



New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

# JOINT OPERATIONS PLANNING

## NZDDP-5.0

## JOINT OPERATIONS PLANNING (NZDDP-5.0)

New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication *Joint Operations Planning* (NZDDP-5.0) is issued for use by the New Zealand Defence Force and is effective forthwith for guidance in defence doctrine.



R. R. Jones  
Lieutenant General  
Chief of Defence Force  
Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force  
Wellington  
June 2011

### CONDITIONS OF RELEASE

The information within this publication is Crown copyright.

No material or information contained in this publication should be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form outside New Zealand Defence Force establishments, except as authorised in writing by the New Zealand Defence Force.

The information may be released by the New Zealand Defence Force to a recipient Defence Force for defence purposes only. It may be disclosed only within the recipient Defence Force, except as otherwise authorised by the New Zealand Defence Force.

© New Zealand Defence Force 2011

Introduction

## AUTHORISATION

Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force is responsible for publishing doctrine and maintaining a hierarchy of such publications. Users wishing to quote New Zealand doctrinal publications as reference material in other work should confirm with the Deputy Director Doctrine whether the publication and amendment state remain extant. Comments on factual accuracy or proposals for amendment should also be directed to the Deputy Director Doctrine at:

### The Doctrine Cell

Directorate of Future Force Development  
Capability Branch  
Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force  
Defence House  
2-12 Aitken St  
Wellington  
New Zealand

DTelN: 349 7477  
Telephone: + 64 4 496 0477  
Facsimile: + 64 4 496 0699  
NZDF intranet: <http://doctrine/desc/nzddp/5.0.html>

### CUSTODIAN

Assistant Chief Strategic Commitments and Intelligence  
Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force

## PREFACE

### Scope

New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication *Joint Operations Planning* (NZDDP-5.0) is the keystone document of the joint planning series. It sits at the philosophical level, above application- and procedural-level publications, and provides a doctrinal foundation to guide members of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) when planning joint operations.

This doctrine replaces Defence Force Order 02/2003 *Strategic Level Planning for Military Operations* and the Strategic Planning Process (STRAPP) contained therein. It also incorporates elements of the operational-level planning process, but does not replace the guidance contained in the standard operating procedures of Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand (HQJFNZ).

NZDDP-5.0 flows directly from NZDDP-D *Foundations of New Zealand Military Doctrine*, and together with its equivalents in other series, is the New Zealand authority for the planning and conduct of joint operations. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine should be followed except when, in the judgement of the commander, circumstances dictate otherwise.

### Purpose

NZDDP-5.0 addresses the military contribution to planning for a potential or actual event, as it happens at the strategic and operational levels of the NZDF. It describes the fundamentals of, and procedural framework for, joint operations planning. It also provides a doctrinal basis for coordinating NZDF planning with that of other partners in government and overseas.

### Application

NZDDP-5.0 is suitable for planning operations across the spectrum of conflict. It is aimed primarily at those engaged in or studying joint operations planning — specifically staff employed in Headquarters NZDF, HQJFNZ, and, when established, a joint task force headquarters. It is also useful to those routinely involved in military operations planning, such as other government agencies. It can be used as a reference at any level.

### Structure

NZDDP-5.0 is divided into six chapters.

- Chapter 1 — *Fundamentals of Military Planning* provides a basic understanding of the context and principles of military planning for joint operations.
- Chapter 2 — *Analysis: Support to Planning and Decision-Making* emphasises the importance of understanding the strategic context as a precursor to effective planning.
- Chapter 3 — *Influences on Planning* outlines several factors that may affect planning for an operation, including resources, time, preparedness, and the nature of New Zealand's contribution.
- Chapter 4 — *Operational Art and Design* considers operational art and the elements of operational design, which together guide the development of a concept of operations and more detailed planning.

## Introduction

- Chapter 5 — *The New Zealand Defence Force Operations Planning Process* describes the process taken to frame a problem, establish a suitable response, and plan this response at both the strategic and operational levels.
- Chapter 6 — *Stakeholders and Planning Groups* details the main people, committees, and planning groups that have a role in the NZDF's planning process.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The New Zealand Defence Force acknowledges its intellectual debt in preparing this publication to a number of military doctrinal publications, listed below.

- AAP-6 – *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*, April 2009, NATO Standardization Agency, Brussels, Belgium
- ADDP 5.0 – *Joint Planning (Provisional)*, January 2006, Australian Defence Headquarters, Canberra, Australia
- ADFP 5.0.1 – *Joint Military Appreciation Process*, April 2009, Australian Defence Headquarters, Canberra, Australia
- AJP-5 – *Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational Planning (Ratification Draft)*, 2006, NATO Standardization Agency, Brussels, Belgium
- CFJP 5.0 – *The Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process*, April 2008, CFEC Joint Doctrine Branch, Canadian Forces, Canada
- JDP 5-00 (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.) – *Campaign Planning*, December 2008, Ministry of Defence, Swindon, United Kingdom
- JP 3-16 – *Multinational Operations*, March 2007, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Arlington, Virginia, United States of America
- JP 5-0 – *Joint Operation Planning*, December 2006, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Arlington, Virginia, United States of America
- LWP-G 0-1-4 – *The Military Appreciation Process*, May 2001, Combined Arms Training and Development Centre, Puckapunyal, Australia
- NZDDP-06.1 – *Rules of Engagement*, February 2010, Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force, Wellington, New Zealand
- NZDDP-3.0 – *Joint Operations*, June 2010, Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force, Wellington, New Zealand
- NZDDP-D – *Foundations of New Zealand Military Doctrine*, November 2008, Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force, Wellington, New Zealand
- NZDFP-2.0.1.1 – *Strategic Military Threat Assessments*, February 2009, Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force, Wellington, New Zealand
- NZDFP-2.0.1.2 – *Strategic Intelligence Estimates*, September 2009, Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force, Wellington, New Zealand

Other works referenced in NZDDP-5.0 include:

- CabGuide, *Cabinet Committees*, <http://cabguide.cabinetoffice.govt.nz/context/definitions/cabinet-committees>
- Defence Act 1990
- Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, *Securing our Nation's Safety: How New Zealand Manages its Security and Intelligence Agencies*, December 2000, <http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/dpmc/publications/securingoursafety/index.html>
- Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, *Security and Risk Group*, <http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/dess/index.htm>
- Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand, *Standard Operating Procedures 501-504*, Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand, Trentham, New Zealand
- Multinational Interoperability Working Group, *Multinational Interoperability Council: Collaborative Staff Procedures in a Coalition Environment*, 1 June 2008
- New Zealand Defence Force, *Defence Force Order 02/2003: Strategic Level Planning for Military Operations*, December 2003, Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force, Wellington, New Zealand
- New Zealand Defence Force, *Statement of Intent 2010-2013*, 27 April 2010, Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force, Wellington, New Zealand.

# CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Title	i
Authorisation	ii
Preface	iii
Acknowledgements	v
Contents	vi
List of Illustrations	viii
Executive Summary	x
<b>Chapter 1: Fundamentals of Military Planning</b>	<b>1</b>
Introduction	3
Fundamentals of Joint Operations Planning	3
Levels of Planning	4
Types of Planning	6
Principles of War	7
<b>Chapter 2: Analysis: Support to Planning and Decision-Making</b>	<b>9</b>
Introduction	11
Conduct of Analysis	12
Scope of Analysis	14
Outputs of Analysis	17
<b>Chapter 3: Influences on Planning</b>	<b>21</b>
Introduction	23
Resources	23
Preparedness	24
Information	25
Risk and Threat	27
Legitimacy	27
Nature of Involvement: Multinational and Multi-Agency Operations	27
Working with Other Government Agencies	31
<b>Chapter 4: Operational Art and Design</b>	<b>33</b>
Introduction	35
Operational Art	35
Operational Design	38
Limitations of Operational Art and Design	45

## CONTENTS (CONT.)

	<i>Page</i>
<b>Chapter 5: The New Zealand Defence Force Operations Planning Process</b>	<b>47</b>
Introduction	49
Initial Response at the National Strategic Level	50
Phase One: Assess	53
Phase Two: Plan	55
Phase Three: Execute and Monitor	57
Annex A: Military Strategic Estimate and Military Response Options	61
Annex B: Joint Operations Planning Process	62
Annex C: Concept of Operations	64
Annex D: Campaign Plan	65
Annex E: Operational Correspondence	67
<b>Chapter 6: Stakeholders and Planning Groups</b>	<b>69</b>
Introduction	71
National Strategic-Level Stakeholders and Planning Groups	71
Military Strategic-Level Stakeholders and Planning Groups	74
Operational-Level Stakeholders and Planning Groups	76
<b>Glossary</b>	<b>80</b>
Terms and Definitions	80
Acronyms and Abbreviations	85
<b>Index</b>	<b>86</b>
<b>Notes</b>	<b>90</b>



## LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

<i>Figure</i>		<i>Page</i>
1-1	Planning takes place at several different levels.	4
1-2	The national strategic level provides direction to the military strategic level.	5
1-3	Immediate planning can happen in response to an unexpected crisis, such as the Canterbury earthquake.	7
1-4	Logistic arrangements should allow maximum freedom of action to carry out the plan.	8
2-1	It is important that NZDF force elements are aware of the culture in which they are operating.	14
2-2	An operating environment will contain a range of actors, with different aims, motivations, cultures, relationships, and abilities.	16
3-1	Time impacts on planning.	23
3-2	Planners must consider the response time that force elements need to train and prepare for operations.	25
3-3	In multinational operations, the forces and capabilities committed will vary from nation to nation.	30
3-4	New Zealand's national response to an event will typically involve more than one government agency. The NZDF will not necessarily be the lead agency, as was the case in the Canterbury earthquake.	32
4-1	Operational art links ends, ways, and means.	35
4-2	The flow of information between the strategic and tactical levels must be planned for and managed, to avoid command and control ambiguities.	37
4-3	A tactical centre of gravity is a specific capability that provides freedom of action, such as a replenishment tanker.	40
4-4	Branches and sequels are triggered by decision points.	45
5-1	Intelligence underpins the three phases of the operations planning process.	50
5-2	Planning may be compartmentalised for sensitive operations such as special forces deployments.	50
5-3	The NZDF Operations Planning Process	52
5-4	The third phase of the planning process begins when force elements deploy.	58
5-5	The Joint Operations Planning Process	62
6-1	The Prime Minister and Cabinet have ultimate authority; however, a series of committees and individuals inform their decision-making.	71
6-2	The Security and Risk Group coordinates New Zealand's response to crises such as the instability in East Timor.	73
6-3	The hierarchy of planning groups and teams at HQJFNZ	76
6-4	The Joint Administrative Planning Group coordinates the support aspects of planning.	79



## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Chapter One: Fundamentals of Military Planning

As an instrument of national power, the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) may be directed by the New Zealand Government to plan a military response to an anticipated or actual event. Operations planning aims to develop military strategic guidance and objectives for this response, which are then translated into a series of military actions within a concept of operations or campaign plan.

**Levels of Planning.** There are three levels of planning, each of which has different purposes, stakeholders, and processes. The planning levels coincide with the three levels of command and operations: strategic, operational, and tactical.

**Types of Planning.** There are two types of operations planning: deliberate and immediate. The main difference between the two is that deliberate planning is relatively free of time constraints, whereas immediate planning takes place within a compressed time scale to meet a developing crisis.

**Principles of War.** Military planners at all levels should judiciously apply the principles of war throughout the planning process.

### Chapter Two: Analysis: Support to Planning and Decision-Making

Problems must be framed before they can be solved — as such, analysis is an important precursor to planning.

Analysis includes the intelligence process and is a continuous, whole-of-headquarters activity to understand the factors that characterise a situation, from both a current and an historical perspective. It also addresses what might happen next, based on assumptions about the actions and reactions of different actors.

**Scope of Analysis.** The scope of analysis will vary from one situation to another, but should generally cover: crisis circumstances and causes, population, culture, legal issues, actors, and possible future outcomes.

**Analysis Community of Interest.** Analysis is a multi-disciplinary activity. While the NZDF's intelligence staff will be the primary advocates of analysis, analysis requires input from a wide community of interest. This may include other NZDF staff, government agencies, coalition partners, host nation representatives, subject matter experts, and so on.

**Output of Analysis.** The practical output of analysis is a clear picture of what is happening, why, and what may happen next. At the strategic level, two intelligence products contain this information: the strategic intelligence estimate and the strategic military threat assessment.

### Chapter Three: Influences on Planning

When planning an operation or campaign, there are several factors to consider.

**Resources.** Planning staff should consider: the planning staff's experience, the time available for planning, the likely cost of the operation, and any logistic limitations.

**Preparedness.** Preparedness is a significant factor in planning. It is a combination of a force's readiness, deployability, combat viability, and sustainability.

**Information.** Effective planning requires close consultation with a number of stakeholders, which may include other government agencies and/or coalition partners. If there are sensitivities around a possible NZDF commitment, knowledge of planning will be restricted. This may limit the scope of the planning advice and options delivered.

**Risk and Threat.** Threat should be managed and mitigated at its source, with strategic risk best managed by all-of-government involvement at the earliest opportunity.

**Legitimacy.** It is vital that any NZDF operation complies with the applicable international, New Zealand domestic, and host nation law, as well as the law of armed conflict.

**Nature of Involvement.** Modern military operations, particularly those in which the NZDF participates, are generally multinational and multi-agency in nature. This requires coordination not only between the components of a joint force, but also between international, governmental, and non-governmental organisations in a multilateral effort.

## Chapter Four: Operational Art and Design

Operational art and the elements of operational design translate strategic military objectives into a design for operations, which is expressed in a concept of operations.

**Operational Art.** Operational art determines when, where, and for what purpose forces will conduct operations. It is the process whereby the commander defines how the military end-state will be achieved, in support of the national strategic end-state. It requires an extensive understanding of how interrelated factors may influence the planning and execution of a campaign or operation.

**Operational Design.** Operational design is the practical extension of operational art — it guides the development of a concept of operations and detailed planning documents. Design elements are the tools of operational design. They provide structure for the plan; help to arrange actions in time, space, and purpose; and help to visualise how the operation will unfold.

**Limits.** While the concepts of operational art and design provide a comprehensive methodology and a lexicon of commonly understood terms, commanders and staff should remember that these concepts are guides, not templates, and should not be followed blindly.

## Chapter Five: The New Zealand Defence Force Operations Planning Process

The NZDF Operations Planning Process (NZDF OPP) guides strategic- and operational-level planning for the command and employment of NZDF force elements on operations. It can be used for both deliberate and immediate planning.

While it delineates the planning responsibilities of the strategic and operational levels, it is designed to allow parallel planning at these levels. Its flexibility reflects the dynamic nature of operations planning and the need to accommodate ongoing developments.

There are three phases in the NZDF OPP, supported by intelligence products throughout: assess, plan, and execute and monitor. When planning the response to an actual crisis, the NZDF OPP will be preceded by activity at the national strategic level, which will determine the national response and any military component.

## Chapter Six: Stakeholders and Planning Groups

The NZDF OPP spans three levels: national strategic, military strategic, and operational. There are a number of stakeholders, planning groups, and decision-making forums at each of these levels, each with a unique role in the planning process.

**National Strategic Level.** At the national strategic level, stakeholders include: the Prime Minister and Cabinet, two Cabinet committees, an officials' committee, and inter-departmental watch groups and working groups.

**Military Strategic Level.** Within Defence, the Chief of Defence Force and the Secretary of Defence hold ultimate responsibility for Defence matters. The Vice Chief of Defence Force is responsible for all operational planning in Headquarters NZDF, through the Assistant Chief of Strategic Commitments and Intelligence. The Strategic Planning Group is the lead group in the NZDF for planning at the strategic level; it is supported by a number of other headquarters functions.



## Introduction

**Operational Level.** The Commander Joint Forces New Zealand (COMJFNZ) guides planning at the operational level, and is supported by a number of interlinked, multi-disciplinary planning groups and teams. The COMJFNZ Planning Group is the senior operational-level planning and steering group in the NZDF. It provides guidance to the Joint Operations Planning Group, the Joint Intelligence Planning Group, and the Joint Administrative Planning Group.







CHAPTER 1:

# FUNDAMENTALS OF MILITARY PLANNING



## Contents

	<i>Page</i>
Introduction	3
Scope of Publication	3
Fundamentals of Joint Operations Planning	3
Purpose	3
Process	3
Scope	4
Considerations	4
Levels of Planning	4
Strategic Level	5
Operational Level	5
Tactical Level	6
Types of Planning	6
Deliberate Planning	6
Immediate Planning	6
Principles of War	7





*Nothing succeeds in war except in consequence of a well-prepared plan.*

**Napoleon, 1769-1821**

## Introduction

1.01 The New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) is an instrument of national power, employed by the New Zealand Government to protect and promote national interests.<sup>1</sup> In order to employ the NZDF as an element of national power, a sound policy foundation and a coherent military planning framework are required. The Government's policy foundation for Defence can be found in the Defence White Paper. Within the NZDF, the NZDF Operations Planning Process (OPP) provides a framework planning process to transform this policy direction into military effects. By nature and definition, military planning is generic and applicable across a range of functions within the NZDF.

1.02 Military planning happens at all levels of Defence — strategic, operational, and tactical — and across the spectrum of operations. Its outcomes range from military response options and standing plans, through to directives, orders, and instructions. Planning is an inherent command responsibility at all levels, and underpins the successful conduct of military campaigns and operations.

1.03 Planning for modern-day operations and contingencies is increasingly a joint, multinational, and all-of-government activity. This is inherently more complex than planning for single-Service, limited-objective operations and activities. It requires a thorough understanding of the military's role in achieving national objectives. It also requires the NZDF to consider the capabilities and processes of disparate force elements, partner agencies, and coalition partners. Naturally, communication and coordination are essential at all levels and between all those involved.

<sup>1</sup> The use of the NZDF in the national interest has its legal foundation in the Defence Act.

## Scope of Publication

1.04 This document provides a framework for planning military operations, through fundamental principles and a planning process that apply to a range of Defence planning scenarios. It focuses on the strategic and operational levels of planning and operations; this document does not consider tactical-level planning in detail.

1.05 It is not the intention to produce a template that must be applied rigidly, or to replicate the Military Appreciation Process.<sup>2</sup> This publication should be read in conjunction with other NZDF-approved doctrine, including, notably, [ADFP 5.0.1 Joint Military Appreciation Process](#).

## Fundamentals of Joint Operations Planning

### Purpose

1.06 As an instrument of national power, the NZDF may be directed by the New Zealand Government to plan a military response to an anticipated or actual event. Operations planning aims to develop military strategic guidance and objectives for this response, which are then translated into a series of military actions within a concept of operations or campaign plan.

### Process

1.07 The NZDF OPP guides planning at the strategic and operational levels — that is, at Headquarters NZDF (HQNZDF) and Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand (HQJFNZ).

<sup>2</sup> The Military Appreciation Process is a decision-making and planning tool that can be applied both individually and collectively by staff at any level. It is applicable within single-Service, joint, and combined environments — for more information on the Joint Military Appreciation Process, see Chapter 5 and the NZDF-approved [ADFP 5.0.1 Joint Military Appreciation Process](#).

1.08 In the early stages of scoping for a commitment, this process focuses on producing potential military response options. This requires a clear appreciation of what must be accomplished, under what conditions, and within what limitations. Once a response option has been selected, a concept of operations is developed to implement and execute the selected option. This involves determining *how* operations can be conducted to achieve the defined objectives, using available forces, and within acceptable risks. For more information on the NZDF OPP, see Chapter 5.

## Scope

1.09 Although the level of detail may vary, operations planning should ultimately address the following major areas.

- Conduct of the operation, to achieve strategic and operational objectives and end-states
- Force capabilities required to conduct the operation (task organisation)
- Command and control arrangements
- Deployment of forces into the joint force area of operations
- Logistic sustainment
- Control and use of operational information
- Cooperation with civilian authorities
- Force protection
- Redeployment and reconstitution

## Considerations

1.10 Operations planning takes place at different levels, under varying circumstances, and produces different outputs. Nevertheless, the following considerations are fundamental to any planning effort.

- Understand the purpose of the military action — the strategic aim or desired end-state.
- Link the military objectives to the desired end-state at the national strategic level.
- Consider guidance from above, as well as requirements from below.
- Clearly define how you will measure success in

reaching the end-state.

- Assess the risks associated with the operation.
- Understand the operational environment, including its civil aspects.
- Understand the capabilities, limitations, and likely intentions of the adversary or factions involved in a conflict.
- Understand the capabilities and limitations of any partners.
- Plan through to the finish, where the force is redeployed and reconstituted.

## Levels of Planning

1.11 There are three levels of planning, each of which has different purposes, stakeholders, and processes. The planning levels coincide with the three levels of command and operations: strategic, operational, and tactical.<sup>3</sup> They are illustrated in Figure 1-1 and explained on the following page.



**Figure 1-1: Planning takes place at several different levels.**

<sup>3</sup> See NZDDP-D *Foundations of New Zealand Military Doctrine* for more information.

## Strategic Level

1.12 The strategic level of planning is divided into two levels: national strategic and military strategic.

- **National Strategic Level.** The national strategic level refers to the macro-level, political dimension of planning. Planning at this level mobilises the instruments of national power to meet the Government's objectives. It is concerned with political independence, national sovereignty and security, and the pursuit of wider national interests. Planning at this level is as much about the avoidance of war (conflict prevention) as the conduct of war. National strategy is the collective responsibility of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, articulated through the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet.
- **Military Strategic Level.** The military strategic level is responsible for the military aspects of planning and for directing military effort. This includes outlining the *military* end-state and a broad concept of how it will be achieved, in order to support the *national strategic* end-state. This level is the domain of the Chief of Defence Force (CDF), through HQNZDF.

## Key Terms

### National Strategic End-State

The national strategic end-state is the range of desired conditions that should exist at the end of a campaign or operation. It may include diplomatic, economic, social, humanitarian, and military conditions.

### Military End-State

The military end-state should align with the national strategic end-state. It represents the desired conditions that should exist at the end of a military campaign or operation. The military end-state may be but one contributor to the national strategic end-state.

## Operational Level

1.13 Campaigns and major operations are planned, orchestrated, and commanded at the operational level.




Figure 1-2: The national strategic level provides direction to the military strategic level.

This level links the military strategic level to the tactical level by translating military strategy into operational objectives, tasks, and end-states. Commander Joint Forces New Zealand (COMJFNZ) is responsible for operational-level planning within the NZDF, and is supported by HQJFNZ. This level of planning includes the preparation, deployment, conduct, sustainment, and recovery of force elements.

## Tactical Level

1.14 The tactical level is where a campaign or operation is actually executed. Planning at this level considers how to apply force elements — in battles, engagements, and minor operations, for example — to deliver the outcomes required by operational- and strategic-level planners.

## Types of Planning

1.15 There are two broad types of operations planning: *deliberate* and *immediate*. They both aim to guide the NZDF's response to a crisis, whether anticipated or actual. The only significant difference between the two is the time available for planning.

*In military operations, time is everything.*

**The Duke of Wellington, 30 June  
1800, dispatch**

## Deliberate Planning

1.16 Deliberate planning is normally undertaken without undue time constraints or the need for immediate action. This allows for wide consultation, detailed analysis of information, and a more detailed product. Because of the time involved in deliberate planning, it is usually done in anticipation of a known or likely event — this is known as contingency planning. It may also be done in reaction to an event if there is sufficient prior knowledge or warning, such as when reviewing or updating existing commitments.

1.17 **Contingency Planning.** Contingency planning involves developing and reviewing standing plans. These standing plans are designed to guide the NZDF response to an anticipated crisis. There are two types of standing plan.

- **Joint Service Plan.** A joint service plan is a strategic-level assessment of how the NZDF will react in a contingency. It is scenario based and outlines, in varying degrees of detail, New Zealand's national strategy for a possible scenario, possible military options, and CDF planning guidance.<sup>4</sup> Joint service plans are owned by CDF.<sup>5</sup>
- **Contingency Plan.** At the operational level, HQJFNZ takes a joint service plan and develops it into a detailed contingency plan. Contingency plans are owned by COMJFNZ.

1.18 **Responsibility.** Deliberate planning — whether in anticipation of, or in reaction to, an event — is the responsibility of HQNZDF's Strategic Commitments and Intelligence (SCI) Branch and HQJFNZ's Joint Plans (J5) Branch.

## Immediate Planning

1.19 Immediate planning creates military options to meet an actual, developing crisis. It takes place within a compressed time scale to meet short-term — and usually unexpected — security challenges or crises.

1.20 Given the time-sensitive nature of immediate planning, there will be limited time for analysis, decision-making, and consultation. The aim is thus to narrow the range of options, in order to speed up decision-making and execution. If the crisis in question is covered by a joint service plan and a contingency plan, these can be used to speed up — but not circumvent — the planning process.

<sup>4</sup> This could include CDF intent, military end-state and objectives, and other military strategic considerations.

<sup>5</sup> Defence Force Order 91 *Joint Service and Combined Plans* contains the NZDF's joint service plans. Its 100 and 200 series (disaster relief and assistance to civil authorities) are unclassified; the 500 series is classified (counter-terrorism, non-combatant evacuation, etc.) Unclassified joint service plans may be shared with relevant government agencies.

## Chapter 1

1.21 **Responsibility.** Immediate planning is the responsibility of SCI Branch at the strategic level, and HQJFNZ's Joint Operations (J3) Branch at the operational level.



Figure 1-3: Immediate planning can happen in response to an unexpected crisis, such as the Canterbury earthquake.

## Principles of War

*The fundamental principles of war are neither very numerous nor in themselves very abstruse, but the application of them is difficult and cannot be made subject to rules. The correct application of principles to circumstances is the outcome of sound military knowledge, built up by study and practice until it has become instinct.*

**British Army Field Service Regulations, 1909**

1.22 Military planners at all levels should judiciously apply the principles of war when formulating a plan. These principles provide a checklist that can be applied throughout the planning process as military response options and concepts of operations are being developed. The principles of war remain relevant across the spectrum of conflict. Those listed below are described largely in terms of their application to joint planning. They are considered in greater detail in [NZDDP-D Foundations of New Zealand Military Doctrine](#).

1.23 **Selection and Maintenance of the Aim.** In the conduct of war as a whole, and in every operation

within it, it is essential to select and clearly define the aim. Once the aim is decided, all efforts are directed to its attainment until a change in situation calls for re-appreciation and potentially a new aim. When different aims are set at different levels of operations, subordinate aims must fully support the attainment of the higher-level aim.

1.24 **Maintenance of Morale.** Material advantages cannot compensate for a lack of courage, cohesion, energy, determination, and endurance. Morale is essential to success in war.

1.25 **Offensive Action.** Offensive action is taken to gain and retain the initiative, exploit opportunities, and capitalise on the adversary's weaknesses. It is the necessary forerunner of success.

1.26 **Security.** Security provides forces with the freedom of action to launch an offensive. It entails adequate sea denial, and the protection of high-value assets and communication and information systems. Security does not imply undue caution or avoidance of all risk.

1.27 **Surprise.** Surprise has a powerful influence on combat operations. Every endeavour should be made to surprise an adversary and to guard against being surprised. The elements of surprise are: secrecy, concealment, deception, originality, audacity, and speed. Counterintelligence activities and information operations contribute to surprise.<sup>6</sup>

1.28 **Concentration of Force.** It is often necessary to concentrate force superior to that of the adversary at a decisive time and place. Concentration implies having forces disposed so that they can unite to deliver the decisive blow at the right time, or counter the adversary's threats.

<sup>6</sup> Any action taken under the guise of surprise cannot equate to perfidy. Perfidy is an act intended to kill, injure, or harm members of the opposing force, by leading them to believe that the offender is entitled to legal protection, or that the offender will afford protected status to the member of the opposing force.

1.29 **Economy of Effort.** Economy of effort implies allocating forces and resources in such a way that they make the maximum possible contribution to the achievement or maintenance of the aim.

1.30 **Flexibility.** Changing situations and unexpected developments require flexible decision-making processes, good training, organisation, discipline, staff work, and a high degree of physical mobility.

1.31 **Cooperation.** Cooperation entails coordinating all force elements (and possibly other, non-military organisations) to achieve the maximum combined effort. Goodwill and the desire to cooperate are vital at all levels.

1.32 **Sustainability.** Logistic and administrative arrangements are crucial to success. They should be designed so as to give the commander maximum freedom of action in carrying out the plan.

Figure 1-4: Logistic arrangements should allow maximum freedom of action to carry out the plan.





CHAPTER 2:

# ANALYSIS: SUPPORT TO PLANNING AND DECISION- MAKING



## Contents

	<i>Page</i>
Introduction	11
Rationale for Analysis	11
Analysing the Context of a Situation	11
Dealing with Complexity	12
Conduct of Analysis	12
The Principles of Good Analysis	12
Methodologies	12
Analysis Community of Interest	13
Information Sources	13
Challenging the Orthodoxy	13
Scope of Analysis	14
Crisis Circumstances and Surroundings	14
Actors and Influences	15
Causes of Crises	16
Implications for the Future	17
Outputs of Analysis	17
Strategic Intelligence Estimate	18
Strategic Military Threat Assessment	18



## Introduction

2.01 Problems must be framed before they can be solved — as such, analysis is an important precursor to planning. Analysis is the examination of all the elements of a situation and their inter-relationships, in order to thoroughly understand the past, present, and anticipated operational contexts that are likely to influence military commitments.

2.02 This chapter provides a brief overview of the nature, conduct, and scope of analysis. Much of the analysis described here is similar to that conducted during operations planning by the New Zealand Defence Force's (NZDF's) intelligence staffs, with input from other functional areas such as operations and logistics.<sup>7</sup>

### Rationale for Analysis

2.03 *Understanding the nature* of a crisis situation helps to *identify the problem* as part of the planning process; both of these are separate from, and should precede, *determining the solution*. This chapter describes the rationale for situational understanding. The key issues are as follows.

- Complex crises do not lend themselves to simple definition or analysis. However, a starting point is to describe the current situation in terms that promote shared understanding for as many people as possible.
- A crisis is 'a situation, which may or may not be foreseen, which threatens national security or interests or international peace and stability, and which requires decision and action'.<sup>8</sup>
- Crises may arise in numerous ways and be perceived differently by different actors. There are seldom objective facts to establish with any certainty what is happening and where, let alone why. Ambiguity, confusion, and contradiction will abound.

- The time available for analysis will almost always be limited. This demands a trade-off between improving understanding and the imperative to develop clear orders and instructions.

2.04 There are two reasons why analysis is particularly important. First, it helps commanders to appreciate the nature of the situation. Second, the process begins to indicate (based on existing *unfavourable* conditions) what might represent a favourable situation. Accordingly, commanders should allow sufficient time for analysis. They should also gather a broad range of perspectives, including those that challenge any preconceived national and/or military ideas.

### Analysing the Context of a Situation

2.05 The term 'context' is used to describe the circumstances, participants, relationships, surroundings, and other influences that collectively form the setting for an event or crisis. Analysing the context includes considering:

- the conditions under which military activity is required (including geospatial, political, environmental, demographic, cultural, and language factors)
- the actors involved (hostile, friendly, neutral, or belligerent), to what extent they are involved, and why
- the nature of participants' involvement (history, culture, relationships, motivations, perceptions, interests, and desired outcomes)
- other influences, both internal (for example, societal factors) and external (for example, regional hegemony)
- the nature and intended effect of the friendly military activity, and with whom it is to be carried out (for example, allies, coalition partners, or other non-military agencies).

<sup>7</sup> For more information on analysis at the operational level, see the NZDF-approved *ADFP 5.0.1 Joint Military Appreciation Process*.

<sup>8</sup> Definition taken from JDP 0-01.1 *United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions*.

## Dealing with Complexity

2.06 Understanding the context of a crisis requires more than just having the right information — rather, it requires reasoning, intellect, and judgement. A crisis situation should be examined in its entirety as a system, recognising that no single element exists in isolation. Because crises are invariably complex, they also tend to have the following characteristics.

- Adaptive — any action causes a reaction, and any benefit has an opportunity cost.
- Uncertain — some risks may be incalculable.
- Ambiguous — crises can be perceived differently depending on your viewpoint. There is seldom a universal view of a problem's context, regardless of how 'clear' the situation may appear from an individual perspective.
- Competitive — requiring compromise, if not submission, in relation to conflicts of interest, need, or perceived security.
- Constrained — by different parties' varying commitment to resolve a crisis, their ability to do so, and their legitimacy (internal and external) to try.
- Unbounded — affecting, or affected by, regional dynamics and the international community.
- Dynamic — changing from the moment that external or internal intervention is anticipated.

## Conduct of Analysis

2.07 Analysis includes the intelligence process and is a continuous, whole-of-headquarters activity to gain knowledge of the factors that characterise a situation. It also addresses what might happen next, based on assumptions about the actions and reactions of different actors. Analysis enables a commander to:

- understand the context in which they are operating or intend to operate
- understand the potential impact of their actions and other events
- act upon this understanding to maximise the positive effects of any action, and minimise the negative effects.

## The Principles of Good Analysis

2.08 **Purposeful.** Analysis is invariably carried out against a finite timeline. It should be managed purposefully to provide situational understanding — analysis is a means to an end.

2.09 **Expansive.** Analysis is about understanding the nature of a crisis, not solving a problem — it is during planning that a commander searches for a solution. Analysis involves revealing factors, exploring different perspectives, and expanding knowledge, rather than focusing on what ought to be done to address a perceived issue.

2.10 **Inclusive.** The commander and staff should consider as many sources of information, ideas, and perspectives as possible. Additional credible insights can enrich understanding.

2.11 **Receptive.** The commander should resist the tendency to ignore information that does not support a particular perspective. A closed mind does not create an inclusive approach.

2.12 **Challenging.** A balance should be struck between being inclusive and being sufficiently discerning. All ideas and information should be tested for their validity.

## Methodologies

2.13 There are several methodologies that can be used to analyse a situation. Commonly used approaches are:

- SWOT analysis — understand strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats
- PEST analysis — understand an environment in terms of political, economic, social, and technological factors. This can be expanded to include the following factors: military, infrastructure, information, physical terrain, and time (PMESII-PT).
- DIME analysis – understand diplomatic, information, military, and economic factors

## Chapter 2

- the components of a nation or society — consider each component of a society, and whether it is a strength or weakness, and thus an opportunity or a threat to the success of an operation
- stakeholder analysis — identify the driving and restraining forces for change
- a cultural estimate — address actors' objectives, political and economic resources, means of social unification, and weaknesses, from a sociological perspective.

### Analysis Community of Interest

2.14 Analysis is a multi-disciplinary and pan-headquarters activity. The Directorate of Defence Intelligence and Security (DDIS), Headquarters NZDF (HQNZDF), and the Joint Intelligence (J2) Branch, Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand (HQJFNZ), will be the NZDF's primary advocates, but analysis frequently involves other staff divisions.

2.15 The community of interest may include:

- the New Zealand intelligence community
- representatives from the functional branches of HQJFNZ
- representatives from other elements of the NZDF
- representatives from other government agencies
- official host nation representatives
- multinational partner representatives
- subject matter experts in areas such as regional knowledge, culture, language, religion, anthropology, sociology, and commerce.

### Information Sources

2.16 The widest possible range of sources and agencies should be tasked or consulted to collect information and intelligence for analysis. When analysing information, staff should bear in mind that every source has a different perspective and a potential bias. Possible sources are:

- the defence intelligence community

- in-theatre sources, such as friendly forces, non-governmental organisations,<sup>9</sup> and key leaders
- non-military sources, such as diplomatic reporting and multinational commercial organisations
- pre-prepared analysis products, such as country briefs or intelligence estimates for a particular contingency.

### Challenging the Orthodoxy

*Preconceived notions, especially in war, are dangerous, because they give their own particular colour to all information that comes in; and ... stifle any real understanding of the actual situation...*

**General Aleksei A. Brusilov,  
A Soldier's Notebook, March 1915**

2.17 Those conducting analysis should avoid 'mirror-imaging' — assuming that other parties will act as they do themselves. They should also mitigate the effect of groupthink: when alternative views or courses of action are not considered, in the interest of preserving a consensus. Alternative views can be introduced by red teaming or devil's advocacy.

2.18 **Red Teaming.** Red teaming involves a team that is separate from the main staff, and which considers the situation from a different perspective, potentially developing different conclusions. A red team may challenge accepted wisdom, thereby improving knowledge of a situation and its actors.<sup>10</sup>

2.19 **Devil's Advocacy.** Devil's advocacy entails a selected individual or element within the community of interest questioning, and potentially disproving, prevailing assumptions.

<sup>9</sup> Care should be taken not to compromise the neutrality of independent or non-aligned civilian organisations, such as non-governmental organisations.

<sup>10</sup> For further information on red teaming, consult the United Kingdom's *A Guide to Red Teaming*.

## Scope of Analysis

2.20 The scope of analysis — *what* is to be analysed — varies from one situation to another, but its purpose remains the same: to enable a commander to understand the situation and frame the problem.

Analysis includes:

- orienting to the circumstances and surroundings of a particular crisis or situation, from both a current and an historical perspective
- examining potential sources of conflict, especially those that appear to be most prominent in the contemporary context.

## Crisis Circumstances and Surroundings

2.21 **Circumstances.** Conflicts rarely have one sole source — more often, they are the result of a combination of factors. As such, analysis should address factors such as:

- significant events and relationships that are central to a group's identity or history
- re-alignment of borders and boundaries that may have contributed to tension or conflict
- geo-strategic position (geography, natural resources, national expertise, neighbours, diasporas)

- physical environment (climate and terrain)
- national and regional infrastructure
- legitimacy of governance
- distribution of resources
- organised crime.

2.22 **Population and Culture.** A population may be divided on the basis of the following distinctions, which are often intertwined. An awareness of these divides is essential not just for analysis, but also for training as part of force preparation.

- **Culture.** For example, rural/urban, traditional/modernist, warrior ethos, nomadic lifestyle.
- **Language.** Language is a key component of identity and a cause of misunderstanding.
- **Ethnicity.** Ethnic boundaries may not match physical borders, which could restrict freedom of manoeuvre.
- **Demography.** Changes or extremes in population distribution can cause tension.
- **Class.** Class may be divided into white collar/blue collar, or complicated by caste, pastoral, or agrarian differences.
- **Religion.** There may be inter-faith divides (such as Christian/animist), inter-tradition divides (such as Sunni/Shi'ia), or tension between extreme fundamentalists and moderates within an observant religious society.



Figure 2-1: It is important that NZDF force elements are aware of the culture in which they are operating.

## Chapter 2

2.23 **Legal Issues.** Legal issues include the legal system of the country in crisis, and New Zealand domestic or international law applicable to any intervention force.

- **Host Nation Law.** The three main systems of law are: common law,<sup>11</sup> a civil code,<sup>12</sup> and religious/culturally-based law.<sup>13</sup> While status of forces agreements, memoranda of understanding, or exchanges of letters covering the deployment of forces normally exempt personnel from local law, deployed forces should nevertheless be conversant with it. As with local governance and economic practice, local laws may not follow conventional Western practice, but reflect instead local cultural, religious, and societal norms, and should be respected accordingly.
- **New Zealand Domestic and International Law.** New Zealand forces are subject to New Zealand domestic law and international law<sup>14</sup>, as well as the legal provisions of any binding United Nations (UN) mandate.<sup>15</sup>

## Actors and Influences

2.24 Those actively participating in a crisis, as well as those with the potential or inclination to do so, influence the course of events in ways that may be positive or negative, certain or uncertain, temporary or enduring. Most crises will be attributed to human interactions, sometimes with a hitherto cooperative state of affairs transforming into one of confrontation or conflict. In addition to an awareness of the circumstances and surroundings described earlier in this chapter, a joint commander should ideally understand the full range of actors, and their motivations and relationships.

<sup>11</sup> The legal systems of New Zealand and many Commonwealth countries are based on common law.

<sup>12</sup> As exemplified by the French legal system.

<sup>13</sup> Such as Sharia courts used in Iran and parts of Afghanistan; many other nations' legal systems also incorporate traditional cultural practices.

<sup>14</sup> Such as that codified in the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols.

<sup>15</sup> New Zealand forces will not be automatically bound by the decisions of the UN. New Zealand will only be bound by the legal provisions of a UN mandate where the New Zealand Government has turned that mandate into domestic law, rules of engagement, or direction to the NZDF.

2.25 **Categorisation of Actors.** Actors generally fall into the following categories.

- **Adversaries.** Adversaries are usually hostile to the achievement of the desired outcome. They may employ legitimate political means, resort to violence, or use both.
- **Belligerents.** Belligerents are hostile to each other. They may oppose the desired outcome, even if not directly hostile to the presence of an intervention force.
- **Neutrals.** Neutrals stop short of active opposition to the desired outcome; they may even support it, with reservations.
- **Friendly.** Friendly actors broadly support the desired outcome.
- **Spoilers.** Spoilers have an interest in maintaining the status quo and try to slow progress or prevent any change that could adversely affect their activities.

2.26 **Range of Actors.** Within each category of actor, there may be a variety of different individuals, groups, and organisations whose identity, status, and influence all need to be understood. These may include:

- key leaders and authorities (political, military, traditional, religious)
- power brokers
- interest groups
- diaspora groups
- civil society
- population, including refugees and internally displaced people
- private sector
- trade unions
- neighbouring states
- foreign embassies
- regional organisations, such as the African Union or the Pacific Islands Forum
- international and non-governmental organisations.

2.27 **Analysis of Actors.** Actors affect a situation to varying degrees, depending upon their:

- aim

- motivation
- position
- intention
- sub-culture
- relationships and alliances
- capacity
- critical vulnerabilities.



Figure 2-2: An operating environment will contain a range of actors, with different aims, motivations, cultures, relationships, and abilities.

## Causes of Crises

2.28 Understanding why states or other groups resort to the use of force is essential to the planning and conduct of operations. Factors that have caused a crisis indicate both *why* events have occurred and, potentially, *how* they may be influenced to develop in a more favourable manner in the future. Crises are seldom attributable to a single cause, in the same way that they are seldom bi-polar. Analysis should encompass the extent of causes, their strength and nature, and the linkages between them.

2.29 **Elemental Causes.** Elemental causes relate to a nation's, government's, or other actor's identity, its relationships with neighbouring nations or groups, or in extreme cases, its very existence. A state or group may act out of:

- fear, and in the interests of survival
- self-interest
- ideology and values.

2.30 **Momentum for Conflict.** Even if the elemental causes do not directly precipitate conflict, two other factors can intensify momentum towards it.

- **Culture.** Some actors have a culture of violence, normally reinforced by political, social, or religious imperatives.
- **Political Will.** The will of an actor's leadership, and its ability to mobilise and sustain popular support, shapes its propensity for violence.

2.31 **Structural Causes.** Structural causes of instability are intrinsic within the policies, structures, and fabric of certain societies. Examples include:

- illegitimate government
- poor governance
- lack of political participation
- inequality and social exclusion
- inequitable access to natural resources.

2.32 **Proximate Causes.** Proximate causes may contribute directly to a crisis, or provide the bedrock for more deep-seated but less-immediate concern.

## Chapter 2

They include:

- an uncontrolled security sector
- the proliferation of weapons
- human rights abuses
- the destabilising role of neighbouring countries
- the role of diasporas.

2.33 **Triggers.** Triggers are actions or events (or their anticipation), which may set off or escalate violence.

They include:

- elections
- arrest/assassination of a key figure
- military coup
- environmental disaster
- increased price/scarcity of basic commodities
- economic crisis, such as a rapid increase in unemployment or the collapse of a local currency
- capital flight.<sup>16</sup>

2.34 **Crisis-Generated Causes.** Crises can be self-perpetuating.

- **Material Causes.** Conflict inherently increases the supply and circulation of weapons, which inevitably spread from those actors involved in the initial crisis to others, allowing them to pursue their own agendas; other weapons may fall into the hands of criminal actors. A 'war economy', with funds from backers and potentially foreign aid, may benefit some actors to the point that they are materially better off during a crisis than during peace.
- **Emotional Causes.** A culture of violence can emerge, or the success of certain actors in achieving their aims may create new enemies, or inspire previously dormant actors to take up arms. In some cultures, there is a tradition of revenge or vendetta; conflict, even if resolved at a higher level, may leave some individuals or groups dissatisfied and liable to re-ignite violence.

<sup>16</sup> Capital flight is when a group or population takes its money and portable assets out of the country, or converts circulating local currency into non-circulating hard currency or precious metal/stones.

## Implications for the Future

2.35 The different facets of a situation may interact in various ways, producing a variety of possible future outcomes. Associated with each outcome are different implications, probabilities, and second-order effects. These may be described in terms of current trends, shocks, risks, and opportunities.

- **Current Trends.** Current trends may be identified as enduring, or likely to escalate or de-escalate, subject to defined changes in circumstances.
- **Shocks.** Shocks are unexpected (low probability) but significant (high impact) occurrences likely to introduce a discontinuity in an established trend or pattern of events. Shocks may be natural (such as an unforeseen environmental disaster) or man-made (the result of unanticipated adversary activity). While their occurrence may be a surprise, their implications can be addressed through contingency planning.
- **Risks and Opportunities.** Negative or positive developments generate risks and opportunities for a joint commander. The commander's analysis of the situation assists in managing risks and exploiting opportunities.

*We are very uncertain about the enemy's [situation], but here too there are signs for us to read, clues to follow and sequences of phenomena to ponder. These form what we call a degree of relative certainty, which provides an objective basis for planning in war.*

**Mao Tse Tung, On Protracted War**

## Outputs of Analysis

2.36 The practical output of analysis is a clear picture in the mind of a commander, based on as many different opinions, perspectives, and viewpoints as possible, of *what* is happening, *why*, and what may happen *next*.

2.37 At the strategic level in the NZDF, two primary intelligence products contain this information.

- Strategic intelligence estimate (SIE)

- Strategic military threat assessment (SMTA)

2.38 At the operational level, the output of analysis includes the ongoing outputs of the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (JIPB) process.<sup>17</sup>

## Strategic Intelligence Estimate

2.39 Commanders and planning staff at all levels need a formalised, structured intelligence product that provides a realistic assessment of the courses of action (COA) open to a stakeholder or adversary. This product should also analyse the likelihood of a given COA being adopted, and identify a stakeholder's vulnerabilities and centre of gravity (CoG).

### Key Terms

#### Stakeholder

A stakeholder is any group or prominent individual that has a specific interest in a given situation. Stakeholders may be local or foreign and include governments, security forces, insurgent groups, political organisations, and religious and ethnic groups.

#### Intelligence Estimate

An intelligence estimate is the appraisal, expressed in writing or orally, of available intelligence relating to a specific situation or condition, with a view to determining the courses of action open to the enemy or potential enemy, and the order of probability of their adoption.

2.40 At the strategic level, the NZDF uses the SIE produced by DDIS. The SIE assists with strategic command and staff planning, and highlights key planning considerations and priority intelligence requirements. It also provides guidance to intelligence staff and operational planners at HQJFNZ, to help them draft their own operationally focused intelligence estimates.

2.41 The difference between a *strategic* and an *operational* intelligence estimate (HQJFNZ-level product) is that the SIE will focus on a stakeholder's strategic capabilities, vulnerabilities, and future intentions. The parameters for an operational intelligence estimate, on the other hand, are usually defined by:

- geography
- the deployed force's mission
- stakeholder capabilities that can realistically influence the outcome of the mission, given the geography
- assessed vulnerabilities and future intentions of the stakeholder's capabilities in that geographical region.

2.42 In order for intelligence to be useful, it must be timely — this means making it available in time for it to be incorporated as part of planning at HQNZDF and HQJFNZ. Accordingly, draft versions may be made available to planning staffs at these headquarters. To ensure that the SIE meets the needs of its principal users, DDIS consults with the Strategic Commitments and Intelligence (SCI) Branch and HQJFNZ (via the J2 Branch) during the drafting process.

2.43 For detailed information on SIEs, see [NZDFP 2.0.1.2 Strategic Intelligence Estimates](#).

## Strategic Military Threat Assessment

2.44 The key difference between an SIE and an SMTA is that the role of an SIE is to identify the broad options available to a stakeholder, whereas a

<sup>17</sup> For more information on the JIPB, see the NZDF-approved ADFP 5.0.1 *Joint Military Appreciation Process*.



## Chapter 2

threat assessment focuses on a stakeholder's threat capabilities and the likelihood of them affecting NZDF operations.

2.45 The purpose of the SMTA is to identify and evaluate the operational and health threats posed to NZDF personnel and equipment during operational deployments. In doing so, it informs risk management, threat awareness and mitigation, and force protection. It also informs planning and decision-making regarding:

- whether the NZDF should commit force elements to an operation
- which force elements and/or capabilities the NZDF should commit
- what restrictions should be placed upon any commitment (for example, type of employment, deployment area, duration, and so on)

- whether the NZDF should maintain a commitment when a mission's mandate is due for renewal.

2.46 Like the SIE, the SMTA must be made available in time for it to be used as part of the planning process. Consequently, the development of an SMTA is likely to be an iterative process, with drafts being made available to planning staffs at HQNZDF and HQJFNZ as the SMTA evolves. To ensure that the SMTA meets the needs of its principal users, DDIS should consult with SCI Branch and HQJFNZ (via the J2 Branch) during the drafting process.


2.47 Together, the SIE and the SMTA provide a foundation for the J2 Branch's support to operational-level planning at HQJFNZ.

2.48 For more information on SMTAs, see [NZDFP 2.0.1.1 \*Strategic Military Threat Assessments\*](#).



CHAPTER 3:

# INFLUENCES ON PLANNING



## Contents

	<i>Page</i>
Introduction	23
Resources	23
Staff Experience	23
Time Limitations	23
Cost	24
Logistics	24
Capability Shortfalls	24
Preparedness	24
Information	25
Strategic Communication	25
Consultation	25
Liaison	25
Compartmentalised/Close-Hold Planning	26
Risk and Threat	27
Critical Assumptions and Information Requirements	27
Planning Risks	27
Legitimacy	27
Legal Compliance	27
Rules of Engagement	27
Nature of Involvement: Multinational and Multi-Agency Operations	27
Creating a Coalition	28
Command Issues	29
Mission Analysis and Assignment of Tasks	29
Integration	30
Other Considerations	30
Working with Other Government Agencies	31
All-of-Government Forums	31
Other Agency Involvement in Military Planning	31
Considerations	32

## Introduction

3.01 This chapter looks at the many factors that influence planning for a military operation. These factors include:

- resources
- preparedness
- information
- risk and threat
- legitimacy
- the nature of the New Zealand Defence Force's (NZDF's) involvement.

## Resources

### Staff Experience

3.02 The degree of the planning staff's knowledge and experience will affect the quality of joint plans and the efficiency of the planning process. A suitably qualified and experienced officer should lead the planning process, supported by subject matter experts and the relevant intelligence products. Planning should be as inclusive as possible, so that the most appropriate individuals or elements are engaged early in the process.

*A good staff has the advantage of being more lasting than the genius of a single man.*

**Lieutenant General Antoine-Henri  
Baron de Jomini,  
Summary of the Art of War, 1838**

### Time Limitations

3.03 Time should be considered as a resource. For both deliberate and immediate planning, the complexity of an operation will largely determine the overall planning time. In immediate planning, a further factor is the speed of the response needed — for example, there will be limited planning time for a non-combatant evacuation operation when New Zealanders' lives are under threat. Although the planning process may be intense, and time limited, plans must be completed accurately and thoroughly.

3.04 The effort and time needed to conduct administrative support planning is often underestimated. This planning is central to raising, training, mobilising, deploying, reconstituting, and demobilising a military force. Figure 3-1 illustrates the relationship between time and planning.




Figure 3-1: Time impacts on planning.

## Cost

3.05 Costing an operation is an important part of planning at the strategic level. Defence provides costings for military response options in its Cabinet submissions, in order to gain the necessary funding appropriation for an operation. The Chief Financial Officer has the task of determining the net additional cost for an operation. To this end, they will need to know, among other things, the force structure, operational tempo, logistic support arrangements, and estimated duration of the mission. In developing cost estimates, the Chief Financial Officer will also need to consult with, and seek data from, relevant planning staff at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

## Logistics

3.06 Resource limitations have the potential to curtail the options available to commanders, and logistic planners must determine what is possible within these limitations. Accordingly, military response options must be both supportable and sustainable. Any risks should be identified early in the process.

## Capability Shortfalls

3.07 Planning should take account of what personnel, materiel, and transportation will be required to carry out the identified courses of action. A critical shortfall in any of these areas may present a risk to mission success. In such cases, planners should consider the funding and time needed to resolve these shortfalls. If they cannot be resolved, or if the resources provided are inadequate to perform the assigned task, planners should identify the impact of these shortfalls and their associated risks, and manage the risk accordingly.

*There is nothing so likely to produce peace as to be well prepared to meet an enemy.*

**General George Washington,  
29 January 1780**

## Preparedness

3.08 Preparedness represents the NZDF's ability to undertake military tasks. It is a combination of readiness, deployability, combat viability, and sustainability.

- **Readiness** denotes a force's current ability to conduct a range of activities within a specified response time. It is defined against the relevant employment context and a directed level of capability (DLOC). Readiness comprises the availability and proficiency of the personnel, equipment, intelligence, and communications allocated to a force.
- **Deployability** is the capacity of a force element to move to an operational level of capability (OLOC), complete final preparations, and assemble for deployment within a specified time.
- **Combat viability** is the in-theatre ability of a force to achieve its military tasks using current resources.
- **Sustainability** is the ability to support a designated force at operating tempo for the duration of an operation. It includes the provision of personnel, logistic, and other support required to maintain operations until the operation has been completed and forces have returned to New Zealand.

3.09 Preparedness is a significant factor in planning. The three levels of capability — operational, directed, and basic — represent the degree of preparedness at which forces can be maintained, and at which they can operate.<sup>18</sup> When planning an operation, planners must consider the level of capability at which force elements sit, and the time and money that it will take them to reach OLOC for their particular task. Response times depend on the employment context, and may also vary between force elements. Furthermore, as operations are often sustained beyond a single engagement, planners must also consider such issues as concurrency, force rotation, and resource allocation.

<sup>18</sup> The lowest level of capability is a basic level of capability (BLOC). This is the minimum level at which military capabilities have to be held if they are not to be permanently lost. At BLOC, a force element could not reach OLOC in less than six months, and will not generally be available for military tasks. For detailed information on employment contexts and levels of capability, see the NZDF *Statement of Intent 2010-2013*.

## Chapter 3

3.10 **Operational Level of Capability.** If a force element is at OLOC for a particular employment context, this means that it has reached the requisite *preparedness state* — that is, the force element is ready, deployable, combat viable, and sustainable. OLOC is the mission-specific level of capability required by a force element to execute its role in an operation at an acceptable level of risk. It is achieved and maintained at a high cost. Consequently, only those force elements required to deal with short-notice contingencies are maintained at this level.

3.11 **Directed Level of Capability.** DLOC maintains forces at a stable level of preparedness that is within financial resources. From DLOC, force elements plan against what is required to reach OLOC in a designated time period. This time period is known as *response time*. It gives force elements time to assemble personnel, arrange logistics support requirements, undergo additional training, and carry out operation-specific planning.




Figure 3-2: Planners must consider the response time that force elements need to train and prepare for operations.

## Information

### Strategic Communication

3.12 Strategic communication is the natural extension of strategic direction. It is an all-of-government effort that applies information as an instrument of national power to create, strengthen, or preserve an information environment favourable to New Zealand's national interests. Strategic communication:

- establishes unity of New Zealand Government messages
- emphasises success

- accurately confirms or refutes external reporting on New Zealand operations
- reinforces the legitimacy of New Zealand goals.

3.13 Strategic communication must be an integral part of the strategy and design for operations. Planning must take account of strategic communication, and ensure collaboration with other government agencies. The predominant military activities that contribute to strategic communication messages are information operations and public affairs.<sup>19</sup> Both of these activities ultimately support the dissemination of information, themes, and messages adapted to their audiences. They should be closely coordinated to ensure consistent themes and messages are communicated.

3.14 Guidance on strategic communication should include any narrative and key themes and messages that will shape operational design across the span of fires, manoeuvre, information activities, and public affairs.

### Consultation

3.15 Effective planning requires close consultation with a large number of stakeholders at each of the planning levels. Foreign stakeholders will need to be consulted in the case of multinational operations; and other government agencies in the case of multi-agency operations and tasks. At the strategic level, consultation needs to occur within Defence and across other government agencies before advice is offered to the Government. At the operational level, stakeholders should be consulted to aid concurrent activity and identify potential capability shortfalls. An open planning construct — when information is shared freely — allows this consultation to happen simultaneously with planning at the strategic level. Conversely, compartmentalised or close-hold planning may limit the depth and scope of the planning advice and options delivered.

### Liaison

3.16 The involvement of NZDF forces in multinational

<sup>19</sup> The NZDF is yet to determine a strategic-level information operations policy. However, as NZDF deployments normally take place under a coalition information operations campaign, some understanding of the subject is required. The NZDF recommends ADDP 3.13 *Information Operations* and ADFP 3.13.1 *Information Operations Procedures* for use, pending the release of an NZDF publication.

or multi-agency operations means liaison plays an important role in coordinating planning and execution.

There are two types of liaison authority.

3.17 **Direct liaison authorised** is the authority granted by a commander to a subordinate to consult directly or coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside the granting command.

3.18 **Coordinating authority** is the authority granted to a commander to coordinate specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more countries, commands, or Services, or two or more forces of the same Service.

## Compartmentalised/Close-Hold Planning

3.19 If there are sensitivities surrounding a possible NZDF commitment, the Chief of Defence Force (CDF) may direct that knowledge of planning for an operation or contingency be kept to a limited group. This group would normally comprise the staff required to provide advice to CDF on:

- the proposed military end-state
- the threat assessment
- force options
- preparedness impact
- resourcing and support cost requirements.

### Real-Life Example

#### Close-Hold Planning for Sensitive Operations: D-Day<sup>20</sup>

The Germans occupied all of France from November 1942. To win the war, the Allies had to reclaim France and other occupied territory. It would require months of planning, often in secret, and the use of thousands of men, ships, and planes.

Hitler feared an invasion on the Western Front. As the shortest shipping distance from England to France was the Pas de Calais region, it was here that the Germans expected the Allies to invade. Aware of this, the British and Americans selected, instead, a landing place further south, on the coast of Normandy.

**The Build-Up.** The logistical planning for this exercise was extraordinary. Tens of thousands of troops poured into the area around Portsmouth and Southampton, where more than 6000 ships were assembled. 4000 landing craft carried troops and equipment, and 1200 Royal Navy warships prepared to support the landings.

By this time, all servicemen knew they were heading for France. But few knew more than that. Secrecy was crucial.

For two weeks before D-Day, the troop camps were sealed off; all leave was cancelled.

**Supporting Acts.** It was not just the landings on Normandy that required months of planning. Alongside the real landing plans, a complicated fake plan was developed to fool the Germans. Operation Fortitude was designed to make the Germans think the Allies would land in Pas de Calais as expected.

Vehicles and dummy landing craft moved to eastern England, and fake radio messages suggested assault divisions were massing. On the night before D-Day, small flotillas of motor boats headed towards Pas de Calais fitted with radar equipment that made them seem much larger on enemy screens.

This fake flotilla was joined by Royal Air Force planes that dropped bundles of window. On German radar, this created the impression of hundreds of ships headed for the decoy area, drawing attention from the real landing sites.

Operation Fortitude was a success. When the real invasion happened, the Germans believed it was yet another diversion and held back their reserve troops for several critical days.

<sup>20</sup> 'D-Day and the battle for Europe', [www.nzhistory.net.nz/war/d-day](http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/war/d-day), Ministry for Culture and Heritage, updated 16 June 2009.



## Risk and Threat

3.20 Risk needs to be identified, analysed, and managed at all levels. In an operational sense, risk is often defined through a military threat assessment and threat state. Strategic-level military threat and risk are different, but linked, concepts. Threat produces risks at one level that may affect other levels. For example, a tactical-level threat may produce operational and strategic risk. Threat will need to be managed and mitigated at its source, with strategic risk best managed by all-of-government involvement in risk analysis at the earliest opportunity.

### Critical Assumptions and Information Requirements

3.21 Critical assumptions are planning assumptions derived from an analysis of the situation, and made in the absence of fact. They are sensitive to change and may significantly affect the outcome of the plan. These assumptions should be highlighted, the nature of their sensitivity described, and their potential effects on outcomes stated. Identifying and addressing information requirements will help turn critical assumptions into fact, thus reducing risk. This is essential to ensuring that the resulting plan is not based solely on assumption, and that when assumptions are made, they are qualified and tested at every opportunity.

### Planning Risks

3.22 There are risks in attempting to forecast and control events too far into the future, or planning to an unrealistic level of detail in the absence of information and in the presence of uncertainty. Most plans are overtaken by events much sooner than anticipated by planners. When planners fail to recognise the limits of foresight and control, the focus for operators moves to satisfying the planning process, rather than deciding and acting effectively on the required planning product. This approach restricts initiative and flexibility of action.

## Legitimacy

*...a popular outcry will drown the voice of military experience.*

**Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan,  
Naval Strategy, 1911**

### Legal Compliance

3.23 It is vital that any NZDF operation complies with the applicable international, New Zealand domestic, and host nation law, as well as the law of armed conflict, where applicable. Commanders at all levels and other members of the NZDF must therefore understand the legal boundaries and issues critical to military action.

### Rules of Engagement

3.24 Rules of engagement are orders issued by CDF and approved by the New Zealand Government. They direct NZDF personnel as to when they may, or may not, use force against persons or property, and detail the authorised level of any such force.<sup>21</sup> As such, rules of engagement shape and control the application of military force in pursuit of national objectives. For more information, see [NZDDP-06.1 Rules of Engagement](#).

## Nature of Involvement: Multinational and Multi-Agency Operations

3.25 Modern military operations, particularly those in which the NZDF participates, are generally multinational and multi-agency in nature. This requires coordination not only between the components of a joint force, but also between international, governmental, and non-governmental organisations in a multilateral effort.

<sup>21</sup> Rules of engagement may also apply to non-kinetic activities such as using sonar and taking photographs.

## Key Terms

There are two main types of multinational operation: coalition and combined.

**Coalition operations** are ad hoc arrangements between two or more nations unified by a common mission.

**Combined operations** involve two or more nations, usually allies.<sup>22</sup>

3.26 Nations join multinational efforts for a variety reasons, and their continued participation has similar known and unknown elements. Likewise, the various agencies involved in an operation — military and civilian, governmental and non-governmental — have varying expectations, interests, and capabilities. Prudent mission analysis and planning can significantly ease the multinational commander's job and provide a more stable multinational force and a more harmonious multi-agency effort.

3.27 This section addresses the major issues that arise when planning a multinational and/or multi-agency operation.<sup>23</sup>

*In war it is not always possible to have everything go exactly as one likes. In working with allies it sometimes happens that they develop opinions of their own.*

**Sir Winston Churchill,  
The Hinge of Fate, 1950**

## Creating a Coalition

3.28 Building a multinational force and planning a multinational operation start with political decisions and diplomatic efforts to create a coalition. Political

consensus is a necessary condition for multinational success. Political consensus depends on at least three conditions: legitimacy, political control, and open political consultation.

3.29 **Legitimacy.** Multinational operations must be based on a defined end-state, international law, and a clear mandate. Normally, a recognised intergovernmental organisation such as the United Nations (UN) would act to initiate or endorse the multinational activity being considered. The UN would also provide political guidance, endorse a coalition's strategic goals, and endorse the desired end-state. Additionally, the UN would either designate or accept the offered services of a lead nation.

3.30 **Political Control.** Through all phases of an operation, political direction of the operation will be carried out through political, not military, authority. The lead nation should coordinate these political and military activities, implement decisions, and report to the international community.

3.31 **Open Political Consultation.** Open political consultation allows all participating nations to be part of the decision-making process. With a firm legal basis and a designated lead nation, in-depth political consultation is made possible through the creation of a political authority in which each participating nation will be represented at an appropriate level (for example, ambassador level). Military participation in the process should be provided by a corresponding military authority.

3.32 Discussions between potential participants will initially seek to sort out basic questions at the national strategic and military strategic levels that will shape further planning. The result of these discussions should:

- determine the nature and limits of the response
- determine the command structure of the response force
- determine the essential strategic guidance for the response force, including military objectives and the desired end-state.

<sup>22</sup> For more information, see [NZDDP-3.0 Joint Operations](#).

<sup>23</sup> For greater detail on multinational operations in particular, consult the NZDF-approved [ADDP 00.3 Coalition Operations](#) and its New Zealand supplement.

## Key Terms

### Intergovernmental Organisation

There are over thirty intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) around the world. These organisations represent a variety of global and regional issues and concerns. Unlike non-governmental organisations (NGOs), IGOs represent political entities, such as the United Nations, the European Union, or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

### Non-Governmental Organisation

NGOs are private, self-governing, not-for-profit organisations dedicated to issues such as alleviating human suffering; promoting education, healthcare, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society.

Both NGOs and IGOs can have a significant impact on military operations.

It should result in a mission statement, commander's intent, and the multinational commander's planning guidance. As part of the mission analysis, the following tasks should be completed:

- identify force requirements
- publish standards for participation (for example, training level competence and logistics capabilities)
- solicit funding requests, certification procedures, and force commitments from likely coalition partners.

3.35 Before proposed courses of action can be developed, the multinational commander must conduct an appreciation, or estimate, of the situation, to analyse the factors that will affect the assigned mission(s). The appreciation process should address the respective political will, national interests, capabilities, and expected contributions of contributing nations. This is a critical step, as each nation determines its own contribution to the operation. Based on these national contributions, and after determining tasks and objectives, the multinational commander should assign specific tasks to the force elements most capable of completing them.

## Command Issues

3.33 When the response force is a coalition, the designated lead nation will normally select both the strategic and operational leadership. The designated strategic commander will coordinate requirements and actions between participating nations. They will also promulgate essential strategic guidance and provide initial guidance to the operational commander. In addition to providing a mission statement, objectives, tasks, an end-state, and guidance on termination, the strategic commander's guidance should address the following points:

- participating nations and expected initial contributions
- common security interests
- specific national limitations, concerns, or sensitivities.

## Mission Analysis and Assignment of Tasks

3.34 A detailed mission analysis is one of the most important tasks in planning multinational operations.

3.36 **Levels of Involvement.** Any number of different situations could generate the need for a multinational response, from man-made actions such as inter-state aggression, to natural disasters like a tsunami. In responding to such situations, nations pick and choose if, when, where, and how they participate. The only constant is that a decision to 'join in' is, in every case, a calculated political decision by each potential member of a coalition. The nature of their national decisions, in turn, influences the multinational task force's command structure.

3.37 **Capabilities.** The operational-level commander must be aware of the specific constraints and capabilities of the forces of participating nations, and consider these differences when planning operations and assigning missions. Multinational task force commanders at all levels have to spend considerable time consulting and negotiating with diplomats,

host nation officials, local leaders, regional political authorities, and others — their role as diplomats should not be underestimated.

3.38 **Employment.** In most multinational operations, the differing degrees of national interest result in varying levels of commitment by members of the coalition. While some countries might authorise the full range of employment, others may limit their forces to strictly defensive or combat service support roles.

## Integration

3.39 The basic challenge in multinational operations is integrating and synchronising available assets toward the achievement of common objectives. Despite disparate or incompatible capabilities, this may be achieved through unity of effort, rules of engagement,

and common equipment and procedures. To reduce disparities among participating forces, minimum capability standards should be established.

## Other Considerations

3.40 A number of other factors should be taken into account when planning and executing a multinational/ multi-agency operation. These include:

- linguistic and cultural differences
- sovereignty issues
- legal considerations, for example military and criminal jurisdiction, law of armed conflict, rules of engagement, treatment of detainees, military justice, conflict of laws
- doctrine
- training
- force protection measures.



Figure 3-3: In multinational operations, the forces and capabilities committed will vary from nation to nation.

## Key Term

### Combined Planning

Combined planning takes place between two or more nations who are usually allies. Combined planning and operations are largely similar to joint planning and operations, barring differences in terminology, command, and planning authorities.

Combined operations may entail separate command and status of forces agreements, as well as some unique planning processes.

The NZDF will be guided by the principles in this publication in agreeing to combined arrangements, including combined planning policy, procedures, and processes. Joint planning procedures should be used within and between the New Zealand components of a combined force.

**Planning with Australia.** The NZDF Operations Planning Process is easily adjusted for combined planning with Australia, as it is an adaptation of the Australian Defence Force's planning processes.



## Working with Other Government Agencies

3.41 New Zealand's national response to an event will typically involve more than one government agency. When this response involves the NZDF, military planning must coordinate with that of the other agencies. While there is no formal all-of-government planning process, a comprehensive approach is achieved through committees and watch groups.

### All-of-Government Forums

3.42 The primary forum for all-of-government coordination is the Officials' Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination (ODESC). This chief-executive-level committee advises the Government and provides direction to lower-level inter-departmental watch groups and working groups.

3.43 These groups provide a common operational picture of a specific event or policy issue that warrants closer scrutiny. They then report to and advise ODESC on these issues. The membership of these groups is at a deputy secretary/senior officer level. They are coordinated by ODESC's support secretariat, the Security and Risk Group.

### Other Agency Involvement in Military Planning

3.44 Outside watch groups and working groups, the NZDF may engage selected government agencies in its operations planning process. Representatives from these agencies should be invited, as required, to participate in the meetings of groups such as the Strategic Planning Group and the Joint Operations Planning Group.

## Considerations

3.45 When working alongside other government agencies, NZDF planners should bear in mind the following points.

- Each agency will have differing resources to commit to the planning effort.
- The NZDF is unique in that it has doctrine, defence

force orders, and standard operating procedures that guide how we plan and conduct operations. Other agencies are unlikely to have such well-defined processes and guidelines.

- Military personnel are taught to plan. Personnel from other agencies may not have as much planning experience as their military counterparts, or may do things differently.




Figure 3-4: New Zealand's national response to an event will typically involve more than one government agency. The NZDF will not necessarily be the lead agency, as was the case in the Canterbury earthquake.



CHAPTER 4:

# OPERATIONAL ART AND DESIGN



## Contents

	<i>Page</i>
Introduction	35
Operational Art	35
Operational Art Considerations	35
Operational Design	38
End-State	38
Objectives	39
Termination	39
Centre of Gravity	40
Decisive Points	41
Commander's Decision Points	42
Main Effort	42
Culminating Points	42
Criteria for Success	42
Measures of Effectiveness and Performance	42
Direct versus Indirect Approach	43
Lines of Operation	43
Arranging Operations	43
Limitations of Operational Art and Design	45



## Introduction

4.01 This chapter examines how the operational commander translates strategic military objectives into a design for operations that shapes the way an operation or campaign may unfold. It considers operational art and the elements of operational design, which together guide the development of a concept of operations and more detailed planning.

*There is a close analogy between what takes place in the mind of a military commander when planning an action, and what happens to the artist at the moment of conception. The latter does not renounce the use of his intelligence. He draws from it lessons, methods, and knowledge. But his power of creation can operate only if he possesses, in addition, a certain instinctive faculty which we call inspiration, for that alone can give the direct contact with nature from which the vital spark must leap. We can say of the military art what Bacon said of the other arts: 'They are the product of man added to nature.'*

**Charles de Gaulle,**  
*The Edge of the Sword, 1932*

## Operational Art

4.02 In its simplest expression, operational art determines when, where, and for what purpose forces will conduct operations. It is the theory and practice of planning, preparing, and conducting campaigns to achieve operational and strategic objectives. In practice, it is a commander's skill in orchestrating the tactical actions of a military force, in concert with other agencies, to achieve the desired outcome.

4.03 Operational art is more than just rote knowledge of doctrine and manuals. It should be applied with an extensive understanding of how interrelated factors may influence the planning and execution of a campaign or operation. Operational art requires a commander to have broad vision, the ability to anticipate, strength of will, and an understanding of the relationship of means to ends, as illustrated in Figure 4-1.




Figure 4-1: Operational art links ends, ways, and means.

4.04 Reduced to its essentials, operational art requires that a commander:

- understand the **national strategic end-state**
- understand what **military end-state** must be attained in-theatre to achieve the national strategic end-state
- identify the **operational objectives** that will produce the desired military end-state
- determine the **sequence of actions** most likely to achieve the operational objectives
- organise and apply the **resources** of the force to accomplish that sequence of actions, within any imposed constraints
- identify the likely **cost or risk** of undertaking that sequence of actions.

## Operational Art Considerations

4.05 Most military campaigns and operations aim to wrest the initiative from the adversary and exploit it to our advantage. To do this, the commander must consider how to achieve the end-state. There are a number of concepts to consider when planning a campaign or major operation.

- **Synergy and Leverage.** Leverage is achieved by focusing our strengths against the opponent's weaknesses to achieve results proportionately greater than the effort applied. Synergy and leverage

can be obtained by the imaginative, combined exploitation of different resources; for example synchronising firepower and manoeuvre.

- **Simultaneity and Depth.** Simultaneous action and extension in depth shape future conditions, and can disrupt the adversary's decision cycle and their ability to execute operations.
- **Offence and Defence.** Offensive and defensive actions can be alternated in time, space, and intensity to exploit the inherent advantages of both and to put continuous pressure on the opponent. For more information, see [NZDDP-3.0 Joint Operations](#).
- **Manoeuvre.** Manoeuvre involves attaining relative advantage in space and time, and is at the heart of the indirect approach.
- **Tempo.** Tempo is the rate or rhythm of friendly activity relative to the enemy. It includes the capacity of the force to transition from one operational posture to another. Tempo is a critical determinant of operational logistics.
- **Perspective.** The operational commander must be able to stand back from the detailed conduct of the campaign or operation to take time to identify emerging trends, grasp new opportunities that arise, and detect potential threats.
- **Information Operations.** Information operations entail defending and enhancing one's own information, information processes, and information systems, and affecting those of the adversary. They are a fundamental resource for the commander's decision-making processes.
- **Termination.** The conditions needed to terminate the campaign on favourable terms must be continuously reviewed.

4.06 **Time, Space, and Forces.** Operational art is largely a matter of imagination and skill in balancing the influences of time, space, and forces in order to gain and maintain the initiative and set the conditions for success. The following combinations are of note.

- **Time/Space.** Relates to the relative speed with which forces can reconnoitre, occupy, secure, or control a given area.
- **Time/Forces.** Relates to the relative readiness and availability of forces and logistic support over time,

including their preparedness and the evolution of capabilities over time.

- **Space/Forces.** Relates to:
  - the relative ability of a force to control or dominate operationally significant areas
  - the concentration and dispersion of forces within the operational area, including the consequences of over-extension, dislocation, and exposure
  - the ability to give up space in order to avoid becoming decisively engaged.
- **Time/Space/Forces.** Relates to the relative capability of a force to project into a region and the comparative speed with which it can build up decisive capabilities.

4.07 **The Adversary.** The underlying premise for all operations planning is that military operations are required to counter threats from an opponent, or to contain violence and hostilities. This applies across the spectrum of operations and encompasses peace support, stability operations, and combat operations.<sup>24</sup> The adversary may comprise political leaders, the general population, and/or the military. Collectively, they possess a will to pursue goals that may be in opposition to our own. This will is influenced by a number of factors, including culture, perspectives, and vital interests. It is therefore imperative during planning to remember that our adversaries may oppose our operations when our aims conflict with their own.

*However absorbed a commander may be in the elaboration of his own thoughts, it is sometimes necessary to take the enemy into account.*

**Sir Winston S. Churchill, 1874–1965**

4.08 **Operational Geometry.** The 'geometry' of the operational area should be analysed to determine operational requirements related to geography. In particular, this analysis should consider the operational

<sup>24</sup> For more information on the spectrum of operations, consult [NZDDP-D 2008 Foundations of New Zealand Military Doctrine](#) and [NZDDP-3.0 Joint Operations](#).

## Chapter 4

reach of joint forces, based on the range at which different force elements can prudently operate or sustain effective operations. For information on how the operational environment is organised, see [NZDDP-3.0 Joint Operations](#).

4.09 **Managing Battle Rhythm.** The rhythmic nature of battle reflects natural rhythms inherent in human behaviour. These rhythms will have consequences at all levels, and must be adequately planned for. For planners, the most ubiquitous of these rhythms is the flow of information between the strategic and tactical levels. Planners must ensure that the relevant headquarters synchronise their rhythms at all levels, to ensure the efficient flow of orders and requests for information from the strategic level down, and the flow of intelligence summaries and routine reports and returns from the tactical level up.

4.10 Through synchronisation, planners will shorten the decision cycle and foster decision superiority. Plans should cover everything that is required to successfully synchronise reporting rhythms. This will often require 24-hour activity, synchronised across several different time zones. The independent rhythms of news media should also be considered.

4.11 Information may pass directly from the tactical to the strategic level and vice-versa, bypassing headquarters and their distinct battle rhythms. This information technology-enhanced capacity for the strategic level to influence the tactical must be planned for and managed, to avoid command and control ambiguities. For more information on battle rhythm, consult [NZDDP-3.0 Joint Operations](#).



Figure 4-2: The flow of information between the strategic and tactical levels must be planned for and managed, to avoid command and control ambiguities.

## Operational Design

4.12 Operational design develops and refines a commander's operational ideas to provide detailed, executable plans. It is the practical extension of operational art and uses design elements to provide structure to the commander's ideas.

4.13 **Design Elements.** Design elements are the concepts and tools of operational design. A joint commander will use design elements to provide structure for the plan; to arrange actions in time, space, and purpose; and to help visualise how the operation or campaign will unfold. The commander also uses design elements to articulate a concept of operations, a statement of intent for the plan, and a command structure for its execution. During execution, commanders and planners continue to consider design elements and adjust both current operations and future plans as the operation unfolds.

4.14 In broad terms, design elements serve three purposes.

- To focus effort during the Joint Military Appreciation Process (JMAP)
- To describe in plans and directives what is to be achieved
- To assist in monitoring the execution of a campaign or operation

4.15 The design elements considered in this chapter are:

- end-state
- objectives
- termination
- centre of gravity (CoG)
- decisive points
- commander's decision points
- main effort
- culminating points
- criteria for success
- measures of effectiveness and performance
- direct and indirect approaches
- lines of operation
- sequencing
- phasing

- operational pause
- branches and sequels.

## End-State

4.16 Before designing an operation or campaign, it is necessary to clearly identify the desired end-state. The end-state is the political and/or military situation that needs to exist at the end of an operation, indicating that the objective has been achieved. The end-state should be clearly established before military forces are committed to execute an operation. An end-state is crucial to any plan, for without it there is no focus for planning. All activities and operations should be judged against their relevance to achieving the end-state.

*Think to a finish!*

**Field Marshal Viscount Allenby of Meggido, 1902**

4.17 **National Strategic End-State.** The national strategic end-state may describe a range of acceptable conditions at the conclusion of the campaign or operation, including diplomatic, economic, social, humanitarian, and military conditions. This will give a clear indication of the relative importance of the military contribution in relation to other instruments of national power and influence.<sup>25</sup>

4.18 **Military End-State.** The desired military end-state should align with the national strategic end-state. It should amplify strategic planning guidance, including criteria for measuring success. The military end-state may be but one contributor to the national strategic end-state, thus highlighting the need for close cooperation with other instruments of national power.

4.19 **Adversaries' End-State.** The desired end-state for adversaries must be deduced, based on analysis and intelligence assessments.

<sup>25</sup> The instruments of national power are economic (e.g. tariffs, subsidies, embargoes, loans, aid); political (e.g. legislative, judicial, diplomatic); psychosocial (e.g. attitudes, norms, benefits); and military (e.g. defence, aggression).

*Pursue one great decisive aim with force and determination—a maxim which should take first place among all causes of victory.*

**Major General Carl von Clausewitz,  
*Principles of War, 1812***

## Objectives

4.20 Operations and campaigns must be directed toward a clearly defined and commonly understood objective that contributes to the achievement of the desired end-state. In simple terms, an objective is an aim to be achieved. Commanders establish objectives to focus the actions of subordinates and to provide a clear purpose for their tasks. Objectives are therefore established at each level of an operation.

4.21 **Military Strategic Objectives.** Based on the desired military end-state, military strategic objectives establish the overall aims of the campaign, with respect to adversaries and strategically important areas. In line with a comprehensive approach, these objectives should be developed in concert with those of the other agencies involved in the operation, and should clearly appreciate the part that each will play in achieving the national strategic end-state. The military strategic objective should reflect a realistic military end-state that allows withdrawal of New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) forces at an appropriate stage, even before the final *national* strategic end-state is attained.

4.22 **Operational Objectives.** Based on the desired military end-state and military strategic objectives, the joint commander will establish operational objectives. Operational objectives often describe the conditions to be achieved by subordinate commanders at decisive points, thus helping to define the purpose of their tasks. This can be in terms of force (for example: expel, defeat, destroy, contain, annihilate, neutralise, isolate), space (for example: seize, secure, defend, control, deny), and/or time (for example: gain time for build-up of own forces).

4.23 **Tactical Objectives.** Tactical commanders establish objectives for their operations, based on their

higher commander's operational objectives and the tasks assigned to them.

4.24 **Adversaries' Objectives.** These will be deduced from the presumed desired end-states.

## Termination

4.25 All planning should consider what conditions are required for the termination of operations. Put simply, once the operational end-state has been achieved, how do we preserve that which has been gained? Termination is a process that includes conflict resolution and the mutual acceptance of terms and conditions, to ensure a lasting settlement. The resolution of armed conflict will generally be characterised by parallel diplomatic, military, economic, and informational activity. The conflict may be resolved at any stage, using a range of means that may not be military, and with little or no fighting. In such circumstances, the NZDF may be required to rapidly reorient to new activities such as humanitarian assistance or peace support.

4.26 **Planning for Termination.** Termination must be considered in the operations planning process. The joint commander and their staff must examine the desired end-state and assess whether it is likely to eliminate or sufficiently reduce sources of further conflict. On this basis, they must determine what military conditions must exist to justify a cessation of military operations. In formulating a plan, the joint commander should ensure that the following considerations are addressed.

- Are termination criteria stated clearly and concisely?
- Do they support the desired end-state?
- Are all instruments of national power available, so as to achieve maximum effect?
- Will the international community provide diplomatic and economic support to help achieve the desired end-state?
- What is the NZDF strategy for conflict termination? Is early termination more desirable than continued military operations?
- How can military operations contribute to long-term stability, while avoiding sowing the seeds for future conflict?

4.27 **Termination Criteria.** Appropriate termination criteria are vital to ensuring that military operations result in conditions that allow conflict resolution on terms favourable to New Zealand/the multinational force. In the event that termination criteria are not clearly articulated, the joint commander should request further guidance or clarification from the strategic level of command.

### Centre of Gravity

*...one must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind. Out of these characteristics a certain centre of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed.*

**Major General Carl von Clausewitz,  
On War, 1832**

4.28 A CoG is the principle source of power for achieving one's aim. The CoG concept allows us to understand our own and an adversary's national and military potential. The CoG is defined as 'the characteristic, capability or locality from which a military force, nation, alliance or other grouping derives its

freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight.' The essence of operational art is to determine an opponent's CoG and the best way to neutralise it, whilst protecting our own CoG. If the adversary's CoG is defeated or neutralised, it should allow us to achieve our objectives.

4.29 CoGs exist at all levels of operations, and relate directly to the attainment of objectives.

- **Strategic.** Strategic CoGs allow the achievement of strategic objectives. Examples include the power of a regime, the will of the people, ethnic nationalism, economic strength, the armed forces, or a multinational force structure.
- **Operational.** Operational CoGs are typically the physical means of achieving operational and strategic objectives. They may include a mass of offensive forces, air power, maritime power projection capabilities, or weapons of mass destruction. An operational CoG may be concentrated in a specific geographical area, or dispersed. In the latter case, preventing a CoG from forming or concentrating its effects could be decisive in its defeat.
- **Tactical.** Tactical CoGs tend to be specific capabilities at specific points that provide freedom of action and the means to achieve tactical objectives.




Figure 4-3: A tactical centre of gravity is a specific capability that provides freedom of action, such as a replenishment tanker.

## Chapter 4

4.30 **Centre of Gravity Analysis.** CoGs may consist of a number of physical and/or psychological elements. The process of identifying these elements is CoG analysis. CoG analysis combines military judgement with input from intelligence and other sources. This initial analysis requires constant review, as objectives and sources of power may change, thus altering the CoG. It is important to determine three different CoGs.

- **Enemy Centre of Gravity.** This CoG will inform our lines of operation. It requires an understanding of the enemy's likely objective and knowledge of its capabilities.
- **Friendly Centre of Gravity from Enemy Perspective.** This CoG should inform us of the enemy's most likely course of action; that is, how the enemy will seek to destroy or neutralise us.
- **Friendly Centre of Gravity from Our Perspective.** This CoG should show us the enemy's most dangerous course of action — one which could actually destroy or neutralise us.

4.31 In non-combat operations when there is not a clearly designated adversary, it may be useful to determine CoGs for the different factions, and for international or non-governmental organisations that must be protected, rather than neutralised or destroyed. In a complex situation involving many opposing factions and no primary source of power, it may be possible to determine an abstract CoG such as the popular will to tolerate ethnic violence, or confidence in international security commitments.<sup>26</sup>

4.32 **Critical Factors.** There are three elements of a CoG, which provide an effective method for assessing capabilities and weaknesses.

- **Critical Capability.** A force's critical capability is something that, if destroyed, captured or neutralised, would significantly undermine the fighting capability of the force; for example, air defence. A successful attack on a critical capability should achieve a decisive point in an operation. The adversary may have a number of critical capabilities.

- **Critical Requirement.** A critical requirement is an essential condition or resource that is needed for a critical capability to function fully. For example, a critical requirement for an adversary's air defence could be fighter aircraft.
- **Critical Vulnerability.** A force's critical vulnerability is something that, if destroyed, captured or neutralised, would significantly undermine a critical capability. A critical vulnerability is not necessarily a weakness, but any source of strength or power that is capable of being attacked or neutralised. For example, the critical vulnerability of an adversary's fighter aircraft lies in its pilots, airfields, or fuels.

4.33 These critical factors and the CoG can be brought together in a CoG analysis matrix. The matrix helps the joint commander to define the CoG and its vulnerable elements, as well as illustrate the underpinning logic as to why a particular CoG has been chosen. An explanation of CoG analysis and an example of this matrix can be found in the NZDF-approved *ADFP 5.0.1 Joint Military Appreciation Process*.

## Decisive Points

4.34 Identifying decisive points is a fundamental part of planning. Decisive points are logically determined from critical requirements and vulnerabilities. They are not necessarily events or battles; they may be the elimination of a capability, or an achievement such as obliging the adversary to engage in formal negotiations. The key determinant of a decisive point is its effect on the enemy. It should affect or neutralise a critical vulnerability, which in turn should disrupt the CoG. The joint commander should exploit the enemy's critical vulnerabilities with a sequence of decisive points, known as a line of operation.

4.35 The commander applies operational art to determine the conditions to be achieved at each decisive point, when, in what sequence, and with what resources. This will help to establish the most promising approach and line of operation to adopt, as well as potential alternatives. The joint commander should designate decisive points as objectives, and allocate resources accordingly.

<sup>26</sup> Joint Doctrine Note 2/10 *Guidelines for Intelligence, Analysis and Planning in Stabilisation Operations* contains more information on CoG analysis for stabilisation operations.

4.36 Sometimes both opposing and friendly forces will share the same decisive point. For example, one force may need to secure points of entry into an operational area, while the opposing force may need to deny access to those same points. Therefore, the adversary's decisive points as well as one's own must be considered.

### Commander's Decision Points

4.37 Decision points are points in time and space at which a commander must make a decision in order to influence the operation in a particular target area of interest. A decision point may act as a trigger for a branch or sequel to be actioned.

4.38 Decision points must be offset from the point where the action is to take place, in order to allow sufficient lead-time for action to be initiated. They are also known as the commander's decision points, to differentiate from decisive points.

### Main Effort

4.39 The main effort is the principal activity or force to which a commander gives priority in each phase of an operation. There can only be one main effort at any time. The concept provides a focus for activity and helps subordinates to understand where the commander's priorities lie. In this way, they can take quick and independent action in times of uncertainty and when tactical orders become inappropriate for the new situation. The characteristics of a main effort are that it:

- allocates priority to the most critical activity or force
- concentrates sufficient effort to achieve the objective
- is expressed as an activity or desired outcome
- coordinates the activities of the allocated force element to achieve success.

### Culminating Points

4.40 Culmination has both offensive and defensive applications.

- In the offence, the culminating point is that point in

time and space where the attacker's combat power no longer exceeds that of the defender, and the attacking force should transition to the defence, or risk counter-attack and defeat.

- A defending force reaches its culminating point when it no longer has the ability to mount a counter-offensive or defend successfully, and is forced to disengage, withdraw, or face defeat.

4.41 The culminating point may be influenced by a number of factors, such as lines of communication, logistics, reduced combat power, attrition, and dwindling national will. To be successful, an operation must achieve its objectives before reaching its culminating point. The art is to preclude our own culmination, while speeding that of the adversary. Sequencing, phasing, and operational pauses should be designed to facilitate this.

### Criteria for Success

4.42 For each objective, the joint commander establishes criteria for success that provide measurable or observable requirements for the essential conditions that must be achieved, as well as any conditions that cannot exist if the objective is to be successfully accomplished.

### Measures of Effectiveness and Performance

4.43 Assessment — both *what* to measure and *how* to measure it — should be incorporated as part of the operations planning process. Assessment is a means to inform decisions, rather than being an end in itself. By monitoring available information and using measures of effectiveness and measures of performance as assessment tools, commanders and staff can determine progress toward achieving objectives and attaining the military end-state, and modify the plan as required.

4.44 Just as tactical tasks relate to operational- and strategic-level tasks and objectives, there is a relationship between assessment measures. Well-devised assessment measures at all levels help commanders and staff to understand the link between specific tasks and the joint force's objectives and end-state.



## Chapter 4

4.45 **Strategic and Operational Levels.** Assessment at the strategic and operational levels uses *measures of effectiveness*, that help to evaluate whether an operation is achieving the desired conditions or outcomes. Measures of effectiveness typically describe predicted benchmark changes in conditions that indicate progress toward accomplishing the objective. They should be relevant, measurable, responsive, and resourced. Measures of effectiveness may influence decisions on the conduct of operations and the allocation of resources.

4.46 **Tactical Level.** Tactical-level assessment typically uses *measures of performance* to evaluate task accomplishment — whether we are ‘doing things right’. Assessment at this level also helps to determine operational- and strategic-level progress.

### Direct versus Indirect Approach

4.47 There are two alternative approaches for defeating the adversary’s CoG — direct and indirect. A campaign or operation can use either, or more usually, a combination of both. With either approach, planning should consider possible losses and the sustainment of deployed capabilities.

4.48 **Direct Approach.** The direct approach brings military force to bear in the most direct manner. It is a linear, uninterrupted approach against an adversary’s CoG, often by way of decisive points. This approach may mean engaging the adversary’s strengths. As such, it is appropriate when a force has superior strength compared to the opposing force, and the risk is acceptable. If successful, the direct approach can achieve the desired objectives and end-state quickly. However, it may also result in high losses and undesired outcomes that work against achieving the national strategic end-state.

4.49 **Indirect Approach.** The indirect approach seeks to exploit the adversary’s vulnerabilities, while avoiding its strengths. The indirect approach should be considered if a force is insufficient to operate directly against the adversary’s CoG or critical strengths in a

single operation. Instead, effort should be focused on exploiting the adversary’s critical vulnerabilities in a series of operations that eventually lead to the defeat of the CoG. In most cases, the indirect approach suits the comprehensive and manoeuvrist approaches of the NZDF, as it aims to avoid the attrition and risk implicit in the direct approach.

### Lines of Operation

4.50 Lines of operation link decisive points in time and space on the path to the opponent’s CoG. Commanders use lines of operation to focus the capabilities of the joint force towards a desired end-state, in order to converge upon and defeat the adversary’s CoG. Lines of operation are differentiated by function (for example, security, stability, governance, reconstruction) and environment (land, sea, air), and exploit the different strengths of each.

4.51 **Parallel Lines of Operation.** Multiple lines of operation are conducted in parallel. They help to control numerous friendly force functions aimed at achieving multiple objectives. Parallel lines of operation force adversaries to react to multiple threats simultaneously, thereby overloading their decision-making capabilities and making it more difficult for them to respond effectively.

### Arranging Operations

4.52 Planners need to determine the best arrangement of actions or operations to achieve assigned military objectives. The following concepts are used to arrange operations.

4.53 **Sequencing.** Sequencing involves ordering military and non-military activities along lines of operation, in the order most likely to defeat or neutralise the adversary’s CoG. A clear understanding of available forces, resources, and time will help to determine this order. The joint commander should ensure that activities are complementary and do not obstruct or contradict one another. There will often be non-military activities — for example diplomatic, economic, or humanitarian

activities — that must be sequenced in parallel with military lines of operation.

4.54 The sequence of events leading to the desired end-state is not rigid. Sequencing should be flexible, so that commanders can adjust the activities of a sequence, change their order, or create new ones. In managing a sequence of military activities, commanders retain future options through planning potential branches and sequels. With options built into the initial plan, commanders may impose their chosen tempo on the enemy. Once the overall sequencing of the operation has been determined, commanders may choose to divide an operation into phases.

4.55 **Phasing.** Operations are organised into phases to break a complex plan into simple and/or discrete parts.<sup>27</sup> Phases are sequential but may overlap, particularly in stability and support operations. The beginning of a phase may rely on the successful completion of a preceding phase, or on a planned change in main effort, both of which should be clearly recognised in operational design. During planning, commanders should determine the conditions to be met before transitioning from one phase to the next, and designate one main effort for each phase. The aim in phasing an operation is to maintain continuity and tempo, and to avoid unnecessary operational pauses. Phasing is also useful for distinguishing the following:

- when major activities start or finish
- whether a task organisation needs changing<sup>28</sup>
- whether the forces available are sufficient to conduct all required tasks concurrently.

4.56 **Synchronisation.** Synchronisation involves arranging military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive time and place. The operational commander will arrange activities to strike the enemy simultaneously across the theatre of operations. These strikes should target the enemy's critical vulnerabilities at decisive

points that form a line of operation to the enemy's CoG. Synchronisation is a planning and control tool that facilitates the efficient use of all force capability, and is normally expressed as a synchronisation matrix.<sup>29</sup> The activities of other agencies must be considered as part of synchronisation.

4.57 **Operational Pause.** An operational pause is a break in operations that is required in order to consolidate and prepare for subsequent activity. As activities cannot be conducted continuously, periodic pauses may be needed on one line of operation, in order to retain the initiative, concentrate activity on another line of operation, avoid culmination, and/or regenerate combat power. Ideally, operational pauses should be planned in order to minimise any overall loss of tempo.

## Key Terms

### Branch

A branch is a contingency option built into the basic plan. A branch is used for changing a force's mission, orientation, or direction of movement, based on anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by enemy actions and reactions. It answers the question, 'What if...?'

### Sequel

A sequel provides options for the next phase of an operation. Plans for a sequel are based on the possible outcomes (success, stalemate, or defeat) associated with the current operation. It answers the question, 'What's next?'

4.58 **Branches and Sequels.** For every military action, there is a range of possible outcomes. Outcomes more favourable than expected present opportunities; those worse than expected pose risks. In order to exploit opportunities and mitigate risks, commanders must anticipate possible outcomes and build flexibility into their plans by providing options that will still achieve the overall objective. This contingency planning is achieved

<sup>27</sup> A generic phasing model is provided in [NZDDP-3.0 Joint Operations](#).

<sup>28</sup> For more information on task organisation, consult [NZDDP-3.0 Joint Operations](#).

<sup>29</sup> An example synchronisation matrix can be found in the NZDF-approved [ADFP 5.0.1 Joint Military Appreciation Process](#).

by developing branches and sequels that are based on continuously exploring 'what if' situations that could occur during or after each phase of the operation.

- **Branches.** A branch is a contingency option built into the current plan, phase, or line of operation. It is planned and executed in response to an anticipated opportunity or reversal, in order to provide the commander with the flexibility to retain the initiative.
- **Sequels.** Sequels provide options for the next phase of an operation. They are planned based on the likely outcome of the current operation or phase. One of the sequels to the current phase may simply be the next pre-planned phase. However, to ensure that the campaign or operation can proceed even in the face of setbacks, planners should prepare several options.

4.59 Once possible branches and sequels have been identified, the next step is to determine where the commander's decision points (not to be confused with decisive points) should be. Such decision points are often represented by battles or engagements that, despite everything being done to anticipate their

outcome, can be either lost or won. Each branch from a decision point requires different actions, and each action demands various follow-up actions, such as (potential) sequels. Figure 4-4 illustrates this concept.

*A plan, like a tree, must have branches—if it is to bear fruit. A plan with a single aim is apt to prove a barren pole.*

**Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart,  
Thoughts on War, 1944**

### Limitations of Operational Art and Design

4.60 While the concepts of operational art and design provide a comprehensive methodology and a lexicon of commonly understood terms, commanders and staff should remember that these concepts are guides, not templates, and should not be followed blindly. When applying operational art and design to plan a campaign or operation, the commander should keep the following points in mind.




Figure 4-4: Branches and sequels are triggered by decision points.

## Real-Life Example

### Unexpected Outcomes: The Battle Of The Somme<sup>30</sup>

**The Plan.** Meticulous planning — much of it the brainchild of British Commander in Chief Sir Douglas Haig — lay behind the Somme campaign of 1916. This planning envisaged that an intense week of shelling the German lines would destroy all forward German defences. Allied troops could then move across No Man's Land and overrun the Germans. It was expected that the surprised Germans, exhausted from the week-long bombardment of their trenches and bunkers, would put up little fight.

**The Reality.** Over on the German line, the soldiers had retreated to their heavily fortified bunkers, while the Allies lobbed 1.6 million shells at the German positions. Once the shelling stopped, the Germans simply emerged from their bunkers and took up position again behind their machine guns. And that is where they were as the whistle sounded for the British to 'go over the top' on the morning of 1 July 1916.

Eleven divisions of men — heavily laden and ordered to walk slowly — headed towards the German lines. At the end of that day, nearly 60,000 men were wounded, dying, or dead.

There was no decisive breakthrough on this day, but the same tactics were repeated in the following days. Over the course of two months, the Allies could measure their gains in mere metres, and there had been massive loss of life. The Germans may have held their positions, or most of them, but they too suffered huge losses.

The slow, painful progress of the Allies finally fizzled out on 18 November. The British and French line had advanced, at most, 12 kilometres since July.

The Battle of the Somme had ended. The human cost for both sides was staggering. The German army was severely damaged; the Somme was 'the muddy grave of the German field army'. And while the British refined their tactics over the course of the battle, almost a century later, opinion remains divided about the strategy that 'won' the Battle of the Somme for the Allies.

4.61 **Problem Type.** Planning processes are best suited to solving well-structured problems that are easily determined and that have a clear, linear solution. They are less effective in dealing with ill-structured problems that are difficult to define and that do not have a clear solution or end-state, if any.

4.62 **Disconnect between Strategic and Tactical Levels.** With planning processes occurring largely at the operational level, there is the danger of the strategic and tactical levels losing sight of one another. The strategic level must include a tactical view of things, or it may select tactically unachievable objectives. Likewise, the tactical level must be aware of the strategic level to ensure that ground-level operations are relevant to the strategic objective. The joint commander should

take care that key strategic themes and objectives are not distorted as they pass down through the levels of command.

4.63 **Desire for Comprehensiveness.** Sometimes it is not possible to account for all variables in the planning process. In particular, the qualitative or human aspects of conflict mean that a complete understanding of the problem and the way forward is not achievable. Furthermore, a desire to account for every possible factor or outcome may exceed the cognitive, organisational, and material abilities of the commander.

4.64 **Ambiguous Terms at the Tactical Level.** The confusion of battle does not lend itself to complex orders; likewise, vague or imprecise terms are of little use at the tactical level. When using terms such as 'synergy', 'leverage' or 'simultaneity', the commander should be mindful of how they will be understood and interpreted at lower levels.

<sup>30</sup> Overview — the Battle of the Somme', <http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/war/the-battle-of-the-somme/overview>, Ministry for Culture and Heritage, updated 18 June 2007



CHAPTER 5:

# THE NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE FORCE OPERATIONS PLANNING PROCESS



## Contents

	<i>Page</i>
Introduction	49
Phases of the NZDF Operations Planning Process	49
Initial Response at the National Strategic Level	50
Phase One: Assess	53
CDF Warning Order	53
Strategic-Level Activity	54
Operational-Level Activity	54
Phase Two: Plan	55
CDF Directive	55
COMJFNZ Warning Order	55
Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace	55
Joint Military Appreciation Process	56
Formal Submission	56
Cabinet Approval	56
Further CDF Direction	57
COMJFNZ Operation Order/Instruction	57
Phase Three: Execute and Monitor	57
Execute	57
Monitor	58
Evaluate	58
Annex A: Military Strategic Estimate and Military Response Options	61
Annex B: Joint Operations Planning Process	62
Annex C: Concept of Operations	64
Annex D: Campaign Plan	65
Annex E: Operational Correspondence	67



## Introduction

5.01 This chapter introduces the New Zealand Defence Force Operations Planning Process (NZDF OPP). In doing so, it refers to a number of stakeholders and planning groups, which are explained in greater detail in Chapter 6.

5.02 The NZDF OPP — shown on page 52 — guides planning for the command and employment of NZDF force elements on operations. It also guides the planning relationship between Headquarters NZDF (HQNZDF) and Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand (HQJFNZ).

5.03 The NZDF OPP can be used for both deliberate and immediate planning — either to develop or review standing plans, or to rapidly develop military options for Cabinet to consider and for HQJFNZ to further develop.

5.04 The NZDF OPP delineates the planning responsibilities of the strategic and operational levels, yet is designed to allow parallel planning at these levels. Its flexibility reflects the dynamic nature of operations planning, and the need to accommodate ongoing developments and feedback.<sup>31</sup>

5.05 The NZDF OPP is also designed to:

- include the advice of Commander Joint Forces New Zealand (COMJFNZ), single-Service staffs and HQNZDF subject matter experts
- ensure appropriate consultation with other government agencies, focused on achieving national end-states
- be responsive to, and integrated with, Cabinet's decision-making processes
- provide the NZDF with a contingency-planning process that suits New Zealand command structures and processes, but which can be readily aligned to contingency planning with Australia.

5.06 At the operational level, the NZDF OPP supports and informs the Joint Operations Planning Process, which is a sub-process of the NZDF OPP. The Joint Operations Planning Process channels the expertise of generalist and specialist staff into a series of interlinked, multi-disciplinary planning groups and teams at HQJFNZ. The deliberations of these groups are guided by the Joint Military Appreciation Process (JMAP). The JMAP is HQJFNZ's primary vehicle for deliberate planning, yet is flexible enough to accommodate immediate planning.<sup>32</sup>

5.07 It should be noted that the NZDF OPP and its subordinate planning processes cannot solve all problems associated with joint planning — successful planning requires the application of intelligence and imagination. This aspect of operations planning is considered in Chapter 4, 'Operational Art and Design'.

## Phases of the NZDF Operations Planning Process

5.08 There are three phases in the NZDF OPP, supported by intelligence products.

- Assess
- Plan
- Execute and monitor

5.09 The NZDF OPP is a guide only and its phases are flexible. The actual sequence of actions and the time spent in each phase are determined by the nature of the contingency, the tasks to be accomplished, and the time available. For immediate planning, the process may be abridged; for contingency planning, it will not be followed through to execution. If the NZDF OPP is abridged, care should be taken to maintain visibility and communication between the strategic and operational levels.

<sup>31</sup> The NZDF OPP does not cover tactical-level planning — for more information on this, consult the relevant single-Service planning publications.

<sup>32</sup> For detailed information on the operational-level planning process, consult the NZDF-approved ADFP 5.0.1 *Joint Military Appreciation Process* and HQJFNZ Standard Operating Procedures 500–504.




Figure 5-1: Intelligence underpins the three phases of the operations planning process.

5.10 **Compartmentalised Planning.** Planning for sensitive commitments may be compartmentalised, or 'close-hold'. This means that the planning process is condensed and restricted to a smaller, select group of people. Key decisions at the national strategic level will be made by the Ministers with *power to act*, who will then inform Cabinet of their decision.

5.11 New Zealand has a broad range of national security interests at home and overseas, as outlined in the 2010 Defence White Paper. If an event develops that threatens these interests, it is ultimately for the Government of the day to determine the most appropriate course of action for New Zealand to take.

5.12 The options available to the Government will vary, as will the level of discretion the Government has in responding. Any response will be a *national* response, taking account of all the instruments of national power, including a possible military component.<sup>33</sup>

5.13 The Government may be informed of an event through a variety of triggers, such as intelligence monitoring or advice from an external party such as the United Nations (UN) or an ally. Alternatively, the Chief of Defence Force (CDF) may receive a request for assistance directly from an external party. In such cases, the request is passed up to the national strategic level for direction.

5.14 Primary responsibility for New Zealand's response to an event lies with the Cabinet Committee on Domestic and External Security, which is chaired by the Prime Minister. This committee is supported and advised by the Officials' Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination (ODESC). Membership of ODESC is at the chief executive level, thus on defence-related business, both CDF and the Secretary of Defence would be expected to attend.<sup>34</sup>



Figure 5-2: Planning may be compartmentalised for sensitive operations such as special forces deployments.

<sup>33</sup> The instruments of national power are: economic (tariffs, subsidies, embargoes, aid, and so on); political (diplomatic, judicial, and legislative); psychosocial (attitudes, norms, values, benefits); and military (defence, aggression). For more information, see NZDDP-D *Foundations of New Zealand Military Doctrine*.

<sup>34</sup> Depending on the circumstances, CDF may be represented at ODESC by other senior officers such as COMJFNZ, the Vice Chief of Defence Force, or the Assistant Chief Strategic Commitments and Intelligence.



## Chapter 5

5.15 In the case of an emergency — immediate planning — an inter-departmental watch group may be formed at the deputy secretary/senior officer level. Its role is to monitor the situation at a cross-government level, advise ODESC, and guide lower-level planning.<sup>35</sup> Watch groups are coordinated by ODESC's support secretariat, the Security and Risk Group. At the same time, informal liaison will likely begin between the staff of affected government agencies.

5.16 ODESC will select a lead government agency according to the nature of the response required. If NZDF personnel or assets are likely to be involved in the national response, the Directorate of Defence Intelligence and Security (DDIS) will monitor areas of interest, and the NZDF will begin planning.

---

<sup>35</sup> In the case of deliberate planning, the Security and Risk Group oversees the development of all-of-government contingency plans to meet New Zealand's strategic interests. The NZDF may also develop its own NZDF-specific standing plans — called joint service plans and contingency plans — without reference to the national strategic level.




Figure 5-3: The NZDF Operations Planning Process

## Phase One: Assess

5.17 The beginning of the NZDF OPP is relatively fluid. In immediate planning, it may be marked by an event that involves Defence being called to an ODESC meeting. CDF may seek advice from COMJFNZ and the Assistant Chief of Strategic Commitments and Intelligence (AC SCI) in order to clarify the feasibility of any potential military response.<sup>36</sup>

5.18 At this early stage, the Vice Chief of Defence Force (VCDF) or AC SCI will convene the Strategic Planning Group. This is the NZDF's lead group for immediate, strategic-level planning. It also helps to develop, review, and amend joint service plans. To facilitate concurrent activity with HQJFNZ and other government agencies, the Strategic Planning Group may include representatives from these organisations.<sup>37</sup> When considering an international commitment, it will also include a representative from the International Branch, Ministry of Defence (MoD).

5.19 In the same vein, the International Branch and the Strategic Planning Group will also begin to liaise at the strategic level with allies, coalition partners, and/or other government agencies at this time. This liaison will establish national end-states and objectives, and facilitate the development of military response options (MROs).

### Key Term

#### Military Response Option

A military response option is a broad proposal outlining one of several strategic options for how the NZDF could respond to a situation and achieve the military and national objectives.

<sup>36</sup> In a period of sustained tension or conflict, an operational-level commander may need to initiate planning autonomously. COMJFNZ may do so by issuing an initiating or planning directive, keeping HQNZDF informed. Regardless of whether the process is supported by a military strategic estimate, the operational sequence of planning should conform to the Joint Operations Planning Process described in this chapter and in Annex B. Naturally, operational urgency may see the process abridged; any associated risks should be managed accordingly.

<sup>37</sup> The primary HQJFNZ representative is likely to be from the Joint Plans (J5) Branch.

### Key Term

#### Strategic Intelligence Estimate

A strategic intelligence estimate provides a realistic assessment of the courses of action open to a stakeholder. This includes analysing the likelihood of a given course of action being adopted, and identifying a stakeholder's vulnerabilities and centre of gravity. The SIE assists with strategic command and staff planning, and also provides guidance to intelligence staff and operational planners at HQJFNZ.

5.20 The intelligence process also begins in earnest at this point, with the development of a *strategic intelligence estimate* (SIE) by DDIS.<sup>38</sup> This estimate identifies likely courses of action (COA) for a stakeholder or adversary. It may inform both immediate and deliberate planning at the strategic and operational levels. In order to provide timely intelligence, drafts of the SIE may be given to planning staffs at HQNZDF and HQJFNZ.<sup>39</sup>

5.21 Based on the advice of COMJFNZ and AC SCI, CDF will have two choices.

- Recommend to the Minister of Defence that the NZDF does not continue planning.
- Decide to commence formal military planning and issue a CDF warning order.

#### CDF Warning Order

5.22 If CDF decides to commence formal planning, a CDF warning order will be issued to AC SCI and COMJFNZ. This order may initially be transmitted by informal means — via phone or email, for example. In such cases, it must subsequently be followed up with a formal warning order generated by SCI Branch.

<sup>38</sup> In the case of immediate planning for a crisis, an SIE may already have been developed as part of a joint service plan. In this case, DDIS will update the SIE to reflect the current situation.

<sup>39</sup> For more information on SIEs, consult Chapter 2 and NZDFP-2.0.1.2 *Strategic Intelligence Estimates*.

CDF may issue another warning order at a later date to address information shortfalls in the initial order, or to redirect planning if new information has come to hand. Alternatively, this new information may be provided in the CDF directive.

5.23 Following the CDF warning order, a number of activities will begin at the strategic- and operational-level headquarters. In immediate planning, when time is short, many of these activities will be concurrent. To keep the process flowing, it is vital that the staff of these headquarters communicate and share information.

### Strategic-Level Activity

5.24 **Military Response Options.** At the strategic level, the Strategic Planning Group will start the military strategic estimate. The purpose of this process is to scope and evaluate possible MROs.<sup>40</sup>

5.25 **Strategic Military Threat Assessment.** In order to assess the feasibility of these MROs, the NZDF must understand the threat posed to its personnel and equipment. To provide this intelligence, DDIS develops a *strategic military threat assessment* (SMTA). The SMTA is maintained for the duration of a deployment, and also contributes to planning at HQJFNZ.<sup>41</sup>

### Key Term

#### Strategic Military Threat Assessment

The purpose of the SMTA is to identify and evaluate the threat posed to NZDF personnel and equipment during operational deployments. It facilitates planning and decision-making processes, risk management, and threat awareness. It also guides decisions on force protection measures.

5.26 **Cabinet Paper.** In immediate planning, once the MROs are endorsed by CDF, they are presented to

Cabinet in a joint ministerial Cabinet paper.<sup>42</sup> This paper will first pass through the relevant inter-departmental watch group and ODESC for endorsement. Next, it will move to one of two Cabinet committees — either the External Relations and Defence Committee for foreign policy issues and overseas deployments, or the Domestic and External Security Committee for counter-terrorism matters. Finally, the paper detailing the MROs is submitted to Cabinet, whose decision is recorded in a minute of decision.

5.27 In the case of contingency planning internal to Defence, CDF is the highest approval authority and planning products will not be passed to Cabinet.

### Operational-Level Activity

5.28 At the same time as the Strategic Planning Group is developing MROs, planning begins at HQJFNZ. This planning at the operational level is called the Joint Operations Planning Process. Annex B expands on this planning process; however, briefly, it has four stages:

- preliminary scoping
- Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (JIPB)
- JMAP
- plan development and execution.

5.29 **COMJFNZ Planning Group.** To begin concurrent planning, COMJFNZ may call on the component commanders, branch heads, and specialist advisers that form the COMJFNZ Planning Group. It is likely that the branch heads will meet beforehand to prepare for the group meeting. Once convened, the COMJFNZ Planning Group will determine the general parameters of the problem and provide guidance to the Joint Operations Planning Group and the Joint Intelligence Planning Group. This is the 'preliminary scoping' stage of the Joint Operations Planning Process.

<sup>40</sup> Annex A explains the process of the military strategic estimate in greater detail.

<sup>41</sup> For more information, see Chapter 2 and NZDFP 2.0.1.1 *Strategic Military Threat Assessments*.

<sup>42</sup> The 'joint ministries' are normally the NZDF, the MoD, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade; however, this may vary depending on the situation.

## Key Terms

### Strategic Intelligence Support Plan

Strategic intelligence support plans detail the overarching intelligence architecture and resources allocated by CDF for a given mission or theatre of operations. These plans also include the agreed levels of support from other government agencies and allies.

For more information, see [NZDFP-2.0.1.4 Strategic Intelligence Support Plans](#).

### Concept of Operations

A CONOPS describes how and why COMJFNZ intends to employ forces, including the desired end-state that should exist on termination. It should provide an estimate of the required resources and costs, and describe:

- what type of action is required
- who will execute it
- when it is to begin
- where it will take place
- how it will be accomplished and sustained
- how the force will be recovered.

For more information, see Annex C.

### Campaign Plan

A campaign plan is similar to a CONOPS, but also details how operations will be synchronised across a theatre. It may incorporate elements of campaign planning, such as sequencing and parallel operations.

For more information, see Annex D.

## Phase Two: Plan

### CDF Directive

5.30 Phase two begins when Cabinet approves an MRO, allowing CDF to issue a CDF directive to COMJFNZ.<sup>43</sup> This directive directs COMJFNZ to produce a concept of operations (CONOPS) or a campaign plan, based on the selected MRO. It will include the military strategic objectives and end-state. This directive will be shaped by guidance provided by the Cabinet External Relations and Defence Committee, and will be supported by an intelligence annex — called a *strategic intelligence support plan*.

### COMJFNZ Warning Order

5.31 At this point, COMJFNZ may release a warning order to affected single Services, formations, and force elements to allow parallel planning and preparation. Further warning orders should be issued when more information becomes available. They are the responsibility of the Joint Plans (J5) Branch.

*A far as possible, the time made available for operational planning should ensure the timely preparation and promulgation of warning and operations orders as the basis for practical guidance to deploying units.*

**Office of the Auditor General,  
New Zealand Defence Force:  
Deployment to East Timor,  
November 2001**

### Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace

5.32 The preliminary scoping completed by the COMJFNZ Planning Group will direct the planning effort at HQJFNZ towards the JIPB and the JMAP. While the JIPB is ideally conducted in advance of the JMAP,

<sup>43</sup> If Cabinet decides to discontinue planning at any time, CDF will issue a fragmentary order or an operation instruction to stop all planning in the NZDF.

the time available for planning will dictate the reality. JIPB products include an operational-level analysis of the operational environment, intelligence and counterintelligence estimates, and threat assessments.<sup>44</sup>

### Joint Military Appreciation Process

5.33 In order to produce a CONOPS or a campaign plan, planning staff at HQJFNZ must follow the JMAP. The JMAP begins in phase two of the NZDF OPP and has four stages.

- Mission analysis — what is the problem?
- COA development — what could we do?
- COA analysis — what should we do?
- Decision and CONOPS development — what will we do?

5.34 Although most phase two activity happens at the operational level, this activity must inform strategic-level planning. In particular, developments in the JMAP should feed into activity at HQNZDF, such as drafting any fragmentary orders and addressing personnel, financial, and legal considerations.<sup>45</sup>

5.35 **Mission Analysis.** The Joint Operations Planning Group starts the JMAP by undertaking mission analysis. This group may initially be limited to 'core' members (mainly J5 Branch members), but can expand to include specialist advisers from other branches, HQNZDF, and force elements.<sup>46</sup> The Joint Administrative Planning Group may also be stood up after this meeting to support the Joint Operations Planning Group.

5.36 **Joint Reconnaissance Team.** At the same time as the JOPG starts mission analysis, a joint reconnaissance team may be deployed to the proposed theatre of operations. Its task is to address any gaps in information for HQNZDF and HQJFNZ, and to establish liaison or a point of contact.

5.37 **Course of Action Development and Analysis.** Following mission analysis, the Joint Operations Planning Group develops and analyses several COA for the approved MRO. These are passed to COMJFNZ, who recommends one COA to CDF.

5.38 **CONOPS Development.** If CDF rejects this COA, it returns to the Joint Operations Planning Group to be redeveloped. If CDF approves it, the group will develop it into a CONOPS. CDF may also add constraints or restrictions to the COA. Once developed, the CONOPS will be passed to COMJFNZ, who may recommend it to CDF for endorsement. If HQJFNZ is developing a contingency plan, the planning process will stop once COMJFNZ has approved the CONOPS.

### Formal Submission

5.39 If CDF endorses the CONOPS, CDF and the Secretary of Defence may provide a Cabinet submission to the Minister of Defence.<sup>47</sup> In turn, the Minister will take this submission to Cabinet. The submission must detail:

- the purpose of the proposed commitment
- the preferred MRO and possible alternatives
- estimated costs
- recommended funding sources
- the legal basis for the commitment
- any diplomatic implications
- any impact on the delivery of NZDF outputs.

### Cabinet Approval

5.40 Cabinet will consider the military option and may:

- approve it
- refer it back to CDF for refinement or adjustment
- choose not to support it all.

<sup>44</sup> For more information on the JIPB, see the NZDF-approved [ADFP 5.0.1 Joint Military Appreciation Process](#).

<sup>45</sup> For example, these may include pension entitlements, allowances payments, and legal issues surrounding an NZDF contribution.

<sup>46</sup> If planning is compartmentalised for security reasons, membership of the Joint Operations Planning Group may be limited.

<sup>47</sup> This submission may also be made to the joint Ministers (Defence and Foreign Affairs and Trade), to the Ministers with Power to Act, or direct to Cabinet, as required. The submission process is facilitated by the NZDF's Strategic Coordination Group.

## Chapter 5

5.41 Cabinet will outline its decision in a minute of decision. If this minute approves the submission made by CDF and the Secretary of Defence, it will provide the legislative authority and any additional funding appropriation required to conduct the operation.<sup>48</sup> It will also be the primary reference for any further direction from CDF.

5.42 In some cases, Cabinet approval may be unnecessary. This will typically be the case if Cabinet's initial endorsement of an MRO has given the NZDF enough latitude to act without having to provide more detail to Cabinet. In such cases, CDF would be the highest endorser of the CONOPS.

### Further CDF Direction

5.43 Following Cabinet approval, a fragmentary order may be issued to update the original CDF directive. This order should confirm the approved military option in sufficient detail for COMJFNZ to prepare an operation order. It may also change or amplify the guidance provided in the CDF warning order or directive. If necessary, it will confirm the attachment of additional personnel or assets to COMJFNZ.

### COMJFNZ Operation Order/Instruction

5.44 On receipt of this direction from CDF, HQJFNZ will conduct further detailed planning. This iterative process is led by the Joint Operations Planning Group. It relies on coordinated and concurrent staff planning across all planning groups. To ensure the prompt exchange of ideas and information, key branches and subordinate planning groups should liaise regularly.

5.45 The output of this detailed planning is a COMJFNZ operation order or operation instruction,

depending on the size of the commitment.<sup>49</sup> These documents are essentially a more detailed, finalised version of a CONOPS, and include a joint intelligence support plan.

## Key Term

### Joint Intelligence Support Plan

Joint intelligence support plans are a product of the JIPB. They detail the operational-level intelligence responsibilities and resources allocated to a deployed force or task group.

5.46 Where possible, orders and instructions should be issued in their entirety; if this is not possible, the lead planner should issue any outstanding annexes and enclosures as soon as possible. Fragmentary orders may also be issued at a later date to address any information shortfalls or to provide information that has recently come to hand.<sup>50</sup>

5.47 At the same time as COMJFNZ issues the operation order or instruction, a command directive may also be issued to the Senior National Officer, if required.

## Phase Three: Execute and Monitor

### Execute

5.48 At the tactical level, phase three begins when NZDF force elements complete their tactical-level planning and deploy. At the operational level, it is usually marked by the J5 Branch handing over to the Joint Operations (J3) Branch. The assigned J3 desk officer or operation team will then establish lines of

<sup>48</sup> Prior to Cabinet approval, it may be necessary to conduct scoping and expend funds — this marginal financial risk (excluding capital) will normally be absorbed by HQJFNZ.

<sup>49</sup> The designation 'plan' may be used instead of 'instruction' or 'order' when preparing for operations well in advance. Operation instructions provide direction to the tactical-level commander of a deployment, who will in turn issue an operation order to the force elements subordinate to them. Operation orders are more prescriptive and are given directly to individuals or small groups who are deploying.

<sup>50</sup> For more information, see Annex E and HQJFNZ SOP 5.3 *Operational Correspondence*.

## The New Zealand Defence Force Operations Planning Process

communication with the deployed force, in order to support command and control and sustainment.

5.49 In the case of immediate planning, there may be no handover if J3 has been responsible for planning from the start. Alternatively, in the case of large or complex missions, the J5 lead planner may maintain an overwatch, especially during the period of initial deployment and establishment.

## Monitor

5.50 Phase three of the NZDF OPP consists largely of monitoring the operation, reporting, and making any necessary planning adjustments.

5.51 **Strategic Level.** At the strategic level, SCI Branch will monitor the operation in order to:

- maintain situational awareness

- seek opportunities to fine-tune the NZDF contribution
- identify any requirement for follow-on operations
- provide routine updates to CDF, the Secretary of Defence, the Minister of Defence, and the relevant Cabinet committee(s)
- identify progress towards the stated military end-state
- engage with international partners and other government agencies.

5.52 If further strategic-level direction or deliberate planning are required as the operation develops, CDF will typically issue a fragmentary order. A new CDF directive will be issued in the case of a full review of New Zealand's mandate for an operation.

5.53 **Operational Level.** At the operational level, HQJFNZ will monitor the operation via the situation reports and post-activity reports that it receives from deployed force elements.<sup>51</sup> In turn, it will brief CDF, through SCI Branch, on a weekly basis. If any of this monitoring highlights a need for action, minor planning adjustments may be made directly by HQJFNZ. Any major planning adjustments will be directed by CDF in fragmentary orders issued to COMJFNZ.

5.54 **Withdrawal Planning.** Planning for drawdown or withdrawal remains part of the NZDF OPP, and is simply another form of planning adjustment. COMJFNZ may direct *planning* for withdrawal, but it is CDF who approves its *execution*, usually on COMJFNZ's recommendation. The Government may also direct withdrawal planning to begin.

## Evaluate

5.55 Evaluation involves the conduct of assessments to identify lessons, gather and use knowledge, and take actions to enhance capability and preparedness.

5.56 Deployed elements should inform HQJFNZ of lessons learned, which may cover a range of issues at



Figure 5-4: The third phase of the planning process begins when force elements deploy.

<sup>51</sup> For more information on these reports, see HQJFNZ SOP 5.3 *Operational Correspondence*.



## Chapter 5

the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Similarly, planning teams at all levels should conduct a lessons learned analysis to validate processes and procedures.

5.57 All identified lessons will be captured in EARLLS<sup>52</sup> and analysed, along with any government guidance on the NZDF's participation in a crisis. The outcomes of this analysis should guide staff action to resolve any problems that were raised. The attainment of a *knowledge edge* is a significant outcome of a robust evaluation regime.

*I am not sorry that I went, notwithstanding what has happened. One may pick up something useful from among the most fatal errors.*

**Major General Sir James Wolfe,  
of the Rochefort Expedition, 1757**

5.58 Evaluation enables individuals, groups and the NZDF as a whole to learn from experience in a systematic manner. By analysing issues and lessons learned, the NZDF may improve:

- the operation order for a long-term, ongoing operation
- its contingency plans for potential operations
- the planning and conduct of future operations
- the strategies that inform capability development and preparedness requirements
- the directed levels of capability.

5.59 Evaluation is an integral component of the planning and conduct of all NZDF activities. The responsibilities for evaluation stem from the accountability that all commanders have for the capability outputs of their command. All commanders are subsequently responsible for evaluating the performance of force elements under their command during all activities in which they participate.

Analysing issues through evaluation and implementing the lessons identified will complete the NZDF OPP.

5.60 For detailed information on evaluation, see the NZDF-approved [ADDP 00.4 Operational Evaluation](#) and its New Zealand supplement.

## Key Term

### Lessons Learned

'Lessons learned' is the term for validated knowledge and experience derived from military operations, exercises, activities, and training that may result in a change to how the NZDF operates.

Lessons learned do not always result in change; indeed, they may reinforce the merits of the current approach.

<sup>52</sup> Electronic Activity Reporting and Lessons Learned System



## ANNEX A: MILITARY STRATEGIC ESTIMATE AND MILITARY RESPONSE OPTIONS

5.61 The military strategic estimate is an appreciation process that develops MROs. These options give the New Zealand Government choices as to how to respond to a developing situation. The military strategic estimate is a process, rather than a product.

5.62 The Strategic Planning Group carries out the military strategic estimate. In doing so, the group may draw on the results of any estimates or plans produced during contingency planning, including strategic intelligence estimates and joint service plans.

5.63 The estimate process will identify a problem and consider how the military can be used to resolve or reduce that problem. Its output is several MROs. The estimate starts with a range of broad options, whose feasibility must be scoped in terms of sustainability, suitability, and acceptability to internal and external

audiences. These broad options are narrowed down over time to a few MROs.

5.64 These MROs must then be evaluated. Selection criteria are applied to each MRO to determine a recommended option. This evaluation may involve asking, would a military contribution:

- represent a desirable contribution to collective security?
- support humanitarian objectives, including the need for humanitarian intervention?
- be the only cost-effective option by which New Zealand could provide assistance?
- enhance security in a region of strategic or economic interest to New Zealand?
- enhance our multilateral or bilateral relationships?
- offer a distinctive role?
- be acceptable to the New Zealand public?

5.65 CDF will consider the MROs produced by the estimate process. One or several MROs may then be submitted to Government for endorsement, in the form of a Cabinet paper. If the Government endorses an MRO, this will be promulgated in a CDF directive, and will provide the framework for operational-level planning.

**ANNEX B:  
JOINT OPERATIONS PLANNING  
PROCESS**

5.66 The Joint Operations Planning Process is a formalised, sequenced process that takes place at HQJFNZ, under COMJFNZ. All planning at the operational level — whether deliberate or immediate — should follow this process.

5.67 This annex provides a brief overview of the Joint Operations Planning Process. For greater detail, consult the NZDF-approved *ADFP 5.0.1 Joint Military Appreciation Process*.

**Phases of the Joint Operations Planning Process**

5.68 The Joint Operations Planning Process has four phases, which are shown at Figure 5-6 and outlined below.

**Preliminary Scoping**

5.69 Although the Joint Operations Planning Process centres on the JMAP, these two processes are not the same. Preliminary scoping is the first step in the Joint Operations Planning Process, and is conducted prior to the JMAP formally beginning. This step is COMJFNZ’s opportunity to engage the COMJFNZ Planning Group on a developing situation, seek opinions and consensus on broad options, and provide initial planning guidance to staff.

**Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace**

5.70 The JIPB is a continuous process to analyse the operational environment and the threat. It runs throughout the Joint Operations Planning Process, informing planning and helping to maintain the situational awareness of the commander and relevant staff. The JIPB is essentially an intelligence function, but should be driven by COMJFNZ and understood by the staff.




Figure 5-5: The Joint Operations Planning Process

## Joint Military Appreciation Process

5.71 The JMAP incorporates input from all staff functions — that is, J0–J9 — to help develop the most appropriate CONOPS or campaign plan. The JMAP requires COMJFNZ's input at all stages and constant JIPB updates to remain current. It has four stages:

- mission analysis
- COA development
- COA analysis
- decision and CONOPS development.

## Plan Development and Execution

5.72 The HQJFNZ staff will further develop the approved CONOPS as the basis for operation orders and instructions to be passed on to subordinate commanders for action.

5.73 Once the operation commences, the HQJFNZ J3 Branch will continually assess progress towards the end-state and the achievement of objectives and tasks. This may include conducting immediate planning if adjustments are required.

## ANNEX C: CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

5.74 A CONOPS is a detailed description of how an operation will be conducted. It outlines the intent of COMJFNZ for an operation or a series of operations.

### Content

5.75 There is no specified format for a CONOPS. It may be presented in an oral, written, or graphic format, or a combination thereof. The suggested content of a CONOPS is listed and described briefly below.

5.76 **Intent of higher commander(s), including military end-state**, to convey the vision and thinking of the commander.

5.77 **Critical assumptions** identified during the JMAP.

5.78 **Updated intelligence estimate** drawn from the JIPB, and based on the listed likely adversary COA. This may include:

- situation
- environment effects
- updated adversary COA
- assessed adversary centre of gravity (CoG) and critical factors
- associated commander's decision points and decisive points.

5.79 **Commander's intent** to describe the commander's mission and intent for this mission. This allows subordinates to analyse their tasks in the context of the overall operation. Responses to alternative adversary actions are stated.

5.80 **Outline of CONOPS** to provide a broad indication of how the mission is to be achieved, the chosen lines of operation, commander's decision points, decisive points, and objectives.

5.81 **The general grouping of forces**

5.82 **The effects to be produced on the adversary** (as applicable)

5.83 **Detailed CONOPS**, outlining the scheme of manoeuvre by phase and addressing each component (where applicable).

5.84 **Main effort** for each phase, which may cover:

- phase boundaries, including timings
- specified tasks and groupings of forces
- phase command and control
- rules of engagement for each phase
- cross-functional considerations, including operations security, offensive support, targeting, information operations, and branches and sequels.

5.85 **Concepts for intelligence operations**, including:

- concept of intelligence collection operations, linking collection to decisive points
- concept of defensive intelligence operations (personal security and counterintelligence)
- relationship to operations security plan.

5.86 **Concepts of personnel, logistics, and health support** before, during, and after operations. May include:

- concept of support to zones of operation
- support phases, matched to operations phases
- key locations
- higher commander's support priorities
- our support priorities
- higher support provided
- summary of support issues (significant, critical, or unusual function; internal and external priorities)
- significant risks.

5.87 **Details of communication and information systems**

5.88 **Command and signal**

5.89 **Vulnerabilities** and how they will be minimised.

## ANNEX D: CAMPAIGN PLAN

### Introduction

5.90 A campaign is a set of operations that aims to achieve a strategic objective within a given time and geographical area. An operation is the process of conducting military tasks or carrying out missions to achieve defined operational or tactical objectives, to achieve a strategic objective.

5.91 A campaign plan is, in effect, the cornerstone of successful campaigning. It sets out: the conditions necessary to achieve the strategic goal, the sequence of operations most likely to produce the operational end-state, and the resources required.

5.92 A campaign plan should:

- provide a statement of the joint commander's intent, desired end-state, scheme of manoeuvre, and main effort
- prescribe the lines of operation and assignment of resources — including prioritisation and apportionment — for the achievement of strategic objectives (this provides the basis for all subordinate planning)
- describe how unity of effort will be achieved between maritime, land, air, special, and logistic forces, and with other government agencies and international or non-governmental organisations, as required
- set out the adversary's operational CoG and provide direction to defeat it<sup>53</sup>
- define the friendly CoG and provide direction for its protection
- define command relationships

<sup>53</sup> For guidance on CoG analysis for stabilisation operations when there is not a clearly designated adversary, see *JDN 2/10 Guidelines for Intelligence, Analysis and Planning in Stabilisation Operations*.

- determine the allocation of communication and information systems (CIS) assets
- determine the optimum sequence for the phases of a campaign.

### Campaign Plan Format

5.93 A campaign plan should be presented as a simple concept, with comprehensively coordinated detail. Specifically, the campaign plan will detail how operations will be synchronised and how available resources will be allocated, coordinated, and prioritised across the theatre. Although there is no set format for a campaign plan, it will normally consist of the following sections.

5.94 **Situation.** The situation is a brief description of the conditions that resulted in the need for a campaign plan. The situation could include the following points.

- The strategic situation across the theatre and the events that brought about the situation
- The all-of-government appreciation of the situation, including relationship with allies and the actions being taken by other government agencies
- Strategic guidance: commander's intent, strategic objectives, military/strategic end-state, conflict termination considerations, and strategic limitations/constraints
- Brief description of the threat situation, the threat CoG, critical capabilities, requirements and vulnerabilities, and the threat COA
- Own CoG and critical vulnerabilities
- Statement of the forces available for operations and any force preparation issues

5.95 **Assumptions.** All assumptions used in the development of the campaign plan are to be listed here. Campaign plans are a combination of deliberate and immediate planning initially based on assumptions, with facts replacing assumptions in real time. Logistic assumptions are also to be listed.

5.96 **Mission.** The campaign mission must be a concise statement focused on achieving the strategic objective and defeating the threat CoG.

5.97 **Commander Joint Forces New Zealand Intent.** COMJFNZ's intent will include the campaign purpose and end-state. The intent will provide COMJFNZ's vision for the campaign and should be a clear, concise, and relatively short statement. The intent will describe the military conditions that subordinate commanders must meet to achieve the campaign's desired end-state.

5.98 **Campaign Outline.** The campaign outline describes the objectives, tasks, and supporting plans required for the success of the campaign. The campaign outline consists of the following.

- **General Description.** A simple, concise explanation of the campaign by phases. Each phase may, if desired, have a name.
- **Phases.** Each phase is described in detail. This is to include any operations that need to be conducted during each stage. Synchronisation of operations and supporting activities is to be detailed. Any branches identified are also to be listed for each phase. For each branch, decision points must be provided to allow activation of the branch. The description of each phase should include any targeting and information operations requirements. Phases are described by: purpose, method, end-state, and key operational considerations.
- **Deception Measures**
- **Force Assignment.** A brief description of forces required for the campaign is provided for each phase. The detailed assignment of forces is to be attached as an annex to the plan.
- **Tasks.** Tasks are to be allocated to subordinate headquarters, which includes allocating responsibility for further operations planning. A detailed task matrix is attached as an annex to the

plan.

- **Coordinating Instructions**
- **Boundaries.** The campaign area of operations and the joint force area of operations are to be described and included as an annex.
- **Timings.** Broad timings and the mechanisms to allow integration and synchronisation of operations are provided.
- **Legal.** Includes the legal regime applicable to the conduct of the campaign, including status of forces agreements and memoranda of understanding, as well as guidance on rules of engagement.

5.99 **Administration.** The administrative concept is based on the campaign phases and should allocate administrative responsibilities and support priorities, as well as identify special requirements.

5.100 **Logistics.** The section on logistics support is based on the campaign phases. It should allocate specific logistics responsibilities and identify the supply chain and logistics support priorities.

5.101 **Command, Control, and Communications.** Command and control relationships are detailed, including combined and joint arrangements, as required. The appointment of the joint commander and coordination and liaison requirements are presented in a command and control diagram. The CIS plan is to be described in brief, with the detail included as an annex.

5.102 **Key Operational Considerations.** This section lists the issues that are critical to the success of the campaign.



## ANNEX E: OPERATIONAL CORRESPONDENCE

*Battles are won through the ability of men to express themselves in clear and unmistakable language.*

**Brigadier General S.L.A. Marshall,  
The Armed Forces Officer, 1950**

5.103 This annex describes the different types of operational correspondence: directives, orders, and instructions. Greater detail and templates can be found in HQJFNZ SOP 5.3 *Operational Correspondence*.

### Format

5.104 All directives, orders, and instructions have the following five components (represented by the acronym SMEAC), which may be further divided into subheadings.

- Situation
- Mission
- Execution
- Administration and logistics
- Command and signal

### Directives

5.105 A directive provides direction in accordance with higher policy decisions. There are three main types of directive: command, policy, and planning.

#### Command Directive

5.106 A command directive is often issued to a senior commander on appointment and defines the functional responsibilities of that commander. It may include:

- title of the appointment

- name of the superior commander and any requirement to establish liaison
- command and control measures
- limitations
- assignment of tasks
- legal matters
- disciplinary responsibilities or delegations
- financial matters
- public relations
- reporting requirements.

#### Policy Directive

5.107 Policy directives normally relate to a particularly important aspect of a commander's responsibilities, such as the division of effort between multinational forces.

#### Planning Directive

5.108 A planning directive is issued by a commander to set subordinate commanders and staff to work on preliminary planning, while the final details of the concept of operations have yet to be agreed. This directive specifies the principal plans to be prepared and sets a deadline for the completion of each major step in the planning process. Planning directives express the commander's intent and may cover, but are not limited to:

- situation
- higher commander's intent
- mission
- assumptions
- constraints and limitations
- national aim, objectives, and end-state
- military objectives and end-state
- responsibilities and/or tasks
- coordinating instructions
- available force elements
- resources
- timings, phasing, or programming
- planning considerations

- administration and logistics
- command and control arrangements
- liaison
- security
- communication and information systems
- electronic warfare
- rules of engagement
- reporting
- legal considerations
- public affairs.

## Orders

5.109 Orders convey the higher commander's intentions, and prescribe in detail the directions for fulfilling them and the allocated resources. They come in four forms: warning, operation, administrative, and fragmentary.

### Warning Order

5.110 A warning order (WNGO) should be issued as early as possible to allow subordinate commanders and force elements maximum time for planning and preparation. For events where the situation is constantly evolving, a subsequent warning order may need to be released.

### Operation Order

5.111 An operation order (OPORD) covers the operational requirements for the strategic situation, the operational mission, tasks, coordinating instructions, administrative support arrangements, and command and signals. An operation order draws details from strategic correspondence, operational planning options, and reconnaissance reports. It should be disseminated in a timely manner, to provide the deploying force with the maximum preparation time possible.

### Administrative Order

5.112 An administrative order (ADMINORD) covers the operational requirements for logistics, health, personnel, finance, and movements. These details are usually included in an operation order, but may be issued as an administrative order if necessary.

### Fragmentary Order

5.113 A fragmentary order (FRAGO) may be needed if the operation order or instruction require amending or further developing. A fragmentary order should follow the standard SMEAC format, but omit those elements that:

- have not changed from previous orders
- are not essential to understanding
- might delay or complicate transmission
- are unavailable or incomplete at the time of issue.

## Instructions

5.114 Instructions come in two main forms: operation instructions and administrative instructions. They convey the higher commander's intentions and allocation of forces and resources, but leave the detailed course of action to the subordinate commander.

5.115 Instructions are normally issued instead of an order, in the following situations.

- To a commander with an independent mission
- To a commander who is under the operational control of an ally or coalition partner
- When the pace of events, communication difficulties, or a lack of information make specific orders impossible or undesirable
- To deal with unforeseen emergencies, such as civil emergencies or terrorist attacks
- To plan for contingencies



CHAPTER 6:

# STAKEHOLDERS AND PLANNING GROUPS



## Contents

	<i>Page</i>
Introduction	71
National Strategic-Level Stakeholders and Planning Groups	71
Cabinet External Relations and Defence Committee	71
Cabinet Committee on Domestic and External Security	72
Officials' Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination	72
Security and Risk Group	72
Military Strategic-Level Stakeholders and Planning Groups	74
Chief of Defence Force and Secretary of Defence	74
Strategic Planning Group	74
Service Chiefs	75
Directorate of Legal Services	75
Commander Logistics	75
Chief Information Officer	75
Strategic Commitments and Intelligence Branch	75
International Branch, Ministry of Defence	75
Operational-Level Stakeholders and Planning Groups	76
Commander Joint Forces New Zealand	76
COMJFNZ Planning Group	77
Component Commanders	77
Joint Operations Planning Group	77
Joint Intelligence Planning Group	78
Joint Administrative Planning Group	78
Joint Exercise Planning Group	79
Joint Reconnaissance Team	79

## Introduction

6.01 Joint operations planning in the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) is a dynamic process spanning three levels: national strategic, military strategic, and operational.<sup>54</sup> A number of stakeholders, planning groups, and decision-making forums operate at each of these levels. Each has a unique role in the planning process, which this section seeks to explain.

6.02 The NZDF Operations Planning Process (NZDF OPP) takes the output of each of these stakeholders and planning groups, and melds it into a cohesive whole. To facilitate this, communication is key. Regular consultation between and across the different levels will help to identify any preparedness, capability, or coordination issues. A lack of communication is often the biggest impediment to cohesive and efficient planning.<sup>55</sup>

<sup>54</sup> This publication does not cover planning at the tactical level. For more information, consult the relevant single-Service publications.

<sup>55</sup> The degree of consultation may be restricted when planning is compartmentalised for sensitive operations.

## National Strategic-Level Stakeholders and Planning Groups

6.03 Generally speaking, the Government provides two forms of guidance to Defence. The first is broad guidance that frames Defence’s strategic objectives and informs long-term planning for tasks that the NZDF may be required to perform. This guidance comes in the form of White Papers and periodic strategic reviews. The second relates specifically to planning for an operation, and is delivered through a series of stakeholders who oversee the process at the national strategic level. Figure 6-1 illustrates the hierarchy of stakeholders at the national strategic and military strategic levels.

### Cabinet External Relations and Defence Committee

6.04 The Cabinet External Relations and Defence Committee (ERD) considers issues of foreign affairs, defence, international trade, tourism, development assistance, and disarmament. Its membership usually comprises the Prime Minister, the ministers of foreign affairs, trade, and defence, and other ministers as necessary.




Figure 6-1: The Prime Minister and Cabinet have ultimate authority; however, a series of committees and individuals inform their decision-making.

6.05 The ERD will normally consider position papers and military response options developed by CDF and endorsed by the Minister of Defence, before passing them to Cabinet for an executive decision. CDF may be invited to attend ERD or full Cabinet meetings when defence issues are being considered.

### Cabinet Committee on Domestic and External Security

6.06 The Prime Minister, as chair of the Cabinet Committee on Domestic and External Security (DES), manages the national response to any situation that potentially threatens New Zealand's national security. The DES includes those ministers whose departments play an essential role in responding to such a situation. CDF may be invited to attend DES or full Cabinet meetings when crisis management and responses are being considered.

6.07 The DES reports to Cabinet on security and intelligence matters, but has the power to act when urgent action is needed, or where required by operational or security considerations.<sup>56</sup> It is supported by the Officials' Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination (ODESC) and the Security and Risk Group (SRG).

### Officials' Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination

6.08 ODESC is a committee of government officials that provides strategic policy advice to the Prime Minister. It is a coordination — rather than decision-making — forum, with executive decisions made by individual chief executives. Any ODESC member may activate the committee.<sup>57</sup>

<sup>56</sup> Any issues regarding policy or the allocation of additional resources must be referred to Cabinet.

<sup>57</sup> ODESC is similar to the Australian indications and warnings capability; however, due to our smaller size and geostrategic position, the New Zealand system is less complex and more informal.

6.09 **Membership.** ODESC comprises the chief executives of the:

- Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (chair)
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
- NZDF
- Ministry of Defence (MoD)
- New Zealand Security Intelligence Service
- Government Communications Security Bureau
- New Zealand Police
- Treasury
- other government agencies when necessary.

6.10 **Working Groups.** ODESC exercises policy oversight in the areas of intelligence and security, terrorism, maritime security, and emergency preparedness. It does so through a number of standing working groups of senior officials from the relevant departments, who develop and consider national strategy and security policy in these areas.

6.11 **Watch Groups.** ODESC may also be informed by watch groups. Their purpose is to monitor a specific domestic or international crisis (potential or actual), and advise the Government and the Prime Minister. For example, there have been watch groups to monitor the destabilising activities in Solomon Islands and Fiji. Watch groups are kept informed by regular intelligence reports and a range of government sources. Watch groups and working groups are chaired by the SRG.

### Security and Risk Group

6.12 The SRG, formerly the Domestic and External Security Group, is the support secretariat for ODESC. It sits within the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, chairs ODESC working groups and watch groups, and advises the Prime Minister on security and defence matters. In the past, the SRG has coordinated the all-of-government response to events such as the Fiji coups, the September 11 attacks, East Timor, and the possibility of conflict between India and Pakistan.

## Real-Life Example

### The East Timor Watch Group

An East Timor watch group was established in April 1999. It served as a forum to share intelligence and prepare reports among relevant government departments — at times meeting daily. Membership of the watch group included the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the MoD, the NZDF, the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, and the then-External Assessments Bureau.

The NZDF's representation on the East Timor watch group provided the group with an NZDF intelligence perspective on the East Timor situation, and a channel for communicating the NZDF's military threat assessment. It also enabled

the NZDF to modify its planning for a possible deployment as circumstances changed.

Constant communication between officials over the planning period helped to ensure that the Government received advice based on a common set of information and assumptions. The watch group acted as a 'clearing-house', ensuring that all participants were fully informed and working from the same information. The group also reported regularly to Ministers on political developments and other intelligence matters. These reports were a short summary of recent events from both a foreign policy and a defence perspective.

After the first New Zealand battalion group had deployed, the East Timor watch group remained a key source of political situation intelligence.



Figure 6-2: The Security and Risk Group coordinates New Zealand's response to crises such as the instability in East Timor.

## Military Strategic-Level Stakeholders and Planning Groups

6.13 CDF and the Secretary of Defence hold ultimate responsibility for Defence matters, and are accountable to Government. Planning within Headquarters NZDF (HQNZDF) for all NZDF commitments — operations, activities, exercises, and training — is the responsibility of the Vice Chief of Defence Force (VCDF), through the Assistant Chief Strategic Commitments and Intelligence (AC SCI). The Deputy Secretary of Defence (Policy and Planning), MoD, provides policy advice and ensures appropriate stakeholder engagement.

6.14 These individuals' planning and decision-making in response to a crisis are supported by a number of groups and stakeholders, detailed in this section. Defence — that is, the MoD and the NZDF — will also consult other government agencies and foreign entities such as potential coalition partners.

### Chief of Defence Force and Secretary of Defence

6.15 CDF and the Secretary of Defence are, respectively, the principal military and civilian advisers to the Minister of Defence. For operations planning, CDF and the Secretary of Defence have the following responsibilities:

- provide timely and responsive advice to Government
- provide guidance to the wider NZDF
- provide a capability that will enable the NZDF to defend New Zealand and its national interests
- ensure the successful conduct of joint military operations.<sup>58</sup>

### Strategic Planning Group

6.16 The Strategic Planning Group is the lead group in the NZDF for immediate planning at the strategic level. In the case of deliberate planning, it facilitates the development, review, and amendment of joint service plans. Its work may inform the ODESC's inter-departmental watch groups and working groups.

6.17 **Responsibilities.** The Strategic Planning Group is responsible to CDF for:

- developing military response options for submission to Government, via the military strategic estimate process
- developing planning guidance, including: CDF intent, military end-state and strategic level objectives, and any other military strategic considerations
- reviewing any draft concept of operations (CONOPS) or campaign plan developed by Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand (HQJFNZ), before it is formally submitted to CDF
- developing, reviewing, and amending NZDF joint service plans, as coordinated by Strategic Commitments and Intelligence (SCI) Branch.

6.18 **Membership.** The Strategic Planning Group is brought together on an as-required basis. Its specific composition and its chair will be determined by VCDF and/or AC SCI, and depends upon the nature of the crisis being considered.<sup>59</sup> The group may include other government agencies by invitation, particularly when the NZDF is leading the national response. A strategic planning group usually consists of representatives from:

- SCI Branch — normally from the Directorate of Defence Intelligence and Security (DDIS), and the Domestic or International Security desks
- the single-Service staffs
- HQJFNZ — normally Joint Plans (J5) Branch staff
- Directorate of Legal Services
- Defence Personnel Executive
- Defence Logistic Command
- Corporate Finance<sup>60</sup>
- Defence Communications Group
- Communication and Information Systems (CIS) Branch
- International Branch, MoD.<sup>61</sup>

<sup>59</sup> The Strategic Planning Group may be chaired by AC SCI, the Director of Strategic Commitments, or the Deputy Director for Domestic or International Security, depending on the situation.

<sup>60</sup> The Corporate Finance representative will act as a point of contact for Treasury and the Ministry of Social Development.

<sup>61</sup> International Branch will also act as a point of contact for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

<sup>58</sup> CDF retains full command authority.



## Service Chiefs

6.19 The Service chiefs provide expert advice to assist CDF and Commander Joint Forces New Zealand (COMJFNZ) with decision-making and advice to Government. They are responsible for raising and sustaining their respective force elements to meet a range of potential contingencies. The component commanders, who sit at HQJFNZ, deliver force preparedness on behalf of the Service chiefs.

## Directorate of Legal Services

6.20 All NZDF operations and activities must comply with financial, ethical, and other statutory and administrative requirements. In particular, compliance with the law of armed conflict and other international obligations must be managed during the operations planning process. The Directorate of Legal Services assists in this task by providing advice on identifying and managing legal risk, and on the legal rights and obligations of the NZDF and its members.

## Commander Logistics

6.21 The Commander Logistics advises CDF on all NZDF logistic matters, as the professional head of defence logistics. As part of this role, Commander Logistics also provides COMJFNZ and single-Service staffs with support and advice on the planning and ongoing sustainment of operations.

## Chief Information Officer

6.22 The Chief Information Officer is the principal military adviser to CDF on the delivery and support of information and communications technology in the NZDF. Communication and information systems are a vital enabler to almost all NZDF deployments. The earliest possible engagement of the Chief Information Officer and CIS Branch will help to ensure the availability of the required services in a timely and economic manner.

## Strategic Commitments and Intelligence Branch

6.23 SCI Branch supports planning for military operations by:

- preparing and issuing strategic intelligence estimates and strategic military threat assessments<sup>62</sup>
- facilitating the military strategic estimate process, in order to produce broad response options<sup>63</sup>
- updating joint service plans, in consultation with the Strategic Planning Group
- preparing and issuing CDF warning orders and directives<sup>64</sup>
- coordinating staff advice to CDF on CONOPS prepared by COMJFNZ
- liaising with allies and bilateral partners, in consultation with International Branch, on NZDF participation in bi- or multilateral operations, training, and exercises<sup>65</sup>
- providing staff support activities such as writing Cabinet submissions and parliamentary and ministerial replies, and reporting on current NZDF operations and planning.

## International Branch, Ministry of Defence

6.24 The International Branch of the MoD has both MoD and NZDF staff. During the early stages of the operations planning process, it often works in concert with SCI Branch. International Branch supports planning for military operations by:

- providing strategic-level policy guidance and oversight
- ensuring consultation and engagement with other government agencies and international partners
- managing the strategic-level aspects of relationships.

<sup>62</sup> These are completed by DDIS.

<sup>63</sup> This is the responsibility of the Directorate of Strategic Commitments (DSC).

<sup>64</sup> For more information on operational correspondence, see Chapter 5, Annex E.

<sup>65</sup> For example, Closer Defence Relations and the Five Power Defence Arrangement.

## Operational-Level Stakeholders and Planning Groups

6.25 COMJFNZ guides planning at the operational level, and is supported by a number of interlinked, multi-disciplinary planning groups and teams. This section provides a brief overview of the key planning groups in HQJFNZ, and their relationship to one another. More detail on these groups, and their subordinate groups and teams, is contained in HQJFNZ SOP 5.2 *Operational Planning Groups and Teams*. Figure 6-3 illustrates the hierarchy of planning groups and teams at the operational level.

### Commander Joint Forces New Zealand

6.26 COMJFNZ helps CDF to carry out his command

functions as they relate to military planning. COMJFNZ has specific responsibility for:

- planning campaigns and operations
- conducting contingency planning
- developing and maintaining country-specific planning guidance
- providing Contingency Planning Assistance Teams (CPAT) and Defence Supplementation Staff (DSS), if required
- providing accurate and timely guidance and advice on operation concepts and plans, the employment of forces, and present and future military capabilities
- ensuring that HQJFNZ meets performance agreements and Operational Level of Capability (OLOC) requirements.




Figure 6-3: The hierarchy of planning groups and teams at HQJFNZ

## COMJFNZ Planning Group

6.27 The COMJFNZ Planning Group, also known as the Commander's Planning Group, is the senior operational-level planning and steering group in the NZDF. It is convened on COMJFNZ's initiative, or on receipt of a CDF warning order.

6.28 **Role.** The COMJFNZ Planning Group:

- completes preliminary scoping for the problem in question
- advises COMJFNZ on the initial guidance required to focus the Joint Operations Planning Group
- provides senior advice to COMJFNZ on the technical and professional viability of a plan or course of action
- guides, reviews, and endorses all planning products produced by subordinate planning groups.

6.29 **Membership.** The COMJFNZ Planning Group comprises COMJFNZ (chair), the component commanders, the HQJFNZ Chief of Staff, and the heads of the following branches: J5, Joint Operations (J3), Joint Logistics (J4), and Joint Finance (J9). It may also include a representative from SCI Branch, to provide a strategic-level overview of the situation. When specialist advice or external representation are required, representatives may be invited from other branches, subordinate formations, government agencies, and/or multinational forces.

## Component Commanders

6.30 The component commanders act as a conduit into the Services for planning staff at HQJFNZ. They help to identify force options in the early stages of planning, and assess the impact of using a particular capability on the wider responsibilities of their respective Service chief.

## Joint Operations Planning Group

6.31 **Role.** The Joint Operations Planning Group is the main NZDF planning group that develops and coordinates joint, operational-level plans. It integrates

the work of the Joint Intelligence and Joint Administrative Planning Groups, so as to achieve a holistic approach to planning. The Joint Operations Planning Group is responsible for:

- leading the Joint Operations Planning Process
- communicating commander's intent, freedoms, constraints, and restrictions
- providing planning guidance to subordinate headquarters and force elements<sup>66</sup>
- producing operational-level correspondence such as warning orders, directives, CONOPS, campaign plans, and operation instructions and orders.<sup>67</sup>

6.32 **Membership.** The Joint Operations Planning Group will initially consist of 'core' members — usually J5 and J3 planning staff, and a representative from SCI Branch to provide a strategic-level overview of the situation.

6.33 Following this core meeting, a wider planning group may be convened. The Joint Operations Planning Group draws its members from across the functional areas of HQJFNZ (J0–J9). Depending on the situation, it may be chaired by J5, J3, or the Chief of Staff. Membership of this planning group may vary from task to task, and should be based on the need for functional and specialist expertise. Time permitting, the Joint Operations Planning Group may also include representatives and planning staff from higher and subordinate headquarters, and commanders of the principal force elements.

6.34 **Subordinate Planning Groups and Teams.** The Joint Operations Planning Group provides direction and focus to the following functional planning groups and specialist teams. They will be stood up when needed to complete detailed work, and will otherwise lie dormant.

- Joint Communications Planning Group
- Surveillance Planning Group

<sup>66</sup> Planning guidance will be provided if subordinate formations/units need specific assistance in the planning process. The Joint Operations Planning Group identifies this requirement and drafts direction for COMJFNZ's signature.

<sup>67</sup> For more information on operational correspondence, see Chapter 5, Annex E.

- Public Affairs Planning Team
- Legal Affairs Planning Team
- Joint Information Operations Planning Team
- Civil Affairs Planning Group
- Maritime, Land, and Air Operations Planning Groups
- Amphibious Operations Planning Team
- Target Planning Team
- Special Operations Planning Team

## Joint Intelligence Planning Group

6.35 **Role.** The role of the Joint Intelligence Planning Group is to produce operational-level analyses, estimates, and plans in the fields of intelligence, counterintelligence, deception, electronic warfare, and psychological operations. To do so, it uses the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (JIPB) process.

6.36 The Joint Intelligence Planning Group runs alongside the Joint Operations Planning Group, and supports the wider NZDF OPP. In deliberate planning, it will normally start its analyses and estimates before the Joint Operations Planning Group is convened, to provide a basis for wider planning. In immediate planning, it will probably not be possible for the Joint Intelligence Planning Group to be convened earlier.

6.37 **Membership.** The Joint Intelligence Planning Group is chaired by the JSO1 Joint Intelligence. Its core members are drawn from the Joint Intelligence (J2) Branch, but representatives from higher and subordinate headquarters, coalition partners, intelligence and security agencies, and other government agencies may be invited in order to enhance concurrent planning. Membership of this group should be situation dependent and based on the need for functional and specialist expertise, rather than rank.

## 6.38 Subordinate Planning Groups and Teams.

The Joint Intelligence Planning Group is responsible for providing direction to the following subordinate planning groups and teams. They will be stood up when needed to complete detailed work, and will otherwise lie dormant.

- Collection Planning Group
- Electronic Warfare Support Team
- Counterintelligence Planning Team
- Deception Planning Group
- Psychological Operations Planning Group

## Joint Administrative Planning Group

6.39 **Role.** The Joint Administrative Planning Group coordinates the support aspects of planning — logistics, health, personnel, finance, and movements — as well as any resulting concepts of operations, orders, and instructions. It supports the Joint Operations Planning Group, and will be stood up when required.

6.40 **Membership.** This group is chaired by the JSO1 Joint Logistics, and will largely comprise staff from support functions such as logistics, personnel, and health. Representatives from other headquarters, government agencies, and coalition partners may be invited if necessary.

6.41 **Subordinate Planning Groups.** Planning for movements, health, and personnel will normally be included in the work of the Joint Administrative Planning Group. However, the following subordinate groups may be convened in the case of a particularly complex campaign or operation.

- Joint Movements Planning Group
- Joint Health Planning Group
- Joint Personnel Planning Group



Figure 6-4: The Joint Administrative Planning Group coordinates the support aspects of planning.

### Joint Exercise Planning Group

6.42 The Joint Exercise Planning Group is the NZDF's principal planning group for the development of joint, operational-level exercises. It is effectively a type of Joint Operations Planning Group for major collective training exercises, and reports to the COMJFNZ Planning Group in a similar manner.

### Joint Reconnaissance Team

6.43 A joint reconnaissance team may deploy to an area of interest as a concurrent part of the planning process, to address any gaps in information and to establish liaison or a point of contact. Joint reconnaissance teams are coordinated by the J5 Branch

and are formed on a cross-functional basis. They should include subject matter experts drawn from across the NZDF — this may include, but is not limited to, the SNO-designate, a planner from a force element (such as the S3 or S5 from a formation headquarters), an engineer, a logistician, and an environmental health expert.

## GLOSSARY

### Terms and Definitions

The references quoted in brackets in this glossary are source documents. The source documents used are:

*AAP-6 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*

*ADDP-D Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine*

*ADDP 3.13 Information Operations*

*ADFP 04.1.1/101 Glossary*

*ADFP 5.0.1 Joint Military Appreciation Process*

*Collins Concise Dictionary (5<sup>th</sup> ed., 2001)*

*JDP 0-01.1 United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms*

*JP 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*

*JP 3-0 Joint Operations*

*JWP 0.01 British Defence Doctrine*

*New Zealand Defence Force, Annual Report 2010*

*NZDDP-3.0 Joint Operations*

#### Agency (JDP 0-01.1)

A distinct non-military body whose objectives are broadly consistent with those of the campaign.

#### Appreciation (ADFP 04.1.1)

A logical process or reasoning by which a commander considers all the circumstances affecting the military situation and arrives at a decision as to the course of action to be taken in order to accomplish his mission. Also called an estimate.

#### Branch (ADFP 5.0.1)

A contingency option built into the basic plan.

#### Cabinet (Collins Concise Dictionary)

The executive and policy-making body of a country, consisting of senior government ministers.

#### Campaign (ADFP 04.1.1)

A controlled series of simultaneous or sequential operations designed to achieve an operational commander's objective, normally within a given time or space.

#### Campaign Plan (JP 1-02)

A joint operation plan for a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space.

#### Centre of Gravity (adapted from ADFP 04.1.1)

That characteristic, capability, or locality from which a military force, nation, alliance, or other grouping derives its freedom of action, strength, or will to fight. Also called CoG.

#### Coalition (JP 1-02)

An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action.

#### Combined (adapted from ADFP 04.1.1)

Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organisations, in which elements of two or more allies participate.

#### Commander's Critical Information Requirements (ADFP 5.0.1)

Information requirements identified by the commander as being critical in facilitating timely information management and the decision-making process, which affect successful mission accomplishment.

#### Commander's Decision Point (ADFP 5.0.1)

A point in time and space when the commander or staff anticipates making a key decision concerning a specific course of action.

## Glossary

**Commander's Intent (ADFP 04.1.1)**

A formal statement, usually in the concept of operations or general outline of orders, given to provide clear direction on the commander's intentions.

**Concept of Operations (ADFP 04.1.1)**

A clear and concise statement of the line of action chosen by a commander in order to accomplish their mission. Also called CONOPS.

**Contingency Plan (AAP-6)**

A plan that is developed for possible operations where the planning factors have been identified or can be assumed. This plan is produced in as much detail as possible, including the resources needed and deployment options, as a basis for subsequent planning. Also called CONPLAN. See *also* Joint Service Plan.

**Course of Action (AAP-6)**

In the estimate/appreciation process, an option that will accomplish or contribute to the accomplishment of a mission or task, and from which a detailed plan is developed. Also called COA.

**Crisis (JDP 0-01.1)**

A situation, which may or may not be foreseen, which threatens national security or interests or international peace and stability, and which requires decision and action.

**Culminating Point (ADFP 5.0.1)**

The point in time and location where a force will no longer be stronger than the adversary, and risks losing the initiative.

**Decisive Point (ADFP 5.0.1)**

A geographic place, key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows a commander to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success. This point may exist in time, space, or the information environment.

**Deliberate Planning (adapted from ADFP 5.0.1)**

A process to develop considered military strategic guidance for the employment of the NZDF, in order to achieve an end-state that supports the New Zealand Government's national strategy.

Note: This planning is generally free of undue time constraints and relies on a mix of assumption-based planning, strategic guidance, and future analysis to account for possible future strategic environments.

**Directed Level of Capability (NZDF Annual Report 2010)**

A level of capability lower than that required to be deployed and commence operations. When directed by Government, force elements have a specified amount of time (known as response time) to increase their level of preparedness from the directed level to the operational level of capability. Also called DLOC.

**Directive (adapted from AAP-6)**

- A military communication in which policy is established or a specific action is ordered.
- Broadly speaking, any communication that initiates or governs action, conduct, or procedure.

**End-State (ADFP 04.1.1)**

The set of desired conditions that will achieve the desired strategic objectives.

**Estimate**

See Appreciation.

**Force Element (NZDF Annual Report 2010)**

A unit that directly contributes to the delivery of an NZDF output expense; for example, a Navy frigate, Army infantry company, or Air Force squadron. Also called FE.

**Fragmentary Order (AAP-6)**

An abbreviated form of an operation order, issued as required, that eliminates the need to restate information contained in a basic operation order. It may be issued in sections. Also called FRAGO.

**Host Nation (AAP-6)**

A nation that, by agreement:

- receives forces and materiel of New Zealand or other nations operating on/from/transiting through its territory;
- allows materiel and/or NATO organisations to be located on its territory; and/or
- provides support for these purposes.

**Immediate Planning (adapted from ADFP 5.0.1)**

Time-sensitive planning for the employment of assigned forces and resources, which occurs in response to a developing situation that may result in military operations.

Note: This planning is informed by the products of deliberate planning, with assumptions replaced by facts as the situation unfolds.

**Information Operations (JDP 0-01.1)**

Coordinated actions undertaken to influence an adversary or potential adversary in support of political and military objectives by undermining his will, cohesion, and decision-making ability, through affecting his information and information-based processes and systems, while protecting one's own decision-makers and decision-making processes.

**Intelligence Estimate (ADFP 04.1.1)**

The appraisal, expressed in writing or orally, of available intelligence relating to a specific situation or condition, with a view to determining the courses of action open to the enemy or potential enemy and the order of probability of their adoption.

**Joint (ADFP 04.1.1)**

Connotes activities, operations, organisations, etc. in which elements of more than one Service of the same nation participate.

**Joint Force (adapted from ADFP 04.1.1)**

A force that is composed of elements of the Navy, Army, and Air Force, or two or more of these Services, operating under a single commander.

**Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (ADFP 5.0.1)**

The analytical process used by joint intelligence organisations to produce intelligence assessments, estimates, and other intelligence products in support of the joint force commander's decision-making process. Also called JIPB.

**Joint Military Appreciation Process**

A four-step joint planning process used to facilitate planning and decision-making for campaigns, operations, and other operational activities. Also called JMAP.

Note: While the JMAP is suitable for use at all levels of conflict, it is primarily used at the operational level. Its four steps are: mission analysis, course of action development, course of action analysis, and decision and concept of operations development.

**Joint Operations Planning Process**

A four-step assumption-based planning process that assists the commander and staff to reach a decision.

Note: The four steps of the Joint Operations Planning Process are: preliminary scoping, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, Joint Military Appreciation Process, and plan development and execution.

**Joint Service Plan**

A strategic-level plan detailing how the NZDF will react to a particular contingency in the event that it arises. Also called JSP.

**Line of Operation (AAP-6)**

In a campaign or operation, a line linking decisive points in time and space on the path to the centre of gravity.

**Lines of Communications (AAP-6)**

All the land, water, and air routes that connect an operating military force with one or more bases of operations, and along which supplies and reinforcements move.



## Glossary

**Military Response Option**

A broad proposal that outlines one of several strategic options for how the NZDF could respond to a situation and achieve the military and national objectives.

**Military Strategic Estimate**

A process that, in response to an actual or anticipated crisis, identifies potential national strategy, military strategy, political issues, and national interests and objectives, as well as the NZDF's military response options to achieve those objectives.

**Mission (AAP-6)**

- A clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose.
- One or more aircraft ordered to accomplish one particular task.

**Mission Analysis (JDP 0-01.1)**

A logical process for extracting and deducing from a superior's orders the tasks necessary to fulfil a mission.

**Multinational (AAP-6)**

Adjective used to describe activities, operations, and organisations in which elements of more than one nation participate.

**Objective (AAP-6)**

A clearly defined and attainable goal for a military operation, for example: seizing a terrain feature, neutralising an adversary's force or capability, or achieving some other desired outcome that is essential to a commander's plan and towards which the operation is directed.

**Operational Art (ADDP-D)**

The skilful employment of military forces to attain strategic goals through the design, organisation, sequencing, and direction of campaigns and major operations. Operational art translates strategic into operational and ultimately tactical action.

**Operational Design (JP 3-0)**

The conception and construction of the framework that underpins a campaign or major operation plan and its subsequent execution.

**Operational Design Element (JP 3-0)**

A key consideration used in operational design.

**Operational Level of Capability (NZDF Annual Report 2010)**

The state of preparedness where a force element is ready, combat viable, deployable, and sustainable. When a force element is at its operational level of capability, it is able to be deployed and commence operations. Also called OLOC.

**Operation Instruction (ADFP 04.1.1)**

An operation instruction indicates the commander's intention and possibly his overall plan of action, but leaves the detailed course of action to the subordinate commander. Also called OPINST.

**Operation Order (ADFP 04.1.1)**

A directive, usually formal, issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation plan. Also called OPORD.

**Public Affairs (ADDP 3.13)**

A range of activities conducted for the primary purpose of keeping the target audiences fully informed, thereby gaining their understanding and support. Also called PA.

**Rules of Engagement (ADFP 04.1.1)**

Directives issued by a competent military authority that specify the circumstances and limitations under which forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called ROE.

**Sequel (ADFP 5.0.1)**

An option that a commander has in conducting follow-on actions after achieving the objective. Will normally follow a different line of operation than originally planned.

**Sequencing (JDP 0-01.1)**

The arrangement of activities within a campaign in the order most likely to achieve the elimination of the enemy's centre of gravity.

**Situation Report (ADFP 04.1.1)**

A report giving the situation in the area of a reporting unit or formation. Also called SITREP.

**Situational Awareness (JDP 0-01.1)**

The understanding of the operational environment, in the context of a commander's (or staff officer's) mission or task.

**Spectrum of Operations (JWP 0.01)**

The full range of levels of violence from stable peace up to and including general war.

**Standing Plan**

A plan issued with a view to putting it into effect when so directed, or in the event that a stated contingency arises. *See also* Contingency Plan *and* Joint Service Plan.

**Sustainment (AAP-6)**

The process and mechanism by which sustainability is achieved and which consists of supplying a force with consumables and replacing combat losses and non-combat attrition of equipment in order to maintain the force's combat power for the duration required to meet its objectives.

**Synchronisation (JDP 0-01.1)**

The focusing of resources and activities to produce maximum combat power at the decisive time.

**Tempo (JWP 0.01)**

The rate or rhythm of military activity relative to the enemy, within tactical engagements and battles and between major operations.

**Warning Order (ADFP 04.1.1)**

A preliminary notice of an order or action that is to follow. Also called WNGO.

## Glossary

**Acronyms and Abbreviations**

AAP	Allied Administrative Publication	JIPG	Joint Intelligence Planning Group
AC SCI	Assistant Chief Strategic Commitments and Intelligence	JMAP	Joint Military Appreciation Process
ADDP	Australian Defence Doctrine Publication	JOPG	Joint Operations Planning Group
ADFP	Australian Defence Force Publication	JP	Joint Publication
CDF	Chief of Defence Force	JRT	Joint Reconnaissance Team
CFJP	Canadian Forces Joint Publication	JSO	Joint Staff Officer
CIS	Communication and Information Systems	LWP	Land Warfare Publication
COA	Course(s) of Action	MoD	Ministry of Defence
CoG	Centre of Gravity	MRO	Military Response Option
COMJFNZ	Commander Joint Forces New Zealand	MSE	Military Strategic Estimate
CONOPS	Concept of Operations	NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
CPG	COMJFNZ Planning Group	NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
DDIS	Directorate of Defence Intelligence and Security	NZDDP	New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication
DES	Cabinet Committee on Domestic and External Security	NZDF	New Zealand Defence Force
DFO	Defence Force Order	ODESC	Officials' Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination
DIR	Directive	OLOC	Operational Level of Capability
DIRLAUTH	Direct Liaison Authorised	OPINST	Operation Instruction
DLOC	Directed Level of Capability	OPORD	Operation Order
DSC	Directorate of Strategic Commitments	OPP	Operations Planning Process
EARLLS	Electronic Activity Reporting and Lessons Learned System	PEST	Political, Economic, Social, Technological
FRAGO	Fragmentary Order	PMESII	Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructural, Informational
HQJFNZ	Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand	SCI	Strategic Commitments and Intelligence
HQNZDF	Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force	SIE	Strategic Intelligence Estimate
J2	Joint Intelligence	SMEAC	Situation, Mission, Execution, Administration and Logistics, Command and Signal
J3	Joint Operations	SMTA	Strategic Military Threat Assessment
J4	Joint Logistics	SOP	Standard/Standing Operating Procedure
J5	Joint Plans	SPG	Strategic Planning Group
J6	Joint Communication and Information Systems	SRG	Security and Risk Group
J9	Joint Finance	STEEPL	Social, Technological, Environmental, Ethical, Political, Legal
JAPG	Joint Administrative Planning Group	STRAPP	Strategic Planning Process
JDP	Joint Doctrine Publication	SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats
JFAO	Joint Force Area of Operations	UN	United Nations
JIPB	Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace	VCDF	Vice Chief of Defence Force
		WNGO	Warning Order

## INDEX

Note: where there are multiple pages listed for a single entry, bold numbers denote reference to significant references.

**A**

AC SCI. *See* Assistant Chief Strategic Commitments and Intelligence

actors 11, 12, **15**

adversary 36. *See also* actors

analysis

community of interest 13

conduct of 12

methodologies 12

outputs of 17

principles of 12

rationale for 11

scope of 14

assessment measures. *See* measures of effectiveness/performance

Assistant Chief Strategic Commitments and Intelligence 53, 74

assumptions 13, **27**, 64, 65, 67

**B**

battle rhythm 37

branches and sequels 42, 44, 64, 66

**C**

Cabinet 5, 49, 50, 54, 55, 56, 72

Cabinet paper 24, **54**, 56, 61, 75

committees. *See* Domestic and External Security Committee; *and* External Relations and Defence Committee

campaign plan 3, 55, 63, **65**, 74, 77

centre of gravity 18, **40**, 41, 43, 44, 64

Chief Information Officer 75

Chief of Defence Force 5, 6, 50, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 72, 74

**C (Cont.)**

close-hold planning. *See* compartmentalised planning

coalition operations. *See* multinational

combat viability. *See* preparedness

combined operations. *See* multinational

COMJFNZ Planning Group 54, 62, **77**, 79

Commander Joint Forces New Zealand 6, 49, 53, 55, 56, 58, 63, **76**

Commander Logistics 75

commander's decision points 41, **42**, 45, 64, 66

commander's intent 29, 64, 65, 66, 67, 74, 77

Commander's Planning Group. *See* COMJFNZ Planning Group

communication and information systems 7, 64, 65, 66, 75. *See also* Chief Information Officer

compartmentalised planning 25, 26, 50

component commanders 54, 75, 77

concept of operations 4, 38, 55, **56**, 57, 63, **64**, 74, 75, 77, 78

contingency planning **6**, 17, 49, 54, 76. *See also* contingency plans *and* joint service plans

contingency plans (operational level) **6**, 56, 59

course of action 68

adversary course of action 18, 41, 53, 64, 65

analysis 56

development 56

criteria for success 42

critical capability 41

critical requirement 41

critical vulnerability 16, **41**, 43, 44, 65

culminating points **42**, 44

**D**

decision points. *See* commander's decision points

decisive points 39, 43, 44, 64

deliberate planning **6**, 49, 58, 74, 78

Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet 5, 72

## Index

**D (Cont.)**

deployability. See preparedness

design elements. See operational design

direct approach 43

directed level of capability 24, **25**, 59

directive 54, 55, 57, 58, 61, **67**, 75, 77

Directorate of Defence Intelligence and Security 13, 18, 19, 51, 53, 54, 74

Directorate of Legal Services 75

Domestic and External Security Committee 50, 54, **72**

**E**

end-state **38**, 39, 43, 63, 65, 66

    military 5, 26, 28, 35, **38**, 39, 42, 55, 58, 64, 74

    national 4, 5, 35, **38**, 39, 43, 49, 53

evaluation 58. See also measures of effectiveness/  
performance

External Relations and Defence Committee 54, 55, **71**

**F**

finance **24**, 56, 67, 68, 74, 78

**H**

health 19, 64, 68, 78, 79

**I**

immediate planning **6**, 23, 49, 51, 53, 54, 58, 63, 74, 78

indirect approach 43

information operations 25, 36, 64

instruction 57, 63, **68**, 77

intelligence 11, 12, 13, 23, 24, 41, 49, 50, 64, 72

    DDIS. See Directorate of Defence Intelligence and  
    Security

    estimate 13, **18**, 56, 64, 78. See also strategic  
    intelligence estimate

    J2. See J2

    JIPB. See Joint Intelligence Preparation of the  
    Battlespace

**I (Cont.)**

Joint Intelligence Planning Group. See Joint  
Intelligence Planning Group

requirements 27

SMTA. See strategic military threat assessment

support plan. See strategic intelligence support plan  
and joint intelligence support plan

inter-agency planning 25, **31**. See also watch group;  
and working group

intergovernmental organisations 28

International Branch 53, 74, 75

**J**

J2 13, 18, 19, 78

J3 7, 57, 63, 77

J4 77

J5 6, 55, 56, 57, 74, 77, 79

J9 77

Joint Administrative Planning Group 56, 77, 78

Joint Exercise Planning Group 79

Joint Intelligence Planning Group 54, 77, **78**

Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace 18, **55**,  
**62**, 64, 78

joint intelligence support plan 57

Joint Military Appreciation Process 38, 49, 55, 56, 62, **63**

Joint Operations Planning Group 31, 54, 56, 57, **77**, 78

Joint Operations Planning Process 49, 54, **62**

Joint Reconnaissance Team 56, **79**

joint service plans **6**, 53, 61, 74, 75

**L**

law 15, 27, 28, 56, 66. See also Directorate of Legal  
Services

lessons learned 59

levels of planning **6**, 71

liaison **25**, 51, 53, 56, 66, 75

lines of operation 41, **43**, 44, 45, 64, 65

logistics 8, 24, 36, 64, 65, 66, 68, 78, 79.  
See also Commander Logistics and J4

**M**

main effort **42**, 44, 64, 65

measures of effectiveness 42, 43

measures of performance 43

military response options 4, 24, 53, 54, 55, **61**, 75

military strategic estimate 54, **61**, 75

Minister of Defence 53, 56, 72

Ministry of Defence 72, 74. See *also* International Branch

mission analysis **29**, 56

movements 68, 78

multinational 13, 25, **27**, 31

**N**

non-governmental organisations 13, 27, **29**, 41, 65

NZDF Operations Planning Process 3, **49**, 78

**O**

objectives 39

- humanitarian 61
- military 3, 4, 28, 35, 40, 41, 42, 46, 55, 63, 74
- national 3, 5, 27, 53

Officials' Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination 31, 50, 51, 53, 54, **72**

operational art **35**, 40, 41, 45

operational correspondence 67

operational design 25, **38**, 45

operational intelligence estimate 18

operational level of capability 24, **25**, 76

operational pauses 42, **44**

order

- administrative order 68
- defence force order 32
- fragmentary order 56, 57, 58, **68**
- operation order **57**, 59, 63, **68**, 77
- warning order **53**, **55**, 57, **68**, 75, 77

other government agencies. See inter-agency planning

**P**

phasing 42, **44**, 64, 66

planning process. See NZDF Operations Planning Process

preparedness **24**, 26, 36, 58, 59, 75

principles of war 8

public affairs 25, 78

**R**

readiness. See preparedness

red teaming 13

resources **23**, 24, 32, 35, 41, 65

risk 4, 17, 19, **27**, 35, 43, 44, 75

rules of engagement **27**, 30, 64, 66

**S**

SCI Branch. See Strategic Commitments and Intelligence Branch

Secretary of Defence 50, 56, 74

Security and Risk Group 31, 51, **72**

sequel. See branches and sequels

sequencing 35, 42, **43**, 65

Service chiefs **75**, 77

stakeholders 18, **69**

- military-strategic level 74
- national-strategic level 71
- operational level 25, 76

Strategic Commitments and Intelligence Branch 18, 53, 74, **75**, 77

strategic communication 25

strategic intelligence estimate **18**, 53, 61, 75

strategic intelligence support plan 55

strategic military threat assessment **18**, 54, 75

Strategic Planning Group 31, 53, 61, **74**, 75

sustainability 8, 61. See *also* preparedness

synchronisation 37, **44**, 66

Index

**T**

termination 36, **39**

threat assessment. See strategic military threat  
assessment

**V**

Vice Chief of Defence Force 53, 74

**W**

watch group 31, 51, 54, **72**, 74

withdrawal planning 58

working group **72**, 74

# NOTES



# NOTES

