions.

3. WORKSHOP UPDATE

- Members who attended this morning's workshop provided an update on the models discussed, these were described and it was noted they have changed slightly. A 24/7 model is achievable but it requires additional resource, time/cost to scale-up. Three models were discussed with the preferred option (at present) being a slightly more scaled back model Option C.

- Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982
[Redacted]

- [Redacted]

- Option C (16-19/7) – This is a mixed deployment model and has reduced resources between 12midnight-6am. The model can be achieved within the current on-call resource availability and would have a reduced impact on staff. This requires Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982 staff. This is preferred model by the majority of pilot Districts.

- It was agreed that Option C would be put forward to SLT as the preferred model at this stage. Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982
[Redacted]

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- The risks and benefits were briefly discussed, those at the workshop have considered these and it's anticipated that the key items will be included in the SLT paper.
- There is an increased need to ensure that the evidence base for this is sound and that going forward it can easily be obtained and measured.

- **Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982**

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

- An observation was that once the PoC Pilot is rolled out that it may be difficult to turn it off, implications of this will be considered with the associated risks identified. It was noted that if the pilot for some reason became permanent in the pilot areas, staff and dog availability was highlighted as a key issue. The group highlighted that there was an end date and the intention is to finish the pilot then. The idea of having a 2 month daylight period was raised to support the evaluation.
- In the future, consideration will need to be given to increasing the number of AOS trained dogs but at this stage there will be no changes for the dog rosters. They will continue to be utilised as per BAU.

- **Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982**

[REDACTED]

- Discussion occurred around the importance and need to drive a positive culture within the ARV team and organisation.

4. SLT PAPER

- A draft SLT paper was received and is currently being updated.

Action: ARV WG members are to provide feedback on the draft SLT Paper by Friday 12 noon.

5. BUSINESS

a. Districts

- **Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982**

[REDACTED]

b. Vehicles

- Each district has identified 2 vehicles to utilise for the pilot.
- The look and feel of the vehicle was discussed. It was noted that comparing the colours of the car (dark blue versa white) and if it is labelled would yield varying results when evaluating and testing trust and confidence. How the public will perceive the vehicles will need to be considered post the pilot. For the purpose of the pilot the vehicle look will be determined by SLT. Consideration can be given to whether or not the vehicles might also be fully marked at a later stage, **Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982**
- **Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982**

[REDACTED] he vehicle colour will form part of the EBPC report.

- Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982

c. Policy

- It was noted that some SOPs/AOS policies might need refining. It was highlighted that the ARV pilot deployment model doesn't have a PNT member.
- It is the intent of the ARV pilot to align with current policies but it was acknowledged that some variations may be needed, these should be highlighted to the SLT as they arise.

Action: An invite to be sent to Policy & Legal to consider sending a representative to attend the ARVWG meetings.

Action: Policy Team/ARV WG to identify and highlight any policies/SOPs that require reviewing and/or taken into consideration in regards to the proposed models.

d. Evaluation

- The draft ARV Literature Review was received and accepted.
- It was noted that ARVs exist throughout the United Kingdom (UK) and in Scotland. Section 9(2)(ba) Official Information Act 1982
- Section 9(2)(ba) Official Information Act 1982
- It was highlighted that there is a case for trialling the ARV pilot (to investigate whether the introduction of ARVs improve operational responsiveness and public and staff safety).
- In London, ARVs are capable of providing a response to an armed incident. Section 9(2)(b) Official Information Act 1982
- The ToR research report highlights that the use of deadly force is rare in NZ and it indicates that less than 1% of face to face interactions require the use of a tactical option. Incidents that required the use of firearms made up 6% of the total reported AOS deployed events. For the vast majority of incidents, these tactics had successful resolutions and the use of deadly force was rare.
- The Draft ARV Pilot Evaluation Plan was received and accepted. A finalised plan will be ready in the next week.
- The evaluation will focus on five key questions:
 1. How were ARVs deployed [and what tactics were used]?
 2. Did our people feel, or were they, safer in the trial Districts as a result of the presence of ARVs?

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3. Was external trust and confidence impacted in the trial Districts as a result of the presence of ARVs?
 4. What would a fit-for-purpose ARV model look like nationally?
 5. What impact did the pilot have on Our Business performance?
- The EBPC will utilise baseline data that already exists, in addition to this structured interviews with staff may take place, utilisation of the trust and confidence survey results and social media responses and feedback. The finer details around these are still being worked through.
 - **Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982**
[REDACTED]
 - Monthly updates will be provided to the ARV working group with the preliminary three month report that was anticipated for December, now due mid-February 2020.

Action: Secretariat to email risks & implications, and evaluation points to EBPC.

Action: EBPC to facilitate a risk workshop/discussion with the ARV WG.

e. Finance

- Work continues around the budget. There is a need for an agreement from SLT/ELB on where costs sit.

Action: secretariat to email draft budget and items costs as discussed to date to **Section 9(2)(a) Official Information**

f. Media & Communications

- A communications and media plan is being developed. A draft will be available in the next week. The communications team acknowledge the issues around public perceptions, particularly those related to safety, trust and confidence. The plan will help highlight these further.
- It was noted that the public will want very clear information about the pilot, the reason for it, what the model will look like, what they will do, where they will be deployed and seen in the public.
- **Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982**

- Equally, what the staff will wear and carry was raised. It was noted that at this point, they would continue to wear the standard blue-role uniform, and preliminary discussions are occurring around the kit they might carry, **Section 6(c) Official Information Act 1982**.
- It was noted that this is about deploying highly skilled officers that offer a range of skills and tactical options, better suited to safely resolving particular types of incidents. It's about the unique suite of skills and tactics that these staff are able to bring with them.
- Members discussed the need to be very transparent with the public and staff around this pilot.
- Staff and public communications were discussed, it was noted that it's important that both internal and external messaging are aligned and managed well. This includes District, Frontline and national communications.

Action: Secretariat to send a copy of the risks discussed to date to **Section 9(2)(a) Official Information**

Next meeting scheduled for 9 September, 9am-4pm workshop, 11 noon – 1pm meeting.

The meeting closed at 1pm.

14 October 2019, 1400 – 1500 hours
Level 3, Special Operations Room, PNHQ (WebEx)

Chair Inspector Freda Grace
Attendees Assistant Commissioner William Searle (Bill) Superintendent Anthony Hill (Tony)
Detective Inspector Graham Pitkethley Detective Inspector Uraia Vakaruru
Inspector Bryan Buck Inspector Jared Pirret

Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982

Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982

Apologies -

1. WELCOME / ADMINISTRATION

- Members were welcomed to the meeting, the apologies were received and accepted as noted above.

2. PREVIOUS ACTIONS / MATTERS ARISING

- As per below.

3. MEDIA & COMMUNICATIONS

- The draft coms plan was sent to all for feedback.
- It was noted that the Commissioner is briefing the Minister today, coms are on hold until the briefing occurs.
- The first coms product pack is on track and will be distributed for consultation.
- The pack includes a draft PR/letter and talking points to engage key stake holders and partners (including local Muslim communities) to the District Commanders from AC Penny. It was noted that these were initially developed for the 3 pilot areas.
- A question was raised if the letter will go to all district commanders. It was noted that at present it was only going to the 3 pilot areas. It was agreed that it needs to go to all 3 district commanders in PM, Canterbury and Waikato. It was noted that the other district commanders have raised questions from outside of the pilot areas and it was suggested that it be sent to all District Commanders.

Action: [REDACTED] to send the PR/Letter and talking point letters to the all 3 district commanders in PM, Canterbury and Waikato. [There was discussion around sending these to all district commanders but no decision made].

- MPeS will be asked to undertake national consultation on our behalf.
- Product pack 2 will be available on Wednesday. This includes the Ten One Story, Ten One information pages, content for Police website, Q&As and the Commissioners talking points.
- The kick-off time will now be 9.30am, at Counties Manukau HQ in the carpark. Work is underway to arrange this. The launch will include the new branded police vehicles, the ART vehicle, and the 4 ART staff dressed in blue uniform.
- The staff that are being utilised for the launch were discussed. The National Manager R&O. approached Counties Manukau to source the staff for this. It was noted that the Media and Coms team have requested that AOS staff are sourced. It was noted that AOS staff could be utilised from the Districts that are not taking part in the trial. No staff names are to be used during the launch or in the media.

Action: UV to follow-up with [REDACTED] /Auckland Media Team about who the 4 AOS members could be.

- Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982

Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982

- The question was raised if there would be any expectation for the District Commander to be speaking. It was noted that there wasn't an expectation for the District Commander to do a speech. The Minister may be attending, this is yet to be confirmed. In this case he will speak along with the Commissioner.

4. VEHICLES

- Noted that Counties Manukau have been informed that there ART vehicle won't be available until next week. The Media and Coms team have received an assurance from Fleet that it would arrive on Thursday in time for the launch on Friday. Further clarity is required around this.

Action: **Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982** to follow-up with Fleet regarding the delivery timeline of the Counties Manukau vehicle and confirm to **Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982**/UV. If required to confirm also if the Waikato ART vehicle is required for the launch.

- Canterbury highlight that they have been asked to locate radios for the ART vehicle. That the wiring looms are there but no radios fitted. It was noted that Waikato sourced theirs from other vehicles that might be de-commissioned or returned. Canterbury are not decommissioning or returning any vehicles.

Action: Freda to follow-up with Fleet regarding the Canterbury ART vehicle radio.

- The media won't be able to take the vehicle for a drive so standard b-roll images/footage will be available for the media.

5. OPERATIONAL CHART (COMS AND COMMAND)

- **Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982** **Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982** **Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982** It was noted that hostage rescue and police negotiation should be excluded from ART as it requires full AOS/STG. **Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982** **Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982** AOS Capability and the other ART Capability section. **Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982**.

Action: Ian to update draft operational chart, AOS Capability and the other ART Capability section. Potentially a third section STG could be included.

6. PEOPLE AND PERFORMANCE (HR)

- **Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982**

Action: Discussion to occur on Wednesday around this to align communications

Action: **Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982** to send draft letters to UV, Jarred, Bryan, Graham, Freda

7. TRAINING

- **Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982**

Action: Freda to follow-up on the national quals course for returning AOS staff and new staff, **Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982**.

Next meeting scheduled for 16 September, 9am-4pm workshop.

The meeting closed at 3pm.

Date: 8 October 2019

Location: Commissioner's Boardroom

Time: 12:30 – 13:30

Frequency: Weekly

Attendance: Chair, Commissioner (Mike Bush) Deputy Commissioner Districts (John Tims), Deputy Commissioner National Operations (Mike Clement), Acting Deputy Chief Executive Service Delivery (Jevon McSkimming), Deputy Chief Executive Media & Communications (Jane Archibald), Acting Deputy Commissioner Strategy and Partnerships (Angela Brazier), Deputy Chief Executive Finance Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982 Chief Executive People Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982, Chief of Staff

Recorder: Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982

Apologies: Acting Deputy Commissioner Strategy and Partnerships (Andy Coster), Deputy Commissioner MPES (Wally Haumaha), Deputy Chief Executive Service Delivery (Mark Evans),

#	Item	Lead	Due Date
1. MEETING ADMINISTRATION			
1.1	All apologies were noted.		
1.2	The minutes from the previous meeting of 1 October were noted as a true and accurate record.		
1.3	No actions were due for today's meeting.		
2. COMMISSIONER'S TOPICS			
	Nil discussed.		
3. DECISIONS			
4.1	<p>SLT/19/61 Armed Response Vehicles – Options for Proof of Concept Model</p> <p>The paper was taken as read. DC Clement introduced the paper and invited members of the working group; <small>Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982</small> Andrew Sissons and Tony Hill to join the meeting. The ELB discussed the issues raised by SLT including but not limited to: resourcing, the expectations on the evaluation and the Communications plan and branding options.</p> <p>Recommendations</p> <p>The ELB:</p> <p>(i) Agreed: the name of the ARVs to be changed to Armed Response Teams (ART).</p> <p>(ii) Supported Option C (16-19/7) for the proof of concept model for the use of ARVs in Counties Manukau, Waikato, and Canterbury as this aligns with demand evidence from Canterbury and will create less pressure on business as usual activity, while still providing a meaningful opportunity to review the pilot</p> <p>(iii) Directed the Evaluation Plan for the proof of concept to be further fleshed out to ensure a clear pre-evaluation baseline, a process for the use of control groups, and an agreed post-evaluation approach in accordance with EBPC's recommendations of best practice.</p>		

	<p>(iv) Agreed: internal and external communications regarding the ART Proof of Concept should be proactive and include the; why, when and how. With a public release confirmed for the end of the week commencing 14 October 2019.</p> <p>(v) Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982 [REDACTED]</p> <p>(vi) Section 9(2)(j) Official Information Act, 1982</p> <p>(vii) Supported: the following key milestones</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proof of concept commences on 28 October 2019 • Mid-point three month evaluation presented to SLT in February • Proof of concept completion 27 April 2020. • Day light period and collection of evaluation data followed by presentation of findings to SLT in late May <p>(viii) Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982</p> <p>(ix) Noted: The effort and hard work of all staff on the working group and all those involved in drafting the proof of concept for consideration, which was recognised as a challenging and complex task.</p> <p>(x) Directed: An agenda item to be placed on Officials for a 'no surprises' conversation with the Minister.</p> <p>(xi) Agreed: The livery on the ART vehicles should be dark blue as ordered.</p>		
4. DISCUSSION			
4.1	<p>Weekly report to the Minister The ELB noted the content of the report.</p>		
4.2	<p>SLT Minutes – 2 October 2019 The ELB noted the SLT minutes from the 2 October meeting.</p>		
5. OTHER BUSINESS			
	Nil discussed		
6. PAPERS SCHEDULED FOR FOLLOWING WEEK			
	All papers scheduled for next week were noted.		

CLOSE MEETING

The meeting closed at 13:36

Certified by meeting Chair

Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982

Mike Bush,
Commissioner of Police

OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR ARMED RESPONSE TEAMS

PURPOSE

The purpose of the Armed Response Teams (ART) is to provide *frontline responders* with an enhanced tactical level of support. The manner in which ART members deliver this support will be key to the success of the trial.

The deployment of the ARTs within District are not deployed in a routine Armed Offender Squad (AOS) capacity and it is important to differentiate the roles of AOS and ART. The AOS will continue to deploy to those incidents, operations, and events as they do currently and in accordance with AOS guidelines. The ARTs although staffed by AOS members are deployed in accordance with ART business rules to provide frontline resources with an enhanced tactical capability where an offender poses a risk to the public or staff.


The AOS staff that currently work in a range of full time positions and deploy to AOS jobs when called will now be assigned to ARTs for the duration of the trial. These AOS/ART staff will continue to fulfil the traditional AOS roles. AOS will continue to deploy to functions that fall outside the scope or capability of ARTs.

There is to be no deviation from the principles of responding to an armed Incident – at all times the AOS principles will be adhered to and all deployments should be considered against these.

- It is better to take the matter too seriously than too lightly.
- All suspects who are believed to be armed are to be treated as dangerous and hostile until the contrary is definitely established.
- Every effort must be made to prevent casualties.
- Caution is not cowardice. When the actions of the suspect permit, time should be taken to cordon the area, and the wait and appeal role should be adopted. Police should never go unnecessarily into danger. However, if the suspect is acting in a way that makes casualties likely, police must act immediately to prevent this.
- Any force used should be the minimum necessary to achieve the objective, and reasonable under the circumstances.
- No AOS member may take part in any activity in an AOS capacity without the authority of the O/C AOS, except in an emergency.

ARTs are an overlapping frontline response that fits with other current arrangements as depicted below.

AOS Commanders are responsible for the deployment of ART but this is by definition not an AOS deployment. A significant portion of the time ART will be deploying in a non AOS capacity.



ROLES and DUTIES

Outlined below is a list of the roles and duties that the ARTs will carry out. For the purpose of the trial, any departure from these need to be documented, and if it is to be on going, to be discussed with the working group.

- **High risk events where a person poses a significant risk to the public, staff, or themselves (e.g. Priority 1 events or through organised crime)**
- Emergencies where an enhanced trauma response is required
- Apprehension of high-risk/priority offenders including Top Five National offenders, District priority offenders, and parole recall warrants
- Preventative activity including:
 - 3M/3F/3R/3C/3T/5K
 - Road policing / contribute to RIDS
 - Lead/POI visits
- Supporting investigations in pre-planned and high-risk search warrants
- Active Armed Offenders
- Enhanced situational command and control
- High profile public events with an associated risk profile **S. 6(c)** or where appropriate and proportionate (in limited circumstances this may include events outside of the trial Districts at the discretion of the Commissioner)
- Daily tasking as assigned by tasking and coordination (DCC).

ART units will not retain ownership for the reporting of incidents and events, that is they will not in the main be the file holders. The only departure from this will be where they take responsibility for an arrest, where the processing will be quick: disorder, warrants, issuing RIDS etc.


COMMAND AND CONTROL

The implementation of ARTs will not affect the current arrangements of command and control. Communication Centres retain the responsibility for the dispatch and initial incident command of the ARTs in accordance with the above outlined roles and duties.

The ARTs are not general incident cars, they are to be deployed in accordance with the above listed roles and duties and should be kept available to respond (similar to current deployment practices of Delta Units).

Should the incident reach the threshold for a full or partial AOS deployment, the current arrangements of AOS command and control will continue to apply, i.e. the command and control of ART members in an AOS deployment are the responsibility of the AOS Commander.

COMMS CENTRES ART/AOS DEPLOYMENT DECISION TREE




AOS DEPLOYMENTS

All deployment decisions must be made within the AOS principles and according to existing Standard Operating Procedures (SOP's). There can be no compromise to officer safety, either frontline staff and ARTs members, (no mission creep).

Incident Occurs: ART deployed – ART Team Leader to determine – can (with the current resources available to the ART Team Leader) the incident be resolved safely, adhering to AOS SOP's – YES – resolved and reported as required and applicable.

Incident Occurs: ART deployed – ART Team Leader determines the incident cannot be managed with current rostered resources – call AOS Commander – for advice/approval for extra resources. AOS Commander can provide following, including deciding incident can be managed with the current ART or provide the following:

- Additions of some extra specialist resources, Delta, PNT
- Several extra to support a blue role deployment
- Full AOS Call out – Black Role



DELEGATED AUTHORITY

AOS Commanders retain the responsibility for any tactics that the Team Leader/ART members may use in resolving an incident. **Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982**

Delegated authority to:	Requires AOS Commander Approval:
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Respond to jobs as assigned by coms - Attend blue role jobs that only require the resources they have - Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982 - Provide initial containment at an incident including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Locating and identifying the offender • Complete initial TENR assessment of the incident • Escalate the attendance of the full AOS squad • Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982 • Adopt the cordon or contain principles when outside of delegated authority 	<p>Except in situations requiring urgent lifesaving actions, AOS Commander approval is required for the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Use of Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982. - Initiating non-compliant vehicle stops - Tactics beyond blue role door knock - Escalation of staffing and additional resourcing - Use of aircraft

REPORTING/RECORDING

Weekly reports are required to be submitted during the course of the trial. These should include only qualitative data. That is, good work stories, where ART have been successful in achieving good results for the frontline, notable arrests e.g. Top 5 and Parole Recall Warrants, positive community impact and anything that supports (or detracts) from the ART pilot. These should be recorded in the RIOD End of Shift page for each pilot District.

Data such as **Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982**

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

MEDIA

During the period of the trial the standard media arrangements are in place. Any requests for commentary or interview should be referred to the Media Group at PNHQ.

Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982



Section 9(2)(k) Official Information Act 1982



Table 1. Number of ART unit deployments by district and date, 28 October – 28 November 2019

Date	Tamaki Makaurau Districts				Total	
	Counties Manukau	Waitemata	Auckland City	Waikato		Canterbury
28/10/2019	13		1	60	12	86
29/10/2019	10		3	88	27	128
30/10/2019	3		1	72	18	94
31/10/2019	17			58	13	88
1/11/2019	16		1	52	9	78
2/11/2019	13			50	34	97
3/11/2019	18		6	64	27	115
4/11/2019	21			64	16	101
5/11/2019	13			50	13	76
6/11/2019	8		2	56	14	80
7/11/2019	5		2	49	16	72
8/11/2019	16		2	42	21	81
9/11/2019	10		4	55	14	83
10/11/2019	4		3	37	20	64
11/11/2019	15		3	22	9	49
12/11/2019	5		1	58	17	81
13/11/2019	12			17	11	40
14/11/2019	10	2	2	29	12	55
15/11/2019	4			8	12	24
16/11/2019	9	1		33	21	64
17/11/2019	5		5	49	15	74
18/11/2019	6		2	32	16	56
19/11/2019	3	2	1	20	12	38
20/11/2019	6			41	9	56
21/11/2019	9			20	10	39
22/11/2019	3			33	28	64

Tamaki Makaurau Districts						
Date	Counties Manukau	Waitemata	Auckland City	Waikato	Canterbury	Total
23/11/2019	3	1	6	73	17	100
24/11/2019	3			62	18	83
25/11/2019	3	1		44	23	71
26/11/2019	7			38	38	83
27/11/2019	5	1		33	16	55
28/11/2019	2	1		44	21	68
Total	277	9	45	1453	559	2343
		331				

Table 2. Number of ART unit deployments by incident type and district, 28 October – 28 November 2019

Incident Code	Incident Description	Tamaki Makaurau Districts					Total
		Counties Manukau	Waitematā	Auckland City	Waikato	Canterbury	
1110	Homicide					1	1
1210	Kidnapping And Abduction	1			1	1	3
1310	Robbery	2		1	6	4	13
1410	Grievous Assaults			1			1
1510	Serious Assaults	12			17	17	46
1640	Minor Assaults	1			3		4
1710	Intimidation/Threats	5			16	21	42
1A	Alarm	1	1		13	7	22
1C	Car/Person Acting Suspiciously	22	1	3	54	28	108
1E	Emergency/Disaster/Spill				3	1	4
1F	Assist Fire/Ambulance/Traffic	1				2	3
1I	Blockage/Breakdown On Highway				1	3	4
1K	Drunk Custody/Detox Centre					4	4
1M	Mental				3	3	6
1N	Noise Control	1					1
1R	Breach Of The Peace	9		1	28	15	53
1U	Traffic Incident	3	1	1	13	12	30
1V	Vehicle Collision	2			5	9	16
1X	Attempted Suicide	3		1	31	9	44
2210	Sexual Affronts					1	1
2630	Sexual Attacks				3		3
2I	Information	7		2	23	37	69
2M	Missing Person	1			3	2	6
2P	Public Relations	8		1	14	12	35
2R	Recovery Motor Vehicle	2			2		4
2S	Summons				5	2	7

2T	Warrant To Arrest/Fines Enforce	1			2		3
2W	Arrest Warrant (Other)	17			48	37	102
2Z	Other Service Request/Response				2		2
3110	Drugs (Not Cannabis)	2					2
3210	Drugs (Cannabis Only)				1		1
3530	Disorder	15			29	28	72
3850	Domestic Violence				4	2	6
3C	Crime Prevention Advice				9		9
3F	Foot Patrol	1		1	2	1	5
3M	Directed Patrol	11		1	66	7	85
3R	Road Checkpoint				6	1	7
3T	Turnover (Vehicle Stop)	31		10	524	82	647
3W	Watching/Observations	11	2	1	1	4	19
3Z	Other Preventive Task			1	13	1	15
4120	Burglary	3		4	12	13	32
4211	Car Conversion	1	1		2	1	5
4220	Interference With Cars	1		1	3	3	8
4320	Theft				5	2	7
4340	Theft Ex Car				1		1
4C	Correspondence/Counter			1		1	2
4E	Escort Duty				7	1	8
4F	Fingerprint Examination				2		2
4G	Travel	1					1
4L	Logistics/Staff Transport				1		1
4Q	Enquiry/Investigation	18	1	2	71	38	130

Armed Response Team Evaluation Plan & Methodology

Evaluation Objectives

The underlying intent of the Armed Response Team (ART) pilot is to improve safety, and feelings of safety, among NZ Police and members of the public. The key evaluation objective is to provide an independent evaluation of whether the introduction of ARTs within the current operating environment achieves this objective, and substantively improves the capability of our people to perform their duties safely.

Proposed Methodology

The intent to deploy to incidents involving specific and unique threats and safety risks, or as part of pre-planned operations, provides an opportunity to survey perceptions of safety from both the officers and communities involved.

The core methods used in the evaluation will be:

1. qualitative analyses of deployment data across districts and incidents responded to;
2. staff surveys focussing on the real or perceived impact of ARTs on police safety;
3. staff survey focussing on the wellbeing of officers involved in, and supporting, ART deployment.

End of Deployment Forms

The End of Deployment (EOD) form is designed to collect basic information pertaining to the activities of ARTs. EOD forms should be completed by ART Team Leaders following each operation or call for service. The form has been designed to match the content typically collected by the Tactical Options Reports (TOR) and AOS Deployment forms (see Appendix A6). The amount of detail required to complete the EOD form depends on the capacity in which the ARTs were deployed. The intention is to place a lens on the preventative/public safety work the ARTs are involved in. Accordingly, the EOD form collates operational information that ordinarily would not require an AOS deployment form to be submitted but is essential to understanding the demand placed upon ARTs. If however, ARTs attend an event that is categorised as a Blue or full Black AOS deployment, the EOD form requires minimal input because the same information will be available through the AOS deployment form. This was implemented to avoid the doubling up of data entry.

To further facilitate data collection the EOD form can be accessed via the Checkpoint Application, which can be installed on all NZ Police mobile devices.

Shift Analysis

The data collection forms will help provide a sense of the demand and use of ARTs. It will further allow the EBPC to perform a shift analysis to examine how the deployment and activity of the ARTs is distributed across rostered shifts, days, weeks, and months. It is from this that potential high demand times can be identified and used to refine scheduling of deployments and patrols. This will be contrasted across the participating districts to determine whether there is more or less demand within each. The demand for ARTs can be contrasted with calls for service across non-participating districts.

Monitoring Deployment

A number of indicators will be recorded that provide insights into the circumstances under which the ART was deployed or used and the effectiveness of the ART emergency response (i.e., an assessment of response times). Moreover, job codes can be monitored to determine the types of incidents that were most attended. It will also be possible to examine how often there were calls for service outside of the patrol district.

Monitoring of Tactical Options and Use of Force

Data collection forms will also permit a monitoring of whether there are any changes in the numbers or type of tactical options used. For example, use of TASER may drop owing to a de-escalation effect of ART presence while an increase use of sponge rounds increases.

Monitoring of Injuries

Collecting injury reports directly will provide a better indicator around any injuries sustained to ART staff, PST staff, and the public. It can further be used to provide an idea of whether the presence of ARTs had a de-escalating effect.

Survey Measures

A total of three survey measures will be used to provide an index of perceptions around safety and operational effectiveness, while also attempting to monitor the wellbeing of ART staff.

Officer Perception Surveys

Officer surveys were designed to measure perceptions around the safety and the effectiveness of ARTs. There are three surveys that are to be completed by different groups involved in an ART operation: the Armed Response Team Officers (ARTOs) themselves, any General Duties Branch (GDB) or Public Safety Team (PST) staff present at the event, and Communications staff involved in the event. These surveys should be completed following all ART operations and calls for service. The intention is to measure role specific perceptions, with each survey embedding a common set of questions that can be used to compare perceptions between each group (compare Appendix A7-A9).

Like the EOD form, the officer surveys can be accessed via the Checkpoint Application and are accessible throughout the pilot.

Wellbeing

The Officer Wellbeing Survey is designed to assess four dimensions relating to officer wellbeing: Mental Wellbeing, Psychological Distress, Burnout, and Perceived Stress. The survey is administered at three points in time:

- T1. Prior to pilot commencement;
- T2. Midway through pilot;
- T3. After cessation of pilot.

The survey will be sent to all AOS members, across all districts, at each time point. The intention is to compare the wellbeing of AOS staff in the districts where the pilot is running against with the wellbeing of members in the districts where the pilot is not running. The survey will also be completed by general duties staff in the participating districts to assess the effect, if any, of having AOS staff move into full-time ART roles.

The *Officer Wellbeing Survey* (see Appendix A10) is a 30 question survey that assesses four dimensions relating to officer wellbeing and is an amalgam of four independent inventories.

Mental Wellbeing. Mental wellbeing is measured using the World Health Organisation- Five Well-Being Index (WHO-5) and is a short self-reported measure of current mental wellbeing. Since its first publication in 1998, the WHO-5 has been translated into several languages and has been validated on a number of clinical and non-clinical populations. The scale has demonstrated validity as a screening tool for depression and has been reliably used as an outcome measure in both clinical trials and in applied research settings (see Topp et al., 2015).

Psychological Distress. The Kessler-10 (K10) is a short self-report measure of non-specific psychological distress in the general population, based on questions about the level of nervousness, agitation, psychological fatigue, and depression. The measure has been validated on both clinical and non-clinical populations and has adequate reliability and validity (for example, see Furukawa et al., 2012).

Burnout. The Maslach Burnout Inventory (MBI) is a self-report measure relating to occupational burnout. It measures three dimensions of burnout, each measured using a single sub-scale: emotional exhaustion, depersonalisation, and personal accomplishment. The inventory has been used widely across a number of occupations and exists in various forms and has adequate reliability and validity (see Wheeler et al., 2011). For the present survey burnout is measured using a modified version of the emotional exhaustion subscale.

Perceived Stress. The Perceived Stress Scale (PSS-10) is a self-report measure that assesses the extent to which one's life is perceived as stressful. The scale has been broadly applied and is a common tool in the assessment of non-specific perceived stress. The scale was originally constructed with 14 items though the shorter 10 items version has satisfactory reliability and validity (see Taylor, 2015).

Information and Consent

Prior to any data collection, informed consent must be obtained from each officer. Accordingly, individuals will be asked to read an information sheet that details the scope of the evaluation and how their data will be handled (see Appendices A1 – A4). Officers will indicate their willingness to participate having signed the relevant consent form (Appendix A5).

References

- Furukawa, T. A., Kessler, R. C., Slade, T., & Andrews, G. (2003). The performance of the K6 and K10 screening scales for psychological distress in the Australian National Survey of Mental Health and Well-Being. *Psychological Medicine*, *33*, 357-362.
- Taylor, J. M. (2015). Psychometric analysis of the Ten-Item Perceived Stress Scale. *Psychological assessment*, *27*, 90.
- Topp, C. W., Østergaard, S. D., Søndergaard, S., & Bech, P. (2015). The WHO-5 Well-Being Index: a systematic review of the literature. *Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics*, *84*, 167-176.
- Wheeler, D. L., Vassar, M., Worley, J. A., & Barnes, L. L. (2011). A reliability generalization meta-analysis of coefficient alpha for the Maslach Burnout Inventory. *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, *71*, 231-244.

- A1. Information Sheet for PST Officer Survey
- A2. Information Sheet for ART Officer Survey
- A3. Information Sheet for Communications Staff Survey
- A4. Information Sheet for Officer Wellbeing Survey
- A5. Consent Form
- A6. End of Deployment Form
- A7. PST Officer Survey
- A8. ART Officer Survey
- A9. Communications Staff Survey
- A10. Officer Wellbeing Survey

A1. Information Sheet for PST Officer Survey

Armed Response Teams (ART) is a new initiative within New Zealand Police and is currently being undertaken on a trial basis. The trial is running from the 28th October 2019 to 27th April 2020 across the Waikato, Canterbury, and Counties Manakau districts.

As part of this, the Evidence Based Policing Centre (EBPC) will be gathering information from staff involved in the trial. This involves collecting data from Armed Offenders Squad (AOS) officers participating in the pilot and police staff in participating districts.

You should complete this survey if you recently attended an operation or a call for service where ART staff were in attendance.

What is the purpose of this survey?

The purpose of this survey is to collect information regarding the ARTs attendance at an operation or a call for service. This information will be compiled and provided to the Executive Leadership Board (ELB) to establish the perceived effectiveness of the ART and identify where possible improvements could be made.

How will the information be managed?

The information you choose to provide will be compiled and published in a report and forwarded to the ELB. Whilst personal information has been utilised to send you this invitation, no identifying information will be disseminated in any report relating to the pilot. All data will be anonymised, reported in aggregate form, and will not be passed on to any other person or agency unless required by law.

The data you choose to provide will not be used to evaluate your performance and will only be used by the EBPC for evaluation of this pilot.

Do I have to participate?

This survey is voluntary and you are under no obligation to participate. You may choose to withdraw at any time. Participation in this survey does not mean that you have to take part in any future data collection related to this project.

The survey should take approximately **5 minutes** to complete.

If you wish to see the results of the study, or you have any questions or concerns, email

Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982

A2. Information Sheet for ART Officer Survey

Armed Response Teams (ART) is a new initiative within New Zealand Police and is currently being undertaken on a trial basis. The trial is running from the 28th October 2019 to 27th April 2020 across the Waikato, Canterbury, and Counties Manakau districts.

As part of this, the Evidence Based Policing Centre (EBPC) will be gathering information from staff involved in the trial. This involves collecting data from Armed Offenders Squad (AOS) officers participating in the pilot and police staff in participating districts.

You should complete this survey if you were the team leader for a recent ART operation or call for service.

What is the purpose of this survey?

The purpose of this survey is to collect information regarding the ARTs attendance at an operation or a call for service. This information will be compiled and provided to the Executive Leadership Board (ELB) to establish the perceived effectiveness of the ART and identify where possible improvements could be made.

How will the information be managed?

The information you choose to provide will be compiled and published in a report and forwarded to the ELB. Whilst personal information has been utilised to send you this invitation, no identifying information will be disseminated in any report relating to the pilot. All data will be anonymised, reported in aggregate form, and will not be passed on to any other person or agency unless required by law.

The data you choose to provide will not be used to evaluate your performance and will only be used by the EBPC for evaluation of this pilot.

Do I have to participate?

This survey is voluntary and you are under no obligation to participate. You may choose to withdraw at any time. Participation in this survey does not mean that you have to take part in any future data collection related to this project.

The survey should take approximately **5 minutes** to complete.

If you wish to see the results of the study, or you have any questions or concerns, email

Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982

A3. Information Sheet for Communications Staff Survey

Armed Response Teams (ART) is a new initiative within New Zealand Police and is currently being undertaken on a trial basis. The trial is running from the 28th October 2019 to 27th April 2020 across the Waikato, Canterbury, and Counties Manakau districts.

As part of this, the Evidence Based Policing Centre (EBPC) will be gathering information from staff involved in the trial. This involves collecting data from Armed Offenders Squad (AOS) officers participating in the pilot and police staff in participating districts.

You should complete this survey if you were the incident controller for a recent ART operation or call for service.

What is the purpose of this survey?

The purpose of this survey is to collect information regarding the ARTs attendance at an operation or a call for service. This information will be compiled and provided to the Executive Leadership Board (ELB) to establish the perceived effectiveness of the ART and identify where possible improvements could be made.

How will the information be managed?

The information you choose to provide will be compiled and published in a report and forwarded to the ELB. Whilst personal information has been utilised to send you this invitation, no identifying information will be disseminated in any report relating to the pilot. All data will be anonymised, reported in aggregate form, and will not be passed on to any other person or agency unless required by law.

The data you choose to provide will not be used to evaluate your performance and will only be used by the EBPC for evaluation of this pilot.

Do I have to participate?

This survey is voluntary and you are under no obligation to participate. You may choose to withdraw at any time. Participation in this survey does not mean that you have to take part in any future data collection related to this project.

The survey should take approximately **5 minutes** to complete.

If you wish to see the results of the study, or you have any questions or concerns, email

Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982

A4. Information Sheet for Officer Wellbeing Survey

Armed Response Teams (ART) is a new initiative within New Zealand Police and is currently being undertaken on a trial basis. The trial is running from the 28th October 2019 to 27th April 2020 across the Waikato, Canterbury, and Counties Manakau districts.

As part of this, the Evidence Based Policing Centre (EBPC) will be gathering information from staff involved in the trial. This involves collecting data from Armed Offenders Squad (AOS) officers participating in the pilot and police staff in participating districts.

What is the purpose of this survey?

The purpose of this survey is to collect information about your current level of wellbeing. This survey will be delivered at three points in time: prior to the pilot commencing, at the midpoint of the pilot, and at the end of the pilot. This information will be compiled and provided to the Executive Leadership Board (ELB) to identify where possible improvements could be made in the use and deployment of ARTs.

How will the information be managed?

The information you choose to provide will be compiled and published in a report and forwarded to the ELB. Whilst personal information has been utilised to send you this invitation, no identifying information will be disseminated in any report relating to the pilot. All data will be anonymised, reported in aggregate form, and will not be passed on to any other person or agency unless required by law.

The data you choose to provide will not be used for any performance evaluation and your responses are only used as indicators of wellbeing. This survey tool cannot be used to make any formal clinical diagnosis.

Do I have to participate?

This survey is voluntary and you are under no obligation to participate. You may choose to withdraw at any time. Participation in this survey does not mean that you have to take part in any future data collection related to this project.

The survey should take approximately **5-10 minutes** to complete and has been approved by the ART Working Group.

If you wish to see the results of the study, or you have any questions or concerns, email

[Section 9\(2\)\(a\) Official Information Act](#).

Armed Response Team Pilot

I have read the information sheet and understand that:

1. My participation in the study is voluntary;
2. My data will be kept secure with access only by those in the Evidence Based Policing Centre who are involved in the project;
3. My data may be held for up to seven years;
4. I can withdraw my consent at any point in time;
5. My QID will be recorded and used to identify my data but will be appropriately anonymised when stored;
6. My data is confidential and no identifying information will be published in any report. My data will not be passed onto anyone else unless required by law.

I consent to participate in the survey.

Sign:

Date:

QID:

District:

A6. End of Deployment (EOD) Form

This form should be completed by ART Team Leaders.

Where the event is escalated to an AOS black role or blue role deployment, then the AOS/PNT Deployment report is required. *It is of note that the items with an * (asterisk) below can therefore be excluded as the data will be provided in the AOS deployment report, please can you complete remaining items to support the evaluation process).*

As per normal a TOR is required in any ART attended event where a member uses force, or undertakes a show of force (Taser Laser painting / Firearms presentation).

Event/Incident Number	
*	Operation Start Date: <pre populate> Operation Start Time: <pre populate> Operation End Date: <pre populate> Operation End Time: <pre populate>
Deployed by:	<input type="radio"/> Deployed by Comms <input type="radio"/> Self-deployed <input type="radio"/> DCC <input type="radio"/> Full AOS <input type="radio"/> Other (Please specify):
*Deployment Type:	<Drop down as per AOS/PNT Deployment report – Deployment Type: Deployment Request Declined Emergency Preplanned - Full Squad Preplanned - Partial Deployment
Deployment Role	<input type="radio"/> Command/Control <input type="radio"/> Support/Assist <input type="radio"/> Sole Attendee <input type="radio"/> Other. Please specify:
Was the AOS Commander consulted?	<input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No
*Type of Job (select one)	< Drop down as per AOS/PNT Deployment report – Type of Job: Combination Mobile Static>
*Address/Location of Incident:	<Address/Location of Incident (tie to NZ post or free text if no match)>
*Offence Codes (High Level) (select as many as apply)	< Drop down as per AOS/PNT Deployment report – Offence Codes. 1100 Homicide 1200 Kidnapping 1300 Robbery 1400 Grievous Assaults 1500 Serious Assaults 1600 Minor Assaults 1700 Intimidation and Threats 1800 Group Assemblies 1M Mental Illness 1X Suicidal 2200 Sexual Affronts 2600 Sexual Attacks 2700 Abnormal Sex 2800 Immoral Behaviour 2900 Immoral Behaviour Misc 3100 Drugs/Not Cannabis

	3200 Drugs/Cannabis 3500 Disorder 3600 Vagrancy Offences 3700 Family Offences 3800 Family Offences 3900 Sale of Liquor Act 4100 Burglary 4200 Car Conversion 4300 Theft 4400 Receiving 4500 Fraud 4600 Computer Crime 4990 Accessory after the fact 5100 Destruction of Property 5200 Endangering 5800 Gambling Act 5900 New Drugs 6100 Trespass 6200 Littering 6300 Animals 6500 Postal Abuses 6800 Firearms Offences 7100 Against Justice 7200 Birth/Deaths and Marriages 7300 Immigration 7400 Blood Samples/Racial 7500 Against National Interest 7600 By Law Breaches 7900 Justice (special) A-W Traffic Offences>
Incident Type that BEST DESCRIBES these events	<drop down as per TOR data> <input type="radio"/> 1C <input type="radio"/> 1K <input type="radio"/> 1M <input type="radio"/> 1R <input type="radio"/> 1U <input type="radio"/> 1V <input type="radio"/> 1X <input type="radio"/> 2T <input type="radio"/> 2W <input type="radio"/> 3A <input type="radio"/> 3T <input type="radio"/> 4U <input type="radio"/> 5F <input type="radio"/> 5K <input type="radio"/> 6D <input type="radio"/> 6E Other (please specify):

Tactical Options Report (TOR) submitted	<input type="radio"/> Yes (if yes, skip the sections with a ^) <input type="radio"/> No
Key Tactics Used (select all that apply)	< "as per the current AOS/PNT deployment report – Key tactics used": Announced Forced entry Breach and Hold Cordon/Contain/Appeal Cover Port Door knock/Direct approach to target Emergency action Open-air arrest Other (Describe in Team Leader comments): Ruse/deception Unannounced Forced entry Vehicle Stop - compliant Vehicle Stop - non compliant>

Incident resolved by	<p><Drop down box “as per the current AOS data – Resolved by or”:</p> <p>Prior to Negotiation Tactical Only Negotiation Only Combined Negotiation/Tactical Offender not contacted/located></p>
Result code	<input type="radio"/> K1 <input type="radio"/> K3 <input type="radio"/> K6 <input type="radio"/> K9
^Resolution	<p>(dropdown as per TOR – resolution section)</p> <p>Arrested – charged Arrested – no charge Released without charge Subject decamped scene Subject returned to caregiver Transport to hospital (medical) Transport to hospital (1M) CATT involvement Refer to Youth Aid Subject Escaped Police Disengaged Other</p>
Who was the primary unit	<input type="radio"/> ART <input type="radio"/> Other (please specify):
What primary unit was responsible for the arrest	<input type="radio"/> ART <input type="radio"/> Other (please specify):
Team Leader Comments	
*Any other additional notes	<p>Upload Images & Files Add Attachment: Browse... Free text</p>

A7. PST Officer Survey

QID: _____ Rank: _____
 Age: _____ Gender: _____
 Years in Service: _____ District: _____
 Incident No. _____ Card Event No. _____

Were you armed at any point during the incident? Yes No

Did you request the assistance of the ART? Yes No

If yes:
 Was the response of the ART timely? Yes No
 If no, why?

Do you think the incident was likely to have been handled differently without the ART? Yes No

If, yes, how?

Thinking about the incident you attended, please circle the response that **best** describes how much you agree with the following statements?

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree

Overall, I felt safer at the incident. 1 2 3 4 5

Overall, I felt that the command structure was clear. 1 2 3 4 5

Overall, I felt that communications were clear. 1 2 3 4 5

Overall, I understood my role within this incident. 1 2 3 4 5

I think the incident was dealt with more efficiently with the ART in attendance. 1 2 3 4 5

If Agree or Strongly Agree, **how** was the incident dealt with more efficiently?

If Disagree or Strongly Disagree, **why**?

I think the presence of the ART de-escalated the incident. 1 2 3 4 5

If Agree or Strongly Agree, **how** was the incident de-escalated?

If Disagree or Strongly Disagree, **why**?

Overall, I was satisfied with the assistance provided by the ART. 1 2 3 4 5

I am likely to request the assistance of the ART in the future. 1 2 3 4 5

My training allowed me to support the ART efficiently. 1 2 3 4 5

A8. ART Officer Survey

QID: _____	Rank: _____
Age: _____	Gender: _____
Years in Service: _____	District: _____
Incident No. _____	Card Event No. _____

Was the assistance of the ART requested? Yes No

If yes:
Was the response of the ART timely? Yes No
If no, why?

Do you think the incident was likely to have been handled differently without the ART? Yes No

If, yes, how?

Thinking about the incident you attended, please circle the response that **best** describes how much you agree with the following statements?

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree

Overall, I felt safer at the incident. 1 2 3 4 5

Overall, I felt that the command structure was clear. 1 2 3 4 5

Overall, I felt that communications were clear. 1 2 3 4 5

Overall, I understood my role within this incident. 1 2 3 4 5

I think the incident was dealt with more efficiently with the ART in attendance. 1 2 3 4 5

If Agree or Strongly Agree, **how** was the incident dealt with more efficiently?

If Disagree or Strongly Disagree, **why**?

I think the presence of the ART de-escalated the incident. 1 2 3 4 5

If Agree or Strongly Agree, **how** was the incident de-escalated?

If Disagree or Strongly Disagree, **why**?

The vehicle enabled me to perform all the duties required of me. 1 2 3 4 5

The equipment I need is readily accessible and in good condition. 1 2 3 4 5

My personal equipment is not satisfactory for my safety and effectiveness. 1 2 3 4 5

Vehicle limitations prevented me from performing my duties appropriately. 1 2 3 4 5

The ART role makes good use of my training. 1 2 3 4 5

A9. Communications Officer Survey

QID: _____ Rank: _____
 Age: _____ Gender: _____
 Years in Service: _____ District: _____
 Incident No. _____ Card Event No. _____

Was the assistance of the ART requested? Yes No

If yes:
 Was the response of the ART timely? Yes No
 If no, why?

Do you think the incident was likely to have been handled differently without the ART? Yes No

If, yes, how?

Thinking about the incident you attended, please circle the response that **best** describes how much you agree with the following statements?

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree

Overall, I felt that the command structure was clear. 1 2 3 4 5

Overall, I felt that communications were clear. 1 2 3 4 5

Overall, I understood my role within this incident. 1 2 3 4 5

I think the incident was dealt with more efficiently with the ART in attendance. 1 2 3 4 5

If Agree or Strongly Agree, **how** was the incident dealt with more efficiently?

If Disagree or Strongly Disagree, **why**?

I think the presence of the ART de-escalated the incident. 1 2 3 4 5

If Agree or Strongly Agree, **how** was the incident de-escalated?

If Disagree or Strongly Disagree, **why**?

Overall, I was satisfied with the assistance provided by the ART. 1 2 3 4 5

My training allowed me to control the incident effectively. 1 2 3 4 5

A10. Officer Wellbeing Survey

Thinking about how you felt over the last **30 days**, for each of the following statements circle the response that **best** describes how much of the time you felt that way.

	0 At no time	1 Some of the time	2 Less than half the time	3 More than half the time	4 Most of the time	5 All the time
1 I have felt cheerful and in good spirits	0	1	2	3	4	5
2 I have felt calm and relaxed	0	1	2	3	4	5
3 I have felt active and vigorous	0	1	2	3	4	5
4 I have felt refreshed when I wake up in the morning	0	1	2	3	4	5
5 I have felt that my daily life is filled with things that interest me	0	1	2	3	4	5
6 I have felt tired out for no good reason?	0	1	2	3	4	5
7 I have felt nervous?	0	1	2	3	4	5
8 I have felt so nervous that nothing could calm me down?	0	1	2	3	4	5
9 I have felt hopeless?	0	1	2	3	4	5
10 I have felt restless or fidgety?	0	1	2	3	4	5
11 I have felt so restless I could not sit still?	0	1	2	3	4	5
12 I have felt depressed?	0	1	2	3	4	5
13 I have felt that everything was an effort?	0	1	2	3	4	5
14 I have felt so sad that nothing could cheer me up?	0	1	2	3	4	5
15 I have felt worthless?	0	1	2	3	4	5
16 I have felt emotionally drained from my work	0	1	2	3	4	5
17 I have felt used up at the end of the work day	0	1	2	3	4	5
18 I have felt fatigued when I wake up in the morning	0	1	2	3	4	5
19 I have felt that working with people all day is a real strain	0	1	2	3	4	5
20 I have felt frustrated by my job	0	1	2	3	4	5
21 I have felt that I'm working too hard on my job	0	1	2	3	4	5
22 I have felt like I am at the end of my rope	0	1	2	3	4	5
23 I have felt upset because of something that happened unexpectedly	0	1	2	3	4	5
24 I have felt unable to control the important things in my life	0	1	2	3	4	5
25 I have felt confident in my ability to handle my personal problems	0	1	2	3	4	5
26 I have felt that things were going my way	0	1	2	3	4	5
27 I have felt unable to cope with all the things I had to do	0	1	2	3	4	5
28 I have felt unable to control irritations in my life	0	1	2	3	4	5
29 I have felt on top of things	0	1	2	3	4	5
30 I have felt angered by things that happened that were outside of my control	0	1	2	3	4	5

Armed Response Team (ART) Pilot

Preliminary Evaluation Report

Evidence Based Policing Centre

December 2019

Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982



Evidence Based Policing Centre.

Reviewed by:
Superintendent Bruce O'Brien, Director, Evidence Based Policing Centre

IN CONFIDENCE

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Glossary of Terms

AOS	Armed Offenders Squad
ART	Armed Response Team
ARTO	Armed Response Team Officer
EBPC	Evidence Based Policing Centre
EOD	End of Deployment
GDB	General Duties Branch
PST	Public Safety Team
TOR	Tactical Options Report

1. Executive Summary

This brief report provides an opportunity to provide quality control feedback regarding the data collection processes for the Armed Response Team (ART) pilot currently being undertaken by New Zealand Police (NZ Police). The report considers data received by the Evidence Based Policing Centre (EBPC) during the first month of the trial. Accordingly, it does not contain a deep dive into the deployment data but does examine survey responses and baselining efforts. A more in depth analysis will follow in January 2020.

Unfortunately, completion of survey tools has been exceedingly poor. In particular, surveys designed to measure perceptions around staff safety – which was highlighted as a core evaluation focus – have not been engaged with and no useable data has been obtained. Moreover, despite the steady stream of deployment reporting, there are patent inconsistencies in what is reported across the trial districts. Such practices limit what can be evaluated and, based upon data in hand, no valuable insights can yet be attained. Several recommendations are made to improve the quality of data collection to ensure a robust evaluation.

2. Introduction

On 30 August 2019, NZ Police's Executive Leadership approved a proof of concept pilot for Armed Response Teams (ART). ARTs consist of a small number of highly trained specialists (members of New Zealand's Armed Offenders Squad) who provide a rapid tactical response to critical incidents, while also providing assistance and support to frontline officers. The ART Pilot began on 28 October 2019 and is scheduled to run for 6 months, ending April 2020, and will be operating across Tamaki Makaurau, Waikato and Canterbury for the duration of the pilot. The purpose of the proof of concept is to consider whether and how ARTs could be introduced on a permanent basis to provide enhanced tactical support to the frontline in real time, thereby increasing the safety of our staff and communities. The EBPC has been tasked with providing an independent evaluation of a pilot.

3. Methods

The underlying intent of the ART pilot is to improve safety, and feelings of safety, among NZ Police and members of the public. The key evaluation objective is to provide an independent evaluation of whether the introduction of ARTs within the current operating environment achieves this objective, and substantively improves the capability of our people to perform their duties safely.

The intent to deploy to incidents involving specific and unique threats and safety risks, or as part of pre-planned operations, provides an opportunity to survey perceptions of safety from the officers involved. The evaluation methodology can be broken down into two components: an operational component and a perceptual component. The core methods used in the evaluation will be:

1. qualitative analyses of deployment data across districts and incidents responded to (operational);
2. staff surveys focussing on the real or perceived impact of ARTs on police safety (perceptual);

3. staff survey focussing on the wellbeing of officers involved in, and supporting, ART deployment (perceptual).

Each of the three methods relies on a specific data collection method which are outlined next.

3.1 End of Deployment Forms

The End of Deployment (EOD) form is designed to collect basic information pertaining to the activities of ARTs. EOD forms should be completed by ART Team Leaders following each operation or call for service. The form has been designed to match the content typically collected by the Tactical Options Reports (TOR) and AOS Deployment forms. The amount of detail required to complete the EOD form depends on the capacity in which the ARTs were deployed. The intention is to place a lens on the preventative/public safety work the ARTs are involved in. Accordingly, the EOD form collates operational information that ordinarily would not require an AOS deployment form to be submitted but is essential to understanding the demand placed upon ARTs. If however, ARTs attend an event that is categorised as a Blue or full Black AOS deployment, the EOD form requires minimal input because the same information will be available through the AOS deployment form. This was implemented to avoid the doubling up of data entry.

To further facilitate data collection the EOD form can be accessed via the Checkpoint Application, which can be installed on all NZ Police mobile devices.

3.2 Officer Perception Surveys

Officer surveys were designed to measure perceptions around the safety and the effectiveness of ARTs. There are three surveys that are to be completed by different groups involved in an ART operation: the Armed Response Team Officers (ARTOs) themselves, any General Duties Branch (GDB) or Public Safety Team (PST) staff present at the event, and Communications staff involved in the event. These surveys should be completed following all ART operations and calls for service. The intention is to measure role specific perceptions, with each survey embedding a common set of questions that can be used to compare perceptions between each group.

Like the EOD form, the officer surveys can be accessed via the Checkpoint Application and are accessible throughout the pilot.

3.3 Officer Wellbeing Survey

The Officer Wellbeing Survey is designed to assess four dimensions relating to officer wellbeing: Mental Wellbeing, Psychological Distress, Burnout, and Perceived Stress. The survey is administered at three points in time:

- T1. Prior to pilot commencement;
- T2. Midway through pilot;
- T3. After cessation of pilot.

It is intended that all AOS members, across all districts, complete the survey at each time point. This is so comparisons can be made between ARTOs and AOS operators in districts where the pilot is not

running. The survey should also be completed by GDB/PST staff in the participating districts to assess the effect, if any, of having AOS staff move into full-time ART roles.

On **October 17 2019** the baseline Officer Wellbeing Survey was sent out to NZ Police Response and Operations for dissemination. The survey closed on **October 27 2019** at 11:00 pm after which no submissions could be made.

3.4 Data Preparation

The data presented in this report covers the period **October 28 2019** to **November 27 2019**. All EOD forms received by the EBPC were subsequently cross-referenced with CARD event logs. If a CARD event number matched an EOD event number then the incident was considered *CARD validated*. For all such cases, closure and result codes contained in the EOD form were changed to align with the CARD data. All non-validated events were discarded. This led to **42** EOD records being discarded for present analytical purposes; nevertheless, this ensures a degree of consistency between the numbers reported here and those generated through NZ Police Business Objects (BO) queries.

4. Results

4.1 End of Deployment Submissions

While there has been a steady stream of submissions received over the past month, the number of EOD forms received from each district varies considerably (see Figure 1). These discrepancies likely reflect a general under-reporting of deployment activity and selective reporting practices across each district. Over the past month there were **1,707** unique ART CARD events recorded across all districts. Of those events, only **234** could be matched with a CARD event (13.7%).

Breaking these numbers down across districts, **986** CARD events were attended by Waikato ART (57.8%), with Christchurch ART and Tamaki Makarau ART attending **454** (26.6%) and **267** (15.6%) events, respectively. Incidents in the Auckland region were predominantly located in Counties Manakau. While Waikato ART appear to be experiencing higher demand, only **46** EOD forms (19.7%) were received from this district. Submissions from Tamaki Makaurau were slightly better (**52** forms received; 22.2%), with Canterbury contributing a much greater proportion, submitting a total of **136** forms (58.1%). Relative to the volume of CARD events recorded for each district, Canterbury had the highest submission rate (29.5% of CARD events had an associated EOD form), followed next by Tamaki Makaurau (19.1%), and then Waikato (4.7%).

Across all districts, it does appear that 3T events tend not to be reported through the EOD form (see Figure 1; compare with the top 5 incidents based upon EOD records). In particular, Waikato responded to over 400 3T events. Given the frequency of these incidents it may not be pragmatic to submit an EOD form every single time. However, even if these incidents are excluded, submission rates are still quite low, particularly in the Waikato. Additionally, officers in Tamaki Makaurau (and Waikato to an extent) appear more conservative with their reporting, only submitting EODs when incidents have ostensibly escalated to a blue role. Alternatively, it could be that jobs listed as blue roles are actually PST-like jobs. In either case, these reporting practices will underestimate the amount of preventative/public safety work the ARTs are attending in these districts.





Figure 1: End of Deployment (EOD) forms received by the EBPC across the three trial districts. Note that these numbers are based upon CARD validated EOD submissions. Also displayed are the top 5 closure codes based upon CARD records and EOD submissions.

To further examine this, EOD submissions listed as either Blue or Black jobs were cross-referenced with AOS deployments recorded over the same period. In total, there were **38** AOS deployments recorded across the pilot districts, far fewer than the **75** Blue/Black roles recorded via the EOD form. Of the 38 AOS deployments, only **10** could be matched to a CARD validated EOD form¹. This indicates that many deployments listed as Blue or Black roles are incorrectly categorised.

From an evaluation point of view this is problematic because complete data is not available for a large number of deployments. If a job is listed as Blue or Black in the EOD form, minimal information is collected because it is expected that all necessary information will be available from the AOS deployment form. However, if the job did not meet criteria for a Blue/Black AOS deployment, then information is lost because an AOS deployment form will not have been completed. It is also possible that the EOD form is being completed knowing that less input is required if the role is set to Blue or Black. If such practices are being undertaken, this compromises the fullness of the data available to the EBPC and will undermine the evaluation.

Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982

Recommendation 3: The importance and necessity to complete the survey tools needs to be better communicated by national and district leadership.



5. Summary

Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982

First, there are inconsistencies in the rate and quality of data submitted through the EOD forms. Canterbury regularly submit EOD forms with Waikato submitting comparatively fewer, despite having the highest demand. Additionally, differences in how ART deployments are perceived have likely skewed the number of Blue, Black, and PST-like roles reported by each district. These inconsistencies provide a false impression of the operational demands across the districts and will preclude reasonable comparisons being made in the future.

Second, a core component of the evaluation is whether officers feel safer with ARTs in attendance. Evaluation thus requires officers to adequately engage with the survey instruments. In light of the number of EOD forms submitted (and ignoring the fraction of the total incidents it represents) the observed response rates are unsatisfactory. No analyses can be undertaken at this stage.

Finally, response rates for the officer wellbeing survey were moderate. While a useable cross-section of AOS members responded from the trial districts, responses from general duties and frontline officers was variable, providing a weak baseline for this cohort. Response were also received from non-trial districts, though submissions could not be reliably matched to AOS members in those districts, thereby limiting analyses to trial districts only. AOS and frontline officers did not differ on either dimension of wellbeing measured.

While it is acknowledged that the amount of data entry required during the pilot can be cumbersome and overwhelming, the quality of the evaluation depends ultimately upon the quality of data. Practices that shortcut the data collection process need to be avoided.

To summarise, the following recommendations are made to ensure the evaluation remains as robust as possible:

Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982

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Armed Response Team (ART) Pilot

Monthly Evaluation Report

Evidence Based Policing Centre

January 2020

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Glossary of Terms

AOS	Armed Offenders Squad
ART	Armed Response Team
ARTO	Armed Response Team Officer
EBPC	Evidence Based Policing Centre
EOD	End of Deployment
GDB	General Duties Branch
PST	Public Safety Team
TOR	Tactical Options Report

Index of Incident Codes

1C	Car/Person Acting Suspiciously
1X	Threatens/Attempts Suicide
2I	Information
2W	Arrest Warrant (Other)
3M	Directed Patrol
3T	Turnover
4Q	Enquiry/Investigation
4X	Execute Search Warrant
5F	Family Harm
5K	Bail Check
1710	Intimidation/Threats
3530	Disorder
6820	Firearms Offences

1. Executive Summary

This brief report provides a process evaluation of the data collection pipelines for the Armed Response Team (ART) pilot currently being undertaken by New Zealand Police (NZ Police). The report considers data received by the Evidence Based Policing Centre (EBPC) during the first two months of the trial period. Analysis of End of Deployment (EOD) form submission rates indicated that the volume of data received by the EBPC improved significantly, though underreporting of deployment activity remained apparent. Nonetheless, the overall consistency of deployment reporting had also improved but further efforts are required to achieve absolute consistency across all districts. Improvements were also noted in the number of surveys that were completed, suggesting an enhanced level of engagement with the survey tools despite the overall responses rates remaining fairly low. Ongoing efforts are required to ensure a sufficient sample will be available for evaluation. The data available, however, did allow for a high level descriptive analysis around perceptions of safety for Armed Response Team and Public Safety Team officers. Early indicators suggested that both cohorts feel safer at incidents they have jointly attended, though a more robust analysis of the data is required. Finally, a reliable baseline is reported for the Officer Wellbeing Survey. Recommendations are made to improve the quality of data collection to ensure a robust evaluation.

Summary of Findings

- Improved volume of data received by the EBPC, though underreporting of deployment activity remained apparent;
- Improved engagement with survey tools from ART and PST staff. Communications staff engagement still low;
- Based upon available survey data, tentative indications that ART and PST feel safer when jointly attending incidents;
- Data from the officer wellbeing survey provides a suitable baseline for future comparisons.

2. Introduction

On 30 August 2019, NZ Police's Executive Leadership Board (ELB) approved a proof of concept pilot for Armed Response Teams (ART). ARTs consist of a small number of highly trained specialists (members of New Zealand's Armed Offenders Squad) who provide a rapid tactical response to critical incidents, while also providing assistance and support to frontline officers. The ART Pilot began on 28 October 2019 and is scheduled to run for 6 months, ending April 2020, and will be operating across Counties Manakau, Waikato, and Canterbury for the duration of the pilot. The purpose of the proof of concept is to consider whether and how ARTs could be introduced on a permanent basis to provide enhanced tactical support to the frontline in real time, thereby increasing the safety of our staff and communities. The EBPC has been tasked with providing an independent evaluation of a pilot.

3. Methods

The underlying intent of the ART pilot is to improve safety, and feelings of safety, among NZ Police and members of the public. The key evaluation objective is to provide an independent evaluation of whether the introduction of ARTs within the current operating environment achieves this objective, and substantively improves the capability of our people to perform their duties safely.

The intent to deploy to incidents involving specific and unique threats and safety risks, or as part of pre-planned operations, provides an opportunity to survey perceptions of safety from the officers involved. The evaluation methodology can be broken down into two components: an operational component and a perceptual component. The core methods used in the evaluation will be:

1. qualitative analyses of deployment data across districts and incidents responded to (operational);
2. staff surveys focussing on the real or perceived impact of ARTs on police safety (perceptual);
3. staff survey focussing on the wellbeing of officers involved in, and supporting, ART deployment (perceptual).

Each of the three methods relies on a specific data collection method which are outlined next.

3.1 End of Deployment Forms

The End of Deployment (EOD) form is designed to collect basic information pertaining to the activities of ARTs. EOD forms should be completed by ART Team Leaders following each operation or call for service. The form has been designed to match the content typically collected by the Tactical Options Reports (TOR) and AOS Deployment forms. The amount of detail required to complete the EOD form depends on the capacity in which the ARTs were deployed. The intention is to place a lens on the preventative/public safety work the ARTs are involved in. Accordingly, the EOD form collates operational information that ordinarily would not require an AOS deployment form to be submitted but is essential to understanding the demand placed upon ARTs. If however, ARTs attend an event that is categorised as a Blue or full Black AOS deployment, the EOD form requires minimal input because the same information will be available through the AOS deployment form. This was implemented to avoid the doubling up of data entry.

To further facilitate data collection the EOD form can be accessed via the Checkpoint Application, which can be installed on all NZ Police mobile devices.

3.2 Officer Perception Surveys

Officer surveys were designed to measure perceptions around the safety and the effectiveness of ARTs. There are three surveys that are to be completed by different groups involved in an ART operation: the Armed Response Team Officers (ARTOs) themselves, any General Duties Branch (GDB) or Public Safety Team (PST) staff present at the event, and Communications staff involved in the event. These surveys should be completed following all ART operations and calls for service. The intention is to measure role specific perceptions, with each survey embedding a common set of questions that can be used to compare perceptions between each group.

Table 1: Number of End of Deployment (EOD) forms submitted across the pilot districts.

Month	Canterbury	Tamaki Makaurau	Waikato	Total
Oct 28 – Nov 27	139	52	46	237
Nov 28 – Dec 27	152	60	121	333
Total	291	112	167	570

Like the EOD form, the officer surveys can be accessed via the Checkpoint Application and are accessible throughout the pilot.

3.3 Officer Wellbeing Survey

The Officer Wellbeing Survey is designed to assess four dimensions relating to officer wellbeing: Mental Wellbeing, Psychological Distress, Burnout, and Perceived Stress. The survey is administered at three points in time:

T1. Prior to pilot commencement;

T2. Midway through pilot;

T3. After cessation of pilot.

It is intended that all AOS members, across all districts, complete the survey at each time point. This is so comparisons can be made between ARTOs and AOS operators in districts where the pilot is not running. The survey should also be completed by GDB/PST staff in the participating districts to assess the effect, if any, of having AOS staff move into full-time ART roles.

On **October 17 2019** the baseline Officer Wellbeing Survey was sent out to NZ Police Response and Operations for dissemination. The survey closed on **October 27 2019** at 11:00 pm after which no submissions could be made.

4. Results

4.1 ART Deployments

The deployment data presented in this report covers the period **October 28 2019** to **December 27 2019**. All time periods are relative to the pilot start date. All EOD forms received by the EBPC were subsequently cross-referenced with CARD event logs. If a CARD event number matched an EOD event number then the incident was considered CARD validated. For all such cases, closure and result codes contained in the EOD form were changed to align with the CARD data. All non-validated events were discarded. This led to **68** EOD records being removed; nevertheless, this ensures a degree of consistency between the numbers reported here and those generated through NZ Police Business Objects (BO) queries. Note that the values reported here may differ slightly from those

reported in the preliminary report. This is because relevant data was received after the publication of the initial report. Numbers reported here, then, are complete and should be referred to.

Note also that, though Counties Manakau is formally specified as the trial district, teams in this district will often attend incidents in Auckland City and Waitematā occasionally. Accordingly, for reporting purposes Counties Manakau ART are referred to using the broader Tamaki Makaurau label.

4.1.1 CARD Events

In total, **3,407** unique ART CARD events were recorded across all trial districts. Breaking these numbers down by districts, Waikato ART attended **1,978** events (58.1%) – the largest number by some margin – with Canterbury and Tamaki Makaurau ART attending **867** (25.4%) and **562** (16.5%) events, respectively. When considered on a per month basis, observed demand decreased slightly in Month 2 (**1,662**; 49%) when compared to Month 1 (**1,745**; 51%). This generally held across all districts, with both Waikato (1,011 vs 967) and Canterbury (463 vs 404) experiencing decreases, whereas demand marginally increased for Tamaki Makaurau (271 vs 291). Given that only two time points are available it cannot be determined whether this decrease is meaningful or not. Additional data is required to make such a determination.

4.1.2 End of Deployment Submissions

At present, the EBPC has received a total of **570** EOD forms. Table 1 (previous page) shows how the submission are broken down across trial district and month. Notably, there was an upturn in the number of EOD submissions received during Month 2 (**333**; 58.4%). This increase was likely driven by a significant growth in submissions received from Waikato during Month 2¹, along with a slight increase in submission from Canterbury. Specifically, Waikato submitted 121 EOD forms (36.3%) in Month 2 (compared to only 46 in Month 1), resulting in an overall submission rate of 29.3% (**167** submissions in total). Note that while there were numerical increase in EOD submissions from Canterbury and Tamaki Makaurau, their respective submission rates declined in Month 2 (Canterbury dropped from 58.6% to 45.6% and Tamaki Makaurau 21.9% to 18%). This ought to be expected, however, given Waikato are now accounting for a greater number of submissions. Nevertheless, Canterbury contributed the greatest proportion overall, submitting a total of 291 forms (51.1%), with Tamaki Makaurau submitting a total of 112 forms (19.6%).

When broken down by role type, it can be seen that Waikato have significantly increased the number of PST-assist deployments (Figure 1; Orange bars). This is the result of clarifying criteria around the specification of a blue role deployment. Accordingly, this has brought the number of submissions across role type more in line with those seen in Canterbury. Tamaki Makaurau have also increased their numbers of PST-assist submissions, though to a lesser degree, and still accounts for the majority of blue role deployments.

4.1.3 End of Deployment Conversion Rate

Next, it is useful to consider the number of EOD forms submitted relative to the number of CARD events recorded. This is simply estimated using the ratio of received EOD forms to recorded CARD events.

Necessarily, the observed increase in submission rates translate to an increased conversion rate. During Month 2 the conversion rate was estimated at 20%, reflecting a 6.4% increase on the estimate

¹ See Technical Appendix: End of Deployment (EOD) submission for details.




Figure 1: The number of EOD forms received from each district, broken down by deployment role.

from Month 1 (13.6%). The overall conversion rate for the current period was estimated at 16.7%, indicating that approximately 17% of all incidents that ARTs attend are being submitted to the EBPC via the EOD form. Across the districts, Waikato increased their conversion rate from 4.5% in Month 1 to 12.5% in Month 2, with an overall conversion rate of 8.4%. Notably, Canterbury also increased their conversion rate, jumping to 37.6% in Month 2 from 30% in Month 1, with an overall conversion rate of 34%. Finally, Tamaki Makaurau increased modestly to 20.6% in Month 2 from 19.2% in Month 1, with an overall conversion rate of 19.9%.

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


Figure 2: Top 5 closure codes based upon CARD records (top panel) and EOD submission (EOD). Note that EOD numbers are based upon CARD validated EOD submissions.

pool that does include these incidents. Conversation rates are next considered with the influence of 3T events removed, providing an adjusted ratio of the CARD to EOD reports.

Removal of 3T incidents sees the number of CARD events shrink to **2,436** incidents, which are fairly evenly spread across Month 1 (**1,205**; 49.5%) and Month 2 (**1,231**; 50.5%). Across the districts, Waikato still attended the greatest number (**1,160**; 47.6%), followed next by Canterbury (**752**; 30.9%) and then Tamaki Makaurau (**524**; 21.5%). With respect to conversion rate, the adjusted estimate for Month 2 now sits at 27.1%, reflecting a 7.4% increase over the adjusted Month 1 estimate (19.7%), with the adjusted overall conversion rate sitting at 23.4%. What this indicates is, of the pool of CARD events where deployment activities have been reported, on average a little more than one-in-five deployments are actually submitted to the EBPC.

At the district level, the adjusted conversion rate for Waikato increases from 8.3% in Month 1 to 19.9% in Month 2, with an overall conversion rate of 14.4. Canterbury also increased their adjusted conversion rate, jumping to 44.7% in Month 2 from 33.7% in Month 1, with an overall conversion rate of 38.7%. Finally, Tamaki Makaurau remained quite stable, dropping slightly from 21.7% in Month 1 to 21.1% in Month 2, with an overall conversion rate of 21.4%.

4.1.4 Summary and Recommendations

There have been evident improvements in the number of EOD submissions received by the EBPC. Additionally, there also appears to be better consistency in how deployments roles are defined which

has resulted in a larger number of jobs recorded as PST-assist. From an evaluation point of view this is encouraging because it increases the amount of data directly received by the EBPC. It is recommended that these reporting practices are maintained to ensure data quality and integrity. However, there is still a level of underreporting that, while not posing an immediate problem, means that a complete picture is not available. As a fraction of the number of incidents ARTs have been deployed to, the number of EOD forms received by the EBPC is still quite low (~17%). A supplementary analysis that adjusted the conversion rates by removing 3T events yielded a more favourable result, yet only one-in-five deployments are being reported, on average. These numbers do vary across the districts – with Canterbury faring the best of the three – though a level of consistency is desirable.

The supplementary analysis also raises another issue around reporting processes. Principally, a decision needs to be made regarding the absence of reporting on 3T incidents. As previously mentioned, there are pragmatic reasons for not submitting an EOD form for every 3T incident, though clarity needs to be established on whether these incidents form part of the deployment analysis or should be omitted altogether.

4.2 Officer Perception Surveys

It is expected that officer perception surveys are completed following all ART operations and calls for service. Notably, there have been some improvement in the number of survey completions. Moreover, the numbers in hand allow for a preliminary analysis on how safe officers feel. At this stage, however, only a high level summary of the survey results can be provided and are necessarily limited in scope. In particular, the results provided below are not broken down across districts. Accordingly, a formal analysis is required in order to draw more statistically robust insights and will follow in subsequent reports.

4.2.1 Armed Response Team Officer Survey

The ART Officer Survey has been viewed a total of **74** times with all individuals consenting to participate. Of those, **40** individuals have submitted a completed, or partially completed, survey. This reflects a significant increase in survey engagement (only three surveys had been completed in Month 1).

To summarise the results, **80%** of ARTOs believed the incident was likely to have handled differently without their assistance. Overall, **63.2%** of officers answered “strongly agree” when asked whether they felt safer at the incidents they attended, with **60.5%** strongly agreeing that the incident was dealt with more efficiently with their assistance. When asked whether the presence of the ART deescalated the incident, the majority of officers tended to agree with this statement (**39.5%**); however, there was some variability in the distribution of responses.

4.2.2 Public Safety Team Officer Survey

The PST Officer Survey has been viewed a total of **132** times with all but one individual consenting to participate. Of those, **70** individuals submitted a completed, or partially completed, survey. This reflects a sizeable increase in survey engagement (only four surveys had been completed the survey in Month 1).

To summarise the results, **60.6%** of officers believed the incident was likely to have handled differently without the Armed Response Team in attendance. Overall, **65.1%** of officers answered “strongly agree” when asked whether they felt safer at incidents where ARTs were present. Similarly, **69.7%** of officers answered “strongly agree” when asked whether the incident was dealt with more efficiently with the ARTs in attendance. When asked whether the presence of the ART deescalated the incident, responses were more widely distributed than the ARTO responses, with the majority of officers responding “neither agree nor disagree” (**40%**). Nevertheless, **73.8%** of officers strongly agreed when asked whether they were satisfied with the assistance provided by the ART. Finally, **80%** of officers strongly agreed when asked whether they are likely to request assistance from the ART in the future.

4.2.3 Communications Staff Survey

The communications staff survey has been viewed a total of **10** times. Of those, nine individuals consented to participate in the survey; however, only two individuals answered all questions, with the remaining choosing not to engage. At this stage a reliable analysis cannot be undertaken on the data in hand.

4.2.4 Summary, Recommendations, and Limitations

Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982




Based upon the data available, there is some tentative suggestion that both PST and ART officers feel safer at incidents they have jointly attended. Moreover, there appears to be some indication that the presence of ARTs has a de-escalating effect. However, as previously mentioned, the summaries reported above are merely descriptive and statistical analyses are required to draw firmer conclusion.

Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982






 The second is the possible tendency to capriciously complete surveys following particular incidents. For example, surveys may only be completed when there is something positive to say about ARTs (or the converse case: when there is something negative to say about ARTs). The problem, though, is the data becomes biased because individuals are picking and choosing when to complete surveys. In order to mitigate this possibility officers are encouraged to be as honest and transparent as possible. For example, submitting surveys following incidents where an individual felt unsafe will help create a more rounded data set and ensure that fairer comparisons can be made between all groups.

4.3 Officer Wellbeing Survey Baseline Results

In total, 236 Wellbeing surveys were completed. However, 25 surveys were removed owing to multiple QID records. Multiple submissions were received from 11 QIDs, with one officer completing the survey four times, and another three times. Given response variability among the surveys supplied by the same individual, all QIDs with multiple submissions were removed from the data because it is unclear which submission should be used. This left a total of 211 unique survey responses. It was expected that the entire national cohort of AOS staff complete the wellbeing survey. Collection of QIDs was necessary to match submissions to AOS members. Once matched, QIDs were encrypted and could not be used for identification purposes. All responses from individuals in non-participating districts that could not be matched to a valid QID were discarded. This left a total of 188 participants for analysis.

4.3.1 Demographics

The baseline sample consisted predominantly of male responders (178; 94.6%) with the majority of female participants coming from general duties branch (8; 80%). The mean age was 38.8 years (SD = 8.5 years) and an officer had an average of 12.7 years of service (SD = 7.93 years).

4.3.2 Armed Offender Squad Wellbeing

Considered first are the responses collected from AOS operators across the country. The average responses for each question – grouped by dimension – are displayed in Figure 2. In general, AOS staff reported low to moderate levels of burnout, psychological distress, and perceived stress, with fairly high levels of general wellbeing (see Table 2 for estimated means across groups and dimension). While there was some variability among the responses provided within each dimension, it can be appreciated that the response profiles from both groups are remarkably similar. Accordingly, average response for each dimension did not differ statistically between the two groups². This indicates that experienced levels of burnout, psychological distress, and perceived stress, and general wellbeing were identical for AOS members in participating and non-participating districts.




Figure 2: Mean response to all questions that comprise each dimension for AOS officers in trial districts (dark blue lines) and non-trial districts (light blue lines).

² See Technical Appendix: Officer Wellbeing Survey for details.


Table 2: Estimated Marginal Means for AOS Officers in Participating and Non-Participating Districts based upon Probit Cumulative Link Model.

	Non-Participating Districts				Participating Districts			
	Mean ^a	SE	Lower	Upper	Mean	SE	Lower	Upper
Burnout	-2.41	.19	-2.78	-2.04	-2.27	.27	-2.80	-1.75
Distress	-3.25	.18	-3.60	-2.91	-2.96	.22	-3.39	-2.53
Stress	-2.12	.13	-2.38	-1.86	-1.95	.18	-2.31	-1.59
Wellbeing	1.51	.18	1.16	1.86	1.42	.25	.93	1.90

^a Estimated means are on the probit scale $[-\infty, \infty]$ and reflect normalised values under the assumption that the data are normally distributed. Accordingly, negative values indicate low levels of the experience or perceived attribute and positive numbers indicate higher levels.

Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982





5. Summary

Examination of EOD submission rates observed in Month 2 indicated that the volume of data received by the EBPC improved significantly. However, some underreporting of deployment activity remained apparent. Despite this, the overall consistency of deployment reporting had improved, though further efforts are required to achieve absolute consistency across all districts.

Improvements were also noted in the number of surveys that were completed. This suggested better engagement with the survey tools, though the overall response rates were still considerably low. However, the data available did permit a descriptive analysis and indicated that both Armed Response Team and Public Safety Team officers feel safer at incidents they have jointly attended.

Finally, a reliable baseline was established for the officer wellbeing survey. A usable cross section of AOS operators from across the country participated in the survey. This accordingly means that a comparison can be made between the wellbeing of ART officers with those AOS officers in non-trial districts. However, responses from general duties and frontline officers was variable, providing a weaker, but nonetheless serviceable, baseline for this cohort.

Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982

Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982

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These will be discussed at the next Armed Response Team Working Group Meeting.

6. Technical Appendix

6.1 End of Deployment (EOD) Submissions

A simple test to determine whether a reliable change in monthly submission rate exists is to use the rates observed in Month 1 to predict the expected number of submission in Month 2. This test is often implemented as a Chi Square Goodness of Fit (GOF) test where the expected frequencies are based upon some known, possibly theoretical, probabilities. Instead of the Chi Square GOF test, here the alternative G-test is used and is calculated as follows

$$G = 2 \sum_{i=1}^K O_i \cdot \ln\left(\frac{O_i}{E_i}\right)$$

where $E_i = p_i \cdot N$ is the expected number of submission from each district in Month 2, p_i denotes the district-level submission rates observed in Month 1, O_i is the number of submissions observed in each district in Month 2, and N is the total number of submissions received in Month 2.

In principle, the test statistic is a likelihood ratio where the expected frequencies (calculated using the previously estimated probabilities) serve as the null hypothesis against which the newly observed data are compared. Moreover, in the limit the test statistic follows a Chi Square distribution with $K - 1$ degrees of freedom (K denotes the number of cells; here, this refers to the number of trial districts).

Application of this test revealed a statistically significant difference in the number of submission received in Month 2, $G_{(2)} = 51.9$, $p < .001$. That is, the observed number of submission received from each district differed the expected number based upon the submission rates estimated during Month 1. Unfortunately, the test cannot definitely isolate the nexus of the difference, though it can be reasonably assumed that the large upturn in submissions observed in Waikato is contributing toward the effect.

6.2 Officer Wellbeing Survey: Baseline Analysis

To establish the baseline measures for officer wellbeing a Cumulative Link Model (CLM) with a probit link function (ordinal probit regression) was fit to the participants rating responses. These model acknowledge the ordinal nature of the data while making the assumption that ratings a normally distributed. The models are fit via maximum likelihood estimation and implemented using the Ordinal package in R.

At the present, each model contains two effects of interest. For convenience these will simply be referred to as effect A and effect B. Cumulative link models are related to generalised linear models (GLM) and thereby are not strictly linear. Accordingly, a simply Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) cannot be used to infer whether an effect is statistically reliable. Instead, tests of effects proceeded using likelihood ratio tests, which compares the maximised likelihood of the two model of interest. This requires four model to be fit to the response data (doing so for each wellbeing dimension separately):

$M_1: Y = b_0 + b_A X_A$	simple effect of A
$M_2: Y = b_0 + b_B X_B$	simple effect of B
$M_3: Y = b_0 + b_A X_A + b_B X_B$	main effect of A and B
$M_4: Y = b_0 + b_A X_A + b_B X_B + b_{AB} X_A X_B$	full (interaction) model

Each model further included random effects for district and participant. This makes allowances for the fact that respondents are based in different districts and therefore the district level data are based upon responses from a different group of individuals. This specification applied regardless of the fixed effects included in the model (see below).

All model comparisons imposed the constraint that terms cannot be omitted if a higher order term depends upon its inclusion (thus obeying the marginality principle assumed when undertaking Type II sums of squares tests). The test statistic is defined using the ratio of the alternative model, M_1 , and the nominal null model, M_0 , and is written as $D = -2 \log(\Lambda)$, where

$$\Lambda = \frac{\mathcal{L}(\Theta_0 | M_0)}{\mathcal{L}(\Theta_1 | M_1)}$$

is the likelihood ratio of the two models being compared. Note that the null model must be parameterised using a subset of the parameter space defining the alternative model; i.e., $\Theta_0 \subset \Theta_1$. In the limit the test statistic follows a Chi Square distribution with degrees of freedom is equal to the difference in the dimensionality of the two model.

6.2.1 Armed Offender Squad Wellbeing

The first test is to determine whether there were any differences in wellbeing between AOS officers in trial districts versus those in non-trial districts. Here the fixed factors were whether an officer belonged to a trial district (binary coded as 1 for Yes and 0 for No) and the dimension related question.

Likelihood ratio tests indicated that a simple model including only an effect of question provided the best fit to the response data, indicating simply that respondents did not provide the same rating to each question. Response heterogeneity was evident across all wellbeing dimensions: burnout, $\chi^2_{(6)} = 267.23$, $p < .001$; psychological distress, $\chi^2_{(9)} = 509.09$, $p < .001$; perceived stress, $\chi^2_{(7)} = 422.72$, $p < .001$; and general wellbeing, $\chi^2_{(4)} = 130.13$, $p < .001$. Despite the variability among questions, the response profiles – i.e., the pattern of responses across all dimension specific questions – was remarkably consistent. Accordingly, entering trial district into the model did not improve the overall fit to the data, thereby indicating that the average response was not statistically different between the two groups on any wellbeing dimension: burnout, $\chi^2_{(1)} = .21$, $p = .65$; psychological distress, $\chi^2_{(1)} = 1.53$, $p = .22$; perceived stress, $\chi^2_{(1)} = .67$, $p = .41$; and general wellbeing, $\chi^2_{(1)} = .11$, $p = .74$. The

absence of any interaction effect further confirms the homogeneity of response profiles between AOS officers in trial and non-trial districts.

6.2.2 Armed Response Team versus General Duties Wellbeing

Next was an assessment of whether the wellbeing of ART officers differed from those of general duties officers. Here the fixed factors were whether the officer was an ART member or general duties (binary coded as before) and the dimension related question.

As above, likelihood ratio tests indicated that a simple model including only an effect of question provided the best fit to the response data and response heterogeneity was evident across all wellbeing dimensions: burnout: $\chi^2_{(6)} = 200.65, p < .001$; psychological distress: $\chi^2_{(9)} = 379.22, p < .001$; perceived stress: $\chi^2_{(7)} = 280.26, p < .001$; and general wellbeing: $\chi^2_{(4)} = 95.13, p < .001$. Again, the response profiles were consistent between the two groups, producing no statistically significant differences on any of the wellbeing dimensions: burnout, $\chi^2_{(1)} = .08, p = .78$; psychological distress, $\chi^2_{(1)} = 1.91, p = .17$; perceived stress, $\chi^2_{(1)} = .10, p = .75$; and general wellbeing, $\chi^2_{(1)} = .80, p = .37$. The absence of any interaction effect further confirms the homogeneity of response profiles between AOS and general duties officers.

Handling Instructions

This document is classified **IN CONFIDENCE**

All **IN CONFIDENCE** information (including data) should clearly identify the originating government agency and date.

Electronic transmission	<p>IN CONFIDENCE data can be transmitted across external or public networks but the level of information contained should be assessed before using clear text.</p> <p>Username/Password access control and/or encryption may be advisable (with the aim of maintaining public confidence in public agencies).</p>
Manual transmission	<p>May be carried by ordinary postal service or commercial courier firm as well as mail delivery staff in a single closed envelope.</p> <p>The envelope must clearly show a return address in case delivery is unsuccessful. In some cases involving privacy concerns, identifying the originating department may be inappropriate and a return PO Box alone should be used.</p>
Storage and disposal	<p>IN CONFIDENCE information can be secured using the normal building security and door-swipe card systems that aim simply to keep the public out of administrative areas of government departments.</p> <p>Must be disposed of by departmental arrangements.</p>

Armed Response Team Evaluation Plan & Methodology

Evaluation Objectives

The underlying intent of the Armed Response Team (ART) pilot is to improve safety, and feelings of safety, among NZ Police and members of the public. The key evaluation objective is to provide an independent evaluation of whether the introduction of ARTs within the current operating environment achieves this objective, and substantively improves the capability of our people to perform their duties safely.

Proposed Methodology

The intent to deploy to incidents involving specific and unique threats and safety risks, or as part of pre-planned operations, provides an opportunity to survey perceptions of safety from both the officers and communities involved.

The core methods used in the evaluation will be:

1. qualitative analyses of deployment data across districts and incidents responded to;
2. staff surveys focussing on the real or perceived impact of ARTs on police safety;
3. staff survey focussing on the wellbeing of officers involved in, and supporting, ART deployment.

End of Deployment Forms

The End of Deployment (EOD) form is designed to collect basic information pertaining to the activities of ARTs. EOD forms should be completed by ART Team Leaders following each operation or call for service. The form has been designed to match the content typically collected by the Tactical Options Reports (TOR) and AOS Deployment forms (see Appendix A6). The amount of detail required to complete the EOD form depends on the capacity in which the ARTs were deployed. The intention is to place a lens on the preventative/public safety work the ARTs are involved in. Accordingly, the EOD form collates operational information that ordinarily would not require an AOS deployment form to be submitted but is essential to understanding the demand placed upon ARTs. If however, ARTs attend an event that is categorised as a Blue or full Black AOS deployment, the EOD form requires minimal input because the same information will be available through the AOS deployment form. This was implemented to avoid the doubling up of data entry.

To further facilitate data collection the EOD form can be accessed via the Checkpoint Application, which can be installed on all NZ Police mobile devices.

Shift Analysis

The data collection forms will help provide a sense of the demand and use of ARTs. It will further allow the EBPC to perform a shift analysis to examine how the deployment and activity of the ARTs is distributed across rostered shifts, days, weeks, and months. It is from this that potential high demand times can be identified and used to refine scheduling of deployments and patrols. This will be contrasted across the participating districts to determine whether there is more or less demand within each. The demand for ARTs can be contrasted with calls for service across non-participating districts.

Monitoring Deployment

A number of indicators will be recorded that provide insights into the circumstances under which the ART was deployed or used and the effectiveness of the ART emergency response (i.e., an assessment of response times). Moreover, job codes can be monitored to determine the types of incidents that were most attended. It will also be possible to examine how often there were calls for service outside of the patrol district.

Monitoring of Tactical Options and Use of Force

Data collection forms will also permit a monitoring of whether there are any changes in the numbers or type of tactical options used. For example, use of TASER may drop owing to a de-escalation effect of ART presence while an increase use of sponge rounds increases.

Monitoring of Injuries

Collecting injury reports directly will provide a better indicator around any injuries sustained to ART staff, PST staff, and the public. It can further be used to provide an idea of whether the presence of ARTs had a de-escalating effect.

Survey Measures

A total of three survey measures will be used to provide an index of perceptions around safety and operational effectiveness, while also attempting to monitor the wellbeing of ART staff.

Officer Perception Surveys

Officer surveys were designed to measure perceptions around the safety and the effectiveness of ARTs. There are three surveys that are to be completed by different groups involved in an ART operation: the Armed Response Team Officers (ARTOs) themselves, any General Duties Branch (GDB) or Public Safety Team (PST) staff present at the event, and Communications staff involved in the event. These surveys should be completed following all ART operations and calls for service. The intention is to measure role specific perceptions, with each survey embedding a common set of questions that can be used to compare perceptions between each group (compare Appendix A7-A9).

Like the EOD form, the officer surveys can be accessed via the Checkpoint Application and are accessible throughout the pilot.

Wellbeing

The Officer Wellbeing Survey is designed to assess four dimensions relating to officer wellbeing: Mental Wellbeing, Psychological Distress, Burnout, and Perceived Stress. The survey is administered at three points in time:

- T1. Prior to pilot commencement;
- T2. Midway through pilot;
- T3. After cessation of pilot.

The survey will be sent to all AOS members, across all districts, at each time point. The intention is to compare the wellbeing of AOS staff in the districts where the pilot is running against with the wellbeing of members in the districts where the pilot is not running. The survey will also be completed by general duties staff in the participating districts to assess the effect, if any, of having AOS staff move into full-time ART roles.

The *Officer Wellbeing Survey* (see Appendix A10) is a 30 question survey that assesses four dimensions relating to officer wellbeing and is an amalgam of four independent inventories.

Mental Wellbeing. Mental wellbeing is measured using the World Health Organisation- Five Well-Being Index (WHO-5) and is a short self-reported measure of current mental wellbeing. Since its first publication in 1998, the WHO-5 has been translated into several languages and has been validated on a number of clinical and non-clinical populations. The scale has demonstrated validity as a screening tool for depression and has been reliably used as an outcome measure in both clinical trials and in applied research settings (see Topp et al., 2015).

Psychological Distress. The Kessler-10 (K10) is a short self-report measure of non-specific psychological distress in the general population, based on questions about the level of nervousness, agitation, psychological fatigue, and depression. The measure has been validated on both clinical and non-clinical populations and has adequate reliability and validity (for example, see Furukawa et al., 2012).

Burnout. The Maslach Burnout Inventory (MBI) is a self-report measure relating to occupational burnout. It measures three dimensions of burnout, each measured using a single sub-scale: emotional exhaustion, depersonalisation, and personal accomplishment. The inventory has been used widely across a number of occupations and exists in various forms and has adequate reliability and validity (see Wheeler et al., 2011). For the present survey burnout is measured using a modified version of the emotional exhaustion subscale.

Perceived Stress. The Perceived Stress Scale (PSS-10) is a self-report measure that assesses the extent to which one's life is perceived as stressful. The scale has been broadly applied and is a common tool in the assessment of non-specific perceived stress. The scale was originally constructed with 14 items though the shorter 10 items version has satisfactory reliability and validity (see Taylor, 2015).

Information and Consent

Prior to any data collection, informed consent must be obtained from each officer. Accordingly, individuals will be asked to read an information sheet that details the scope of the evaluation and how their data will be handled (see Appendices A1 – A4). Officers will indicate their willingness to participate having signed the relevant consent form (Appendix A5).

References

- Furukawa, T. A., Kessler, R. C., Slade, T., & Andrews, G. (2003). The performance of the K6 and K10 screening scales for psychological distress in the Australian National Survey of Mental Health and Well-Being. *Psychological Medicine*, *33*, 357-362.
- Taylor, J. M. (2015). Psychometric analysis of the Ten-Item Perceived Stress Scale. *Psychological assessment*, *27*, 90.
- Topp, C. W., Østergaard, S. D., Søndergaard, S., & Bech, P. (2015). The WHO-5 Well-Being Index: a systematic review of the literature. *Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics*, *84*, 167-176.
- Wheeler, D. L., Vassar, M., Worley, J. A., & Barnes, L. L. (2011). A reliability generalization meta-analysis of coefficient alpha for the Maslach Burnout Inventory. *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, *71*, 231-244.

- A1. Information Sheet for PST Officer Survey
- A2. Information Sheet for ART Officer Survey
- A3. Information Sheet for Communications Staff Survey
- A4. Information Sheet for Officer Wellbeing Survey
- A5. Consent Form
- A6. End of Deployment Form
- A7. PST Officer Survey
- A8. ART Officer Survey
- A9. Communications Staff Survey
- A10. Officer Wellbeing Survey

A1. Information Sheet for PST Officer Survey

Armed Response Teams (ART) is a new initiative within New Zealand Police and is currently being undertaken on a trial basis. The trial is running from the 28th October 2019 to 27th April 2020 across the Waikato, Canterbury, and Counties Manakau districts.

As part of this, the Evidence Based Policing Centre (EBPC) will be gathering information from staff involved in the trial. This involves collecting data from Armed Offenders Squad (AOS) officers participating in the pilot and police staff in participating districts.

You should complete this survey if you recently attended an operation or a call for service where ART staff were in attendance.

What is the purpose of this survey?

The purpose of this survey is to collect information regarding the ARTs attendance at an operation or a call for service. This information will be compiled and provided to the Executive Leadership Board (ELB) to establish the perceived effectiveness of the ART and identify where possible improvements could be made.

How will the information be managed?

The information you choose to provide will be compiled and published in a report and forwarded to the ELB. Whilst personal information has been utilised to send you this invitation, no identifying information will be disseminated in any report relating to the pilot. All data will be anonymised, reported in aggregate form, and will not be passed on to any other person or agency unless required by law.

The data you choose to provide will not be used to evaluate your performance and will only be used by the EBPC for evaluation of this pilot.

Do I have to participate?

This survey is voluntary and you are under no obligation to participate. You may choose to withdraw at any time. Participation in this survey does not mean that you have to take part in any future data collection related to this project.

The survey should take approximately **5 minutes** to complete.

If you wish to see the results of the study, or you have any questions or concerns, email

Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982

A2. Information Sheet for ART Officer Survey

Armed Response Teams (ART) is a new initiative within New Zealand Police and is currently being undertaken on a trial basis. The trial is running from the 28th October 2019 to 27th April 2020 across the Waikato, Canterbury, and Counties Manakau districts.

As part of this, the Evidence Based Policing Centre (EBPC) will be gathering information from staff involved in the trial. This involves collecting data from Armed Offenders Squad (AOS) officers participating in the pilot and police staff in participating districts.

You should complete this survey if you were the team leader for a recent ART operation or call for service.

What is the purpose of this survey?

The purpose of this survey is to collect information regarding the ARTs attendance at an operation or a call for service. This information will be compiled and provided to the Executive Leadership Board (ELB) to establish the perceived effectiveness of the ART and identify where possible improvements could be made.

How will the information be managed?

The information you choose to provide will be compiled and published in a report and forwarded to the ELB. Whilst personal information has been utilised to send you this invitation, no identifying information will be disseminated in any report relating to the pilot. All data will be anonymised, reported in aggregate form, and will not be passed on to any other person or agency unless required by law.

The data you choose to provide will not be used to evaluate your performance and will only be used by the EBPC for evaluation of this pilot.

Do I have to participate?

This survey is voluntary and you are under no obligation to participate. You may choose to withdraw at any time. Participation in this survey does not mean that you have to take part in any future data collection related to this project.

The survey should take approximately **5 minutes** to complete.

If you wish to see the results of the study, or you have any questions or concerns, email

Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982

A3. Information Sheet for Communications Staff Survey

Armed Response Teams (ART) is a new initiative within New Zealand Police and is currently being undertaken on a trial basis. The trial is running from the 28th October 2019 to 27th April 2020 across the Waikato, Canterbury, and Counties Manakau districts.

As part of this, the Evidence Based Policing Centre (EBPC) will be gathering information from staff involved in the trial. This involves collecting data from Armed Offenders Squad (AOS) officers participating in the pilot and police staff in participating districts.

You should complete this survey if you were the incident controller for a recent ART operation or call for service.

What is the purpose of this survey?

The purpose of this survey is to collect information regarding the ARTs attendance at an operation or a call for service. This information will be compiled and provided to the Executive Leadership Board (ELB) to establish the perceived effectiveness of the ART and identify where possible improvements could be made.

How will the information be managed?

The information you choose to provide will be compiled and published in a report and forwarded to the ELB. Whilst personal information has been utilised to send you this invitation, no identifying information will be disseminated in any report relating to the pilot. All data will be anonymised, reported in aggregate form, and will not be passed on to any other person or agency unless required by law.

The data you choose to provide will not be used to evaluate your performance and will only be used by the EBPC for evaluation of this pilot.

Do I have to participate?

This survey is voluntary and you are under no obligation to participate. You may choose to withdraw at any time. Participation in this survey does not mean that you have to take part in any future data collection related to this project.

The survey should take approximately **5 minutes** to complete.

If you wish to see the results of the study, or you have any questions or concerns, email

Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982

A4. Information Sheet for Officer Wellbeing Survey

Armed Response Teams (ART) is a new initiative within New Zealand Police and is currently being undertaken on a trial basis. The trial is running from the 28th October 2019 to 27th April 2020 across the Waikato, Canterbury, and Counties Manakau districts.

As part of this, the Evidence Based Policing Centre (EBPC) will be gathering information from staff involved in the trial. This involves collecting data from Armed Offenders Squad (AOS) officers participating in the pilot and police staff in participating districts.

What is the purpose of this survey?

The purpose of this survey is to collect information about your current level of wellbeing. This survey will be delivered at three points in time: prior to the pilot commencing, at the midpoint of the pilot, and at the end of the pilot. This information will be compiled and provided to the Executive Leadership Board (ELB) to identify where possible improvements could be made in the use and deployment of ARTs.

How will the information be managed?

The information you choose to provide will be compiled and published in a report and forwarded to the ELB. Whilst personal information has been utilised to send you this invitation, no identifying information will be disseminated in any report relating to the pilot. All data will be anonymised, reported in aggregate form, and will not be passed on to any other person or agency unless required by law.

The data you choose to provide will not be used for any performance evaluation and your responses are only used as indicators of wellbeing. This survey tool cannot be used to make any formal clinical diagnosis.

Do I have to participate?

This survey is voluntary and you are under no obligation to participate. You may choose to withdraw at any time. Participation in this survey does not mean that you have to take part in any future data collection related to this project.

The survey should take approximately **5-10 minutes** to complete and has been approved by the ART Working Group.

If you wish to see the results of the study, or you have any questions or concerns, email

Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act .

A5. Consent Form

Armed Response Team Pilot

I have read the information sheet and understand that:

1. My participation in the study is voluntary;
2. My data will be kept secure with access only by those in the Evidence Based Policing Centre who are involved in the project;
3. My data may be held for up to seven years;
4. I can withdraw my consent at any point in time;
5. My QID will be recorded and used to identify my data but will be appropriately anonymised when stored;
6. My data is confidential and no identifying information will be published in any report. My data will not be passed onto anyone else unless required by law.

I consent to participate in the survey.

Sign:

Date:

QID:

District:

A6. End of Deployment (EOD) Form

This form should be completed by ART Team Leaders.

Where the event is escalated to an AOS black role or blue role deployment, then the AOS/PNT Deployment report is required. *It is of note that the items with an * (asterisk) below can therefore be excluded as the data will be provided in the AOS deployment report, please can you complete remaining items to support the evaluation process).*

As per normal a TOR is required in any ART attended event where a member uses force, or undertakes a show of force (Taser Laser painting / Firearms presentation).

Event/Incident Number	
*	Operation Start Date: <pre populate> Operation Start Time: <pre populate> Operation End Date: <pre populate> Operation End Time: <pre populate>
Deployed by:	<input type="radio"/> Deployed by Comms <input type="radio"/> Self-deployed <input type="radio"/> DCC <input type="radio"/> Full AOS <input type="radio"/> Other (Please specify):
*Deployment Type:	<Drop down as per AOS/PNT Deployment report – Deployment Type: Deployment Request Declined Emergency Preplanned - Full Squad Preplanned - Partial Deployment
Deployment Role	<input type="radio"/> Command/Control <input type="radio"/> Support/Assist <input type="radio"/> Sole Attendee <input type="radio"/> Other. Please specify:
Was the AOS Commander consulted?	<input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No
*Type of Job (select one)	< Drop down as per AOS/PNT Deployment report – Type of Job: Combination Mobile Static>
*Address/Location of Incident:	<Address/Location of Incident (tie to NZ post or free text if no match)>
*Offence Codes (High Level) (select as many as apply)	< Drop down as per AOS/PNT Deployment report – Offence Codes. 1100 Homicide 1200 Kidnapping 1300 Robbery 1400 Grievous Assaults 1500 Serious Assaults 1600 Minor Assaults 1700 Intimidation and Threats 1800 Group Assemblies 1M Mental Illness 1X Suicidal 2200 Sexual Affronts 2600 Sexual Attacks 2700 Abnormal Sex 2800 Immoral Behaviour 2900 Immoral Behaviour Misc 3100 Drugs/Not Cannabis

	<p>3200 Drugs/Cannabis 3500 Disorder 3600 Vagrancy Offences 3700 Family Offences 3800 Family Offences 3900 Sale of Liquor Act 4100 Burglary 4200 Car Conversion 4300 Theft 4400 Receiving 4500 Fraud 4600 Computer Crime 4990 Accessory after the fact 5100 Destruction of Property 5200 Endangering 5800 Gambling Act 5900 New Drugs 6100 Trespass 6200 Littering 6300 Animals 6500 Postal Abuses 6800 Firearms Offences 7100 Against Justice 7200 Birth/Deaths and Marriages 7300 Immigration 7400 Blood Samples/Racial 7500 Against National Interest 7600 By Law Breaches 7900 Justice (special) A-W Traffic Offences></p>
<p>Incident Type that BEST DESCRIBES these events</p>	<p><drop down as per TOR data> <input type="radio"/> 1C <input type="radio"/> 1K <input type="radio"/> 1M <input type="radio"/> 1R <input type="radio"/> 1U <input type="radio"/> 1V <input type="radio"/> 1X <input type="radio"/> 2T <input type="radio"/> 2W <input type="radio"/> 3A <input type="radio"/> 3T <input type="radio"/> 4U <input type="radio"/> 5F <input type="radio"/> 5K <input type="radio"/> 6D <input type="radio"/> 6E Other (please specify):</p>

<p>Tactical Options Report (TOR) submitted</p>	<p><input type="radio"/> Yes (if yes, skip the sections with a ^) <input type="radio"/> No</p>
<p>Key Tactics Used (select all that apply)</p>	<p>< "as per the current AOS/PNT deployment report – Key tactics used": Announced Forced entry Breach and Hold Cordon/Contain/Appeal Cover Port Door knock/Direct approach to target Emergency action Open-air arrest Other (Describe in Team Leader comments): Ruse/deception Unannounced Forced entry Vehicle Stop - compliant Vehicle Stop - non compliant></p>

Incident resolved by	<p><Drop down box “as per the current AOS data – Resolved by or ”:</p> <p>Prior to Negotiation Tactical Only Negotiation Only Combined Negotiation/Tactical Offender not contacted/located></p>
Result code	<input type="radio"/> K1 <input type="radio"/> K3 <input type="radio"/> K6 <input type="radio"/> K9
^Resolution	<p>(dropdown as per TOR – resolution section)</p> <p>Arrested – charged Arrested – no charge Released without charge Subject decamped scene Subject returned to caregiver Transport to hospital (medical) Transport to hospital (1M) CATT involvement Refer to Youth Aid Subject Escaped Police Disengaged Other</p>
Who was the primary unit	<input type="radio"/> ART <input type="radio"/> Other (please specify):
What primary unit was responsible for the arrest	<input type="radio"/> ART <input type="radio"/> Other (please specify):
Team Leader Comments	
*Any other additional notes	<p>Upload Images & Files Add Attachment: Browse... Free text</p>

A7. PST Officer Survey

QID:	_____	Rank:	_____
Age:	_____	Gender:	_____
Years in Service:	_____	District:	_____
Incident No.:	_____	Card Event No.:	_____

Were you armed at any point during the incident? Yes No

Did you request the assistance of the ART? Yes No

If yes:

Was the response of the ART timely? Yes No

If no, why?

Do you think the incident was likely to have been handled differently without the ART? Yes No

If, yes, how?

Thinking about the incident you attended, please circle the response that **best** describes how much you agree with the following statements?

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree

Overall, I felt safer at the incident. 1 2 3 4 5

Overall, I felt that the command structure was clear. 1 2 3 4 5

Overall, I felt that communications were clear. 1 2 3 4 5

Overall, I understood my role within this incident. 1 2 3 4 5

I think the incident was dealt with more efficiently with the ART in attendance. 1 2 3 4 5

If Agree or Strongly Agree, **how** was the incident dealt with more efficiently?

If Disagree or Strongly Disagree, **why**?

I think the presence of the ART de-escalated the incident. 1 2 3 4 5

If Agree or Strongly Agree, **how** was the incident de-escalated?

If Disagree or Strongly Disagree, **why**?

Overall, I was satisfied with the assistance provided by the ART. 1 2 3 4 5

I am likely to request the assistance of the ART in the future. 1 2 3 4 5

My training allowed me to support the ART efficiently. 1 2 3 4 5

A8. ART Officer Survey

QID: _____ Rank: _____
 Age: _____ Gender: _____
 Years in Service: _____ District: _____
 Incident No. _____ Card Event No. _____

Was the assistance of the ART requested? Yes No

If yes:
 Was the response of the ART timely? Yes No
 If no, why?

Do you think the incident was likely to have been handled differently without the ART? Yes No

If, yes, how?

Thinking about the incident you attended, please circle the response that **best** describes how much you agree with the following statements?

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree

Overall, I felt safer at the incident. 1 2 3 4 5

Overall, I felt that the command structure was clear. 1 2 3 4 5

Overall, I felt that communications were clear. 1 2 3 4 5

Overall, I understood my role within this incident. 1 2 3 4 5

I think the incident was dealt with more efficiently with the ART in attendance. 1 2 3 4 5

If Agree or Strongly Agree, **how** was the incident dealt with more efficiently?

If Disagree or Strongly Disagree, **why**?

I think the presence of the ART de-escalated the incident. 1 2 3 4 5

If Agree or Strongly Agree, **how** was the incident de-escalated?

If Disagree or Strongly Disagree, **why**?

The vehicle enabled me to perform all the duties required of me. 1 2 3 4 5

The equipment I need is readily accessible and in good condition. 1 2 3 4 5

My personal equipment is not satisfactory for my safety and effectiveness. 1 2 3 4 5

Vehicle limitations prevented me from performing my duties appropriately. 1 2 3 4 5

The ART role makes good use of my training. 1 2 3 4 5

A9. Communications Officer Survey

QID: _____ Rank: _____
 Age: _____ Gender: _____
 Years in Service: _____ District: _____
 Incident No. _____ Card Event No. _____

Was the assistance of the ART requested? Yes No

If yes:
 Was the response of the ART timely? Yes No
 If no, why?

Do you think the incident was likely to have been handled differently without the ART? Yes No

If, yes, how?

Thinking about the incident you attended, please circle the response that **best** describes how much you agree with the following statements?

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree

Overall, I felt that the command structure was clear. 1 2 3 4 5

Overall, I felt that communications were clear. 1 2 3 4 5

Overall, I understood my role within this incident. 1 2 3 4 5

I think the incident was dealt with more efficiently with the ART in attendance. 1 2 3 4 5

If Agree or Strongly Agree, **how** was the incident dealt with more efficiently?

If Disagree or Strongly Disagree, **why**?

I think the presence of the ART de-escalated the incident. 1 2 3 4 5

If Agree or Strongly Agree, **how** was the incident de-escalated?

If Disagree or Strongly Disagree, **why**?

Overall, I was satisfied with the assistance provided by the ART. 1 2 3 4 5

My training allowed me to control the incident effectively. 1 2 3 4 5

A10. Officer Wellbeing Survey

Thinking about how you felt over the last **30 days**, for each of the following statements circle the response that **best** describes how much of the time you felt that way.

	0 At no time	1 Some of the time	2 Less than half the time	3 More than half the time	4 Most of the time	5 All the time
1 I have felt cheerful and in good spirits	0	1	2	3	4	5
2 I have felt calm and relaxed	0	1	2	3	4	5
3 I have felt active and vigorous	0	1	2	3	4	5
4 I have felt refreshed when I wake up in the morning	0	1	2	3	4	5
5 I have felt that my daily life is filled with things that interest me	0	1	2	3	4	5
6 I have felt tired out for no good reason?	0	1	2	3	4	5
7 I have felt nervous?	0	1	2	3	4	5
8 I have felt so nervous that nothing could calm me down?	0	1	2	3	4	5
9 I have felt hopeless?	0	1	2	3	4	5
10 I have felt restless or fidgety?	0	1	2	3	4	5
11 I have felt so restless I could not sit still?	0	1	2	3	4	5
12 I have felt depressed?	0	1	2	3	4	5
13 I have felt that everything was an effort?	0	1	2	3	4	5
14 I have felt so sad that nothing could cheer me up?	0	1	2	3	4	5
15 I have felt worthless?	0	1	2	3	4	5
16 I have felt emotionally drained from my work	0	1	2	3	4	5
17 I have felt used up at the end of the work day	0	1	2	3	4	5
18 I have felt fatigued when I wake up in the morning	0	1	2	3	4	5
19 I have felt that working with people all day is a real strain	0	1	2	3	4	5
20 I have felt frustrated by my job	0	1	2	3	4	5
21 I have felt that I'm working too hard on my job	0	1	2	3	4	5
22 I have felt like I am at the end of my rope	0	1	2	3	4	5
23 I have felt upset because of something that happened unexpectedly	0	1	2	3	4	5
24 I have felt unable to control the important things in my life	0	1	2	3	4	5
25 I have felt confident in my ability to handle my personal problems	0	1	2	3	4	5
26 I have felt that things were going my way	0	1	2	3	4	5
27 I have felt unable to cope with all the things I had to do	0	1	2	3	4	5
28 I have felt unable to control irritations in my life	0	1	2	3	4	5
29 I have felt on top of things	0	1	2	3	4	5
30 I have felt angered by things that happened that were outside of my control	0	1	2	3	4	5

Armed Response Vehicle (ARV) Pilot: Draft Evaluation Plan

Executive Summary:

Changes to our operating environment has warranted a review of our national Armed Offenders Squad (AOS) and Special Tactics Group (STG) model to ensure it remains fit for purpose and contributes to our aim of being the safest country. To safeguard our operational capabilities, the Executive Leadership Board (ELB) has approved and commissioned a pilot of Armed Response Vehicles (ARV) across Tāmaki Makaurau, Waikato, Bay of Plenty, and Christchurch. ARVs are intended to improve safety, and feelings of safety, among police staff and the public. The pilot will be monitored by an ARV Working group and is currently being established by National Response and Operations.

The Evidence Based Policing Centre (EBPC) has been tasked with providing an independent evaluation of a pilot that will see ARV's stood up across six districts in New Zealand. This document will outline a high level summary of the ARV pilot evaluation objectives and proposed methodologies.

Background:

The 2017 New Zealand Police (NZ Police) Tactical Options Research Report indicates that less than 1% of face-to-face interactions between NZ Police and the public require the use of a Tactical Option (TO)¹. In total, the AOS were deployed to 799 incidents nationwide². Incidents requiring the use of firearms³ are extremely rare, comprising approximately 6% of all reported TO events. In addition, firearms use by NZ Police resulted in just six subject injuries (three non-fatal; three fatal).

The events of March 15th in Christchurch, however, significantly changed the landscape and working environment our people operate in. As part of our commitment to being the safest country, a pilot has been approved to investigate whether the introduction of ARVs improves operational responsiveness, and the subsequent safety of both our people and our communities, including how ARV's impact on trust and confidence. Historically, the use of ARVs in New Zealand has been limited. In response to the March 15th events a quasi-ARV unit was deployed that enabled AOS members to rapidly arrive on the scene after first reports were received. Perceptions around the regular deployment of this capability post-March 15th were largely positive, and increased feelings of safety were experienced by police staff⁴. In addition, ARVs have been deployed across Tāmaki Makaurau in support of both Operations Unity and Whakahaumanu.

Despite their low frequency, it is essential that the NZ Police remain capable to respond to critical incidents while also ensuring our communities feel, and be, safe. Perceptions of safety and capability of police in reducing real or perceived threats are critical in maintaining trust and legitimacy between the police and communities.

Previous Research:

Perceptions around the use of the ARVs has received limited evaluation. One relevant piece of research comes from a 2014 review conducted by HM Inspectorate of Constabulary in Scotland (HMICS)⁵. Police Scotland invited HMICS to provide an objective professional assessment of the existing standing firearms authority for ARVs⁶. The review indicated that ARV officers felt that improvements to officer and public safety had been made as a result of the current ARV model. Nevertheless, a key finding from the review was that public concern about the presence of ARV officers at non-firearm incidents was underestimated. A significant contributor was a lack of community understanding about the involvement of armed officers at routine incidents and the absence of an established deployment criteria. As a result, the Chief Constable recommended that ARVs only be deployed to firearm incidents, or where there is a threat to life.

¹ Tactical options include: empty hand tactics, handcuffs and restraints, OC spray, TASER, firearms, dogs, baton, and "other" tactical options; see NZ Police Tactical Options Research Report, Report #6, 2017.

² Note that multiple AOS squads may have been deployed to a single incident.

³ The report notes that most firearms use by police relates to presentations. However, changes were made to Police firearms and fatality reporting in 2017.

⁴ Operating Model Enhancements including Proof of Concept trial for ARVs, August 2019.

⁵ HM Inspectorate of Constabulary in Scotland – Review of Standing Firearms Authority for Armed Response Vehicles Crews within Police in Scotland, October 2014.

⁶ The Armed Policing Model was introduced along with the establishment of Police Scotland in April 2013.

The review further concluded that gaps existed in the public understanding around the nature and extent of armed policing. Despite media coverage surrounding the use of ARVs, just under half the population were aware of the change in firearms policy⁷. Critically, those aware of the change were informed via the media rather than through engagement by Police Scotland. Moreover, only one in five were aware of the correct level of armed officers in Scotland⁸. The report noted that the relationship between police services and communities had not strengthened as a result. Though there are perceived benefits in the use of ARVs as a standard operating procedure, the research strongly suggests that perceptions around safety are linked to how firearms policies are communicated to the public.

Evaluation Objectives:

The underlying intent of the ARV pilot is to improve safety, and feelings of safety, among NZ Police and members of the public. The key evaluation objective is to provide an independent assessment of whether the introduction of ARVs within the current operating environment achieves this objective, and substantively improves the capability of our people to perform their duties safely.

The evaluation will be guided by three key questions:

1. How are ARVs being deployed across the districts and what are the real or perceived impacts on public and police safety?
2. What effect does ARV deployment have upon the wellbeing of police staff?
3. How does the communication around the use of ARVs influence public and police perceptions of safety?

Proposed Methodology:

The intent to deploy to incidents involving specific and unique threats and safety risks, or as part of pre-planned operations, provides an opportunity to survey perceptions of safety from both the officers and communities involved. The proposed evaluation will take an exploratory approach that will baseline the impact of ARVs deployments on perceptions around safety.

The core methods used in the evaluation will be:

1. quantitative analysis of previous firearms related offences;
2. quantitative analyses of deployment data across districts and incidents responded to;
3. public and staff surveys focussing on the real or perceived impact of ARVs on NZ Police and public safety;
4. staff survey focussing on the wellbeing and safety perceptions of officers involved in, and supporting, ARV deployment;
5. a randomised controlled trial (RCT), using a behavioural insights approach, to examine the effect of varying communication framing and how that affects perceptions of safety.

In honouring our commitment to the Treaty of Waitangi and to the principles of Kaupapa Māori a number of structured interviews will be conducted with leaders from Māori and Pacific communities.

Resource Commitment & Key Stakeholders:

Consideration should be given to allocating a small budget to allow field interviews to be conducted, which will require travel expenses. The EBPC will provide a preliminary report in the first week of December; however, given the nature of the evaluation it may require additional time to provide a robust final report. Nonetheless, efforts have already begun in reaching out to academic partners for expert advice on measuring perception. Successful implementation of the evaluation plan requires significant investment in time and personnel, requiring the development of public and police survey tools at the national scale. Large scale structured interviews will further require adequate time to ensure that community leaders are heard and that representative samples are obtained from the community.

Our key internal stakeholders include Response and Operations: Research and Evaluation at Police National Headquarters, AOS, District staff and leadership teams, and Maori and Pacific Ethnic Services. External stakeholder will include the general public, our Maori and Pacific communities and key community leaders, and the University of Waikato.

⁷ HM Inspectorate of Constabulary in Scotland – Police Firearms Survey Final Report, October 2014.

⁸ Ibid.

Date: 8 October 2019

Location: Commissioner's Boardroom


Time: 12:30 – 13:30

Frequency: Section 6(4)
Official

Attendance: Chair, Commissioner (Mike Bush) Deputy Commissioner Districts (John Tims), Deputy Commissioner National Operations (Mike Clement), Acting Deputy Chief Executive Service Delivery (Jevon McSkimming), Deputy Chief Executive Media & Communications (Jane Archibald), Acting Deputy Commissioner Strategy and Partnerships (Angela Brazier), Deputy Chief Executive Finance (John Bole), Chief Executive People (Kaye Ryan), Chief of Staff (Cassandra Anderson)

Recorder: Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982

Apologies: Acting Deputy Commissioner Strategy and Partnerships (Andy Coster), Deputy Commissioner MPES (Wally Haumaha), Deputy Chief Executive Service Delivery (Mark Evans),

#	Item	Lead	Due Date
1. MEETING ADMINISTRATION			
1.1	All apologies were noted.		
1.2	The minutes from the previous meeting of 1 October were noted as a true and accurate record.		
1.3	No actions were due for today's meeting.		
2. COMMISSIONER'S TOPICS			
	Nil discussed.		
3. DECISIONS			
4.1	<p>SLT/19/61 Armed Response Vehicles – Options for Proof of Concept Model</p> <p>The paper was taken as read. DC Clement introduced the paper and invited members of the working group; Section 9(2) Official Information Act 1982 Andrew Sissons and Tony Hill to join the meeting. The ELB discussed the issues raised by SLT including but not limited to: resourcing, the expectations on the evaluation and the Communications plan and branding options.</p> <p>Recommendations</p> <p>The ELB:</p> <p>(i) Agreed: the name of the ARVs to be changed to Armed Response Teams (ART).</p> <p>Se cti</p>  <p>(iii) Directed the Evaluation Plan for the proof of concept to be further fleshed out to ensure a clear pre-evaluation baseline, a process for the use of control groups, and an agreed post-evaluation approach in accordance with EBPC's recommendations of best practice.</p>		


	<p>(iv) Agreed: internal and external communications regarding the ART Proof of Concept should be proactive and include the; why, when and how. With a public release confirmed for the end of the week commencing 14 October 2019.</p> <p>(v) Section 9(2)(g) Official Information Act 1982 [Redacted]</p> <p>(vi) 9(2)(i) [Redacted]</p> <p>(vii) Supported: the following key milestones</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proof of concept commences on 28 October 2019 • Mid-point three month evaluation presented to SLT in February • Proof of concept completion 27 April 2020. • Day light period and collection of evaluation data followed by presentation of findings to SLT in late May <p>Secti on [Redacted]</p> <p>Act [Redacted]</p> <p>[Redacted]</p> <p>[Redacted]</p>		
4. DISCUSSION			
4.1	<p>Weekly report to the Minister</p> <p>The ELB noted the content of the report.</p>		
4.2	<p>SLT Minutes – 2 October 2019</p> <p>The ELB noted the SLT minutes from the 2 October meeting.</p>		
5. OTHER BUSINESS			
	Nil discussed		
6. PAPERS SCHEDULED FOR FOLLOWING WEEK			
	All papers scheduled for next week were noted.		

CLOSE MEETING

The meeting closed at 13:36

Certified by meeting Chair

Section 9(2)(a) Official Information Act 1982



Mike Bush,
Commissioner of Police