New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

CAMPAIGNS AND OPERATIONS

NZDDP–3.0
(SECOND EDITION)

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The New Zealand Defence Force Publication *Campaigns and Operations* (NZDDP–3.0) (2nd Edition) is issued for use by the New Zealand Defence Force and is effective forthwith for guidance in defence doctrine.

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PREFACE

Scope

In pursuit of national defence objectives, members of New Zealand's armed forces may be deployed on operations. These operations are often joint in nature; that is to say, they involve two or more of New Zealand's Services working cooperatively.

The successful execution of joint military operations requires a clearly understood and widely accepted doctrine. Doctrine provides authoritative and proven guidance, which can be adapted to suit each unique situation. New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication (NZDDP)−3.0 *Campaigns and Operations* (2nd Edition) is the keystone document of the joint operations series. It sits at the philosophical level and provides the doctrinal foundation and fundamental principles that guide members of New Zealand's armed forces in the conduct of military campaigns and joint operations.

NZDDP−3.0 *Campaigns and Operations* (2nd Edition) flows directly from NZDDP−D *Defence Doctrine*, and together with its equivalents in other series, is the New Zealand authority for the conduct of campaigns and operations. The guidance in this publication is authoritative, and as such, this doctrine should be followed except when, in the judgement of the commander, circumstances dictate otherwise.

Purpose

The key theme in this publication is 'operations are operations'. All operations can fundamentally be approached in the same manner because members of New Zealand's armed forces must expect to perform a wide range of potentially simultaneous activities across the whole spectrum of operations, from combat actions to humanitarian assistance.

NZDDP−3.0 *Campaigns and Operations* (2nd Edition) is designed to provide guidance on the preparation, execution and termination of campaigns and joint operations. It describes the fundamental aspects of joint New Zealand Defence Force operations, including enabling and supporting functions; basic command and control (C2) structures; campaign and operations design, planning and management; and considerations for the execution on campaigns and joint operations.

Application

This publication is primarily intended for use by commanders and staff at all levels, particularly joint staff, task forces established for operations, and joint training organisations. It can equally be used as a reference at any level.

Structure

NZDDP−3.0 *Campaigns and Operations* comprises 3 parts and 10 chapters.

- Part 1 – *The Context for Campaigns and Operations*
  - Chapter 1 – *The Strategic Context.*
  - Chapter 2 – *Campaigns and Operations.*

- Chapter 3 – *Joint Functions.*
- Chapter 4 – *Forming the Force.*

- Part 2 – *Campaigning*
  - Chapter 5 – *Campaign Design – Situational Understanding.*
  - Chapter 6– *Campaign Design – Campaign Planning and Preparation.*
  - Chapter 7 – *Campaign Management – Campaign Execution, Assessment, and Adaption*
  - Chapter 8 – *Redeployment*

- Part 3 – *Joint Operations*
  - Chapter 9 – *Planning of Joint Operations*
  - Chapter 10 – *Execution of Joint Operations*

Linkages

- NZDDP–D *New Zealand Defence Doctrine* (3rd Edition)

- NZDDP–00.1 *Command and Control*

- NZDDP–5.0 *Joint Operations Planning*

- NZDDP–3.12 *New Zealand Special Operations* (2nd Ed)

In addition, NZDDP–3.0 *Campaigns and Operations* (2nd Edition) links into a series of more detailed publications which sit at the application and procedural levels of the joint doctrine hierarchy.

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Part One: The Context for Campaigns and Operations

Chapter One: The Strategic Context

The primary mission of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) is to secure New Zealand against external threat, to protect sovereign interests, and to be able to take action to meet likely contingencies in our strategic area of interest. In pursuit of this mission, members of New Zealand's armed forces may be deployed on operations. New Zealand's current strategic environment is characterised by a growing number of non-conventional security challenges. New Zealand's armed forces must be sufficiently versatile to conduct conventional military operations and also address non-conventional threats. The NZDF may be tasked to conduct or support a range of operations in support of national strategic objectives. The multi-agency and multinational environment is a reality within which the NZDF must be prepared to network and operate, to maximise the chances of operational success. A comprehensive approach responds to this reality, by coordinating and deconflicting the activities of the military and other agencies.

Chapter Two: Campaigns and Operations

The operational environment frames all military and non-military activities that contribute to the strategic end-state. The operational environment must be understood to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, and complete the mission. It includes physical environments, all actors, time, weather, terrain, the electromagnetic spectrum, and the information environment. The operational environment embraces all the elements, conditions, and circumstances which may influence campaigns and operations.

Although armed conflict is a violent clash of wills, it is subject to practical, legal, moral, and political constraints. Professional military skills are crucial, not only in winning the war, but in minimising the human and material cost. The operational environment comprises four physical domains: maritime, land, air and space, and two non-physical: information, including cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), and the human. Campaigns and operations will invariably be planned and conducted as part of an all-of-government approach, and may be multinational. The three categories of operational activities are offensive, defensive, and stability. They may be conducted sequentially or simultaneously, with varying levels of effort.

Chapter Three: Joint Functions

Joint functions consider the enabling capabilities and activities that assist commanders to integrate, synchronise, and direct campaigns and joint operations.

Joint functions underpin joint operations, and have a profound influence across and throughout all campaigns and joint operations, at the operational and tactical levels. The profile and importance of each joint function will vary within and between operations, but they are mutually supporting activities and should not be viewed as a discretionary list to pick and choose from.

Chapter Four: Forming the Force

The operational level of command is responsible for forming joint task forces.

There is no template solution – each is scaled for a specific situation and mission.

In principle, there are three levels of command: strategic, operational, and tactical. The strategic is the domain of the New Zealand Government and the Chief of Defence Force. The operational level rests with the Commander Joint Forces New Zealand (COMJFNZ) and the tactical with the joint task force (JTF) commander.

Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand (HQJFNZ) is the permanent, operational-level, joint force headquarters (HQ) of the NZDF. It is under the command of COMJFNZ,

who exercises command over all assigned and deployed NZDF force elements. HQJFNZ is responsible for the sustainment of the NZDF's joint operational commitments A Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) is normally responsible for the planning and conducting tactical level actions.

If New Zealand were to lead a multinational force, the following points need to be addressed when designing a joint force HQ: location, staffing, infrastructure, and coordination with components and other agencies.

The set-up for New Zealand stand-alone operations shares many of the above considerations. Notable differences may include a streamlined HQ and force, enhanced operational tempo, and limited military capabilities.

When the NZDF contributes a national contingent to an operation led by another nation, it would likely deploy a number of staff officers, typically including a senior national officer, to work in the multinational HQ. The NZDF may also deploy national command and support elements.

Part Two: Campaigning

Chapter Five: Campaign Design — Situational Understanding

The first step in campaign design is gaining situational understanding. Situational understanding underpins campaign planning. The joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment is a key activity in gaining situational understanding.

Mission analysis is conducted to identify and confirm what must be accomplished, when, where, and most importantly, why. Campaigning is inherently complex and a networked capability is essential, particularly for multinational military and civilian partners. Gaps in situational understanding and assumptions are the basis for determining the commander's critical information requirements.

Chapter Six: Campaign Design — Campaign Planning and Preparation

Campaign planning is collaborative and conducted in parallel with subordinate and superior planning. The campaign approach flows from situational understanding and broadly indicates how the campaign and associated operations are to be conducted. The initial, broad concept describes how the campaign is intended to unfold. The campaign concept is a single, unifying idea which promotes understanding and provides direction for the way in which a campaign is to be conducted. A campaign line of operation is a linked sequence of operations objectives to achieve a campaign objective. The campaign scheme of manoeuvre is based on selected lines of operation and describes how operations and associated actions are orchestrated in time, space, and purpose. The final campaign plan is a formal and detailed description of what is to be accomplished and how it is to be done.

Preparation comprises a range of activities, mostly conducted concurrently, which enable transition from planning to execution. Major aspects of preparation are ensuring force readiness to execute the campaign, and movement and positioning of forces and resources. During preparation the responsibility for developing and maintaining the campaign plan shifts from the plans to the operations staff. A successful transition depends on a full understanding of the campaign plan by commanders and staff who will execute it. Refinement of the campaign plan occurs during preparation.

Chapter Seven: Campaign Management — Campaign Execution, Assessment, and Adaptation

Execution is the implementation of the campaign plan through the application of fighting power. Effective execution requires commanders who can make independent decisions and balance risks with a mission command philosophy. Comprehensive and accurate situational understanding must be maintained during execution. Monitoring of execution identifies variances. A variance is a difference between the actual and forecast situation. There are two types of variances: opportunities and threats. Decisions made during execution are either execution decisions or adaptation decisions.

Assessment helps indicate if the campaign is or is not progressing as planned. Assessment enables learning and greater situational understanding providing the basis for successful adaptation. Assessment is a tool to support decision making, not an end in itself. Its benefits have to be weighed against the costs. Longer term aspects of assessment and adaptation include military education, training of forces already in the joint force area of operations and those being prepared, and technical and equipment-based solutions. The campaign plan includes a comprehensive and integrated assessment plan. Measures of performance and measures of effectiveness are either quantitative (observation based) or qualitative (opinion based). A balance between the two is necessary. When campaigns and operations, such as counterinsurgency, last a number of years, continuity of assessment measures is important to determine trends and measure progress.

Chapter Eight: Redeployment

The end of a campaign or operation can be a chaotic and complex phase with many parallel and simultaneous activities. It requires careful detailed planning by commanders and their logistics staff to ensure coordination with the overall campaign and mission plans, and therefore its success.

Planning for redeployment should be considered early and continued throughout the operation and is best accomplished in the same time-phased process in which deployment was accomplished.

Redeployment operations enable the projection of the military instrument of national power. Redeployment and campaign closure is planned and executed by both the supported and supporting commanders.

Part 3: Joint Operations

Chapter Nine: Planning of Joint Operations

Operational design is a framework that refines the commander's vision of how they see the operation unfolding. A plan is the practical expression of operational design. It is the commander's vision, translated into actionable detail by operations orders and directives. Plans are essential in providing a common understanding across the joint task force of the commander's intent and overall conduct of operations.

With planning being conducted for an operation, the NZDF must ensure that its force elements are prepared for military operations. There are four elements of preparedness: personnel, equipment, trained state, and sustainability.

Within the operational environment, it is essential for all levels of command to coordinate the conflicting needs of force elements. Ineffective management of the operational environment can cause fratricide and the loss of operational tempo and freedom of manoeuvre.

Chapter Ten: Execution of Joint Operations

All campaigns and operations require diligent planning and execution due to the time, effort, and national resources committed. As with any operation, there is no single prescription for success; however there are recurring themes that can serve as a framework for applying the principles of war.

An overarching framework for planning and conducting conventional operations is provided by the activities listed below. This framework also illustrates how a commander might arrange operations through phasing. Working within this generic construct, an operation's actual phases will vary according to the nature of the operation and the military objectives.

Shape. Shape activities are executed continuously with the intent to enhance international legitimacy and gain multinational cooperation in support of defined strategic objectives.

Deter. This phase's purpose is to deter an adversary from undesirable action, because of the presence of friendly capabilities and the will or intent to use them.

Seize Initiative. The joint commander will seek to seize the initiative. In combat, this involves conducting

offensive and defensive operations at the earliest opportunity, to force the enemy to culminate and to facilitate friendly decisive operations.

Dominate. This phase focuses on breaking the enemy's will to resist or, in non-combat situations, controlling the operational environment.

Stabilise. The intent in this phase is to help restore infrastructure and political and economic ability. Military operations will likely be part of a comprehensive approach.

Enable Civil Authority. This phase is characterised by military support to legitimate civil governance, to allow the civil authority to regain its ability to govern and meet the needs of the population.

All operational activities are offensive or defensive in nature and apply across the framework of operations. Offensive and defensive operations should be balanced with stability operations, which seek to provide a secure environment.

PART 1:

THE CONTEXT FOR CAMPAIGNS AND OPERATIONS

New Zealand **Defence Doctrine Publication**

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CHAPTER 1:
THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT

New Zealand **Defence Doctrine Publication**

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Introduction

1.01   The modern security environment is becoming increasingly complex. This can be largely attributed to the inter-relationships and the degree of harmony existing among or between individuals, groups, societies, and states. While individuals may act for reasons of altruism, nations generally act in their own self-interest, including the pursuit of political, economic, ideological, religious, and cultural objectives.

1.02   When the self-interests of groups or nations are in harmony, or at least pose no real or perceived threat to each other, there is peace. When they are not, and the actions or policies of one are viewed as threatening the vital interests of another, conflict arises. Conflict, unless minimised, resolved, or contained, can quickly escalate in nature and scope.

Enduring Characteristics of Conflict

1.03   The clash of opposing human wills, together with the firepower and destructive capabilities of modern weapons and technologies, gives conflict its violent dynamic and produces environments and outcomes that are rarely predictable. There are four enduring characteristics of conflict.

- **Friction.** Friction is what makes the apparently easy difficult, and the difficult seemingly impossible.[1] During conflict, friction can exist on the moral plane in the form of personality clashes among leaders or indecisiveness of commanders; or it may exist on the physical plane in the form of breakdown of vehicles, loss of communications, navigational errors, difficult ground, and bad weather. When such problems are coupled with the interplay and hostile actions of opponents who are at the same time attempting to impose their will, friction abounds and makes the conduct of military operations a difficult and complex undertaking.

- **Uncertainty.** All actions during conflict occur in an atmosphere of uncertainty. Despite revolutionary advances in information processing and data management, knowledge, information and intelligence about an enemy or situation will remain finite and subject to probabilities. The 'fog of war' is real and pervasive, generating anxiety and often restricting effective decision-making. Uncertainty can be reduced by developing a climate of trust between leaders and subordinates, and by applying military judgement, experience, and intuition to situations. Uncertainly can be reduced by having simple, flexible plans and good standing orders and operating procedures. Ensuring that orders and the intentions of commanders are clearly articulated and understood, and by fostering in subordinates initiative and independence in thought and action also helps to reduce uncertainty.

- **Actions and Reactions.** Conflict manifests a continuous series of actions, reactions, and situational changes as the principles of war are applied. New challenges and difficulties continually arise, along with opportunities for exploitation. The tempo of operations will be dependent on the ability of a force to accelerate or decelerate its activities, including synchronising combat functions, to meet an ever-changing situation.

- **Violence and Destruction.** The waging of conflict is an intrinsically violent and bloody affair producing destruction, terror, suffering, and death for combatants and non-combatants alike. The means and weapons used in modern conflict are extremely lethal and diverse in nature, from the crudest of weapons to weapons of mass destruction. The diversity and lethality of weapons available to potential adversaries poses significant challenges to commanders and leaders at all levels of operations.

War, Warfare, and Conflict

1.04   **War.** War is an instrument of policy, normally stimulated by fear, self-interest, or ideology, and is characterised by organised violence. War is used as a means to assert the will of a state, or entity. The potential and conditions for war, at all levels and intensities of armed conflict, exist at all times. They occur within and between all societies and polities, and simply reflect

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[1]   Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War; translated from German by O.J. Mattijis Jollies*, New York, The Modern Library, 1943.

the existence of incompatible goals, ambitions, or perceptions among individuals, groups, or states.

1.05   New Zealand has consistently advocated that it will not use war as an extension of policy. New Zealand formally renounced the use of war as an element of state policy when it signed the Pact of Paris in 1928 and again when it signed the Charter of the United Nations (UN) in 1945. However, New Zealand retains the right to use armed force for individual or collective self-defence and for the purposes of the UN.

1.06   **Warfare.** Warfare is the conduct of war. It is the 'how' of waging war. In a nation-state, warfare is the domain of the nation's armed forces. Warfare reflects, amongst other things, the culture, society, and political aspirations of belligerents and other interested parties. Warfare is an inherently unpredictable, often chaotic, human activity. Warfare changes as rapidly as the means to wage war and the societies that wage war do; this is to say, nearly continuously[2]. Understanding the changing nature of warfare provides the context in which wars are fought. Context helps policy makers and combatants make the right choices on essential matters as force structure, force preparation, the conduct of campaigns and operations to attain policy goals and objectives.

1.07   **The Character of Warfare.** The terms 'war' and 'warfare' are unsatisfactory to describe the many facets of armed conflict. War is bound by international law that regulates the circumstances in which states may resort to the use of armed force (jus ad bellum in accordance with the UN Charter) and regulates the way in which armed force is actually used. However, neither peace nor war are absolute. Instead they represent a continuum or notional spectrum. No conflict is likely to be played out entirely at a single point. Its prevalence, scale, and intensity may vary from war, through to inter- and intra-state conflict characterised by instability and chaos, to activities to promote stability, and, ultimately, lasting peace in one form or another. Moreover, it may be

unhelpful to describe efforts to counter irregular activity, for example, as war, even though such circumstances may include armed conflict between state and non-state actors.

1.08   **Conflict.** The essence of conflict is a clash between opposing human wills, each trying to impose its own will on the other to gain a more advantageous position. In inter- and intra-state conflict, the means to impose your nation's or entity's will on an adversary can include the separate or collective application of diplomatic/political, economic, and military instruments. The desired goals should ideally be obtained through non-military means. However, if this is not possible without resorting to force, the conflict has the potential to escalate in scope and intensity.

1.09   **The Continual Evolution of Conflict and Warfare.** The evolution of conflict and warfare will continue to be unpredictable. Its prevalence, scale, and intensity will change along the continuum of conflict from war, through inter- and intra-state conflict, and ultimately peace. The New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) will confront diverse conditions and threats from both state and non-state actors, often concurrently in the same operating environment. Moreover, complexity will be exacerbated by the pervasive and immediacy of technology enabled media, placing intense scrutiny on the military actions and responses, and placing greater emphasis to understand the various interdependencies and cause and effect relationships that may result from your actions from the political through to the tactical level.

1.10   Therefore, the approach policy makers and military commanders adopt to frame complex problems and determine subsequent military goals is of critical importance to setting the conditions for eventual success. Adversaries have demonstrated they are adept at countering military strength and employing sophisticated approaches to strategic communication to support the achievement of their objectives. Accordingly, conflict may be less likely to end in decisive victory, and it will rely on the resilience, intellectual, and institutional agility as much professional mastery to define the NZDF's objectives and desired effects.

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[2]   Historian John Keegan has offered that war is a universal phenomenon whose form and scope is defined by the society that wages it. The changing form and scope of warfare gives value to delineating the distinction between war and warfare.

Understanding the Operational Context

1.11   Crises, conflict, and war are inherently dynamic and frequently unbounded; they are subject to continual change, external intervention, and other influences. Indeed, military activity alters the dynamics of a situation, precipitating both intended and unintended consequences, frustrating the achievement of any pre-ordained sequences of events. The commander's response is more art than science. A joint commander gains their understanding of the operational context through analysis of the situation, including both the overt symptoms and underlying causes of conflict. Thereafter, awareness of and feel for how a situation is being changed by military activity and other influences, is cultivated and maintained by continuous assessment.

1.12   A commander can develop their understanding of an operational environment by considering: the overall context, which is characterised by the circumstances past, present, and anticipated future conditions; the participants involved and their relationships; and the surroundings including location and environment. Collectively, these factors include:

- the physical, political, cultural, and other conditions within which military activity may be required

- the actors involved (opponent, friendly, neutral, belligerent, and spoiler), to what extent they are involved, and why

- the military forces deployed

- national or societal factors (rule of law, education, commerce)

- humanity, health, information (including the media), military, economy

- diplomacy, administration, and governance

- other external influences (such as overseas diasporas or regional controls).

1.13   A joint commander's situational understanding, upon which they base and incrementally adjusts their assessment, is critically dependent upon determining the involvement of all those implicated in a crisis. An appreciation, albeit inevitably imperfect, of their inter-relationships can indicate the appropriate purpose for military action and the range of effects required. The effectiveness of some irregular activists, for example, may be diminished by isolating them (physically and morally) from the rest of the civilian population, as well as any regional or international sympathisers upon whom they depend. Alternatively, the disarming or disciplined co-option of a militia which had previously dominated a society may not only alter the balance of power, but also send a forceful signal to the affected community that, with a secure and stable environment, investment in development and reconstruction may follow.

1.14   The importance, allegiance, and objectives of the various participants in a crisis are situation-dependent and the interplay between them changes as the situation evolves. Experience has shown how state-on-state armed conflict between regular forces, even after one side has been technically defeated, can develop into an asymmetric contest between the notional victor and those unsuppressed elements that continue to have access to the means of perpetuating violence. Multiple causes of violence, including unresolved internal struggles for power, can emerge at the moment of apparent victory, frustrating progress and leading to regression of good will.

Military Activity in Context

1.15   The global security environment is an intricate and dynamic blend of cooperation, confrontation, and conflict between states, between groups and factions within states, and between other state and non-state actors. Any significant deterioration in relations may be triggered by a crisis or constitute one. The armed forces operate across this spectrum.

1.16   Strategic planning objectives include:

- conflict prevention

- deterrence

- coercion

- disruption

- defeat and destruction

- stabilisation.

1.17   Planning seeks to prevent confrontation from escalating into conflict (or at least to contain it) and ultimately to resolve armed conflict when it arises. However, planning may include assumptions that may prove to be flawed and therefore it provides the basis for operational plans, not a template for them.

Cooperation, Confrontation, and Conflict

1.18   During periods of stable cooperation within and between states, demonstrable military capability and measured power projection contribute to deterrence (to dissuade would-be aggressors from acting against New Zealand's interests). Faced with either an imminent crisis or a more gradual deterioration in relations causing or threatening instability, military force may be required to prevent further deterioration in security or the eventual resort to armed conflict. Deterrence may be supplemented or replaced by more assertive coercion and conflict prevention activities, such as timely pre-emption and focused or preventative military intervention.

1.19   Some differences may be irreconcilable without recourse to armed force. A focus on deterrence before conflict may shift to compulsion through the application of force. In extreme cases, combat operations are conducted to disrupt, defeat, or destroy opposing forces, in order to remove major threats to security and other causes of instability. To be genuinely successful, combat operations should be accompanied by the longer term prevention of future insecurity. The striking of an opponent is likely to be combined with an often concurrent or at least over-lapping stabilisation of the overall situation (including addressing the underlying causes of conflict to ensure that resolution is enduring and self-sustaining).

1.20   Military activity often seeks to re-establish and maintain security in order to enable stabilisation, which is a comprehensive rather than an exclusively military endeavour. The military contribution is likely to focus on reducing the causes of conflict and insecurity in a nation or region, and enabling other government departments (OGDs) to restore host-nation governance, capacity, and authority (thereby ensuring that conditions do not again foment conflict). The achievement of these inter-related objectives of security and stability, requires the application of military effort to a variety of activities, potentially concurrently.

1.21   Conflict and stabilisation is invariably complex, and the military contribution (including what is sometimes referred to as military assistance to stabilisation and development) is discussed further below. As with security, stability tends to be relative rather than an absolute. From a military perspective an important criterion is a sufficiently permissive environment to enable OGDs, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), indigenous authorities, and others to fulfil their responsibilities. A distinction, albeit not an exact one, is therefore drawn between different types of stabilisation activity: firstly, where, following a successful intervention or other settlement, a high degree of protection is still required. Secondly, where the environment is generally benign but military forces are still required (to deter or contain local hostilities).

Campaign Evolution

1.22   Each campaign is likely to involve a different and dynamic balance between mid to high intensity conflict to defeat or destroy threats to security; associated security operations to enable and support the process of stabilisation; and operations including periodic peacetime military engagement where local governance is established. Distinctions between the roles of military forces may be blurred; they may change suddenly and obviously, or more gradually, even imperceptibly, over time. As the situation changes, and emphasis shifts between different activities, so a joint commander modifies the posture and approach of their force to deliver the weight of effort to each as is deemed appropriate.

1.23   The joint commander should resist the temptation to prejudge or prematurely classify a crisis situation, based upon an initial impression of the past or prevailing circumstances. The character of a

particular campaign, at any point in time, is reflected in the combination of activities being undertaken and their associated purpose(s).

1.24 Campaigning invariably requires coordination between military partners of different nations, and between military and non-military actors, to achieve the desired outcome. The command and control (C2) relationships between cooperating nations and non-military actors require a joint commander's precise attention.

The Role of Strategy

1.25 **National Strategy.** Policy dictates ends, while strategy determines and balances the ways and means of achieving those goals. Together they describe *what* needs to be achieved, *how*, and *with what*. A successful national strategy sets out a path, using all three instruments of national power — diplomatic, military, and economic — to maintain political independence, achieve the long-term aims of the nation and/or protect its values and interests.

1.26 Figure 1-1 depicts the key questions to be answered by the Government in determining a national strategy.

1.27 This process may — but will not always — lead to a single, integrated all-of-government strategy. It should result in the effective coordination and synchronisation of the instruments of power. Individual plans may, for example, be brought together and managed under central Government auspices. A lead department, acting on behalf of the Government, should then:

- review, and where necessary, revise the policy outcome sought

- assess progress and adjust priorities, across government, as necessary

- ensure the coherent and efficient use of national resources.

1.28 The importance of what has been described variously as all-of-government, a comprehensive,

Figure 1-1: Determining a National Strategy — Key Questions.

unified, integrated, or simply a joint approach, is widely recognised. The significant practical, organisational, and cultural challenges involved in its implementation, however, continue to be addressed.

1.29   **Military Strategy.** A winning military strategy hinges on the successful union of:

- ends — outcomes

- ways — objectives

- means — resources.

1.30   Senior leaders should bring these three elements into balance. They should not demand a particular way to meet the stipulated ends without providing the requisite means, or to set ends without accepting the risk to the means that will result from that chosen way.

1.31   Some policy goals, such as those expressed in Defence policy, are long-term and aspirational, while associated strategy concerns the development of military structures and capabilities within allocated resources. With regard to a particular crisis, more immediate and specific political outcomes may be sought. Political intentions may be expressed in the form of an overarching strategic aim and objectives to achieve a specific result (to change a situation, or to create a favourable outcome). In this case, military strategy is about gauging the optimum military contribution, based upon appropriate and available capability.

> *"The art of strategy is to determine the aim, which is or should be inherently political; to derive from that aim a series of military objectives to be achieved; to assess these objectives as to the military requirements they create, and the preconditions which the achievement of each is likely to necessitate; to measure available and potential resources against the requirements; and to chart from this process a coherent pattern of priorities and a rational course of action."*
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> **Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff**

1.32   Any military strategy should explain how it is to be integrated with other non-military elements of a national or multinational strategy, and how the achievement of military strategic objectives relates to the achievement of the desired outcome. Where New Zealand intends to act in concert with other nations, either as part of an alliance or an ad hoc coalition, then the outcome sought should be agreed between nations. This is of course accepting the additional time and complexity involved. Between New Zealand and other nations there should be at least national perspectives harmonised in order to unify individual national efforts. While negotiation and consensus building may need to precede agreement, formal direction must follow, ultimately delivered through national chains of command. In the interim, military preparations and some preliminary operations may already have started.

1.33   As an integral part of a national or multinational strategic planning process, military strategy involves developing, deploying, sustaining, recovering, and redeploying military forces. Two important elements that need to be considered are military feasibility and sustainability. Competing demands for military resources to meet concurrent operational commitments, should be prioritised and balanced accordingly, while military effectiveness should be maintained, and developed, to meet future requirements based upon the assessed strategic context and political intent.

1.34   It is principally in these two regards that military strategy informs policy, as well as being driven by it. In any event, policy goals are likely to evolve over time as situations develop and priorities change; it is for this reason that strategic planning is continuous and dynamic, and why commanders at all levels need to be responsive to changes in both circumstances and political intent.

Key Term

Military Strategy

That component of national or multinational strategy, presenting the manner in which military power should be developed and applied to achieve national objectives or those of a group of nations.

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
Figure 1-2: Levels of Military Operations.

Levels of Military Operations

1.35   Conflict and war are perceived as actions spanning three broad levels (depicted in Figure 1-2): strategic, operational, and tactical. While each level is definitive in broad terms, all levels are interrelated and it is normal for conflict to be planned and prosecuted at all three levels concurrently.

The Operational Hierarchy

1.36   The hierarchy of operations is depicted in Figure 1-2. In the hierarchy, the actions performed at the tactical and the sub-tactical levels are the fundamental building blocks of concrete military activity. Broadly, actions generate effects, which is to say, a change in the environment or situation. Tactical actions and associated effects combine into operations. An operation is a series of tactical actions, such as battles and engagements, conducted by combat forces of one or several Services, coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operational area.

Strategic Level

1.37   The strategic level of military operations consists of two sub-levels: the national strategic level and the military strategic level.

1.38   **National Strategic Level.** The national strategic level refers to the political dimension of conflict at the macro level, both domestically and internationally, and the mobilisation of national military and non-military resources to meet the Government's national strategic aim. The national strategic aim describes the Government's declared aspiration or goal. In order to achieve this aim a number of strategic objectives need to be attained. The national strategic level pertains to the full range of issues associated with the maintenance of political independence and territorial integrity and the pursuit of wider national interests. It is about the coordinated use of the three principal instruments of national power: the diplomatic, economic, and military instruments enabled by the effective collection and dissemination of information. This requires contributions from a number of government agencies. The national strategic level is as much concerned with the avoidance

of war as with its conduct. National strategy is the collective responsibility of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.

1.39   **Military Strategic Level.** The military strategic level is responsible for the military aspects of planning and directing conflict. This level includes setting the military end-state and the broad military approach to its achievement, in order to support the national strategic aim. Military strategy is the military component of national strategy. To achieve the stated strategic objectives, the NZDF makes a range of contributions: it raises, trains, and maintains operationally prepared forces for use by the Government, and it carries out campaigns and operations in accordance with government direction. Military strategy is the primary focus of Headquarters NZDF (HQNZDF) and the Ministry of Defence.

Key Terms

National Strategic Level

The national strategic level refers to the political dimension of conflict at the macro level, both domestically and internationally, and the mobilisation of national military and non-military resources to meet the Government's national strategic aim.

National Strategic Aim

The national strategic aim is the Government's declared purpose in a situation. It is normally expressed in terms of a future desired outcome.

Strategic Objectives

A strategic objective is a goal to be achieved by one or more of the instruments of national power in order to meet the national strategic aim.

Military Strategic Level

The military strategic level is responsible for the military aspects of planning and directing conflict. This level includes setting the military end-state and the broad military approach to its achievement in order to support the national strategic aim.

Operational Level

1.40   The operational level is the level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned and commanded. A campaign consists of a series of linked operations and is conducted to achieve a campaign end-state. This end-state is reached when all the operational or campaign objectives have been attained. The operational level links military strategy to tactics by establishing operational objectives and end-states, initiating actions, and applying resources to ensure the success of the campaign or operation. Operations could involve only NZDF force elements, or be conducted in conjunction with other New Zealand agencies/departments and/or the forces of other countries. In the planning and conduct of campaigns or major operations, 'operational art' is practiced. Operational art is the skilful employment of military forces to attain strategic goals through the design, organisation, integration, and conduct of campaigns or major operations.

Tactical Level

1.41   The tactical level is where battles, engagements, and actions — that is, the execution of the operation or campaign — actually take place. Tactics is the art of disposing maritime, land, air, and special forces for battle or conflict, and logistics for direct support of those engaged in combat, to achieve success in battle. It is what Carl von Clausewitz referred to as the theory and use of military forces in combat.

Full-spectrum Operations

1.42   The global security environment is an intricate and dynamic blend of cooperation, confrontation, and conflict between states, between groups and factions within states, and between other state and non-state actors. Any significant deterioration in relations may be triggered by a crisis or constitute one. The NZDF operates across this spectrum of operations, which ranges from peace at one extreme, to war at the other. Between these two extremes is the wide variety of conditions that represent the relationships between the aforementioned actors.

Figure 1-3: The Range of Security Events.

1.43　　The NZDF must expect to perform a number of concurrent operations to deal with a number of security events across the spectrum. The range of security events is outlined in Figure 1-3. These operations range from combat actions to humanitarian assistance.

1.44　　The current complex operating environment require forces to alternate with agility between combat operations and stability and support operations without warning, based on rapidly changing tactical situations. At any given moment, some portions of a force may be conducting combat operations, while others may be engaged in stability and support operations. In addition, combat operations always need to be conducted with longer-term stability and support operations in mind. The NZDF must be appropriately trained and equipped to conduct both types of operations concurrently.

- **Combat Operations.** In the NZDF, combat operations are defined as 'military operations where the use or threatened use of force, including lethal force, is essential to impose will on an opponent or to accomplish a mission.'

- **Stability and Support Operations.** Stability and support operations impose security and control over an area while employing military capabilities to restore services and support civilian agencies. They may occur before, during, and after offensive and defensive combat operations, or as the primary objective of a campaign.

Key Terms

Campaign

A campaign is a series of related operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space.

Operation

An operation is a series of military actions or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, Service, training, or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defence, and manoeuvres needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign.

Real–Life Example

The Changing Nature of New Zealand Defence Force Campaigns and Operations

Over the past decade the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) has conducted a series of campaigns and operations, in the South-West Pacific and also further afield. The most well known operations are Afghanistan, Timor Leste and the Solomon Islands – and all have been conducted as joint, inter-agency and multinational (JIM) operations. While New Zealand has made a valuable and comprehensive contribution to these operations, other nations provided the framework or lead nation.

New Zealand has had recent experience of being a framework nation albeit in a smaller operation. The regional assistance mission to support the Kingdom of Tonga to restore law and order in 2006 is one such example. The New Zealand contributions to multinational coalitions were not only part of a wider theatre campaign plan but also overlaid with a national campaign plan (though this expression may not have been used) to support New Zealand's national objectives. A good example of this was New Zealand's inter-agency campaign plan for Operation ARIKI (Afghanistan). This plan was characterised by the active involvement of a range of State Sector agencies including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the New Zealand Police.

In 2007 and 2008 the situation in Afghanistan changed. Partner nations, many of whom were preoccupied with operations elsewhere, renewed their commitment to creating the environment for long-term stability in Afghanistan. A change in approach was needed. Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand (HQJFNZ) subsequently reviewed the number of independent operations being conducted in Afghanistan and concluded that there was a need for a more focused and integrated New Zealand all-of-government effort. What followed was a campaign plan designed to integrate all the disparate activities under refreshed and updated strategic direction and guidance.

The intent was to create a more integrated and synchronised approach that would shape the all-of-government response to the changing nature of the operation. In 2008 the substantive planning occurred with the HQJFNZ. A Command Directive was issued later that year. This provided a plan that would transcend the rotation-by-rotation approach and allow the operation to start developing lines of operation with branches and sequels to provide contingencies for the future evolution of the campaign, principally from a developing threat perspective. This approach allowed the NZDF to ensure it achieved the Government's objectives (primarily centred around provincial development assistance in Bamian) as well as the objectives of the NATO-led stabilisation force. As a result and with further iterations of the campaign plan, Operation ARIKI progressed to the point where the NZDF was able to extract the bulk of its force elements in good order by the end of April 2013 and – importantly – do so in concert with North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) partners and the Government of Afghanistan. That experience, coupled with a refocus on the South-West Pacific has led to a resurgence in the campaign planning capability and capacity within the NZDF. Other recent innovations – one of which is Headquarters Deployable Joint Inter-agency Task Force (HQ DJIATF) will also strengthen New Zealand's ability to plan operations and campaigns from an operational-level perspective.

Joint Inter-agency and Multinational Approach

1.45   Today's complex security environment means that operations undertaken by New Zealand's military forces will generally be in a joint, inter-agency, and multinational (JIM) context. The NZDF will normally contribute task-organised force elements to a wider coalition. Coalition partners could include other armed forces, NGOs, UN agencies, and national and foreign government agencies.

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Multinational Operations

1.46   Most joint operations conducted outside New Zealand territory will be in conjunction with other nations' forces, and are thus termed 'multinational'. Some of these operations will be conducted within a framework of formal agreements. In such cases, there are two main distinctions as outlined below.

- **Combined** operations involve the participation of elements of more than one nation, usually allies

- **Coalition** operations are ad hoc arrangements between two or more nations unified by a common mission. These are the most common form of operation conducted by the NZDF.

Interoperability, Adaptability, and Liaison

1.47   Interoperability provides the means, processes, and understanding to allow the NZDF to work within a multinational environment. Interoperability between contributing militaries is the key to cohesion in multinational operations. Shared doctrine, combined education and training, and other background activities in the years leading up to a multinational operation contribute immensely to interoperability. This assists the NZDF in operating in a multinational framework.

1.48   Adaptability is facilitated by maintaining a broad base of single-Service capability from which to form tailored joint forces that can switch rapidly between types of operational activity. Liaison is essential for the NZDF to successfully network and conduct campaigns and operations within a growing multinational framework.

1.49   When the NZDF is operating within a JIM context there are potentially 11 other government departments or agencies contributing to the NZDF's operational tasks. See Figure 1-4 for the departments or agencies that may support NZDF outputs or that the NZDF may in turn provide support to.

Bilateral Activities

1.50   Nations may concurrently conduct bilateral activities in support of a common host-nation in the same area. These activities may involve a measure of multinational coordination but are not classified as multinational operations because an MNF has not been formally constituted. For example, immediate humanitarian response is generally conducted multilaterally. However, such activities may exhibit many of the characteristics of multinational operations, and therefore many aspects of this doctrine are applicable.

1.51   All of these agencies may also call on the support of the NZDF to achieve the objectives of their own activities. The relationship that the NZDF has with these other departments and agencies forms part of the NZDF's commitment to a comprehensive approach.

A Comprehensive Approach

1.52   The NZDF recognises that in an increasingly complex modern security environment, effective defence solutions are best achieved through the input of relevant government departments/agencies and multinational institutions, agencies, and organisations with an interest in a particular crisis. Complex crises do not lend themselves to simple definition or analysis. Today's challenges demand a comprehensive approach by the international community, including coordinated action from an appropriate range of civil and military actors, enabled by the orchestration, coordination, and de-confliction of New Zealand's military and political instruments with the other instruments of power. This requires broader cooperation and planning in accordance with the principles and decisions of relevant senior New Zealand bodies. Any New Zealand engagement in a comprehensive approach to crisis management needs to be focused at three levels (as outlined directly below).

- At both the national- and military-strategic levels, New Zealand agencies need to concentrate on building confidence and mutual understanding between themselves and with international actors.

- At the operational level, the priority is to cooperate with other international actors in the overall planning for complex operations in which a large degree of civil-military interaction will be required.

Ministry of Defence	The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade	New Zealand Police
Ministry for Primary Industries	New Zealand Customs Service
Maritime New Zealand	New Zealand Security Intelligence Service
Aviation Security Service	Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management
Department of Corrections	Antartica New Zealand
National Rural Fire Authority	Government Communications Security Bureau
Ministry for Culture and Heritage	National Maritime Coordination Centre
New Zealand Fire Service	Department of Conservation

Ministry of Health

Figure 1-4: Agencies that the New Zealand Defence Force may support or receive support from.

- At the theatre level, NZDF force commanders must be empowered to cooperate and coordinate with the local host-nation authorities and other international actors in the execution of operations.

1.53   In the context of crisis management, the success of a comprehensive approach is dependent on a common sense of purpose and resolve, mutual understanding and collaboration, and appropriate resourcing. This is predicated by political agreement on the desired outcome and the establishment of a robust coordination framework whereby the efforts of all agencies can be synchronised, integrated and, when required, deconflicted.

1.54   A future desired outcome is likely to involve aspects related to security, governance, and economic development. The complexity or evolving nature of a crisis may preclude the desired outcome being defined. It may only be possible to look ahead months and reframe the problem in order to discover the necessary desired outcome.

1.55   Political agreement on a desired outcome is necessary for clarity on strategies and objectives. However, complete agreement between different actors may be difficult to achieve and, in that case, developing a shared vision or unity of purpose should be pursued. Creating the conditions to achieve a desired outcome requires active involvement from each of the instruments of power. It also requires effective collaboration between military and non-military actors, across both New Zealand government agencies and a broad range of multinational institutions, agencies, and organisations.

1.56   **Principles that inform a Comprehensive Approach.** The implementation of this comprehensive approach may vary between the levels of operation, and from one crisis to another, so there are a number of guiding principles that serve as guidance towards a unity of purpose and shared vision. These principles are outlined below.

- **Proactive Engagement.** Vigorous and industrious engagement is necessary between all actors, before and during a crisis.

- **Shared Understanding.** Active participation that is shared through cooperative working, liaison, education, and a common language, is vitally important as is a clear understanding of the objectives, roles, responsibilities, and limitations of participating agencies.

- **Collaborative Working.** A esprit de corps based upon mutual trust and a willingness to cooperate is valuable — institutional familiarity and information sharing is key.

- **Outcome Focused Thinking.** Thinking based on objectives ensures that all actors work towards common and mutually agreed goals, underpinned, even in the absence of unity of command, by a unity of purpose.

1.57　　Commitment to a comprehensive approach does not mean that the NZDF forgoes its warfighting ethos or ability to conduct conventional military operations. Although applicable throughout the continuum of conflict and crisis, a comprehensive approach may not be applicable to every scenario in which NZDF force elements are engaged. The degree to which a comprehensive approach is applied will be guided by situational imperatives such as the complexity, duration, and nature of the situation.

1.58　　Just as the levels of military operations overlap and the distinctions between them blur, similarly levels of government operations can also overlap under a comprehensive approach. The need for careful and considerate planning is crucial, given that the NZDF will likely be involved in operations led by other government departments or agencies — leaving the NZDF in a supporting role only.

Key Term

Comprehensive Approach

An approach that responds effectively to complex crises by orchestrating, coordinating, and deconflicting the activities of the military, other government departments and, where possible, international organisations and non-governmental organisations.

The Joint Approach to Campaigns and Operations

1.59　　The NZDF recognises that military success relies on a joint effort, usually with force elements from two or more of the Services brought together under a unified command structure. The principle contributions to the maritime, land, and air environments and the special operations area are summarised below. For more detailed guidance on the employment of maritime, land, and air power, within their specific environments, please consult the relevant single-Service doctrine.

Maritime

1.60　　**Characteristics.** Maritime forces provide an agile and scalable capability, which can operate from the open ocean to the littoral, and across the spectrum of operations. The enduring characteristics of maritime forces — primacy, presence, poise, versatility, graduated response, reach, mobility and freedom of manoeuvre, resilience and cost-effectiveness — bring utility across a broad range of operations. These operations are grouped under the three general categories of military, constabulary, and diplomatic.

1.61　　The following broad strategies allow maritime forces to exercise some form of authority over the sea — sea power.

- **Power Projection.** Power projection from the sea describes the situation where a state provides resources to enable it to directly affect activities on the land. It can be enacted by the use of strategic weapons, land attack cruise missiles, organic aircraft, naval gunfire, and amphibious forces. Although the NZDF has a limited ability to conduct power projection from the sea, it remains an essential requirement for expeditionary forces.

- **Sea Control.** Sea control permits freedom of action to use the sea for one's own purposes in specified areas and for specified periods of time, in order to deny or limit its use to the enemy. Sea control differs from power projection in that it only indirectly affects activities ashore.

- **Sea Denial.** Sea denial falls short of full sea control, and exists when an adversary is prevented from using the sea for their own purposes. Sea denial may be achieved through methods such as mines, fast attack craft, and submarines — assets that can operate in dispersed but coordinated groups.

- **Maritime Presence and Support.** This is the least resource-intensive strategy, and typically is used by nations without the resources or national will to protect their interests beyond littoral waters. This option usually implies strategies of neutrality or non-alignment.

1.62   The strategies listed above need to be viewed in relative terms. For example, in the geo-strategic context of the South Pacific, the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) maintains a capacity to exercise all elements of sea power — depending on the nature of the threat. As the geographic and military employment context widens however, the RNZN's stand-alone capabilities fall away sharply and it will be limited to supporting coalition operations.

1.63   **Contribution to Joint Operations.** Maritime forces are able to contribute to a broad range of joint operations, from complex warfighting at one extreme, to humanitarian aid at the other. In a warfighting role, the maritime contribution falls into two broad groups: operations at sea, and operations from the sea. Both broad groups are outlined below together with other contributions to joint operations.

- **Operations at Sea.** Operations at sea focus on maintaining sea control, and include:
  - blockade operations
  - containment operations
  - interdiction of enemy forces
  - maritime exclusion zone operations
  - barrier operations
  - area sea control operations.

- **Operations from the Sea.** Operations from the sea directly affect activities ashore, and are power projection in nature. They include:
  - naval gunfire support

  - support to Special Operations Forces (SOF)
  - littoral air defence
  - maritime counterterrorism
  - mine warfare
  - intelligence collection
  - force projection.

- **Other Contributions.** Other maritime force contributions may be divided into seven distinct groups:
  - support to domestic law enforcement
  - diplomacy tasks
  - presence
  - humanitarian tasks
  - support to forces ashore
  - coercion
  - peace support tasks.

Land

1.64   **Characteristics.** Land power is the ability to exert immediate and sustained influence on or from the land in conditions of peace, crisis, and conflict. In exerting land power, land forces contribute the unique capability to operate on the land, in the littoral, and can be projected by land, sea, and air. They can clear terrain, hold it against armed adversaries, and operate amongst the people to build security, and support the development of indigenous capacity and governance. New Zealand's global interests dictate a land force that is not only multifunctional and potent, but also displays the following enduring characteristics.

- **Multi-Role.** Land forces are adaptive and can be employed in multiple roles throughout the spectrum of conflict. This includes the ability to transition and adapt to a new purpose or changes within the operational environment.

- **Agile.** The light orientation of New Zealand Army provides flexibility, strategic responsiveness and mobility options by various modes. The ability for land forces to transition between tasks, operations, and environments provides the basis for adaptability and flexible response options.

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Figure 1-5: Maritime Forces contribute to a range of joint operations.

- **Precise.** While often operating in a distributed manner, land force's able to conduct targeted and precise actions to achieve specific effects with minimal collateral damage.

- **Distributed.** Distributed Operations seek to maximize the commander's ability to employ tactical units across the depth and breadth of a nonlinear operational environment in order to achieve favourable intelligence-driven engagements as part of the Joint Force Commander's overall campaign.

1.65 **Contributions.** The New Zealand Army employs a comprehensive approach in order to influence and shape the land environment, allowing peaceful political discourse and a return to normality. Functions, or lines of operation if used in a campaign context, describe where land force effort is applied in order to achieve the desired end-state. The following mutually supporting functions are the fundamental contributions the New Zealand Army is required to make across the Spectrum of Operations.

- **Joint Land Combat.** This involves actions to secure the land environment, remove organised resistance, and set conditions for the other lines of operation.

- **Population Protection.** This provides protection and security to threatened populations in order to set the conditions for the re-establishment of law and order.

- **Information, Influence, and Engagement.** These actions inform and shape the perceptions, attitudes, behaviour, and understanding of target population groups. Activities conducted prior to, during, and in response to a crisis or event, are required to effectively influence specific groups.

- **Population Support.** This restores or temporarily replaces the necessary essential services in effected communities.

- **Indigenous Capacity Building.** This involves the New Zealand Army, alongside other agencies, in nurturing the establishment of civilian governance. Other agencies may include local and central government, security, police, legal, financial, and administrative systems.

1.66   These fundamental contributions are comprised by one or more of the following elements.

- **Command and Control.** Communications units provide the backbone for land-based C2 elements.

- **Manoeuvre.** Land forces conduct warfighting operations that seek to undermine the enemy's will. They can be inserted into an area of operations using a variety of sea-, air- or land-based methods of entry, to conduct offensive, defensive, or security and stability operations. They may also assist maritime and air manoeuvre by seizing, protecting, denying, destroying, or operating forward operating bases.

- **Offensive Support.** Land forces' offensive fire assets include artillery, electronic warfare, armour and infantry. They may also contribute to joint fire support coordination, and provide specialist teams to coordinate air-ground operations. During offensive operations, land forces may help reduce enemy air and sea power through strike and target designation.

- **Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.** Land forces support intelligence gathering and analysis. This includes the provision of human intelligence (HUMINT), ground-based electronic warfare and surveillance units, reconnaissance units, and Special Operations Forces (SOF) assets.

- **Force Protection.** Force protection in the land environment includes the physical protection of bases, facilities, and the deployed force. Force protection also includes the protection of personnel from environmental threats, through the provision of preventive health measures. Force protection includes the use of land force engineering assets to provide horizontal construction support of force protection facilities.

- **Mobility and Counter-mobility Support.** Land forces engineering support includes the provision of mobility support through vertical construction (airfields, roads, and beach-heads) as well as mobility denial to enemy freedom of movement.

- **Logistics.** Land forces' logistic capabilities are termed combat service support. They include movement control, personnel support, construction and general engineering, terminal operation, medical and dental facilities, general transport support, materiel and supply services, and contract management support. Alternatively, combat service support may be supplied by the host-nation, contractors, or in-theatre sources, among others.

Air

1.67   Air pervades and overlays both the land and sea environments, so air power is inherently joint; airmen intuitively understand that they must act within a framework of Joint Action. The expeditionary and influence-based approach to future operations means that increasingly, air power will be deployed as part of the comprehensive approach to resolving crises, and working closely not just with the land and maritime, but also OGDs and national and multinational NGOs.

1.68   **Characteristics.** Air power has three core characteristics that are relevant across the spectrum of joint operations: speed, reach, and height. These core characteristics also act synergistically to produce the additional strengths of presence, agility, and concentration. The core attributes are manifested into four fundamental air power roles.

1.69   **Contributions.** Air power has the following four roles:

- control of the air

- air mobility

- intelligence and situational awareness

- attack.

1.70   **Control of the Air.** Counter-air operations achieve control of the air through the destruction,

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Figure 1-6: Land forces can operate in a variety of terrain.

degradation, or disruption of an enemy's air capability. Counter-air operations are subdivided into offensive and defensive counter-air missions:

- **Offensive Counter-Air Missions.** Offensive Counter-Air (OCA) missions are offensive operations aiming to destroy, disrupt, or degrade enemy air and missile threats, either by destroying them on the ground, or close to their source.

- **Defensive Counter-Air Operations.** The object of Defensive Counter-Air (DCA) is to protect friendly forces and vital interests from enemy airborne threats and is synonymous with air defence. DCA consists of active and passive defence.

1.71　　Please note that the Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) has limited capability in the counter-air

role, generally being restricted to passive measures such as camouflage, concealment and deception, and dispersion.

1.72　　**Air Mobility.** Air mobility and lift (including precision air delivery) enable the global, regional, and local deployment of military and civilian personnel and materiel in a timely manner. Although air lift is limited in payload in comparison with surface lift, in many crisis situations it represents the only way of providing immediate influence by rapidly deploying and sustaining forces. It consists of the following six sub-sets.

- **Air Lift.** Air lift provides the capability to enable rapid global deployment and redeployment of military personnel and associated equipment.

- **Air-to-Air Refuelling.** Air-to-Air Refuelling is a

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significant force multiplier. It increases the range, endurance, payload, and flexibility of all receiver-capable aircraft and is especially important when forward basing is limited or unavailable.

- **Airborne Operations.** Airborne operations project combat power through the air delivery of land forces onto an objective.

- **Special Air Operations.** Special Forces (SF) are small units employing specialised equipment and tactics. They are dependent on air support, and special air operations are an integral part of SF.

- **Aerial Delivery.** Aerial delivery enables the rapid precision delivery of logistics stores to remote or isolated locations that are not served by either a secure landing strip or roads.

- **Aeromedical Evacuation.** Aeromedical Evacuation is a specialised form of air lift for transporting ill or injured personnel under medical supervision to appropriate medical treatment facilities.

1.73   **Intelligence and Situational Awareness.** Surveillance and reconnaissance are the means by which air and space power provides intelligence and situational awareness (ISA), whether for operational level commanders taking a theatre-wide perspective using space-based assets, or individual soldiers exploiting live video feeds from manned or unmanned aircraft. The high vantage point afforded by air and space allows an almost unhindered view 'over the hill' and across the electromagnetic spectrum, providing intelligence at all levels of command, although a robust capability is required to direct, collect, process, and disseminate information.

1.74   Air and space systems now have sufficient sensor resolution to find and identify very small targets, down to individual people. They can also map terrain and infrastructure and even monitor patterns of change and behaviour, routinely penetrating poor weather and overcoming concealment techniques. Sensors can also intercept communications and other signals, helping to build a comprehensive and coherent intelligence picture. The intelligence provided by air and space capabilities can then be fused with other forms of intelligence

such as HUMINT, which can then be used to develop situational awareness into situational understanding.

1.75   **Attack (Engage).** Attack from the air can no longer be simply divided into tactical or strategic categories, as air power spans the spectrum of conflict in range, reach, and effect. Additionally, attack is not solely kinetic (or lethal), because air power can also provide a very effective lever against an opponent's cognitive domain through the effects on an adversary's perceptions of future force application and their vulnerability to it.

1.76   The demonstrable capability to attack an adversary underpins a graduated range of credible threats. Air power's ability to escalate the use of force in a graduated manner means that it has become an increasingly important element of coercive strategies. It may be kinetic with approaches such as counter-air or precision attack or it may be non-kinetic, in the form of presence patrols or demonstrations. The RNZAF has limited capability for the application of kinetic effect; however all air assets can be used to engage in non-kinetic roles.

1.77   Attack from the air may be broken down into deep attack, counter-land and counter-sea operations, and information operations.

- **Deep Attack.** Deep Attack describes attacks conducted against targets often (but not always) deep in enemy territory and of significant, often strategic, importance. Deep attack is used to disrupt or destroy centres of gravity or other vital targets.

- **Counter-land Operations.** Counter-land operations aim to gain and maintain a desired degree of control of the land battle-space by targeting fielded enemy ground forces and the infrastructure directly supporting them, or by using the psychological effects of air power to attack the enemy's will. Counter-land operations fall into three mission types as outlined below.
  - **Air Interdiction.** Air Interdiction (AI) is action to destroy, disrupt, divert, or delay the enemy's surface potential before it can be used effectively

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against friendly forces, or otherwise achieve its objectives.

- **Close Air Support.** Close Air Support (CAS) is action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets requiring detailed integration with the fire and movement of friendly forces for targeting guidance and to avoid fratricide.

- **Counter-air Operations for Psychological Effect.** In irregular activities especially, the psychological impact of air power, from the presence of a Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) to the noise generated by a fast jet, has often proved to be effective in exerting influence, especially when linked to information operations.

- **Counter-sea.** Counter-sea operations extend the application of air power into the maritime domain, and extend the attack range and capability of surface and sub-surface elements.

  - **Anti-surface Warfare.** Anti-surface warfare (ASUW) operations are conducted to destroy or neutralise enemy naval surface forces.

  - **Anti-submarine Warfare.** Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) operations are conducted with the intention of denying the enemy the effective use of submarines.

  - **Aerial Mining.** Aerial Mining Operations are conducted to support the control of vital sea areas, by inflicting damage on an enemy's surface-vessels or submarines.

- **Information Operations.** Information Operations (IO) are primarily non-kinetic actions taken to influence, affect or defend information, systems, and decision-making. They must be integrated into air (and space) operations in the same manner as more traditional capabilities.

- IO includes:
  - Electronic Warfare (EW)
  - Influence Operations
  - Computer Network Operations (CNO).

Special Operations

1.78   **Characteristics.** Special operations are

focused, often discreet operations of an unorthodox and frequently high-risk nature, undertaken to achieve significant political or military objectives that are outside the current capability of conventional forces. There are six specific characteristics of special operations that provide broad considerations for strategic decision-makers in determining if a task warrants a special operation. The six characteristics are outlined below.

- **Distinct.** While special operations are not a substitute for conventional operations, they can substitute conventional solutions. Special operations are used when conventional forces are, for military or political reasons, neither appropriate nor feasible. This may be by virtue of the task itself or the environment. Special operations can be distinguished by the degree of acceptable risk, techniques, modes of employment, or independence from friendly support.

- **Unconventional.** New Zealand's Special Operations Forces (NZSOF) do the unexpected. This may involve combining technology with tactics and can include indirect methods to aid or influence others. Equally, adversaries may be defeated by audacity and innovative thinking, rather than by physical might and more traditional methods. It is important that commanders learn how to exploit the characteristics of both conventional and unconventional approaches, especially given the complex and interconnected nature of the contemporary operating environment.

- **Often Discreet.** While special operations can be overt or conducted openly without concealment, they mainly tend to be focused on covert or clandestine operations.

- **Focused.** There are two aspects to 'focus'; precision and economy of force. Special operations apply precise force against vital objectives using the minimum personnel. Operations requiring numerical strength generally fall outside their scope except where special operations either support or are supported by conventional operations.

- **Integrated.** Special operations typically involve the integrated efforts of joint and inter-agency elements to enable their conduct over great distances, in contested or politically sensitive environments.

Figure 1-7: Air Power is able to sense, move, and engage.

Implicit in this are the blending of high-quality intelligence, detailed planning, and political and military oversight at the highest levels. In this way, special operations integrate joint and inter-agency actions for strategic impact.

- **Strategic.** Special operations are often of strategic utility, at national or theatre level. They may have high politico-military priority with fine tolerances between success and failure. In recent times the ability of special operations to discreetly or economically link military initiatives to foreign policy objectives has become increasingly necessary, given a complex and interconnected security environment.

1.79   **Contribution to Joint Operations.** NZSOF are capable of operating in small groups by air, sea, and land, far from support, in all types of terrain, climatic conditions, and scales of conflict. They can operate as either a supported or a supporting force in a joint environment.[3]

1.80   In the joint environment, NZSOF are typically employed in four core tasks.

- **Inform through Special Reconnaissance.** Special reconnaissance can be conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance. They employ military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces. Special reconnaissance is an additional capability that supplements other conventional reconnaissance and surveillance actions.

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[3]   NZDDP–3.12 *New Zealand Special Operations* (2nd Edition) provides more detailed information on the use of NZSOF

Figure 1-8: New Zealand's Special Operations Forces may combine technology with tactics and can include indirect methods to aid or influence others.

- **Defeat through Direct Action.** Direct action operations are short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive operations to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage on designated personnel or property.

- **Protect by Combating Terrorism.** Combating terrorism includes antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counter-terrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism) measures.

Combating terrorism also includes the use of non-kinetic activities such as influence operations to target the will of terrorist organisations.

- **Enable by Providing Support and Influence.** Support and influence tasks aid in the facilitation of politico-military ends within coordinated joint, inter-agency, or multinational initiatives. They are often conducted in tandem with an information campaign and support the work of other government agencies.

Real–Life Example

Special Operations in OPERATION SPITFIRE, East Timor, 1999

In 1999 the Pacific nation of East Timor was thrown into turmoil as Indonesia's control of the country was tested by a referendum on independence. New Zealand contributed civilian and military personnel to the United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) overseeing the referendum, including MAJ Jon Knight, then Executive Officer of the New Zealand Special Air Service (NZSAS). Their task was made difficult by the presence and activities of anti-independence militias sponsored by Indonesia, who used tactics such as intimidation and physical violence to manipulate and influence East Timorese voters. The subsequent vote on 30 August 1999 in favour of independence caused the militias to unleash yet more violence.

OPERATION SPITFIRE was a New Zealand and Australian plan to manage unrest in East Timor should the situation require it. On 9 September 1999, forces from the NZSAS were flown to Tindal Airbase by an RNZAF C–130 to join with Australian Special Air Service Regiment personnel in evacuating over 1500 people from Komoro Airfield near Dili and Bacau in a period of approximately

10 days. More NZSAS troopers were deployed subsequently to join Australian and British forces in establishing a secure foothold in East Timor for conventional forces to exploit. Tasks included securing airfields and ports, negotiating with the Indonesian Army, conducting reconnaissance missions and providing close personal protection for high-value individuals.

"The work rate was frantic. We would return from one operation and often would hardly have time for a break and to grab some food and water before we were off on the next. We later worked out we were sometimes working for 80 per cent of the day over this period." [CAPT Chris, NZSAS Troop Commander]

Special Operations Forces (SOF) are most often employed in operations of strategic significance. As the post-referendum violence in East Timor increased, it began to threaten the UNAMET personnel present and the stability of the country at large. Stabilisation planning had been conducted prior to the referendum by the New Zealand Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Defence, together with military personnel and their Australian counterparts. The NZSAS was an integral part of that plan. Spearheading a multinational, multi-Service task force to initiate plans of strategic importance, as occurred in OPERATION SPITFIRE, is a natural operational fit for SOF.

The New Zealand Defence Force's Approach to Campaign and Operations

Operational Tenets

1.81   This section identifies and explains the essential elements of NZDF military operations. These elements, defined as operational tenets, are fundamental to the conduct of military operations and permeate down through New Zealand military doctrine.

1.82   **Warfighting Ethos.** The nature of military doctrine is a product of military imperatives. Those imperatives lead ultimately to the need to prepare for and, if necessary, to fight and win in battle. The conduct of warfighting in support of national interests is the most important function military forces may have to perform.

Every member of the NZDF must be prepared to fight for whatever legitimate cause the New Zealand Government is pursuing through military endeavour. It follows also that military doctrine must have at its core a warfighting ethos.

1.83   Warfighting is about the deliberate application of lethal force, usually by two sides against each other, but increasingly in more complex patterns. Because of the destructive nature of warfighting, those involved are forced to endure a constant threat to their lives and well being. They will themselves be attempting to create and amplify the same fear in the minds of their adversary.

1.84   The dynamic and destructive nature of warfighting produces massive uncertainty, confusion, chaos, and an inevitable abandonment of initial plans for the conduct of the war. With both sides attempting

Figure 1-9: Special Operations Forces undertake four core tasks: Inform, Defeat, Protect, and Enable.

to gain the advantage, surprise and shock will be a constant drain on resources, both physical and mental.

1.85   Warfighting is likely to be demanding and frightening for the individuals involved. Fear and uncertainty are likely to be commonplace, even within the minds of those most conditioned to cope with its challenges. The bravest men and women may be frightened; it is their ability to carry on despite their fears that is the measure of their courage. Importantly, by its very nature, military activity is about confronting risk and managing it. It is emphatically never about avoiding risk; the military profession is not one for those who are risk averse.

1.86   Warfighting ethos provides the NZDF with the vital moral and emotional capacity to cope with most of the circumstances it is likely to confront in operations across the range of security events. It also prepares public opinion for the possibility of casualties in pursuit of a legitimate and justifiable cause, especially when that cause is a matter of choice and not fundamental to New Zealand's national strategic interests.

1.87   The NZDF must develop and maintain a warfighting ethos in order to succeed in combat, conduct effective peace support operations, provide force protection, and be able to respond to government requirements across a range of security events.

1.88   **The Joint Effect.** Effective military operations require military force elements from all Services to operate in an integrated fashion. The integrated approach allows the value of a joint force to become more than merely the sum of its component parts. When joint commanders and staff focus upon the desired outcomes or effects required, and employ the appropriate means from two or more Services, it is called generating the 'joint effect'

1.89   Whilst applicable to all levels of military operations, the joint effect is predominantly concerned with the harmonisation of force elements at the operational and tactical levels.

1.90   The joint effect can only be achieved when all components are working effectively and harmoniously

with those from the other Services. Each Service makes a unique contribution to a joint force whilst retaining its individual Service ethos. Maritime, land, and air forces have different but complementary attributes that are amplified in maritime, land, and air power doctrine.

1.91   Operations are not joint simply because forces from different Services and resources from other agencies and organisations operate in the same area. Operations are joint when there is cooperation between single-Service force elements and/or other government agencies. Effective C2 of joint operations depends upon commanders and staff understanding the relative strengths and weaknesses (both inherent and situational) of each military or non-military component of the force, and how they may complement each other. This understanding, applied in the planning and execution of operations, allows NZDF force elements to achieve military objectives out of proportion to the resources applied.

1.92   **The Principles of War.** From an understanding of the nature of conflict, it is possible to derive certain basic, enduring principles about the conduct of armed conflict. These principles are known as the principles of war. In planning for military operations and executing that plan, joint commanders and their staff at all levels need to consider these principles, which provide guidance for the conduct of military action. The principles of war[4] recognised by the NZDF are outlined in Figure 1-10.

1.93   **The Manoeuvrist Approach.** The manoeuvrist approach is based on using an indirect method to defeat the adversary's will to fight. It aims to apply strength against vulnerable capabilities that support an adversary's centre of gravity (GoG). In order to achieve the objective, the emphasis is on disrupting the adversary by taking the initiative and applying pressure at times and places the adversary least expects. A key characteristic of the manoeuvrist approach is joint commanders attaining decision superiority by executing better decisions with more agility than the adversary, thus placing pressure on the adversary's decision-

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[4]   For more detail on the Principles of War, please refer to NZDDP–D *Defence Doctrine* (3rd Ed).

THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

- Selection and Maintenance of the Aim
- Maintenance of Morale
- Offensive Action
- Security
- Surprise
- Concentration of Force
- Economy of Effort
- Readability
- Cooperation
- Sustainability

Figure 1-10: The Principles of War.

making cycle and achieving a superior operational tempo. Manoeuvrist thinking is applicable to all types of military operation, and offers the prospect of rapid results or results disproportionately greater than the resources applied.

1.94   **Command Philosophy.** Modern commanders face a dilemma in where they should position themselves: either forward to provide physical leadership and gain detailed awareness of the tactical situation, or further back where they can better orchestrate the efforts needed to achieve the objective. Modern communications can enhance C2. However, it may also present a challenge – the risk of superior commanders using communications to micro-manage lower levels of operations. This has the run-on effect of undermining the long-term ability of subordinates to take initiative, which is fundamental to the manoeuvrist approach. It is thus necessary to strike a balance in C2 between direction and delegation. Mission command is the command philosophy that achieves this balance. See NZDDP–D *New Zealand Defence Doctrine* (3rd Ed)

and NZDDP–00.1 *Command and Control* (2nd Ed) for further guidance on Mission Command.

1.95   **Inherent Flexibility and Pragmatism.** A flexible and pragmatic attitude is required to successfully conduct modern military operations across the spectrum. Commanders must be conditioned to think imaginatively and innovatively — this kind of thinking is essential to manoeuvrist operations.

Justifiable Action

1.96   As New Zealand prides itself on being a democratic member of the international community, it is imperative that the basis for any NZDF operation complies with the law. All operations must be conducted within a legal framework based on international law, national domestic law and (where not excluded by international law or any agreed modifications) host-nation law. Usually, for each operation there are clearly articulated rules of engagement (ROE) issued by the Chief of Defence Force (CDF). Central to this framework will be a justification for the use of force. This may be, for example, a UN mandate such as a UN Security Council Resolution that is the legal authority for the operation and that will determine the mission and desired end-state. Alternatively the operation may be based on New Zealand's inherent right of individual or collective self-defence under the UN Charter. Commanders at all levels and other members of the NZDF must understand the legal boundaries and issues inherent within military action. Being able to justify military action contributes significantly to the morale component of fighting power and is a key operational enabler. For further information on ROE please refer to NZDDP–06.1 *Rules of Engagement*.

The Task Force

1.97   **Concept.** The term 'task force' is defined as 'a temporary grouping of units, under one commander, formed for the purpose of carrying out a specific operation or mission.' The task force concept provides a generic descriptor for a force of any size and composition, ranging from a section-sized organisation to a major formation. It can be employed across the spectrum of operations. As the task force will be a

mission-specific grouping, it may or may not contain elements of two or more of the NZDF's single-Services. Should the task force be multi-Service in composition, then the adjective 'joint' shall be employed to describe all aspects of the operation. As this publication deals specifically with joint operations, the term 'joint task force' (JTF) will be used throughout.

1.98   If OGDs or other government agencies (OGA) are also part of the task force then the adjective 'inter-agency' is added to the 'joint' and the task force will be titled a Joint Inter-agency Task Force (JIATF).

1.99   **Command and Control of a Joint Task Force.** As several elements of the NZDF may be required to cooperate to achieve a mission, a JTF's structure and C2 relationships must be clearly defined. As HQJFNZ is the NZDF's operational-level HQ, Commander Joint Forces New Zealand (COMJFNZ) will be responsible for forming a JTF and appointing its joint commander. This publication uses the generic term 'joint commander'

wherever possible, with the distinction between COMJFNZ and the JTF commander made as required. Greater detail on the can be found in Chapter 4 of this doctrine and in NZDDP-00.1 *Command and Control* (2nd Ed).

1.100   **Task Organisation Structure.** The temporary command structures used by the NZDF to integrate joint forces for operations are often more complex than those permanently established to support the enduring task of raising, training, and sustaining forces. Due to the transitory nature of these command structures, a common method is applied, called task organisation structure. The task organisation structure divides a JTF into subordinate groups, units, or elements. They are called, in order from higher to lower, task groups, task units, and task elements. Each entity is numbered, building on the immediate superior organisation's assigned number. See Chapter 4 for further information on the task organisation structure.

CHAPTER 2:
CAMPAIGNS AND OPERATIONS

CONTENTS

The Operational Environment

2.01   The operational environment frames all military and non-military activities that contribute to the strategic end-state. It is generally the factors and conditions that must be understood to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, and complete the mission. This includes the maritime, land, air, and space domains, the adversary and friendly forces, facilities, weather, terrain, the electromagnetic spectrum, the human and the information environment within the Joint Forces Area of Operations (JFAO) and areas of interest. In addition to the domains there are several other elements in the operational environment that that must be understood. These include the adversaries, friendly forces, neutrals, international organisations, non-governmental organisations, other government agencies (OGA), and the weather.

2.02   Understanding the operational environment helps the joint commander to grasp how it impacts on the achievement of the military end-state. The domains

of the operational environment are explained below and the JFAO and other associated areas are listed in Annex A.

2.03   The process that defines the operational environment is the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE), which is part of the Joint Military Appreciation Process (JMAP).

2.04   **Domains.** The operational environment has nine overlapping and interrelated domains, which include five environmental and four non-environmental domains.

Environmental Domains

- **Land.** The land domain is the principle geographic medium on which conflict occurs. Land forces retain the unique capacity to capture, occupy, and hold terrain.

- **Maritime.** The maritime domain includes blue water (open ocean), green water (over continental shelves,

Figure 2-1: Elements of the operational environment.

archipelagos, and coasts), brown water (inshore areas and estuaries), and the sub-surface domain.

- **Air.** The air domain is the third dimension of every commander's operational environment. Air is not merely a medium for transit; its exploitation is critical to success.

- **Space.** The space domain provides a global perspective and access that is unhindered by geographic or political boundaries. Space systems provide essential capabilities in communications, intelligence, surveillance, navigation, timing, early warning, meteorology, mapping, geodesy, and wide area coverage. Space systems enable the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) to view the operational environment more clearly, and strike more quickly and precisely.

- **Electromagnetic Spectrum.** The electromagnetic spectrum is a domain in its own right. It comprises the range of frequencies in which oscillating electric and magnetic fields transmit waves at the speed of light. The electromagnetic spectrum includes cosmic and gamma radiation, x-rays, ultraviolet, visible and infrared radiation, and radio waves.

Non-environmental Domains

- **Information.** The information domain encompasses all information and related infrastructure that influence operations. This includes information and intelligence sourced and managed outside the NZDF. Exploitation of the information domain supports joint commanders' decision-making, particularly in the areas of information operations and media operations.

- **Cyberspace.** Cyberspace is a global domain consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers, and their resident data. All of the domains are susceptible to hostile cyberspace activity.

- **Time.** Time is a domain comprising two interrelated aspects. The first is timely action to achieve the right effect at the right time. The second is making the best use of time in the face of the increasing volume of information that needs to be processed, analysed, and disseminated in sufficient time to be of use.

- **Human Domain.** Armed conflict, as a clash of wills, has always been started by people. The human domain therefore embraces how people apply their non-materiel resources (intellect, emotions, motivation, and leadership) to fight and win. It is within the human domain that decisions are made, individually or collectively.

Relationship between Campaigns and Operations

2.05   Tactics, techniques, and procedures are the building blocks of concrete military actions. Actions generate effects and change in the environment or situation. Tactical actions are the component pieces of operations.

2.06   An operation is a sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme or objective. An operation may entail the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defence, battles, engagements, and manoeuvres needed to achieve the objective of any battle or campaign. However, an operation need not involve combat.

2.07   A campaign is a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. Planning for a campaign is appropriate when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major operation. Campaigns are often the most extensive joint operations in terms of time and other resources. The NZDF has been involved in a number of campaigns post–World War 2, including Malaya, Vietnam, Bosnia, East Timor, Afghanistan, and the Solomon Islands. Some operations can be executed in a single operation and not require campaigning. A non-combatant evacuation, for example, may be executed in a single operation.

Campaigning

2.08   Campaigning — the conduct of campaigns — is distinct from the conduct of operations in that it will encompass more than one operation, and will endure over a longer period of time. A campaign is a set of operations that aims to achieve a strategic objective within a given time and geographical area.

2.09   There are two types of campaign, which differ in scope.

2.10   **Theatre Campaign.** A theatre campaign encompasses activities that accomplish military, strategic, or operational objectives within a theatre of operations, primarily within the operational-level joint commander's area of responsibility.

2.11   **Subordinate Campaign.** A subordinate campaign comprises the actions of a subordinate commander, which accomplish or contribute to the achievement of military, strategic, or operational objectives, in support of a theatre campaign. Subordinate commanders develop subordinate campaign plans if their assigned missions require military operations of such size, complexity, and duration that they cannot be accomplished within the framework of a single, major operation. Subordinate campaign plans should be consistent with the strategic and operational guidance provided in the theatre campaign plan.

Principles of Campaigning

2.12   Campaigning demands a way of thinking and specific supporting processes that together enable the effective use of military capability, usually as part of a comprehensive response, to achieve favourable outcomes. It is underpinned by a number of guiding principles:

- take a long-term view about both the underlying causes and symptoms of conflict

- focus on strategic and operational outcomes as well as the conditions required to realise them

- plan and execute a campaign in concert with the other instruments of power where practicable

- embrace collaborative engagement with those multiple agencies sharing the intent to improve the situation

- consider the whole situation and recognise that it is complex, adaptive, non-linear, and to a certain extent unpredictable

- conduct continuous analysis and assessment to deepen understanding of changing environments and to modify planning and execution.

Operational Art

2.13   Operational art translates strategy into operational and tactical action, thus linking the three levels of operations and ensuring coherence. It embraces a joint commander's ability to take a complex problem and provide clarity and logic to enable detailed planning and practical orders. The joint commander uses operational art to consider the most effective employment of military forces and their sustainment. Without operational art, campaigns and operations would be a set of disconnected engagements.

2.14   Operational art requires a joint commander to do the following things:

- identify the military end-state or conditions required to achieve the given strategic objective

- decide the operational objectives required to reach the desired end-state

- order a sequence of actions that will fulfil those objectives

- apply military resources to achieve that sequence of actions

- identify the likely cost or risk of undertaking that sequence of actions.

2.15   Operational art is realised through a combination of a commander's skill and the staff-assisted processes of operational design, planning, and management of the operational environment, illustrated in Figure 2-2. This diagram also describes the analyse-

Figure 2-2: Rational Art converts strategic objectives into tactical activity.

plan-execute-assess cycle, which reflects the continually evolving nature of all operations conducted in uncertain environments.

Operational Design

2.16   While operational art is the creative process, operational design is its practical extension — the science that supports the art. Operational design is the creation of a framework that develops and refines the joint commander's vision of how they see the operation unfolding — to provide detailed and actionable plans for its execution. Together, operational art and design synthesise the intuition and creativity of the joint commander with the analytical and logical process of design, and assist in overcoming the ambiguity and uncertainty of a complex operational environment.

2.17   Operational design continues throughout the duration of a campaign or operation, in response to changing circumstances. Review and refinement are critical aspects of continuous operational redesign,

because the situation will change in response to military intervention, the actions and reactions of other actors — including adversaries, — and the unavoidable consequences of chance and friction. It is for this reason that a joint commander should become accustomed to uncertainty, and should thrive on turning chaos to their advantage. To that end, the joint commander should exploit assessment as an integral part of the operational design process.

2.18   **Design Elements.** Design elements are the concepts and tools of both campaign and operational design. They assist commanders and staff to visualise the campaign or operation and develop a concept of operations (CONOPS), by facilitating the arranging of actions in time, space, and purpose. Design elements are useful for analysing strategic and operational factors, understanding operational requirements, enhancing creativity, and ensuring a logical, balanced relationship between ends, ways, and means. Annex B contains greater detail on design elements.

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Range and Types of Joint Operations

Domestic Tasks

2.19   The term 'domestic tasks' is used to describe both the formal, pre-planned support to specific government departments and agencies, and the unplanned emergency support in times of crisis. Domestic tasks are becoming an increasingly significant function for the NZDF within New Zealand's range of security events. Undertaking domestic tasks is a joint activity and typically involves operations concerned with the New Zealand Exclusive Economic Zone/maritime environment and New Zealand territory, including resource and border patrol operations.

2.20   Aid to Civil Authorities. The NZDF may be tasked to support the civil authorities in New Zealand or elsewhere if there is no suitable alternative source of assistance. This is particularly in instances of emergency and for other requests where worthwhile training or public relations benefits will accrue to the NZDF as a result of the provision of assistance.

> **Real–Life Example**
>
> **Disaster Relief — Christchurch 2011**
>
> On 22 February 2011 at 12.51pm a magnitude 6.3 earthquake struck the city of Christchurch.
>
> Buildings collapsed or were seriously damaged and infrastructure including water, roads, sewerage, power, and telecommunications were brought seriously damaged. From the outset it was obvious that this was not an ordinary event. Christchurch had been badly damaged and at least 172 people lost their lives making it the second worse natural disaster in New Zealand's history after the Napier earthquake of 1931.
>
> Christchurch City declared a state of local emergency at 14:45 hours on 22 February. This was soon superseded when the Minister of Civil Defence declared a state of national emergency.
>
> The New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) responded by undertaking its largest ever humanitarian assistance operation. At its peak the NZDF's response operation involved close to 1800 Defence personnel from the Navy, Army, Air Force; Regulars and reservists, and military and civilians were involved in undertaking relief operations on the ground in Christchurch. Behind these people were many more working to support the operations from the camps and bases around the country.

Figure 2-3: Domestic tasks are both the formal, pre-planned support to specific government departments and agencies, and the unplanned emergency support in times of crisis.

Defence Diplomacy and International Engagement

2.21   Defence diplomacy is a range of peaceful engagement activities undertaken by the NZDF to dispel hostility, build and maintain trust, and assist in the development of democratically accountable armed forces. Two specific groups of military tasks underpin

defence diplomacy's contribution to conflict prevention and resolution:

- arms control, non-proliferation, and confidence and security building measures

- outreach activities such as the Mutual Assistance Programme, designed to contribute to regional security and stability, by enhancing the capabilities of and interoperability with, selected partners in the Asia-Pacific region.

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

2.22   Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) is the use of available military resources to assist in the alleviation of human suffering. The prime responsibility for the provision of humanitarian aid, assistance and disaster relief rests with specialised civilian, national, international, governmental or non-governmental organisations and agencies. The NZDF can augment and complement the capabilities of these agencies, and may be tasked to conduct or support HADR activities overseas.

2.23   Military forces are often employed in HADR roles because of their rapid response capability, airlift assets, ability to coordinate and plan, unique skills and structure, and ability to operate where entry/delivery points may be contested. NZDF HADR operations may be part of a dedicated operation, or a support activity as part of a larger operation.

Non-combatant Evacuation

2.24   The Government of New Zealand has a fundamental obligation to ensure the safety and wellbeing of New Zealand citizens. For those citizens abroad, this responsibility is assumed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT). Life-threatening circumstances can arise for a variety of reasons, ranging from natural disasters to civil strife. Dependent on the threat level, MFAT may request the assistance of the NZDF to conduct an evacuation of New Zealand nationals and approved foreign nationals. An NZDF military operation conducted in support of MFAT's

evacuation is called a non-combatant evacuation (NEO). NEOs may be conducted at one of three levels — permissive, uncertain, and hostile — depending on the threat. NEOs are fundamentally defensive in nature. They are conducted to reduce to a minimum the number of New Zealand citizens at risk, and to protect them during the evacuation process. For more information, refer to the NZDF-approved ADDP–3.10 *Evacuation Operations*.

Peace Support

2.25   Peace support operations, carried out under an appropriate mandate, make use of diplomatic, civil, and military means to restore or maintain peace. The complexities of these operations require an understanding of not only the military role in a peace operation, but also the interrelated roles of diplomatic,

Figure 2-4: The New Zealand Defence Force has a long history of undertaking peace support operations.

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electoral, human rights, civilian police, humanitarian and civil components. Peace support operations may be divided into five broad categories, as detailed in the following paragraphs.

2.26 **Peace Building.** Peace building employs complementary diplomatic, civil and — when necessary — military means, to address the underlying causes of conflict and the longer-term needs of the people. Peace building requires a commitment to a long-term process and may run concurrently with other types of peace support operation.

2.27 **Conflict Prevention.** Conflict prevention uses diplomatic, civil and — when necessary — military means to monitor and identify the causes of conflict, and take timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of hostilities. Military activities will be tailored to meet the political and situational demands, but will generally fall within the following categories: early warning, surveillance, training and security sector reform, preventive deployment, and enforcing sanctions and embargoes.

2.28 **Peace Making.** Peace making is conducted after the start of a conflict, to bring hostile parties to a ceasefire or a peaceful settlement. It primarily involves diplomatic action supported, when necessary, by the direct or indirect use of military assets.

2.29 **Peacekeeping Operations.** Peacekeeping operations follow an agreement or ceasefire. They take place in a permissive environment where the level of the belligerents' consent and compliance is high, and the threat of disruption is low. The use of force by peacekeepers is normally limited to self-defence.

2.30 **Peace Enforcement.** Peace enforcement is conducted to maintain a peace agreement where the level of consent and compliance is uncertain, and the threat of disruption is high. Military forces must be capable of applying credible coercive force and must apply the provisions of the peace agreement impartially. Peace enforcement operations differ from war in that their aim is not to defeat a designated enemy, but rather to coerce the (potential) belligerent(s) into avoiding, or ceasing, armed conflict and participating in the peaceful settlement of disputes.

Countering Irregular Activity

2.31 Countering irregular activity (C-IA) is a range of coordinated, multi-disciplinary measures that deals with the threats to security from irregular activity. Irregular activity can be defined as "the use or threat of force by irregular forces, groups or individuals, frequently ideologically or criminally motivated, to effect or prevent change as a challenge to governance and authority". As such, it comprises criminality, disorder, insurgency, and terrorism. C-IA is typically conducted under a comprehensive approach, and aims at building authority while addressing the underlying grievances that are driving and protracting the irregular activity. The types of C-IA operations that the NZDF may conduct include counterinsurgency, combating terrorism, internal security, and anti-piracy.

2.32 **Counterinsurgency.** An insurgency is an organised movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. Insurgencies tend to arise when state authorities are unable or unwilling to redress the demands of significant social groups, which may unite against the authorities to achieve common goals, despite their differences. Insurgency is deeply related to the aspirations of the people. Counterinsurgency operations are those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken to defeat an insurgency.

2.33 **Combating Terrorism.** Combating terrorism includes antiterrorism and counterterrorism measures taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire spectrum of operations. As such, it also includes the use of non-kinetic activities, such as information operations, to target the will of terrorist organisations.

- **Antiterrorism.** Antiterrorism comprises defensive measures taken to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts. It includes the physical protection of vital facilities and personnel, the provision of security advice, forward deployment in times of heightened risk, and response to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats.

- **Counterterrorism.** Counterterrorism encompasses all offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. It may include the recovery of personnel and equipment, the surveillance and disruption of terrorist organisations, and counter-proliferation, in concert with a range of government agencies. Normally, counterterrorism operations require specially trained personnel capable of mounting swift and effective action. In New Zealand, counterterrorism is the responsibility of the Police. NZDF force elements may be employed in a counterterrorism role at the request of, and in support to, the Police.

2.34 **Internal Security.** Internal security is defined as "the military assistance provided to the civil authorities to maintain peace, restore law and order, and safeguard essential services." It can be considered a subset of aid to the civil authorities, and its focus may also include support to the police in case of civil riots and violent disorder.

2.35 **Anti-piracy.** As defined in the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, piracy is an act that can only be committed on the high seas, and for which universal jurisdiction applies — that is to say, any state can apprehend a pirate vessel, regardless of its flag state. Anti-piracy operations are constabulary operations. Although primarily the domain of maritime forces, the opposed boarding capability of the special operations forces (SOF) and the surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities of the Air Force make anti-piracy operations joint operations.

Major Warfighting

2.36 Short of the direct defence of New Zealand against a major opponent, the most exacting commitment of NZDF force elements is likely to be a large-scale, deliberate intervention operation. In extremis, if deterrence, containment and coercion fail, or if circumstances deteriorate, major, sustained warfighting could ensue.

2.37 Major warfighting involves diplomatic, military, and economic actions, unified by an overall strategy. It is characterised as combat centred on a contest between the regular armed forces of a state (organised and scaled for combat operations) and the resources of another regular state, and/or an action against large-scale irregular opponents.

2.38 Major warfighting will be highly resource-intensive, on account of its widespread and often protracted violence, although an asymmetric advantage in terms of weight of effort or technological superiority is likely to mitigate human losses. It tends to be characterised by a series of battles and major engagements, and therefore has the potential to be accompanied by intense combat activity and logistic consumption. The tempo of activities is usually high, with a need to prioritise resources and generate additional fighting power.

Operational Activities

2.39 All NZDF operational activities, whatever the type or phase of a campaign or operation, fall into three broad categories: offensive, defensive, and stability and support. They may be conducted sequentially or simultaneously by military forces, with varying levels of effort.

2.40 **Offensive.** Offensive activities normally directly target an adversary's centre of gravity (CoG), critical capabilities, critical requirements (CR) and critical vulnerabilities. They require freedom of action and the ability to conduct simultaneous activities within the operational environment. A commander's freedom of action may be limited by military strategic guidance or due to an inability to generate or sustain adequate combat power.

2.41 Generating sufficient fighting power requires careful harnessing of resources, such as only conducting essential defensive activity to allow the remainder of the force to concentrate its combat power elsewhere.

2.42 Coordination of a wide range of capabilities and effects requires careful synchronisation in time and space. It may be possible to take the offensive at the start of an operation, however a period of shaping and force build-up is normally required.

2.43	Offensive activities seek to:

- seize and retain the initiative

- maintain momentum

- maintain flexibility and fluidity to exploit opportunities

- control tempo to sustain own force operations and keep the adversary off balance

- achieve decisive results.

2.44	Offensive activities may include a mix of force element for information operations (IO), SOF, counter-air, strategic air strike, close air support (CAS), interdiction, naval surface fire support, maritime strike, anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, anti-air warfare, mining, amphibious, and airborne and land manoeuvre. Force elements may be used for the advance, attack, and pursuit.

2.45	**Defensive.** Defensive activities are primarily conducted to protect one's own CoG and critical factors, and to preserve combat power. They provide a commander with a secure foundation and time to prepare for offensive activities. An effective defence is rarely passive as the defender resists and contains the adversary while seeking every opportunity to seize the initiative and move onto the offensive.

2.46	Defensive activities may include a mix of force protection, IO, SOF, control of the air (including defensive counter-air and anti-air warfare), CAS, maritime screening, defensive mining, anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface and land manoeuvre including delaying, deliberate and mobile defence, and counter-attack.

2.47	Defensive activities conducted for shaping and/or stability purposes may include the above but are generally governed by more limited and restrained rules of engagement (ROE) than during decisive operations.

2.48	Defensive activities in all domains aim to force the adversary to culminate due to loss of momentum, exhaustion, overextended lines of communication, and diminished fighting power creating conditions for offensive and stability activities.

2.49	**Stability and Support.** The aim of stability and support operations (SASO) is to impose security and control over an area while employing military capabilities to restore services and support civilian agencies. SASO are conducted using a comprehensive approach involving various government, non-government and other actors. The New Zealand all-of-government contribution may include the NZDF conducting stability activities, but stabilisation can be conducted without military forces. SASO may occur before, during, and after offensive and defensive combat operations.

2.50	The military contribution to SASO can include:

- providing security for own and other agency operations (which may include countering an insurgency and/or terrorism)

- supporting humanitarian operations

- supporting the restoration of law and order

- providing essential services

- supporting governance and the restoration of a functioning civil authority.

2.51	SASO may involve countering irregular activity, including counter-insurgency (COIN). It is unlikely that irregular activity or COIN would be conducted without the use of military forces. When countering insurgency, it is usually necessary to isolate an adversary from the population. However, while insurgency can seriously inhibit the establishment of security, it is not usually the root cause of the instability. Long term and sustainable stability requires a coordinated response to economic, diplomatic, governance, and security issues.

Balance Between Operational Activities

2.52	**Balancing Offensive, Defensive, and Stability and Support Operations.** The joint commander strives to apply the many dimensions of military power simultaneously across the depth, breadth, and height of the operational area. Consequently, effort is normally concentrated in specific areas or functions, requiring economy of force in others. Operation plans should feature an appropriate balance between offensive,

defensive, and SASO operations in all phases. Even during sustained combat, there will be a need to (re-) establish security and control, and provide humanitarian assistance as succeeding areas are occupied or bypassed.

2.53   Planning for SASO and the eventual transition to a handover to civil authority and redeployment should commence during plan development and be on-going during all phases of the campaign or operation. A failure to sufficiently plan for SASO in the 'dominate' phase may impede planning for the 'stabilise' and 'enable civil authority' phases, and ultimately the momentum of the joint operation.

All-of-Government Approach

2.54   The New Zealand Government's approach to planning and coordination at the national strategic level is described as all-of-government and is based on a clearly articulated policy. All-of-government is defined as government departments and agencies working across portfolio boundaries to achieve a shared goal and an integrated government response to particular issues.

2.55   The all-of-government approach is planned and managed by interdepartmental committees. An interdepartmental committee is normally chaired by the department that has the lead responsibility for the relevant issue. The principal interdepartmental committee is the Officials Domestic External Security Committee (ODESC) which supports the Domestic and External Security Coordination (DESC) committee for Cabinet. An interdepartmental committee can be formed for routine monitoring of an issue that is no longer an emergency.

2.56   For crisis management an ad hoc emergency task force (ETF) or similar group is formed to gather interdepartmental views on options for crisis management. The lead department for a particular crisis uses the ETF to gain a comprehensive perspective on the issues.

Strategic Communication

2.57   Strategic communication is a term describing a range of activities, in both the information and human domains, at all levels, to achieve information effects within the operational environment. Strategic communication is an all-of-government activity utilising all elements of national power to mould the perceptions and behaviour of a target audience in support of national objectives.

2.58   Strategic communication establishes the dominance of the narrative. A narrative is the fundamental story, the default understanding, which a party to a conflict is aiming to establish as valid within the minds of members of one or more target audiences. The dominance of New Zealand's narrative with various local, regional, and global audiences is central to convincing these audiences that our aims and actions are valid and beneficial, and to winning their support. To remain credible and dominant, our narrative must evolve as circumstances evolve. The means used are psychological (such as images and information), physical (such as shows of force and/or firepower), and humanitarian operations, to demonstrate intent and capability. Irrespective of whether psychological or physical means are used, the effect sought is psychological. Commanders and planners need to be aware that in a multinational environment the strategic narrative of coalition partners might differ.

Key Term

Strategic Communication

Strategic communication describes a range of activities to achieve information effects within the operational environment. Strategic communication is an all-of-government activity utilising all elements of national power to mould the behaviour of a target audience in support of national objectives.

Figure 2-5: Strategic communication.

2.59   **Presence, Posture, and Profile.** Another contributor is presence, posture, and profile. This is the demonstration by a force of its intent, attitudes, and commitment in order to influence target audiences. Projection of the image of a professional, capable, and disciplined force, displaying military prowess in a measured, constrained, and focused way — especially when coupled with timely and well designed announcements and actions — can have a significant impact on the perceptions of target audiences, including uncommitted or potential adversaries. It can also be a significant factor in establishing and reinforcing a force's credibility and legitimacy.

2.60   Although information effects are not easily planned, applied, or assessed, their success may be fundamental to the whole campaign or operation. This is overwhelmingly so in counterinsurgency where the perceptions, attitudes, and behaviour of the local population are central to the outcome.

2.61   The media is fundamentally important to strategic communication and must be comprehensively and effectively engaged. Other major contributors include public affairs and public information, civil-military operations (CMO), and psychological operations.

2.62   The area in which campaigns or operations will be conducted is organised and labelled in such a way that elements of a Joint Task Force (JTF) have a common understanding of its principal boundaries, thus enabling effective management of the operational area. The primary methods of defining the areas of the operational environment are detailed below.

2.63   **Theatre of Operations.** This is a designated geographic area or 'volume of space' for which an operational-level joint or combined commander is appointed, and in which a campaign or series of major operations is conducted. A theatre of operations (TOO) encompasses and surrounds the Joint Force Area of Operations (JFAO), within which a joint commander conducts operations. The TOO may include countries that are providing assistance to deployed forces by allowing access, basing or over-flight.

2.64   **Joint Force Area of Operations.** The JFAO is that portion of a theatre necessary for joint military operations and their administration as part of a campaign. The JFAO is the space in the operational environment allocated to a joint commander for the conduct of operations, for a specific mission, and period of time. The characteristics of a JFAO are as follows:

- a JFAO may cut across national boundaries

- the JFAO should be large enough to allow the joint commander adequate freedom of manoeuvre, yet small enough to monitor activity within the JFAO and deny an adversary unobserved freedom of manoeuvre

- the joint commander is responsible for the protection of all friendly forces within the JFAO

- adjacent JFAOs may share boundaries (to avoid fratricide and deconflict operations along these borders, commanders should coordinate closely).

2.65   **Area of Operations.** An area of operations (AO) is an operational area defined by the joint commander for land or maritime forces to conduct military activities. Normally, an AO does not encompass the entire JFAO, but is sufficient in size for a joint commander to accomplish assigned missions and protect forces.

2.66   **Joint Special Operations Area.** A joint special operations area (JSOA) is a restricted area of land, sea, and airspace defined by the joint commander for use by a special operations component or task force. A commander may use a joint special operations area to delineate the conduct of simultaneous conventional and special operations.

2.67   **Amphibious Objective Area.** An amphibious objective area (AOA) is a geographic region that contains the area(s) to be secured by the amphibious task force. It is delineated in terms of land, sea, and airspace. The size of the amphibious objective area must be sufficient for mission accomplishment, and for the conduct of the necessary air, land, and sea operations. For further information on amphibious operations, refer to NZDF-approved ADDP–3.2 *Amphibious Operations* (2nd Ed).

2.68   **Area of Responsibility.** An area of responsibility (AOR) is a defined area of land wherein the commander of the area is specifically assigned responsibility for, and authority to exercise, the following functions:

- development and maintenance of installations

- control of movement

- conduct of tactical operations involving troops under their control.

2.69   In naval usage, the AOR is a pre-defined area of enemy terrain that supporting ships are responsible for covering, either by observation or by fire on known targets or targets of opportunity.

2.70   **Tactical Area of Responsibility.** The tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) is that portion of an AO or JFAO necessary for tactical military operations.

2.71   **Area of Influence.** An area of influence is a geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations, by manoeuvre or fire support systems normally under their command or control.

2.72   **Area of Interest.** An area of interest (AI) is that area of concern to the joint commander. It includes the area of influence and adjacent areas, and extends into enemy territory for current or planned operations. This also includes areas occupied by enemy forces that could jeopardise the accomplishment of the mission.

2.73   **Area of Intelligence Interest.** The area in which a joint commander requires intelligence on those factors and developments likely to affect the outcome of current and future operations.

2.74   **Named Area of Interest.** A named area of interest (NAI) is the geographical area where information that will satisfy a specific information requirement can be collected. They are usually selected to capture indications of adversary courses of action, but also may be related to conditions of the operational environment. In addition they provide an objective basis for the employment of intelligence collection assets.

2.75   **Forward Edge of the Battle Area.** The forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) represents the foremost limits of a series of areas in which ground combat units are deployed. This excludes the areas where covering or screening forces are coordinating fire support, the positioning of forces, or the manoeuvre of units.

2.76   **Target Area of Interest.** The geographical area where high-value targets can be acquired and engaged by friendly forces.

2.77   **Electromagnetic Spectrum.** The electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) is the range of frequencies in which oscillating electric and magnetic fields propagate waves at the speed of light. It includes cosmic and gamma radiation, x-rays, ultraviolet, visible and infra-red radiation, and radio waves. Electromagnetic energy does not respect geographic, military, or other man-made boundaries. Military use of the spectrum is rarely conducted in isolation, and includes:

- command and control (C2)

- navigation

- communications and information systems

- intelligence gathering, surveillance, and reconnaissance

- targeting

- defence and attack.

2.78   **Fire Support Coordination Measures.** Fire support coordination measures (FSCM) are employed by surface force commanders to enable rapid engagement of targets, while providing safeguards for friendly forces. FSCM are employed according to the operational situation and are coordinated with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders.

2.79   **Airspace Control Plan.** Within the JFAO, the joint commander will appoint an airspace control authority, usually the Air Component Commander. The main means of managing and deconflicting airspace is by the airspace control plan (ACP), which is effectively a battlefield airspace management support plan.

2.80   **Water Space Management.** In the maritime environment, comprehensive water space management (WSM) is crucial in support of friendly submarine operations to avoid fratricide. Within the JFAO the joint commander should appoint a submarine control authority if submarines are deployed.

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ANNEX B:
DESIGN ELEMENTS

</div>

2.81   Design elements are used to build the structure within which campaigns and operations take place. A joint commander will design the campaign or operation plan around the design elements to help visualise how the campaign or operation will unfold and to manage its development. The commander also uses design elements to articulate a concept of operational design, a statement of intent for the plan, and a command structure for executing the plan. In broad terms, design elements serve three purposes:

- to focus effort during the Joint Military Appreciation Process (JMAP)

- to describe in plans and directives what is to be achieved

- to assist in monitoring the execution of a campaign or operation.

Termination of Operations

2.82   All planning starts with the consideration of what conditions are required for the termination of operations. The term 'termination' in this context is really more about transition than traditional notions of cease-fires and victory parades. Instead, the joint commander seeks to focus on what happens when the operational end-state has been achieved — how to preserve that which has been gained. When considering the end-state, commanders and staff should be aware that diplomatic, information, and economic activities will be running parallel to military activities, all contributing to the national strategic end-state. As military objectives may be achieved well before the national strategic end-state is realised (particularly in a peace support operation), a follow-on force may be required. It is worth noting that the conflict may be resolved at any stage, using a range of means that may not be military, and with little or no fighting. In such circumstances, the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) may be required to rapidly reorient to new activities such as humanitarian assistance or peace support.

End-state and Objectives

2.83   **End-state.** The end-state is the political and/or military situation to be attained at the end of an operation, which indicates that the objective has been achieved. It should be established before the execution of an operation. End-states are established for both the national and military strategic levels. The military strategic end-state, developed during operational design, represents a set of conditions beyond which the Government no longer requires military action to achieve New Zealand's national strategic end-state. End-states can also be identified at the operational and tactical levels for an operation, a phase of an operation, or a tactical action. While it may mirror many of the conditions of the national strategic end-state, the military end-state typically will be more specific and contain other supporting conditions. These conditions contribute to developing termination criteria. An understanding of the end-state is a crucial element of any plan, for without it there is no focus for planning. All activities and operations should be judged against their relevance to achieving the end-state. Aside from its obvious association with strategic or operational objectives, clearly defining the military end-state promotes unity of effort, facilitates synchronisation, and helps clarify (and may reduce) the risk associated with the campaign or operation. Commanders should include the military end-state in their planning guidance and commander's intent statement.

2.84   **Objectives.** Objectives are clearly defined goals that must be achieved to realise the desired end-state. Commanders establish objectives at their level to focus the actions of subordinates and to provide a clear purpose for their tasks. Objectives are therefore established at each level of operations:

- military strategic objectives define the role of the NZDF in the context of national strategic objectives and strategic centre of gravity (CoG) analysis

- operational objectives are drawn from strategic objectives and operational CoG analysis

- tactical objectives are drawn from operational objectives and tactical CoG analysis.

> ## Example: End-state and Objectives for a Non-combatant Evacuation Operation
>
> **Situation:** Insurgent action and an unstable government in country Orange are imposing a grave risk to elements of the local population and resident foreign nationals.
>
> **National Strategic Level:**
>
> **End-state:** The safety of New Zealand nationals (NZN) and approved foreign nationals (AFN) in Orange has been secured.
>
> **Objectives:**
>
> • to ensure the safety of NZN and AFN in Orange
>
> • all NZN and willing AFN are evacuated from Orange
>
> • diplomatic relations with the legitimate government of Orange are maintained.
>
> **Military Strategic Level**
>
> **End-state:** The successful evacuation of willing NZN and AFN from Orange has been completed and NZDF forces are redeployed to and reconstituted in New Zealand.
>
> **Mission:** New Zealand forces are to evacuate all willing NZN and AFN in Orange.
>
> **Objectives:**
>
> the successful evacuation of NZN and willing AFN from Orange, as part of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFAT) and Trade-led non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO), is achieved
>
> • friendly force freedom of action to conduct the NEO is maintained
>
> • Defence supplementation support to the New Zealand Head of Mission in Orange is provided.

Effects

2.85   An effect is a physical and/or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. A desired effect can also be thought of as a condition that can support achieving an associated objective, while an undesired effect is a condition that can inhibit progress toward an objective.

Tasks

2.86   Tasks describe friendly actions to create desired effects or to preclude undesired effects.

Centre of Gravity

2.87   The CoG concept allows us to understand our own and an adversary's national and military potential. The CoG is the characteristic, capability, or locality from which a military force, nation, or alliance derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. If the adversary's CoG is defeated or neutralised, it will lead to the achievement of our objectives.

2.88   Intelligence staff will attempt to analyse three different CoGs. The first is that of the enemy, which will inform our lines of operation. The second is our CoG from the enemy's perspective, which should inform us of their most likely course of action; that is, how the enemy will seek to destroy or neutralise us. The last is our CoG from our perspective. This should show us the enemy's most dangerous course of action, one which could actually destroy or neutralise us. Unfortunately, this analysis is often less thorough under time pressures.

2.89   There are three elements of a CoG, which provide insight into the most effective method for assessing adversary and friendly capabilities and weaknesses:

• **Critical Capability.** A critical capability is a characteristic or key element of a force that, if destroyed, captured, or neutralised, would significantly undermine the fighting capability of the force.

• **Critical Requirement.** A critical requirement is an essential condition or resource that is needed for a critical capability to function fully.

• **Critical Vulnerability.** A critical vulnerability is a characteristic or key element of a force that,

if destroyed, captured or neutralised, would significantly undermine a critical capability. A critical vulnerability, is not necessarily a weakness, but any source of strength or power that is capable of being attacked or neutralised.

Example: Adversary's Centre of Gravity for a Non-combatant Evacuation Operation

The adversary's CoG is its ability to disrupt or deny an effective NEO. The supporting critical capabilities underpinning the CoG are the adversary's:

- support base within the orange population

- combat power

- lines of communication

- freedom of movement

- leadership.

Direct versus Indirect

2.90   There are two alternate approaches for defeating the adversary's CoG — direct and indirect. A campaign or operation can use either, or more often use a combination of both. Planning should consider possible losses and the sustainment of deployed capabilities when considering either approach.

- **Direct Approach.** The direct approach brings military force to bear in the quickest and most direct manner. It is a linear, uninterrupted approach against an adversary's CoG, often by way of decisive points (DPs). This approach may mean engaging the adversary's strengths. As such, it is appropriate when a force has superior strength compared to the opposing force, and the risk is acceptable. If successful, the direct approach can achieve the desired objectives and end-state quickly. However, it may also result in high losses and undesired outcomes that work against achieving the national strategic end-state.

- **Indirect Approach.** The indirect approach seeks to exploit the adversary's physical and moral

vulnerabilities, while avoiding its strengths. The indirect approach should be considered if a force is insufficient to operate directly against the adversary's CoG or critical strengths in a single operation. Instead, effort should be focused on exploiting the adversary's critical vulnerabilities in a series of operations that eventually lead to the defeat of the CoG. In most cases, the indirect approach suits the comprehensive and manoeuvres approaches of the NZDF, as it aims to avoid the attrition and risk implicit in the direct approach.

Decisive Points

2.91   A DP is a point from which a hostile or friendly CoG can, either directly or through subsequent DPs, be threatened. This point may exist in time, space or the information domain. A DP is not necessarily an event or battle; it may be the elimination or denial of a capability, or an achievement such as forcing an adversary to engage in formal negotiations. DPs are the keys to unlocking CoGs, which can be attacked directly by a commander designating the most important DPs as objectives and allocating resources to protect, control, destroy or neutralise them. DPs are also used to plan for the protection of own CoGs and forces. DPs are arranged along lines of operation that lead to the adversary's critical vulnerabilities and ultimately its CoG. The key determinant of a DP is its effect on an adversary or own force. During the course of the campaign or operation, changing circumstances may necessitate the rapid reappraisal of previously determined DPs.

2.92   **Commander's Decision Points.** Commander's Decision Points (DPs) are points in time and space at which a commander must make a decision in order to influence the operation in a particular target area of interest (AI). CDPs must be offset from the point where the action is to take place, in order to allow sufficient lead-time for action to be initiated. These are also known as the commander's CDPs, to differentiate from CDPs.

2.93   **Lines of Operation.** Lines of operation link DPs in time and space, providing a path to the adversary's CoG. Lines of operation are differentiated by function — for example, security, stability, governance,

reconstruction — and environment (land, sea, and air), and exploit the different strengths of each (see Figure 2-6). Commanders use lines of operation to focus the instruments of power toward a desired end-state, applying force through time and space in a logical design that integrates all the capabilities of a joint force, in order to converge upon and defeat the CoG of adversary forces.

2.94   **Parallel Lines of Operation.** Multiple lines of operation are conducted in parallel and are a means to control a variety of friendly force functions to achieve multiple objectives. They force the adversary to react to multiple threats simultaneously, thereby overloading their decision-making capabilities and making it more difficult for them to respond effectively.

Main Effort

2.95   The main effort is the principle activity or force to which a commander gives priority in each phase of an operation. There can only be one main effort at any time. It is not a geographical location, nor is the force just a unit or force element. The characteristics of a main effort are that it:

* allocates priority to the most critical activity or force

* concentrates sufficient effort to achieve the objective

* is expressed as an activity or desired outcome

* coordinates the activities of the allocated force element to achieve success.

Figure 2-6: Example line of operation for an uncertain non-combatant evacuation.

Example: Main Effort in a Non-combatant Evacuation Operation

Phase 1 Shaping: The conduct of information operations to shape the environment and set the conditions for the NEO.

Phase 2 Control: The establishment of an air/sea bridge between Orange and New Zealand.

Phase 3 Conduct: The successful evacuation of NZN and AFN from Orange is undertaken.

Phase 4 Withdrawal/Reconstitution: Withdrawal of NZDF forces from Orange.

Culminating Point

2.96   Culmination has both offensive and defensive applications.

- In the offence, the culminating point is that point in time and location when the attacker's combat power no longer exceeds that of the defender and the attacking force should transition to the defence or risk counter-attack and defeat.

- A defending force reaches its culminating point when it no longer has the capability to mount a counter-offensive or defend successfully, and is forced to disengage, withdraw, or face defeat.

2.97   Identification of the culminating point allows full exploitation of the event, or the planning of operational pauses in order to avoid it. The culminating point may be influenced by a number of factors such as lines of communication, logistics, reduced combat power, and dwindling national will. Sequencing and phasing should ensure that the adversary's operations culminate well before they can achieve their objective, while ensuring that friendly operations achieve their objective well before any culmination. Given that no operation goes according to plan, viable contingency plans should be developed and initiated to ensure that friendly forces retain the initiative.

Arranging Operations

2.98   **Sequencing.** Sequencing is the arrangement of military and non-military activities along lines of operation, in the order most likely to achieve the defeat or neutralisation of the adversary's CoG. Effective sequencing requires a clear understanding of the relationship between activities in terms of time, space, and resources. This understanding helps to determine the order in which activities can be conducted. Care is required to ensure that all activities are complementary and do not obstruct one another. There will often be non-military activities, for example diplomatic, economic, and humanitarian, that must be sequenced in parallel with the military lines of operation. Once the overall sequencing of the operation has been determined, the joint commander may choose to divide their operation into phases.

2.99   **Phasing.** Operations are organised in phases to break a complex plan into simple and/or discrete parts. Phases are sequential but may overlap, particularly in peace support operations. In some cases, the beginning of a phase may rely on the successful completion of a preceding phase. During planning, commanders should determine the conditions to be met before transitioning from one phase to the next, and designate one main effort for each phase. The aim in phasing an operation is to maintain continuity and tempo, and to avoid unnecessary operational pauses. It is also useful for distinguishing the following:

- when major activities start or finish

- whether a task organisation needs changing

- whether the forces available are sufficient to conduct all required tasks concurrently.

2.100   **Synchronisation.** Synchronisation is the arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time. It is a planning and control tool that facilitates the effective and efficient employment of all force capability to execute and support the plan, and is normally expressed as a synchronisation matrix. Other agency activities must be considered as part of synchronisation.

2.101   **Operational Pause.** An operational pause is a break in operations, required to consolidate and prepare for subsequent activity. As activities cannot be conducted continuously, there may be a need for periodic pauses on one line of operation, in order to retain the initiative and concentrate activity on another line of operation. Ideally, operational pauses should be planned in order to minimise any overall loss of tempo.

2.102   **Contingency Planning: Branches and Sequels.** For every action there are a range of possible outcomes that may or may not achieve the desired outcomes of military activity. Outcomes that are more favourable than expected may present opportunities; outcomes that are worst than expected may pose risks. In order to exploit opportunities and mitigate risks, contingency planning helps to anticipate such situations and deal with them. Commanders should anticipate possible outcomes and ensure that their operational planning provides options, in order to preserve freedom of action in changing circumstances and to allow them to retain or regain the initiative over the adversary. There are two broad approaches to contingency planning: branches and sequels. They are developed both during initial operational planning and during the execution of the plan and are described below.

- **Branches.** A branch is a contingency option built into the current plan, phase, or line of operation.

- **Sequels.** A sequel is a significant shift in focus that requires a new operation or line of operation. Sequels are planned based on the likely outcome of the current operation or phase.

Criteria for Success

2.103   For each objective, the joint commander establishes criteria for success that provide measurable or observable requirements with respect to the essential conditions that should be achieved, as well as any conditions that cannot exist for the objective to be successfully accomplished.

CHAPTER 3:
JOINT FUNCTIONS

CONTENTS

Introduction

3.01   Joint functions group related capabilities and activities to assist joint commanders to integrate, synchronise, and direct joint operations. The joint functions, see Figure 3-1, detailed in this chapter have been divided into joint operational enablers and joint operations support activities. These two broad groups of activities characterise and underpin joint operations. Both groups are so important as to have a profound influence across and throughout an operation, as opposed to the phased nature of component activities. They are generally joint force area of operations (JFAO) activities, and are common to all joint operations at the operational and tactical levels.

3.02   The profile and importance of these joint functions will vary and change with time, the operating environment, and the nature of the mission. Although described separately here, they are mutually supporting activities and should not be viewed as a discretionary list to pick and choose from. They will invariably be present on all operations, and at times activities may even migrate from one category to another.

3.03   **Joint Operational Enablers.** Joint operational enablers are a group of activities which, while fundamentally important, do not have an end unto themselves. They are unlikely to be discrete lines of operation in the achievement of the end-state. Rather, their principle purpose is to enable other activity to take place.

3.04   **Joint Operations Support Activities.** Unlike joint enablers, operations support activities have an end unto themselves. They are capabilities or techniques that are likely to be essential to the achievement of the end-state and will usually, though not always, form specific lines of operation. They are underpinned by joint enablers.

Figure 3-1: The joint operational enablers and operations support activities.

Joint Operational Enablers

3.05   Joint operational enablers are those actions, capabilities, or services undertaken in order to enable the successful conduct of activities essential to the achievement of the end-state. They include:

- command and control (C2)

- planning

- legal advice

- political and policy advice

- language and regional expertise

- operational intelligence

- intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

- movement

- manoeuvre

- sustainment

- communications and information systems

- integrated mission support

- budgets and accounting.

Command and Control

3.06   In the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), C2 is exercised across the three levels of command: strategic, operational, and tactical. These levels mirror the three levels of warfare and reflect the distribution of responsibilities for planning and directing resources allocated to the conduct of operations. They apply to all military activity across the spectrum of operations.

3.07   **Strategic Level of Command.** The strategic level comprises the national strategic and military strategic levels.

- The national strategic level refers to the broad political dimension of the conflict, and is the exclusive province of Government, which defines political objectives and provides overall direction for military strategic planners.

- The military strategic level refers to the planning and direction of military operations to meet national strategic objectives, within a comprehensive approach. The Chief of Defence Force (CDF), supported by Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force (HQNZDF), is responsible for setting the military strategic end-state and any major constraints, as well as defining the mission, its purpose, associated key tasks, and command arrangements. This is normally done through a CDF Planning Directive issued to the Commander Joint Forces New Zealand (COMJFNZ).

3.08   **Operational Level of Command.** The operational level of command is the primary responsibility of COMJFNZ, supported by HQJFNZ. The operational level provides direction and resources to force elements taking military action, thus acting as the interface between the strategic and tactical levels of command. The focus on command at this level is on planning the campaigns, synchronising the joint effects, assessing success against the objectives and endstate, forming joint forces, deploying them into areas of operations (AO), and sustaining them logistically.

3.09   **Tactical Level of Command.** The tactical level plans and conducts military tasks and actions to achieve operational objectives. Most force elements conduct operations at this level, applying force to bring about the desired outcomes.

3.10   **Overlapping Command Levels.** In practice, the levels of command overlap and the distinctions between them may not always be clear. This overlap has substantial implications for C2. These implications include the potential for tactical action to have disproportionate desired or undesired effects at the operational or strategic levels. They also include the tasking of tactical force elements by the military strategic level to achieve strategic effects.

3.11   **Joint Command and Control Structure.** In accordance with the NZDF's command philosophy, operations should be characterised by centralised direction to achieve unity of effort, with authority for execution being decentralised — delegated to the lowest

level appropriate for the most effective use of forces. To enable the execution of such direction, a joint C2 structure is required. This structure must be understood at all levels, and facilitate the clear, timely and secure passage of guidance, orders, situation reports, and coordinating information. Because of the joint nature of the force, the characteristics, doctrine, procedures, and equipment of each of the Services have to be taken into consideration.

3.12   The joint C2 system must enable the staff to manage its time and information flow, and must also afford a joint commander an environment conducive to decision-making. Furthermore, the structure and all command relationships must have built-in redundancy, be robust, flexible, and capable of development and adaptation throughout the course of the operation. The joint C2 system should be supported by a strong communication and information architecture at the appropriate classification level. Effective communications and information systems (CIS) support is fundamental to the success of any campaign or operation. Timely deployment and appropriate establishment of a robust CIS capability is a decisive factor for successful deployed operations. It is imperative that secure, interoperable, and deployable CIS assets are available at all levels of command in the JFAO.

3.13   **Managing the Operational Environment.** Managing the operational environment, or battlespace management, is a command function that facilitates own force operational freedom of action, whilst denying the same to the adversary. It includes operational management, battle rhythm, shared situational awareness, understanding, and managing important relationships.

3.14   **Control and Coordination Measures.** The joint commander establishes various movement and manoeuvre control measures, and airspace coordination measures, to facilitate effective joint operations. These measures may include, but are not limited to, boundaries, phase lines, objectives, air defence areas,

operational areas, submarine operating patrol areas, no-fire areas, and coordinating altitudes to deconflict air operations.

Planning

3.15   In order to prepare for and conduct military operations, it is necessary to develop operation plans, which address all relevant factors applicable to the efficient and successful conduct of an operation. During joint operations the integration of numerous planning cycles at various levels requires careful coordination. The purpose of joint planning is to produce a coherent view of the situation, based on expertise from a range of military and non-military disciplines. From this coherent view, the military role in achieving military objectives can be identified, and plans produced that are coordinated with other instruments of power.

Legal Advice

3.16   New Zealand has an obligation under international law to provide legal advisers at every appropriate level of command. Legal advice is required for the planning and conduct of all campaigns or joint operations. This is to ensure that all NZDF operations are justifiable and conform to a legal framework based on international, domestic and, if appropriate, host-nation law.

3.17   **Law of Armed Conflict.** Whilst the legal basis for an operation will be mission-specific, there are aspects of the legal framework that will be similar from one operation to the next. The Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) applies in situations of armed conflict and consists of treaty law and customary international law. It seeks to:

- reduce as much as possible the suffering, loss, and damage caused by armed conflict

- facilitate the restoration of peace

- regulate the means and methods of warfare

- protect persons who do not take a direct part in the conflict and in particular safeguard the fundamental rights of:

- the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked
- persons who are deprived of their liberty as a result of armed conflict, particularly prisoners of war (PW), detained personnel, internees and detainees civilians.

3.18   LOAC's detailed provisions are grounded in the principles of military necessity, humanity, distinction, proportionality, and non-discrimination. Commanders bear a responsibility to plan and conduct operations in accordance with the LOAC and to ensure their subordinates' compliance with the LOAC. In fulfilling this requirement, joint commanders will be assisted by their legal staff.

3.19   **Rules of Engagement.** The use of force during operations will generally be governed by rules of engagement (ROE) that reflect political, operational, and legal requirements. ROE are issued at the highest level of military command and are approved at the highest level of government. ROE are dynamic, differing from operation to operation, and may even be altered as an operation evolves. Compliance with ROE does not of itself ensure legality. All members of the NZDF are individually responsible for complying with the law. Furthermore commanders at all levels are legally responsible for ensuring that their subordinates' actions comply with the law.

3.20   When the NZDF contributes to multinational operations, the ROE of the lead nation are usually proposed for use. International organisations such as the United Nations (UN) may also issue ROE. The NZDF may adopt these ROE, depending on the political and operational acceptability and lawfulness of the use of force. If NZDF ROE conflict with those of another nation or organisation, NZDF ROE prevail. Commanders must understand that in multinational operations, interpretations of ROE may differ between states. These different interpretations can have constraints on action which are equally important to understand. For further information on ROE, see NZDDP–06.1 *Rules of Engagement*.

3.21   **Legal Considerations for a Joint Task Force Commander.** All military operations must be conducted within a legal framework. The laws that apply will vary depending on the nature of the operation. Failure to comply with the law, or even perceived failure, can significantly undermine an operation. It may also entail individual criminal responsibility. Considerations for a joint task force (JTF) commander will likely involve some of the specific factors outline below.

- A JTF commander must understand the legal responsibilities and obligations inherent in command.

- A JTF commander must ensure that all persons under their command understand their legal responsibilities and obligations, and are trained on the LOAC and relevant ROE.

- All JTF commanders have a further duty to ensure compliance with the law and observance of the ROE by exercising command authority over their subordinates, and may be individually criminally responsible for any failure to do so.

- In a multinational context, a JTF commander must consider the differing national policy positions and legal obligations of respective national contingents. National participation in the operation may be predicated upon certain conditions and national ROE may differ.

- Any suspected unlawful activity should be investigated and, where appropriate, punished. Such activity must be reported immediately.

Political and Policy Advice

3.22   In addition to interacting with international political leaders and diplomats, a joint commander requires an intimate knowledge of the political situation regionally and within the JFAO. The commander's decisions will also be framed by New Zealand Government policy. On all campaigns and operations, the joint commander's command directive will provide basic political guidance. For operations that are short-term or that require an immediate response, it is unlikely that a political advisor would be appointed. On long-term campaigns and operations however, the joint commander may be assisted and advised on political

issues by an advisor from either the Ministry of Defence (MoD) or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT). If this is unfeasible, the joint commander is expected to liaise with the New Zealand diplomatic post in the region, for political and diplomatic advice.

Language and Regional Expertise

3.23   Language skills and regional knowledge are crucial warfighting skills that are integral to joint operations. Deployed joint forces must be capable of understanding and effectively communicating with native populations, local and national government officials, and coalition partners. This force-multiplying capability has the potential to save lives and is integral to successful mission accomplishment.

Operational Intelligence

3.24   Intelligence is an essential capability for all military operations. It provides a timely and accurate warning of developing crises and is the starting point for all operational planning. Intelligence informs almost every area of the commander's decision-making process, and it makes a major contribution to their assessment of how and when they will achieve their end-state.

3.25   Operational intelligence (OPINT) should provide commanders, their staff, and their force elements with a coherent and full understanding of the human terrain, including the adversary and of the operational environment, in order that they may plan and execute operations with the benefit of the most timely and

Figure 3-2: Regional knowledge is a crucial warfighting skill that is integral to joint operations.

relevant information and intelligence to hand. In addition to supporting the military appreciation and decision-making process, intelligence acts as a key enabler for the operations support activities.

3.26   OPINT focuses on two overlapping and complementary subjects: the human terrain and the operational environment.

3.27   Some of the information required for the human terrain consists of:

- characteristics

- culture

- values

- beliefs

- capabilities

- location

- intention of adversaries.

3.28   The operational environment will take into account (but not limited to) the following elements:

- geography

- climate

- weather

- demography.

3.29   Intelligence helps to identify relevant and attainable military objectives by producing estimates of adversary capability, intent, and exploitable vulnerabilities. In drawing in all available and appropriate providers of information, a customised intelligence architecture will be constructed to fulfil the joint commander's intelligence requirements.

3.30   **Human Terrain.** It is important to examine all aspects of the human terrain, and to avoid only focusing on the obvious and different aspects of the group. Cultural practices are the things that are immediately observable in a society, such as people's style of dress, greetings and rituals, flags and other symbols. On an individual level, cultural practices manifest themselves

in a person's behaviour. However, to understand the human terrain, we need to look beyond the immediately observable cultural practices to examine what drives or underlies these practices. These social structures are the normally invisible concepts and institutions that organise society.

3.31   **Joint Force Area of Operations.** As the operation unfolds, the joint commander requires as accurate a picture of the JFAO as possible. But just as the commander seeks this advantage, so too does the adversary. As such, maintaining information superiority gives the joint commander a critical edge.

3.32   Environmental data will include:

- meteorology — for example weather and climate,

- oceanography and hydrography — for example sea bed, beach gradients

- geography — for example terrain and vegetation

- ephemeris — for example sunrise and sunset, moonlight, phase

- imagery.

3.33   Where data is lacking, this will feature early as commander's critical information requirements. The commander's outline course of action and intent will need to be clear in the mind of the staff tasked with obtaining, analysing, and compiling the detail in order to correctly focus staff effort.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

3.34   Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) is the coordinated and integrated acquisition, processing and provision of timely, accurate, relevant, coherent, and assured information and intelligence to support effective decision-making. The effective conduct of ISR requires the collection of information from a wide range of sources and agencies, and its subsequent interpretation to inform key decision-makers in the intelligence cycle. This is achieved through the close coordination of assets and the delegation of control

of these assets to an appropriate level of command. The coordination of scarce ISR assets is a complex and multidimensional activity that requires disciplined tasking.

3.35   Surveillance and reconnaissance assets perform much of the collection effort. To implement collection, these assets need to be integrated into the collection plan and then into operational planning and execution. Whereas direction, processing, and dissemination are largely conducted by joint intelligence staff (J25), collection requires the coordinated efforts of sources and agencies, not all of which are internal to the JTF. This results in the need for a customised ISR architecture. Whilst the J2 branch (Intelligence) is ultimately responsible for designing the collection plan, it has no tasking authority over most sources

and agencies who actually conduct the information gathering process. This has led to the emergence of the ISR process, which operates alongside the intelligence cycle.

3.36   The aim of ISR is to coordinate the requirements of the demanders of information (i.e. commanders) with the operational capabilities and tasking of the providers of that information (i.e. surveillance and reconnaissance assets). ISR draws together the three elements of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance into a coherent whole, providing a framework for selecting, tasking, and coordinating the collection assets. At the same time, it provides the links through which time-sensitive information and intelligence can be relayed, direct from the surveillance or reconnaissance system, to those assets that can make immediate use of it.

Figure 3-3: A Royal New Zealand Air Force P–3K2 Orion undertakes a surveillance mission.

> **Key Term**
>
> **Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance**
>
> Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) is the coordinated and integrated acquisition, processing, and provision of timely, accurate, relevant, coherent, and assured information, and intelligence to support effective decision-making.

Mounting Operations

3.37   Mounting is defined as all preparations of forces made in anticipation of an operation. Mounting operations include assembly and maintenance in a mounting area, preparation, movement to loading points, and subsequent embarkation onto ships, craft, or aircraft as appropriate. Each operation will have a nominated mounting authority responsible for ensuring assigned forces are at the required level of capability specified to meet the needs of the operational commander. For more detail on mounting operations see the NZDF-approved ADDP–4.4 *Movements and Transport* and its New Zealand Supplement.

Movement

3.38   Movement aims to position or dispose joint forces in the best possible position for manoeuvre to commence. Movement is classified as either tactical or administrative.

3.39   **Tactical Movement.** Tactical movement involves the deployment of forces into, or within, an environment where the prime determinant is battle readiness. It is

Figure 3-4: New Zealand Defence Force personnel arrive in Bamiyan province Afghanistan.

normally executed under tactical control, and aims to minimise the likelihood of loss in high-risk environments. Its outcomes are:

- the maximum readiness levels of forces during debarkation, prepared for immediate manoeuvre against an adversary

- the movement of forces within and between tactical areas of responsibility.

3.40   **Administrative Movement.** Administrative movement involves pre-positioning the maximum combat and combat support capability in the time available and within the constraints of lift capacity. It is normally executed under operational control, and in a low-risk environment, with efficiency as a key determinant. Its outcomes are:

- the pre-positioning of forces in a JFAO in preparation for conflict

- the rotation of NZDF force elements during an operation

- the redeployment of forces between JFAOs

- the maximum utilisation of all available resources within operational constraints.

3.41   Movement is further categorised by mode of transport — surface, air, or sea. Each has its advantages and disadvantages, and the mode of transport used will depend on such factors as speed, cost, security, and capacity.

Manoeuvre

3.42   Manoeuvre is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to secure or retain positional advantage, usually in order to threaten or apply force. Through manoeuvre, the joint commander can concentrate forces at decisive point (DPs) to achieve surprise, psychological shock, and physical momentum. Effective manoeuvre keeps the enemy off balance and thus also protects the friendly force. It contributes considerably to exploiting success, preserving freedom of action, and reducing vulnerability by continually posing new problems for the enemy. Manoeuvre enables a small force to achieve decisive superiority at the necessary time and place.

3.43   At all levels of war, successful manoeuvre requires not only fire and movement, but also agility and versatility of thought, plans, operations, and organisations. It requires designating and then, if necessary, shifting the main effort and applying principles of mass and economy of force.

- **Strategic Level.** At the strategic level, manoeuvre should place forces in an advantageous position to begin the phases of an operation or campaign.

- **Operational Level.** Operational manoeuvre targets the adversary's critical vulnerabilities and centre of gravity (GoG), aiming to reduce the amount of fighting needed to achieve the operational end-state.

- **Tactical Level.** Tactical manoeuvre aims to give the joint commander a decisive combat advantage before battle is joined.

Sustainment

3.44   Sustainment is the provision of logistics, including personnel support and the CIS needed to maintain and prolong operations until military objectives are achieved. Sustainment planning considerations include distance, destination, demand, duration, threat levels, available resources, priorities, and risk. Sustainment of a force also depends on the force's ability to restore itself through regeneration, reconstitution and rehabilitation, and on the ability of command to monitor the flow of resources. Sustainability, as distinct from sustainment, is the ability of the logistic system to maintain support to the entire force throughout the duration of an operation.

3.45   **Logistics.** Logistic support is part of overall capability support, and is essential for the deployment and redeployment of a force, and for the sustainment of operations. The support of operations requires a logistic network that draws resources from national and international support bases, and positions them to meet the supported force's needs. This type of support is usually short-term, and is focused on supporting forces tasked with specific outcomes.

Figure 3-5: Tactical Manoeuvre is designed to give a Joint Commander a decisive combat advantage.

Figure 3-6: Logistic Support is essential for the deployment of a force and the sustainment of operations.

3.46   The nature of in-theatre logistics is continually evolving, largely because there is no longer a clear forward edge of the battle area and operations tend to be distributed. As a result, logistics is no longer a function that operates predominantly in the rear, and personnel are required to be more combative than before. Combat Service Support (CSS) and deployed Maritime and Air Logistics force elements must be able to operate more autonomously in support of distributed operations, whilst maintaining strong links to the network from which supplies are drawn.

Key Terms

Manoeuvre

Manoeuvre is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to secure or retain positional advantage, usually in order to threaten or apply force. Effective manoeuvre keeps the enemy off balance and thus also protects the friendly force.

Sustainment

Sustainment is the provision of logistics, including personnel support and the CIS needed to maintain and prolong operations until military objectives are achieved.

3.47   Logistics cuts across a wide variety of discrete activities to achieve a common purpose. Because logistics encompasses a wide range of support activities that go into providing logistic outputs, logistic support requirements are normally broken down into six broad functional areas, allowing us to understand, organise, and execute logistics.

- **Supply.** Supply is the acquisition, management, reception, storage, and issue of materiel required by the operating forces to equip and sustain the force. The supply function includes requirements determination, procurement, contracting, provisioning, warehousing, inventory management, issuing, receipting, and disposal.

- **Transport and Movement.** Transport and movement includes the movement of units, personnel, equipment, and supplies. It is essentially the support needed to put sustainability assets (personnel and

materiel) in the right place at the right time, in order to commence and maintain operations.

- **Equipment Maintenance and Engineering.** Equipment maintenance and engineering includes the design, construction, test and evaluation, and maintenance of equipment (especially platforms and combat systems), in order to assure technical integrity. It also includes the actions taken to ensure that materiel and equipment are in a serviceable condition, to return them to service or to update and upgrade their capability.

- **Infrastructure Maintenance and Engineering.** Infrastructure maintenance and engineering include the construction, damage repair, operation, and maintenance of roads and facilities, and logistics enhancements required to sustain military operations.

- **Personnel Support Services.** Personnel support services consist of the action, functions, and services undertaken in the generation of a deployable force and the personnel services provided to that force in a theatre of operations. These services include manning, pay, allowances, welfare, honours, and awards. For further information, see NZDDP–1.0 *Personnel* (2nd Edition).

- **Health Support.** Health support helps to ensure that members of New Zealand's armed forces are fit for military employment, protected from avoidable hazards to their health, and provided with effective and efficient healthcare. Health support services contribute to the effectiveness, readiness, and morale of NZDF force elements. This functional area includes services such as dental services; casualty collection, treatment and temporary holding; health protection services; and preventive healthcare. For more information on health services, refer to NZDDP–1.0 *Personnel* (2nd Edition).

Communications and Information Systems

3.48   CIS are an enabler for military operations, providing joint commanders at all levels with the means to exercise C2, and disseminate vital information. CIS enhance shared situational awareness, which in turn

Figure 3-7: Communications systems help to disseminate vital information for better decision-making.

facilitates better and faster decision-making. CIS should therefore be robust and the best available. For more information, see DFO 101 Defence Force Orders for *Communications and Information Systems* and DFO 102 Defence Force Orders for *Use of NZDF Communications and Information Systems*.

3.49   Communications systems help to disseminate vital information for information management. Decision superiority relies on information management, which in turn depends on effective CIS. Information management is a staff function and one of the keys to effective C2. It involves the transmission, acquisition, storage, access, manipulation, dissemination, presentation, and re-use of information. Without it, critical information can be lost, staff can be overloaded by data, and information security becomes vulnerable.

Integrated Mission Support

3.50   Integrated mission support is customised (by equipment type, operation, and theatre) packages of information that are largely, but not exclusively, electronic. Integrated mission support packages are prepared by a variety of agencies, and give the information essential for the execution of tasks, particularly for maritime and air platforms. Examples include threat profiles, terrain data, and aerial photographs. Although integrated mission support appears to be a tactical-level issue, it is critical to the effectiveness of certain strategic assets, such as ISR platforms and special operations forces. Because such assets are also high value assets, it is natural that command will want to be informed about any restrictions in their employment.

Budgets and Accounting

3.51   Effective acquisition of financial resources is critical to the success of any campaign or operation. It is important to ensure adequate provision of financial resources before the mission commences. Budgets should be devised, credits allocated, and a financial element in the organisation inserted to handle this part of the operation and provide advice to the joint commander. Paving the way with the acquisition of financial resources and a staff to handle related issues will ensure effective support of the operation.

Joint Operations Support Activities

3.52   The purpose of joint operations support activities is principally to influence the complete range of adversary, neutral, and friendly target audiences to adopt an attitude or course of action that supports the joint commander's objectives. With regard to the adversary, targets in this context can, within legal and political constraints, range from physical structures and capabilities to more cognitive aspects such as attitude and behaviour.

3.53   Whilst some of the support activities, such as information operations, civil-military operations (CMO), media operations, deliberate targeting and joint fires, combine to secure effects, others such as force protection seek to ensure that the endeavours of the JTF are neither lessened nor negated.

Information Operations

3.54   Information operations are defined as 'the coordination of information effects to influence the decision-making and actions of a target audience and to protect and enhance our decision-making and actions in support of national interests.' Information underpins all operational and management functions within the NZDF. The ability to exploit information is vital for rapid, superior decision-making, and for creating and managing perceptions in support of the mission. One key aspect of information operations is support to the

less-lethal aspect of offensive action.

3.55   Information operations comprise three interrelated activities.

- **Influence.** Influence activities focus on changing or reinforcing the perceptions and attitudes of adversaries, potential adversaries, community leaders, the local population, government representatives, and international audiences.

- **Information Protection.** Information protection activities focus on preserving the NZDF's freedom of manoeuvre in the information environment, by defending the data and information that support decision-makers and the decision-making process.

- **Counter-command.** Counter-command activities focus on attacking the data and information that support adversaries and potential adversaries, and those C2, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition systems that use information to support a decision-making process.

3.56   Information operations are not a capability in their own right, but rather a collection of elements coordinated and integrated to impact on the decision-making of the target audience and protect our own decision-making. A target audience analysis (TAA) carefully examines the identified groups and individuals for their ability to be influenced. This analysis provides insights as to possible ways to get the target audience to change its behaviours to ones that are more favourable to the joint force.

3.57   Information operations objectives can be reached by the coordination of the military capabilities, tools, and techniques that affect, influence, or protect information and information systems. The use of force (coercion) may also combine with those means, for example by delivery of specifically targeted fires. There are several capabilities, tools, and techniques, or 'key elements' that form the basis of most information operations activity. These key elements are considered in the following paragraphs; however it should be noted that their function is not limited to information operations.

Figure 3-8: Effective civil-military operations require good relations to be established with the civilian population.

Key Term

Target Audience

An individual or group selected for influence.

Civil-military Operations

3.58   CMO denote the activities whose aim is to establish and maintain the full cooperation of the civilian population and civil authorities, in order to create conditions that offer the joint commander the greatest possible moral, material, environmental, and tactical advantages. These activities should also include liaison with other contributors such as non-governmental organisations (NGO) and international organisations (IO). Implicit in this aim is the denial of such advantages to an adversary. Through establishing good relations with the civilian population, the joint force may gain access to resources and information. A positive relationship with the civil authority may provide security in certain areas — it may be impossible to gain full freedom of action and movement without the cooperation.

3.59   The long-term purpose of CMO is to create and sustain conditions that will support the achievement of a lasting solution to the crisis. Although CMO may be undertaken using JTF resources alone, such operations will benefit from the specialist advice and coordination provided by a comprehensive approach.

Media Operations

3.60   While a distinction is made at the strategic level between media operations and information operations, at the operational level they become more intertwined, because short-term information operations messages rely on dissemination by all available means. The role of media operations is to increase knowledge and promote further understanding of the mission among all key audiences, both within and beyond the JFAO. How media operations are handled has a fundamental impact on how the operation is perceived globally, regionally, and in New Zealand. Furthermore, the maintenance of public support is vital if the JTF is to maintain freedom of movement and morale. Thus in times of tension and conflict, the NZDF must balance military secrecy and operations security with the need for openness and accountability.

3.61   Influencing the media is difficult to achieve, as the media can neither be shaped nor exploited, and a wholly protective approach would be regarded as defensive. Successful media operations succeed largely on personal relationships and the ability to grant access, rather than rigid adherence to procedural guidelines. In order to work effectively with the media, it is important to understand their differing agendas and requirements. Inadequate planning to accommodate news media will not stop them from reporting, and could prejudice mission success. The media's interest will most likely ebb and flow in response to operational tempo and the general situation.

3.62   There are three major considerations in media operations.

- Information Release. Prior to formal political approval to execute an operation, an information

Figure 3-9: News media need and expect access to New Zealand Defence Force operations in order to report fully.

release will be retained at the national strategic level. During initial operational planning, COMJFNZ should anticipate a passive media operations policy at the operational level, and possibly up to approval for mission execution. Following political approval to execute an operation, an active media operations policy for all levels of the operation should be considered.

- **Media Operations Guidance.** The development and dissemination of a media operations strategy, in consultation with the Government and other key stakeholders, is a means to ensure the consistency of policy and media operations messages across all participating government agencies. The media operations strategy is developed by the Defence Communications Group, and signed off by COMJFNZ. The joint commander should use the overarching information strategy to develop more detailed directives and instructions, as well as media operation plans. The joint commander should draft appropriate statements and identify issues of interest to external and internal audiences.

- **News Media Access.** Media need and expect access to operations in order to report fully. A media cell should be established in the JFAO to manage news, deal with incidents, engage the media, and conduct rebuttal, if necessary. To develop a sound relationship, the joint commander should fully support the access of news media to widely dispersed force elements. These force elements should be staffed with personnel trained in media operations, as all levels of the NZDF should be ready to deal with detailed information requests without compromising operations security. This balance between an active media operations policy and operations security should be managed by the joint commander. Any decision to deny the media access should be taken in full knowledge of the difficulty of enforcing this decision and the attention that it will attract.

Force Protection

3.63   Force protection is a broad concept that seeks to minimise the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, equipment, and operations, whilst preserving freedom of action and the operational effectiveness of the force. Force protection should not be viewed as a totally defensive set of actions; rather it should be conducted in a way that directly contributes to the physical integrity and moral well-being of the fighting force. Force protection is achieved through the application of multi-layered active and passive measures throughout the operational environment, which protect the capability of the force from operational, environmental, and occupational threats.

3.64   Force protection should be an integral part of operation planning and execution. Force protection planning does not stop with the initial plan; it is on-going and needs to be constantly reviewed and updated as threats evolve. The key to efficient force protection is effective management of any identified risks. Over-protection can divert needed resources from achieving the aim, while under-protection can result in the unnecessary loss of capability.

3.65   **Threats.** Threats are usually articulated through comprehensive and detailed intelligence and threat assessments that guide the implementation of force protection measures. In addition to operational threats such as physical, electronic, or chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) attack and hostile ISR, a range of environmental and occupational threats must be addressed. Intelligence and threat assessments are constantly reviewed and updated to inform the planning and implementation of appropriate force protection measures and mitigation strategies.

3.66   **Responsibilities.** All assigned force elements are likely to have some force protection responsibilities. The command of force protection assets and tasking is exercised using established C2 arrangements. The overall responsibility for force protection planning and implementation rests with commanders at all levels. The joint commander will set the overarching force protection policy for the force, which is coordinated by the joint operations staff (J3).

3.67   **Force Protection Measures.** Figure 3-10 outlines some of the key elements of force protection. There are a number of wide-ranging means to achieve force protection, which are described in the following

paragraphs. Some of these require significant oversight and coordination by commanders and/or force protection staff to implement, while some only require the occasional injection to maintain a force-wide policy.

3.68 **Air Defence.** Air defence is all actions to negate or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air action. The NZDF may rely on coalition partners to provide some of the elements of air defence, which can include:

- surveillance and identification, including ship and land-based air defence and surveillance radars, over the horizon radars, and airborne early warning and control aircraft

- integrated and layered weapon systems, including fighter aircraft, ground-based air defence, and air defence ships

- command, control, and coordination

- an awareness of airpower capability, so that joint commanders can control the disposition of their forces to take advantage of terrain and other conditions.

3.69 **Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence.** CBRN defence seeks to protect personnel from the strategic, operational, tactical, physiological, and political impacts of the use of CBRN weapons. CBRN defence relies upon anticipating CBRN attack and the training and equipping of own forces. Forces prepared and able to survive and operate in a CBRN environment may reduce the adversary's incentive to employ such weapons. CBRN defence:

- minimises hazard effects

- maintains the extant operational and logistic capability

- provides for the rapid recovery of operational and logistic efficiency

- deters attacks on intentional industrial release by demonstrating a sound defensive capability

- actively targets the adversary's offensive CBRN capability by executing conventional attacks on their C2 systems, operational stockpiles, and delivery systems.


Figure 3-10: Elements of force protection.

3.70   **Security.** There are a number of security activities that contribute to effective force protection.

- **Operations Security.** Operations security is the process that gives an operation, exercise, or activity appropriate security, using passive or active means to deny an adversary knowledge of the dispositions, capabilities, and intentions of friendly forces. The operations security process commences from the beginning of planning and continues to the end of the operation. Operations security is linked categorically to the principle of need-to-know and is to be applied to all aspects of the operation.

- **Physical Security.** Physical security is that part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel, to prevent unauthorised access to equipment, installations, materiel, and documents, and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft.

3.71   **Friendly Fire Prevention.** Measures need to be implemented to eliminate deaths or injuries caused by friendly fire. It is a high priority, given the political imperative and the potentially devastating impact on public support and force morale. The prevention of friendly fire incidents are enabled by combat identification (combat ID) and good management of the operational environment.

- **Combat Identification.** Combat ID is critical to the elimination of fratricide. Its key elements are outlined below.

  - **Shared Situational Awareness.** This allows all friendly forces to know the location, intent, and constraints of all own forces, as well as those of all adversary and neutral forces. Shared situational awareness is a fundamental element of effectively managing the operational environment.

  - **Target Identification.** Target identification is the differentiation between friendly, adversary and neutral forces, personnel, and systems. Target identification measures, which are mostly electronic, need to be unambiguous, resistant to counter-measures and exploitation, and interoperable between all force elements.

  - **Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.** Adherence to robust tactics, techniques, and procedures

(TTP) underpins the human dimension of the employment of weapon systems in the operational environment. TTP should be robust enough to account for the possibility of a combat ID system failure, or to exploit the vulnerabilities of the adversary's combat ID system.

- **Managing the Operational Environment.** Management of the operational environment is based on the use of well-established procedures.

3.72   **Mine Awareness and Explosive Ordnance Disposal.** When dictated by the threat, all deployed personnel should receive mine, improvised explosive device (IED), and unexploded ordnance (UXO) awareness training as part of their pre-deployment training. In a JFAO, the joint commander needs to ensure that a current force-level policy on awareness training is enforced. Additionally, the coordination of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) needs to be managed to mitigate the threat from located mines, IEDs, and UXO.

3.73   **Countering Improvised Explosive Devices.** Countering the modern IED threat requires a fully integrated and systematic approach to attacking the IED system, as part of the wider operation, involving all elements of national power and the synchronisation of effort at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Countering the threat from IEDs involves two aspects:

- defensive, protective, and enabling measures, such as training and force protection, aiming to reduce vulnerability to the threat

- offensive measures attacking the adversary's critical vulnerabilities, aiming to reduce the threat.

3.74   Counter-IED capabilities may include:

- EOD

- technical intelligence

- electronic warfare

- forensic and bomb analysis

- biometrics capabilities.

3.75   Managing the above capabilities requires flexible C2 arrangements with counter-IED force elements.

3.76   **Joint Personnel Recovery.** Joint personnel recovery is the aggregation of military, civil, and political efforts to rescue, release, or recover personnel from permissive, uncertain, or hostile environments, whether they are captured, missing, or isolated. Joint personnel recovery is an important mechanism for the preservation of capability and the maintenance of morale and the will to fight. It is essential that all NZDF personnel have confidence in the likelihood of successful recovery following isolation.

3.77   **Force Health Protection.** Force health protection focuses on minimising the impact of operational, environmental, and occupational health threats to which members of the armed forces may be exposed during training and operations. In an operational environment, force health protection requires an active, integrated approach. Prevention measures should be part of the planning process for all operations, with threat assessment personnel being deployed as part of a reconnaissance mission or as early as possible after deployment. By rapidly identifying and minimising health threats, the NZDF can reduce casualties and maximise the operational effectiveness of deployed forces.

Key Term

Joint Personnel Recovery

Joint personnel recovery is the combination of military, civil, and political efforts to rescue, release, or recover personnel from uncertain or hostile environments, whether they are captured, missing, or isolated.

3.78   **Other Force Protection Considerations and Measures.** There are a number of other force protection measures and considerations, which include, but are not limited to those outlined below.

- **Environmental Considerations.** Environmental health is a discrete force protection consideration in operations. The aim of environmental health is to minimise the attrition of the force through disease and non-battle injuries. Key to environmental health is a health risk management plan. As a force protection issue, environmental health involves both medical and non-medical personnel. Environmental health can involve a wide range of activities, including specific environmental analysis (for example air/water/soil quality), taking appropriate measures to mitigate health risk, such as treating local water before use and the taking of anti-malarial drugs, and the use of personal protective equipment.

- **Occupational Considerations.** Road safety is an important force protection consideration and will often require compromise and/or prioritisation when balancing risk with the need to achieve the task. This is especially relevant in the conduct of deployment, movement, and resupply tasks. Driver training and licensing can help to mitigate this risk. Equally, the identification and control of general 'industrial' hazards such as fire, chemical spill, and ergonomic extremes is essential. This includes the provision of alarms, procedures, and incident management resources such as fire-fighting, all of which must be implemented within the force. Other factors such as electrical safety and general occupational health and safety should also be considered.

Real Life Example

Force Health Protection

In the year 2000, in East Timor, NZBATT 2 had only 10 cases of malaria out of 600 troops over a 6 month period. This was due to a suite of preventative measures being taken. These measures included pre-deployment training briefings, treating of clothing and bed netting with permethrin, using insect repellent, larvacides, base camp spraying, and removal of mosquito breeding sites. Another nationality, with a similar AO within East Timor did not practice these preventative measures. After 2 months a third of that force had succumbed to malaria, essentially unable to carry out its mission.

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Targeting and Joint Fires

3.79   Targeting and the joint fires process are two of the principle means by which the joint commander's objectives are achieved. At the strategic level, the principle purpose of joint fires and targeting will be to affect the adversary's will (normally aimed at the ruling elite), whilst at the operational level it will be to shape the operational environment prior to and during a campaign or operation. At the tactical level, the aim will be to support the manoeuvre of force elements, whilst reducing the adversary's ability to achieve its operational objectives. At the strategic and operational levels, the broad order of effects to be achieved needs to be determined (usually expressed in terms of commander's intent), in order to establish and coordinate the most appropriate action(s) to achieve the desired objectives.

3.80   The selection of targets should align with the objectives in the campaign or operation plan, to ensure that the application of force or non-destructive methods to achieve influence is both necessary and the most effective. Targets selected and approved must conform to the overall scheme of manoeuvre for the operation. Furthermore, the joint commander must ensure that the results of interdiction operations do not later hinder their own operations, for example the destruction of bridges on routes that will be needed for subsequent manoeuvre or the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

3.81   While all components are fully engaged in targeting to achieve coordination, ultimate responsibility for, and control of, joint fires will rest with the joint commander.

3.82   **Coordinating Joint Fires.** The joint commander will normally designate a main effort in order to concentrate forces. As circumstances change, so the main effort may shift. It is the speed and poise with which this can be achieved that is the essence of a successful joint campaign or operation. Generating a high tempo will, in itself, present opportunities for decisive action. To achieve this degree of tempo will require the synchronisation of joint fires at all levels.

3.83   Fire support coordination measures and their associated procedures are the measures employed by a commander within their AO to facilitate the rapid engagement of targets and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces. These coordination measures may also protect forces, populations, critical infrastructure, and sites of religious or cultural significance. The coordination of joint fires requires extensive CIS support augmented by liaison, to obtain approval as rapidly as possible and maintain tempo.

Figure 3-11: Joint Fires requires synchronisation at all levels.

CHAPTER 4:
FORMING THE FORCE

CONTENTS

Command and Control

4.01   From an operational perspective, there is no fundamental difference in the military command and control (C2) structure for any kind of operation or campaign. All operations will be met by a combination of New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) mission-tailored deployable and static assets, optimised for a specific operation. Figure 4-1 illustrates the possible command arrangements for an NZDF-led, multinational operation.

Levels of Command

4.02   The NZDF organise C2 across three levels: strategic, operational, and tactical. This provides a simple structure for the purposes of planning and execution. More often than not, levels of command may overlap as a result of a complex operational environment and multiple participants responsible to different capitals. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) operations in Afghanistan is an example where strategic, operational, and tactical command overlap due to the complexity of the operation. Dependant on your position, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) headquarters (HQ) was a strategic HQ for those within Afghanistan but referred to as the operational HQ from the perspective of NATO staff in Brunsum.

4.03   **Strategic Level.** At this level, NZDF forces are employed within a political-military framework endorsed by the Government and the Chief of Defence Force (CDF), in order to achieve the military strategic objectives and contribute to the national strategic objectives. CDF commands the armed forces at this level, through the Service chiefs. The Service chiefs in turn command their Services, and are responsible for raising, training, and maintaining forces to meet operational requirements.


Figure 4-1: Possible command and control arrangements for a New Zealand led multinational campaign/operation.

4.04   **Operational Level.** At this level, military operations are planned, conducted, sequenced, directed, and sustained in order to achieve the military objectives that support the political end-state. The Commander Joint Forces New Zealand (COMJFNZ) exercises operational command (OPCOM) over all assigned NZDF force elements that are deployed operationally, and is responsible to CDF. This is the highest level of operational command, and comes with the responsibility for deployments, sustainment, and recovery in the NZDF. COMJFNZ may delegate the operational control (OPCON) of these force elements to field commanders, as appropriate. During an operation, the COMJFNZ exercises their responsibilities through the NZDF's permanent, operational-level, joint force HQ, Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand (HQJFNZ).

4.05   The component commanders' primary responsibilities revolve around supporting the needs of COMJFNZ by providing forces for operations. They may be required to fulfil the role of Joint Task Force (JTF) commander, by commanding a New Zealand JTF deployed within New Zealand or overseas. The component commanders also have residual responsibilities to their respective Service chief for the raising, training, and maintaining force elements to the directed level of capability (DLOC). This is achieved through a series of directives, annual plans, mission essential tasks, budgets, and readiness training and exercises.

4.06   **Alternative Theatre Command Arrangement.** In exceptional circumstances the COMJFNZ may delegate some theatre-level C2 responsibilities to the deployed JTF commander and their supporting Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ). This arrangement affords greater flexibility to the JTFHQ to direct subordinate task groups operating at the tactical level, as well as liaison and coordination with the host-nation. The exact nature of these delegated responsibilities would be determined at the time.

4.07   **Tactical Level.** At the tactical level, NZDF operations are commanded by the JTF commander. The NZDF usually deploys a JTFHQ to command NZDF operations at the tactical level. JTFHQs are usually designed for C2 at the tactical level and will be task

tailored depending upon the nature of the operation or campaign. If New Zealand is contributing to, rather than leading, a multinational JTF, deployed NZDF force elements will likely be commanded by a foreign commander. Numerous other tactical-level commanders will exist subordinate to the JTF commander.

National Contingents

4.08   When the NZDF contributes a national contingent to a multinational operation led by another nation, it is unlikely that the NZDF would deploy a contingent HQ. Rather, the NZDF would deploy a number of staff officers, typically including an Senior National Officer (SNO), to work in the multinational HQ. The NZDF may also deploy a national command element (NCE) and a national support element (NSE) to support the SNO and the New Zealand contingent. Further detail on New Zealand national contingents can be found later in this chapter.

States of Command

4.09   There are different types of command authority, ranging from the highest – full command, to the lowest – tactical control. The different aspects of joint operations are commanded and controlled according to the following states of command. While summarised below, these states of command are covered in detail in NZDDP-00.1 *Command and Control* (2nd Ed).

4.10   **Full Command.** Full command covers every aspect of military operations and their administration. It exists only within a national force; no international force commander can exercise full command over another nation's force elements. Full command in the NZDF is exercised by CDF through the Service chiefs, who in turn exercise full command of their respective Service.

4.11   **National Command.** CDF further exercises national command over NZDF contingents, through COMJFNZ. This authority is exercised with the advice of a deployed SNO, who is typically based in an in-theatre HQ. The SNO represents New Zealand's national interests on operations and reports back to COMJFNZ on matters pertaining to deployed NZDF force elements.

4.12   **Operational Command.** The delegation of OPCOM authorises a commander to make a number of decisions without having to obtain prior approval from the commander holding full command. A commander assigned OPCOM (usually COMJFNZ) may:

- detail missions and tasks as appropriate

- reassign forces to another force

- allocate the separate use of components of assigned elements

- delegate OPCON, tactical command (TACOM) and/or tactical control (TACON) to a subordinate commander.

4.13   **Operational Control.** OPCON denotes a commander's authority to direct assigned forces to accomplish specific missions or tasks, usually limited by function, time, or location. A commander assigned OPCON cannot exceed the limits placed on the use of their assigned force, without reference to the delegating authority. In the NZDF, OPCON is typically allocated to a field commander — NZDF or otherwise — whilst COMJFNZ retains OPCOM.

4.14   **Tactical Command.** TACOM allows a commander to task forces to achieve an assigned mission, and to group and regroup those forces as required, within the commander's assigned force structure. TACOM is narrower in scope than OPCOM, but includes the authority to delegate or retain TACON.

4.15   **Tactical Control.** TACON is the detailed and normally local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks. TACON is usually delegated as a short-term authority when two or more force elements not under the same OPCON conduct tactical activity as a cohesive tactical element. A commander assigned TACON is responsible for the operational method used to achieve assigned missions or tasks.

Administrative Authorities

4.16   Full command is the only state of command that has an automatic administrative responsibility. Other states of command may include administrative authority if specified. Administrative authority permits the 'owner' to assign a force element to provide administrative support, in addition to its operational assignment. The administrative authorities used in the NZDF are administrative control, local administration, and technical control.

4.17   **Administrative Control.** Administrative control is the exercise of authority in administrative matters such as personnel management and supply services. Examples of New Zealand arrangements for administrative control are movement, daily maintenance, medical, and repair and recovery.

4.18   **Local Administration.** Local administration relates to the troops or operation in a specific area, and is exercised by a local commander. It involves:

- discipline

- local movement of materiel and personnel

- provision of services and administration

- allocation of ranges, training areas, and recreation facilities

- local road traffic control and movement

- security

- supervision and maintenance of safety

- relations with local civil authorities and the population

- allocation of any local pool of labour and unit transport

- allocation of local duties.

4.19   **Technical Control.** In an operational setting, technical control is generally the provision of specialist advice on technical operating and maintenance matters. Responsibility for technical control is normally retained in-Service; however on joint operations the division of responsibility may be specified in directives assigning forces and assets. This advice may not be modified, but may be rejected in part or in total by a commander, in consideration of operational factors.

Supported and Supporting Relationships

4.20   The supported/supporting inter-relationship principle allows the strengths and capabilities of the HQ and forces of the military command structure to complement each other to best overall effect. Within a joint force, components or elements can support or be supported for the achievement of a particular task.

4.21   Subordinate commanders may be supported and act as supporting commanders concurrently.

4.22   **Supported Commander.** The supported commander has the primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by either the strategic- or the operational-level command. In the context of joint operations planning, the supported commander prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to the requirements of the CDF. In the context of a support command arrangement, it is the supported commander who receives assistance or capabilities from another commander's force, and who is responsible for ensuring that the supporting commander understands the assistance required.

4.23   **Supporting Commander.** The supporting commander provides forces or capabilities to a supported commander and develops a supporting plan. In the context of a support command arrangement, the supporting commander aids, protects, complements, or sustains the supported commander's force and is responsible for providing the assistance required by the supported commander. More detail on this can be found in AJP–3(B) *Conduct of Operations*.

Methods of Command

4.24   The NZDF recognises two methods of command for joint operations: the direct method and the component method. For more information on the methods of command, see NZDDP–00.1 *Command and Control* (2nd Ed).

4.25   **Direct Method.** The direct method allows a commander of a joint force to directly exercise command over assigned forces, and is most commonly used in the NZDF.

4.26   **Component Method.** The component method is used when the scale and intensity of the operation increases significantly, and the span of command becomes too great for the effective use of the direct method. Under the component method of command, assigned forces are divided into components, each with their own commander, who issues orders consistent with the broad direction of COMJFNZ. The integration of components within a JTFHQ is considered later in this chapter.

Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand

4.27   HQJFNZ is the NZDF's permanent, operational-level, joint force HQ. It is under the command of COMJFNZ, who exercises command over all assigned and deployed NZDF force elements. Put simply, HQJFNZ is responsible for the sustainment of the NZDF's joint operational commitments. This comprises the resourcing, planning, and conduct of joint operations and campaigns at the operational level. HQJFNZ provides resources and sets operational objectives for the JTFHQ or subordinate commanders.

4.28   If New Zealand were to lead a multinational JTF, HQJFNZ would be the operational-level HQ, running the campaign or operation from New Zealand. The C2 of the other nations' forces would be assigned to COMJFNZ, who would then most likely delegate some of this authority (usually OPCON) to the JTF commander, for the use of these forces in-theatre. A number of multinational elements may be collocated in HQJFNZ, such as liaison officers, national contingent commanders, and/or SNOs, depending on the specifics of the operation. Alternatively, contributing nations may attach a full national contingent HQ to HQJFNZ.

A New Zealand-led Joint Task Force

4.29   The following section describes the design of a New Zealand JTFHQ, for a New Zealand-led, multinational force. If other government departments (OGD) are part of the deployed NZDF task force, then the force will be known as a Joint Inter-agency Task Force (JIATF) and the HQ would be titled a Joint Inter-agency Task Force Headquarters (JIATFHQ). A New Zealand stand-alone operation is considered in the following section.

Joint Task Force Headquarters Organisation and Staffing

4.30   **Location of the Joint Task Force Headquarters.** A JTF commander will exercise command from the place they feel best able to influence events. Usually this will be near the region in which operations are taking place, namely the joint force area of operations (JFAO). National contingent commanders from contributing nations may place themselves alongside the JTF commander in the JTFHQ/JIATF, or at HQJFNZ. The JTF commander will consider several factors in determining the optimum location of the HQ. These include:

- the nature of the operation

- the need to influence regional political leadership

- the ability to reach back to higher HQ, dependent on capacity and information management capability

- the protection of the HQ

Figure 4-2: Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand is an operational level headquarters.

- the need for routine contact with locally-based international, military, and non-governmental agencies

- the suitability of local infrastructure and facilities.

4.31   A JTFHQ may be afloat when the operation is essentially maritime or amphibious, or when infrastructure ashore is unsuitable. A JTFHQ may also be established afloat as a preliminary measure in advance of other elements of the JTF arriving and establishing a secure environment ashore.

Purpose of the Headquarters Staff

4.32   All activity across a joint force, including multinational operations, is undertaken on behalf of a joint commander. Staff effort is focused on four primary functions:

- **Integration.** The staff, through the Chief of Staff (COS), actively promotes integration. Permanently assigned HQ staff has a particular responsibility for instilling unity of effort in multinational and augmentation staff.

- **Planning.** Although planning is primarily the domain of the plans branch (J5), the entire staff has a planning responsibility, either by directly assisting in the formation and development of the operation or campaign plan, or by conducting specialist planning within their discrete areas of responsibility.

- **Monitoring and Coordination.** Whilst keeping higher and parallel HQ informed of events, the staff monitors the implementation of orders and provides feedback to the joint commander for timely decision-making and planning. The staff then produces and disseminates the necessary coordination measures, normally in the form of orders and instructions, for the execution of the operation.

- **Decision-making.** A joint commander is not normally the sole decision-maker in the HQ. Delegation of authority and aspects of decision-making enable a joint commander to concentrate on operational decisions and be shielded from routine business. Staff must therefore have clear guidance about which decisions have been delegated, and to whom.

4.33   **Categories of Staff Officer.** A JTFHQ is comprised of five main types of staff officer.

- **Joint Staff Officers.** Joint staff officers form the core of the HQ and generally occupy the key positions. They are required to raise their understanding and involvement above tactical business, yet still appreciate the implications of developments at that level. By definition, these officers should be joint-trained, be experienced at working in an operational HQ, and preferably also have had multinational experience.

- **Multinational Staff Officers.** Multinational staff officers, sometimes termed 'embedded staff', have national and/or professional expertise within functional areas and are fully integrated into the HQ. They are not principally liaison officers for their nations, and should be able to play a full role in planning, integrating, coordinating, and decision-making.

- **Personal Staff.** The joint commander has a small number of personal staff who work exclusively for them. They may include a military assistant an aide de camp, and a personal assistant. Close protection and an interpreter are also likely requirements in a JTFHQ. The JTF Commander may establish a support group of subject matter experts who provide specialist political, media, and command advice. This small group will often develop the ideas and thoughts of the commander and improve the ability of the commander to manage large amounts of information and provide clear guidance to Branch staff.

- **Liaison Officers.** The contribution made by high-grade, well-motivated, and suitably empowered liaison officers from any components and contributing nations significantly enhances integration and coordination across the joint force. Interpreters may be essential in order to enable liaison officers to function effectively, particularly when working alongside host-nation organisations.

- **Component Staff.** If the situation requires it, environmental component staff may provide specialist advice within a joint HQ and facilitate liaison and coordination between the joint HQ and

their respective component. They also provide a surge capacity during busy periods.

4.34   **Chief of Staff.** The COS will be an experienced commander in their own right. With the understanding they possess, they will coordinate the work of the staff divisions by giving clear direction and setting priorities. The COS has particular responsibility for the following staff functions: operations, operations support, plans, intelligence and legal. The COS also coordinates and fuses the work of the wider HQ, assisted by the Deputy Chief of Staff. The COS generates vital esprit de corps by ensuring the HQ is a close-knit and effective team, not a large, impersonal, and dislocated organisation. In a multinational JTFHQ, this role is particularly important.

4.35   **Deputy Chief of Staff.** The deputy chief of staff coordinates the logistic and personnel functions within the joint HQ, and often a large proportion of the financial functions as well. Although normally of equivalent rank to the COS, the COS takes precedence. For practical purposes, the personnel, logistics, and finance branches will normally be collocated.

4.36   **Key Relationships.** Inter-personal relationships are a vital though largely intangible factor underpinning the morale component of fighting power. The necessary trust and understanding within the joint HQ can only be achieved through individuals with wide experience and proven competence. The COS occupies a central position within the joint HQ, ensuring a smooth campaign rhythm. Interaction by the COS with the joint force and empathy with staff are fundamental to successful integration and coordination across the force

4.37   **Joint Staff Designations.** An effective staff structure, with clear divisions of responsibility, is critical to achieving assigned tasks. The common joint staff system provides such structures, with its division of the joint staff from J0 to J9. The size and shape of each branch will be dictated by the requirements of the operation at hand, and may see branches amalgamated, subdivided, or left dormant. Although widespread in its usage across the western military community, it should be noted that the common joint staff system is structured slightly differently from country to country.[5]

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[5] Greater detail on staff responsibilities can be found in NZDDP-00.1 *Command and Control (2nd Ed).*

4.38   The divisions below represent the structure of the joint staff system in the NZDF.

- J0 — Command

- J1 — Personnel

- J2 — Intelligence

- J3 — Operations

- J4 — Logistics

- J5 — Planning

- J6 — Communications and information systems

- J7 — Training

- J8 — Evaluation and development

- J9 — Finance.

4.39   Much like the 'J' prefix of the joint staff system, component staff working in a joint HQ will instead be designated a prefix relating to their particular environment; be it M (maritime), L (land) or A (air).

Joint Task Force Headquarters Infrastructure

4.40   **Life Support.** The physical JTFHQ infrastructure needs to provide a secure and stable environment from where a commander can exercise command and the occupants can work safely in a degree of comfort. A deployed HQ has the same life support requirements as any other HQ; the staff must have somewhere to work, eat and sleep, and preferably it should be modular to enable adaptation. The fixed nature of strategic and operational communications infrastructure means it will probably not be mobile, in the sense of being able to move rapidly, but options should be planned for its relocation if necessary. For example, the transition from a ship-based to shore-based JTFHQ. It is likely that a dedicated force will be required for protection and security.

4.41   **Communications and Information Systems.** Communications and Information Systems (CIS) offer the principle means of managing, processing and storing information within a HQ, and passing information

between HQ. The NZDF is responsible for providing CIS support to any New Zealand JTFHQ, as well as communications to associated force elements. As a primary contributor to situational awareness, CIS effectiveness improves with a commonality of systems and applications. This aids tempo by speeding up the promulgation of decisions and the sharing of information. Nevertheless, CIS have their limitations, which include the following.

- The ready accessibility of information that CIS provide can lead to ever-greater demands for information from higher HQ. If unchecked, this can erode the principle of mission command.

- The need for robust information management to prevent staff being subject to information overload.

- The potential for equipment failure or compromise, necessitating robust, flexible CIS systems, and contingency plans.

- The passage of large amounts of data will be constrained by the bandwidth limitations of the bearer systems.

- Difficulties with CIS interoperating within the JTF, which can impact on situational awareness and information sharing within the JTF environment.

- In a dispersed environment, the ability to communicate to subordinate elements who may operate on different electronic systems and apply different security protocols because they are embedded in another nation's force.

Integrating Components into the Joint Task Force

4.42   If a campaign or operation is deemed sufficiently large and complex to require the component method of command, the JTF will be divided into components. Each of these components will be commanded by a component commander, who in turn is responsible to the JTF commander. The components may include maritime, land, air, special operations, and logistics forces, which each have different but complementary attributes that contribute to the combat power of a JTF. The specific nature of each component's

contribution is detailed in the respective single-Service or specialist doctrine publications. Optimum coordination of the different components is achieved through clearly established C2 procedures and a mutual understanding of one another's intentions, capabilities, and weaknesses.

4.43   **Location of the Component Commanders.** The component commanders should not be regarded as a 'set', but driven by the nature of the operation and the need for access to the joint commander. The degree of this access is largely tempered by the location of the component commanders, who must strike a balance between the advantages of face-to-face contact with the joint commander, and the need to exercise their tactical responsibilities, which may be somewhat detached from the joint commander.

4.44   To enable access, air and special operations component commanders generally favour collocation with the joint commander. For maritime, land, and logistics component commanders, the decision to collocate is not as clear-cut and depends entirely upon the circumstances. In general, land component commanders favour proximity to their manoeuvre forces. To mitigate the disadvantages of separation, commanders may use CIS enablers such as video teleconferencing. Nevertheless, such facilities cannot replace the value of personal contact between commanders.

4.45   **Component Representation in the Joint Task Force Headquarters.** Each component commander should be represented at key JTF planning, orders and coordination groups by staff with the authority to make decisions. The need for this representation is reduced if the component commanders are located in the JTFHQ/JIATFHQ. Component commanders separated from the JTFHQ/JIATFHQ will require carefully selected and capable representatives.

4.46   **Liaison Between Components.** Lateral liaison between components is as vital as liaison with the JTFHQ/JIATFHQ. This ensures that critical information is rapidly assessed and disseminated between supported and supporting commanders. Liaison officers are

essential for critical liaison, as technology can never fully bridge the gap. However, the requirement for a liaison officer must be carefully managed, as it can tie up a disproportionate number of high quality personnel.

Inter-agency Coordination

4.47　Increasingly, military operations must be coordinated and synchronised with the activities of other agencies. Combined planning at the commencement of operations ensures effective coordination between agencies. This is especially pertinent for humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and peace support operations. For example, in performing its duties, the NZDF's provincial reconstruction team in Afghanistan interacted with provincial, district, and local Afghan Government, the Afghan National Police, other nations' military forces, non-governmental organisations (NGO), the New Zealand Agency for International Development and a range of representatives from other nations.

4.48　In complex joint, inter-agency, and multinational (JIM) operations, there may be a requirement to develop cross-agency doctrine and procedures. Key joint HQ staff will be involved in establishing close relationships with other agencies, and in coordinating activities and resources. For example, legal staff, civil affairs staff, regional advisers, media operations staff, and other agency liaison officers are likely to have key supporting roles.

4.49　**A New Zealand Stand-alone Operation.** Almost all of the principles mentioned in this section apply in equal measure for a joint commander who commands a stand-alone, New Zealand national operation. However, significant differences are:

- international acceptance for military operations may be more difficult to achieve because there is no burden sharing

- although there will be no requirement to include multinational liaison officers, embedded staff or national component commanders and their HQ, a comprehensive approach would require additional representatives from other government agencies (OGA), specifically Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), Primary Industries, and Health.

- national joint operations should in theory be the least complex to conduct, and operational tempo may be enhanced, due to the streamlined nature of a uniquely New Zealand force

- this is the default model for joint force logistics, as the NZDF is responsible for its own logistic support

- the range of military capabilities readily available to the joint commander will be reduced, for example, due to New Zealand not having close air support (CAS), main battle tanks, or submarines.

4.50　The doctrinal C2 arrangements for a stand-alone NZDF operation are shown in Figure 4-3.


Figure 4-3: Command and control arrangements for a stand-alone New Zealand Defence Force operation.

New Zealand as a Contributing Nation

4.51   This section considers the situation where New Zealand elects to participate in an operation or campaign that it does not command. Under these circumstances, the NZDF will usually place an SNO into the coalition or United Nations (UN) JTFHQ. A significant proportion of the NZDF's recent and on-going operations comprise the deployment of contingents that range in size from six to over 600 personnel, to theatres ranging from the Solomon Islands, to Bosnia, to Afghanistan.

Command and Control Arrangements for New Zealand Defence Force Contingents

4.52   Based on the states of command covered earlier in this chapter, CDF has full command over all NZDF force elements, which includes an overarching responsibility for the logistics and administration of deployed NZDF contingents. Furthermore, CDF exercises national command over NZDF contingents through COMJFNZ and a deployed SNO.

4.53   CDF assigns OPCOM of an NZDF contingent to COMJFNZ, who will in turn delegate OPCON of that contingent to an in-theatre multinational/UN commander, or an out-of-theatre UN/multinational HQ. The exact nature of the OPCON authority is usually specified in an operational directive, and thus varies according to operation specifics. These C2 arrangements are illustrated in Figure 4-5.

4.54   **Senior National Officer.** In general terms, the role of the SNO is to integrate the New Zealand contingent into the multinational force, promoting cohesion, trust and understanding, while implementing New Zealand's own policies and caveats. The SNO also acts as a national figurehead and a conduit back to New Zealand on tactical incidents and operational developments, media issues, and matters of support to, and the force protection of, the New Zealand contingent.

4.55   The specific role of an SNO is outlined in an SNO directive issued to the individual in question. Usually issued by COMJFNZ, the SNO directive outlines responsibilities relevant to the national oversight of deployed NZDF force elements. This may include administrative responsibilities relating to the conduct, efficiency, and discipline of the deployed NZDF force elements. The SNO directive also obligates the SNO to advise HQJFNZ when those force elements are at risk of being used in a manner inconsistent with the New Zealand Government's directions.

4.56   An SNO's responsibilities may include the following:

- representation of NZDF interests

- establishing effective relationships with the in-theatre UN/coalition HQ

- the conduct and efficiency of all deployed NZDF personnel

- ensuring that all deployed NZDF personnel observe all lawful orders or instructions in the exercise of agreed roles and tasks

- consulting with HQJFNZ before complying with any order or instruction inconsistent with the purpose of posting or attaching NZDF personnel

- reporting to HQJFNZ in accordance with specified reporting procedures

- maintaining a continuous awareness and review of the activities and dispositions of all NZDF force elements

- attendance at post-activity debriefs at HQJFNZ.

4.57   **National Command Element.** On deployments of larger NZDF contingents, an NCE may be deployed. The NCE may be collocated with the multinational HQ, or may sit separately. The commanding officer of an NCE may exercise delegated national command over the NZDF contingent; however responsibility for operational planning and C2 rests with the commander of the multinational JTF. The NCE's functions and tasks vary according to operation specifics, in-theatre command arrangements, and the nature of the NZDF commitment. Common tasks include:

- assisting the SNO in ensuring NZDF force elements are used in accordance with national guidance

Figure 4-4: Command and control arrangements for a New Zealand Defence Force contingent deployed as part of a multinational operation.

- facilitating the rotation of NZDF contingents

- liaison with HQJFNZ and the multinational/UN HQ

- coordination of an in-theatre communications plan for NZDF force elements

- assisting with administrative arrangements for the NZDF contingent.

4.58　**National Support Element.** The command of national logistics on large NZDF contingent deployments is likely to be retained by the NZDF and exercised through an NSE. The NSE may be under HQJFNZ control in support of a number of in-theatre missions, or instead be deployed in direct support of an SNO. The NSE's functions will vary depending on the operation. The NSE does not command deployed NZDF logistic force elements, but rather coordinates with J4 branch at HQJFNZ to provide in- and near-theatre logistic support

and management to all in-theatre NZDF operations. The NSE primarily assists the SNO in providing supply, movements, maintenance, finance, administration, contract management, and logistic liaison.

4.59　**Communications and Information Systems.** As part of a multinational JTF, the NZDF is responsible for providing its own C2 CIS, to meet national requirements. At a minimum, this will include communications from New Zealand to the NCE and NSE. Consideration should also be given to the integration of NZDF CIS into the wider JTF CIS infrastructure. Common issues are procedures, equipment compatibility, and information management and security. Internal CIS support to the JTF command is usually the responsibility of the lead nation, however the NZDF should be prepared to meet some or all of its own requirements, as part of the JTF's wider CIS infrastructure.

Multinational Force Interoperability

4.60   NZDF operations are likely to be part of a multinational effort. The key to such operations is interoperability, which fosters effective operations across the multinational environment. Important aspects of interoperability are clear C2 arrangements, the early identification of constraints, and the specific tasks and activities that NZDF force elements may undertake. For detailed information on building and managing a military coalition, see the NZDF-approved ADDP–00.3 *Multinational Operations* (2nd Ed) and its New Zealand supplement.

4.61   **Command Arrangements.** Governments should agree on higher command arrangements and appointments at the national strategic, military strategic and operational levels, prior to operations commencing. Considerations may include national command authority, national commander, multinational force commander, operational command arrangements, and the role of COMJFNZ.

4.62   **Command Doctrine.** Many of New Zealand's potential military partners may adhere to command doctrine whose terminology is subtly different to that of New Zealand. For example, there are variations in terminology for operational authority, which further complicates multinational operations. These differences need to be identified and common definitions agreed between nations when forming a multinational force.

Integrating the Force

4.63   The command structures used by the NZDF to integrate JTFs for operations are often more complex than those permanently established to support the enduring task of raising, training, and sustaining forces. Due to the transitory nature of these command structures a common method is applied using task organisation structures.

4.64   The task organisation structure divides a JTF into subordinate task groups, task units, and task elements. Each entity is numbered, building on the immediate superior organisation's assigned number.

4.65   The numbering will usually be sequential. Task organisation is used by the United States, the United Kingdom and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Task organisation is detailed in Annex A.

Component Contributions

4.66   JTF components have different but complementary capabilities that contribute to overall combat power. For further guidance on component capabilities, refer to:

- NZDDP–3.12 — *Special Operations* (2nd Ed)
- NZDDP–4.0 — *Defence Logistics*
- Land Warfare Doctrine (LWD) 1 — *The Fundamentals of Land Warfare*
- AAP 1002 — *The Operational Air Doctrine Manual*.

ANNEX A:
TASK ORGANISATION

4.67   Task organisation is used by the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) to define the structure and command chains of assigned forces. Task organisation is used by Australia, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the United Kingdom, and the United States.

4.68   One or more task forces will be established as the situation dictates, with each task force being allocated a discrete number. The NZDF has been allocated task organisation numbers 650 to 654 inclusive, which are managed and allocated by the J5 branch at Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand (HQJFNZ). Each number refers to a geographical area:

- 650 — New Zealand

- 651 — South Pacific

- 652 — Asia

- 653 — Middle East

- 654 — Europe and South Africa.

4.69   Each task force is divided and subdivided into subordinate units or elements. These subordinate entities are called, in order from higher to lower, task groups (TG), task units (TU) and task elements (TE). Each component is numbered, building on the immediate superior organisation's assigned number. The numbering will usually be logical and sequential.

The numbering structure for a task force is explained below, using the example of OP ARIKI:

- TF xxx (for example Task Force (TF) 653 JFNZ)

- TG xxx.x (for example TG 653.01 OP ARIKI)

- TU xxx.x.x (for example TU 653.01.02 OP KEA)

- TE xxx.x.x.x (for example TE 653.01.02.01 OP RUA).

4.70   Command within a task organisation follows the numbering structure. Each component has its own commander, with their position in the chain of command corresponding to the organisational hierarchy. A commander's command position is designated by the element, unit, group, or force they command, for example Commander TF 650 (Comd TF 650), Commander TE 650.1.2.0 (CTE 650.1.2.0). Depending upon circumstances, a commander may be appointed to command more than one component within a task organisation. For example, the Maritime Component Commander appointed as Commander Task Group 650.1 (CTG 650.1) may also be appointed as the Commander of JTF 650 (Comd JTF 650). The component commanders, for the example of JTF 650, would be designated as in Figure 4.5.

4.71   A task force commander can form a subordinate TG to meet specific operational requirements within the joint force area of operations (JFAO). An example would be to establish a dedicated task group to meet an operational requirement, which utilised maritime patrol, surveillance and a quick response capability for a border protection task.

COMPONENT	COMMANDED BY	ABBREVIATED TITLE
Joint Task Force	Commander Joint Task Force	CJTF 650
Maritime	Commander Task Group 650.1	CTG 650.1
Land	Commander Task Group 650.2	CTG 650.2
Air	Commander Task Group 650.3	CTG 650.3
Special Ops	Commander Task Group 650.4	CTG 650.4
Logistics	Commander Task Group 650.5	CTG 650.5

Figure 4-5: Joint Task Force Component Designation.

4.72   The HQJFNZ or a delegated lead planning HQ will develop an appropriate task organisation for one or more TFs for each NZDF campaign or operation. Of note, some of the identified components within the structure might be dormant while other components may be active from the outset of operations. Dormant components may be included because of planned phases of the operation, or to provide flexibility to effect branches and sequels. The use of dormant components gives a time dimension to a task organisation. As a consequence, that can mean a specific NZDF unit may be included in multiple components within a published task organisation. This flexibility can only be effective if it is clear at all times which components are active and which are dormant.

4.73   There are no defined criteria for when one or a number of TFs should be established to support an NZDF activity. However, a TF is neither bound by geography (for example a JFAO) or by time (for example an operational phase). HQJFNZ will usually assign a single TF number for a specific, coherent series of activities, whether that is a single operation or campaign.

PART 2:

Campaigning

New Zealand **Defence Doctrine Publication**

CONTENTS

CHAPTER 5:

CAMPAIGN DESIGN — SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING

CONTENTS

Introduction

5.01   Situational understanding is defined as "knowledge and understanding of any current situation which promotes timely, relevant and accurate assessment of friendly, competitive and other operations within the operating environment in order to facilitate decision-making. An informational perspective and skill that fosters an ability to determine quickly the context and relevance of events that are unfolding.[6] "

5.02   It is no longer sufficient just to know about adversaries and their capabilities, although identifying, neutralising, or defeating adversaries remains the primary military focus. There is a need to understand the context, within which our adversaries operate, the institutions within which they live and detailed information about their cultures, fears, perceptions, motivations, and history. The human domain framework includes the totality of the human sphere of activity or knowledge, and concerns the interaction between humans and their broader environment. The focal point for understanding is the role of people as actors on the global stage in their identities as states, non-state, actors, populations, organisations, groups, or individuals. At the very least, actors must be considered within their cultural, institutional, technological, and physical environments to provide the context for developing understanding.

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[6]   Definition from United States Army Field Manual.

Key Terms

Situational Awareness

The understanding of the operational environment in the context of a commander's (or staff officer's) mission (or task).

In intelligence usage, situational awareness is the ability to identify trends and linkages over time, and to relate these to what is happening and what is not happening.

Situational Understanding

The accurate interpretation of a situation and the likely actions of groups and individuals within it. Awareness, analysis, knowledge, comprehension, and judgement facilitate understanding, which allows accurate and timely decision-making.

5.03   **The Importance of Insight and Foresight.** Whatever the context, understanding refers to the acquisition and development of knowledge to enable insight (knowing why something has happened or is happening) and foresight (being able to identify and anticipate what may happen). Developing understanding, see Figure 5-1, relies initially on gaining the situational awareness to identify the problem. Analysis of this situational awareness provides greater comprehension (insight) of the problem. Judgements based on this comprehension provide understanding of the problem (foresight). The distinction between situational awareness and understanding is the level of analysis and depth of comprehension that allows judgement to be applied effectively.


UNDERSTANDING

Situational Awareness + Analysis = Comprehension (Insight)

Comprehension + Judgement = Understanding (Foresight)

Figure 5-1: Achieving understanding.

Situational Understanding

Gaining Situational Understanding

5.04   Gaining situational understanding is critical to the conduct of campaigns and operations and therefore is a command responsibility. "Creating effective intelligence is an inherent and essential responsibility of command. Intelligence failures are failures of command — [just] as operations failures are command failures[7]."

5.05   Situational understanding is the basis for:

- anticipating how a conflict or crisis might evolve

- recognising the potential impact of specific actions and events

- identifying opportunities

- highlighting risks

- recognising and managing transitions.

5.06   Situational understanding has the following main aspects:

- understanding the operational area

- understanding the problem

- understanding partners

- understanding the mission

- balancing speed and completeness

- constant review, assessment and adaptation

- understanding intelligence collection disciplines to identify capability and intent.

Contributors to Situational Understanding

5.07   The process of achieving situational understanding is commanded by Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand (HQJFNZ). Commander Joint Forces New Zealand (COMJFNZ) commands this intelligence effort though the J2 (Intelligence) who coordinates with the NZDF Intelligence enterprise to achieve situational understanding. At this early stage the main contributors are intelligence staff from HQJFNZ, joint task force (JTF), subordinate formations, and the New Zealand intelligence community.

5.08   **Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.** The Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE) is central to gaining situational understanding. It requires analysis of the total operational environment, mission analysis, and a detailed analysis of the full range of possible adversary courses of action (COAs). The aim is to gain an understanding of all domains in the operating environment not just of the physical domains, but also of the non-physical domains, particularly the human domain. JIPOE products include intelligence and counterintelligence estimates and threat assessments. The format and level of detail in the JIPOE depends on the joint commander's priorities, staff resources, time available, and information gaps.

5.09   There are many other potentially significant contributors to gaining understanding, including:

- representatives from other New Zealand Government departments and agencies

- host-nation representatives

- subject matter experts including (academics)

- diplomatic representatives

- the media and other open sources

- non-government organisations (NGOs) and international organisations with representatives in a theatre of operations

- specialists such as Defence Technology Agency (Operations Analysis) staff.

- international defence intelligence community.

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[7]   Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor. *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan*. Jan 2010.

Understanding the Operational Area

5.10   Understanding the various joint force areas of operation which may be required, and their associated areas of influence and interest, is achieved through analysis of a range of factors. These include:

- military forces, particularly the adversary, including regular forces, militias and paramilitary groups and their capabilities, strengths, and vulnerabilities

- physical conditions, including terrain, infrastructure, and weather

- demographic, cultural, social, and economic conditions

- political conditions, including political parties, groups, alliances, antagonisms, rivalries, and external influences (such as migration and regional powers)

- communication and information systems

- political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information, physical terrain, and time (PMESII-PT) analysis

- areas, structures, capabilities, organisations, people, and events (ASCOPE) analysis.

5.11   Understanding the problem is also referred to as framing of the problem. Understanding includes causes, areas of competition and associated tensions, who is involved, their intentions, motivations, and agendas, and what is happening and why. Understanding the problem assists in visualising an effective COA to resolve it.

5.12   Understanding how the problem might evolve during the campaign is also important in order to identify potential threats and opportunities through the appropriate use and coordination of intelligence collection capabilities. This involves identifying favourable trends, which should be stabilised or reinforced, and unfavourable trends, which should be reversed, redirected, or transformed. Understanding the problem facilitates a realistic appreciation of campaign limitations.

Understanding Partners

5.13   Understanding multinational military and civilian partners is a critical aspect of overall situational understanding. The greater the complexity of a force, the greater the potential for misunderstandings. These may become points of friction if not identified and addressed, and may include:

- strengths, weaknesses, capabilities, organisation, values and attitudes of the various elements and assets, both military and non-military, which comprise the force

- command jurisdiction, which is the legal position of command by one national commander over military personnel of another nation

- caveats which restrict the employment of particular national forces; and types of tasks most effectively employed by particular assets and their potential tempo of operations.

Understanding the Mission

5.14   Understanding of the mission is derived through the mission analysis, the second step of the joint military appreciation process (JMAP). Mission Analysis is conducted to identify and confirm what must be accomplished, when, where, and most importantly, why. Mission Analysis ensures that the operational level joint commander and planning staff clearly understand the military strategic commander's intent.

5.15   Mission Analysis should identify the intended national and military strategic end-states and associated strategic objectives; essential, specified, and implied tasks; criteria for termination and transition; and any limitations, constraints, and restrictions on the conduct of the campaign and associated freedom of action resulting from legal, political, and military limitations imposed by the New Zealand or host-nation Government.

5.16   Key outputs of the mission analysis to support the development of the campaign plan are:

- mission statement and purpose, method, and end-state

- campaign objectives

- critical facts and assumptions

- limitations

- tasks

- adversary centre of gravity (CoG) and our own CoG

- associated critical factors.

5.17   Mission analysis is constant. As a campaign progresses, changes to campaign objectives and the campaign plan may become necessary due to changes in strategic aims and objectives and to critical vulnerabilities. Similarly, actions and changes at the tactical level may influence a campaign from below. Such changes, particularly in a campaign of long duration, may be in response to emerging conditions that did not exist at the outset. These conditions may result from success or failure and are to be expected.

Balance Between Speed and Completeness

5.18   Balance is necessary between the time potentially required to gain an ideal breadth and depth of situational understanding, and the need for action. In a crisis, success may depend on acting first and fastest. Too much time spent on analysis of intractable problems or cause and effect relationships may be time wasted. The intelligence solution should strive for 80 per cent on time as opposed to 100 per cent complete and late.

5.19   Timely action, accepting some risk, is preferable to waiting for complete situational understanding and potentially failing to act in time, or at all. Generally complete understanding of the problem will not be possible before commencement of operations. The role of commanders at all levels is the key to balancing speed and completeness, and acceptance of risk.

Constant Review, Assessment, and Adaptation

5.20   Constant review and assessment, enabling rapid recognition of changing conditions and subsequent adaptation is essential. In some situations,

review and assessment will indicate that the campaign is progressing as envisaged, that campaign and operations objectives are being achieved, and that no adjustments are necessary. In other situations, review and assessment may indicate that while campaign and operations objectives remain valid, the campaign and associated operations are not progressing as envisaged. In such situations, adjustments to the campaign plan may be necessary. This may involve significant changes.

5.21   In the worst case, review and assessment may indicate that campaign and operations objectives, or even the intended campaign end-state, are no longer relevant or valid. In such cases a fundamental revision and re-thinking of the problem is necessary. This process is sometimes referred to as 're-framing the problem'. A new campaign end-state and associated objectives may result, requiring a new campaign plan.

Assumptions

5.22   When situational understanding is incomplete, planning should be assumption based. As assumptions involve a degree of risk, they must be logical and realistic. Assumptions should be regularly tested throughout the campaign, usually at the completion of a phase or on a specific time basis.

5.23   Gaps in situational understanding and assumptions are the basis for determining Commander's Critical Information Requests (CCIR). CCIR are focused on what is not known and what must be confirmed. As the campaign progresses, CCIR will change as situational understanding increases.

Risk

5.24   The commander should closely manage risk within the operational environment. Regardless of the level of command, a commander should ensure that the staff is clear on the degree of risk that the commander is prepared to accept. Risk management (RM) is the systematic application of procedures and practices for analysing, assessing, controlling, and monitoring risk and is applied in parallel to planning at each stage

of joint operations planning. RM is the process that considers the risk, likelihood, and impact of occurrence. Rather than limiting activities through restrictive safety concerns, RM allows the full operational potential to be achieved through managing, rather than avoiding, risk.

5.25   It is that risks are identified as early as possible during the planning process so that they can be assessed and suitable mitigation can be identified. See the NZDF approved Australian Defence Force Publication (ADFP)–5.0.1 *Joint Military Appreciation Process* for further guidance on assessing and managing risk.

Strategic Guidance

5.26   Clear strategic guidance and frequent interaction between senior leaders and planners promote an early, shared understanding of the complex operational problem presented, strategic and military end-states, objectives, mission, planning assumptions, considerations, risks, and other key guidance factors. This facilitates responsive plan development and modification, resulting in constantly up-to-date plans.

5.27   Clear strategic guidance is a key to enabling the joint commander and planning staff achieving the required situational understanding necessary for effective campaign planning. In the New Zealand context the strategic guidance that commanders can expect that will help with achieving understanding and planning is listed below.

- Direction from the Prime Minster and Cabinet.

- New Zealand Defence policy.

- The National Security Structure.

- A cross government strategic political analysis of options for the resolution of a crisis. This analysis develops the necessary economic, diplomatic, and military objectives to be achieved. It would normally be lead by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) and developed by an inter-departmental working group. This is an evolving process.

- The National Aim defines the Government's 'ends'

to be achieved. The National Aim states the agreed national 'goal' or end-state and the supporting diplomatic, economic, and military objectives from the strategic political analysis. The National Aim is created collaboratively and approved by the Cabinet.

- The Strategic Military Estimate is a strategic level appreciation of the situation developed by the Strategic Planning Group (SPG). It is crafted to achieve the military objectives. The Strategic Military Estimate has a number of functions as listed below.

  - Developing a military strategy that balances the means (resources) and the ways (objectives). Chapter 1 described how the development of a military strategy is an integral part of a national or multinational strategic planning process. This military strategy involves the developing, deploying, sustaining, recovering, and redeploying military forces in a campaign or operation.

  - Developing the military's campaign end-state and supporting campaign objectives.

  - Developing military responses options (MRO) available to the NZDF that are capable of achieving the campaign end-state.

- NZDF Joint Service Plans — these are strategic level contingency plans

5.28   There are two important elements that need to be considered in developing a strategy. These are military feasibility and sustainability. Competing demands for military resources to meet concurrent operational commitments, should be prioritised and balanced accordingly, while military effectiveness should be maintained and developed to meet future requirements based upon the assessed strategic context and political intent.

5.29   Based upon the Prime Minister and Cabinet's intent, and drawing on the National Security Framework and Defence Policy, the Officials' Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination (ODESC) develops policy and national strategic objectives through a process of political strategic analysis, and provides guidance for national planning. These objectives are endorsed by Cabinet. National policy is then implemented through an integrated cross

Figure 5-2: Strategy formulation.

government strategy, coordinated through the ODESC or another cross government body as appropriate. Figure 5-2 illustrates the structure for formulating national strategy.

5.30 **Military Contribution to the National Strategic Aim.** The extent of the military contribution to meeting the national strategic aim is termed the military strategic end-state, expressed as a series of military strategic objectives. The Commander Joint Forces New Zealand (COMJFNZ) is responsible for a series of campaign objectives, expressed in terms of one or more effects, the achievement of which indicates the campaign end-state. The military contribution must accord with the diplomatic and economic contributions towards the same national strategic aim.

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Ambiguity and Incrementalism in Strategic Guidance

5.31   In reality, commanders should expect strategic direction to be developed incrementally. During initial crisis planning, this phenomenon can increase pressure significantly — both in terms of compressing military planning and preparation, and obliging military commanders to contend with ambiguity at the very time that they seek certainty and reassurance, in respect of the underlying purpose of any intervention (as well as the objectives they are assigned to achieve). That 'uncertainty will be the norm' is an important insight, and no amount of doctrine — however clear and seemingly logical — can entirely mitigate its disruptive impact. Understanding why political decision-making and strategic direction occur as they do, can however go some way to helping military commanders accommodate uncertainty. Indeed, one of the joint commander's responsibilities is to minimise the impact of changes in guidance by coordinating upwards, as well as downwards.

5.32   Decision-making horizons may be intentionally limited. Political leaders, for example, may wish to test reactions (both home and abroad) to the inference, formal announcement, or actual execution of a particular COA, before committing to some more comprehensive involvement. The decision – not to decide upon a definitive long term COA from the outset — also acknowledges the adaptive nature of crises, with intervention from any quarter inevitably altering the dynamics between actors, and hence the relevant objectives to be sought at any time throughout an intervention. Moreover, incremental decision-making may enable political leaders to manage risks with greater sophistication, making only those commitments that are necessary rather than merely expedient.

Figure 5-3: The Prime Minister and Cabinet are a key source of strategic guidance.

CHAPTER 6:
CAMPAIGN DESIGN — CAMPAIGN PLANNING AND PREPARATION

CONTENTS

CONTENTS (Cont.)

Introduction

6.01   A campaign plan is best described as a framework that guides and constrains the execution of operations to achieve the campaign objective. The measure of a good campaign plan is not whether execution occurs as planned, but whether the plan enables rapid, effective action in the face of unforeseen events to achieve the objectives.

6.02   The plans for any campaign or joint operation must be adaptable. A detailed plan which depends for success on forcing a pre-ordained sequence of causes and effects on an uncooperative situation, and which does not allow for ambiguity, uncertainty and change, is likely to fail.

Elements of Operational Design

6.03   The elements of operational design are the key factors which must be considered in campaign planning. They include:

- centres of gravity (CoGs)

- campaign end-state and campaign objectives

- decisive points (DPs)

- operation objectives

- effects

- lines of operation

- sequencing

- phasing

- main effort

- operational reach

- culmination

- risk

- contingencies

- criteria for success

- termination.

Campaign Planning Steps

6.04   Campaign planning progresses from the general to the particular through:

- developing the campaign approach

- developing the campaign concept (which includes defining the campaign lines of operation and developing the campaign scheme of manoeuvre and supporting schemes)

- developing the campaign plan.

The Campaign Approach

6.05   The campaign approach flows from situational understanding and broadly indicates how the campaign and associated operations are to be conducted. The campaign approach is the basis for the subsequent campaign concept of operations (CONOPS) and campaign plan.

6.06   The campaign approach is developed during the mission analysis stage of the joint military appreciation process (JMAP) and includes:

- commander's confirmation

- commander's visualisation

- commander's initial planning guidance.

Commander's Confirmation

6.07   Commander's confirmation involves confirming the adversary's and others' CoG and associated critical factors determined in the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE), our own CoG and associated critical factors, and the campaign end-state and objectives determined earlier during mission analysis.

6.08   **Centre of Gravity.** A CoG comprises characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. In some situations such as in counterinsurgency

it may be difficult or impossible to identify a CoG. Time and effort may be better spent in developing greater understanding of critical factors.

6.09 **Campaign End-state.** The campaign end-state is determined by Commander Joint Forces New Zealand (COMJFNZ) and must be clearly defined, decisive, and attainable. Selection and maintenance of the aim is the first principle of armed conflict. The single, unambiguous aim for campaigning is achievement of the campaign end-state.

6.10 **Campaign Objectives.** Campaign objectives are determined by COMJFNZ and are expressed in terms of one or more decisive conditions that need to be achieved. Decisive conditions may focus on will, understanding, and capabilities; be lasting or temporary; tangible or intangible, military or non-military; and involve physical or psychological factors.

Commander's Visualisation

6.11 The power of creative thought of joint commanders and their staff is fundamental to campaign planning. The joint commander must be able to visualise the broad sequence of events through to the campaign end-state. This visualisation is also referred to as the theory of change and is where the principles of armed conflict should initially be considered.

6.12 Commander's visualisation should determine what is possible, given factors such as terrain, weather, capabilities, resources, sustainability, risk, transitions and termination, and time. An important aspect is determining whether a direct approach or indirect approach, or a combination of both, is to be adopted in attacking the adversary's CoG. Other important considerations include seizure and retention of the initiative, and deception.

Commander's Initial Campaign Planning Guidance

6.13 Based on the joint commander's visualisation, the commander's initial campaign planning guidance describes the campaign approach and provides direction to staff for course of action (COA) development. It also provides direction to the joint task force (JTF) and other participating agencies and organisations to enable effective collaborative and parallel planning, particularly for development of operations plans.

6.14 Initial campaign planning guidance includes:

- initial commander's intent

- broad concept

- campaign narrative

- commander's critical information requirements (CCIR).

6.15 The campaign approach is expressed in the initial commander's intent, broad concept, and campaign narrative.

6.16 **Commander's Initial Intent.** The initial intent focuses the overall planning process, providing the basis for development and refinement of COA, and evolves as planning progresses. It is a concise statement of what the joint commander wants to accomplish, and why. It may include:

- statement of the problem

- current (start) state

- intended military strategic and campaign end-states

- campaign objectives.

6.17 **Broad Concept.** The broad concept is the basis for eventual development of the campaign concept. It describes how in general terms the campaign and associated operations are intended to unfold, and when, where, and how fighting power is to be employed to achieve the campaign objectives and attain the campaign end-state. It evolves as planning progresses, and may include:

- relative importance of the various campaign objectives

- broad description of proposed operations in terms of time and space

- ideas for deception

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- priorities for resource allocation

- acceptable levels of risk and broad risk mitigation measures

- approach to sustainment

- requirements of planning efforts by other organisations.

6.18   **Strategic Communication Theme.** Strategic communication is that part of the all-of-government approach establishing the dominance of the narrative. The narrative theme is based on strategic guidance and developed in consultation with partners. The broad campaign concept must be consistent with the theme for actions remain credible. Commanders and planners need to be aware that in a multinational environment the narratives of coalition members may differ.

6.19   **Commander's Critical Information Requirements.** CCIR are information requirements identified by the joint commander as being critical in facilitating timely information management and the decision-making process that affect successful mission accomplishment. Critical friendly force information and priority intelligence requirements are the two key sub-components of CCIR. They consist of Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR), Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI), and Friendly Force Information Requirements (FFIR).

6.20   **Priority Intelligence Requirements.** PIR are intelligence requirements for which leadership has a stated priority. PIR are identified by the commander and staff and managed by the joint intelligence staff (J2).

6.21   **Essential Elements of Friendly Information.** EEFI are key questions likely to be asked by adversary officials and intelligence systems about specific friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities, so that they can obtain answers critical to their operational effectiveness. Identification of EEFI is the first step in operations security (OPSEC). EEFI must be detailed and precise. Not all will last the whole campaign, and some may need to be protected only during specific actions or events.

6.22   **Friendly Force Information Requirements.** FFIR are information the commander and staff need about the forces available for the operation. FFIR concern friendly forces, contribute to situational awareness, and enable appropriate planning and operations management. FFIR are identified by the commander and staff and managed by Joint Operations Staff (J3).

Termination

6.23   Effective planning cannot occur without a clear understanding of the end-state and the conditions that must exist to end military operations. Knowing when to terminate military operations and how to preserve achieved advantages is key to achieving the national strategic end-state.

6.24   Termination criteria are developed first among the elements of operational design as they enable the development of the military end-state and objectives. Termination criteria describe the standards that must be met before conclusion of a joint operation.

6.25   Commanders and their staffs must think through, in the early stages of planning, the conditions that must exist in order to terminate military operations on terms favourable to New Zealand and its multinational partners. A hasty or ill-defined end to the operation may bring with it the possibility that the adversary will renew hostilities or other actors may interfere, leading to further conflict. Commanders and their staffs must balance the desire for quick victory with termination on truly favourable terms.

6.26   Termination criteria should account for a wide variety of operational tasks that the joint force may need to accomplish, to include disengagement, force protection, transition to post-conflict operations, reconstitution, and redeployment.

6.27   Once approved, the termination criteria may change. It is important for joint commanders and staffs to keep an eye out for potential changes, as they may result in a modification to the military end-state as well as the joint commander's operational approach.

As such, it is essential for the military to keep a dialogue between the civilian national leadership, and the leadership of other agencies and partners involved.

Campaign Concept

6.28   The campaign concept is developed by Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand (HQJFNZ) from the basic concept determined as part of the commander's initial planning guidance. The campaign concept is a single, unifying idea which promotes understanding and provides direction for the way in which a campaign is to be conducted. It is a textual and graphic statement which describes and directs the combination and sequence of operations to be conducted.

6.29   At the heart of the campaign concept are its objectives and associated operations. The campaign concept and associated CONOPS are dynamic and should be continually refined as the campaign progresses.

6.30   Generally, the campaign concept would include:

- commander's intent, including intended military strategic and campaign end-states and campaign objectives

- campaign narrative

- designation of the theatre of operations in which the campaign is to be conducted and joint force area of operations (JFAO) in which individual operations within the campaign are to be conduced

- campaign lines of operation

- campaign scheme of manoeuvre including shaping transitional and decisive engagement, by phase, along the lines of operation

- scheme of offensive support including relative priorities for fire

- scheme of sustainment

- other supporting schemes

- a statement of what risk will be acceptable

- designation of the reserve, including its location and composition

- contingencies

- key control measures

- evaluation methodology

- other agency aspects.

> **Key Term**
>
> **Campaign Concept**
>
> A simple unifying idea that promotes understanding and provides direction for the way in which a campaign is to be conducted.

Operational Areas

6.31   Access by the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) to operational areas is gained through a combination of diplomatic approvals from the government and other nations, and the use or threatened use of force. Lack of timely access may be a significant disadvantage which could seriously reduce or even negate chances of success. This may result in having to adopt a higher risk COA with potentially higher casualties to gain access, which could have been avoided had timely access been secured.

6.32   When conducting campaigns or operations, joint commanders may define operational areas. Annex A to Chapter 2 describes the operational environment geometry but some of the key ones are outlined below.

- **Theatre.** A theatre is a designated geographic area for which an operational level joint or combined commander is appointed and in which a campaign or series of major operations is conducted. A theatre may contain one or more JFAO.

- **Joint Force Area/s of Operations.** A JFAO is that portion of a theatre necessary for joint military operations and their administration as part of a campaign.

- **Tactical Area of Responsibility.** A tactical area of responsibility is a defined geographical area for which responsibility is specifically assigned to a commander as a measure for the control of assigned forces and coordination of support.

- **Named Area of Interest.** A named area of interest is an aspect which will confirm or deny enemy intentions, serve to focus attention on areas where the enemy must appear for a particular COA, and provide an objective basis for the employment of intelligence gathering assets. This can not only apply to the physical terrain but also to the human terrain.

Campaign Lines of Operation

6.33   In a campaign or operation, a line of operation links decisive points (DPs) in time and space on the path to the CoG. Several lines of operation may be developed, each leading to a specific campaign objective. In some cases one line of operation may achieve more than one campaign objective.

6.34   Lines of operation are determined by:

- identification of DPs

- determination of operation objectives

- determination of intended effects.

Identification of Decisive Points

6.35   A DP is a geographic place, key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows a joint commander to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success. DPs may be physical or psychological, or both. Physical DPs mainly relate to destruction of physical fighting capability, whereas psychological DPs target the will to fight.

Operational Objectives

6.36   An objective is a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every military operation should be directed. An operational objective is an objective that needs to be achieved in the campaign to reach the military strategic end-state. Once a DP has been selected for action it becomes an operational objective. Like DPs, operational objectives may be physical, for example an adversary force or terrain feature, or conceptual as a goal, for example establishment of rule of law.

6.37   Once the military end-state is understood and termination criteria are established, operational design continues with development of strategic and operational military objectives. Joint planning integrates military actions and capabilities with those of other instruments of national power in time, space, and purpose in unified action to achieve the Joint Force Commander's objectives. Objectives and their supporting effects provide the basis for identifying tasks to be accomplished.

6.38   **Objectives Prescribe Friendly Goals.** They constitute the aim of military operations and are necessarily linked to national objectives (simply defined as what we want to accomplish). Military objectives are one of the most important considerations in campaign and operational design. They specify what must be accomplished and provide the basis for describing desired effects.

6.39   A clear and concise end-state allows planners to better examine objectives that must be met to attain the desired end-state. Objectives describe what must be achieved to reach the end-state. These are usually expressed in military, diplomatic, economic, and informational terms and help define and clarify what military planners must do to support the national strategic end-state. Objectives developed at the national-strategic and theatre-strategic levels are the defined, decisive, and attainable goals toward which all operations, not just military operations, and activities are directed within the JFAO.

6.40   Achieving operational objectives ties execution of tactical tasks to reaching the military end-state. There are four primary considerations for an objective:

- an objective establishes a single desired result (a goal)

- an objective should link directly or indirectly to higher-level objectives or to the end-state

- an objective is prescriptive, specific, and unambiguous

- an objective does not infer ways and/or means—it is not written as a task.

6.41   Objectives at all levels are linked. Each tactical objective must contribute to achieving an operation objective, which must contribute to achieving a campaign objective, which, in turn, must contribute to achieving military strategic and, ultimately, national strategic objectives. The statement of an objective should include 'what' and 'why'—the task and its purpose.

Effects

6.42   An effect is a physical and/or behavioural state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. A desired effect can also be thought of as a condition that supports achieving an associated objective, while an undesired effect is a condition that inhibits progress toward an objective.

6.43   The Strategic Commitments and Intelligence (SCI) Branch at Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force (HQNZDF) establishes the campaign end-state and supporting objectives based on analysis of the national strategic objectives and development of theatre strategic objectives supported by measurable strategic and operational desired effects and assessment indicators (see Figure 6-1). At the operational level, J5 (Planning) Branch, HQJFNZ develops supporting plans, which can include objectives supported by measurable operational-level desired effects and assessment indicators. This may increase operational- and tactical-level understanding of the purpose reflected in the higher-level commander's mission and intent. At the same time, commanders consider potential undesired effects and their impact on the tasks assigned to

Figure 6-1: End-states, Objectives, Effects, and Tasks.

subordinate commands. Annex A lists the definitions of the more important effects terms.

6.44   Effects are useful in planning but must be used with great care. Cause and effect chains are complex and difficult to comprehend. It isn't possible to identify, let alone understand, all possible effects resulting from every action. Some intended effects may never occur. Some may be generated by a particular action and may be able to be identified. Others may occur but not be able to be identified or measured.

6.45   Some unintended effects may also occur. These may, or may not, be able to be identified. While an intended first order effect may result from a particular action, and may be identified, that action may result in significant but unintended and unidentified second and third order effects.

6.46   Secondly, measurable results of a particular action may not appear for some time. This time lag not only complicates assessment enormously but it could slow the tempo of operations. A major difficulty lies in assessing effects and then deciding and implementing adjustments at a pace that supports the campaign or operation.

6.47   There are four primary considerations for writing a desired effect statement:

- each desired effect should link directly to one or more objectives

- the effect should be measurable

- the statement should not specify ways and means for accomplishment

- the effect should be distinguishable from the objective it supports as a condition for success, not as another objective or a task.

Key Terms

Decisive Points

A DP is a geographic place, key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows a commander to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success.

Operations Objective

An operational objective is an objective that needs to be achieved in the campaign to reach the military strategic end-state.

Effect

An effect is a physical and/or behavioural state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect.

Defining Lines of Operation

6.48   The overriding requirement in defining lines of operation is to ensure they enable the integration and most effective employment of all the instruments of power — military and non-military, and physical and psychological. Well defined lines of operation provide clarity and enable unity of purpose and effort. Poorly defined lines lead to confusion.

6.49   A single line of operation concentrates effort and simplifies planning. Multiple lines of operations increase flexibility and create more opportunities for success, but increase complexity.

6.50   When multiple lines have been defined, a particular line may be designated as being dominant and the others as subsidiary. A dominant line is expected to yield decisive results and, as such, is critical to the success of the overall campaign. Subsidiary lines have a shaping function, enabling the success of the dominant line.

6.51   Lines of operation are categorised as physical and conceptual. A campaign may involve a combination

of physical and conceptual lines. Combinations may change as the campaign progresses.

6.52   **Conceptual Lines.** Conceptual lines of operation link multiple tasks and missions using the logic of purpose. They are applicable when positional reference to an adversary has little relevance (such as in counterinsurgency in which the focus is on stability actions) and generally involve multinational forces and non-military agencies and organisations. Conceptual lines indicate how particular actions involving the various instruments of power, military, and non-military, relate to each other. Information actions are generally a central aspect. Conceptual lines may be differentiated by function, such as security, population protection, population support, stability, governance, indigenous capacity building, and reconstruction.

6.53   **Physical Lines.** Physical lines are geographic and involve terrain and positional reference to the adversary. Major combat, in which the focus is on defeating adversary forces and seizing terrain, is typically conducted using physical lines. Physical lines may be further categorised as exterior and interior. A force is operating on exterior lines when it's converging force element, and the points from which their actions emanate, are separated by the adversary. A force is operating on interior lines when its actions emanate from a central point, and it is separating converging adversary forces. Interior lines allow a weaker force to mass combat power against a portion of the adversary force by shifting resources more rapidly than the adversary.

> ## Key Term
>
> **Lines of Operation**
>
> Lines of operation link DPs in time and space, providing a path to the adversary's CoG. Lines of operation are differentiated by function (for example, security, stability, governance, reconstruction) and environment (land, sea, and air), and exploit the different strengths of each.

The Campaign Scheme of Manoeuvre

6.54   The campaign scheme of manoeuvre is based on the selected lines of operation. It is the way in which operations and associated actions are orchestrated in time, space, and purpose along particular lines of operation to achieve operation objectives, and ultimately campaign objectives. Some operations may be conducted simultaneously, others sequentially. The principles of concentration of force and economy of effort are major considerations in development of the scheme.

Shaping, Decisive Engagement, Transition, and Sustainment

6.55   Development of the campaign scheme of manoeuvre involves four key aspects: shaping, decisive engagement, transition, and sustainment. These aspects assist in visualising how particular operations relate to one another in time, space, and purpose within the overall campaign. They should not be viewed as sequential or separate and distinct phases.

6.56   A campaign will involve multiple operations. Some will have a shaping purpose, intended to create conditions for successful decisive engagement, while others will be purely decisive engagement. Decisive operations are the focal point around which the overall campaign is developed and priorities determined.

6.57   An operation with the overall purpose of shaping generally includes decisive engagement and transitioning as well as shaping actions. Similarly, an operation with the overall purpose of decisive engagement will include shaping and transitioning as well as decisive actions.

6.58   **Shaping.** To shape is to engage in actions that enhance the friendly force's position, delay the adversary's response, or lead the adversary into an inadequate or inappropriate response in order to set the conditions for decisive action. The purpose of shaping is therefore to create and preserve conditions for successful decisive engagement. Shaping may occur before, during, or after decisive engagement. It may

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be physical or psychological or both. Physical shaping includes destruction of particular adversary capabilities that could interfere with the decisive engagement; seizure of key terrain, which if held by the adversary would affect the decisive engagement; and interdiction of the movement of adversary forces and sustainment. Psychological shaping includes deception, and/or psychological operations to undermine the adversary's will and isolate them from a population.

6.59   Shaping activities that assist fragile states, preventing them from becoming seriously unstable, or that help build capabilities of partner countries can help create the conditions for the successful conduct of joint operations; or they can prevent the necessity for the conduct of operations in the future. Therefore, allocating adequate resources toward shaping activities focused on stability and support operations (SASO) prior to a crisis enables the joint force, normally operating as part of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) led effort, to advance its interests using relatively modest amounts of targeted resources, rather than spending much more substantial, and often massive amounts of resources to respond to a crisis. Shaping activities also enable joint forces, as well as New Zealand civilian agencies and multinational partners, to develop a better understanding of a specific region, which may prove critical for the successful planning and execution of stabilization efforts.

6.60   **Decisive Engagement.** In land and naval warfare, decisive engagement is defined as an engagement in which a unit is considered fully committed and cannot manoeuvre or extricate itself. In the absence of outside assistance, the action must be fought to a conclusion and either won or lost with the forces at hand. Decisive engagement aims to achieve decisive results at the critical time and place, generally by attacking and destroying the adversary's will and cohesion. It may be physical or psychological or both, and is achieved through synchronisation of fire and manoeuvre. Successful decisive engagement must be followed by rapid physical and psychological exploitation.

6.61   **Transition.** Transition has three primary aspects: stabilisation, handover, and withdrawal.

Transition is conducted in combination with shaping and decisive engagements, and is just as relevant in campaigns focused on major combat as those focused on counterinsurgency or peace support. Potential transitions are identified during planning and accounted for in execution. Assessment should measure progress toward transition and inform actions to prepare for and execute them.

6.62   **Sustainment.** Sustainment is a primary consideration in developing the scheme of manoeuvre. It must be continuous, able to adapt rapidly to changing conditions within the operational area, and be able to effectively support shaping, transitioning, and decisive engagement along multiple lines of operation, shifting the point of effort across lines as required. It is critical to seizure, retention, and exploitation of the initiative. Culmination and operational reach are also important sustainment considerations.

Key Terms

Shaping

To shape is to engage in actions that enhance the friendly force's position, delay the adversary's response, or lead the adversary into an inadequate or inappropriate response in order to set the conditions for decisive action.

Decisive Engagement

Decisive engagement is defined as engagement in which a unit is considered fully committed and cannot manoeuvre or extricate itself.

Deep, Close, and Rear

6.63   In developing the campaign scheme of manoeuvre, it can be helpful to consider shaping, decisive engagement, transition, and sustainment within a deep, close, and rear framework. This framework facilitates situational understanding and assists in orchestrating operations in time and space along lines of operation. It applies equally in linear and non-linear situations, and in a physical or psychological sense. Irregular warfare is a classic example.

6.64   **Deep.** Operations in the deep employ a combination of physical and/or psychological capabilities against an adversary's forces or resources not currently engaged in the close battle. They target the adversary's CoG and supporting critical vulnerability such as combat power and command and control (C2), and thus the tempo of operations, reinforcement capability, installations, and supplies. Operations in the deep shape the OE for manoeuvre elements. Although offering some prospect of immediate results, the focus is on the longer term.

6.65   **Close.** Close involves shaping and decisive engagement in direct contact with the adversary or situation, generally within direct fire weapon range and in an immediate timescale. Once again, this involves physical and psychological aspects. Operations in the close are most effective when synchronised with deep operations.

6.66   **Rear.** Operations in the rear aim to ensure the security of friendly force CoG, critical factors, and the generation of combat power. Typical activities are force protection, force generation (air, and mounting bases), force sustainment (logistics, air and port facilities), C2, civil military cooperation, and communications and information support. Consequently, rear areas are the likely targets of deep adversary actions in both a physical or psychological sense.

Forms of Manoeuvre

6.67   Manoeuvre is physical and/or psychological, both of which are complementary. The various forms of manoeuvre are integrated in the scheme of manoeuvre. Psychological manoeuvre is achieved primarily through activities in the information and human domain.

6.68   Each single-Service applies manoeuvre in different ways according to the unique characteristics of its operating domain. At the operational level, forms of manoeuvre include envelopment, encirclement, turning movement, penetration, area defence, and mobile defence. Forms of manoeuvre can be employed in combination and sequence depending on mission, adversary, and terrain. A classic example of operational

level manoeuvre was the 1950 Inchon landing during the Korean War. A joint force comprising land, air, and naval force element conducted envelment and a turning movement from the sea.

Tenets of Manoeuvre

6.69   Successful manoeuvre warfare derives from the application of well established tenets of manoeuvre. These are described in the following paragraphs.

6.70   **Dislocation and Disruption.** Dislocation involves actions to render the adversary's strength irrelevant by not allowing it to be employed at the critical time and place. In effect, dislocation separates the adversary's CoG from the critical factor that support or protect it.

6.71   Disruption is a direct attack that neutralises or selectively destroys key elements of the adversary's capabilities. The aim of disruption is to reduce the adversary's cohesion and will to fight by preventing it acting as a coordinated whole.

6.72   **Taking the Initiative.** Manoeuvre emphasises the need to take the initiative and to apply decisive action at times and places, and in ways, the adversary least expects. This requires the accurate identification of critical vulnerabilities (CV) and the application of operational art.

6.73   **Surprise.** Surprise may enable a force to achieve demoralisation, confusion. and disruption of the adversary's decision-making cycle. Information Operations (IOs) contributes to the achievement of surprise through, among other things, denying critical information to the adversary and deceiving the adversary as to our intentions. Tactical surprise is often immediate and local, whereas operational surprise can affect the whole campaign. Surprise can be facilitated by:

- deception — designed to mislead the target by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce the target to react in a manner prejudicial to their interests

- ambiguity — leaving the adversary confused as to

ones intentions through variable or multiple actions

- novelty and unpredictability consistent with risk.

6.74   **Shock Action.** Shock action is a physical and psychological assault upon an adversary, employing firepower and mobility to maximum effect. Shock action aims to disrupt an adversary's plans, destroy cohesion, sap morale, and weaken the will to resist.

6.75   **Simultaneity.** Simultaneity is the concurrent application of overwhelming military and non-military power against a sufficient number of an adversary's coalition force to cause the adversary serious indecision. If this effect can be achieved against a number of different target sets, the adversary will suffer increasing decision-making paralysis.

6.76   **Tempo.** Tempo is the rate and rhythm of activity relative to the adversary and incorporates the capacity of the force to transition from one operational posture to another. Maintaining a higher tempo than the adversary helps to retain the initiative. Mission command facilitates a higher tempo by encouraging subordinates to act quickly on their own initiative.

6.77   **Main Effort.** Main effort is the concentration of forces or means, in a particular area and time, where a joint commander seeks to bring about a decision. Main effort is the principle activity or force to which a joint commander gives priority in each phase of an operation. There can only be one main effort at any time.

6.78   Firepower is central to manoeuvre warfare. The NZDF concentrates fire and forces at critical points to achieve a desired effect. NZDF emphasis on manoeuvre requires a command philosophy which provides clear direction on desired effects and acceptable risk.

6.79   Operational mobility allows a joint commander to closely match the requirements of the campaign plan as well as maintaining flexibility to rapidly exploit opportunities. Tactical mobility is the flexibility to move swiftly up to, around and between objectives in the physical sense.

6.80   Manoeuvre is more challenging when adversaries have significantly different levels of conventional military capability and employ distinctly different methods. An adversary's cultural beliefs, priorities, and moral constraints may be quite different to ours which can make them difficult to identify, target or even negotiate with. They could also be more willing to accept casualties, or even target the civilian population.

6.81   Manoeuvre should therefore be able to adapt to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons, insurgency, and attacks on bases and lines of communication in the JFAO. Targets outside a JFAO may also be attacked for political and economic effect. The key is to use our strengths against an adversary's weaknesses.

Sequencing and Synchronisation

6.82   Sequencing is the ordering of lines of operation and actions into a logical progression in time, space, and purpose to maintain tempo and focus fighting power. Synchronisation is an aspect of sequencing. It is the execution of multiple related and mutually supporting actions in different locations at the same time. Synchronisation is a means, not an end. It must be balanced with tempo and initiative, which must not be sacrificed for the sake of synchronisation.

Phasing

6.83   Sequencing may lead to phasing of a campaign. Campaigns are organised into phases to break a complex undertaking into simple discrete parts, or when insufficient forces are available to conduct all required tasks concurrently. Each phase represents a natural subdivision in the campaign. Phasing enables focusing of effort, concentration of fighting power at a critical point, and achievement of objectives deliberately and logically.

6.84   Phases must be clearly defined according to time, distance, terrain, or events. Phasing:

- determines when major actions are to start or be completed

- maintains continuity and tempo is appropriate for significant changes to task organisation, or for reallocation of resources

- is often dictated by sustainment requirements.

6.85   Similarly, operations which comprise a campaign may be organised in phases. However, phasing must not create a predictable pattern that is evident to the adversary. Nor should it lead to a ponderous, incremental approach to the conduct of a campaign or operation, sacrificing tempo and surprise.

6.86   The number and sequence of phases for a campaign is not set and depends solely on the nature of the campaign. There are a number of generic models which provide a basis for adaptation. Two are outlined below.

6.87   **Model One.** This model, which is the one normally used by the NZDF for conventional operations, has the following phases:

- shape

- deter

- seize initiative

- dominate

- stabilise

- enable civil authority.[8]

6.88   **Model Two.** This model is primarily used in stability operations has the following phases:

- shape

- secure

- hold

- develop.[8]

6.89   Further information on Model Two can be found in the appropriate NZDF doctrine on stability operations.

Operational Reach

6.90   Operational reach is the distance and duration across which a unit can successfully employ military capabilities. Operational reach is a tether — the longer the better. For a joint force, actions such as strategic attack and control of the air and sea can significantly extend operational reach.

6.91   A key consideration is the level of sustainment which limits what is operationally feasible. Operational reach may also be limited by the size of the operational area and distances to be covered, lengthy and vulnerable lines of communication, dispersion of a force over wide areas, attrition of fighting power, terrain, weather, tempo, and associated fatigue.

6.92   The limit of a force's operational reach is its culminating point. A culminating point occurs when a situation can just be maintained and not either developed to any greater advantage or exploited by the enemy.

6.93   In the offence, the culminating point is where the attacking force's fighting power no longer exceeds the defender's, or offensive momentum is no longer sustainable, or both. This can vary with domains. For example, culmination of air forces is generally due to logistic limitations such as maintenance of equipment and depleted weapon stocks.

6.94   Beyond the culmination point, continued offensive action risks over-extension, vulnerability, counter-attack, and defeat. In defence, the culminating point is where the defending force can no longer defend successfully or counter-attack to restore the cohesion of

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[8]   See Chapter 10 for more information on phases of the NZDF's Campaigns and Operations Model.

[8]   See NZDDP-3.21 *Stabilisation: The Military Contribution* for more information on the NZDF model for stability operations.

the defence. A campaign should be planned, balancing ends, ways, and means, to achieve its objectives before reaching culmination.

6.95   Ways in which operational reach can be extended and culmination avoided include: limiting the scope of the campaign and associated operations, phasing, and varying tempo and the use of operational pauses. Options for limiting scope include reducing the number of envisaged lines of operation and reducing the number of simultaneous actions along those lines of operation in favour of sequential actions.

6.96   An operational pause is a deliberate break in operations to maintain or extend operational reach or prevent culmination. Throughout a campaign several operational pauses may be required. They should be managed to retain initiative and minimise loss of momentum. If a pause is taken on one line of operation, pressure should be maintained or intensified along other lines. While there may be benefit in taking pauses along different lines simultaneously, generally they should be taken in sequence.

6.97   An operational pause taken by United States forces in Iraq in late March 2003 had become necessary for the sustainment of a formation which had advanced several hundred kilometres in a week over difficult terrain. The pause lasted four days, enabling resupply, consolidation, and preparation for successful resumption.

Risk

6.98   Soundly considered acceptance of risk is fundamental to campaigning. Risk is the product of hazard (a source of potential harm) and likelihood (probability or frequency of hazard). Risk must be balanced against audacity and imagination in order to seize the initiative, exploit fleeting opportunities, and achieve decisive results.

6.99   Campaign planners assess the risks when developing the scheme of manoeuvre and the necessary actions to mitigate them. The greatest risks generally

accompany concentration of fighting power at critical points at critical times. See the NZDF approved Australian Defence Force Publication (ADFP)−5.0.1 *Joint Military Appreciation Process* for further information on assessing and managing risk.

Contingencies

6.100   Campaigns are unlikely to proceed exactly as planned. The scheme of manoeuvre must therefore be sufficiently adaptable to enable exploitation of unexpected opportunities while allowing for response to unforeseen threats or reversals, and regaining of initiative if lost. This flexibility may be achieved through adjustments to lines of operation and the sequence of operations and actions, and by the use of branches and sequels.

6.101   **Branches and Sequels.** Branches and sequels are types of contingency plans that anticipate future options, uncertainties, opportunities or reversals, and are intended to shorten decision cycles and to retain the initiative. They must be part of the scheme of manoeuvre, not the result of an afterthought, and have execution criteria that are monitored and updated based on on-going assessment. Branches and sequels are selected by the commander.

6.102   **Reserve.** A reserve is a force held to counter unforeseen situations or to impact on future events. Identification and employment of an operational level reserve must be considered in developing the campaign scheme of manoeuvre. Aspects include force composition, capabilities, location, concealment, criteria for committal, likely tasks including all branches and sequels, and response times.

6.103   **Developing Supporting Schemes.** A number of supporting schemes are developed in conjunction with the campaign scheme of manoeuvre. These are generally based on the NZDF joint functions, which are addressed in Chapter 3.

6.104   They may include schemes for:

- influence

- intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

- fires (including targeting)

- counter command actions (including deception)

- protection (including OPSEC)

- mobility

- sustainment.

> ## Key Term
>
> **Reserve**
>
> A reserve is a force held to counter unforeseen situations or to impact on future events.

The Campaign Plan

6.105   The campaign plan describes what is to be accomplished and how it is to be done. Depending on the nature of the campaign, the plan will focus the efforts of all partners, military and non-military, addressing the integration and implementation of political, military, economic, and diplomatic measures within the theatre of operations.

6.106   The campaign plan is developed based on the campaign concept. Essentially the campaign concept is fleshed out through detailed planning, which includes:

- tasking of subordinate JTF

- allocation of resources

- task organisations

- command and support arrangements

- control measures

- coordination

- scheduling

- movements

- support priorities

- transitions between operations

- transitions of authority (such as military to civilian)

- conduct of assessment.

6.107   Similarly, supporting schemes developed in conjunction with the campaign scheme of manoeuvre are developed into detailed supporting plans. Other documents are developed based on the campaign plan. These include subordinate JTF operation plans and subsequently their operation orders and any other required supporting plans and instructions.

Content

6.108   Broadly, the campaign plan may include the following, either in the main document or supporting annexes:

- mission

- commander's intent, including intended military strategic and campaign end-states

- campaign objectives

- coordination with other strategic lines of activity

- campaign narrative

- assumptions

- limitations

- campaign objectives and their relative importance

- lines of operation including operations objectives

- designated shaping and decisive operations

- campaign phases, and sequencing of operations within phases

- transitions between operations

- branches and sequels

- tasks to subordinate JTF

- allocation of forces and resources to subordinate JTF

- resource priorities

- command structure and support relationships including between HQ, components, inter-agency

elements, and support providers

- control measures

- priorities for movement, offensive support, and protection

- priorities for sustainment

- CCIR

- EEFI

- OPSEC measures

- risk assessment and mitigation

- legal aspects including rules of engagement (ROE)

- assessment.

6.109   Supporting plans are based on the supporting schemes developed in conjunction with the scheme of manoeuvre, addressed earlier in this chapter.

Mission Statements

6.110   COMJFNZ tasks the subordinate JTF Commander and others by means of mission statements. A mission statement is a clear and direct order to a subordinate which contains the elements of who, what (task), when, where, and why. There are three broad types of mission statement: single task, multiple tasks, and a list of contingent or "be prepared to" tasks which are usually for reserves.

Control Measures

6.111   Control measures are the means by which a force is regulated. They assign responsibilities, facilitate coordination and impose restrictions in order to most effectively orchestrate operations and actions. Control measures promote unity of effort, maximise the use of terrain, foster initiative, de-conflict actions and maximise freedom of action. They must not be imposed unnecessarily.

6.112   When two or more JTF operate in the same theatre of operations their activities must be coordinated.

The degree of control required depends on the level of interaction.

6.113   Control measures must not remain static, inhibiting or preventing exploitation of opportunities, but must adapt to changing situations.

> **Key Term**
>
> **Campaign Plan**
>
> The campaign plan describes what is to be accomplished and how it is to be done.

Preparation

Developing Understanding of the Campaign Plan

6.114   A key aspect of the transition from planning to execution is developing understanding of the campaign plan among joint commanders, staff, formations, force elements and others who will execute it. This has several aspects, including:

- transition from J5 to J3 staff

- understanding by subordinate commanders and staff

- understanding of other agencies and organisations.

Transfer of Effort

6.115   During preparation, responsibility for developing and maintaining the campaign plan is progressively transferred from the J5 staff to the J3 staff. Finalisation of this transfer occurs when the J3 staff fully understands all aspects of the campaign and become responsible for its execution, and the focus of the J5 staff shifts to branches and sequels.

6.116   **Understanding by subordinate commanders and staffs.** It is critical that subordinate commanders and staffs understand the commander's intent, mission, and CONOPS, as well as their own missions and

purpose, and the missions of other commanders. This understanding is facilitated through personal visits, liaison officers, rehearsals, and confirmation briefs by subordinate commanders.

6.117   **Understanding of other agencies and organisations.** On a 'need to know' basis consistent with OPSEC, it is also important that non-military agencies and organisations participating in a campaign understand the plan and their role in it. This assists in building unity of effort and is facilitated by personal visits and liaison officers.

Organising and Integrating

6.118   The task organisation developed during planning is put into effect during preparation. This includes grouping and regrouping of formations, attachment and detachment of force element, establishing communications, and providing for sustainment. Task organising should occur early during preparation to enable sufficient time for integration, particularly in the case of organisations that have not previously worked together.

Information Operations

6.119   Some information operations, including OPSEC and deception, will generally be initiated before execution. Effective OPSEC and deception go hand in hand. Deception can be highly complex, resource intensive, and require long lead times and consequently should be implemented well before campaign execution commences. Influence actions with a shaping purpose have similarly long lead times and also require early implementation.

Preliminary Operations

6.120   Preliminary operations may be necessary in preparation for campaign execution. These may include seizure of an important piece of terrain, destruction of a critical adversary capability, development of obstacles, breaching of obstacles such as minefields, non-combatant evacuation, enforcing exclusion zones,

and electronic attack or computer network attack to disrupt C2 networks. Preliminary operations may also focus on securing important lines of communication infrastructure, and areas required for the sustainment, organisation, and positioning of forces.

Force Protection

6.121   Preparation generally involves protection related activities. These may include, for example, actions to counter adversary intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, improving camouflage and concealment, and hardening of C2 facilities and critical infrastructure. OPSEC is a key consideration. Force protection is detailed in Chapter 3.

Force Projection

6.122   A principle aspect of preparation is the movement and positioning of forces and resources. This may occur concurrently with task organisation. OPSEC is a key consideration as the movement of forces is a primary indicator of intentions, force composition, and dispositions.

Force Preparation

6.123   Ensuring force readiness to execute the campaign is generally a major aspect of preparation. This may involve introduction of new equipment:

- introduction of new or different tactics

- techniques and procedures

- training, particularly in relation to specific or complicated tasks

- new equipment, rehearsals and inspections.

Sustainment

6.124   During preparation, means of sustainment are developed and optimised. This includes identifying and ensuring access to the infrastructure and resources currently available in the JFAO, developing bases and

lines of communications, determining and establishing contract support requirements, identifying (and where necessary taking action to mitigate) endemic health and environmental factors, positioning and repositioning of sustainment assets, and forecasting and positioning stocks.

Infrastructure and Terrain Preparation

6.125   Infrastructure and terrain preparation may include the establishment and upgrade of infrastructure including ports, airfields, storage facilities, bridges, and roads; improving defensive positions; building and strengthening obstacles; and breaching and crossing

obstacles. Action should occur early to identify potential for improvements in the JFAO, establish priorities and commence work

Refinement of the Campaign Plan

6.126   Refinement of the campaign plan occurs during preparation. This may be necessary due to improved situational understanding, validation (or not) of assumptions made during planning, political factors, adversary action, weather conditions, results of shaping, information operations and preliminary operations, breaches of OPSEC, and emerging opportunities.

ANNEX A:
EFFECTS DEFINITIONS

6.127   In campaign planning, effects are concise statements identifying who or what is to be affected and the desired state to be achieved. Importantly, the focus on outcomes rather than activity dictates that effects be enunciated as nouns (deterrence of Warlord A) rather than mission task verbs (deter Warlord A).

6.128   Table 6-2 lists the more commonly used effects. The list is not exhaustive and can be supplemented as necessary. To impart explicit meaning, each effect should:

- identify whom or what is to be affected

- describe the desired state or change as a consequence of activity undertaken

- be delegated as an effect, with maximum practicable freedom of action about how it is to be realised

- be precisely expressed

- reflect its position and importance in time and space

- be assignable to a functional lead or agent

- be measurable, so that observable systemic and attribute changes can be recognised

- be realistic in terms of timing, risk, and resources.

6.129   The following is an example of effects to support objectives:

- **Example 1: Objective** — the sovereignty of Green is maintained.
  - **Effect 1.1:** Support is gained from the international community for the coalition protection of Green sovereignty.
  - **Effect 1.2:** Defence of Green is facilitated by its leadership's rapid acceptance and reception of deployed coalition forces.
  - **Effect 1.3:** Denial of low level Red cross-border incursions into Green territory is achieved.
  - **Effect 1.4:** Deterrence of Red aggression against Green is achieved without conflict.

- **Example 2: Objective** — regional terrorism activities are neutralised.
  - **Effect 2.1:** Containment of Red's terrorist activities is achieved and the threat to Australia and its interests is negated.
  - **Effect 2.2:** Disruption of regional transnational terrorist networks is effective.
  - **Effect 2.3:** Expanded antiterrorism and counterterrorism training, capabilities, and operations are established in regional countries.

EFFECT	DEFINITION	EXPLANATION
COERCION	Use or threat of force to persuade an opponent to adopt a certain pattern of behaviour against their wishes.	Coercion may be used in concert with deterrence. Coercion relies on effective communication of the desired COA, backed by the threat of credible and punitive military force.
CONTAINMENT	Geographical restriction of the freedom of action of enemy forces.	The military might be involved directly against an adversary or indirectly as a third party.
DEFENCE	Employment or deployment of combat capability to prevent, resist, repel, or destroy an adversary attack before it can achieve its objective and, during the conduct phase, to accept decisive engagement.	

Table 6-2: Effects definitions and explanations.

EFFECT	DEFINITION	EXPLANATION
DENIAL	Action to hinder or deny the enemy the use of space, personnel, or facilities. It may include destruction, removal, contamination, or erection of obstructions.	Denial can be achieved by diplomatic pressure, sanctions, physical or implied presence, firepower, obstacles, destruction and contamination, or a combination of these.
DETERRENCE	The convincing of a potential aggressor that the consequences of coercion or armed conflict would outweigh the potential gains. This requires the maintenance of a credible military capability and strategy with the clear political will to act.	
DEFEAT	Reduction of the effectiveness of an individual, group, or organisation to the extent that it is either unable or unwilling to continue its activities or at least cannot fulfil their intentions.	
DESTRUCTION	Sufficient damage of an enemy state or non-state adversary that it is unable to return to conflict.	May include removal of an adversary's military capability, or elimination of terrorist organisations.
DISRUPTION	A direct attack that neutralises or selectively destroys key elements of the adversary's capabilities. The aim of disruption is to reduce the adversary's cohesion and will to fight by neutralising or destroying parts of the force in a manner that prevents the force from acting as a coordinated whole.	Disruption can target offensive forces, or indirect isolation from support, leading to dislocation and disorientation.
DISLOCATION	Dislocation involves action to render the adversary's strength irrelevant by not allowing it to be employed at the critical time or place. In effect, dislocation separates the adversary's CoG from the key capabilities that support or protect it.	
NEUTRALISATION	To degrade or negate a adversary's capabilities to such an extent that it is rendered ineffective.	
PREVENTION	To prevent emerging crises and conflict by fostering regional and national security through programmes to address the underlying causes of instability, such as poor governance, political repression, social inequality, and economic hardship.	Involves developing agreements to reduce weapons proliferation, particularly weapons of mass destruction, as well as building local capacity to deal with emerging crises and encourage the international community to act.
PROTECTION	Preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission related military and non-military personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given operational area.	

Table 6-2: Effects definitions and explanations (Cont.).

EFFECT	DEFINITION	EXPLANATION
SHAPING	Actions that enhance the friendly force's position, delay the adversary's response, or lead the adversary into an inadequate or inappropriate response in order to set the conditions for decisive action.	Shaping actions set conditions for decisive action. Shaping continues through conflict prevention, conflict, and post-conflict. By developing influence through relationships, contributions to coalition operations and regional training activities, the NZDF contributes to a common understanding of security issues with regional neighbours and promotes an environment consistent with New Zealand's interests.
STABILISATION	Activities that impose control and establish security over an area while restoring services and support to civilian agencies, which set the conditions to allow primacy of indigenous organisations.	Generally a comprehensive approach is required to tackle the underlying causes as well as the symptoms of the instability so as to meet political, legal, and basic humanitarian needs. Military force may be needed to assist with the return of political control as well as helping with reassurance, reconstruction and providing aid.
UNDERMINING	Action to weaken the military, economic or political strength of a nation, directed at the morale, loyalty, or reliability of its leadership and supporting elements of national power which are detrimental to New Zealand's interests.	

Table 6-2: Effects definitions and explanations (Cont.).

CHAPTER 7:

CAMPAIGN MANAGEMENT — CAMPAIGN EXECUTION, ASSESSMENT, AND ADAPTATION

CONTENTS

Introduction

7.01　　Execution is the implementation of the campaign plan through the application of fighting power to accomplish the mission. Effective execution is complex and demanding, involving issuing orders, monitoring and assessing the plan through to completion, and continually synchronising and coordinating activities until receipt of a cease order.

7.02　　Execution requires flexibility, effective teamwork between headquarters (HQ), subordinate formations, and force elements, and rapid information exchange among them. A situation may change rapidly. Events as executed may bear little resemblance to those envisioned in planning. When this occurs, aggressive subordinate commanders are required with the latitude to exploit opportunities and take risks consistent with the higher commander's intent.

Fundamentals of Execution

7.03　　The fundamentals of execution include:

- seizing and retaining the initiative

- building and maintaining momentum

- exploiting success.

7.04　　**Seizing and Retaining the Initiative.** Seizing the initiative requires anticipation of events and identification and exploitation of opportunities. Retaining the initiative requires constant effort to set the agenda, maintaining freedom of action while dictating the terms of action, and forcing the adversary and others to conform to friendly purposes and tempo. Action is necessary to seize and retain the initiative, even if it means accepting calculated risks. Inaction due to hesitation and undue caution in the face of uncertainty surrenders the initiative and potentially wastes opportunities.

7.05　　**Building and Maintaining Momentum.** Momentum comes from seizing the initiative and executing shaping and decisive engagements at a rapid and sustainable tempo. By building and maintaining

momentum, pressure on the adversary and others is sustained and opportunities are created. Anticipating transitions between operations and actions is important to maintaining momentum.

7.06　　**Exploiting Success.** Successful engagements and resulting opportunities must be fully and rapidly exploited, both physically and psychologically. Exploitation may involve transition to a sequel, acceleration of the phasing of the campaign or operation, or adoption of other lines of operations that enable objectives to be accomplished more quickly and easily. The depth and degree of exploitation is largely dependent on sustainment.

> ### Key Term
>
> **Execution**
>
> Execution is the implementation of the campaign plan through the application of fighting power to accomplish the mission.

Control

7.07　　Control of execution consists of a series of implementing decisions and actions. Many of these are projected during planning. Others are dictated by the course of events. Control includes:

- maintaining comprehensive situational understanding

- monitoring and assessing progress

- decision-making and making adjustments.

Maintaining Situational Understanding

7.08　　Comprehensive and accurate situational understanding must be maintained during execution. A focus will be satisfaction and adjustment of the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR). If this does not occur, the overall effort may become fragmented and ineffectual. Intelligence requirements must be focused on specified targets, each with indicators clearly defined. The information collected

and resulting intelligence is a basis for the assessment of whether objectives have been achieved. Intelligence collection and assessment must be able to match the speed of the adversary's ability to react to our actions. As execution unfolds, the adversary is likely to eliminate vulnerabilities when it becomes evident they are being exploited. Similarly, the adversary is likely to adjust their actions to more effectively attack and exploit our vulnerabilities. Therefore our intelligence effort must be able to rapidly detect and assess such changes, and enable effective decision-making in response to unanticipated actions and events.

Monitoring

7.09   Monitoring of execution identifies variances. A variance is a difference between the actual and forecast situation. There are two types of variances: opportunities and threats.

7.10   **Opportunities.** Opportunities result from forecasted or unexpected success. Depending on the nature and scale of the variance, it may enable accomplishment of objectives more easily and be the basis for initiation of a branch or sequel.

7.11   **Threats.** Depending on their nature and scale, threats may affect accomplishment of objectives, and even survival of the force. Not all relate to the adversary — they include disease, toxic hazards, and weather conditions. Threats generally require adjustments including possible initiation of branches and sequels. When the variance is so extreme that no branch or sequel is available, the campaign plan and subordinate plans must be substantially redeveloped.

Decision-making and Making Adjustments

7.12   Development of the campaign plan generally identifies commander's decision points (CDP). These are points in time and space along a line of operation at which a commander must make a decision in order to influence the campaign. A CDP does not dictate what the decision should be, will always precede a branch or sequel, and may sometimes occur before a new phase.

7.13   CDP are supported by CDP matrices which are refined during campaign preparation. CDP are therefore anticipated. However, unanticipated action by the adversary or others, and/or significantly changed conditions, may require an unanticipated decision. These decisions are just as critical to success.

7.14   Decisions made during execution are either execution decisions or adaptation decisions. Execution decisions involve options anticipated in the order and include CDP. They include, for example, changing a boundary, terminating tasks, altering the task organisation, transitioning between phases, and executing a branch.

7.15   Adaptation decisions involve responses to variances. They may include adjusting tasking to respond to unanticipated adversary actions, exploiting opportunities, and redirecting tasks not achieving objectives.

Assessment and Adaptation

7.16   Successful campaigning is characterised by effective assessment and adaptation. Assessment is the monitoring and evaluation of the progress. Adaptation involves change, and is the means by which the initiative is retained over potentially extended periods against innovative adversaries in an ever changing operational environment.

7.17   Assessment requires a comparison of forecasted outcomes to actual events, indicating successes, shortfalls and setbacks, as well as threats and opportunities. Assessment enables learning and greater situational understanding, providing the basis for successful adaptation.

7.18   Assessment indicates when the campaign is not progressing as envisioned. In some cases minor adjustments may be necessary. In other cases it may be necessary to significantly revise understanding of the Joint Force Area of Operations (JFAO) and rethink how to solve the problem. This may lead to major, even fundamental, changes in the campaign plan, operation plans, and their execution.

7.19   Assessment and adaptation equally apply at the tactical level. Formations and force elements must be able to learn from experience and adapt their planning, tactics, techniques and procedures and, more importantly, their thinking to deal with evolving conditions, uncertainties, ambiguities, and constantly changing threats in the JFAO.

7.20   Apart from an immediate operational response, assessment and adaptation have longer term aspects. These include: military education, doctrine, training of forces already in the JFAO and those being prepared, and technical and equipment-based solutions.

Key Term

Assessment

Assessment is the monitoring and evaluation of the progress of the campaign plan at the tactical level. Assessment requires a comparison of forecasted outcomes to actual events and indicates when the campaign is not progressing as envisioned.

Assessment Planning

7.21   A comprehensive and integrated assessment plan should be developed, linking assessment activities and measures at all levels. Assessment of results at the tactical level assists in determining progress at the joint task force level and at Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand (HQJFNZ).

7.22   Generally, the level at which a specific operation, task, or action is conducted should be the level at which it is assessed. This provides a focus for assessment and improves the efficiency of the overall process.

7.23   An assessment plan focused on the campaign end-state and campaign objectives is one option. Based on assessment, lines of operation will be revised and adjusted and resources reallocated accordingly. Other options include plans focused on a particular line of operation, a specific operation objective, a geographic area, or a particular critical action.

7.24   Assessment planning is based on:

- what needs to be assessed and in what detail

- the balance between formal and informal assessment

- how the assessment is to be used to support decision-making

- what specific information is needed

- how that information is to be collected.

Assessment Measures

7.25   Formal assessment measures are used to assess critical aspects of the conduct of the campaign, whilst aspects of lesser importance are generally assessed informally. Informal means include routine reporting, operational and intelligence summaries, running estimates, updates, and observations by subordinate commanders and staff. They may also include after action and post-operation reviews and reports.

7.26   Formal assessment measures include measures of performance (MOP) and measures of effectiveness (MOE) which are used in combination. MOP determines whether tasks are being accomplished and carried out correctly. MOE focus on results and consequences to determine whether the most appropriate things are being done in order to accomplish a task, achieve an objective, or create an intended effect.

7.27   Development and use of MOP is relatively straightforward. However, formulation of MOE, particularly those that enable identification and measurement of effects with a significant time lag, is far more difficult. The latter relies on an accurate understanding of the logic used to build the plan, the underlying assumptions, campaign approach, and campaign concept.

7.28   MOE and MOP are either quantitative or qualitative. Effective assessment generally requires a balance between the two. A key aspect of any assessment is the degree to which it relies on human

judgement and direct observation and mathematical rigour. Human judgement is critical to assessment and can provide insights and understanding not possible through quantitative means. However, it is subject to bias and may be based on invalid assumptions. Quantitative rigour offsets the inevitable bias. Effective use of measures of effectiveness requires establishing cause and effect.

7.29   Generally, establishing causality between actions and their direct first order effects is relatively straightforward. An example is an air strike to destroy a bridge. In other cases, particularly regarding changes in human behaviour, attitudes and perception, and establishing links between cause and effect is difficult. Although difficult, it is crucial to establish cause and effect if measures of effectiveness are to have any validity.

7.30   As some types of campaigns and operations, most noticeably counterinsurgency, may last a number of years, continuity in the selection and use of assessment measures is important in order to determine trends and measure progress. In using measures of effectiveness the aim must be to measure what is important. What is easy to measure may not be important and what is important may not be easy to measure.

7.31   **Operations Research and Systems Analysis.** An operations research and systems analysis team, primarily drawn from the Defence Technology Agency, can use a wide array of tools to significantly enhance campaign assessment.

Key Terms

Measures of Performance

Measures of performance are the assessment of task performance and achievement of its associated purpose. They are an evaluation of what actions have been completed, rather than simply what has been undertaken — are we doing things right?

Measures of Effectiveness

Measures of effectiveness help answer the question — are we doing the right things? Measures of effectiveness provide the means for determining progress and successful achievement of the objective or end-state.

CHAPTER 8:
REDEPLOYMENT

CONTENTS

Introduction

8.01   This chapter looks at the sequence with which a campaign flows from Joint operations through transition, redeployment, and campaign termination. An understanding of these steps and terminology used in the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) context is important. All planning starts with the consideration of what conditions are required for the termination of a campaign or joint operation. The termination criteria is the specified standards or conditions set by the New Zealand Government that must be met before a campaign or joint operation can be concluded. The term 'termination' essentially seeks to focus on what happens when the operational end-state has been achieved and the deployed force elements have been redeployed, regenerated, and the equipment reconstituted for future joint operations.

8.02   The steps involved to achieve campaign or joint operation termination are:

- transition (including cessation of operations (CEASOPS) and a mission change date)

- theatre extraction (including drawdown and redeployment)

- mission closure

- regeneration

- reconstitution

- campaign

- mission termination.

8.03   While 'redeployment' can occur during the joint operation, at the end of a campaign it involves preparing forces and relocating them to a new deployment area or to home bases. 'Transition' meanwhile looks at a noteworthy change in effort or action within a military activity in a campaign or joint operation. Transition at the end of a campaign implies theatre extraction. Theatre extraction is part of retrograde operations and may be incorporated into, or subsequent to, a tactical withdrawal. The process may involve handover to a follow-on coalition force or host-nation element, or the closure of a coalition force base and include de-militarisation and site remediation. Theatre extraction will be shaped by political guidance and imperatives, and direction by in-theatre Headquarters (HQ) including access to coalition forces or host-nation force protection enabling support. Theatre extraction may involve a formal visit by a political and/or military delegation, generate media interest, and include the deployment of additional force protection and security elements.

Campaign Termination

8.04   Campaign termination is a complex issue that requires deliberate planning in order to achieve the transition to the end of joint operations, mission closure, regeneration, and reconstitution. It is a critical area that requires early consideration by the Commander Joint Forces New Zealand (COMJFNZ), and considerable consultation with non-military organisations at the strategic level of war. All events, transition, theatre extraction, mission closure and termination, could take place over an extended period and are marked by specified conditions, mission change dates, handover points, and specific reconstitution timelines. They each require early planning; planning that, although conditions-based, is backed up by command-led, objective assessment to provide the necessary indicators for any change in force posture and configuration.

Campaign Transition

8.05   Campaign transition involves a significant shift in the weight of effort afforded to a particular type of military activity. Key considerations include the following.

- What structures, capabilities, and postures are required next? Over the period of an operation a joint force changes, adjusting balance, configuration and posture. This change is dictated by the evolving operating environment and the prevailing conditions. It may look substantially different at the end of an operation to its original state. The difficulty associated with such changes should not be underestimated.

- The focus of commanders and staffs at all levels is key, never more so than at the operational level. If focus is shifted too early, there is a danger of taking 'an eye off the ball' and losing current advantage; if too late, an unnecessary and disruptive period of instability may result while force adjustment takes place. For example, making a change to the force protection posture could lead to a near collapse of vital intelligence feeds.

8.06   The term campaign termination is not meant to convey an idea of traditional 'victory' with the formal signing of a cease-fire. Instead its focus is on what happens when the campaign end-state has been achieved: how to preserve that which has been gained, and how to make it enduring. COMJFNZ, recognising that the desired outcome may only be reached some time after the campaign end-state has been achieved, should ensure the following points.

- Early identification of those decisive conditions that indicate successful achievement of the campaign end-state, together with a system of measuring them. These conditions are not immutable and may alter as the campaign progresses.

- Confidence in avoiding a resumption of hostilities. What state should the indigenous forces or warring factions be left in? How will responsibilities be transferred to indigenous or follow-on forces, or other agencies?

Redeployment

8.07   Redeployment at the end of a campaign or operation involves preparing forces and relocating them to a new destination; either to a new deployment area or to home bases. Redeployment is a discrete operation and needs to be planned as such. A plan needs to be developed that considers all necessary factors to safely, effectively, and efficiently withdraw the force from the theatre of operations. Redeployment is normally conducted in stages — the entire Joint Task Force (JTF) usually will not redeploy in one short period. If the campaign or operation is not complete, this phase will involve the redeployment of only those forces that are no longer required, or that are to be rotated.

8.08   Redeployment may include waste disposal, port operations, closing of contracts and other financial obligations, disposing of contracting records and files, clearing of live firing ranges and/or clearance of Unexploded Ordnance (UXO), and ensuring that appropriate force elements remain in place until their missions are complete.

Drawdown

8.09   Drawdown is the graduated, orderly reduction and withdrawal of forces. It is often an intermediate step in the preparation for the complete withdrawal of the force. It may be conducted by the theatre or Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) or a separate HQ. A theatre extraction Team (TET) may be established by Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand (HQJFNZ) to facilitate the recovery of materiel from the operational theatre to an agreed point in New Zealand. Tasks will include the drawdown of non-unit equipment, materiel, and combat supplies, specifically the identification, accounting refurbishment (if necessary), appropriate cleaning and border control clearance, and dispatch of items to the National Support Area (NSA) in accordance with the operational instructions and requirements of COMJFNZ and their subordinate commanders.

8.10   Drawdown will also include giving appropriate specialist advice to withdrawing units on material management issues such as equipment recovery and identification, disposal action if required, and accounts reconciliation. A drawdown unit may also include local disposals and gratuitous issues, and depending on the operation and what remains in-theatre, could conceivably take under command all movement assets associated with force recovery.

Redeployment to Other Contingencies

8.11   Forces deployed may be called upon to rapidly deploy to another theatre. Commanders and their staff should consider how they would extricate forces and ensure that they are prepared for the new contingency. This might include such things as:

- a prioritised redeployment schedule

Figure 8-1: Redeployment is a discrete operation and must therefore be carefully planned.

- identifying aerial ports for linking intra- and inter-theatre airlift

- recent intelligence assessments and associated geospatial intelligence products for the new contingency

- considerations on how to achieve the national strategic objectives of the original contingency through other means.

8.12   Responsibility for the repatriation of material from an operation theatre to an agreed point in New Zealand lies with HQJFNZ. On behalf of COMJFNZ, the J4 (Joint Logistics) will be responsible for the reconstitution of deployed materiel and marginal cost budgets. The Defence Logistic Command (DLC) assists with the receipt, inspection, repair, rectification, and redistribution of materiel. Following guidance on the issue into service of Urgent Operation Requirement (UOR) material, the Component Commander on behalf of the Service Chief, then directs the priority for reconstitution and redistribution of materiel.

Theatre and Force Extraction

8.13   The redeployment of a force out of a theatre of operations is a complex phase, requiring considerable detailed planning, and the deployment of dedicated extraction capabilities such as a Force Extraction Team (FET) or TET.

8.14   Force extraction is the process of repatriating a deployed force from a theatre of operations and

replacing it with another force. It is necessary to deploy a FET during the rotation of most the NZDF's larger overseas missions. A FET is composed of logistics, movement, and subject matter experts such as medical and psychological support staff, and other government agencies such as Ministry of Primary Industries (MPI) and New Zealand Customs staff, deployed from New Zealand. The team manages and directs the rotation process for a deployed force, the maintenance of mission equipment, and the replacement of the outgoing contingent by the incoming New Zealand rotation.

8.15   Theatre extraction is the process of repatriating a deployed force and its entire infrastructure from a theatre of operations, without replacement. This marks the end of the New Zealand presence in the mission area. The New Zealand contingent may or may not handover to a contingent from another nation. A TET is composed of logistics, movement, and subject matter experts from New Zealand, who will manage and direct the repatriation process of the deployed force and its infrastructure. It may also handle the handover of equipment and infrastructure to another nation whose force is replacing the New Zealand contingent. As this task is greater than that of force extraction, it is likely to include additional resources and capabilities.

8.16   **Post-deployment Briefings.** Post-deployment briefings serve a critical function in members' readjustment and in helping their families to return to a normal life. Current NZDF practice is to provide a link between the operational theatre and normal life by providing debriefings at, or very close to, the point of exit from theatre. There are also follow-up post-deployment psychological briefings and questionnaires for most members three months after their return to New Zealand.

Reconstitution

8.17   Reconstitution is the process of restoring materiel and equipment returned from an operational deployment to a serviceable and operationally useable condition, subsequently returning it either to a parent operating unit, or into operational reserve. The

reconstitution process is therefore focussed on the equipment capability and supporting inventories, rather than restoration of the personnel and unit capability which is a separate process referred to as Regeneration. Reconstitution provides time for forces and personnel to recover to the preparedness levels required by strategic policy. Units or individuals may require refresher training prior to reassuming more traditional roles and missions.

8.18   Planning for the reconstitution of redeployed equipment is undertaken by the J4 as part of the theatre drawdown plan. This planning involves the fleet managers (FMs) within DLC with the outcome being an agreed and workable financially costed plan and timeline for the return of equipment and its induction into maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) facilities, and reintegration of any inventories being returned.

8.19   At that agreed point of handover, responsibility for the equipment transfers from the operational commander to the parent Service; however its reconstitution is still managed as a cost against the mission budget.

8.20   Critical to the reconstitution effort and the establishment of costs is the full condition assessment of all equipment and inventory at the agreed point of handover. Deployed operations are often conducted in harsh environments which can markedly reduce the life of equipment and inventory. The implications of accelerated wear and tear, and battle damage must be determined at this time to enable:

- the full funding requirements for reconstitution to be identified

- that any changes to capability lifecycles resulting from the deployment are included in Capability Management Plans.

8.21   Fleet managers need to review short- to medium-term maintenance and inventory plans to ensure that they are aligned to the designated levels of capability required including any changes to contingency reserve stocks.

Key Terms

Cessation of Operations

The cessation of tactical operations directly supporting the execution of the primary mission. Dependent on the tactical situation, this may denote the cessation of overt action but not necessarily the continuance of force protection measures.

Mission Change Date

The date the mission ceases to perform its primary tasks and commences new tasks such as the theatre extraction (including drawdown and redeployment).

Redeployment

Redeployment occurs at the end of an operation and involves preparing forces and relocating them to a new destination, either to a new deployment area or to home bases.

Drawdown

Drawdown is the graduated, orderly reduction and withdrawal of forces. It may be conducted by the theatre or JTFHQ or a separate HQ.

Force Extraction

Force extraction is the process of repatriating a deployed force from a theatre of operations and replacing it with another force.

Theatre Extraction

Theatre extraction is the process of repatriating a deployed force and its entire infrastructure from a theatre of operations without replacement. It marks the end of the New Zealand presence in the mission area.

PART 3:

Joint Operations

CONTENTS

CHAPTER 9:

PLANNING OF JOINT OPERATIONS

CONTENTS

Joint Planning

9.01   A plan is the practical expression of operational art and design. It conveys the commander's vision of how the campaign or operation will unfold, and is translated into actionable detail by operations orders and directives. Plans are essential in providing a common understanding across the joint task force (JTF) of the commander's intent and overall conduct of operations.

9.02   Planning and operations are part of a continuous process. Planning flows into execution, the outcome of which creates the conditions for subsequent planning. Both are interdependent — planning shapes the execution of the campaign or operation plan, but equally the on-going results of execution will cause the joint commander to have to review, adapt, and modify the plan. Planning is considered briefly in this section, at the strategic and operational levels. It is considered in greater detail in New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication (NZDDP)-5.0 *Joint Operations Planning*.

9.03   There are two types of planning.

- **Deliberate Planning.** Deliberate planning is planning for the possible. It is largely assumption-based and concerned with identifying potential military responses to possible scenarios. For example, contingency planning for the defence of New Zealand or a natural disaster in the South Pacific.

- **Immediate Planning.** Immediate planning is planning for the likely or certain. It is situation-based and normally time sensitive. For example, operations (OP) such as OP CASTELL (East Timor International Force for East Timor (INTERFET)), OP KORU (East Timor International Stabilisation Force) (ISF), OP CRIB (Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Team) PRT), and OP RATA (Solomon Islands (Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands) (RAMSI).

Strategic Level Planning

9.04   The strategic level of planning is divided into two levels: national strategic and military strategic.

- **National Strategic Level.** The national strategic level refers to the macro-level, political dimension of planning. Planning at this level mobilises the instruments of national power to meet the Government's objectives. It is concerned with political independence, national sovereignty and security, and the pursuit of wider national interests. Planning at this level is as much about the avoidance of war (conflict prevention) as the conduct of war. National strategy is the collective responsibility of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, articulated through the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet.

- **Military Strategic Level.** The military strategic level is responsible for the military aspects of planning and for directing military effort. This includes outlining the *military* end-state and a broad concept of how it will be achieved, in order to support the *national strategic* end-state. This level is the domain of the Chief of Defence Force (CDF), through Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force (HQNZDF).

Operational Level Planning

9.05   Campaigns and major operations are planned, orchestrated, and commanded at the operational level. This level links the military strategic level to the tactical level by translating military strategy into operational objectives, tasks, and end-states. Commander Joint Forces New Zealand (COMJFNZ) is responsible for operational-level planning within the NZDF, and is supported by Headquarters New Zealand Joint Forces New Zealand (HQJFNZ). This level of planning includes the preparation, deployment, conduct, sustainment, and recovery of force elements.

Tactical Level Planning

9.06   The tactical level is where a campaign or operation is actually executed. Planning at this level considers how to apply force elements — in battles, engagements, and minor operations, for example — to deliver the outcomes required by operational- and strategic-level planners.

Process for Planning Joint Operations

9.07 The NZDF Joint Operations Planning Process (NZDF OPP) guides strategic and operational level planning for the command and employment of NZDF force elements. While the NZDF OPP delineates the planning responsibilities at the strategic and operational levels it is designed to allow parallel planning at all levels. See New Zealand Defence Force Publication (NZDDP)–5.0 *Joint Operations Planning* and the NZDF approved Australian Defence Force Publication (ADFP)–5.0.1 *Joint Military Appreciation Process* for further guidance.

9.08 The NZDF's planning for operations draws on the joint operational tenets, the joint functions and the elements of operational design. Operational tenets such as the manoeuvrist approach provide strategies and prompt creativity in the planning process. The joint functions are used to assist commanders to integrate, and synchronise and coordinate related capabilities and activities within the plan. Design elements provide the structure within which operations take place. See Chapter 2 for further discussion on design elements.

9.09 Operational plans are the practical expression of operational art and design. They convey the commander's vision of how operations should unfold and translate orders and directives into operational details, through operation instructions. As a minimum, the plan should clearly set out the following:

- the end-state

- the objectives, their relative importance, and the sequence in which they are to be achieved in order to realise the end-state

- any desired and undesired outcomes to be achieved or mitigated respectively

- the tasks that need to be conducted to gain success

- how success will be measured

- the conditions to achieve in order to realise the end-state

- the assignment of forces, resources, and necessary command and control (C2) arrangements.

9.10 **Planning Responsibility.** At all levels, planning for operations is a HQ-wide function and will involve all joint staff and specialist advisors, where appropriate. However, in the majority of instances, the planning activity will be led by either the joint plans or operations staff. As a general rule, the division of lead planning responsibility is as follows:

- **Planning Staff.** The planning staff will lead all deliberate planning activities and will usually lead the following immediate planning activities:

  - campaign planning

  - major operations

  - minor operations with a long lead time

  - branches identified in a future phase of an on-going operation

  - unforeseen branches in an on-going operation

  - sequels.

- **Operations Staff.** The operations staff generally will lead immediate planning in the following areas:

  - minor operations with short-notice lead time

  - crisis response operations

  - branches identified within the current phase of an on-going operation.

9.11 **Stages of the Joint Operations Planning Process.** Effective joint operations planning is a formalised, sequenced process involving the commander and staff. While any planning process is linear and iterative, it also involves the constant review of inputs and outputs in terms of earlier steps in the process, and constant interaction between the commander and staff. The stages of joint operations planning, from the initiating requirements through to execution of the operation include:

- Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE)

- the Joint Military Appreciation Process (JMAP)

- plan development and execution.

9.12 **Step One: Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.** A key part of the joint operations planning process is the JIPOE. The JIPOE

Figure 9-1: Joint operations planning process.

assesses the environment and stakeholders, including threat impediments to the JIPOE of the mission. The JIPOE should commence as early as possible and runs in parallel to the JMAP. Timely intelligence assessments and specialist products are the precursor to effective planning. There are four steps in the JIPOE.

- **Define the Operational Environment.** Outlines the environment, stakeholders, threats, and own forces. It also defines characteristics of the operating environment that may affect both the adversary and friendly forces.

- **Describe the Operational Environment Effects.** Evaluates the impact of the operational environment on adversary, friendly, and neutral military capabilities, and describes their potential impact on own and adversary COAs.

- **Evaluate the Threat(s).** Identifies and evaluates the adversary's capabilities and limitations, current situation, centre of gravity (CoG), and the doctrine, patterns of operation, and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) employed by adversary forces. Evaluates the characteristics of each threat and determines current threat capability, disposition, and operational habits. It also determines own CoG from both own and enemy perspective, and enemy CoG.

- **Determine Threat Courses of Action.** This final JIPOE step develops a detailed understanding of the adversary's probable intent and future strategy. It assesses possible threat courses of action (COA) and determines the most likely and most dangerous COAs — actions that could result in the dislocation of the CoG.

9.13 **Step Two: Joint Military Appreciation Process.** The core of the joint operations planning process is the JMAP, which is used to plan NZDF campaigns and operations. The JMAP is a military problem-solving process, formatted to make sense out of confusion and enable the development of a feasible COA and a subsequent CONOPS. The JMAP is used to plan the campaign or operation, the conduct of which is monitored against the plan. If objectives are not being achieved, the JMAP is revisited to adjust the plan (branches) and/or develop a new plan (sequels).

9.14 The JMAP can be adapted and applied at any level, and can be used in full or abridged, depending upon time and staff resources available. This process can be initiated by an event, decision, preliminary scoping, and/or initial commander's guidance. The JMAP is intimately connected to the JIPOE and the continuous intelligence cycle, which ensure that the

planning and conduct of operations are focused on the real situation as it changes.

9.15   There are five steps to the JMAP, which are listed below.

- **Scoping and Framing.** Scoping and framing contributes to the development of situational understanding. Scoping and framing may include:

  - examining the requirements identified within the commander's initial guidance

  - identifying initial force preparation and capability requirements

  - seeking guidance from previous deliberate or immediate planning activities

  - conducting framing to ensure the correct problem has been identified and will be subsequently addressed during the conduct of planning.

- Outputs of scoping and framing include the environment and problem frames, a listing of information requirements in priority order, confirmation of the commander's initial planning guidance, identification of the desired end-state, and the initial identification of types of force element that may be required to conduct the impending campaign or operation.

- **Mission Analysis.** Mission analysis identifies, from higher level guidance, stated and implied tasks, the mission, commander's intent, and broad operational themes.

- **Course of Action Development.** COA development refines the commander's intent and broad operational themes into a number of potentially workable and distinguishable options to achieve the end-state.

- **Course of Action Analysis.** COA analysis validates each friendly COA for workability, strengths, and vulnerabilities in comparison to selected threat COAs. This identifies modifications to workable COAs and discounts unworkable options.

- **Decision and Concept of Operations Development.** This final JMAP step involves the commander deciding on the optimal COA. Selection is based on the criteria of suitability, feasibility, acceptability, and sustainability. The staff then develops a CONOPS based on the selected COA, to pass to the superior commander for approval.

9.16   The JMAP is explained in detail in the NZDF-approved ADFP–5.0.1—*Joint Military Appreciation Process*.

9.17   **Step Three: Operation Plan Development and Execution.** On completion of the JMAP, the final stage of the joint operations planning process is the development and execution of a plan. The staff will develop the plan, usually an operation plan, based on the approved CONOPS. The operation plan will be used as the basis for developing the associated operation orders or instructions, to be passed to subordinate commanders for action.

9.18   Once the operation commences, the HQ staff continually assesses progress towards the end-state and achievement of objectives and tasks. The J3 (Joint Operations) staff monitors and controls the operation, including conducting immediate planning as adjustments are required, for example activating planned branches and/or sequels. The J5 (Joint Planning) staff conducts planning in support of the current operation as required, in the form of additional branches and sequels.

Preparedness

9.19   With planning being conducted for an operation, the NZDF must ensure that the force elements it intends to use are prepared for military operations. NZDF force elements are kept at varying levels of capability, depending on the employment contexts in which they are likely to be used. In order to be employed on a military operation or task, NZDF force elements must reach their operational level of capability (OLOC). Reaching OLOC means that a particular force element has the required level of preparedness to be deployed. Within the NZDF, there are four ingredients of preparedness: readiness, combat viability, deployability, and sustainability.

9.20   **Readiness.** Readiness is the current proficiency and effectiveness of a force in conducting a range of activities, defined against an employment context, a specified response time, and a level of capability. In the case of NZDF force elements being deployed on operations, an OLOC is required prior to deployment. Force readiness comprises personnel, trained state (individual and unit), equipment held and its condition (serviceability), and tactical C2, communications, and intelligence.

9.21   **Combat Viability.** Combat viability is the in-theatre ability of a force to achieve its military task or mission, using current resources. It incorporates the following:

- the ability of service personnel to engage in combat with due regard for morale, leadership, and a sense of mission

- the sufficiency of equipment to provide firepower, protection to personnel, and other battlefield attributes to the level required by the threat

- the adequacy of military doctrine and tactics to make effective use of personnel and equipment

- the standard of collective or combined training

- the ability of the force to achieve the level and duration of fighting to achieve its objectives

- the effectiveness of standardisation when working with friendly forces.

9.22   **Deployability.** Deployability is the capacity of a force element to move to an OLOC, complete final preparations, and assemble for deployment within a specified time. Deployability is achieved when OLOC

Figure 9-2: Training contributes to the preparedness for military operations.

generation training is complete, equipment and munitions are prepared for deployment, and personnel and equipment are positioned for embarkation by sea or air.

9.23   **Sustainability.** Sustainability is the ability to support a designated force at operating tempo throughout the duration of an operation. It includes the availability of replacement personnel, equipment maintenance, sufficiency of second- and third-line stocks, and the lift capacity to carry all of these into theatre and to those force elements requiring them.

Managing the Operational Environment

9.24   The operational environment has nine interrelated domains, plus numerous operational areas, which frame all military and non-military activities. The management of the operational environment is a command function that facilitates own force operational freedom of action, whilst denying this freedom to the adversary.

9.25   Within the operational environment, it is essential to coordinate the conflicting needs of force elements, all operating within a potentially confusing and densely occupied area. Ineffective management of the operational environment can cause fratricide, and the loss of operational tempo and freedom of manoeuvre. This can result in an inability to effectively attack an adversary's critical vulnerabilities and CoG when opportunities arise.

9.26   All levels of command are responsible for managing the operational environment. However, the focus of commanders at different levels will vary and will require unique solutions. For example, the strategic and operational levels may focus on issues such as host-nation access and support, basing, over-flight and access to territorial waters. The tactical level, on the other hand, will likely focus on more detailed planning within the joint force area of operations (JFAO).

9.27   This section addresses the four main areas to be taken into consideration when managing the operational environment:

- operational management

- battle rhythm

- situational awareness

- important relationships.

Operational Management

9.28   Armed forces undertake a wide range of potentially simultaneous activities within an operation. The changing balance between these activities will often change the character of an operation (the predominant theme) gradually over time. It will often be difficult to identify a single moment of transition or point of change. Judgement will be required to determine the most suitable philosophical approach to each activity. Given the complex nature of joint operations, a number of control mechanisms exist that are used to order activities and to ensure that priorities are understood. The following paragraphs concentrate on those areas in which the joint commander should play a significant role.

9.29   **Monitoring Progress.** Assessment is a process that measures the progress of the joint force toward mission accomplishment. The assessment process begins during mission analysis when the commander and staff consider what to measure and how to measure it, to determine progress toward accomplishing a task, or achieving an objective. Assessment actions and measures help commanders to adjust operations and resources as required, to determine when to execute branches and sequels, and to make critical decisions that ensure operations remain aligned with the mission and military end-state. A rigorous monitoring and assessment process will allow the commander to make judgements on the following points below.

- **Apportionment.** The process should assess the likelihood of achieving individual decisive points and so inform the joint commander's apportionment of effort between critical capabilities.

- **Contingency Planning.** The process should be able to gauge whether the operational plan is on track and so identify the need for contingency plans, in the form of branches and sequels.

- **Confirming Adversary Centre(s) of Gravity.** The process should confirm that the correct CoG(s) and associated critical vulnerabilities have been selected. The joint commander should be alert to the possibility that new critical vulnerabilities may be exposed, or that previously identified critical vulnerabilities may be too well protected to be attacked. Thus CoG analysis should be an iterative process for planning staff and the CoG(s) should be reviewed periodically.

9.30 Assessment occurs at all levels and across the entire range of military operations. Even in operations that do not include combat, assessment of progress is just as important and can be more complex than traditional combat assessment. As a general rule, the level at which a specific operation, task, or action is directed should be the level at which such activity is assessed.

- **Strategic and Operational Levels.** Assessment at the operational and strategic levels typically is broader than at the tactical level, and uses measures of effectiveness that concentrate on broader tasks, objectives, and progress toward the military end-state. Continuous assessment helps the joint commander to determine if the joint force is 'doing the right things' to achieve its objectives, not just 'doing things right'.

- **Tactical Level.** Tactical-level assessment typically uses measures of performance to evaluate task accomplishment. It may include assessing progress by phase lines, destruction of enemy forces, control of key terrain, peoples, or resources, and security, relief, or reconstruction tasks. Assessment at this level helps determine operational and strategic progress, so the joint commander must have an integrated assessment plan that links assessment activities and measures at all levels.

9.31 **Managing Lines of Operation.** Lines of operation show the inter-relationship between decisive points. As such, they are a way of visualising the overall activity within a force, and coordinating and deconflicting the activities of force elements. The careful management of lines of operation allows the force to

realise its full potential. Two tools which can assist in this are the campaign/operation plan schematic and the synchronisation matrix.

- **Schematic.** The schematic enables the overall plan to be visualised at a glance and can be used to monitor progress.

- **Synchronisation Matrix.** The matrix is the method for planning the coordination of activity between force elements, in time and space, along the path to the objective. An example of a synchronisation matrix can be found in the NZDF-approved ADFP–5.0.1 *Joint Military Appreciation Process*.

9.32 **Risk.** Risk is inherent in military operations, and managing risk is a key element of command. Commanders must accept that risk cannot be completely eliminated, but must be managed and/or mitigated. This is based on the level of risk that a commander is prepared to accept in order to achieve operational objectives. The management of risk is about preserving lives and resources by avoiding or limiting unnecessary risk. The commander should balance the consequences and acceptance of risk against the attainment of objectives and the end-state.

Battle Rhythm

9.33 Battle rhythm is the method used to fuse staff effort and synchronise concurrent activity. It is a routine cycle of meetings, briefings, reports, and returns involving staff in the Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) and potentially higher HQ. While battle rhythm promotes shared situational awareness and informs the chain of command, it is not an end in itself. It ultimately exists to support the conduct of operations and tactical activities. A sustainable battle rhythm should include a staff surge capacity to meet the demands of increased operational tempo and assist the commander to exploit the time domain. The elements of battle rhythm are discussed below.

9.34 **Meetings, Reports, and Returns.** At the heart of a joint HQ' internal regulatory mechanism is a series of meetings, briefings, planning groups, and informal and specialist gatherings, all used to coordinate activity

and aid synchronisation. The relative importance of each meeting will depend on the type, scale, and intensity of the operation. Consequently, the Chief of Staff (COS) may incorporate some meetings into others, with the aim of reducing time spent in meetings by the joint commander and staff.

9.35   The outputs of these fora are, broadly:

- a common understanding of the situation, achieved through briefings

- dealing with key issues and taking operational decisions

- deciding priorities and allocating resources to match them

- issuing direction and guidance

- focusing staff effort over the next period

- general coordination.

9.36   Apart from routine meetings, another important activity in the battle rhythm cycle is the production of formal daily reports and returns. Reports and returns requirements will be dictated by the commander and promulgated in appropriate orders and instructions.

9.37   **Synchronisation of Component Battle Rhythms.** If the component method of command is being used, operational tempo is likely to vary between components. For example, the air component battle rhythm will be dictated by the air tasking order cycle, which is typically 72 to 96 hours. Other components have different cyclical requirements and action times, and the extent to which the COS can synchronise them will contribute greatly to force synergy.

9.38   **Routine Influences on Battle Rhythm.** There are a number of routine influences on Battle Rhythm.

- **Time Zones.** Battle rhythm can be complicated in multinational operations, where widely varying time zones and daily rhythms can cause significant dislocation; particularly as the lead nation's or higher HQ' requirements will normally take precedence. When operations involve assets deploying from

multiple time zones, such as aircraft from one time zone providing close air support (CAS) to troops in another, there is a high probability of confusion. At best this may be a minor inconvenience; at worst it could result in significant casualties or the loss of a force element due to a lack of essential support. To overcome this, a common time zone should routinely be employed.

- **National Imperatives and Considerations.** Military activity is conducted under political authority and as such, information flow up the chain of command to the strategic level must be accurate and timely. This is particularly important to inform the Government of incidents ahead of media reporting, even before the military chain of command may have formally gathered all relevant facts. Battle rhythm planning must factor in the need for immediate reporting of incidents, formal routine reporting, and short notice requests requiring immediate attention up the chain of command.

- **Parallel Briefing.** Multinational operations will often require multiple reporting chains, all of which may need to be deconflicted. Reporting priorities should be driven by operational expedience and the requirement for appropriate situational awareness at the top of each chain.

- **Multinational Influences.** Multinational operations add to briefing tasks. Required briefings to international authorities or organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and/or coalition partners can consume a significant amount of a commander's time, to the extent that they may become the principle activity. Commanders are likely to have to allocate dedicated staff effort to manage this task.

- **Synchronised Shift Changes.** Synchronised shift changes are required across all joint HQ staff, to ensure that shared situational awareness is maintained.

- **Human Factors.** The demands placed on individuals during intense and prolonged 24/7 operations cannot be underestimated. Rest and recuperation time should be factored into staff routines. Personnel required to work long hours for extended periods will lose their sharpness and objectivity, resulting in a

tired staff incapable of responding to the unexpected. However, there must be a balance between providing rest and maintaining situational awareness. Commanders are responsible for ensuring the well-being and morale of their subordinates.

- **Media.** Media deadlines, particularly those for key morning and evening broadcasts, should be considered. Often the staffing times required to either rebut or confirm incidents will be tied to these deadlines.

- **Communications and Information Systems.** Communications and information systems (CIS) can be particularly complicated in multinational operations, with differing procedures, languages, equipment, security practices, and information management processes. The ability to share information in a multinational environment is therefore significantly complicated, which in turn affects the tempo of operations and the level of situational awareness.

9.39   **Incident Management.** Serious incidents invariably occur on operations. The commander should have an incident management process in place to deal with the unexpected. Incident management involves understanding, containing, and reacting to the consequences of the incident within the operational environment. Some incidents such as collateral damage, civilian casualties, loss of an aircraft, mass casualties and fratricide should have standing plans, whilst others will be managed as the incident develops. This may involve a range of activities, which could include force movement and deployments, casualty evacuation, investigations, and other associated activities. A critical part of incident management is reporting and managing the flow and content of relevant information.

- **Significant Incident Reporting.** Significant incidents will normally be reported via the chain of command; however media will often dictate the speed with which information reaches the public domain. All incidents generate a demand for information, possibly up to ministerial level and often at short notice, and may require a subsequent media briefing. The JTFHQ will monitor the incident and keep force elements and higher HQ informed.

- **Rebuttal.** Public reporting of an incident may require rebuttal or correction. Rebuttal is a defensive action to correct factual inaccuracies in media reporting, or to refute allegations. This will be carried out by designated and authorised Defence spokespersons at the strategic level, in accordance with defence policy.

Situational Awareness

9.40   Situational awareness is defined as the understanding of the operational environment in the context of a commander's (or staff officer's) mission (or task). Shared situational awareness involves the sharing of that understanding of the operational environment across the force and aids in achieving situational understanding.

9.41   **Shared Situational Awareness.** Shared situational awareness should inform friendly forces of the location, intent and constraints of own and adversary forces, and neutral elements. Shared situational awareness includes:

- information on the physical environment (geography, meteorology, oceanography, and hydrography)

- the status, posture, and sustainability of own forces

- the status and possible intentions of the adversary

- locations and actions of other groups of interest within the JFAO

- understanding possible consequences of actions by own, adversary, and neutral elements

- the common operational picture.

9.42   Shared situational awareness promotes effective management of the operational environment, supports coordination and synchronisation of military action, and is a key component of force protection. The situational awareness needs of commanders and staff depend on their role and level. However, many of the systems, processes, and displays that provide this awareness will be common.

9.43   Maritime and air operations are heavily platform-based and the environments themselves are relatively uncluttered compared to land operations. Consequently, dynamic maritime and air information on own and adversary forces, at good resolution, tends to be more readily available at the operational and tactical levels of command. Maritime and air information is exchanged automatically through tactical data links and presented as either near real-time pictures on command systems or non-real-time pictures on networked command and mission support systems.

9.44   The land environment is more complex and diffuse, due to the myriad elements and variables involved. Additionally, being only partially platform-based, it is more difficult to digitise. Land situational awareness is generally achieved by aggregation of information and knowledge provided through a series of HQ, and is generally presented by non-digital, procedural means.

9.45   **Techniques Used to Aid Shared Situational Awareness.** A variety of tools can be used to create understanding, aid deconfliction, and enhance synchronisation.

- **Information Management.** Information management is the effective handling of all forms of information into, within, and out of a joint HQ. Information management aims to ensure that information gets to the right people, at the right time and in the right form, thus easing the planning and conduct of operations across the operational environment. It is fundamental to decision superiority, which in turn is critical for successful operations.

- **Common Operational Picture.** The (near) real-time exchange of tactical data via a network of tactical data links has been a fundamental aspect of operations for many years, particularly in the maritime and air environments. However, it is constrained both by the equipment level of participating forces and by the manner in which the tactical data link capability has been implemented into the platforms.

- **Synchronisation Matrix.** Synchronisation matrices, an output of the JMAP, have traditionally proved

to be a useful tool in showing the many activities that require sequencing, as well as indicating, at a glance, possible areas of conflict or uncertainty. An example of a synchronisation matrix can be found in the NZDF-approved ADDP–5.0.1 *Joint Military Appreciation Process*.

- **Mission Rehearsal.** At any level, a commonly used and well understood rehearsal technique is to conduct a walk-through, talk-through, mission rehearsal. This involves the key personalities in a stage or activity, but is usually open to as wide an audience as possible, commensurate with operations security. Effectively, this is a verbal rehearsal where participants become accustomed to their role, as well as understand the impact of their actions on others. These rehearsals require the participation of a multi-disciplined, unbiased 'Red Team' who will consider events from the adversary's perspective.

- **Mission Essential Checklists.** A mission essential checklist is a detailed matrix of actions and sequences. It details the go/no go criteria for discrete activities within the operation, including anticipating actions that could cause the mission to be aborted. The lists are usually constructed in codeword format to preserve operations security and to aid simplicity.

- **Wargaming.** Wargaming should not just be regarded as an aid to deliberate planning; it can be conducted at any stage of execution and can consider a wide range of eventualities. Normally based on an action and consequence format, a range of manual and computer-generated techniques can be used to great effect. However it is important to appreciate that, to be of real value, the solutions generated by operational analysis must be subjected to rigorous military judgement.

9.46   **Combat Identification.** Combat identification (ID) is a vital part of managing the operational environment. Combat ID aims to rapidly and securely identify and locate combatants and platforms within the JFAO, thus contributing to shared situational awareness. All forces deployed within the JFAO require combat ID in order to prevent fratricide. This is especially important for special operations forces operating behind adversary lines and any other deep manoeuvre assets operating

in the same area. Combat ID supports targeting by differentiating friendly, adversary and neutral forces, personnel, and systems.

9.47   In formulating the combat ID aspects of their operation plan, the joint commander should consider the likely consequences of friendly fire incidents. Such incidents will inevitably be controversial, and may undermine the legitimacy of the operation. In all circumstances where there is a risk of fratricide, honesty will be needed where genuine mistakes have been made, together with the capability to rapidly establish the true facts of each situation. Linked to this is the requirement for a responsive media approach, which is authoritative, informed, well-coordinated, and timely.

9.48   **Multinational Considerations for Combat Identification.** Establishing a sound approach to combat ID in multinational operations will pose particular challenges. Individual nations will have varying combat ID capabilities, and varying abilities to minimise the dangers of friendly fire. For example, some will be less likely to cause such incidents due to more restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) or through their doctrine, training and technical approach. Some nations may accept casualties as an inevitable consequence of military operations; others may regard them as controversial and a cause to doubt their continuing involvement in operations. The joint commander should be aware of these differences and, where possible, should allocate missions and areas of operation (AO) appropriately. Training and liaison are also a key means of reducing risk.

Important Relationships

9.49   Operations are increasingly being conducted in a joint, inter-agency and multinational environment. This requires the commander to consider the sensitivities and in some cases needs of external parties. These could include other government agencies, international organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), allies, neutrals, and the host-nation. Forging, maintaining, and utilising relationships with all interested parties should be a key commitment for a commander.

In addition, media interest and associated political pressures, allied with any responsibility for the security of non-military parties, are also considerations.

9.50   **Inter-element.** Each force element in the operational environment has unique requirements that affect its designated roles and missions. Force elements are well-practiced in the management and conduct of operations in their own environments. However, difficulties may arise where they intersect with the activities of other force elements. A joint commander needs to be cognisant of force element activities, to ensure that they are synchronised and deconflicted, and that maximum use of the operational environment is achieved.

9.51   **Comprehensive Approach.** The New Zealand comprehensive approach aims to build open and effective relationships between government and non-government agencies. This approach develops trust and understanding, and should improve shared situational awareness. However while clearly beneficial, it adds complexity to the operational environment, which must be managed.

9.52   **Civil-military.** The NZDF conducts military operations within an integrated operational environment, which is influenced by civil and political dimensions. Civil-military operations (CMO) involve interaction with other government agencies, international organisations, NGOs, the host-nation, media, and the civil community. CMO develop bonds with local and international communities and agencies. As such, this interface may affect other operations. Further information on CMO is contained in the NZDF-approved ADDP–3.11 *Civil Military Operations*.

9.53   **Coalition.** Operational deployments of the NZDF have generally been as part of a coalition. An effective coalition depends upon trust and understanding, which is supported by effective management of the operational environment. Shared situational awareness, a clear understanding of force capabilities and tasks, and the provision of liaison officers at all levels, are key to effective management. Further information is contained in the NZDF-approved

ADDP–00.3 *Multinational Operations* and its New Zealand supplement.

9.54   **Media.** The NZDF will deal with the media at all levels. Supportive media coverage will play a key role in maintaining public support and the endorsement of the international community, which are important contributors to maintaining the morale and cohesion of the JTF. A proactive, well-managed approach to the media will therefore be important in any campaign or joint operation.

CHAPTER 10:

EXECUTION OF JOINT OPERATIONS

CONTENTS

Introduction

10.01   All operations require diligent planning and execution due to the time, effort, and national resources committed. All operations strive for unity of effort among the forces and serve to focus the activities of other actors under a comprehensive approach. With any operation, there is no single prescription for success; however there are recurring themes that can serve as an overall framework for applying the principles of war.

10.02   A framework for planning and conducting conventional operations is provided by the activities of:

Figure 10-1: All operations require diligent planning and execution due to the time, effort, and national resources committed.

- shape

- deter

- seize initiative

- dominate

- stabilise

- enable civil authority.

10.03   This framework illustrates how a joint commander might arrange operations through phasing. These activities are introduced in the following section, Phasing a Joint Operation. They are later considered individually, looking at key elements or considerations of each phase.

10.04   Fundamental to any military activity are offensive and defensive tactical operations and stability operations. The balance between these activities is also considered in this chapter, along with aspects of the physical environment that merit reflection due to their potential impact on military operations.

Phasing a Joint Operation

10.05   **Purpose.** The purpose of phasing is to help the joint commander organise operations. It helps the commander and their staff to visualise and think through an entire operation, and define requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space, and purpose. The primary benefit of phasing is that it helps commanders systematically achieve military objectives that cannot be attained all at once, by arranging smaller, related operations in a logical sequence. Commanders can phase operations to achieve intermediate objectives, thus gaining progressive advantages that help to achieve primary objectives.

10.06   **Application.** The joint commander's vision of how the operation should unfold drives subsequent phasing decisions. Phasing assists in framing commander's intent and assigning tasks to subordinate commanders. Each phase should represent a natural subdivision of the operation's intermediate objectives. A phase represents a definitive stage during which a

large portion of force elements and capabilities are involved in similar or mutually supporting activities.

10.07   **Sequence.** Shaping and deterring activities continue throughout an operation, at a generally constant level of effort. However, dominating activities, particularly in large-scale combat operations, generally peak after the force seizes the initiative, and then fall off as the situation stabilises and leadership shifts to civil authorities. Working within this generic phasing construct, an operation's actual phases will vary (compressed, expanded, or omitted entirely) according to the nature of the operation and the military objectives.

10.08   **Overlap.** During planning, the joint commander establishes conditions, objectives or events for transitioning from one phase to another, and plans sequels and branches for potential contingencies. Phases do not overlap each other, but some activities from a phase will continue into subsequent phases or actually begin during a previous phase. The joint commander can adjust the phases to exploit opportunities or react to unforeseen circumstances.

10.09   **Transition.** Transitions between phases are distinct shifts in the focus of operations. The shift from one phase to the next normally occurs when the joint task force (JTF) achieves the phase's objectives, or when enemy actions require the joint commander to significantly adjust planned operations. A change in focus takes time and may require a change in priorities, command relationships, force allocation, or even the boundaries of the operational area. An example is the shift from sustained combat operations in the dominate phase to mostly stability operations in the 'stabilise and enable' civil authority phases. Hostilities may lessen as order, commerce, and local government are re-established, and adversaries are deterred from resuming hostile action. This challenge demands an agile shift in the JTF's skill sets, actions, behaviour, and attitude, and coordination with a wide range of partners to facilitate stabilisation and transition to civil authority.

10.10   **Phasing Model.** Although the joint commander determines the specific phases for the operation, the generic model in Figure 10-2 is useful as a starting point for planning most operations. Following the figure is a discussion of each phase.

Figure 10-2: Phasing model.

10.11   **Shape.** Joint and multinational operations and various inter-agency activities occur routinely during the shape phase. Shape activities are executed continuously with the intent to enhance international legitimacy and gain multinational cooperation in support of defined military and national strategic objectives. These activities are designed to assure success in a number of ways:

- shaping perceptions and influencing adversaries' and allies' behaviour

- developing friendly military capabilities for self-defence and multinational operations

- improving information exchange and intelligence sharing

- providing New Zealand forces with peacetime and contingency access to the host-nation.

10.12   Physical shaping includes:

- destruction of particular adversary capabilities that could interfere with the decisive engagement

- seizure of key terrain, which if held by the adversary would affect the decisive engagement

- interdiction of the movement of adversary forces and sustainment.

10.13   Psychological shaping includes:

- information operations

- influence activities

- deception

- psychological operations to undermine and isolate adversary within their community.

10.14   The joint commander must adapt shape phase activities to a particular theatre environment. These activities may be executed in one theatre in order to achieve objectives in another.

10.15   Deter. The intent of this phase is to deter an adversary from undesirable actions, because of friendly

capabilities and the will to use them. Deter differs from the deterrence that occurs in the shape phase, because deter is characterised by preparatory activities that indicate the intent to execute subsequent phases of the planned operation. Many actions in the deter phase build on activities from the previous phase. In support of the joint commander's concept of operations (CONOPS), these actions may include:

- tailoring of forces and other pre-deployment activities

- initial over-flight permission(s) and/or deployment into a theatre

- employment of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets

- development of mission-tailored command and control (C2), intelligence, force protection, and logistic requirements.

10.16   **Seize Initiative.** The joint commander will seek to seize the initiative through a mix of design, planning, initiative, and the use of joint force capabilities. In combat, this involves both defensive and offensive operations at the earliest possible time, forcing the enemy to culminate offensively and setting the conditions for friendly decisive operations. Rapid application of combat power may be required to delay, impede, or halt the enemy's initial aggression and deny their initial objectives. If an enemy has already achieved their initial objectives, offensive combat must dislodge enemy forces and create the conditions necessary to ultimately destroy those forces and their will to fight in the dominate phase. Operations to gain access to theatre infrastructure and expand friendly freedom of action continue during this phase, while the joint commander seeks to degrade enemy capabilities with the intent of resolving the crisis at the earliest opportunity.

10.17   **Dominate.** This phase focuses on breaking the enemy's will to resist or, in non-combat situations, controlling the operational environment. Success in the dominate phase depends on overmatching the adversary's capabilities at the right time and place. When operations focus on traditional enemy combat forces, the dominate phase normally concludes with decisive operations that drive an enemy to culmination. Against an irregular adversary, decisive operations are characterised by controlling the operational environment through a balance of offensive, defensive, and stability operations. In non-combat situations, the joint commander seeks to control the circumstances that require the use of military power. Dominate activities may establish the conditions to achieve the strategic objectives early, or may set the conditions for transition to the next phase of the operation.

10.18   **Stabilise.** The intent in this phase is to help restore local political, economic, and infrastructure ability. Civilian officials may lead operations during part or all of this phase, but the joint commander will typically provide significant supporting capabilities and activities until legitimate local entities are functioning. The stabilise phase is typically characterised by a change from sustained combat operations to stability operations. These operations help to re-establish a safe and secure environment and provide essential government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. Redeployment operations may begin during this phase. The joint commander should continuously assess the impact of operations in this phase on the ability to transfer authority for remaining requirements to a legitimate civil entity, which marks the end of the phase. The tasks and activities typically associated with stability operations do not occur only within the stabilise phase. The balance of offensive, defensive, and stability operations is discussed in the following section.

10.19   **Enable Civil Authority.** This phase is predominantly characterised by JTF support to legitimate civil governance. The joint commander provides this support by agreement with the appropriate civil authority. The purpose is to enable the civil authority to regain its ability to govern and meet the needs of the population. Military forces will most likely be working alongside and in cooperation with a number of other agencies, as part of a comprehensive approach. Redeployment operations may begin during this phase. The military end-state is achieved during this phase, signalling the end of the joint operation, which concludes when redeployment is complete.

Offensive, Defensive, and Stability and Support Operations

10.20   All New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) operational activities are either offensive, defensive, or stability and support in nature and apply across the framework of operations (see Figure 10-3). The emphasis given to offence or defence, and the use of lethal or less-lethal systems, will vary depending on an operation's objectives and end-state. Although the majority of activities on operations are likely to be defensive, it is offence that is normally decisive in combat. The relationship between offence and defence is a complementary one — defensive operations enable the conduct of offensive operations.

10.21   **Offensive Operations.** Offensive operations are the joint commander's ultimate means of seizing the initiative by attacking the adversary's centres of gravity (CoGs), and critical capabilities and vulnerabilities. To achieve objectives quickly and at the least cost, the commander will seek the earliest opportunity to conduct decisive, offensive operations. Nevertheless, a period

of shaping and force build-up is normally required. Economy of effort is also needed to concentrate sufficient combat power for the conduct of offensive operations. This may entail minimising all other activity and resources to cover only the conduct of essential defensive activity.

10.22   **Defensive Operations.** Defensive operations are primarily conducted to overcome an adversary's advantage, preserve our combat power, and protect our CoG, critical capabilities, and vulnerabilities. Defence provides a secure foundation and the time to prepare for and conduct offensive operations. The major challenge of defensive activity is to maintain the cohesion of own forces, whilst wearing down the adversary. An effective defence is rarely passive, as the defender resists and contains the adversary while seeking every opportunity to move onto the offensive.

Stability and Support Operations

10.23   These missions, tasks, and activities seek to maintain or re-establish a safe and secure

Figure 10-3: Notional balance between offensive, defensive, and stability and support operations.

environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, or humanitarian relief. Many of these activities are the essence of civil-military operations (CMO). To reach the military strategic end-state, the joint commander must integrate and synchronise stability and support operations (SASO) with other operations (offensive and defensive) within each campaign or operation phase. SASO will likely be conducted as part of a comprehensive approach, in coordination with and in support of host-nation authorities, other government agencies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), international organisations, and the private sector.

10.24   Several fundamental principles of peace operations will likely apply to the conduct of stability operations:

- consent

- impartiality

- transparency

- credibility

- freedom of movement

- flexibility and adaptability

- civil-military harmonisation

- mutual respect.

Physical Environment Considerations

10.25   **Weather, Terrain, and Sea Conditions.** Weather, terrain, and sea conditions should be carefully assessed before undertaking sustained combat operations, as they can significantly affect operations and logistic support. Poor conditions can affect force mobility, the integration and synchronisation of operations, and the ability to employ precision munitions. Climatological and hydrographic planning tools, studies, and forecast products help the commander to determine the most advantageous time and location to conduct operations.

ACTIVITIES COMMON TO OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
Information Operations
Special Operations
Close Air Support
Anti-submarine Warfare
Anti-surface Warfare
Anti-air Warfare
Land Manoeuvre

OFFENSIVE ACTIVITIES

Counter-air
Interdiction
Naval Surface Fire Support
Maritime Strike
Mining

Including advance, attack, and pursuit

DEFENSIVE ACTIVITIES

Defensive Counter-air
Force Protection
Maritime Screening
Area Defence
Defensive Mining

Including delaying, deliberate mobile defence, and counter-attack

Figure 10-4: Offensive and defensive activities.

Figure 10-5: New Zealand Defence Force elements must operate in complex terrain.

10.26   **Complex Terrain.** Complex terrain is terrain in which operations may not be conducted easily by conventional forces. Examples are urban, mountainous, forests, jungle, arctic, and desert; they may require specially designed equipment and suitably trained personnel. The movement, manoeuvre, C2, and sustainment of force elements can be greatly complicated by complex terrain. Complex terrain can change the fundamental nature of basic tasks. For example, seizing "key terrain" — high ground — in truly mountainous terrain does not afford the usual advantages of line of sight communications, the employment of direct fires, and advanced warning.

10.27   The urban area possesses all the characteristics of the natural landscape, with the addition of man-made construction, infrastructure, and most importantly — a high density of non-combatants.

Thus the urban area is not merely physical terrain but a dynamic, complex environment that the joint force must be capable of understanding. The joint force will be required to sense, locate, and isolate the adversary among non-combatants, requiring the precise and discriminate application of combat power.

10.28   **Littoral Areas.** The littoral area contains two parts. The first is the area seaward of the coast, which must be controlled to support operations ashore. The second is the area inland from the coast, such as estuaries and rivers, which can be supported and defended directly from the sea. Control of the littoral area is often essential to maritime superiority, as the littoral area can project power, fire, and forces. They can facilitate the entry and movement of other elements of the JTF, through to the seizure of an adversary's port, naval base, or air base.

New Zealand **Defence Doctrine Publication**

Figure 10-6: 2 Pounder anti-tank gun Portee in the Western Desert.

Real-Life Example

The Impact of Terrain on Operations: Ruweisat Ridge

On the night of 14 July 1942, 5 Brigade of the 2nd New Zealand Division participated in an Eighth Army night attack to capture Ruweisat Ridge. The ridge was defended by infantry of the Italian Pavia and Brescia Divisions, and unknown by the New Zealanders, also by tanks of 8 Panzer Regiment.

Ruweisat Ridge and the ground around it were devoid of vegetation, thus affording the defenders extended lines of observation and fire. The ridge was the only high ground in the vicinity and so dominated all approaches to it that the attackers would have to use. In order to negate this enemy advantage and reduce the numbers of casualties, it was decided that the attack would be conducted at night. The terrain was such that movement of infantry support weapons during the assault would be difficult. The added threat of mines prevented tanks accompanying the infantry. Tanks and support arms were therefore not to participate in the assault but were to join the infantry on the objective at first light, ready to defeat the inevitable Axis counterattack.

On nights preceding the attack, New Zealand reconnaissance patrols identified Italian infantry preparing defences forward of the ridge. It was assumed that these positions were outposts only and that the bulk of the enemy defence was based along the top of the ridge on the higher

ground. Patrols were unable to get close enough to obtain more detailed information because the RAF dropped flares which exposed patrols to the defence. Aerial photographs delivered to the New Zealanders prior to the attack were badly over-exposed and so enemy dispositions in the New Zealand sector could not be determined.

The attack took place as planned. By first light the attackers were on the ridge, but there were no defences on the crest. The 'outposts', many of which were bypassed in order to close with the expected main position on the ridge, were in fact the main line of defence. Ridges are typically rock, and so difficult to defend with infantry. The Italians had therefore sited their defence forward, in ground where they could dig in. Much of the actual main line of defence had therefore been bypassed. These positions became active after first light and stopped the New Zealanders' support weapons from coming forward and prevented engineers from clearing lanes for the tanks to use.

As a result, the New Zealanders were badly prepared to meet the dawn counter-attack. Further, the ground proved to be so firm that the New Zealanders were unable to dig in and defend their position. In all, 21 officers and 334 other ranks were captured in the counter-attack.

Shape

10.29   The joint commander must be capable of working closely with multinational, inter-agency, and other partners to maintain or enhance stability, prevent or mitigate crises, and set the conditions for access and responsive crises intervention. The joint commander is able to take actions before committing forces which will assist in determining the shape and character of potential operations. These actions are known as shaping.

10.30   During the shaping phase, joint and multinational operations—inclusive of normal and routine military activities—and various inter-agency activities are performed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies. They are executed continuously with the intent to enhance international legitimacy and gain multinational cooperation in support of defined national strategic and strategic military objectives. They are designed to ensure success by shaping perceptions and influencing the behaviour of both adversaries and partner nations, developing partner nation and friendly military capabilities for self-defence and multinational operations, improving information exchange and intelligence sharing, and providing the joint force with peacetime and contingency access.

10.31   Shaping operations must adapt to a particular theatre environment and may be executed in one theatre in order to create effects and/or achieve objectives in another. Planning that supports most "shaping" requirements typically occurs in the context of day-to-day security cooperation, and Commander Joint Forces New Zealand (COMJFNZ) will nest Phase 0 activities and tasks into their campaign plan. Planners developing contingency plans must identify shaping requirements that can be accomplished within the scope of JFNZ's steady-state activities; however, planners may also identify shaping requirements specific to their plan that would only be implemented in the event of crisis. A number of actions may occur during the shaping phase.

10.32   **Organising and Training Forces.** Organising and training forces to operate throughout the operational area can serve as a deterrent. NZDF force elements that may be employed on operations should be exercised regularly during peacetime, both in New Zealand and in potential theatres of employment, when the opportunity permits. When possible, other government agencies should be invited to participate in relevant training with the NZDF, to ensure a common understanding and to build a working relationship prior to actual execution.

10.33   **Establishing Operational Area Access.** A vital activity during shaping is to gain and maintain access to the operational area. This will ensure forward presence, basing, freedom of navigation, and cooperation with coalition nations. This effort may be multinational, involving maintenance of inter-theatre air and sea lines of communication. A lack of timely access to a joint

force area of operations (JFAO) may defer significant advantage to an adversary and seriously reduce the NZDF's chances of operational success. It may also result in forces having to adopt a higher-risk course of action (COA) with potentially higher casualties.

10.34   **Civil Affairs.** Civil Affairs (CA) provide the joint commander with expertise on the civil component of the operational environment. The joint commander uses CA's capabilities to analyse and influence the human terrain through specific processes and dedicated resources and personnel. CA must be nested within the overall mission and intent and support the legitimacy and credibility of the mission by advising on how to best meet the moral and legal obligations to the people affected by military operations. The key to understanding the role of CA in shaping the operational environment is recognising the importance of leveraging each relationship between the joint force and every individual, group, and organisation to achieve a desired effect.

10.35   **Information Operations.** Information Operations (IO) in the shaping phase look to coordinate information effects to influence the decision-making and actions of a target audience, and to protect and enhance the joint force commander's decision-making and actions in support of their mission. IO may look to convey select information and indicators to a target audience to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately, the behaviour of key decision-makers, organisations, groups, and individuals. IO seek to induce or reinforce attitudes and behaviour favourable to the joint force commanders objectives.

10.36   **Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Architecture.** The establishment of an ISR architecture is a fundamental step in the shape phase. ISR supports the joint commander's mission, and an ISR system must be in place and operational in order to support subsequent missions.

10.37   **Space Superiority.** Space operations are a critical enabler that supports all joint operations. In a multinational operation, the NZDF will likely rely on coalition partners to ensure that friendly forces gain and maintain space superiority. Hostile actions

that may affect friendly space operations should also be anticipated. Space capabilities help shape the operational environment in a variety of ways, including providing ISR and the communications necessary for keeping commanders and leaders informed worldwide.

10.38   **Stability and Support Operations.** SASO in the shape phase may be required to quickly restore security and infrastructure, or provide humanitarian relief in portions of the operational area. This may dissuade further adversary actions or help ensure access and future success. Possible SASO in subsequent phases should also be considered at this point. Preparation for these operations may include inter-agency planning to synchronise the civil-military effort; confirming the feasibility of the military objectives and end-state; and providing for adequate intelligence, an appropriate force mix, and other capabilities

Deter

10.39   Before the initiation of hostilities, the joint commander must gain a clear understanding of the strategic objectives, CoGs and decisive points, desired and undesired outcomes, actions likely to create those desired outcomes, and required joint, multinational, and non-military capabilities matched to available forces. In particular, an early assessment of the adversary's decision-making process will indicate which actions will be an effective deterrent.

10.40   Deterrence arises when the adversary recognises that its actions may bring about an unacceptable counter-action from friendly forces. It involves pre-planned actions tailored to bring an issue to early resolution without armed conflict. Both military and non-military agencies can be used to dissuade actions before a crisis arises, or to deter further aggression during a crisis. Each instrument of national power may take deterrent actions; however they are most effective when used in combination.

10.41   Deterrent actions taken by NZDF force elements should not create a risk to the force that exceeds their potential benefit. The deter phase

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should set the conditions for successful operations in subsequent phases. Tailored military deterrence can improve the military balance of power in the operational area, especially in terms of early warning, intelligence gathering, logistic infrastructure, air and maritime forces, and psychological operations (PSYOPS), without precipitating an armed response from the adversary. Care should be taken to ensure that friendly military deterrence is not mistaken by the adversary to be preparation for a pre-emptive attack.

Preparing the Operational Environment

10.42   The wider operational environment should be prepared in a way that will support the conduct of operations. At the strategic level, the legitimacy of intended actions must be self-evident. The strategic communication strategy plays an important part in this, and must consider boundaries that are not the same as those of the JFAO. The stance of the international community will influence the adversary's perception of its own chances of success, although it may not necessarily discourage the adversary from pursuing its aims.

10.43   At the operational level, the joint commander should seek to prepare the JFAO by undermining the adversary's will and cohesion. The commander should aim to erode the adversary's resolve, persuading it that military action is unlikely to be successful. To achieve this, the joint commander may draw on a number of capabilities, which are considered below.

10.44   **Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.** In order to identify the adversary's vulnerabilities and weaknesses, the joint commander will draw on the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE) process. The understanding gained through this process is crucial to planning operations and tailoring effective deterrence. The JIPOE seeks to determine the adversary's CoGs and refine estimates of its capabilities, dispositions, intentions, and probable COAs within the context of the current situation. Commanders look for specific indications of imminent enemy activity that may require an immediate response or accelerated

friendly decision cycles. Equally, the joint commander may seek to determine friendly forces' CoGs, so as to better protect them and thus deter the adversary. For additional guidance on intelligence support to joint operations, refer to the NZDF-approved NZDF series of joint intelligence doctrine.

10.45   **Special Operations.** Special Operations Forces (SOF) may play a role in preparing the operational environment by setting conditions that mitigate risk and facilitate successful follow-on operations. SOF can provide operational leverage in the deter phase by gathering critical information, undermining a potential adversary's will or capacity to wage war, and enhancing the capabilities of conventional friendly forces. For further information on the roles of SOF, refer to NZDDP–3.12 *New Zealand Special Operation* (2nd Edition).

10.46   **Civil-military Operations.** Establishing and maintaining civil-military relations may include interaction and liaison between NZDF, coalition and host-nation forces, and other government agencies, NGOs and international organisations. Civil-military affairs staff can provide expertise on factors that directly affect military operations, including culture, social structure, economic systems, language, and host-nation support capabilities. For further guidance on CMO, refer to the NZDF-approved ADDP–3.11 *Civil Military Operations*.

10.47   **Human Intelligence.** Key to understanding the operational environment is an understanding of the impact of non-combatants, whose presence may be substantial and dynamic. Human behaviour is difficult to control on a mass scale; to do so under the strains of conflict, with persons of a different ethnicity, religion or culture, can be nearly impossible. The availability of sufficient personnel, skilled in the political, sociological and economic intelligence disciplines, will prove indispensable to commanders at all levels. This intelligence requirement, particularly in urban settings, highlights the importance of human intelligence (HUMINT).

10.48   **Stability and Support Operations.** Planning and operations carried out prior to the commencement of hostilities should be conducted with a view to

establishing a solid foundation for SASO in later phases. By anticipating likely problems at the wind-down of combat operations, commanders can ease the transition and shorten the path to the national strategic end-state and/or handover. Considerations include:

- limiting damage to major infrastructure and services

- establishing the intended disposition of captured leadership and demobilised military and paramilitary forces

- the availability of cash

- identifying and managing potential 'stabilise' phase enemies

- determining the proper force mix (e.g. combat, military police, engineer, medical, and multinational)

- availability of host-nation law enforcement and health services

- securing key infrastructure nodes and facilitating host-nation law enforcement and first responder services

- developing and disseminating strategic communication themes to suppress potential new enemies and promote new governmental authority.

Isolating the Adversary

10.49   Critical to deterrence is the physical, informational, and moral isolation of the adversary. At the strategic level, this could involve coordinating the elements of national power to deny them the support of allies and/or sanctuary. At the operational and tactical levels, methods of isolation could include targeting the adversary's critical force projection, C2 and sustainment capabilities, key decision-makers, and other influential persons. The intent is to strip away as much of the adversary's support and freedom of action as possible, while limiting its potential for escalation.

10.50   **Physical Isolation.** The physical isolation of a large area clearly has land, air, and likely maritime implications for the identification and control of the movement of personnel and equipment. Examples of physical isolation include controlled border crossings, naval blockades, and no-fly zones. The capabilities provided by command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) support systems may also be used to isolate areas.

10.51   **Informational Isolation.** The joint commander may also isolate the adversary by achieving and sustaining information superiority. As quickly as possible, and to the maximum extent possible, information going into and out of the operational area should be under the control of the joint commander. The joint force may not only cut off internal and external adversary communications, but may also control indigenous radio, television, and other media. This has the effect of separating the adversary's C2 system from its operational and strategic leadership, and also prevents the adversary from communicating with the civil population. Information operations are critical to isolation, shaping, and deterrence. The overall result is to prevent the adversary from attaining unity of effort within the operational area.

10.52   **Moral Isolation.** Moral isolation is a function of both physical actions and information operations. It can deny the adversary political and military allies, and separate the political leadership from the civil populace. The joint force should thus aim to physically and psychologically isolate the adversary force; ensure that non-combatants in the area receive the joint commander's messages; and reject any messages from the adversary force.

Seize Initiative

10.53   As operations commence, the joint commander seeks decisive advantage through the application of combat power. By seizing and maintaining the initiative at the onset of combat, the commander can affect the adversary's CoG and critical factors, generating in them a sense of inevitable defeat. Decisive operations should not be entered into lightly, as they involve major combat and therefore imply significant cost in terms of resources and lives.

10.54   When planning decisive operations in order to seize the initiative, the joint commander should tailor the JTF's actions to the adversary, and aim to create conditions that contribute to the attainment of the end-state.

- **Nature of the Adversary.** Bringing about defeat is dependent on the nature of the adversary and the situation. For example, a cohesive adversary may be susceptible to conventional attack, whilst an ill-defined adversary may not. Likewise, a conventional adversary may be readily identified and engaged; whereas an irregular adversary may be difficult to identify, resulting in operations that focus on the areas and populations from which the adversary gains its support and freedom of manoeuvre.

- **Achieving Conditions that Contribute to the End-state.** Decisive operations should always aim to create conditions that help to achieve the end-state. These conditions will be unique for each operation and are determined in the planning process. In conventional conflict, examples may include local air superiority over land forces, secure sea lines of communication, and the destruction of the adversary's long-range missile capability. In an irregular conflict, conditions may include the denial of support to insurgents from the local population, border security, and the restoration of law and order.

10.55   **Full-spectrum Superiority.** Establishing control of the operational environment will permit the conduct of friendly operations without effective opposition. Once established, this superiority will deliver significant tactical- and operational-level advantage and create an environment conducive to successful operations. A concerted effort is required to maintain superiority, and the NZDF may rely on coalition partners to secure certain environments.

- **Air and Maritime Superiority.** Air and maritime superiority allows the JTF to conduct operations without prohibitive interference from opposing forces. Control of the air is a critical enabler because it provides the JTF both freedom from attack and the freedom to attack.

- **Land Superiority.** Land forces can be moved quickly into an area to deter the adversary from inserting forces, thus preventing it from gaining an operational advantage. The rapid deployment and employment of land forces enable sustained operations to control people and land, aid the defeat of an adversary, and support the goal of stability.

- **Space Superiority.** Space superiority will ensure access to communications, weather, navigation, timing, remote sensing, and intelligence assets.

- **Information Environment Superiority.** Information environment superiority degrades the enemy's C2, while allowing the joint commander to better understand the enemy's intentions, capabilities and actions, and influence foreign attitudes towards the operation.

10.56   **Integration of Special Operations Forces.** SOF provide the joint commander with an additional and specialised capability to achieve objectives that might not otherwise be attainable by conventional forces. Integration enables the commander to take full advantage of conventional and SOF core competencies. SOF are most effective when special operations are fully integrated into the overall plan, and executed through proper SOF C2 elements that are responsive to the needs of the supported commander. Such elements are provided to conventional force commanders and include:

- joint special operations task forces to conduct a specific special operation, or to prosecute special operations in support of a joint campaign or operation

- special operations C2 elements to synchronise integrated special/conventional force operations

- special operations liaison elements to coordinate special operations with conventional operations, enhance situational awareness, and facilitate planning and training for integrated operations.

Force Projection

10.57   NZDF force elements may be employed immediately, sometimes as part of deterrent strategies, to resolve a crisis quickly. When these forces are not sufficient, the deployment of further forces and/

or the use of multinational forces may be necessary. Consequently, the joint commander must sequence, enable, and protect the deployment of forces to achieve early decisive advantage in the seize initiative stage. The commander should not overlook the adversary's ability to affect deployment from bases to ports of embarkation. The deployment of forces may be either opposed or unopposed by an adversary.

- **Opposed Deployment.** Initial operations will need to suppress or circumvent the adversary's anti-access capabilities. In some cases, maritime combat power or long-range air operations can provide effective force projection; in others, forcible entry operations are applied, coordinated with strategic air mobility, sealift, and pre-positioned forces. To conduct opposed deployment, the NZDF may need to use coalition assets.

- **Unopposed Deployment.** Unopposed deployment provides the joint commander a more flexible operational environment to build combat power, train, rehearse, and establish the conditions for successful combat operations. In unopposed entry, the joint commander arranges the flow of combat and logistic forces as best facilitates the CONOPS. Logistic forces may be a higher priority for early deployment than combat forces, as determined by the in-theatre protection requirements.

10.58   **Forcible Entry.** Forcible entry is a joint military operation conducted to seize and hold a military lodgement in the face of armed opposition, for the continuous landing of forces. The NZDF is unlikely to conduct forcible entry operations alone; however in a multinational force, it would make use of coalition assets. Forcible entry operations may include amphibious, airborne, and air assault operations, or any combination thereof. They may be facilitated by the use of credible deception. The relevant commander will employ distributed, coherent operations in a coordinated attack that overwhelms the adversary before it has time to react. Participating forces should be prepared to immediately transition to follow-on operations, and should plan accordingly. The sustainment of forcible entry operations can be formidable and the introduction of logistic and further combat forces should be carefully balanced.

10.59   **Threats.** Commanders must ensure that deploying forces receive thorough briefings concerning the threat and force protection requirements in the JFAO. In addition, commanders should evaluate possible threats posed by interested parties other than the adversary, such as terrorists. A frequently overlooked liability is friendly ports of embarkation where forces are massed for deployment.

10.60   **Early Entry Forces.** During force projection, NZDF force elements and ports of debarkation must be protected. Forces should be introduced in a manner that allows a secure and rapid force build-up. From a C2 perspective, echelon is essential. Therefore, early entry forces should deploy with sufficient organic and supporting capabilities to preserve freedom of action and protect them from likely threats. A deployable, joint C2 capability will also aid rapid assessment of the situation, decision-making, and the conduct of initial operations.

10.61   **Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration.** Joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration must be considered for all operations. These activities occur in the operational area and comprise the essential processes required to transition arriving personnel, equipment, and materiel into forces capable of meeting operational requirements.

10.62   **Sustainment and Rotation.** Sustainment comprises the provision of support required to maintain operations and the force commitment until the accomplishment of the mission or national objective. Depending on the duration of operations, this could involve reinforcements, augmentation, and rotation of forces. Despite the considerable powers of endurance of NZDF force elements, operational relief is required at suitable intervals. Higher intensity operations require more frequent relief. Longer periods on operations will have a progressively greater strain on members of the armed forces and their equipment. A contingency of any operation, therefore, is to include a programme of rotation to allow rest, maintenance, and refresher training.

Command and Control

10.63   Controlled littoral areas often offer the best positions from which to begin, sustain, and support joint operations, especially in operational areas with limited or poor infrastructure for supporting NZDF joint operations ashore. Sea-based assets ability to protect fires, ISR, and information operation capabilities allow the commander to maintain initiative. Depending on the nature of the operation, a maritime headquarters (HQ) may serve as the base of the JTF headquarters (JTFHQ), or subordinate commanders may use the command, control, and intelligence facilities aboard the ship.

10.64   **Transferring the Headquarters Ashore.** Transferring C2 from sea to shore requires planning, liaison, and coordination throughout the JTF. Such a transition may involve a simple movement of flags and supporting personnel, or it may require a complete change of JTFHQ. The new JTFHQ may use personnel and equipment from the old HQ or it may require augmentation from different sources. One technique is to transfer command in several stages; another is for the joint commander to satellite off the capabilities of one of the components ashore until the new HQ is fully prepared. Whichever technique is used, the value of joint training and rehearsals for this transition is evident.

Engagement

10.65   As part of achieving decisive advantages early, joint force operations may be directed immediately against adversary CoGs using conventional and special operations forces and capabilities. This engagement may be decisive, or may begin offensive operations. It encompasses actions taken by the joint commander against a hostile force, a political situation, or a natural or humanitarian predicament that will most directly accomplish the mission.

10.66   Successful engagement requires the full-spectrum dominance of the operational environment through the seizure, disruption, control, or destruction of the adversary's critical factors. These critical factors may include CoGs, critical requirements, and vulnerabilities. They may also include tangible components of infrastructure such as power grids or transportation hubs. Additionally, critical factors may be intangible, socio-economic or political factors such as cultural sensitivities, or a particular demographic group.

10.67   In operations that require a lesser degree of combat, engagement will depend on the type of operation being conducted. Non-combatant evacuations will likely require brief engagement in a relatively small area, while peace support operations can require engagement throughout the area of operations (AOs) for a long period of time.

Force Protection

10.68   The joint commander must strive to conserve the fighting potential of the JTF at the onset of combat operations. Furthermore, host-nation infrastructure and logistic support vital to force projection and sustainment must be protected. The joint commander counters the adversary's fire and manoeuvre by making personnel, systems, and units difficult to locate, strike, and destroy. Every effort must also be made to reduce the potential for fratricide. The commander should be aware of situations that increase the risk, and institute appropriate preventive measures, such as combat ID. Key elements of force protection at the onset of combat operations are:

- operations security

- deception

- operations to gain air, space, and maritime superiority

- defensive use of information operations

- joint personnel recovery

- protection of airports, seaports, lines of communication, and friendly force lodgement.

Supporting Stability and Support Operations

10.69   The onset of combat provides an opportunity to set into motion actions that will establish favourable conditions for stability operations and ease the situation encountered at the conclusion of sustained combat.

Such actions may include the following:

- initiating operations to neutralise or eliminate potential 'stabilise' phase enemies

- contacting national and local host-nation authorities and offering support

- seizing or otherwise protecting key infrastructure

- intelligence collection on the status of enemy infrastructure, government organisations, and humanitarian needs

- PSYOPS, to influence the behaviour of approved foreign target audiences.

Dominate

10.70   The dominate phase is marked by a shift to sustained combat operations, which the joint commander conducts when a coup de main is not possible. During sustained combat operations, the joint commander employs forces and capabilities throughout the breadth and depth of the operational area. The commander may designate one force element or line of operation to be the main effort, or there may be a main effort in each mission area. When conditions or plans change, the main effort and focus of the operation might shift.

10.71   Some operations and activities, such as interdiction or information operations, run continuously to deny the enemy sanctuary, freedom of action or informational advantage. When executed concurrently with other operations, these activities degrade enemy morale and physical cohesion, and bring the enemy closer to culmination. When prevented from concentrating, the enemy can be attacked, isolated at tactical and operational levels, and defeated in detail. At other times, the joint commander may cause the adversary to concentrate their forces, facilitating their attack by friendly forces.

Real-Life Example

The Importance of Sound Judgement, Initiative, and Rapid Action

The German invasion of Crete began after dawn on 20 May 1941 with a furious aerial bombardment and strafing, followed by waves of gliders and air-borne troops. Despite losing many parachutists, the Germans were able to establish a foothold in Prison Valley. Gliders landing in a riverbed to the west of Maleme airfield posed a further threat, with the Germans who had secured a lodgement there, soon threatening the airfield. Counter-attacks were launched that evening, only to fail due to confusion, miscommunication, and serious errors of judgement on the part of the New Zealand commanders.

These command errors transformed the initially tenuous German position into one of strength. In the early evening Lieutenant-Colonel L.W. Andrew, commander of 22 Battalion, mistakenly believed that his two forward companies on the edge of Maleme airfield had been overrun. Andrew thus decided to pull back from Hill 107 to defensive positions. Brigadier Hargest, commander of 5 Brigade, had at first agreed – 'if you must, you must' – but then ordered two companies forward to reinforce 22 Battalion, neither of which succeeded.

The possibility of 21 and 23 Battalions making an immediate counter-attack was considered but rejected, despite pre-invasion orders stating that they were to counter-attack immediately if the Germans secured a lodgement on the airfield. Their commanders' misjudgement was compounded by Hargest's lethargy. Instead of taking control of the situation, he remained at his headquarters well removed from the scene of action.

At dawn on 21 May, the Germans discovered that Hill 107 was unoccupied. Consolidating their hold on the airfield, they were able to land several transport aircraft under fire that afternoon, delivering vital reinforcements and supplies to the paratroops.

10.72   This section will explore several key considerations for the 'dominate' phase, including attacks on adversary CoGs, operations in the littoral, linear and non-linear operations, contiguous and non-contiguous AOs, and synchronising manoeuvre and interdiction.

10.73   **Attacks on Adversary Centres of Gravity.** Decisive operations and attacks on adversary CoGs typically continue during sustained operations. Commanders should synchronise their actions with other JTF activities or operations, to achieve unity of effort. As with all JTF activities, direct and indirect attacks on adversary CoGs should be designed to achieve the required objectives, while limiting undesired impacts on subsequent operations.

10.74   **Littoral Operations.** Littoral operations provide excellent opportunities to achieve leverage over the adversary by operational manoeuvre from the sea. In short periods of time, such operations can introduce forces over relatively great distances into the rear or flanks of the adversary. Maritime forces' mobility at sea, coupled with their ability to rapidly land operationally significant forces, can be crucial to achieving operational objectives.

10.75   **Linear Operations.** Linear operations are conducted with identified forward lines of own troops. In these operations, the emphasis is placed on maintaining the position of friendly forces in relation to one another. Each commander directs and sustains combat power toward an adversary, in concert with adjacent force elements. Positioning forces in this linear manner facilitates the massing of forces and enhances security, particularly that of rear areas and lines of communication between sustaining bases and fighting forces. Protected lines of communication, in turn, increase the endurance of the JTF.

10.76   Some conditions favour a linear organisation of the operational area, as they allow commanders to concentrate and synchronise combat power more easily:

- when NZDF forces are severely outnumbered, or lack the information needed to conduct non-linear operations

- when the adversary force is deeply arrayed and echeloned

- when the threat to lines of communication reduces friendly force freedom of action.

10.77   **Non-linear Operations.** Non-linear operations typically focus on multiple decisive points, by emphasising simultaneous operations along multiple lines of operation. Forces orient on objectives without geographic reference to adjacent forces. Swift manoeuvre against several decisive points, supported by precise, concentrated fire, can overwhelm the adversary, allowing the joint commander to retain the initiative. Due to the fluidity of non-linear operations and the presence of non-combatants, situational awareness and precision fires are vital to success. Non-linear operations place a premium on communications, intelligence, mobility, and innovative means for sustainment.

- **Offensive Non-linear Operations.** During offensive, non-linear operations, attacking forces focus offensive actions against decisive points. Vulnerability to attack increases as operations extend over a larger area. Link-up operations, particularly those involving vertical envelopments, require extensive planning and preparation. The potential for fratricide increases due to the fluid nature of the operational area and the changing disposition of attacking and defending forces.

- **Defensive Non-linear Operations.** During defensive, non-linear operations, defenders focus on defeating adversary forces, not retaining large areas. Non-contiguous defences are generally mobile; however some force elements may conduct area defence to hold key terrain or channel the adversary into engagement areas. Non-linear defence places a premium on reconnaissance and surveillance, to monitor the adversary and maintain a common operational picture and outlined in the bullets below.

10.78   **Areas of Operations and Linear/Non-linear Operations.** During operational design, the joint commander considers combinations of linear and non-linear operations with contiguous and non-contiguous AOs. They choose the combination that best fits the operational environment and the purpose of the

operation. These combinations are illustrated in Figure 10-7.

- **Linear Operations in Contiguous Areas of Operations.** This combination (box 1) typifies sustained offensive and defensive operations against powerful, echeloned, and symmetrically organised forces. The contiguous areas and continuous forward line of own troops focus combat power and protect sustainment functions.

- **Linear Operations in Non-contiguous Areas of Operations.** Box 2 depicts the joint commander's operational area with subordinate commanders

conducting linear operations in non-contiguous AOs. The joint commander retains responsibility for the operational area outside the subordinate commanders' AOs.

- **Non-linear Operations in Contiguous Areas of Operations.** Box 3 shows the joint commander's entire operational area divided into subordinate AOs, where subordinate commanders are conducting non-linear operations. This combination is typically applied in stability operations and aid to the civil authorities.

Figure 10-7: Combinations of areas of operations and linear/non-linear operations.

- **Non-linear Operations in Non-contiguous Areas of Operations.** Box 4 depicts both the joint commander and subordinate commanders conducting non-linear operations. The size of the operational area, composition and distribution of adversary forces, and capabilities of friendly forces, are important considerations in deciding whether to use this combination.

Synchronising and/or Integrating Manoeuvre and Interdiction

10.79   Interdiction and manoeuvre should be considered as complementary operations designed to achieve military objectives. Their synchronisation and integration provides one of the most dynamic concepts available to the JTF. All commanders should consider how their operations can complement interdiction. This may include actions that will likely cause the enemy to reposition surface forces, making them better targets for interdiction, such as deception, withdrawals, lateral repositioning, and flanking movements. Likewise, interdiction operations should conform to and enhance the joint commander's scheme of manoeuvre.

10.80   **Enemy Responses.** Responding to integrated and synchronised manoeuvre and interdiction can create a dilemma for the enemy. If it attempts to counter the manoeuvre, its forces may be exposed to unacceptable losses from interdiction. If the enemy attempts to reduce such interdiction losses, its forces may not be able to counter the manoeuvre. The synergy achieved by integrating and synchronising these two operations thus assists commanders to optimise leverage at the tactical level.

10.81   **Deconflicting Interdiction and Manoeuvre Requirements.** As a guiding principle, the joint commander should exploit the inherent flexibility of command relationships, targeting procedures, and other techniques to resolve the issues that can arise when interdiction and manoeuvre are employed. The joint commander should balance the needs of surface manoeuvre forces, area-wide requirements for interdiction, and the undesirability of fragmenting JTF capabilities. Clear communication of the joint

commander's objectives, intent, and priorities enables subordinates to fully exploit the military potential of their forces, while minimising the friction generated by competing requirements.

10.82   **Interdiction Targets.** The joint commander should pay particular attention to activities that impinge on and support the manoeuvre and interdiction needs of all forces. In addition to normal target nomination procedures, the joint commander should establish procedures through which subordinate commanders can identify those interdiction targets within their operational area that they are unable to engage with organic assets, and which could affect planned or on-going manoeuvre. These targets are considered alongside JFAO-wide interdiction priorities, and are used to plan, coordinate, and execute the theatre air interdiction plan. The purpose of these procedures is to give visibility and priority to targets directly affecting planned manoeuvre by any friendly forces.

Stabilise

10.83   Operations in the stabilise phase ensure the national strategic end-state continues to be pursued at the conclusion of combat operations. These operations typically begin with significant military involvement, including some combat, then move increasingly toward enabling civil authority as the threat wanes and civil infrastructure is re-established. As progress is made, military forces will increase their focus on supporting the efforts of host-nation authorities, other government agencies, NGOs, and/or international organisations. Some stabilise phases may be short; others may require years to transition to the enable civil authority phase. Therefore, the requirement for success is often the patient and resolute pursuit of national strategic end-state conditions for as long as necessary.

10.84   Shifting into the stabilise phase, several lines of operation may be initiated immediately, for example, providing humanitarian assistance and establishing security. In some cases, the scope of the problems may dictate using better-suited, non-military entities to address the problems. The goal of these military and

civilian efforts should be to eliminate the root causes or deficiencies that create the problems. For example, this may be by strengthening legitimate civil authority, rebuilding government institutions, fostering a sense of confidence and well-being, and supporting the conditions for economic reconstruction. With this in mind, the joint commander may need to address how to harmonise CMO with the efforts of other participating agencies and organisations.

10.85   **Adjusting the Mix of Forces and Capabilities.** Operations in the stabilise phase will often involve a mix of forces and capabilities far different to those that supported the previous phases. To begin stability operations in those areas where sustained combat has ceased, the joint commander may need to realign forces and capabilities. Planning and continuous assessment will reveal the nature and scope of the forces and capabilities required. The joint commander should anticipate and request these forces and capabilities in a timely manner to facilitate their opportune employment.

10.86   **Civil-military Operations.** As sustained combat operations conclude, military forces will shift their focus to stability operations, which probably will still involve some combat. Of particular importance will be CMO, which involve NZDF force elements working with a range of agencies — governmental, international, non-governmental, host-nation, local authority, and media — to deliver tangible benefits to communities. CMO are initially conducted to secure and safeguard the populace, re-establish law and order, protect or rebuild key infrastructure, and restore public services. NZDF force elements should be prepared to lead the activities necessary to accomplish these tasks when indigenous civil, New Zealand Government, or international capacity to assume responsibility does not exist. Once a legitimate civil authority is prepared to conduct such tasks, NZDF force elements may support such activities as required. Strategic communication will play an important role in providing public information to foreign populations during this period.

10.87   **Military Support.** Although the military may be given the de facto lead in stability operations, most stability operations will be in support of, or will transition to support of, diplomatic, United Nations (UN) or host-nation efforts. Integrated civilian and military efforts are crucial to success, as both parties bring unique perspectives and expertise. Military forces should be prepared to work in integrated civil-military teams that could include representatives from other New Zealand government agencies, foreign governments and security forces, international organisations, NGOs, and members of the private sector. Typical military support includes, but is not limited to, the following.

- Working in a civil-military team to ensure security, develop local governance structures, promote bottom-up economic activity, rebuild infrastructure, and build indigenous capacity for such tasks.

- Gaining and reinforcing popular support for the JTF's objectives.

- Training, advising, and supporting indigenous security forces.

- Counter-intelligence activities, to safeguard essential elements of friendly information and counter adversary HUMINT efforts. Those working with New Zealand forces may pass information — knowingly or unknowingly — to adversary elements that enable the adversary to interfere with stability operations.

- Media operations to communicate with internal and international audiences, and community relations support.

- Activities needed to restore essential services, such as reconstruction, engineering, logistics, law enforcement, and health services support.

- Joint stability operations need to sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the emerging or host government. During operations where a government does not exist, extreme caution should be used when dealing with individuals and organisations to avoid inadvertently legitimising them. Effective strategic communication can enhance perceptions of the legitimacy of stability operations.

10.88   **Force Protection.** During stability operations in the stabilise phase, threats to the safety of friendly forces

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must be considered. These could include activists, a group opposed to the operation, looters, organised criminals, and terrorists. The joint commander should be ready to counter activity that could significantly harm force elements or jeopardise mission accomplishment. Force protection may also extend to the security of host-nation authorities, contractors, and members of other government agencies, NGOs and international organisations, if authorised by higher authorities. Security requirements should be balanced with the military operation's nature and objectives. In some stability operations certain security measures, such as carrying arms, wearing helmets and protective vests, or using secure communications, may cause forces to appear more threatening than intended. This may degrade the force's legitimacy and hurt relations with the local population.

10.89   **Restraint.** During stability operations, military capability must be applied prudently. The use of excessive force could adversely affect efforts to gain or maintain legitimacy and public support. The actions of members of the armed forces are framed by the disciplined application of force, including specific rules of engagement (ROE). These ROE often will be more restrictive and detailed than those for sustained combat operations, due to national policy concerns. Restraints on weaponry, tactics, and levels of violence are to be expected. When dealing with unarmed hostile elements, the use of less-lethal capabilities should be considered to fill the gap between verbal warnings and deadly force, and to avoid raising the level of conflict unnecessarily. This concept does not preclude the application of overwhelming force when appropriate, to display NZDF resolve and commitment. The reasons for restraint need to be understood by each member of the armed forces, because a single act could have adverse political consequences.

Enable Civil Authority

10.90   In this phase the joint operation normally is terminated when the stated military strategic and/or operational objectives have been met and the JTF has been redeployed. This should mean that a legitimate civil authority can manage the situation without further outside military assistance. In some cases, it may become apparent that the stated objectives fall short of properly enabling civil authority. This may require a redesign of the operation and extended stability operations, in support of diplomatic, host-nation, NGO and/or international organisation efforts.

10.91   **Peace Support Operations.** The transition from military operations to full civilian control may involve stability operations that initially resemble peace enforcement or countering irregular activity, and eventually evolve to a peacekeeping or peacebuilding mission. Stability operations establish the conditions that enable these missions to succeed. The ultimate measure of success is political, not military. Therefore, the joint commander seeks a clear understanding of the national strategic end-state and how military operations support that end-state.

10.92   **Transfer to Civil Authority.** In many cases, New Zealand will transfer responsibility for the political and military affairs of the host-nation to another authority. The joint commander may be required to transfer responsibility for operations to another authority (e.g. UN observers or a multinational peacekeeping force), as determined by the termination criteria. This will probably occur after an extended period of conducting stability and peace support operations as described above. Overall, transfer will most likely occur in stages. For example, from host-nation sovereignty, to peace operations under a UN mandate, to the termination of all New Zealand military participation.

10.93   NZDF support to this effort may include the following:

- **Support to Truce Negotiations.** This support may include providing intelligence, security, transportation and other logistic support, and linguists for all participants.

- **Transition to Civil Authority.** This transfer could be to local or host-nation federal governments, to a UN peacekeeping operation after peace enforcement, or through the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to an NGO in support of refugees.

Termination and Redeployment

10.94   The termination of and redeployment from an operation is a complex activity. Planning needs to start as soon as practicable since the end of an operation normally involves termination, transition and redeployment activities. The term 'termination' essentially seeks to focus on what happens when the operational end-state has been achieved and how to preserve that which has been gained. While 'redeployment' at the end of operations involves preparing forces and relocating them to a new deployment area or to home bases. 'Transition' meanwhile looks at a noteworthy change in effort or action within a military activity in a campaign or operation. See Chapter 8 for further discussion on redeployment and the end of an operation.

Evaluation of Operations

10.95   The effectiveness and synergy of a JTF are dependent on its fighting power. Quality control of the way military forces operate is difficult to achieve, but one of the most reliable measures must be their performance on operations. Operational evaluation is an important means by which the NZDF can learn from the successes and mistakes of the past, to improve capability and prepare forces to meet future exigencies. Commanders should ensure that operational evaluation is an on-going activity for all operations, to identify lessons learned and capture knowledge and experience gained, to ensure that mistakes are not repeated. For further information, please consult the NZDF-approved ADDP–00.4 *Operational Evaluation* and its New Zealand supplement.

10.96   **Lessons Learnt.** 'Lessons learnt' is the term for validated knowledge and experience derived from military operations, exercises, activities and training, which may result in a change to NZDF equipment, training, doctrine, organisational structure, standard operating procedures, tactics, techniques and procedures, policies, or most importantly a change in behaviour. Lessons learned do not always result in change; indeed it may reinforce the merits of the current approach.

10.97   The joint commander is responsible for ensuring their force takes into account the requirement to capture lessons learned during all stages of the operation and that an appropriate mechanism has been established from the beginning. In the NZDF, the system to capture lessons learned is Electronic Activity Reporting and Lessons Learned System (EARLLS). EARLLS provides NZDF force elements with a knowledge management facility to learn efficiently from experience and provide validated justifications for amending the existing way of doing things, in order to improve performance. In order to be meaningful, lessons need to be brought to the attention of the appropriate authority. Furthermore, the chain of command must clearly understand how to prioritise and staff lessons.

GLOSSARY

Terms and Definitions

The references quoted in brackets in this glossary are source documents. The source documents used are:

AAP–6 *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*, 2013.

ADDP–D *Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine* (2nd Edition) 2011.

AJP–3 (A) *Allied Doctrine for Joint Operations*, 2012.

JDP 0–01.1 *United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms*, 2006.

JDP 3–00 *Campaign Execution* (3rd Edition), 2009.

JP 1–02 *Department of Defence Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 2007.

JP 3–05 *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*, 2011.

New Zealand Defence Force Annual Report, 2013.

NZDDP–00.1 *Command and Control* (2nd Edition), 2014.

NZDDP–D *New Zealand Defence Doctrine* (3rd Edition) 2012.

Agency (JDP 0-01.1)

A distinct non-military body which has objectives that is broadly consistent with those of the campaign.

Air Defence (ADFP–04.1.1)

All measures designed to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air action.

Alliance (JP 1–02)

The relationship that results from a formal agreement (for example treaty) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members.

Basic Level of Capability (NZDF Annual Report 2013)

The minimum level at which an essential military capability has to be maintained if it is not to be lost over a period of time. Also called BLOC.

Campaign (NZDDP-D)

A controlled series of simultaneous or sequential operations designed to achieve an operational commander's objective, normally within a given time or space.

Centre of Gravity (NZDDP–D, ADDP–D)

That characteristic, capability or locality from which a military force, nation or alliance derives its freedom of action, strength or will to fight at that level of conflict. The centre of gravity at each level of conflict may consist of a number of key elements. Also called CoG.

Coalition (JP 1–02)

An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action.

Combined (AAP–6)

Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organisations, in which elements of more than one nation participate.

Combined Joint Task Force (adapted from AJP–3 (A))

A Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) is a combined (multinational) and joint (multi-Service) deployable task force, tailored to the mission, and formed for the full range of the NZDF's military missions. A CJTF consists of three layers: the CJTF headquarters (HQ), subordinate component HQ if required, and forces assigned for the mission.

Command (NZDDP–00.1, ADFP–04.1.1)

The authority that a commander in a military Service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of their rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using

available resources and for planning the employment of, organising, directing, coordinating and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale and discipline of assigned personnel.

Commander's Critical Information Requirement (JP 1–02)

An information requirement identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely decision-making. The two key elements are friendly force information requirements and priority intelligence requirements. Also called CCIR.

Commander's Intent (ADFP–04.1.1/)

A formal statement, usually in the concept of operations or general outline of orders, given to provide clear direction on the commander's intentions.

Common Operational Picture (JP 1–02)

A single identical display of relevant information shared by more than one command. A common operational picture facilitates collaborative planning and assists all echelons to achieve situational awareness. Also called COP.

Component (JDP 0–01.1)

Force elements grouped under one or more component commanders subordinate to the operational level commander.

Comprehensive Approach (NZDDP–D)

An approach that responds effectively to complex crises by orchestrating, coordinating and deconflicting the activities of the military, other government departments and, where possible, international organisations and non-governmental organisations.

Concept of Operations (ADF 04.1.1)

A clear and concise statement of the line of action chosen by a commander in order to accomplish his mission. Also called CONOPS.

Conflict Prevention (AAP–6)

A peace support operation employing complementary diplomatic, civil, and - when necessary - military means, to monitor and identify the causes of conflict, and take timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of hostilities.

Control (NZDDP–00.1; ADFP 04.1.1)

The authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organisations, or other organisations not normally under his command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives. All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated.

Contingency Plan (AAP–6)

A plan which is developed for possible operations where the planning factors have been identified or can be assumed. This plan is produced in as much detail as possible, including the resources needed and deployment options, as a basis for subsequent planning.

Conventional Forces (adapted from JP 3–05)

Those forces other than designated special operations forces.

Course of Action (AAP–6)

In the estimate process, an option that will accomplish or contribute to the accomplishment of a mission or task, and from which a detailed plan is developed. Also called COA.

Directed Level of Capability (NZDF Annual Report 2013)

A level of capability lower than that required to be deployed and commence operations. When directed by Government, force elements have a specified amount of time (known as response time) to increase their level of preparedness from the directed level to the operational level of capability. Also called DLOC.

Directive (AAP–6)

A military communication in which policy is established or a specific action is ordered. A plan issued with a view to putting it into effect when so directed, or in the event that a stated contingency arises. Broadly speaking, any communication which initiates or governs action, conduct or procedure.

Effect (JP 5.0)

An effect is a physical and/or behavioural state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. A desired effect can also be thought of as a condition that can support achieving an associated objective, while an undesired effect is a condition that can inhibit progress toward an objective.

End-state (ADFP–04.1.1)

The set of desired conditions which will achieve the strategic objectives.

Essential Elements of Friendly Information (JDP 3–00)

Items of critical exploitable information, concerning friendly dispositions, intentions, capabilities, morale, knowledge and potential vulnerabilities that, if compromised, could threaten the success of friendly forces. Also called EEFI.

Explosive Ordnance Disposal (AAP–6)

The detection, identification, on-site evaluation, rendering safe, recovery and final disposal of unexploded explosives ordnance. It may also include explosives ordnance which has become hazardous by damage or deterioration. Also called EOD.

Fires (JP 1–02)

The use of weapon systems to create a specific lethal or non-lethal effect on a target.

Force Element (New Zealand Defence Force Annual Report 2013)

A unit that directly contributes to the delivery of an NZDF output class, e.g. a Navy frigate, Army infantry company or Air Force squadron.

Force Projection (JP 1–02)

The ability to project the military instrument of national power from New Zealand, in response to requirements for military operations.

Host Nation (AAP–6)

A nation which, by agreement:

- receives forces and materiel of New Zealand or other nations operating on/from/transiting through its territory;

- allows materiel and/or NATO organisations to be located on its territory; and/or

- provides support for these purposes.

Human Intelligence (ADFP–04.1.1)

A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. Also called HUMINT.

Information Environment (JP 1–02)

The aggregate of individuals, organisations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information.

Intelligence (NZDDP–D, ADFP–04.1.1)

The product resulting from the processing of information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. The term is also applied to the activity that results in the product and to the organisations engaged in such activity.

International Organisation (AAP–6)

An intergovernmental, regional or global organisation governed by international law and established by a group of states, with international juridical personality given by international agreement, however characterised, creating enforceable rights and obligations for the purpose of fulfilling a given function and pursuing common aims.

Note: Exceptionally, the International Committee of the Red Cross, although a non-governmental organisation formed under the Swiss Civil Code, is mandated by the international community of states and is founded on international law, specifically the Geneva Conventions, has an international legal personality or status on its own, and enjoys some immunities and privileges for the fulfilment of its humanitarian mandate.

Interoperability (NZDDP–D, ADFP–04.1.1)

The ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to, and accept services from, other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.

Joint (NZDDP–D, ADFP–04.1.1)

Connotes activities, operations, organisations, etc. in which elements of more than one Service of the same nation participate.

Joint Force (NZDDP–D)

A force which is composed of elements of the Navy, Army and Air Force, or two or more of these Services, operating under a single commander.

Lines of Communications (AAP–6)

All the land, water, and air routes that connect an operating military force with one or more bases of operations, and along which supplies and reinforcements move.

Line of Operation (AAP–6)

In a campaign or operation, a line linking decisive points in time and space on the path to the centre of gravity.

Manoeuvre (NZDDP–D)

A movement to place ships or aircraft in a position of advantage over the enemy.

Employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission.

Manoeuvrist Approach (NZDDP–D)

The manoeuvrist approach seeks to shatter the enemy's cohesion through a series of actions orchestrated to a single purpose that creates a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope. The manoeuvrist approach focuses commanders at every level on exploiting enemy weaknesses, avoiding enemy strength and protecting friendly vulnerabilities.

Military Objective (ADFP–04.1.1)

Military objectives are legitimate objects of attack and comprise:

- All combatants who have a capacity and are willing to fight;

- Establishments, buildings and locations at which the armed forces or their materiel are located; and

- Other objects which, by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. The presence of non-combatants in or around a military objective does not change its nature as a military objective. Non-combatants in the vicinity of a military objective must share the danger to which the military objective is exposed.

Military Strategy (AAP–6)

That component of national or multinational strategy, presenting the manner in which military power should be developed and applied to achieve national objectives or those of a group of nations.

Mission (AAP–6)

A clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose.

One or more aircraft ordered to accomplish one particular task.

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Mounting (ADFP–04.1.1)

All preparations made in areas designated for the purpose, in anticipation of an operation. It includes the assembly in the mounting area, preparation and maintenance within the mounting area, movement to loading points and subsequent embarkation into ships, craft or aircraft if applicable.

Multinational (AAP–6)

Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organisations, in which elements of more than one nation participate. Related terms: combined, coalition.

Non-governmental Organisation (JP 1–02)

A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organisation dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. Also called NGO.

Objective (AAP–6)

A clearly defined and attainable goal for a military operation, for example seizing a terrain feature, neutralising an adversary's force or capability or achieving some other desired outcome that is essential to a commander's plan and towards which the operation is directed.

Operational Art (NZDDP–D)

Operational art is the skilful employment of military forces to attain strategic goals through the design, organisation, sequencing and direction of campaigns and major operations. Operational art translates strategic into operational and ultimately tactical action.

Operational Design (JP 3–0)

The conception and construction of the framework that underpins a campaign or major operation plan and its subsequent execution.

Operational Design Element (JP 3–0)

A key consideration used in operational design.

Operational Environment (JP 1–02)

A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander.

Operational Level of Capability (NZDF Annual Report 2013)

The state of preparedness where a force element is ready, combat viable, deployable and sustainable. When a force element is at its operational level of capability, it is able to be deployed and commence operations. Also called OLOC.

Peacebuilding

A peace support operation employing complementary diplomatic, civil and - when necessary - military means, to address the underlying causes of conflict and the longer-term needs of the people. It requires a commitment to a long-term process and may run concurrently with other types of peace support operations.

Peace Enforcement

A peace support operation following an agreement or ceasefire that has established a permissive environment where the level of consent and compliance is high, and the threat of disruption is low. The use of force by peacekeepers is normally limited to self-defence.

Peacemaking

A peace support operation conducted after the initiation of a conflict to secure a ceasefire or peaceful settlement, that involves primarily diplomatic action supported, when necessary, by direct or indirect use of military assets.

Peace Support Operations

A generic term describing operations that impartially make use of diplomatic, civil and military means to restore or maintain peace. They are operations

carried out under an appropriate mandate. Such operations may include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. Also called PSO.

Psychological Operations (ADFP–04.1.1)

Planned psychological activities in peace and war directed to enemy, friendly and neutral audiences in order to influence attitudes and behaviour affecting the achievement of political and military objectives. They include strategic psychological activities, consolidation psychological operations and battlefield psychological activities. Also called PSYOPS.

Rules of Engagement (ADFP–04.1.1)

Directives issued by a competent military authority which specify the circumstances and limitations under which forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called ROE.

Sequencing (JDP 0–01.1)

The arrangement of activities within a campaign in the order most likely to achieve the elimination of the enemy's centre of gravity.

Situational Awareness (JDP 0–01.1)

The understanding of the operational environment in the context of a commander's (or staff officer's) mission (or task).

In intelligence usage, situational awareness is the ability to identify trends and linkages over time, and to relate these to what is happening and what is not happening.

Situational Understanding (ADDP–3.0)

The accurate interpretation of a situation and the likely actions of groups and individuals within it. Awareness, analysis, knowledge, comprehension and judgement facilitate understanding, which allows accurate and timely decision-making.

Strategic Communication (JP 1–02)

Focused New Zealand Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favourable for the advancement of New Zealand Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programmes, plans, themes, messages and products synchronised with the actions of all instruments of national power.

Synchronisation (JDP 0–01.1)

The focusing of resources and activities to produce maximum combat power at the decisive time.

Target Audience (ADDP–3.13)

An individual or group selected for influence.

Theatre (ADFP–04.1.1)

A designated geographic area for which an operational level joint or combined commander is appointed and in which a campaign or series of major operations is conducted. A theatre may contain one or more joint force areas of operations.

Warning Order (ADFP–04.1.1)

A preliminary notice of an order or action which is to follow. Also called WNGO.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AAP	Allied Administrative Publication
ACP	Airspace Control Plan
AC SCI	Assistant Chief Strategic Commitments and Intelligence
ADDP	Australian Defence Doctrine Publication
ADF	Australian Defence Force
ADFP	Australian Defence Force Publication
AFN	Approved Foreign Nationals
AI	Area of Interest
AII	Area of Intelligence Interest
AJP	Allied Joint Publication
AO	Area of Operations
AOA	Amphibious Objective Area
AOR	Area of Responsibility
ASCOPE	Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organisations, People, and Events
ASW	Anti-submarine Warfare
BLOC	Basic Level of Capability
BPT	Be Prepared To
CAS	Chief of Air Staff
CAS	Close Air Support
C2	Command and Control
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear
CCIR	Commanders Critical Information Requirement
CDF	Chief of Defence Force
CDF EXORD	Chief of Defence Force Execute Order
CDP	Commander's Decision Point
CEASOPS	Cessation of Operations
C-IA	Countering Irregular Activity
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CIS	Communications and Information Systems
CMO	Civil-military Operation
CNO	Computer Network Operations
COA	Course of Action
CoG	Centre of Gravity
COIN	Counter Insurgency
Combat ID	Combat Identification

Comd	Commander
COMJFNZ	Commander Joint Forces New Zealand
COMLOG	Commander Logistics
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
COO	Chief Operating Officer
COS	Chief of Staff
C-IED	Counter Improvised Explosive Device
CPG	Commander Joint Forces New Zealand Planning Group
CR	Critical Requirement
CSS	Combat Service Support
CTE	Commander Task Element
CTG	Commander Task Group
CTU	Commander Task Unit
CV	Critical Vulnerability
C4ISR	Command, Control, Communications, Computers & Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
DCA	Defence Counter-Air
DCOS	Deputy Chief of Staff
DJIATHQ	Deployable Joint Inter Agency Task Force Headquarters
DLC	Defence Logistics Command
DLOC	Directed Level of Capability
DP	Decisive Point
DPS	Defence Planning System
EARLS	Electronic Activity Reporting and Lessons Learned Systems
EEFI	Essential Elements of Friendly Information
EMS	Electromagnetic Spectrum
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
ETF	Emergency Task Force
FEBA	Forward Edge of the Battle Area
FET	Force Extraction Team
FFIR	Friendly Force Information Requirement
FM	Field Manual
FM	Fleet Manager
FSCM	Fire Support Coordination Measures
HADR	Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
HQ	Headquarters

HQJFNZ	Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand	NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
HQNZDF	Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force	NSE	National Support Element
HUMINT	Human Intelligence	NZDDP	New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication
ID	Identification	NZDF	New Zealand Defence Force
IDC	Interdepartmental Committee	NZN	New Zealand Nationals
IED	Improvised Explosive Device	NZSOF	New Zealand Special Operations Forces
ISA	Intelligence and Situational Awareness	OCA	Offensive Counter-Air
INTERFET	International Force for East Timor	ODESC	Officials' Committee for Domestic and External Security Co-ordination
IO	Information Operation or International Organisation	OGA	Other Government Agencies
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force	OGD	Other Government Departments
ISF	International Stabilisation Force	OLOC	Operational Level of Capability
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance	OP	Operation
JDP	Joint Doctrine Publication	OPP	Operations Planning Process
JF	Joint Force	OPCOM	Operational Command
JFAO	Joint Force Area of Operations	OPCON	Operational Control
JIPOE	Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment	OPINT	Operational Intelligence
JIM	Joint, Inter-agency, Multinational	OPSEC	Operations Security
JMAP	Joint Mutual Appreciation Process	PIR	Priority Intelligence Requirement
JP	Joint Publication	PMESII PT	Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information, Pysical Terrain and Time
JIATF	Joint Inter-agency Task Force		
JIATFHQ	Joint Inter-agency Task Force Headquarters	PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
JSOA	Joint Special Operations Area	PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
JTF	Joint Task Force	PW	Prisoner of War
JTFHQ	Joint Task Force Headquarters	RAMSI	Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands
JWP	Joint Warfare Publication	RM	Risk Management
LOAC	Law of Armed Conflict	RNZAF	Royal New Zealand Air Force
MFAT	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade	RNZN	Royal New Zealand Navy
MNF	Multinational Force	ROE	Rules of Engagement
MOE	Measures of Effectiveness	SASO	Stability and Support Operations
MOP	Measures of Performance	SCI	Strategic Commitments and Intelligence
MRO	Military Response Option	SNO	Senior National Officer
MRO	Maintenance, Repair Overhaul	SOF	Special Operations Forces
NAI	Named Area of Interest	SRO	Search and Rescue Operation
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation	STRAPP	Strategic Planning Process
NCE	National Command Element	SU	Situational Understanding
NEO	Non-combatant Evacuation Operation	TAA	Target Audience Analysis
		TAOR	Tactical Area of Responsibility

TACOM	Tactical Command	**TTP**	Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
TACON	Tactical Control	**TU**	Task Unit
TAI	Target Area of Interest	**UAV**	Unmanned Aeriel Vehicle
TE	Task Element	**UN**	United Nations
TET	Theatre Extraction Team	**UNAMET**	United Assistance in East Timor
TF	Task Force	**UOR**	Urgent Operational Requirement
TG	Task Group	**UXO**	Unexploded Ordnance
TOO	Theatre of Operations	**WSM**	Water Space Management

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