
S6(a): classification marking



Security Intelligence Report SIR

Report Date: 22 March 2017 Report No: DMS6-15-293

Counter terrorism: Overview of the New Zealand environment

Summary

S // s6(a)

- 1. (S//s6(a)) The terrorism threat level in New Zealand is low and terrorist threats against New Zealand are very rare. A small number of New Zealanders are assessed to be supportive of terrorism and violent extremism.
- 2. (S//s6(a)) Some of these individuals have travelled to states in the Middle East in which terrorist groups are active, and a small number of individuals are assessed to remain interested in travelling offshore to engage in militant jihad, or otherwise support terrorist groups.
- 3. (S//s6(a) NZSIS is aware of online communities in which some New Zealand-based individuals express support for violent extremist ideologies.
- 4. (S//s6(a)) Because the number of individuals of counter terrorism security concern is low and the group is diverse, it is difficult to identify trends or strong themes in the domestic terrorism environment.

Report Detail

S // s6(a)

Current environment

1. (S//s6(a)) Currently, between 30 and 40 people are listed on the NZSIS counter terrorism risk register, which includes individuals in New Zealand and offshore. These individuals are assessed as presenting an actual or potential terrorism-related threat to New Zealand.

s6(a): specific detail about New Zealand individuals offshore

2. (C) No New Zealanders are known to have returned to New Zealand after associating with terrorist groups in Syria or Iraq, although this remains a realistic possibility, especially given ISIL's decline in Syria and Iraq. It is possible such individuals could return with the requisite skills and experience to use weapons and explosives, radicalise other New Zealanders, or facilitate others to fight with extremist militant groups.



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6. (C) The small number of individuals of counter terrorism security concern in New Zealand and the absence, to date, of any successful domestic terrorist attack make it difficult to assess the New Zealand terrorism and violent extremism environment for trends. The group of 30-40 individuals is relatively diverse, comprised of males and females who are New Zealand-born citizens or from various 6(a) backgrounds, 6(a) backgrounds, 56(a). Socioeconomic and social-integration difficulties are likely to have aggravated the radicalisation process for many of these individuals; however, these are factors rather than causes in what is a multi-faceted and often individual process.

CTAG comment

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- 7. (S//s6(a)) The Combined Threat Assessment Group (CTAG) concurs that in New Zealand there are a small number of extremists who espouse attack rhetoric and possess the capability to commit an unsophisticated terrorist attack. Attacks of this nature have occurred worldwide and are increasingly perpetrated by self-radicalised individuals and small groups with no external coordination or direction. The nature of these attacks is applicable in New Zealand, where an unsophisticated attack would be relatively simple to plan and implement, with materials such as vehicles and knives readily available.
- 8. (S//s6(a)) CTAG assesses the principal threat in New Zealand is from individuals who adhere to a violent version of Islamist ideology that is reinforced by a Sunni extremist narrative, often


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through online propaganda. However, CTAG has not seen credible intelligence to indicate any group or person is advanced in their plans to conduct an attack in New Zealand. The general terrorism threat level for New Zealand is LOW (terrorist attack is assessed as possible, but is not expected).

ENDS

NZSIS Contact: Intelligence Publications Manager s6(a)




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International





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
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