FEBRUARY CLUSTER DEBRIEF
Purpose
1. This briefing sets out issues and actions to guide a debrief  on the February Auckland
cluster. In this debrief, we seek agreement on the following actions and work streams to
address issues identified. Key statistics around the cluster and testing are provided as
context.
2. On Saturday the 13th of February a student at Papatoetoe High School (Case A) tested
positive for COVID19. The student had no history of travel or connection to anyone who
had recently arrived from overseas.  In the 14 days from Saturday 13.2.2021 to the
27.02.2021 a total of 15 cases across 4 households have been confirmed with an
epidemiological link to Case A.
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3. A comparison before and after 14 February shows a big increase in testing as a result of
this cluster:
Total tests (NZ) since 14 Feb
164,786
Total tests (NZ) since 27 Feb
50,239
Total tests Auckland (Middlemore, LabTests, LabPlus, Waitemata) since 14 Feb
105,986
INFORMATION
Total tests Auckland (Middlemore, LabTests, LabPlus, Waitemata) since 27 Feb
30,760
Tests in community since 14 Feb (Auckland usual y resident population, per 1,000)
42
4. Contact type and test results as of 0900 12 March 2021:
Contact Type
Initial Testing Result
Day 12 Testing Result
Al  Contacts
89/89 (89 negative)
86/89 (86 negative, 1 outstanding
Close + Contacts
in JETPARK), 2 no further action
required)
180/184 (no outstanding, 11
161/171 (1 positive, 160 negative,
Close Contacts
positive, 169 negative, 2 exempt, 2  4 outstanding (household contacts
no further action required)
in JETPARK), 6 no further action
required)
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1930/1967 (1930 negative, 22
Casual + Contacts (treated as
1938/1945 (1938 negative, 7 no
close contacts *Kmart)
exempt, 15 no further action
further action required)
required)
3708/3776 (3 positive, 3705
Casual + Contacts
negative, 3 exempts, 1 refused, 64  N/A
no further action required)
The total number of all contacts is as follows:

Close Contacts:
174
Close + Contacts:
86
Casual + Contacts (Kmart):
1,855
Casual +
3,753 (not limited to the significant locations detailed
below ie: Supermarkets etc)
Total Contacts:
5,899
Issues and next steps
5. Issues identified during the response:
a. Close contacts and operational procedures
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i. Genome sequencing
• Issue: timing of result for first identified community case associated with a
potential new cluster or border incursion within a day of test result notification
and sharing of ESR analysis
• Action: agree to timings and processes detailed in HR 2021 0199 attached.
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ii. Definition and treatment of dif erent types of contacts
• Issue: confusion around new definitions used and isolating requirements with
additional close plus category [on top of: close, casual, casual plus] when
they were communicated.
• Actions:
- Ministry of Health [MoH] has commenced an internal review with ARPHs,
Healthline and other key responders.
- COVID-19 independent continuous review, improvement and advice
group wil  also pick this up as a rapid work stream.
- COVID-19 Group communications campaign being reviewed by John
Walsh
- Internal investigation of Facebook post completed
iii. Contact tracing service process
• Issue: Case J had 9 phone calls and four texts from the 15th – 21st February
from public health to get tested. Identified a need for clarity on the protocol
timeframes between NITC, finder services, Healthline and ARPHs and when
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a follow up door knock is required.
• Action: agree to timings and processes detailed in attached A3.
iv. Contact tracing processes in school settings
• Issue: Timely contact tracing and consistent communications to diverse
communities.

•  Actions: Health, DIA and Education updating the March 2020 protocol on
Tuesday to include -
-  Support from schools supported by the Ministry of Education to help
Health to monitor students compliance with public health instructions
-  Translation of key public health messages for ethnic communities that can
then be disseminated to families via the Ministry of Education and school
networks.

v.  Readiness of PHUs beyond Auckland
•  Issue: ARPHs is the only PHU who has had significant experience in dealing
with outbreaks that involve dif erent communities, a variety of scenarios (new
variants, apartment blocks and schools etc.) Potential for the wheel to be
reinvented with regards to the response in other regions.
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•  Actions:
-  MoH to provide an HR this week on deployment of IMT response int
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regions outside of Auckland.
-  MoH deployment of staf  in ARPHs to get outbreak experience.
-  COVID-19 independent continuous review, improvement and advice
group wil  also be requested to look into progress on scenario planning as
part of lessons from the rapid review into contact tracing during the
August outbreak.

b.  Legal powers
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i.  Protocol around s70

•  Issue: clarity on the legal instruction of a Medical Of icer of Health to a group
to follow public health instruction on testing and self-isolation at the beginning
of an outbreak

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•  Action: MoH and Crown Law work on a plan (involving dif erent scenarios) to
be presented to AG and Minister for COVID-19 Response this week to allow
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the next time we have an outbreak to be managed so that:
-  The Medical Of icer of Health’s authority is clearly invoked at the start to
contacts, close contacts etc.
-  That can be conveyed to the people so instructed by someone else, but
what that looks
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MoH and Crown Law use the structure of the above to audit the Papatoetoe
cluster event so that we understand with complete clarity whether the Med
Of icer of Health’s authority was effected so that it could have, without more,
have been enforced by a constable.

c.  Alert Levels
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i.  Checklist for what is required for Cabinet to take a decision

•  Issue: lack of a clear checklist of advice on factors that lead to public health
and Cabinet [based on public health advice] make the decision to go up an
alert level.

•  Actions:

-  COVID-19 response business unit and MoH to work with offices on
checklist protocol for alert level papers.
-  Memo to DG from Dr McElnay/Dr Town to be shared with relevant of ices
to support first Boardroom meeting after a community case is identified.

d.  Regional boundary
i.  Economic documentation

•  Issue: Over 30,000 QR codes were downloaded which raises questions
whether the definitions and processes are working

•  Action: Review of economic travel documentation provided for crossing the
boundary including whether QRs being downloaded accurately reflect the
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types of businesses and services that should be accessing them (MBIE
underway)

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ii.  Transiting through areas at a higher alert level

•  Issue: disproportionate effect of Auckland transit provisions on Northland on
the ability of residents to undertake travel (e.g. for funerals in Auckland when
we allow exemptions for economic purposes

•  Action: DPMC to review transit provisions in the order to allow broader travel
through an area
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iii.  Standing up and location of boundaries and checkpoints

•  Issues: public confusion around the location of where police check points are
being stood up and where boundaries are. Timing of defence being able to
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attend checkpoints.

•  Actions: The COVID-19 G
THE  roup includes police checkpoints and COVID-19
testing locations on the interactive map (hosted by NEMA available on
COVID-19 website).
-  Boundary setting process was reviewed following initial lockdown.
-  New process used on 27 February successfully, including
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communications protocols
-  There is an ongoing work plan to create ‘draft’ regional boundaries for
Wellington, Christchurch and Waikato (DPMC underway)

iv.  Entering higher Alert Level regions to return home

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•  Issue: Queue at southern boundary for people to return to Auckland resulted
in some people waiting a long time to enter the region.

•  Actions: We could consider building flexibility in to the order to allow Police
to apply pragmatic approach for a period of time. We would need legal advice
on how this could be done in a lawful way. (DPMC lead)
-  Health is supportive of this approach as risk is low.
-  This could be incorporated into scenario planning in the National
Resurgence Response Plan

e.  Communications
i.  Preparation of alert level material in multiple languages

•  Issue: delay in communications around key alert level information in dif erent
languages
-  The DIA translation mechanism does not have suf icient capability and
capacity to meet requirements when new information is required to be
translated at pace (e.g. breadth of languages, and speed of translation
required)

•  Actions: There is an opportunity for Ministry of Education to work with DIA.
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Education have a system and process for languages and process could
synchronise better with DIA (DPMC)
-  COVID-19 Group use some resurgence funding to increase resour
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DIA mechanism (including through contractors etc. if required)
-  Predrafting of communications (including translations) for Alert Level
changes could minimise translation delays.

6.  Looking ahead:
a.  Note, Minister for COVD-19 Response is taking a paper on the Elimination Strategy
to SWC on 24 March. This paper wil  confirm the process for address key strategy
and governance questions to the end of the year, including on vaccines
INFORMATION   and border
settings

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Document Outline