



NATIONAL EXERCISE PROGRAMME



EXERCISE  
**HIGH WATER**  
2018

 **NATIONAL  
EXERCISE  
PROGRAMME**  
INTERAGENCY  
CAPABILITY BUILDING



**MINISTRY OF BUSINESS,  
INNOVATION & EMPLOYMENT**  
HĪKINA WHAKATUTUKI

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## AMENDMENT SCHEDULE

This is the first version of the Exercise High Water 2018 Post Exercise Report. Amendments to later versions will be recorded in the table below.

Date	Brief description of amendment

## SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

All Exercise High Water documentation and agency participation at a RESTRICTED level. Agencies were asked to adapt their participation and correspondence.

Released under the Official Information Act 1982

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Exercise High Water 2018 was a series of three national-level exercises held in September 2018 as a scheduled exercise under the National Exercise Programme (NEP). The exercise was designed and conducted by MBIE, with support from the NEP planning team (Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet – DPMC).

The focus of the exercise was on the national, strategic considerations for a maritime mass arrivals response conducted as per the national Mass Arrival Control and Processing Plan (MACPP), the first national-level exercise of this type since the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) took over lead agency responsibilities for mass arrival planning, and the first since the introduction of the national Mass Arrival Prevention Strategy and the revised National Security System Framework. NZ Customs was previously the national mass arrivals lead and last held a strategic-level exercise (Exercise Barrier) in 2013.

The national-level Exercise High Water 2018 exercises were designed to inform the development of an operational-level mass arrivals exercise tentatively scheduled for 2019 in Auckland. The exercises – and this Post-Exercise Report – also advise the current MACPP revision. A revision draft MACPP was circulated to agencies in July 2018.

Three national exercises were held. A discussion workshop for Senior Officials was held on the morning of 14<sup>th</sup> September and the outcome of these discussions were taken to a Watch Group exercise conducted on the afternoon of 14<sup>th</sup> September. The outcome of these exercises advised the Executive Leadership (Officials for Domestic and External Security Coordination – ODESC) exercise which was held on 28<sup>th</sup> September.

Exercise High Water 2018 was attended by a wide range of agencies listed in the MACPP, to a senior level. Agencies were thanked for this level of participation and their willingness to openly discuss interagency strategy, interdependencies, risks and considerations.

Feedback from exercise participants and nominated Evaluators (from MBIE, Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management – MCDEM, and Ministry of Health – MoH) acknowledged the opportunity to discuss the key stages of a realistic exercise scenario. Although the exercise scenario strictly followed the MACPP standard planning model 6(c), there was much discussion about the implications of standing up a response, and the need for contingency arrangements.

The preparation, participation and feedback to the exercises highlighted the need for a structured approach to the complex, dynamic topic of maritime mass arrival incident planning. In particular, the critical role of technical experts, the need for complex information (including agency interdependencies and command and control responsibilities) to be simplified for timely reference during an incident, the need for a baseline level of knowledge and planning among all agencies, and the need to pro-actively address possible issues such as the scope of strategic and operational decision-making and contingency arrangements for critical personnel and resources from particular agencies.

The exercise design, format and conduct included a wide range of objectives and KPIs covering various MACPP stages. There were some constraints on the exercise based on time and required format, and the exercise flow was also affected by participant familiarity with the MACPP itself. This is somewhat expected given the time since the last national-level MACPP exercise, staff turnover, the introduction of new national guidelines such as the NSS Framework, CIMS Version 2, Health and Safety reform, and the differing levels of involvement by agency staff in the MACPP revision as well as familiarity with the MAPS. However, this and future exercises may be supported by high-level information being provided to agencies on mass arrivals principles and strategic priorities of the MACPP, in the form of general summary information, presentations, forums and/or workshops on specific MACPP sections.

Overall, Exercise High Water 2018 was well-received and this type of exercise and discussion was seen as worthwhile both to validate the MACPP principles and revisions, and as a forum for robust discussion on the strategic rationale and implications of a mass arrivals response as described in the MACPP.

## INTRODUCTION

### BACKGROUND

The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) is the lead agency within the National Security System (NSS) for planning and response to irregular maritime 'mass arrivals'.

The national Mass Arrivals Prevention Strategy (MAPS) relates to detection and disruption of people smuggling ventures. The national Mass Arrival Control and Processing Plan (MACPP) relates to the preparation of a coordinated response to an imminent arrival if MAPS detection and disruption efforts are not sufficient.

Exercise High Water 2018 was a series of exercise workshops focused on reviewing the national-level, whole of Government Response to an imminent mass maritime arrival to New Zealand in accordance with the Mass Arrival Control and Processing Plan (MACPP).

Previous maritime mass arrival exercises have been jointly coordinated by Immigration New Zealand and NZ Customs under the name 'Exercise Barrier'. Exercise Barrier 2012 was a multi-stage series of tabletop discussion exercises, culminating in a live operational exercise on 19<sup>th</sup> June 2012. Exercise Barrier 2013 (11<sup>th</sup> December 2013) was a tabletop discussion exercise focused on Coordination and Control (C<sup>2</sup>) Organisation, and the Port-of-Entry (PoE) Processing components of the MACPP. The exercise also focused on the legal risks and new group warrant of commitment processes following the amendments to the Immigration Act 2009.

The purpose of Exercise High Water 2018 was to familiarise a wide cohort of Executive Leadership Teams and Senior Officials with the challenges of responding to a maritime mass arrival, noting that one has not occurred to date in New Zealand.

Exercise High Water 2018 was the first national mass arrivals exercise since 2013 and the first exercise since the transition of mass arrivals lead agency responsibilities from NZ Customs to MBIE.

Other changes since 2013 that had an impact on exercise planning were the implementation of the all-of-government Mass Arrival Prevention Strategy (MAPS), endorsed by Cabinet in 2014, and changes to legislation, national guidelines and operational capacity, including the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015, National Security System (NSS) changes (as per the NSS Handbook 2016), Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS) 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition (2014), and the upgrade in June 2016 to the Mangere Refugee Resettlement Centre

Furthermore, during Exercise High Water 2018 MBIE was managing a review of the MACPP itself, and a revision draft was circulated to participating agencies in July 2018.

### PURPOSE OF THIS REPORT

This report provides a summary of the planning process, exercise and evaluation for Exercise High Water 2018. It is intended as a reference for participating agencies and groups (in particular the MAPS Group and the MACPP revision group) to advise mass arrival planning priorities, as well as a reference for future mass arrivals-themed exercises.

### EXERCISE MANAGEMENT

#### EXERCISE INITIATION

MBIE began planning for a mass arrivals exercise in November 2017. The Warning Order was sent to all participating in June 2018.

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 NATIONAL EXERCISE PROGRAMME

Exercise High Water 2018 was a scheduled exercise under the National Exercise Programme (NEP). Therefore, the exercise design followed the revised (since NEP Exercise Tangaroa 2016) planning process and documentation process. Support for the exercise design was also sourced from the NEP Exercise Programme Team (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC)).

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 EXERCISE CONTROL TEAM

Exercise High Water 2018 was designed and delivered by MBIE as the lead agency for Mass Arrivals planning.

**Exercise Director:** Rebecca Miller: MBIE – Manager People Smuggling, Human Trafficking & Regional Cooperation

**Exercise Team:** Rebecca Miller

Matt Shaw: MBIE – Principal Advisor Emergency Management

Anna Bishop: MBIE – Senior Advisor Emergency Management

Henrietta McNeill: MBIE – Advisor – People Smuggling, Human Trafficking & Regional Cooperation

Richard Simpson: MBIE contractor – Exercise Writer

**Lead Facilitator:** Senta Jehle (Senior Officials Group Exercise)

*(Marika Hughes (DPMC) and Andrew Kibblewhite (CE – DPMC) acted as exercise participants as Chair of the Watch Group and ODESC exercise meetings respectively. Peter Devoy (MBIE) acted as an exercise participant as the nominated National Controller for the exercise scenario).*

**Table Facilitators:** (Senior Officials Exercise only) – Anna Bishop, Henrietta McNeill, Matt Shaw, Richard Simpson, Kate Herlihy.

**Note Takers:** 9(2)(a)

Three Evaluators were sourced, two external Evaluators from the Ministry of Health (MoH) and the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM), and one internal Evaluator (MBIE).

The internal Evaluator (Lisa Jones) was unable to attend the Senior Officials and Watch Group exercises on 14<sup>th</sup> and a backup Evaluator (Dana McDonald) was briefed to evaluate these exercises.

**Evaluators:** Dana McDonald (MBIE) – Senior Officials and Watch Group exercises

Lisa Jones (MBIE) – Executive Leadership (ODESC) exercise

Murray Mills (Ministry of Health – MoH)

Sara Mitchell – Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management – MCDEM)

## EXERCISE DESIGN

Exercise High Water 2018 was focused on the strategic, national level response to the standard planning scenario described s. 6 (c)

The three national strategic-level exercises were also intended to inform the design of an operational exercise planned for early 2019 to test the PoE processing components of the MACPP.

The schedule was designed around three ‘tabletop’ discussion exercises, with invitees being representatives from three strategic levels of the NSS: Senior Officials, Watch Group and Executive Leadership (Officials Committee for

- Senior Officials exercise – 14<sup>th</sup> September 2018: Facilitated workshop format
- Watch Group exercise – 14<sup>th</sup> September 2018: Watch Group meeting format
- Executive Leadership exercise – 28<sup>th</sup> September 2018: ODESC meeting format

Participants were advised in advance that the focus was to be the implementation of a MACPP response (rather than MAPS [REDACTED] 6(c) [REDACTED])

The Senior Officials exercise was a series of facilitated discussions, with ‘table facilitators’ from the Exercise Control team facilitating discussions and providing exercise injects at five tables of eight to nine participants, with groups reporting back at each exercise stage to the National Controller (Pete Devoy). The National Controller was supported by a Lead Facilitator (Senta Jehle – MBIE) and Exercise Director (Rebecca Miller – MBIE).

The Watch Group and ODESC tabletop discussion exercises followed the standard agenda format for each respective group, as per the exercise format requirements of the NEP. Participants were asked to brief their agency colleagues between each exercise on the mass arrivals scenario, key decisions/discussions and their agency participation, in preparation for subsequent exercises.

The Watch Group exercise was led by a Watch Group Chair (Marika Hughes). The majority of Watch Group participants also attended the Senior Officials exercise held immediately prior, and most attendees of the Senior Officials exercise stayed as Observers.

The Executive Leadership (ODESC) exercise was led by Andrew Kibblewhite (CE – DPMC). Agency attendees from the Senior Officials and Watch Group exercises were asked to brief their respective ODESC participants in advance of the exercise. The Exercise Planning Team also sent additional information and updated scenario information to participants in advance of the ODESC exercise.

EXERCISE SCENARIO AND FORMAT

Due to the changes in mass arrivals planning since 2013, the focus of Exercise High Water 2018 was a comprehensive overview of strategic national decision points at various MACPP phases.

MACPP 6(c) [REDACTED] was largely addressed in MAPS planning and exercising, therefore the scope of Exercise High Water 2018 was on MACPP 6(c) [REDACTED]

s. 6 (c) [REDACTED]

All three tabletop exercises followed the same scenario s. 6 (c) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] As the scope of the Exercise was from MACPP 6(c) [REDACTED] there was an assumption that the MAPS and NSS had already been stood up for some time and regular Watch Groups and ODESC meetings were already being held.

Each exercise commenced at a time in the scenario after ODESC had (notionally) appointed a MACPP National Controller and Senior Officials had been tasked by their respective agencies to begin mass arrivals response arrangements. The main exercise discussion was to focus on three stages of the response where critical strategic decision-making would be required:

- 6(c) [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

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## EXERCISE PREPARATION TIMELINE

Exercise preparation and documentation followed the NEP process, with ongoing consultation with the NEP team at the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC).

An invitation and exercise Warning Order was sent in June 2018 to agencies listed in the MACPP, with a deadline for RSVPs of 20<sup>th</sup> August 2018.

An external consultant was sourced in June 2018 as 'Exercise Writer' to support the Exercise Control team for the exercise writing and facilitation, and a project plan was developed with the exercise planning schedule. A limited timeframe of the end of July was proposed for key exercise material – to suit planned leave of key Exercise Control personnel and to allow time to refine the final documentation.

An Exercise Instruction document for all three tabletop discussion exercises was sent to participants on 12<sup>th</sup> August 2018.

An Exercise Control and Evaluation Rules of Play document (which included an Agenda and Master Schedule of Events) and Evaluation Forms were used as the main Exercise Control documents.

For the Senior Officials exercise, table facilitators used a handout sheet with the detail of each exercise scenario and facilitator prompts to serve as a Master Schedule of Events reference and to provide consistent Injects for discussion at each table.

## AIM, OBJECTIVES AND KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

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### AIM

The overall aim of Exercise High Water 2018 was to review the Whole of Government response to a mass maritime arrival to New Zealand in accordance with the MACPP. The exercise was also intended to inform the update to the MACPP.

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### OBJECTIVES

The high level objectives were to:

- Familiarise agencies, key Senior Officials and Executive Leadership with the MACPP;
- Explore the key strategic decisions points within the MACPP;
- Assess the systems, processes, and resources set out within the plan are appropriate should the MACPP need to be implemented; and
- Assess agencies with roles and responsibilities under the MACPP have appropriate arrangements in place within their own agency to effectively contribute to the response.

Refer to **Appendix 2** for a full list of exercise objectives and key performance indicators (KPIs).

### PARTICIPATING ORGANISATIONS

All agencies with roles and responsibilities under the MACPP were invited to participate, with a focus on those with responsibilities at a strategic level.

- |  |                                  |
|--|----------------------------------|
| ▪ Department of Corrections                | ▪ Ministry of Justice            |
| ▪ Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet | ▪ Ministry of Primary Industries |
| ▪ Electoral Commission (Observers)         | ▪ Ministry of Social Development |



- Government Communications and Security Bureau
- Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment
- Ministry of Defence
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
- Ministry of Health
- NZ Customs Service
- NZ Defence Force
- NZ Police
- NZ Security Intelligence Service
- Oranga Tamariki

The following agencies also attended Exercise High Water 2018, as observers and to support their preparation of other NEP exercises: Electoral Commission; National Cyber Policy Office.

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#### PARTICIPANT PRE-READING

The Exercise Planning Team made an early decision to minimise pre-reading, both to save participant time and to maintain the strategic focus of the exercise.

In a real event, response staff would need to be familiar with a large amount of documentation. As well as operational response material for their own agency, personnel would need to be familiar with:

- The MAPS and 6(c)
- The MACPP itself.
- Situation Reports, intelligence reports, briefings, Ministerial communication and other incident documentation to date.
- The detailed Concept of Operations (Conops) and Operational Orders for the Response stage.

A detailed **Exercise Instructions** was circulated in advance to agencies, as well as a **Joining Instructions** document with a summary of the key scenario events to date. Agencies were asked to familiarise themselves with this information (in lieu of the more detailed documentation above), and also to identify their agency actions to date.

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#### SENIOR OFFICIALS EXERCISE

Following a karakia timatanga, the Lead Facilitator welcomed exercise participants and observers, and gave an overview of the day. Participants were divided into tables of approximately nine people each, led by an MBIE Table Facilitator.

In order to maximise workshop discussion time, the exercise commenced immediately after the welcome and initial briefing. As per the participant Exercise Instructions, it was assumed all participants were familiar with the MACPP, their agency responsibilities in a mass arrivals situation, and the exercise pre-reading (Exercise Instructions and Joining Instructions).

The exercise comprised of three facilitated discussions around the three critical response 'stages' above. Following a brief by the Lead Facilitator and National Controller about updates to the exercise scenario, each table discussed risks, options and decisions.

Each table had time to prepare notes, then spokespersons from each table gave their view of what actions should be taken, and identified three key risks, information or decisions that should be escalated to the Watch Group. The National Controller asked questions of the spokesperson about their comments.

Once all tables had provided feedback, the National Controller gave a high-level summary of the notional actions to be taken and confirmed the risks, information and decisions that would be escalated to the Watch Group. The exercise then moved to the next 'stage', with the Lead Facilitator giving an overview of the revised scenario.

Following the Senior Officials exercise 'hot debrief', there was a 15-minute afternoon tea between the Senior Officials Exercise and the Watch Group exercise. Participants were asked to ensure they were familiar with their agency priorities for items to be escalated to the Watch Group meeting. Most participants were the agency representative for both exercises, although there were some new attendees for the afternoon Watch Group exercise.

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#### WATCH GROUP EXERCISE

This exercise followed the NEP requirement to follow a standard Watch Group Agenda format.

The exercise began with Peter Devoy, the designated National Controller, giving a briefing on risks, decisions and requests already highlighted during the Senior Officials Exercise. The group then allocated time to discuss these within the context of each exercise stage in sequence.

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#### ODESC EXERCISE

This exercise followed the NEP requirement to follow a standard ODESC Agenda format.

After an introduction from the Exercise Director (Rebecca Miller), the ODESC Chair (Andrew Kibblewhite) welcomed the participants and handed over to Marika Hughes – as Chair of the Watch Group exercise meeting – for a Watch Group update. This was followed by initial observations to the group from Greg Patchell as DCE Immigration, and Peter Devoy, as designated National Controller.

The group then framed the discussions using an agenda format and focusing on three key items of;

- Standing up facilities,
- Communication with the vessel, and
- Options for a proactive or reactive approach with the media.

## EVALUATION

### EVALUATION PROCESS

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#### EVALUATORS

External Evaluators used an evaluation form with questions and suggested evaluation criteria for each exercise sub-objective and KPI.

All Evaluators were asked to review the activities at each table and at the group discussions for the Senior Officials exercise, and the overall discussions in the Watch Group and ODESC exercises. Evaluators were asked to identify overall ratings for each KPI, rating each as 'Observed' or 'Not observed' and a rating of 'P' (performed without challenges), 'S' (performed with some challenges), 'M' (performed with major challenges) or 'U' (unable to be performed). Evaluators were also provided with suggested evaluation criteria and a section for any additional comments about sub-objectives and KPIs.

The MBIE Evaluator used a set of general questions to evaluate the Lead Agency activities. For the Senior Officials exercise, the MBIE Evaluator also referred to the scenario inject prompts used by each table facilitator.

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#### PARTICIPANT FEEDBACK

At the Senior Officials exercise, each table nominated a scribe and a spokesperson to document & report key risks, decisions and/or requests to escalate to the Watch Group at each round of discussions. The written notes were

collected at the end of the exercise, as well as any 'carparked' issues and feedback on MACPP processes out of scope of the exercise itself.

Each exercise ended with a 'hot debrief' where participants were invited to give brief comments about the exercise itself. Participants were also given feedback forms to complete and provide to the Exercise Control team, with the option of giving feedback anonymously.

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#### PARTICIPATING AGENCY FEEDBACK

In the pre-exercise documentation, agencies were asked to continue their review and feedback to the MACPP, and to undertake internal mass arrivals planning and exercising as necessary.

A 'hot debrief' was held immediately after each exercise, with participant feedback documented by MBIE note-takers.

Participants were provided with hardcopy exercise feedback forms to fill out, as well as with the contact details of the Exercise Director for additional feedback.

Following Exercise High Water 2018, the Exercise Planning Team sent a reminder to agencies to submit any additional feedback by 09/11/2018. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, NZ Customs and Department of Corrections provided additional feedback which included the outcome of their internal discussions and exercises.

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#### EXERCISE CONTROL FEEDBACK

MBIE note-takers were allocated to each table to document the discussions and to support the MBIE Table Facilitator.

Exercise Control staff were asked to note the table discussions (Senior Officials exercise) and their observations from the Watch Group and ODESC exercises.

## EXERCISE OUTCOMES

### WHAT WENT WELL?

#### EXERCISE PLANNING

The NEP documentation states a full-scale NEP exercise normally takes two years to plan, however the strategic and tabletop discussion nature of Exercise High Water 2018 meant the timeframe could be significantly shortened.

The majority of Exercise High Water 2018 planning was completed from mid-June to August. This follows the commonly recommended timeframe of 1-3 months for 'complex but inexpensive' exercise preparation (as per the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Exercise: Director's Guideline for Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups [DGL 010/09], page 18). The Exercise Planning Team followed a project plan and risk register (created June 2018) and had regular teleconference meetings.

Exercise preparation was somewhat hindered by the availability of Exercise Planning Team members due to other work commitments and scheduled leave, but this risk was managed through the amended planning timeframe and the appointment of an external Exercise Writer to the Exercise Planning Team.

The Exercise Planning Team communicated well with each other and also received prompt advice and support from the NEP Team at DPMC during the planning process.

Additional MBIE staff were briefed and brought in on 14th September to help coordinate the support and administration of the large Senior Officials workshop.

## PARTICIPANT FEEDBACK ON EXERCISE CONDUCT

**Senior Officials Exercise:**

The majority of participant and evaluator feedback was very positive. The table below shows the number of participants who gave each rating to the standard questions in the feedback forms.

	Strongly disagree 1	2	3	4	Strongly agree 5
Adequate pre-exercise information	1		4	14	15
Realistic, suitable scenario			2	12	21
Well organised and structured				11	22
Effective exercise control and facilitators			1	10	23
Suitable pace			2	12	20
Appropriate content for own agency			5	11	19
Adequate discussion time		1	1	17	15
Clear, effective documentation			2	13	19
Challenging enough			3	11	20
Effective learning opportunity				14	20

Positive comments from participants focused on the realistic scenario, the opportunity to interact with a range of agency colleagues, and the quality of the exercise organisation and facilitation.

**Watch Group Exercise:**

Participant feedback about the Watch Group exercise was more mixed and generally positive, as per the participant feedback form ratings, in the table below.

	Strongly disagree 1	2	3	4	Strongly agree 5
Adequate pre-exercise information			3	3	1
Realistic, suitable scenario		1	1	3	2
Well organised and structured	1	1	2		2
Effective exercise control and facilitators			2	4	1
Suitable pace		3		4	
Appropriate content for own agency				4	3
Adequate discussion time	1	1	1	1	1
Clear, effective documentation		2	1	3	1
Challenging enough			1	2	4
Effective learning opportunity			1	2	4

Positive participant comments focused on the value of a realistic scenario prompting interagency discussion about the strategic priorities of a mass arrival incident, and the usefulness of this exercise in future mass arrivals planning. This was mirrored by Evaluator comments, e.g. that "the exercise and scenario appeared well within agency

parameters and provided a sense of realism. While there is always an opportunity to inject exercise complications it was rewarding to see that Exercise High Water 2018 remained on brief to meet its aims and objectives.

#### **ODESC Exercise:**

Senior ODESC participants were encouraged to provide feedback to the Exercise Control Team, however participants were not asked to fill out feedback forms.

The meeting notes from the ODESC exercise shows the Chair acknowledged the level of participation from a wide range of agencies in the exercise, including the seniority of agency representatives. Participants also acknowledged the opportunity to test planning assumptions within an exercise and for the Exercise High Water 2018 findings to inform the current MACPP revisions.

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#### **EXERCISE CONTROL**

The Exercise Control team – including Evaluators – were well briefed in advance of the exercises. As well as teleconference meetings, the Exercise Control team shared a detailed 'Exercise Control and Evaluation Rules of Play' document.

Exercise Control and Evaluator staff were subject-matter experts with prior knowledge that included NEP exercise design and mass arrivals preparedness. This was a key factor in creating the exercise within a short timeframe.

In the Senior Officials exercise, exercise control staff had dedicated roles, which allowed them to focus on specific exercise components.

- The Exercise Director ensured the scenario discussions were in line with the main exercise objectives.
- The Lead Facilitator (supported by the National Controller) was in charge of the exercise agenda and acted as 'referee' to keep discussions on track.
- Table Facilitators (supported by dedicated MBIE note-takers) were responsible for prompting discussions at each table and raising 'inject' questions. All Table Facilitators used the same reference documents for inject questions and expected group discussion and decisions.

During the Watch Group and ODESC exercises, the meeting Chair (who was also an exercise participant) was supported by the Exercise Director and the Lead Facilitator.

The main Exercise Planning Team had support from other MBIE staff for administration, printing, collating and preparation of rooms and resources for the exercises. This helped the smooth running of the exercise on the day, and participant feedback indicated this attention to detail showed the exercise as well organised and professionally run.

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#### **EVALUATION**

Expert Evaluators were sourced from external agencies (MoH and MCDEM) and were well briefed in advance. Evaluators worked from detailed Evaluation Notes documents which included prompts for how exercise KPIs were likely to be met.

Having external Evaluators available to support MBIE in this level of exercise is invaluable and greatly appreciated.

Although the nominated MBIE Evaluator was not available for the 14<sup>th</sup> September (Senior Officials and Watch Group) exercises due to illness, a backup MBIE Evaluator was quickly sourced and briefed in advance of the exercise.

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## PARTICIPANT PREPARATION

Agencies were provided with a detailed Exercise Instructions and Joining Instructions in lieu of the extensive documentation they would be working from in a real event. A revision draft of the MACPP was also circulated to participating agencies over a month in advance of the exercise.

Hardcopies of the MACPP, scenario information and exercise injects were provided to all participants as a reference during the exercise.

Table Facilitators observed that participants who were familiar with their agency plan and the MACPP content were more prepared and informed during table discussions than those who did not come prepared.

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## WHAT COULD BE IMPROVED?

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### EXERCISE PLANNING

Although an MBIE-led mass arrivals exercise had been intended – in theory – for some time, planning for Exercise High Water 2018 was completed in a short time-frame from June to August 2018. A longer planning timeframe would have allowed more time to refine – in particular – a shortened list of exercise KPIs and a detailed scenario to incorporate the notional MAPS and initial MACPP activity already completed.

#### NEP exercise criteria:

As a NEP exercise, the Exercise Planning Team took direction from the DPMC NEP team on the required exercise design. Some NEP requirements proved difficult to align with the original Exercise High Water 2018 design, in particular; the requirement for all exercise KPIs to be selected from the list of NEP exercises, the requirement for Watch Group and ODESC exercises to be shortened to one hour, to be led by a participant Chair and to follow a standard agenda rather than workshop format. The Exercise Planning Team also needed to condense the standard NEP (full-scale exercise) template documents to allow for a relatively minor tabletop discussion NEP exercise.

There were some last-minute changes – on the day – to the design of the Watch Group exercise, and further refinements to the design of the ODESC exercise in the two weeks following the Watch Group exercise. Future exercises may be helped by a more formal connection (i.e. an agreed process for review and feedback) between the Exercise Planning Team and NEP representatives well in advance of the exercise date, to discuss the plan for exercise control and facilitation roles and responsibilities, and to review the proposed exercise agenda and scenario as it related to the objectives and KPIs.

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### EXERCISE FORMAT

#### Exercise 'warm start':

The initiation of a standard MACPP response follows the initiation and actions for 6(c)

Therefore, a necessary criteria for the MACPP exercise was a 'warm start' where agencies were advised to pretend some activity – e.g. Watch Group and ODESC meetings, and MAPS actions – had already been underway.

However, there was some confusion around what actions would have been completed, and which risks and issues already would have been managed, or which were underway, as per the MAPS.

The Exercise Planning Team had felt that creating 'mock-up' Sitreps/intelligence reports, ConOps and briefing material (as well as the Joining Instructions and Exercise Instructions) as pre-reading would be excessive for a relatively brief tabletop exercise and this amount of operational detail may have been a distraction from the strategic exercise priorities. However, if future exercises are to also have a 'warm start', a detailed timeline and also specific information about MAPS decisions and actions (as pre-reading or initial briefing) may help exercise play.

**Strategic vs operational discussions:**

Evaluators and some agencies indicated a significant issue was the exercise being treated in a highly operational state rather than being at the strategic level at which this exercise needed to be undertaken. Participants commented there were many potential operational “rabbit holes” and that strong facilitation was needed to keep the discussions on track.

There was some lack of understanding of the decision-making authority of NSS (Senior Officials, Watch Group and ODESC) levels compared with CIMS Response levels (National Coordination Centre, Regional Coordination Centre, Emergency Operations Centres and individual agencies). For example, while some participants felt certain decisions were the responsibility of the strategic, national decision-makers, other participants felt most decisions with a strong operational component should be initiated from the Response (regional CIMS) levels by way of the detailed ConOps and Operational Orders presented to the Senior Officials and Watch Group.

A simplified exercise scenario may have helped participants agree on roles and responsibilities, as well as clearer instructions in the exercise pre-reading. During the exercise, Facilitators and the National Controller could be briefed to keep the discussions strictly at the strategic level.

From a planning perspective, a recommendation is to develop a simple shared agency process map, to outline where individual agency responsibilities intersect. In particular this would be around horizontal and vertical Command and Control at both the NSS and CIMS Response levels.

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Overall, this type of ‘warm start’ exercise could have been simplified, with more a more detailed timeline available to participants about actions already completed. This approach would need to include strong exercise facilitation to ensure the scope of exercise discussions remained in line with the exercise objectives and KPIs.

Participants should be reminded of their responsibilities to be familiar with their agency’s component of the MACPP, and with the scope of the Watch Group and ODESC groups as per the NSS Framework. Participants should also be briefed on the limited discussion scope of any ‘simplified’ exercise, to manage expectations.

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**EXERCISE CONTROL**

The Exercise Control team had dedicated roles, which helped these staff focus on specific duties – i.e. Exercise Director and Lead/Table Facilitators. However, in practice the flow of each exercise was largely directed by an exercise participant (i.e. National Controller and Watch Group/ODESC Chairs). These staff were not part of the Exercise Control team and were therefore not familiar with the specific exercise KPIs and priorities (for example to frame the Senior Officials exercise discussion to allow key risks/issues/decisions to be collated and presented to the Watch Group exercise – which began 15 minutes after the Senior Officials exercise ended).

The benefits of having senior participants in the ‘drivers seat’ for the exercise were that it allowed a more realistic discussion format that was focused more on addressing the scenario needs rather than checking off exercise objectives and KPIs. It also allowed the Exercise Control team to also evaluate these senior participants.

The disadvantages were that discussion of some exercise KPIs was missed and there was some ambiguity about the transition of exercise information between each exercise. Exercise High Water 2018 had a complex exercise plan (i.e. a ‘warm start’ exercise, skipping forward in time through a series of exercise phases, and requiring a discussion of horizontal and vertical Command and Control arrangements), with a number of KPIs that needed to be demonstrated over a short period of time.

Future exercises should consider the exercise lead being either a Facilitator from the Exercise Control team, or Exercise Control should ensure the Controller/Chair exercise participant is fully briefed on the high-level intentions of the exercise KPIs and exercise plan (as well as the scenario itself).

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## PARTICIPANT PREPARATION

Exercise High Water 2018 was the first national interagency mass arrivals exercise since 2013, and there have been significant changes to national legislation and planning guidelines since that time. Also, the agenda of the three Exercise High Water 2018 exercises was designed to maximise time for actual exercise 'play', therefore the sessions did not begin with an overview of the concept, principles or current state of mass arrivals preparedness.

Additionally, considering this was a 'warm start' exercise with a number of MACPP Phases to cover, participants were asked to familiarise themselves with the MACPP and supporting material before the exercise. Participants were provided with Exercise Instructions and Joining Instructions to support this.

There was a wide range of familiarity with the MACPP. Participants who came prepared contributed greatly to discussions, but there was feedback that some participants were not clear on their own or other agency responsibilities under the MACPP, which resulted in unnecessary discussion and too great a focus on operational (rather than strategic) topics.

Considering mass arrival incidents as a complex, evolving risk – and one that has not yet occurred in New Zealand – there may be a need for a central agency training reference and/or a schedule of 'preparedness phase' or urgent familiarisation sessions on general mass arrivals principles. This would include a declassified overview of the current mass arrivals climate (including political, social, legal and ethical), an overview of the MACPP itself (including for backup and senior government staff who may not be required to be familiar with the entire MACPP) and a declassified overview of the MAPS (including for agencies who do not have access to the document itself).

Agencies should also be reminded that they are required to have personnel who are fully cognisant of their agency's role in the MACPP.

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## PARTICIPANT FEEDBACK

### **Senior Officials Exercise:**

A large amount of participant comment focused on the items above, i.e. the risk of operational "rabbit holes" when the discussions should be more strategic-focused, the need for more detailed information about the notional activity that had already taken place, the need for visual, reference and/or summary information about key principles.

Although agencies appreciated being in mixed groups for the Senior Officials exercise, some felt there were some gaps if certain key agencies were not present at their table. Again, the request related to the need for general summary information about the key principles of agency roles and responsibilities (although hardcopies of the MACPP were provided to each table).

### **Watch Group Exercise:**

Constructive feedback generally centred around the lack of adequate opportunity to transition information from the Senior Officials to the Watch Group (or Watch Group to ODESC) exercises. Again, some participants felt more detailed summary or timeline information (tailored for that group) would have helped.

General feedback was also that the short timeframe and formal meeting agenda format of the Watch Group and ODESC exercises meant a better approach may have been to frame the meeting as a general discussion of risks and principles. This is as opposed to a structured discussion where the group "skips forward" in time to each scenario stage. One participant commented the need was to "balance the need to discuss with the need to exercise".

### **ODESC Exercise:**

NZ Customs and the Department of Corrections provided overall feedback as listed above, which included the scope of their representation at the ODESC exercise. Senior participants were not asked to provide feedback via feedback forms.

The ODESC exercise discussions focused strongly on the complexity of a MACPP response and the need to have



specialist subject matter expertise to advise ODESC decisions (e.g. on international law and obligations), as well as clarity of decision-making responsibility and vertical lines of communication to the Cabinet level.

While participants acknowledged the need for advance planning such as communications strategy, key messages and operational capacity, participants also acknowledged these are also highly dependent on incident-specific factors such as the current relationship with other countries who may be asked to support a response and the assets and resources available at the time.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

### PURPOSE OF THIS SECTION

The purpose of this section is to advise mass arrivals planning and to inform future mass arrivals exercises.

Mass arrival strategic and operational planning is led by MBIE and the following recommendations will be tabled to the interagency MACPP revision group to advise ongoing planning. MBIE may also contact individual agencies with specific feedback on future planning.

The schedule for joint mass arrivals exercises is led by MBIE and the following recommendations will be used by MBIE to advise the development of future mass arrivals training, familiarisation and exercises – including future ‘High Water’ exercises (held at both strategic and operational levels).

### MASS ARRIVAL PLANNING RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations to be submitted to MBIE as lead for interagency MACPP revision and ongoing planning.

Exercise High Water 2018 – feedback, lesson or finding	Recommendation
<p>Preliminary or concurrent MAPs actions were seen as critical to an effective MACPP response, however the MACPP does not directly link with the MAPs.</p> <p>This is particularly relevant when ongoing disruption or detection efforts (e.g. liaison and joint disruption efforts alongside other countries, intelligence-gathering, media/vessel communication strategy) may influence MACPP Response options and timeframe.</p> <p>MAPs is also a secure document. 6(c)</p>	<p>Include a section in the MACPP about the MAPS, including management of a response for a formal transition point from MAPS to MACPP and/or when the MAPS and MACPP actions are underway concurrently.</p> <p>This should include specific information about how the MAPS and MACPP response groups will interact, and how MAPS 6(c)</p> <p>to the CIMS Response level if the actions may impact on operational planning/response.</p> <p>Include a section in the MACPP with direct reference to how the MACPP response arrangements (Command and Control) relate to the national structures and processes in the NSS Framework.</p>
<p>There was some lack of agreement (/understanding) on strategic and operational Command and Control.</p>	<p>Have a specific, central reference (/process map) in the MACPP which clearly outlines the decision-making scope &amp; authority at each level, i.e.:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Ministerial</li> <li>- ODESC</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Watch Group, Senior Officials and National Coordination Centre</li> <li>- Regional Emergency Coordination Centre</li> <li>- Emergency Operations Centre, Incident Management Teams, including response teams.</li> </ul> <p>Note: One Evaluator also recommended the production of agency strategic task cards (as an implementation or practical dissemination guide supporting the MACPP), as well as the need for agencies to look at interdependencies and explore roles, responsibilities and scope of authority.</p>
<p>Participants commented on the logistical issues of meeting the standard MACPP scenario, i.e.:</p> <p>s. 6 (c)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The need for a significant amount of INZ staff to meet the 24-hour Warrant of Commitment deadline.</li> <li>- s. 6 (c)</li> </ul>	<p>Include planning options for urgent contingency measures if an MACPP event occurs with no-notice (i.e. undetected arrival) s. 6 (c)</p>
<p>Some participants felt the MACPP needed to be simpler to navigate in order to make it an effective document "for retrieving key information during a tight turnaround."</p>	<p>Consider more annotated tables, visual content, flowcharts, high-level summaries, simple structure. Reduce A3 pages.</p> <p>Consider high-level summary sections (or documents) to be used as quick/urgent references, and/or as summary material for agencies or staff who do not need to be familiar with the entire MACPP.</p>

**MASS ARRIVAL TRAINING AND EXERCISING RECOMMENDATIONS**

Recommendations to be submitted to MBIE as lead agency for MACPP preparedness, including oversight and support for joint planning between agencies.

Exercise High Water 2018 – feedback, lesson or finding	Recommendation
<p>Some participants were not familiar with the MACPP, NSS or MAPs as key reference documents.</p> <p>Some participant knowledge about mass arrivals as a topic was incomplete or out-of-date.</p>	<p>Consider interagency briefing material on key principles of the MACPP.</p> <p>Consider standard, declassified training material (/exercises, discussions, presentations) on the topic of mass arrivals, the NSS and MAPs.</p>

	<p>Consider pre-exercise briefings and/or presentations to ensure participants are prepared.</p> <p>MBIE to identify and manage an ongoing schedule of agency-specific liaison and discussion forums/exercises focused on specific parts of the MACPP.</p>
<p>The "warm start" and strategic nature of the exercises meant participants needed to come prepared but the exercise discussions needed to be tightly controlled to avoid operational "rabbit holes".</p>	<p>Consider a more limited exercise scope.</p> <p>Provide detailed background/timeline to participants.</p> <p>Ensure all facilitators are well briefed on ensuring participants stay within scope of the exercise objectives &amp; KPIs, as well as the exercise scenario itself.</p>
<p>Some adaptation was needed to the original Exercise Plan to meet NEP requirements, and the exercise delivery was modified further at the time of the exercise, following NEP team feedback.</p>	<p>Have an agreed process of engagement with NEP subject-matter-experts to confirm the alignment of the exercise with NEP principles well in advance of the exercise.</p> <p>This should include how the exercise schedule, content and delivery format is intended to help achieve the chosen objectives and KPIs.</p>

## EXERCISE EVALUATOR CONCLUSIONS

The following information is from exercise Evaluators asked to give an overall summary of capability and performance for the exercise, including any recommendations.

### Sara Mitchell (MCDEM) Evaluator feedback:

**Senior Officials exercise:**

The exercise was a good opportunity for a wide range of agencies to come together and test the current state of the MACPP.

Overall, there was too much focus on operational issues and detail and not enough strategic-level focus in the discussions and report backs.

The general knowledge and understanding of the MACPP was lacking and not a lot of direct reference was made to it during the day. There also seemed to be some lack of knowledge and understanding of agency roles and responsibilities and how they interact with the plan and with other agencies.

A positive was the willingness of agencies to come together and participate in the exercise. The format of the exercise kept people engaged, but the timeframes may have been too tight to allow for full discussions.

There did not seem to be a lot of familiarity with the NSS and how Watch Groups function and what they need to know. The role of senior officials in feeding up to the Watch Group was not clear or well understood.

**Watch Group exercise:**

The format of the Watch Group meeting was changed from that in the exercise guidance at the last minute – it would have been better to have prepared for this in advance.

There was not enough time allowed for agency representatives from the senior officials exercise to brief representatives arriving for the Watch Group. In most cases, this was the same person and didn't matter, however, where a new person came in it was clear that they had not received appropriate information on the scenario and decisions to date to be able to fully engage with the meeting discussion. For future exercises of this format, there needs to be a very clear set up of the start state and the decisions made to date to ensure all participants are starting from the same place.

It was too difficult and there was not enough time allowed to cover off all three exercise phases in the one

discuss these. The Watch Group was not presented with a set of options from which to make decisions and/or recommendations to ODESC – discussion may have been more focused if this had occurred. It is suggested that only one exercise phase be covered in the ODESC exercise to allow it to operate more true-to-life.

The issues presented to the Watch Group were generally not of a strategic-enough focus for participants to engage in appropriately. It was also not clear what decisions they were being asked to make, and what decisions needed to be elevated to the ODESC level. There needs to be greater understanding of at what level Minister's want to be involved at, and of what CEs expect to hear and want to discuss.

Again, it was good to see such a wide range of agencies represented, and a willingness to discuss and change approach partway through to make the discussion work better was a positive.

The benefits of the format of holding a free and frank discussion on what would be the main issues versus playing a straight exercise Watch Group could be a lesson for future exercise design.

#### **ODESC exercise:**

Overall this was a really focused, well-run exercise meeting, with clear points of decision-making identified.

There was good involvement from all participants, and good knowledge of processes, plans and responsibilities was demonstrated. Focus was maintained on strategic-level issues and decision-making without getting into too much operational detail.

The participants identified the value of running this scenario through with Ministers to see where they're at with their thinking and to then use this to inform planning and future actions.

#### **Lisa Jones (MBIE) – Evaluator feedback on ODESC exercise:**

Good overview provided by DCE, focused on the three key points that needed to be covered. s (6) (a) . Brought back by the Chair.

A lot of the session was spent talking about the actual decision-making and where this should sit, particularly in relation to the decision to activate the response. The Chair asked if this was actually MBIE's decision to make. DCE's view was yes it is. CE agreed. Her view was ODESC needs to show leadership and make decisions while keeping Ministers informed and involved. MBIE would advise Minister's what key messages should be used regarding deterrence but also be advising them on what not to say. She referenced the fuel crisis as a real example of how this would play out.

Overall, agencies seemed engaged and lots of good discussion was generated. It did go off track a little and at times became very operational but overall, a good session.

#### **9(2)(a) (MoH) – Executive summary from Evaluator report covering Senior Officials, Watch Group and ODESC exercise**

1. Exercise Highwater provided valuable experience and opportunity for stakeholder agencies to discuss and analyse component parts of the MACPP
2. Consideration given to cluster exercises before coming back to a general exercise day. 6(c) , Health cluster exercise their responsibilities. Benefit being that agencies will be better able to seek clarity from other stakeholders on an identified issue or gap
3. While agencies present at the first two exercise components (Senior Officials/Watchgroup) of Highwater seemed appropriately represented it may have been apparent not all participants were well versed in the MACPP contents. This was evident in some of the table discussions where points under debate appear to be articulated in the MACPP.
4. All agencies (and their delegates) across the three exercises understand their roles under the NSS
5. Opportunity to raise risks from within agencies, especially where these impact or influence other stakeholders. Included in this is the considered socialising of these risks with CE's and Ministers.

After looking at the People, Process, Organisation, Support, Technology, Training and Exercise management (P2OST2E) methodology there were 5 insights identified as a result of Exercise Highwater. These insights crossed over the key performance indicators as set by the exercise governance group.

1. There needs to be more awareness across all agencies on planning documents and roles and responsibilities listed therein.
2. There needs to be a better understanding of those planning documents and a knowledge of agency capacity and capability

3. There seemed to be, in part, a lack of definitive familiarisation by staff to understand specific legislative and planning documents.
4. Agencies (while not fully conversant with all aspects of the MACPP) understood roles and responsibilities as per the NSS. Appeared to be well versed in processes for this type of event.
5. There was some lack of understanding for external agencies in capacity and capability of each other's roles. While the general recognition of agencies activities is well understood, e.g. Police – enforcement/investigation, NZDF – specialist and tactical support, health – Ambulance and DHB support, Justice – legal processing etc, some of the intricacies of roles was less evident. This could be highlighted as an immediate risk

By way of treatment options it is recommended the following actions be taken

1. Increase capacity and education around MACPP.
2. Further interagency exercising and consideration for sup group exercises.
3. Share plans and standard operating procedures across agencies
4. Look at frequency of MACPP exercises
5. Look at cluster exercises for specific parts of MACPP and treat any findings as an outcome across all agencies.

## APPENDICES

### Appendix 1: Abbreviations

<b>CDEM</b>	Civil Defence and Emergency Management
<b>CIMS</b>	Coordinated Incident Management System, 2 <sup>nd</sup> Edition (2014)
<b>ConOps</b>	Concept of Operations [document]
<b>DPMC</b>	Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet
<b>KPI</b>	Key Performance Indicator
<b>MACPP</b>	Mass Arrivals Control and Processing Plan v01/03/2013 (& revision draft v20/07/2018)
<b>MAPS</b>	Mass Arrivals Prevention Strategy
<b>MBIE</b>	Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment
<b>MCDEM</b>	Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management
<b>MoH</b>	Ministry of Health
<b>NEP</b>	National Exercise Programme
<b>NSS</b>	National Security System
<b>NZ</b>	New Zealand
<b>ODESC</b>	Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination
<b>PoE</b>	Port of Entry

## Appendix 2: Objectives and KPIs

Objectives and KPIs (including numbering) were taken directly from the National Exercise Programme.

The following table summarises the performance against each exercise Objective, based on exercise Evaluator feedback. Evaluators were asked to review participation in each exercise against the overall objectives and KPIs. Evaluators provided feedback in their Evaluation Forms and summary reports.

One Evaluator commented “some of the key performance indicators were unable to be clearly assessed. This is not to be seen as a criticism of either the exercise governance or participants. It relates solely to the management of the scenario against time allowed and depth of discussions by participants.” This is similar to the opinions expressed by the other exercise Evaluators.

Exercise Objective, sub-objectives and KPIs	Summary of Evaluator feedback
<p><b>Objective 1.0</b> Lead a coordinated interagency response to a significant incident or emerging threat that warrants a NSS activation. <u>Note: This objective is only applicable to the Lead Agency (or Unified Control) for this exercise.</u></p>	
<p><b>SO 1.1</b> Identify significant incident or emerging threat.</p> <p><b>KPI 1.1.1</b> Incident identified as a significant incident or emerging threat requiring activation of the NSS.</p> <p><b>KPI 1.1.2</b> Lead agency understands the activation criteria and coordinates with DPMC to activate NSS.</p>	<p>The background scenario included assumptions about some of the activation and coordination that had already been (notionally) completed. The National Controller (MBIE) gave an overview of the meetings and decisions that had led to the start of each exercise, e.g. the assumption that previous Watch Group and ODESC meetings had already taken place.</p>
<p><b>SO 1.2</b> Activate coordination centres at all required levels in accordance with standard operating procedures.</p> <p><b>KPI 1.2.1</b> Lead agency activates coordination centres in accordance with standard operating procedures.</p> <p><b>KPI 1.2.4</b> Key stakeholders are identified and informed of the activation(s).</p>	<p>Because of time constraints, and not all agencies being at each table during the Senior Officials exercise, there was limited opportunity to look at the detailed timeline and pathway for agency notification and activation. Evaluators commented that it was sometimes unclear how agencies had been activated (e.g. through Single Point of Contact process) and also the distinction between government and NGO agencies in terms of receiving notifications when access to information is still being controlled.</p>
<p><b>SO 1.3</b> Develop an effective action plan in accordance with standard operating procedures.</p> <p><b>KPI 1.3.4</b> Likely threats and associated consequences and risks are embedded in the action plan.</p> <p><b>KPI 1.3.5</b> Legal and policy frameworks are taken into account &amp; appropriately used to support action plan.</p> <p><b>KPI 1.3.6</b> Relevant support agencies are integrated into action planning processes.</p>	<p>For the Watch Group exercise, an Evaluator commented “the short delay between Senior Official and Watch Group exercise hindered briefings, but incoming participants who had not attended the Senior Officials exercise had a good understanding of roles and responsibilities.”</p>
<p><b>SO 1.4</b> Coordinate the interagency response to the significant incident or emerging threat in accordance with the lead agency’s emergency plan, the action plan, CIMS 2, and legal/policy frameworks.</p> <p><b>KPI 1.4.2</b> Response is managed in accordance with plans and within mandated frameworks.</p> <p><b>KPI 1.4.3</b> The systems, processes and resources are appropriate for implementing the action plan, or adjusted to meet the needs of the situation.</p> <p><b>KPI 1.4.4</b> Lead agency delegates tasks to support agencies within legal frameworks.</p>	<p>Good leadership demonstrated by Lead Agency, Chairs of Watch Group and ODESC, and senior agency personnel at ODESC exercise.</p> <p>Some Evaluators commented that at times (in all three exercises) it was not clear what specific decision had been made or that a consensus had been reached, especially when there had been a lot of discussion about the pros and cons of each option. There could be more specific times for the Lead Agency and meeting Chair (and National Controller) to specifically state what decisions and actions have been made following these discussions. However, this lack of clarity may have been because of the artificial exercise environment rather than the workshop/meetings being in response to a real event.</p>
<p><b>SO 1.8</b> Direction is taken from NSS decision-makers.</p> <p><b>KPI 1.8.1</b> NSS decisions are factored into planning and implemented.</p>	

Exercise Objective, sub-objectives and KPIs	Summary of Evaluator feedback
<p><b>Objective 2.0</b> Support a coordinated interagency response to a significant incident or emerging threat that warrants a NSS activation. <u>Note: This objective is only applicable to the Support Agencies for this exercise.</u></p>	
<p><b>SO 2.1</b> Support the identification of a significant incident or emerging threat.</p> <p><b>KPI 2.1.2</b> Support agencies identify additional risks from within their spheres of expertise.</p>	<p>There was inconsistent reference to the MACPP and lack of clarity of MACPP decision points. Lack of knowledge of some participants on technical information (e.g. legal requirements and agency powers) in the MACPP.</p>
<p><b>SO 2.2</b> Activate coordination centres at all required levels in accordance with standard operating procedures.</p> <p><b>KPI 2.2.1</b> Support agencies activate coordination centres, where required, in accordance with standard operating procedures.</p> <p><b>KPI 2.2.2</b> Lead agency and other key stakeholders are informed of the activation(s).</p>	<p>Inconsistent use of the MACPP itself as a reference, although those participants who did refer to the MACPP contributed well to group discussions.</p> <p>Some lack of reference/knowledge of the MACPP led to groups considering response options outside the scope of the MACPP. Although useful as a thought exercise, caution is needed when suggesting alternatives as the default MACPP processes have been more thoroughly reviewed by all agencies and technical experts.</p>
<p><b>SO 2.3</b> Support the development of an action plan in accordance with standard operating procedures.</p> <p><b>KPI 2.3.1</b> Support agencies contribute to the lead agency planning processes as established in standard operating procedures and CIMS 2.</p> <p><b>KPI 2.3.2</b> Threats and associated risks identified by the support agencies are embedded in the action plan.</p> <p><b>KPI 2.3.3</b> Support agencies develop action plans to detail the tasks assigned to them by the lead agency.</p> <p><b>KPI 2.3.4</b> Where appropriate, legal and policy frameworks are used to support the action plan.</p>	<p>Most groups identified the information required to make a risk assessment, and Health and Safety implications of decision, but the exercise timeframe meant these were not discussed in detail.</p> <p>Exercise formats did not support discussion of action planning or assigning tasks to support agencies. Wrap-up comments by National Controller at end of each exercise stage (Senior Officials exercise) focused on high-level risks and decisions. Watch Group and ODESC meetings did look at operational needs, however this did not extend to assigning actions to individual agencies. Some participants commented this could have been enhanced with a detailed ConOps being used as an exercise reference, although others felt this level of scenario-specific exercise detail may detract from the overall exercise objectives and KPIs.</p>
<p><b>SO 2.4</b> Support the interagency response to the significant incident or emerging threat in accordance with the lead agency’s emergency plan, the action plan, CIMS, and legal/policy frameworks.</p> <p><b>KPI 2.4.1</b> Support agency staff assigned to work in the response have a level of competency appropriate to their role.</p> <p><b>KPI 2.4.3</b> Response is supported in accordance with plans and within mandated frameworks.</p> <p><b>KPI 2.4.4</b> The systems, processes, and resources are appropriate for implementing the action plan.</p>	<p>ODESC exercise included thorough consideration of pros and cons of decisions, but effort was needed to ensure discussions stayed strategic rather than operational. Most agencies were familiar with MACPP responsibilities and their agency role, as well as the current political/resource and environmental context of mass arrivals planning. Critical actions and deadlines were identified and discussed.</p>
<p><b>SO 2.6</b> Strengthen personal and interagency collaborative relationships.</p> <p><b>KPI 2.6.1</b> Support agency personnel work in a collaborative manner with colleagues from other agencies.</p>	<p>Agencies highlighted some critical dependencies in specific agency personnel/resources at specific MACPP stages, and the need for strong contingency planning if the timeline is shortened and/or the personnel/resources are not available.</p>



Exercise Objective, sub-objectives and KPIs	Summary of Evaluator feedback
<p><b>Objective 3.0 Enable high level all-of-government decision making through the NSS.</b></p>	
<p><b>SO 3.1</b> Agencies fulfil their roles as expected in the NSS response governance structures.</p> <p><b>KPI 3.1.2</b> All relevant agencies support ODESC and Watch Groups with appropriate staff empowered to make decisions for their agencies.</p> <p><b>KPI 3.1.4</b> Relevant NSS groups provide strategic direction to relevant agencies, allowing comprehensive operational planning as required.</p> <p><b>KPI 3.1.5</b> Relevant NSS groups monitor and evaluate decisions throughout the incident.</p> <p><b>KPI 3.1.6</b> Agencies keep Ministers informed through their own agency processes or as agreed by ODESC.</p>	<p>There was acknowledgement at each exercise that decisions from higher-level groups (Watch Group, ODESC, Ministers, Cabinet, Prime Minister) would change response options.</p> <p>Some lack of familiarity with the scope of decision-making responsibility of each group and vertical communication pathways (including with the CIMS Response levels).</p> <p>Tendency for discussions to move to operational detail rather than staying strategic. Some Evaluators felt there could be benefit in having scope of responsibility clearly shown (e.g. as a visual or quick reference) in the MACPP, especially considering the introduction of the MAPS and the revision of the NSS Framework has added more complexity to MACPP processes.</p> <p>Some discussion – and information in the MACPP – also needed about influences and contingency options around key decisions, and what activities must continue or be postponed pending a decision</p>
<p><b>Objective 5.0 Situational awareness is established and maintained during the exercise.</b></p>	
<p><b>SO 5.1</b> Incident information is effectively managed and communicated by all agencies involved in the response.</p> <p><b>KPI 5.1.1</b> Accurate information is communicated within agencies (vertically) in a timely manner in accordance with standard operating procedures.</p> <p><b>KPI 5.1.2</b> Information is communicated between agencies (horizontally) in a timely manner in accordance with existing communications policies, procedures, and MOUs.</p>	<p>Some discussion about activating other groups (e.g. Government Legal Network) to enable interagency agreement on technical matters.</p> <p>Assumptions that Ministers were being informed. Detail of schedule/requirements not covered.</p> <p>Good range of agencies represented at all meetings, good willingness to share information and contribute.</p> <p>s. 6 (a)</p>
<p><b>Objective 8.0 Integrate previous lessons identified from interagency activities to engender a culture of continuous improvement. <u>Note: This applies to the exercise process</u></b></p>	
<p><b>SO 8.2</b> Participating agencies commit to evaluation, and post-exercise reporting</p> <p><b>KPI 8.2.1</b> Lead agency coordinates evaluation against relevant National Objectives.</p> <p><b>KPI 8.2.2</b> Supporting agencies conduct and record internal debriefs that feed into the lead agency’s post-exercise report.</p> <p><b>SO 8.3</b> Participating agencies commit to improvement and corrective actions.</p>	<p>Recognition of good information flow, the treatment of classified information (including security clearances) and the need to declassify information as soon as possible to enable robust Response planning at all levels.</p> <p>One Evaluator commented “the format of the [Senior Officials] exercise kept people engaged, but the timeframes may have been too tight to allow for full discussions”</p> <p>Format of the Watch Group exercise was modified late,</p>

Exercise Objective, sub-objectives and KPIs	Summary of Evaluator feedback
<p><b>KPI 8.3.1</b> Post-exercise reports are shared with other agencies to inform future exercise planning and ensure that lessons identified are reflected in agencies' planning processes.</p> <p><b>KPI 8.3.2</b> Corrective actions, identified in post-exercise reports, are implemented by the appropriate agency and in collaboration with other agencies where necessary.</p>	<p>exercise objectives and KPIs – especially for a complex, multi-stage exercise scenario. However most participants had been at the Senior Officials workshop that morning so continued the discussions. Some participants suggested they could have been provided with a set of pre-written options from which to make decisions/recommendations. However, the Exercise Control Team had felt these decisions/recommendations should have come from those raised in the Senior Officials exercise itself rather than being assumed and pre-written by Exercise Control.</p> <p>“It was good to see such a wide range of agencies represented [at all exercises] and a willingness to discuss and change approach pathway to make the discussion work better.”</p>

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## APPENDIX 3: EVALUATION CONTENT

The following content advised this Post Exercise Report:

- **Evaluation Report (for Senior Officials, Watch Group and ODESC exercises) – Murray Mills (MoH)**
- **Evaluation Forms submitted by Sara Mitchell (MCDEM)**
  - o Senior Officials Exercise Evaluation Forms
  - o Watch Group Exercise Evaluation Forms
  - o ODESC Exercise Evaluation Forms
- **Evaluation Form submitted by Lisa Jones (MBIE)**
  - o MBIE Internal Evaluation Form for ODESC Exercise
- **External agency – Feedback from Exercise High Water and internal preparatory exercises:**
  - o From NZ Customs Service (submitted 09/11/2018 NZ Customs Service MACPP Team – Strategic Coordination Unit)
  - o From the Department of Corrections (submitted 05/11/2018 by Craig Hamilton – Principal Advisor Emergency Management). The Department of Corrections also conducted an Executive Leadership Team table top exercise (31/07/2018) based on a mass arrivals scenario (a debrief summary was sent to MBIE to inform Exercise High Water evaluation).
  - o From the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (submitted 14/11/2018 by Mark Bateman – Principal Advisor Organisational Resilience)
- **Exercise Notes:**
  - o Discussion notes (taken by MBIE notetakers at each table during the Senior Officials exercise, and as Observers during the Watch Group exercise), including ‘carparked’ discussion points, whiteboard notes and ‘hot debrief’ feedback.
- **Participant feedback forms (Senior Officials and Watch Group exercises – no feedback forms used for ODESC exercise)**

