Organisational Capability Governance Group
Cover Sheet
Reference OCGG/20/31
[Obtained from the Executive Services team]
Paper title
Fleeing driver events: Overview of investigation and policy papers
Sponsor
Deputy Commissioner Glenn Dunbier
Presenter/s
Assistant Commissioner Sandra Venables
Prepared by
Kelly Larsen, Fleeing Driver Programme Manager
Meeting date Tuesday 17 November 2020
[Paper is due with ES six working days before scheduled meeting date]
Consultation required
1982 to Ti Lamusse
Unless specifically directed by the paper’s Sponsor, the paper should be presented to at least one of the four sub
governance groups in the first instance, using the appropriate governance group paper template.
If the contents of this paper are such that they are to be presented to the SLB only, consultation may stil need to be
undertaken with other work groups / service centres / districts to ensure their views have been sought and are accurately
reflected in this paper.
For consultation purposes, please use the following group email addresses: ‘DL_Assistant Commissioners’ and
‘DL_GovernanceConsultation’. These email lists are frequently updated.
Please double click the boxes to tick which groups / individuals have been consulted regarding this paper and include their
feedback in the Feedback Received section.
Tick Group / individual
Specify, if required
Police under the OIA
Assistant Commissioners
Executive Directors
Consultation Group (SLB Papers)
District staff (specify)
External (specify)
Other (specify)
While a sponsor can exempt a paper from seeking consultation this should be an extremely rare occurrence. If your
Sponsor deems consultation to be unnecessary, a full explanation must be provided below:
by New Zealand
TRACKING:
(for ES use only)
Released
Organisational Capability Governance Group
Reference
OCGG/20/31
Title
Fleeing driver events: Overview of investigation and policy papers
10 November 2020
Purpose
1.
This paper provides an overview of three separate but related papers to be considered by the
Organisational Capability Governance Group (OCGG) in relation to revision of the Fleeing D iver
policy and the investigation of fleeing driver events.
Executive Summary
2.
The joint IPCA / Police thematic review;
Fleeing drivers in New Zealand: a collaborative review
of events, practices and procedures was publicly released in March 2019 and details 33 specific
actions which Police agreed to implement.
3.
The Fleeing Driver policy has been revised to give effect to these agreed actions, noting that ‘
If
appropriately understood and properly applied, the existing fleeing driver policy can provide the
1982 to Ti Lamusse
necessary balance between public safety and public protection.. .’.
4.
In May 2020 the Executive Leadership Board (ELB) considered proposed revisions to the Fleeing
Driver policy [refer ELB/20/35], with three action point arising from that discussion.
5.
Since then, the proposed policy revisions have been further tested and refined in the operational
environment and have proven to be effective in changing the culture and mindset of operational
staff.
6.
For example, there has been a 35% reduction in the number of fleeing driver events in Canterbury
District since January 2020. Fleeing driver events where Police have not pursued are also
included in this reporting, meaning the reduction pursuits is significantly higher.
7.
A cross jurisdictional comparison of the effectiveness of investigations
Police under the OIA following fleeing driver
events has been completed [refer OCGG/20/33]
.
8.
A nationally consistent practice guide for investigation following a fleeing driver event has been
developed [refer OCGG/20/32].
9.
Increased emphasis on using investigations rather than pursuits to identify and hold fleeing
drivers to account wil realign operational practice with policy and wil have safety benefits.
10. It is likely that fewer pursuits wil result in fewer injuries and deaths from fleeing driver events.
This aligns with our vision, purpose and mission, as well as our goals of safe roads and safe
communities.
by New Zealand
Background
11. In late 2016, Police and the IPCA recognised there was an opportunity to build on the collective
understanding of the fleeing driver environment. A joint thematic review (the Review) was
initiated, seeking to identify and address common themes, as well as issues in existing practice
where further improvements may be required.
Released
12. The joint Independent Police Conduct Authority (IPCA) / New Zealand Police (Police) thematic
review;
Fleeing Drivers in New Zealand, A Collaborative Review of Events, Practices and
Procedures was published in March 2019. This report contained eight high level
recommendations which Police agreed to action.
1
13. Recommendation 3 of the Review requires Police to:
13.1 Review the Fleeing Driver policy against the findings of the Review and make any
necessary revisions to the policy and standard operating procedures to ensure they remain
fit for purpose and support the effective management of fleeing driver events.
14. In May 2020 the Executive Leadership Board (ELB) considered proposed revisions to the Fleeing
Driver policy [refer ELB/20/35]. Three action point arose from that discussion;
14.1 ELB requested additional information about whether post-event investigations are a
credible and effective mechanism to identify and hold fleeing drivers to account, and
recommended obtaining comparable information from international jurisdictions.
14.2 ELB requested the development of a nationally consistent best practice process for post-
event investigations following fleeing driver events.
14.3 ELB requested consideration be given to what opportunity there is to develop drone
capability in relation to the management of fleeing driver events.
Post Event Investigations
1982 to Ti Lamusse
15. A cross jurisdictional comparison of the effectiveness of investigations following fleeing driver
events has been completed [refer OCGG/20/33].
16. The report identifies that;
16.1 Besides Queensland, New Zealand appears to have a higher apprehension rate through
post-event investigations than Australian jurisdictions and a higher apprehension rate
overall.
16.2 While Police currently apprehends a lower proportion of drivers through post-event
investigations (30%) compared with the pursuit stage (40%), this does not necessarily
indicate that investigations are ineffective.
16.3 An increased emphasis on using investigations rather than pursuits to identify and hold
Police under the OIA
fleeing drivers to account wil have safety benefits. It is likely that fewer pursuits will result
in fewer injuries and deaths from fleeing driver events. This aligns with our vision, mission
and purpose, as well as our goals of safe roads and safe communities.
16.4 While there is a risk that fewer pursuits may lead to a decrease in the overal apprehension
rate, this is outweighed by the safety benefits and the comparatively high apprehension
rate currently achieved through post-event investigations. This aligns with our priority of
delivering the services that New Zealanders expect and deserve.
Fleeing Driver Events: Investigation Practice Guide
17. A hui was undertaken with a range o
by New Zealand f District staff to develop a nationally consistent best practice
investigation process, to ensure that fleeing drivers and any person enabling this behaviour are
held to account.
18. The proposed Fleeing Driver: Investigation Practice Guide [refer OCGG/20/32] is the result of
those discussions and wider internal consultation.
Released
19. Increased emphasis on using investigations rather than pursuits to identify and hold fleeing
drivers to account wil realign operational practice with the Fleeing Driver policy and Our Business
as previously outlined.
2
Drone Capability 20. Response and Operations Group undertook a proof of concept for Remotely Piloted Aircraft
Systems (RPAS).
21. The evaluation report presented to the National Operations Steering Group (NOSG) on the 1
September 2020 identified that;
21.1
The Bell 429 utilised by Air Support has a maximum cruise speed of 150 knots (278 km/h).
In comparison, even a high specification RPAS have much lower maximum speeds, and
are unable to even reach the maximum legal open road speed of 100km/h. RPAS also
suffer from limited endurance (typically 25 minutes). The ability to fly long distances is also
restricted by the requirement in the Civil Aviation Rules for the RPAS to remain within line
of sight of the pilot. These factors collectively mean that a small RPAS is unsuited to tasks
such as pursuing fleeing drivers.
Further Policy Revisions
22. Since the proposed policy revisions were considered by ELB in May 2020, messaging to
operational staff has been further tested and refined to identify how to most effectively achieve a
culture and mindset change in relation to fleeing drivers.
1982 to Ti Lamusse
23. The key question is ‘What is the initial reason for wanting to stop the driver?’.
24. Having determined the initial reason for wanting to stop the driver, the next consideration relates
to the current policy principle that ‘
fleeing driver incidents wil only be commenced and/or
continued when the seriousness of the offence and the necessity of immediate apprehension
outweigh the risk of pursuing’.1
25. The risks of a pursuit include death and serious injury, reputational risk and negative impact on
public trust and confidence.
26. The question which then needs to be asked is ‘Does the initial reason for wanting to stop the
driver outweigh the risk of death or serious injury?’ In most circumstances, the answer wil be
‘No’.
Police under the OIA
27. The second important point in the operational context is emphasising the need to make the
decision about whether to pursue or not, before signalling the driver to stop (i.e. proactive, rather
than reactive decision making).
28. By placing greater emphasis on using alternative tactical options to apprehend offenders, it is
possible to achieve a reduction in both the number of fleeing driver events and the number of
pursuits.
29. The graph below il ustrates the significant reduction (64%) in the number of fleeing driver events
in Canterbury District since January 2019.2
by New Zealand
30. It is important to note these figures include fleeing driver events where Police have decided to
not pursue. For example, of the 27 fleeing driver events reported in October, Police decided to
not pursue in 11 of these events (41%).
Released
1 https://tenone.police.govt.nz/pi/fleeing-driver-policy
2 New Zealand Police Fleeing Driver Notification database
3
list), as well as external stakeholders in relation to the proposed policy revisions and the
Investigation Practice Guide.
36. This paper simply provides a summary of action taken since the ELB’s request for additional
information, and therefore has not been consulted on.
Recommendations It is recommended that the OCGG:
i.
Note the report,
Fleeing driver events: Cross-jurisdictional comparison of effectiveness of
post-event investigations [OCGG/20/33].
ii.
Endorse the recommendations contained in the report,
Fleeing driver events: Cross-
jurisdictional comparison of effectiveness of post-event investigations.
iii.
Note the report,
Fleeing Driver Events: Investigation Practice Guide [OCGG/20/32].
iv.
Endorse the recommendations contained in the report,
Fleeing Driver Events: Investigation
Practice Guide.
1982 to Ti Lamusse
v.
Note that this paper is intended to assist the ELT in considering and approving the revised
Policy and should be considered alongside the paper discussed on 18 May 2020
[ELB/20/35].
vi.
Endorse the recommendations contained in the report,
Fleeing Driver Policy –
Recommended revision as a result of the joint IPCA/Police thematic review [ELB/20/35].
vii.
Endorse the revised Fleeing Driver policy at ached to this report (Appendix A).
_________________________________
Police under the OIA
Glenn Dunbier
Deputy Commissioner: District Operations
by New Zealand
Released
5
Feedback received
Reference
OCGG/20/xxx
Title
Date paper sent for
consultation
1982 to Ti Lamusse
In the table below, please record the names of those people consulted, their feedback and your action or recommendations. Please clearly state if no response is received from any
parties. If consultation has not been undertaken, a full explanation must be provided on the Cover Sheet.
Name / position / Feedback provided
Action taken or recommended following the
workgroup / agency
feedback
Police under the OIA
by New Zealand
6
Released