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TERRORISM IN NEW ZEALAND: EXTREMISM AND FOREIGN
TERRORIST FIGHTERS
NAC 6/2014-15
(SECRET NZEO)
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The Uncertainty Yardstick
Intelligence assessments often deal not in statements of fact or precise calculations, but in judgements
based on the careful weighing of information that may be incomplete, opaque or uncertain in its credibility.
Assessments issued by the National Assessments Committee, and by its constituent agencies, express
this uncertainty by the deliberate and consistent use of language to convey probabilities. As used in
assessment reporting, this language has precise meaning as defined by the following probability ranges.
Qualitative Statement
Associated Probability Range
Remote/Highly Unlikely
<10%
Improbable/Unlikely
15-20%
Realistic Possibility
25-50%
Probable/Likely
55-70%
Highly /Very Probable/Likely
75-85%
Almost Certain
>90%
The gaps between one probability range and the next are intentional, as a means of encouraging precision
in judgements about probability.
The terms used here, and their associated probability ranges, are also used by some of New Zealand’s
overseas intelligence partners, and have been adopted here in order to promote consistency internationally.
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NAC 6/2014-15
6 November 2014
TERRORISM IN NEW ZEALAND: EXTREMISM AND FOREIGN
TERRORIST FIGHTERS
This paper presents an assessment of the current landscape of terrorism in, and
affecting New Zealand, focusing on the impact of the Syria/Iraq conflict and the
consequent increase in the Foreign Terrorist Fighter Threat.
What is happening?
(R) While al-Qa’ida (AQ) remains a central threat to the West, it has
been overshadowed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL) as a source and driver of terrorism-related activity
threatening the West. This shift is also characterised by the
increasing importance of “Foreign Terrorist Fighters”.
What does it mean for New Zealand?
(S) New Zealand agencies are aware s6(a)
New Zealand Foreign
Terrorist Fighters who have travelled to Syria, although it is almost
certain further individuals have travelled to, and returned from,
Syria to fight without our knowledge.
(S s6(a)
) s6(a)
New Zealand citizens are subjects of
terrorism-related national security interest, including some who
have been prevented from travelling to Syria by having their
passports cancelled; of these, some are known to be conducting
New Zealand-based extremist activities, while the remainder have
no known current stated intent to act against New Zealand. We are
also aware of others who ideologically and financially facilitate
terrorism-related activities.
(S) We assess the Syria/Iraq conflict will continue to be a major
driver for Islamic-inspired extremism in the short to medium term,
both in New Zealand and internationally. Given overseas trends, we
assess it is likely there will be an increase in the number of
radicalised individuals in New Zealand and New Zealand Foreign
Terrorist Fighters, both attempted and realised.
(S) We assess there is a realistic possibility a New Zealand military
contribution against ISIL may incidentally increase the already-
present threat to New Zealand from terrorist-related activity, but
we also assess such a contribution would not increase the likelihood
New Zealand would become the target of an externally planned
terrorist attack.
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Introduction
1.
(R) International and domestic terrorism is a growing concern for Western
Governments, including New Zealand. Islamic-inspired terrorism is currently the most
prominent terrorist threat; non-Islamic inspired terrorism remains a threat, although
comparatively minor. Since the conflict in Syria escalated in mid-2012, the terrorism
landscape has shifted; al-Qa’ida has fallen from dominance and has been
overshadowed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. New Zealand agencies
have also identified a rise in the number of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (see below)
since the conflict escalated. As of October 2014 the Combined Threat Assessment
Group (CTAG) assessed the likelihood of a terrorist attack occurring in New Zealand
as “possible, but not expected”. s6(a)
Global Context
2.
(R) Islamic-inspired terrorism presents a significant, growing, and rapidly
evolving threat to Western states, including New Zealand. While Western forces
were engaged in major combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the primary
terrorist threat to Western states came from al-Qa’ida (AQ) and its franchises, such
as al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI), and al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The main
threats from AQ were in the form of spectacular attack planning, and attempts to
recruit Western financial support.
3.
(R) Even as recently as 2013, the
majority of terrorist attacks planned
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
and/or committed in the West were at
(ISIL)
least inspired by AQ and its narrative. The
(S) Also known as Islamic State of Iraq and
perpetrators of the April 2013 Boston
Syria (ISIS), and Islamic State (IS), ISIL in its
Marathon bombings – Chechen brothers
current formation was established by Abu
Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev –
Bakr al-Bagdhadi in 2011. ISIL was originally
claimed not to be formally linked to any
affiliated with al-Qa’ida, but the two
terrorist group, but used information
organisations separated as a result of
published online by AQAP to construct
tensions created by ISIL’s modus operandi
their bombs. The Canadian rail bombing
and unsanctioned creation of an Islamic
plot, also in April 2013, was linked to AQ
State. ISIL is of particular interest to security
elements based around the Iran-Pakistan
agencies due to its success in inspiring
border.
Foreign Terrorist Fighters to join them, and
its use of extreme violence and brutality.
4.
(R) The escalation of the Syrian s6(a), s6(b)(i)
conflict since mid-2012 however, has led
to a dramatic shift in the terrorism
landscape. While AQ remains a central
threat to the West, it has been overshadowed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant (ISIL – see text box) as a source and driver of terrorism-related activity
threatening the West. This shift is also characterised by the increasing importance of
“Foreign Terrorist Fighters” (individuals seeking to travel outside their countries of
residence to join and fight alongside terrorist entities and other groups in active
conflict zones), with the number of such fighters increasing dramatically since 2012.
In addition to increasing the direct capability of terrorist groups to conduct external
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attacks, Foreign Terrorist Fighters who return to their countries of residence, or
onwards to third countries, also present significant threats as they are likely
radicalised, and may have had combat training and experience. Foreign Terrorist
Fighters therefore present significant, complex and potentially long-term terrorism
threats.
5.
(C) Until mid-2012, the AQ network attracted the majority of Foreign Terrorist
Fighters into countries such as Yemen, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Since 2013,
Foreign Terrorist Fighters have been almost exclusively entering (or attempting to
enter) Syria and/or Iraq and joining ISIL, Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) or groups aligned to
either of these entities. The movement of Foreign Terrorist Fighters has occurred in
conjunction with increased, and increasingly widespread, ideological and financial
support for terrorist groups involved in the Syrian conflict, of which ISIL has become
the most successful.
6.
(C) Unlike other civil conflicts of the past two decades, the Syrian conflict has
resonated more strongly and with a wider variety of audiences worldwide, including
many without tangible links to the region. ISIL has used this resonance to increase
its own support base, producing propaganda that actively targets particular Muslim
subgroups in Western nations through dedicated websites, forums, and social media
networks. This propaganda has generated an emotionally charged extremist rhetoric
that resonates with both radicalised and non-radicalised groups, increasing
individuals’ desire to travel to Syria and/or Iraq to fight with ISIL, but also to conduct
militant jihad for their own purposes.
7.
(R) AQ attacks against Western targets were – for the most part – rigidly
planned or at least sanctioned by al-Qa’ida Senior Leadership (AQSL). AQ did
encourage and inspire lone actor attacks, but this was not their core objective. In
contrast, ISIL strongly encourages Muslims in Western countries who are either
unable or unwilling to join ISIL in Syria or Iraq to commit domestic terrorist acts
without active ISIL direction. In September 2014, senior ISIL leader al-Adnani gave
a major speech, directing such individuals to attack Westerners:
“The best thing you can do is to strive to your best and kill any disbeliever,
whether he be French, American, or from any of their allies. If you are not able
to find an IED or a bullet, then single out the disbelieving American,
Frenchman, or any of their allies. Smash his head with a rock, or slaughter him
with a knife, or run him over with your car, or throw him down from a high
place, or choke him, or poison him”
8.
(C) We assess such public statements from ISIL encouraging violence have
already inspired attack plans, will inspire new attacks plans by both groups and lone
actors in the future, and will encourage those already planning attacks to speed up
their preparations.
9.
(C) In September 2014, Australia raised its national threat level from Medium
to High. The decision was not in response to a specific threat, but rather to an
overall increasing level of concern at the scale and scope of Islamic-inspired
extremism within Australia. s6(a)
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An aspiring
Foreign Terrorist Fighter prevented from travelling by the cancellation of his passport
was also fatally shot in Melbourne in September 2014 after attacking two police
officers.
10.
(R) In early October 2014, UK authorities arrested four individuals believed to
be involved in planning a terrorist attack in the UK; these individuals were also
reportedly inspired by ISIL, s6(a)
New Zealand Situation 11.
(U) The vast majority of New Zealand’s population, including its Muslim
population, does not demonstrate extremist or radical beliefs. New Zealand’s resident
Muslim community (approximately one per cent of New Zealand’s total population)
largely consists of Fijian-Indians and their descendants, and generally practices a
moderate form of Islam. Recent migration from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Persian
Gulf Arab states has increasingly led to the establishment of Salafist-orientated
mosques and brought Salafism1 into mainstream mosques.
12.
(R) There are Muslims in New Zealand who hold radical interpretations of
Islam, with a range of New Zealand agencies reporting varying levels of support for
terrorist groups among New Zealand’s Muslim population. Those who espouse
support for extremist groups tend to have limited formal knowledge of Islam, and
rely largely on the internet or their Imam for religious interpretation. This makes
them vulnerable to radicalisation, including by radical preachers.
13.
(R) The role of the internet has been unprecedented in the production and
propagation of Islamic-inspired extremist material. Currently, extremist propaganda
can be easily accessed through the formal media presence of designated terrorist
groups, such as ISIL and JN, who disseminate their messages via official websites,
Twitter, and publications, including ISIL’s Dabiq magazine. Online social media and
networking allows this material to be disseminated almost indiscriminately, increasing
the range of sources New Zealand citizens and residents can obtain this material.
Practical guidance on how to conduct a terrorist attack, including how to build
explosives and obtain funding is also freely available online.
14.
(R) The volume of extremist material available online makes it possible for
New Zealand citizens to self-radicalise exclusively via the internet. Given the
difficulties of detecting and tracking online activity, such as posts on forums and
1 (U) Salafism is an approach to Islam that attempts to emulate early Muslim practices. The emphasis
on violence in some Salafi teachings is of concern to intelligence agencies as an indicator for possible
future radicalisation. Most Salafis are simply religious conservatives, however, and are not prone to
violent extremism. Nevertheless, Salafi theology generally forms the basis of Islamist extremist groups
who do wish to restore an Islamic order to society, and who view violent jihad as a legitimate means of
achieving that aim.
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other social media, New Zealand security agencies are probably aware of only a
small percentage of extremist activity that occurs online by New Zealand citizens and
residents.
15.
(S s6(a)
We are aware of a small number of individuals involved in
extremist activities in New Zealand. NZSIS is aware of s6(a New Zealand citizens who
we assess have almost certainly travelled to participate
)
in the Syrian conflict: s6(a)
16.
(S) New Zealand’s small absolute number of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (both
realised and attempted) makes it difficult to identify demographic trends. s6(a), s6(b)(i)
17.
(S) While we do not have a comprehensive understanding of the size or the
extent of the Foreign Terrorist Fighter issue in New Zealand, we assess it is almost
certain individuals have travelled to, and returned from, Syria to fight without our
knowledge. Foreign Terrorist Fighter returnees – both known and unknown – are
likely radicalised and combat-trained to at least some degree. s6(a)
18.
s6(a)
New Zealand’s assessed terrorism threat
levels are subject to change and can do so at very short notice should new
information arise.
19.
(S s6(a)
In addition to the s6(a) Foreign Terrorist Fighters s6(a)
New Zealand citizens are subjects of terrorism-related national
security interest s6(a)
. Some are known to be
conducting New Zealand-based extremist activities, while the remainder have no
known current stated intent to act against New Zealand.s6(a)
We
are also aware of individuals who do not intend to travel to Syria or other conflict
zones themselves, but are ideologically and financially facilitating the travel of others
2 s6(a)
.
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through actively encouraging others to travel offshore to engage in fighting, and/or
providing funds to aspiring Foreign Terrorist Fighters.
20.
(S) As with New Zealand’s known Foreign Terrorist Fighters, the individuals
discussed above do not demonstrate clear demographic trends: they include a wide
range of ethnic backgrounds, both native Muslims and converts to Islam, first-,
second- and third-generation New Zealand citizens, and varying socio-economic
statuses. s6(a)
21.
(R) The known Foreign Terrorist Fighter numbers together with the
individuals of national security interest described above mean New Zealand has a
surprisingly large overall number in comparison to some other Western states, in
relative population terms. The reason for this has not yet been explored.
Effects of New Zealand Government Action 22.
(C) The changing Islamic-inspired extremist and terrorist threat to, and
within, New Zealand represents a new and difficult challenge for the New Zealand
Government. Broadly, governments can act against domestic extremism and
terrorism in two ways: counter-radicalisation3 and de-radicalisation4 programmes
aimed at moderating and/or managing extremism in overall populations; and specific
actions against known or suspected extremists. To date, the New Zealand
Government has had little to no experience with formal counter-radicalisation and
de-radicalisation processes, although New Zealand Police has had some success with
its community outreach and Maori, Pacific and Ethnic Service (MPES) programmes.
23.
(S) Our Five Eyes partners have all had significant legislative reforms or
amendments within the past five to six years to address the new terrorism
landscape.5 In contrast, the New Zealand Government response to individuals’
terrorist-related activities relies primarily on the Terrorism Suppression Act (TSA),
which, despite the significant evolution in the terrorism threat both domestically and
internationally, has not been updated since it was enacted in 2002. In addition, the
TSA has not been tested in regards to prosecuting an individual in court for a
terrorist act, and has significant gaps in regards to both facilitation and Foreign
Terrorist Fighters.
3 (U) A package of social, political, legal, educational and economic programmes specifically designed to deter
disaffected individuals from being radicalised.
4 (U)A process general y directed against individuals who have become radical with the aim of re-integrating them
into society or at least dissuading them from violence.
5 (U) For example, the Australian “Foreign Fighters Bil ” (Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment Bil 2014), the
Canadian Bil S7 Combating Terrorism Act 2012 (enacted April 2013), the American USA PATRIOT Amendments Act
2009, and the United Kingdom Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 and Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order 2009.
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24.
(U) Given the current legislative framework, the primary means by which the
New Zealand Government can prevent Foreign Terrorist Fighters who are New
Zealand citizens from travelling is by the Minister of Internal Affairs cancelling (or
refusing to issue) their passports. Unlike in Australia, the New Zealand Government
cannot cancel, or prevent the use of, a legitimate foreign passport by a New Zealand
citizen or resident.
25.
(S) While cancelling an individual’s passport can prevent the long-term threat
they may pose to New Zealand and international security, given trends observed
overseas we assess such action may also increase the domestic threat in the
immediate term. In addition to the Melbourne shooting in September 2014, on 20
October 2014, a Canadian aspiring Foreign Terrorist Fighter whose passport had
been revoked killed a police officer in a deliberate hit-and-run incident. Two days
later, another Canadian extremist (who had expressed a desire to travel to the
Middle East, but did not have a passport) attacked Parliament in Ottawa after
shooting a soldier dead at the National War Memorial.
26.
s6(a)
27.
(S) The New Zealand Government also currently has limited options to
respond to non-New Zealand citizens who present national security threats; for
example, almost all residence class visa holders must be granted entry permission at
the border and the New Zealand Government cannot quickly cancel a residence class
visa, even if that person poses a national security threat. Refugee and protected
person status may also add further complications. As such, understanding the
demographic context of the Foreign Terrorist Fighter issue in New Zealand will be
critical to developing strategies for responding to extremist non-New Zealand citizens
in the future.
Looking Forward
28.
(S) In the short-to-medium term, we assess the activities of ISIL and JN, and
the Syria/Iraq conflict in general will continue to be a major driver for Islamic-
inspired extremism, both in New Zealand and internationally. Given overseas trends,
we assess it is likely there will be an increase in the number of radicalised individuals
in New Zealand and New Zealand Foreign Terrorist Fighters, both attempted and
realised.
29.
(S) We assess there is a realistic possibility any future New Zealand
contribution to military action against ISIL will incidentally increase the already
present threat to New Zealand from terrorism-related activity in the short-to-medium
term, both domestically and to New Zealand interests and New Zealanders offshore
where ISIL has at least some support. Such a New Zealand military deployment
could lead to increased terrorism-related activity by already radicalised New Zealand-
based individuals. s6(a)
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30.
(S) Retaliation in New Zealand could include a New Zealand-based attack, or
an increase in the number of individuals within New Zealand motivated to become
Foreign Terrorist Fighters. We assess there is also a realistic possibility individuals
susceptible to radicalisation, yet not currently radicalised, could become more
extreme in response to a New Zealand military deployment into Syria and/or Iraq.
31.
(R) Steps taken domestically to undermine extremism, and steps taken
abroad to contain and degrade ISIL will likely, however, have a longer-term payoff in
mitigating the threat ISIL poses to international and New Zealand security.
32.
(S) We do not assess that New Zealand military action against ISIL would
increase the likelihood of New Zealand being the target of an external attack, as New
Zealand would continue to rank below a range of other Western states as a target
for groups capable of such action.
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