



23 March 2021

Minister of Foreign Affairs

For action by

26 March 2021

Manatua Submarine Cable – Assistance to Cook Islands

BRIEFING Decision Submission

PURPOSE To seek your views on whether s 7(c)
s 7(c)
at the upcoming visit by Prime Minister Mark Brown.

Tukunga tūtohua – Recommended referrals

Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs

For information by

5 April 2021

Taipitopito whakapā – Contact details

NAME	ROLE	DIVISION	WORK PHONE
Ben McKenzie	Divisional Manager	Development Sectoral and Thematic	s9(2)(a)
Paul Seaden	Lead Adviser	Development Sectoral and Thematic	s9(2)(a)

Mā te Tari Minita e whakakāi – Minister's Office to complete

- | | | |
|--|---|------------------------------------|
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Approved | <input type="checkbox"/> Noted | <input type="checkbox"/> Seen |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Needs amendment | <input type="checkbox"/> Declined | <input type="checkbox"/> Withdrawn |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Overtaken by events | <input type="checkbox"/> See Minister's notes | |

Comments

Manatua Submarine Cable – Assistance to Cook Islands

Pito matua – Key points

- Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown will visit New Zealand from 25 March to 3 April. The visit provides an opportunity to raise ^{s 7(c)} with the Prime Minister
- The Manatua submarine cable system, which connects the Cook Islands and Niue to Samoa and French Polynesia and from there to the rest of the world, launched in July 2020. New Zealand provided funding of NZ\$15 million to Cook Islands and NZ\$7 million to Niue to support their contribution to the cable system.
- s 7(c)
- s 7(c)
- s 7(c)
- s 7(c)
- If you consider it appropriate, the issue could be raised during Prime Minister Brown's visit to New Zealand. ^{s 7(c)}
s 7(c) s 9(2)(g)(i)
s 9(2)(g)(i)
- Our interest in helping to resolve this issue is as close political partner to the two Realm countries affected, as well as a desire to see the benefits of the New Zealand Aid Programme investment be realised fully.



Jonathan Kings
for Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Manatua Submarine Cable – Assistance to Cook Islands


Tūtohu – Recommendations

It is recommended that you:

- 1 s9(2)(ba)(i) Yes / No

- 2 **Note** New Zealand's role as funding partner to the Cook Islands and Niue for the Manatua cable, through the New Zealand Aid Programme. Yes / No

- 3 **Agree** for the matter to be raised with Prime Minister Brown in his upcoming visit to New Zealand, ^{s 7(c)} _{s 7(c)} Yes / No



Hon Nanaia Mahuta
Minister of Foreign Affairs

Date: 23 10 3 12021

Released under the
Official Information Act

Manatua Submarine Cable – Assistance to Cook Islands

Pūrongo – Report

1. The Manatua cable is the first submarine cable connection for the Cook Islands and Niue, bringing low cost, high performance internet connectivity to replace the existing ageing and unreliable satellite connection. The paramount importance of the cable connection and of reliable communications with the rest of the world has been demonstrated since the COVID-19 pandemic closed physical borders.
2. The cable operator in each country connecting to the Manatua submarine cable (French Polynesia, Cook Islands, Niue and Samoa) is required to purchase onward capacity for telecommunications traffic from operators in the countries where the cable terminates; in this case, Samoa and French Polynesia. This is so that traffic can flow from the cable to the rest of world. Due to the network of cables in the Pacific region, there are multiple options for capacity and this competition drives pricing lower.
3. s 7(c)
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.

Released under the
Official Information Act

Manatua Submarine Cable – Assistance to Cook Islands

MANATUA CABLE SYSTEM CONFIGURATION 1

© SUBCOM. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED




Figure 1: Manatua Submarine Cable route

Released under the Official Information Act



12 April 2021

Minister of Foreign Affairs

For approval by

19 April 2021

Tokelau Submarine Cable

BRIEFING Decision Submission

PURPOSE To seek approval for an additional NZ\$1.5 million now required to complete the Tokelau submarine cable project. Funding is for additional costs resulting from COVID-19 impacts on the region.

Tukunga tūtohua – Recommended referrals

Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs

For information by

19 April 2021

Taipitopito whakapā – Contact details

NAME	ROLE	DIVISION	WORK PHONE
Jonathan Kings	Deputy Secretary	Pacific and Development Group	s9(2)(a)
Paul Seaden	Lead Adviser	Pacific and Development Group	s9(2)(a)

Mā te Tari Minita e whakakī – Minister's Office to complete

 Approved Noted Seen Needs amendment Declined Withdrawn Overtaken by events See Minister's notes**Comments**

Tokelau Submarine Cable

Pito matua – Key points

- In November 2017, New Zealand and Tokelau approved NZ\$29.2 million of funding toward a submarine cable connection for Tokelau. This connection will replace the slow, expensive, and unreliable satellite links in Tokelau and will connect the country to fast, low cost internet connectivity for the first time. The activity is part of a wider New Zealand Aid Programme initiative to improve connectivity and build long-term resilience in all three New Zealand Realm countries.
- New Zealand has provided NZ\$22.2 million to the project, with Tokelau providing NZ\$7 million. The cable will connect Tokelau to the Southern Cross NEXT trans-Pacific cable, which is due to be completed in Q2 2022.
- The original funding approval included a NZ\$2 million contingency against exchange rate fluctuation or project delivery cost increases. However, exchange rate volatility over the 4.5 year lifetime of the project and COVID-19's impact on project delivery costs has meant that the project requires a further \$1.5 million of contingency funding.
- This funding will ensure that the project has the appropriate contingency in place to manage the additional risks that the current operating environment presents. The total allocated funding for this project from the New Zealand Aid Programme will increase from NZ\$22.2 million to NZ\$23.7 million. The total project funding will increase to NZ\$30.7 million. This funding increase will be provided from the existing Tokelau core funding allocation for this financial year, and therefore does not constitute an increase in overall funding for Tokelau.

Jonathan Kings
for Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Tokelau Submarine Cable

Tūtohu – Recommendations

It is recommended that you:

- | | | |
|---|---|-----------------|
| 1 | Note the project completion date of Q2 2022 for the submarine cable. | Yes / No |
| 2 | Note the complexity of the COVID-19 operating environment in the Pacific and the impact on exchange rates, people movements, and shipping logistics. | Yes / No |
| 3 | Approve an additional NZ\$1.5 million of contingency funding for the project to ensure it is able to meet any costs resulting from these risks. | Yes / No |
| 4 | Note that this will be provided from the existing Tokelau core funding allocation for this financial year and does not constitute an increase in overall core funding. | Yes / No |
| 5 | Refer this submission to the Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs. | Yes / No |

Hon Nanaia Mahuta
Minister of Foreign Affairs

Date: / /

Released under the
Official Information Act

Tokelau Submarine Cable

Pūrongo – Report

1. Tokelau is one of the most poorly connected countries in the Pacific. It is dependent on slow, unreliable, and expensive satellite links for international and inter-atoll connectivity. This constrains the ability for Tokelauans to communicate effectively and to access modern digital services. It also prevents the country from using digital platforms to improve government, education, and health services.
2. In November 2017, New Zealand and Tokelau approved NZ\$29.2 million of funding to connect the three Tokelauan atolls to a submarine cable and provide high performance, low cost internet connectivity for the first time. New Zealand provided NZ\$22.2 million from the Aid Programme, and Tokelau provided NZ\$7 million toward the total funding cost.
3. This project formed part of a wider initiative to connect all three New Zealand Realm countries to submarine cable. The New Zealand-funded Manatua Submarine Cable connecting Cook Islands and Niue was completed in 2020.
4. The submarine cable design for Tokelau is a connection to an upcoming trans-Pacific cable system called Southern Cross NEXT, which is due to become operational in Q2 2022. Southern Cross NEXT will connect New Zealand and Australia to the West Coast of the United States. Tokelau, Fiji and Kiribati will also be connected as a part of this cable system (see Figure 1 below).

Increase in Contingency Funding

5. Contingency funding of NZ\$2 million (10% of the NZ\$22.2 million total New Zealand funding commitment) was included in the original project budget. This was due to the significant length of the project (4.5 years), the fact that payments are made mainly in foreign currencies over the lifetime of the project and are subject to exchange rate fluctuations, and the complexity of delivery to a country as remote as Tokelau.
6. Since the 2017 funding approval, volatility in the currency markets has meant that the New Zealand dollar rate has moved beyond the 10% variation provisioned for within the contingency allocation. This exchange rate risk will continue until the project is completed and the final payments are made.
7. The closed borders and complex operating environment resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic has meant that suppliers have to commit additional resources and costs to cope with the impact. Border controls and increased costs of shipping and logistics have increased the burden on suppliers who are required to enter Pacific countries for equipment installation and configuration. Whilst many of these direct costs are not being passed on to the project, this has resulted in additional costs of approximately NZ\$600,000 to date. This is expected to increase before project completion in 2022, dependent on how long the border control measures currently in place in the region will remain.
8. A further provision of NZ\$1.5 million is therefore required for the remainder of the project until its completion in Q2 2022.
9. This additional funding will ensure that the project has the appropriate contingency in place to manage the risks that the current operating environment presents. This will increase total allocated funding for this project from the New Zealand Aid Programme from NZ\$22.2 million to NZ\$23.7 million.

Tokelau Submarine Cable




Figure 1: Southern Cross NEXT cable route

Released under the
Official Information Act

Tokelau Submarine Cable

Annex: Other Key Information

Funding for this activity comes from the Tokelau programme:



Resilience: The activity supports economic, governance and social resilience in Tokelau.

Impact: The activity will significantly improve communications access and affordability for Tokelau.

Measuring impact: Impact will be measured by the increase in reliability and performance of communications and Internet access in Tokelau, and the reduction in pricing of local communications services.

Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): This activity will contribute to SDG Goal 9: *Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation, Target 9.c: Significantly increase access to information and communications technology and strive to provide universal and affordable access to the Internet in least developed countries.*



1 June 2021

Minister of Foreign Affairs

For action by

11 June 2021

New Zealand's approach to the Indo-Pacific

BRIEFING Decision Submission

PURPOSE To respond to your request for further information on the evolution of the Indo-Pacific concept, the approaches taken by partners in both the region and externally, and work currently under way to develop further New Zealand's policy and narrative.

Tukunga tūtohua – Recommended referrals

Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs

For information by

18 June 2021

Taipitopito whakapā – Contact details

NAME	ROLE	DIVISION	WORK PHONE
Alison Mann	Divisional Manager	Asia Regional Division	s9(2)(a)
Zoe Coulson-Sinclair	Unit Manager	Asia Regional Division	s9(2)(a)

New Zealand's approach to the Indo-Pacific

Pito matua – Key points

- s6(a)

- Partners who now use the term Indo-Pacific include both those in the region (Australia, ASEAN, Canada, India, Japan, South Korea, and the United States) and externally (the UK, France, Germany, the EU, the Netherlands, and Switzerland amongst others). The term is even more widely used in defence circles. China and Russia refuse to use it.
- New Zealand's current policy focuses on the principles we want to see upheld in regional governance – openness and inclusivity, transparency, sovereignty, consistency with international law, open markets, freedom of navigation and overflight, and ASEAN centrality.
- We use the term Indo-Pacific as our broadest description of our home region, and in particular in ASEAN-centred forums and in bilateral engagements with Indian Ocean counterparts. We continue to use the term Asia-Pacific in the APEC context and the term the Pacific in regional and bilateral engagement with Pacific Island partners.
- s9(2)(g)(i)

- We will seek your guidance on this when our thinking is further developed.

Mark Sinclair
For Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade

New Zealand's approach to the Indo-Pacific

Tūtohu – Recommendations

It is recommended that you:

- | | | |
|---|---|----------|
| 1 | Note that the term Indo-Pacific ^{s6(a)} and is increasingly the term used by regional and external partners to describe the region. | Yes / No |
| 2 | Note that ^{s9(2)(g)(i)} | Yes / No |
| 3 | Note that this work will take account of, and be consistent with, the update of our Pacific policy. | Yes / No |
| 4 | Note that we will seek your guidance on this when our thinking is further developed. | Yes / No |
| 5 | Refer a copy of this submission to the Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs. | Yes / No |

Hon Nanaia Mahuta
Minister of Foreign Affairs / Minita Take Aorere

Date: / /

New Zealand's approach to the Indo-Pacific

Pūrongo – Report

1. s6(a)

6. The Asia-Pacific, as a concept, has been challenged to reflect these new emphases. It is essentially an economic construct promoting regional trade and economic integration. The Indo-Pacific is about the regional order – the system of principles, rules and norms that govern our home region, across the spectrum of the region's political, economic, and security engagement. This broader range of concerns is common to the countries of both the Pacific and Indian oceans.

7. The Indo-Pacific as a concept has been around for nearly two decades, with greatest resonance for partners such as Australia and Indonesia who straddle both oceans. Australia first adopted the term in 2013 and now uses it to describe its home region. Indonesia was promoting an Indo-Pacific concept in the East Asia Summit in 2014.

8. s6(a)

9. s6(a)

The emergence of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) in June 2019 was decisive in normalising the term within the region. The AOIP is a re-statement of key principles in the ASEAN Charter and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, which has been signed by all ASEAN's formal partners, including New Zealand. The AOIP is designed to enable partners to "dock on" their own Indo-Pacific policies in areas of regional priority. Having a statement on the Indo-Pacific at the heart of the region's institutions has largely taken the divisiveness out of the debate.

10. s6(a)

New Zealand's approach to the Indo-Pacific

s6(a)

11. s6(a)

13. The term Indo-Pacific is now an accepted descriptor for the region. Within the region it is used by Australia, ASEAN (although a number of individual ASEAN member states also use Asia-Pacific), Canada, India, Japan, South Korea, the US. Externally by the UK, France, Germany, the EU, the Netherlands and Switzerland amongst others). s6(a)

New Zealand's approach

14. New Zealand first used the term Indo-Pacific at the East Asia Summit in 2018. s6(a)

15. The key elements of our policy are as follows:

- **We are not definitive about its geographic reach.** In an operational sense however, we focus our efforts on the region from the west coast of the Americas through to the Indian sub-continent.
- **We do not use the terminology of the Indo-Pacific in all situations:**
 - i) We use **Indo-Pacific** in all ASEAN-centred forums, whose membership is drawn from both oceans. We also use it in bilateral engagement with Indian Ocean partners, notably India.
 - ii) We use **Asia-Pacific** in APEC, whose members are all from the Pacific Rim.
 - iii) We continue to use **Pacific** in the Pacific Islands Forum and our engagement with Pacific Island partners.
- We support **regional architecture, including new architecture, and other regional initiatives** that reflect the following principles:
 - i) They are **open and inclusive** in membership
 - ii) They are **transparent**
 - iii) They uphold **sovereignty**

New Zealand's approach to the Indo-Pacific

- iv) They are **consistent with international law**
- v) They promote **open markets**
- vi) They uphold **freedom of navigation and overflight**
- vii) They respect **ASEAN centrality**
- In our engagement in Indo-Pacific and Asia-Pacific forums, we also reflect the interests of **Pacific Island countries** where appropriate. We do not presume to speak for them, but do seek to ensure that major issues that impact on their wellbeing and prosperity are reflected and appropriately pursued in the broader regional agenda, for example climate change.

Next steps

16. s9(2)(g)(i)

19. We will seek your guidance on this work when our thinking is further developed.

The following two pages are withheld in full under s 6(a)

Released under the
Official Information Act

Released under the
Official Information Act



13 August 2021

Minister of Foreign Affairs

For action by

20 August 2021

Aotearoa New Zealand's approach to the 'Indo-Pacific'

BRIEFING Decision Submission

PURPOSE To confirm settings on how and when we articulate our engagement with the Indo-Pacific.

Tukunga tūtohua – Recommended referrals

Prime Minister	For concurrence by	27 August 2021
Minister for Trade and Export Growth	For information by	27 August 2021
Minister of Defence	For information by	27 August 2021
Minister of State for Trade and Export Growth	For information by	27 August 2021
Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs	For information by	27 August 2021

Taipitopito whakapā – Contact details

NAME	ROLE	DIVISION	WORK PHONE
Pip McLachlan	Principal Adviser	Americas and Asia Group	s9(2)(a)

Mā te Tari Minita e whakakī – Minister's Office to complete

- | | | |
|--|---|------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Approved | <input type="checkbox"/> Noted | <input type="checkbox"/> Referred |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Needs amendment | <input type="checkbox"/> Declined | <input type="checkbox"/> Withdrawn |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Overtaken by events | <input type="checkbox"/> See Minister's notes | |

Comments

Aotearoa New Zealand's approach to the 'Indo-Pacific'

Pito matua – Key points

- Aotearoa New Zealand is first and foremost of 'the Pacific'. But 'Indo-Pacific' has become an accepted descriptor for our wider region – which in strategic and economic terms now demonstrably extends into the Indian Ocean. In 2021 the term 'Asia-Pacific' no longer captures adequately the full span of Aotearoa New Zealand's interests, our trade flows and our strategic partnerships.
- Significantly, ASEAN now routinely deploys the term 'Indo-Pacific', including the context of its own declared 'ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific'. We use Indo-Pacific in all ASEAN-centred forums, whose membership is drawn from both oceans. It is the best geographical description there is for the group of countries involved in the East Asia Summit and ASEAN Regional Forum, because it recognises the importance of the Indian subcontinent and of maritime issues in the region. We also use the term in day-to-day diplomatic interactions as a descriptor of our wider home region.
- The term 'Indo-Pacific' is also widely used by partners in the region and in Europe. In addition to its use as a geographic descriptor, the term is associated with a set of principles and values for the conduct of international relations consistent with our own.
- s6(a)

While Aotearoa New Zealand is in good company on use of 'Indo-Pacific', deployment of the term is not without its challenges. s6(a)

- For Aotearoa New Zealand, context matters – and we have been consistent. We do not use the terminology of the Indo-Pacific in all situations:
 - i) We continue to use **Pacific** in the Pacific Islands Forum and our engagement with Pacific Island partners.
 - ii) We use **Asia-Pacific** in APEC, whose members are all from the Pacific Rim.
- Since our first public deployment of the term in 2018, we have emphasised a **principles-based approach** to the conduct of our Indo-Pacific policy, focusing on open markets, inclusiveness, transparency, sovereignty, freedom of navigation and overflight, international rules, and ASEAN centrality.
- Our articulation of 'Indo-Pacific' is explicitly one which promotes an open and inclusive region. s6(a)

The 'Indo-Pacific' is a concept we share with a variety of partners at a point of inflection for the region, as it grapples with COVID recovery. It also reflects the increased significance of India's economy, global reach (including its diaspora) and strategic position.

Mark Sinclair
for Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Aotearoa New Zealand's approach to the 'Indo-Pacific'

Tūtohu – Recommendations

It is recommended that you:

- | | | |
|----|---|-----------------|
| 1 | Note that 'Indo-Pacific' is now an accepted descriptor for our wider region, reflecting realities of the evolving strategic and economic dynamic of Asia; | Yes / No |
| 2 | Note that India's newly active engagement in Asian regional affairs and its new prominence in flows of goods, services, capital, knowledge and skills has been a key factor in wider adoption of the 'Indo-Pacific' descriptor; | Yes / No |
| 3 | Note that the 'Indo-Pacific' term is commonly deployed by others across the region, notably by ASEAN, as well as by key European partners, and is more inclusive of India than other regional constructs; | Yes / No |
| 4 | s6(a) | Yes / No |
| 5 | s6(a) | Yes / No |
| 6 | Note that our contributions to the security, resilience and stability of the wider Indo-Pacific region also support our Pacific policy; | Yes / No |
| 7 | Note that Aotearoa New Zealand's approach to Indo-Pacific diplomacy has been based on a set of principles that include commitments to open markets, inclusiveness, transparency, sovereignty, freedom of navigation and overflight, international rules, and ASEAN centrality; | Yes / No |
| 8 | Agree that ' the Pacific ' will remain the appropriate term in our engagement with Pacific Island country partners and Pacific Islands Forum; | Yes / No |
| 9 | Agree that we will continue to use the term ' Indo-Pacific ' in ASEAN-centred forums, in bilateral engagement with Indian Ocean partners, and to describe our wider home region; | Yes / No |
| 10 | Agree that we will continue to use ' Asia Pacific ' in APEC; | Yes / No |
| 11 | Refer a copy of this submission to the Prime Minister, Minister for Trade and Export Growth, Minister of Defence, Minister of State for Trade and Export Growth and Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs. | Yes / No |

Hon Nanaia Mahuta
Minister of Foreign Affairs / Minita Take Aorere

Date: / /

Aotearoa New Zealand's approach to the 'Indo-Pacific'

Pūrongo – Report

1. The Prime Minister's speech to the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs on 14 July is the most recent articulation of Aotearoa New Zealand's approach to the Indo-Pacific. In the Q&A session that followed, the Prime Minister noted:
 - Our place in the world is in the Pacific, but it is an increasingly contested region;
 - We have embraced the concept of the Indo-Pacific as a means of locating Aotearoa New Zealand in a larger ecosystem which includes East Asia, the Pacific, the Indian subcontinent and the Pacific Rim;
 - Our engagement is based on the principles that have served us well in the past – and ones which the region will need to adhere to if it is to address common challenges with success.
 - Openness and inclusivity is key – our success will depend on working with the widest possible set of partners.
2. Building on these comments, this submission seeks to confirm settings on how we articulate our engagement with the wider region of which we are part.

What is the 'Indo-Pacific'?

3. 'Indo-Pacific' is increasingly seen as the term that best reflects the realities of the region of which Aotearoa New Zealand is part. In 2021, the term 'Asia Pacific' does not capture the full range of our interests in our wider home region: our values, our strategic partners, our trade flows.
4. The Indo-Pacific is a **broad construct** – intentionally so. It extends to include a sub-continent that is now a major part of the strategic and economic dynamic of Asia. s6(b)(i)
5. Others in the region who use the term include ASEAN (although a number of individual ASEAN member states also use Asia-Pacific), Canada, Japan, South Korea, and the US. The emergence of the **ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP)** in June 2019 was decisive in normalising the term within the region. The AOIP is a re-statement of key principles in the ASEAN Charter and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, which has been signed by all ASEAN's formal partners, including Aotearoa New Zealand. The AOIP is designed to enable partners to "dock on" their own Indo-Pacific policies in areas of regional priority. **Having a statement on the Indo-Pacific at the heart of the region's institutions is significant.** s6(a)
6. For some of our regional partners, the 'Indo-Pacific' reflects a **geographic reality**. The term has greatest resonance for Australia and Indonesia, which straddle both oceans (also signalling a stronger maritime dimension). Australia first adopted the term in 2013 and now

Aotearoa New Zealand's approach to the 'Indo-Pacific'

uses it to describe its home region. Indonesia was promoting an Indo-Pacific concept in the East Asia Summit in 2014

7. It has taken time to bed in, but the 'Indo-Pacific' is now **an accepted descriptor**, to the extent that our likeminded partners beyond the region also now deploy it as a hook for engagement. The UK, France, Germany, the EU, the Netherlands and Switzerland have all published Indo-Pacific strategies or policies over the past year.
8. A common construct across those deploying the term is a focus on regional order: the system of principles, rules and norms that govern our wider home region, across the spectrum of the region's political, economic and security engagement. By way of contrast, 'Asia-Pacific' is essentially seen as an economic construct, promoting regional trade and economic integration.
9. The Pacific continues to be of primary focus for Aotearoa New Zealand. But the security complexities and challenges that feature more acutely in the wider Indo-Pacific need active engagement from us to support our goals in our immediate neighbourhood.

How contested is the term?

s6(a)

Released under the
Official Information Act

Aotearoa New Zealand's approach to the 'Indo-Pacific'

s6(a)

How has Aotearoa New Zealand responded to date?

17. Aotearoa New Zealand first used the term Indo-Pacific at the 8^h Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting in Tokyo in May 2018, and then at the 2018 East Asia Summit. The consistent elements of our approach since then have been as follows:

- **We are not definitive about its geographic reach.** In an operational sense, however, we focus our efforts on the region from the west coast of the Americas through to the Indian sub-continent.
- **We do not use the terminology of the Indo-Pacific in all situations:**
 - i) We use **Indo-Pacific** in all ASEAN-centred forums, whose membership is drawn from both oceans. We also use it in bilateral engagement with Indian Ocean partners, notably India, and to describe our wider home region.
 - ii) We use **Asia-Pacific** in APEC, whose members are all from the Pacific Rim.
 - iii) We continue to use **Pacific** in the Pacific Islands Forum and our engagement with Pacific Island partners.
- We support **regional architecture, including new architecture, and other regional initiatives** that reflect the following principles: open markets; inclusiveness, transparency, sovereignty, freedom of navigation and overflight; international rules; and ASEAN centrality. These protect and advance the interests of all states, but especially small states, including Aotearoa New Zealand.
- In our engagement in Indo-Pacific and Asia-Pacific forums, we also reflect the interests of **Pacific Island countries**, where appropriate. We do not presume to speak for them, but do seek to ensure that major issues that impact on their wellbeing and prosperity are reflected and appropriately pursued in the broader regional agenda (e.g. climate change).

s6(a)



13 August 2021

Minister of Foreign Affairs

For concurrence by

20/08/2021

Aotearoa New Zealand's engagement with the Quad

BRIEFING Decision Submission

PURPOSE To provide background on the 'Quad', Aotearoa New Zealand's interaction to date, and the proposed settings for any future engagement.

Tukunga tūtohua – Recommended referrals

Prime Minister	For concurrence by	27 August 2021
Minister for Trade and Export Growth	For information by	27 August 2021
Minister of Defence	For information by	27 August 2021
Minister of State for Trade and Export Growth	For information by	27 August 2021
Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs	For information by	27 August 2021

Taipitopito whakapā – Contact details

NAME	ROLE	DIVISION	WORK PHONE
Pip McLachlan	Principal Adviser	Americas and Asia Group	s9(2)(a)
Cecile Hillyer	Divisional Manager	International Security and Disarmament Division	s9(2)(a)

Mā te Tari Minita e whakakī – Minister's Office to complete

 Approved Noted Referred Needs amendment Declined Withdrawn Overtaken by events See Minister's notes**Comments**

Aotearoa New Zealand's engagement with the Quad

Pito matua – Key points

- The Quad is a relatively new construct, relaunched by Japan, the United States, Australia and India on the margins of the ASEAN summits in 2017.
- It is a grouping of significance for our partners. Australia regards it as an important pillar of its foreign policy. US engagement with the grouping has been sustained by the Biden Administration.
- It is not a formal alliance – and the language of its statements aligns with Aotearoa New Zealand's principles for engagement in the Indo-Pacific. They feature strong commitments to a rules-based order and upholding international law in the Indo-Pacific, s6(a)
- s6(a)

- The Minister of Foreign Affairs welcomed the Quad leaders' statement in March this year. This statement went beyond common security concerns, focusing on the COVID19 response, vaccine access, climate change, diversified supply chains and an appeal to restore democracy in Myanmar.
- We have not been asked to join the Quad – s6(a)
- s6(a)

Ben King
for Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Aotearoa New Zealand's engagement with the Quad

Tūtohu – Recommendations

It is recommended that you:

- | | | |
|---|---|-----------------|
| 1 | Note that the principles of the Quad and its focus on a rules-based order for the region align with our own Indo-Pacific principles; | Yes / No |
| 2 | Note that the Quad is not a formal alliance; | Yes / No |
| 3 | s6(a) | Yes / No |
| 4 | s6(a) | Yes / No |
| 5 | s6(a) | Yes / No |
| 6 | Refer a copy of this submission to the Prime Minister for concurrence and to other Minister for information. | Yes / No |

Hon Nanaia Mahuta
Minister of Foreign Affairs / Minita Take Aorere

Date: / /

Aotearoa New Zealand's engagement with the Quad

Pūrongo – Report

1. The first meeting of Quad members – Japan, Australia, India and the United States – took place in 2007. Initiated by Japan, it went into abeyance for a period, but was relaunched in 2017, when Foreign Ministers met on the margins of the ASEAN summits. It had its inaugural meeting at leaders' level on 12 March this year.
2. The Quad is not a formal alliance – there is no institutionalisation, but there are working groups on issues of shared interest (including climate change, critical and emerging technologies, diversified supply chains, vaccines).
3. The revival of the initiative stems from an interest on the part of the four countries to shore up stability in an increasingly contested region. It provides a geopolitical framing for their leaders, ministers and officials to have discussions – and this increased dialogue by our partners is a net positive for Aotearoa New Zealand. Increased engagement and investment by these four countries is important for the resilience of the region, in the throes of COVID, s6(a) It is clearly a grouping of significance to our close partners:
s6(a), s6(b)(i)
4. s6(a) the Quad's statements intentionally feature strong commitments to a rules-based order and upholding international law in the Indo-Pacific, s6(a) This was evident in the language of the leaders' summit. s6(a)
5. s6(b)(i)
6. There are also some ASEAN member states who are wary of the Quad and its potential to weaken ASEAN centrality.
7. That said, the principles of the Quad and its focus on a rules-based order for the region **align with our own principles** for engagement in the Indo-Pacific¹. Leaders have stated that they are 'united in a shared vision for the free and open Indo-Pacific. We strive for a region that is free, open, inclusive, healthy, anchored by democratic values, and unconstrained by coercion.'

¹ These are discussed in the accompanying submission on Aotearoa New Zealand's approach to the Indo-Pacific. They are: openness and inclusivity, transparency, sovereignty, consistency with international law, open markets, freedom of navigation and overflight, and ASEAN centrality.

Aotearoa New Zealand's engagement with the Quad

8. We also support the recent direction the Quad membership has been taking – the Minister of Foreign Affairs welcomed the Quad leaders' statement in March. This leaders' statement went beyond common security concerns, touching on the COVID-19 response, vaccine access (aiming to get at least one billion doses out across the Indo-Pacific by the end of 2022), climate change (with a focus on low emissions technology), diversified supply chains, and an appeal to restore democracy in Myanmar.
9. We have taken a **pragmatic approach** with the Quad to date, engaging in line with existing policy about support for regional initiatives in line with our values and interests. Our response to any questions about our engagement is that we are a member of a range of regional groupings in the Indo-Pacific; that we have a particular focus on the Pacific and on strengthening our existing partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region. We do everything we can to vocalise our support for ASEAN centrality – and this sentiment was echoed in the March Quad leaders' statement, which reaffirmed 'strong support for ASEAN's unity and centrality'.
10. s6(a), s6(b)(i)
11. The Quad membership may look over time to do "Quad- Plus " activities (e.g. on vaccines or marine pollution) and we may see "Quad-Plus" referenced with more frequency s6(a)

Briefing for meeting Sheryl Sandberg, Chief Operating Officer (COO) of Facebook, 15 September, 10:00am – 10:15am (NZT)

Haurongo – Biography

Sheryl Sandberg serves as the Chief Operating Officer (COO) of Facebook and the founder of LeanIn.Org. In June 2012, she was elected to Facebook's Board of Directors, becoming the first woman to serve on its board. Prior to joining Facebook as its COO, Sandberg was Vice President of Global Online Sales and Operations at Google, and was involved in its philanthropic arm Google.org. Before that, Ms Sandberg served as Chief of Staff for the United States Secretary of the Treasury, Lawrence Summers.

Ms Sandberg has not met you before. Her last interaction
s9(2)(a)

Ngā whakaritenga - Call Logistics

- He Mihi – Greeting: Ms Sandberg's native language is English. You may wish to greet her in Te reo Māori.
- Likely atmospherics: a private and relaxed discussion with no formal agenda. Mia Garlick from Facebook (Director of Policy, Australia, New Zealand and Pacific) and Alex Masters will be in attendance.
- Detail about the call format: This will occur via a Zoom link provided by your office (separate from the link used for the preceding Roundtable).
- Whakapāho – Social media: Facebook will provide to your office a selection of media assets that you may wish to share following the Roundtable and bilateral call. You may also wish to tag Ms Sandberg and the Māori businesses involved in the Roundtable.

Ngā Whāinga – Objectives

- The main objective of this call is to build a relationship with Ms Sandberg.
- The call also provides an opportunity to:
 - Express New Zealand's willingness to explore further collaboration opportunities with Facebook, including on New Zealand's APEC priorities, supporting Indigenous businesses and the Christchurch Call.
 - Acknowledge Facebook's efforts to take forward commitments in the Christchurch Call to Action to eliminate terrorist and violent extremist content online.

Kaupapataka – Agenda

- There is no formal agenda. Facebook has suggested topics include high level acknowledgement of the following:
 - Reflections on the Roundtable preceding this call;
 - APEC and New Zealand Government's plans by hosting; and
 - Christchurch Call.
- Ms Sandberg may also raise the following topics:
 - The attack in Auckland on 3 September;
 - Māori business and the digital economy;
 - Māori community and social cohesion under the COVID-19 pandemic; and
 - APEC CEO Summit.

Ngā Take - Issues

Reflections on the Roundtable preceding this call

- The Indigenous Small Business Roundtable provided an opportunity to elevate and profile Indigenous voice from the business community. In particular it highlighted the role technology plays in lowering barriers to business entry and enabling storytelling to connect with consumers and empower communities.

APEC and New Zealand Government's plans by hosting

- The United States recently announced their decision to host APEC in 2023, ^{s9(2)(g)(i)} to run a successful host year.
- Facebook has indicated their interest to have further engagement with APEC in 2021. Facebook has a particular focus on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), cross border data flows, women in the economy and Indigenous economies.
- Free and open trade and investment is at the centre of APEC's shared strategy for revitalised economic growth.
- A core component of New Zealand's APEC trade and economic priority seeks to restore confidence in the rules-based multilateral trading system, advance economic integration in the region, and facilitate the movement of essential goods and services.
- In 2021 APEC is delivering on its existing agenda laying the policy foundations for an inclusive and sustainable recovery, particularly for SMEs, women, and Indigenous Peoples.

- This includes the implementation of the La Serena Roadmap for Women and Inclusive Growth, delivery of the APEC Economic Policy Report on Structural Reform and the Future of Work, and Policy workshops and dialogues on measuring Indigenous economies. We are also working to advance economic efficiency into environmental responses through further liberalisation of environmental goods and services.
- The COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated digital transformation and highlighted how essential digital technologies are to enable society and businesses to recover and thrive.
- In 2021 New Zealand is promoting participation in the digital economy, including broadening participation in e-commerce for Indigenous Peoples and ethnic minorities, and supporting the development of emerging technologies to advance sustainability goals.
- Compared to other areas, there are relatively few international rule frameworks for the digital economy. APEC can play an important role in supporting the development and implementation of international rules in this area, for example by drawing on international agreements already in place and sharing experiences. Adopting digital technologies and processes across the border can also enable more efficient and transparent international trade.

Christchurch Call

- Facebook has made significant efforts since May 2019 to implement the commitments in the Christchurch Call (the Call), as a result of the mosque shootings in March 2019. In particular, Facebook has continued work to support the restructured Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT) to reach its potential as a more effective, collaborative and inclusive body that is suitably resourced to deliver significant results on a range of Call commitments.
- Facebook provided strong engagement in the lead up to the Second Anniversary Summit in May 2021. The Summit was an opportunity for the Call Community to set out plans for our next steps to fulfil the commitments taken in Paris. Facebook's involvement included collaborating with the wider Call community to support the development of the ambitious forward work plan, which was endorsed by Leaders. The plan focused on crisis response, transparency, algorithms/ positive interventions and the importance of the Call Community.
- The trust based model New Zealand has employed to take forward the work of the Call is an example of effective multi-stakeholder collaboration in action. New Zealand is committed to further efforts on this work.
- To date, the Call community has collectively achieved a great deal. However, events since the Call's launch in 2019 highlight that terrorist and violent extremist content online remains a threat to our open and inclusive societies. New Zealand is looking to explore further opportunities for collaboration with Facebook and other company supporters to deliver our shared goal of eliminating this type of content.

If raised: the attack in Auckland on 3 September

- Ms Sandberg may raise the recent attack that took place on 3 September in Auckland. We acknowledge and appreciate any condolences she may express. The attack highlights the need to continue our efforts to combat extremism and work collaboratively with the international community to achieve this.

If raised: Māori business and the digital economy

- Digital capability is integral to sustainable, growing, and innovative Māori businesses. New Zealand government agencies are working together to deliver 'digital reach' programmes to offer more opportunities for Māori SME uptake. Officials (Te Puni Kōkiri) are also piloting SME capability support for Māori SMEs to better participate and benefit from government contracts.
- Digital marketing is a priority for Māori businesses. A recent business survey revealed 52 percent of Māori businesses are interested in augmenting their digital marketing capabilities and channels, five percent want to better utilise e-commerce, 16 percent are seeking more hardware and software resources and 27 percent wish to increase their digital literacy.
- Digital enablement is a support service that is sought after, especially for Māori business who do not have an online footprint or digital capability to access the current digital boost. There is a noted preference towards a high touch model.
- Māori business are seeking more advice to implement digital pivots and capabilities. We are interested in how digital and social media companies can support Māori digital capabilities and highlight the authentic services and products offered by Māori business.

If raised: Māori community and social cohesion under the COVID-19 pandemic

- Māori businesses and community groups in New Zealand initiated their own and ongoing responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. Many hapū collectivised and continue to use their resources to provide aid to their communities, typically in the form of food or direct financial support. Some iwi also used their customary seafood catch allocation to provide sustenance to members of their communities.
- To build longer-term Māori economic resilience New Zealand is implementing a long-term and overarching Māori Economic Resilience Strategy. Building resilience will help ensure Māori communities and economies continue to thrive when faced with future economic shocks.

Tuarongo - Background

APEC and New Zealand Government's plans by hosting

- New Zealand is focusing on three key policy areas during our APEC host year to enable an effective COVID-19 recovery in the region:
 - Economic and Trade Policies that Strengthen Recovery;
 - Increasing Inclusion and Sustainability for Recovery; and
 - Pursuing Innovation and a Digitally-Enabled Recovery.
- In 2021 New Zealand is focusing on three key areas of the digital economy: advancing digital inclusion, infrastructure and green technology; digitally-enabled business and trade; and structural reform to support innovation.

Christchurch Call

- The Christchurch Call is a series of voluntary commitments that bring Governments, Tech Companies and Civil Society together, with the common goal of eliminating terrorist and violent extremist content online. New Zealand is committed to working collaboratively, with industry and civil society, to prevent an online event like the shootings in Christchurch from happening again.
- The Christchurch Call is grounded in support for a free, open and secure internet, and the understanding that commitments must be respected in a way that upholds human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression and States' obligations under international human rights law.
- As founders of the Christchurch Call, New Zealand and France have worked closely with Call supporters to deliver significant progress in the first year. The Prime Minister is the responsible Minister.
- Since the Christchurch Call was established:
 - More than 50 countries and international organisations have supported it
 - 10 tech companies are in support.
 - Three crisis response protocols are operational, that did not exist at the time of the Christchurch Attack. The Christchurch Call Shared Online Crisis Response Protocol, the industry led Content Incident Protocol and the European Protocol, provide an interlinking communications network that enables a rapid and coordinated response to online events, between Governments and companies.
 - The Call has been the driving impetus for reform of the GIFCT, giving it independent status and dedicated resourcing.
 - The GIFCT will carry forward substantive progress on a number of the Call commitments.

12/10/2021

Minister of Foreign Affairs
Minister of Defence

For information by
For information by

22 October 2021
22 October 2021

AUKUS: Trilateral Enhanced Security Partnership – Implications for Aotearoa New Zealand

BRIEFING Overview Submission

PURPOSE To provide an overview of the recently established AUKUS trilateral enhanced security partnership, and the implications for Aotearoa New Zealand and the Indo-Pacific region.

Tukunga tūtohua – Recommended referrals

Prime Minister and Minister for National Security and Intelligence	For information by	27 October 2021
Minister Responsible for the NZSIS and GCSB	For information by	27 October 2021
Minister for Trade and Export Growth	For information by	27 October 2021
Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control	For information by	27 October 2021

Taipitopito whakapā – Contact details

NAME	ROLE	DIVISION	WORK PHONE
Cecile Hillyer	Divisional Manager	International Security and Disarmament Division	s9(2)(a)
Kathleen Pearce	Head of International Branch	Policy and Planning	

Mā te Tari Minita e whakakī – Minister's Office to complete

<input type="checkbox"/> Approved	<input type="checkbox"/> Noted	<input type="checkbox"/> Referred
<input type="checkbox"/> Needs amendment	<input type="checkbox"/> Declined	<input type="checkbox"/> Withdrawn
<input type="checkbox"/> Overtaken by events	<input type="checkbox"/> See Minister's notes	

Comments

AUKUS Security Partnership: Implications for Aotearoa New Zealand

Pito matua – Key points

- On 16 September, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States announced the creation of AUKUS - a non-binding, trilateral partnership focused on defence and security technology and capability.
s6(a), s6(b)(i)

Officials will continue to engage with AUKUS partners to understand the partnership and maintain visibility over areas of particular interest to Aotearoa New Zealand.

- AUKUS is a significant geostrategic development, with wide-ranging and still evolving impacts for regional security, partnerships, and nuclear non-proliferation. s6(a)

- The announcement has received a mixed response. s6(a)

- s6(a)

- s6(a)

Ben King
for Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Andrew Bridgman
Secretary of Defence

AUKUS Security Partnership: Implications for Aotearoa New Zealand

Tūtohu – Recommendations

It is recommended that you:

- | | | |
|---|--|----------|
| 1 | Note that on 16 September 2021, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States announced a non-binding trilateral defence partnership, “AUKUS”. | Yes / No |
| 2 | Note that AUKUS provides for: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i) Australia’s acquisition of at least eight nuclear-powered submarines, supported by the United States and the United Kingdom; and ii) Increased cooperation among AUKUS partners across a range of emerging security technology and defence capabilities, such as artificial intelligence, cyber, quantum, long-range strike capabilities, and additional undersea capabilities. | Yes / No |
| 3 | s6(a) | Yes / No |
| 4 | Note that the partnership will have wide-ranging and still evolving impacts, including for regional security, partnerships, and nuclear non-proliferation. | Yes / No |
| 5 | Note that officials will continue to engage with AUKUS partners, with a view to better understanding the partnership and maintaining visibility over areas of particular interest to Aotearoa New Zealand. | Yes / No |
| 6 | Endorse the updated key messages on AUKUS at Annex A. | Yes / No |
| 7 | Refer a copy of this submission to the Prime Minister, Minister Responsible for the NZSIS and GCSB, Minister for Trade and Export Growth, and Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control. | Yes / No |

Hon Nanaia Mahuta
Minister of Foreign Affairs / Minita Take Aorere

Hon Peeni Henare
Minister of Defence Minita Kaupapa
Waonga

Date: / /

Date: / /

AUKUS Security Partnership: Implications for Aotearoa New Zealand

Pūrongo – Report

What is AUKUS?

1. On 16 September, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States announced the creation of AUKUS - a non-binding, trilateral partnership on defence and security technology and capability. The first initiative – and key driver – of the partnership is Australia's acquisition of at least eight nuclear powered submarines. The submarines will be built in Australia using US and British technology, and come into service towards the end of the 2030s. They will be nuclear powered, but not nuclear armed, and include precision guided conventional weapons (as do Australia's current submarines). AUKUS also covers deepened cooperation on emerging security and defence technologies, including artificial intelligence, cyber, quantum, long-range strike capabilities, and additional undersea capabilities.
2. These headlines aside, it is clear that much work remains to be done to flesh out the arrangement. ^{s6(a), s6(b)(i)}

s6(a), s6(b)(i)

4. ^{s6(a)} the US force posture announcements, delivered following the Australia-US Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN)¹ on 16 September, also signalled significant developments in the Australia/US defence relationship, including an increase the breadth, scale, and frequency of rotations of US land, air and maritime forces in Australia.
5. ^{s6(a), s6(b)(i)}

¹ AUSMIN are the annual set of bilateral US-Australia foreign and defence minister meetings, held since 1985.

AUKUS Security Partnership: Implications for Aotearoa New Zealand

s6(a)

Non-proliferation

9. To date, no non-nuclear weapons state has possessed a nuclear propelled submarine.²
s6(a), s6(b)(i)

² Countries that possess nuclear propelled submarines are the UK, US, France, Russia, China, and India.

s6(a)

AUKUS Security Partnership: Implications for Aotearoa New Zealand

s6(a), s6(b)(i)

Managing the broader nuclear non-proliferation challenges would be an ongoing challenge. The attached annex contains further detail.

Responses

10. The attached annex contains detail of the international response to the AUKUS announcement. s6(a), s6(b)(i)

s6(a), s6(b)(i)

Impacts for the Indo-Pacific region

s6(a), s6(b)(i)

14.

Released under the
Official Information Act

AUKUS Security Partnership: Implications for Aotearoa New Zealand

15. s6(a), s6(b)(i)

Next steps for AUKUS partners

16. The immediate focus for AUKUS partners will be the 18-month submarine procurement, s6(a), s6(b)(i)

17. s6(a), s6(b)(i)

18. s6(a), s6(b)(i)

Implications for Aotearoa New Zealand

19. The establishment of AUKUS is another manifestation of the negative trajectory in our strategic operating environment over coming decades. Recent MFAT and Defence assessments of our strategic outlook foresees a world that will be less open, less prosperous, less secure and less free. COVID's ongoing impact will amplify and accelerate these trends. s6(a)

20. s6(a)

There are likely to be significant opportunities to develop other planned capabilities through future cooperation with AUKUS development programmes beyond the submarines, particularly in the cyber and artificial intelligence areas.

21. s6(a), s6(b)(i)

22.

AUKUS Security Partnership: Implications for Aotearoa New Zealand

23. s6(a), s6(b)(i)

The Trilateral Pacific Security Dialogue, a senior official level meeting between Australia, the US and Aotearoa New Zealand, scheduled for December, may provide an opportunity to discuss these issues further with Australia and the US, s6(a), s6(b)(i)

24. While we have welcomed increased engagement by the UK and US in the region,

25. As the partnership evolves, it will be important for Aotearoa New Zealand officials to maintain visibility of a number of particular areas, namely.

- Nuclear non-proliferation aspects, including engagement with the IAEA; and
- Other areas of cooperation, including cyber, AI, and quantum computing. s6(a)

26. s6(a)

Prime Minister Arden's public comments – which welcomed increased engagement by the UK and US in our region while reiterating the collective objective needing to be the delivery of peace and stability and the preservation of the international rules based system - s6(a)
s6(a)

Updated unclassified messaging for use by New Zealand Ministers and officials, based on the Prime Minister's existing statements and recent speeches by the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, is included in the Annex to this submission.

27. We will maintain active diplomatic engagement with AUKUS partners to stay apprised of developments and – as possible – ensure partners are aware of our interests and to share perspectives on regional responses/reactions.

AUKUS Security Partnership: Implications for Aotearoa New Zealand

Annex A: Aotearoa New Zealand key messages on the AUKUS partnership

What is AUKUS and what is Aotearoa New Zealand's position on it?

- We understand the AUKUS arrangement to focus on enhanced capability in security and defence technology areas, and to be complementary to, rather than supplanting, existing arrangements with other partners, including Five Eyes, Quad and ASEAN-centric architecture, but it is still early days in terms of being able to assess the details and implications.
- Aotearoa New Zealand welcomes increased engagement by the UK and the US in our region. We are a Pacific nation and we view foreign policy and security developments through the lens of what is in the best interest of the region.
- We note the joint statement by the three AUKUS countries describes the initiative as helping to sustain peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. We agree our collective objective needs to be the delivery of peace and stability and the preservation of the international rules based system in the region.
- This arrangement does not change our security and intelligence ties with these three countries, as well as with Canada.

Should Aotearoa New Zealand have been invited to join AUKUS?

- No, given the centre piece of the arrangement is nuclear powered submarines, prohibited from our internal waters under the 1987 New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act. New Zealand's position in relation to the prohibition of nuclear powered vessels in our internal waters remains unchanged.
- We note AUKUS includes cooperation on other emerging security capability areas, including ones on which we work closely with these countries, such as cyber. We will continue to engage closely with the US, the UK and Australia on how we can cooperate to mutual benefit in such areas.

What is Aotearoa New Zealand's position on proliferation risks?

- We note concerns about nuclear proliferation raised by the deal, as well as the public reiterations of commitments to non-proliferation by the AUKUS partners, including for Australia those under the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. [Note: which prohibits the acquisition of nuclear explosive devices but not nuclear power].
- While these public commitments include Australia not acquiring nuclear weapons or establishing a civil nuclear capability, it will be important for Aotearoa New Zealand that as well as Australia, the US and the UK upholding their commitments, that AUKUS does not encourage proliferation by other countries. We will be watching this closely in the IAEA and other relevant fora.

AUKUS Security Partnership: Implications for Aotearoa New Zealand

s6(a)

What is Aotearoa New Zealand's position on the Five Eyes?

- Aotearoa New Zealand derives significant value from the Five Eyes. We are a committed and contributing participant within the grouping.
- AUKUS does not in any way diminish our commitment to the Five Eyes, nor the value we derive from it.

Released under the
Official Information Act

AUKUS Security Partnership: Implications for Aotearoa New Zealand

Annex C: Proliferation concerns from AUKUS nuclear submarine procurement

- To date, no non-nuclear weapons state has possessed a nuclear propelled submarine.⁴
s9(2)(g)(i)

- For Aotearoa New Zealand, section 4 of the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act 1987 establishes a nuclear free zone on land, water, sea and airspace out to the 12 nautical mile limit. Section 11 prohibits the entry into the internal waters of New Zealand by any ship whose propulsion is wholly or partly dependent on nuclear power. The right of innocent passage through New Zealand's territorial sea (in accordance with international law) is permitted. Australia has noted that the nuclear powered submarine procurement is not in contradiction with its obligations under the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty, or "Treaty of Rarotonga", which is concerned with nuclear weapons and nuclear dumping rather than the issue of nuclear propulsion.
s9(2)(h)

⁴ Countries that possess nuclear propelled submarines are the UK, US, France, Russia, China, and India.

⁵ The IAEA Board comprises 35 Member States including China. Aotearoa New Zealand is serving on the Board from 2020-22.

⁶ Canada previously explored development of nuclear submarines in the 1980s and Brazil has a long-standing interest in developing the capability. Iran has also in recent years expressed an interest.



Ministry for Primary Industries
Manatū Ahu Matua



22 November 2021

Minister of Foreign Affairs	For action by	25 November 2021
Minister of Defence	For action by	25 November 2021
Minister for Oceans and Fisheries	For action by	25 November 2021

Southern Ocean: Surveillance activities 2021/22

BRIEFING Overview Submission

PURPOSE To provide New Zealand's proposed maritime surveillance programme in the Southern Ocean this season.

Tukunga tūtohua – Recommended referrals

Prime Minister	For information by	25 November 2021
----------------	--------------------	------------------

Taipitopito whakapā – Contact details

NAME	ROLE	AGENCY	MOBILE PHONE
Jana Newman	Unit Manager	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade	s9(2)(a)
s9(2)(a)	Analyst, Defence Policy	Ministry of Defence	
s9(2)(a)	Deputy Director, Strategic Commitments – Regional	New Zealand Defence Force	
James Brown	Manager, International Fisheries Management	Ministry for Primary Industries	

Mā te Tari Minita e whakakī – Minister's Office to complete

<input type="checkbox"/> Approved	<input type="checkbox"/> Noted	<input type="checkbox"/> Referred
<input type="checkbox"/> Needs amendment	<input type="checkbox"/> Declined	<input type="checkbox"/> Withdrawn
<input type="checkbox"/> Overtaken by events	<input type="checkbox"/> See Minister's notes	

Comments

Pito matua – Key points

- New Zealand's annual maritime surveillance programme in the Southern Ocean supports the protection of the Antarctic environment, and New Zealand's strategic interests in the Ross Sea region.
- The objectives of the programme include monitoring vessels' compliance with the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) conservation measures, and detecting and deterring illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing activities in the Ross Sea region.
- s6(a), s6(c)
- s6(a), s6(c) A revision of the operating parameters for New Zealand's Offshore Patrol Vessels in 2018 stipulated that they are unsuitable to operate in or near sea-ice. This information is now in the public domain.

Deborah Geels
for Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Approved by:

KR Short
Air Marshal
Chief of Defence Force

Philip Houlding
Director, International Policy
Ministry for Primary Industries

Andrew Bridgman
Secretary of Defence

Recommendations

It is recommended that you:

- | | | |
|---|---|----------|
| 1 | Note the objectives of New Zealand's Southern Ocean maritime surveillance programme (in paragraph 1); | Yes / No |
| 2 | s6(a), s6(c) | Yes / No |
| 3 | s6(a), s6(c) | Yes / No |
| 4 | Note that s6(a) ongoing work by officials to monitor the situation in relation to New Zealand's strategic interests in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean, and to assess alternative patrol and surveillance methods. | Yes / No |

Hon Nanaia Mahuta
Minister of Foreign Affairs

Hon Peeni Henare
Minister of Defence

Hon David Parker
Minister for Oceans and Fisheries

Date: / /

Released under the
Official Information Act

Report

Objectives of the maritime surveillance programme

1. New Zealand's annual maritime surveillance programme in the Southern Ocean, known as s6(a) is a multi-agency operation that promotes and protects New Zealand's interests in the region. Annex A outlines New Zealand's strategic interests in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean, which were agreed by Cabinet in August 2017. Specifically, the **objectives of the maritime surveillance programme** are to:
 - 1.1. maintain New Zealand's influence in the governance of the Southern Ocean;
 - 1.2. support international sustainable fisheries management in the Southern Ocean;
 - 1.3. detect, deter and disrupt fishing activity that is illegal, unreported or unregulated (IUU) with respect to the regime established by the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR);
 - 1.4. monitor licensed vessels' compliance with CCAMLR's rules in the Ross Sea, including the Ross Sea region Marine Protected Area, and to bring any potential breaches to the attention of the Commission and the relevant flag state for action; and
 - 1.5. maintain situational awareness of maritime activity in the Ross Sea region.
2. These objectives have been supported by a combination of naval and airborne surveillance patrols of the Ross Sea region.
3. These maritime surveillance patrols were initially undertaken by P-3K2 Orion aircraft. These patrols were then complemented in 2011 by Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) operated by NZDF, with fisheries officers from the Ministry for Primary Industries embarked to carry out boarding and inspections.
4. In 2018, NZDF determined that the OPVs were not safe for operation in or near sea ice. s6(a), s6(c)
The impacts of this are discussed in paragraphs 15 and 16, below.
5. NZDF continues to conduct maritime surveillance patrols over CCAMLR fisheries using the P-3K2 Orion aircraft.

Proposed asset deployment for the 2021/22 season

6. s6(a), s6(c)
7. s6(a), s6(c)

s6(a), s6(c)

8. s6(a), s6(c)

9. Contingency media points are provided at Annex C. MFAT will coordinate any media response.

Projected fishing activity in the Ross Sea region for the 2021/22 season

10. Up to 22 vessels flagged to eight CCAMLR members¹ may participate in the Ross Sea and Amundsen Sea exploratory toothfish fisheries in the 2021/22 season. This includes three New Zealand vessels (two from Sanford Limited and one from Talley's Limited) that have participated in the fishery for a number of years.

11. s6(a)

12. s6(a)

13. Given the impact of COVID-19 on fisheries operations (such as the difficulty in attaining international observers and travel restrictions for crew) there is a possibility that fewer vessels may ultimately participate in the Ross Sea and Amundsen Sea exploratory toothfish fisheries than in previous years. s6(a), s6(c)

Maritime capability

14. Given that OPVs are unsuitable to operate in or near sea-ice, s6(a), s6(c)

s6(a), s6(c)

This information is now in the public domain.

s6(a), s6(c)

¹ Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Spain, Ukraine, Uruguay and the United Kingdom notified vessels.

s6(a)

s6(a), s6(c)

15. The Maritime Security Oversight Committee, a governance body in the national security architecture, s6(a), s6(c) and agreed officials should actively monitor our strategic interests in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean, and report to the Joint Maritime Advisory Group at the conclusion of each Southern Ocean season. Any significant impacts, and proposed mitigations, will also be reported to the Maritime Security Oversight Committee and Ministers. s6(a), s6(c)

Report back on surveillance activities in the 2020/21 season

16. The plan for the 2020/21 season included s6(a), s6(c) scheduled airborne surveillance patrols s6(a) with warranted CCAMLR inspectors on board. s6(a)
17. The first patrol reported 10 fishing vessels and one icebreaker. The patrol did not detect any instances of non-compliance.
18. The second patrol reported seven fishing vessels. One compliance issue was noted, relating to CCAMLR requirements on the marking of fishing vessels and gear.
19. No IUU listed or unlicensed fishing vessels were detected within the CCAMLR Convention area during either patrol.
20. The patrols included broad, multi-vessel flyovers, making contact with as many vessels as possible. s6(a), s6(c)

s6(a)

22. s6(a)

s6(a), s9(2)(f)(iv)

Annex A: New Zealand's Strategic Interests in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean

New Zealand's strategic interests in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean were agreed by Cabinet in August 2017 [CAB-17-MIN-0437]. They are summarised in the table below.

s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i), s9(2)(j), s9(2)(f)(iv)

Released under the
Official Information Act

Released under the
Official Information Act

Annex C: Contingency media points

On surveillance

- New Zealand has conducted naval and aerial maritime surveillance in the Southern Ocean for a number of years.
- The aim is to detect, deter and disrupt illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing.
- The Southern Ocean is important to New Zealand, and we're playing our part to ensure that fishing is conducted within the rules established by the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR).
- New Zealand's surveillance of the fishery has seen increased compliance of the licensed fishing fleet with CCAMLR rules, and in detecting, deterring, and bringing to account unlicensed operators.
- New Zealand has a range of ways to monitor compliance. We tailor our operations around a number of factors including forecast fishing activity and asset availability. We don't comment on operational matters relating to our compliance monitoring activities, as this may undermine the effectiveness of the programme.
- Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in the Ross Sea region has been reduced in recent years. New Zealand has played a major part in deterring illegal fishing in this region and uses a variety of tools to combat illegal trade in toothfish, including diplomatic and legal efforts.

On the Palmer IUU fishing issue

- All Members, except for Russia, supported the inclusion of the Russian flagged *Palmer* on the IUU vessel list at last year's CCAMLR meeting. As CCAMLR is a consensus-based decision-making body, without Russia's agreement the vessel could not be listed. The *Palmer* has not fished in the Southern Ocean since the proposed listing.
- Consensus-based decision making is at the heart of the Antarctic Treaty system of which CCAMLR is an integral part and reflects the spirit of cooperation that underpins the system.



24 November 2021

Minister of Foreign Affairs

For action by

8 December 2021

Bougainville – New Zealand's approach and Bougainville Partnership

BRIEFING Decision Submission

PURPOSE To update you on New Zealand's current engagement in Bougainville and seek your agreement to Aotearoa New Zealand partnering with Australia to fund the next phase of the Bougainville Partnership.

Tukunga tūtohua – Recommended referrals

Prime Minister	For information by	8 December 2021
Minister of Defence	For information by	8 December 2021
Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs	For information by	8 December 2021

Taipitopito whakapā – Contact details

NAME	ROLE	DIVISION	WORK PHONE
Richard Griffith	Unit Manager	Pacific Melanesia and Micronesia Division	s9(2)(a)
Alex Lennox-Marwick	Senior Policy Officer	Pacific Melanesia and Micronesia Division	s9(2)(a)

Mā te Tari Minita e whakakī – Minister's Office to complete

<input type="checkbox"/> Approved	<input type="checkbox"/> Noted	<input type="checkbox"/> Seen
<input type="checkbox"/> Needs amendment	<input type="checkbox"/> Declined	<input type="checkbox"/> Withdrawn
<input type="checkbox"/> Overtaken by events	<input type="checkbox"/> See Minister's notes	

Comments

Bougainville – New Zealand’s approach and Bougainville Partnership

Pito matua – Key points

- s6(a)

- s6(a)

- New Zealand has a strong interest in stability and development in Bougainville. Since brokering peace in 1997, we have continued to support peace and development in Bougainville, through a long-standing policing programme, a range of development activities, and regular engagement from the High Commission in Port Moresby. New Zealand’s legacy is underpinned by whanaungatanga and we are a small but trusted partner in Bougainville. New Zealand supports the right of all people to self-determination, realising this can take various forms including through current autonomy arrangements.
- In the 2019 referendum, Bougainvilleans voted overwhelmingly for independence (97.7%). Political consultations are underway between the Government of Papua New Guinea and the Autonomous Bougainville Government on whether Bougainville should be independent or not. The Papua New Guinea Parliament is the final decision-maker, s6(a)
- s6(a)

- s6(a)

- s6(a)

- We also propose to identify additional, targeted interventions s6(a)
s6(a) As an important tool of our engagement and partnership approach with Australia, we also recommend that New Zealand continue to support the Bougainville Partnership, which is a long-term development intervention directly supporting the political process through technical advisers, and providing broader support for building capability, resilient governance, peacebuilding and economic development.

Jonathan Kings
for Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Bougainville – New Zealand’s approach and Bougainville Partnership

Tūtohu – Recommendations

It is recommended that you:

- | | | |
|---|---|----------|
| 1 | s6(a) | Yes / No |
| 2 | Note that further opportunities to support the political consultations between Bougainville and Papua New Guinea may arise s6(a) | Yes / No |
| 3 | Agree it is in New Zealand’s, and the Pacific’s, interests to continue to engage in Bougainville in support of peace and development, s6(a) | Yes / No |
| 4 | Agree that New Zealand should maintain support for the consultations and encourage peaceful settlement of Bougainville’s future political status, s6(a) | Yes / No |
| 5 | Approve funding of up to NZ\$12 million from the Papua New Guinea bilateral allocation to support the next phase of the Bougainville Partnership (2022-2025) which will provide critical support for governance, peacebuilding and economic development; | Yes / No |
| 6 | Refer a copy of this submission to the Prime Minister, Minister of Defence, and Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs. | Yes / No |

Hon Nanaia Mahuta
Minister of Foreign Affairs / Minita Take Aorere

Date: / /

Bougainville – New Zealand’s approach and Bougainville Partnership

Pūrongo – Report

1 The Bougainville conflict was the most significant crisis in the Pacific since World War II. Following New Zealand-led mediation efforts from 1997, the Bougainville Peace Agreement (BPA) was signed in 2001. In the resulting 2019 referendum, Bougainvilleans voted overwhelmingly in favour of independence (97.7%). A timeline of major events in Bougainville is included in Annex One.

New Zealand’s Bougainville Legacy

2 Since our role in the peace process, which was highly regarded by both Bougainvilleans and the Government of Papua New Guinea, we have invested significantly in Bougainville’s post-conflict recovery and development, including through a long-standing New Zealand police presence. Other activities in recent years include the Bougainville Partnership (co-funded with Australia), electoral commission assistance, referendum support, a community health and leadership programme, Volunteer Service Abroad, and other development activities. While New Zealand is a relatively small although significant development partner in Papua New Guinea, our presence in Bougainville has been more significant, alongside Australia and the United Nations as the primary international partners with a development footprint.

3 This legacy and the principles of tātou tātou which underpin our engagement in Bougainville has built and maintained for New Zealand, and the kiwi “brand”, a very positive reputation in Bougainville. s6(a)

s6(a) together with our development support, We are also a long-standing and generally trusted partner to the Government of Papua New Guinea. A description of our interests in Papua New Guinea and Bougainville is included in Annex Two.

Current situation and outlook

4 The Government of Papua New Guinea and the Autonomous Bougainville Government are consulting on Bougainville’s political future following the referendum. Two rounds of consultations, chaired by the United Nations, have occurred (May and July 2021) and the next is planned for December 2021. An international Moderator (former Irish Prime Minister, Bertie Ahern) is in the process of being appointed s9(2)(f)(iv)

5 In the consultations to date, s6(a)

s6(a) o date, the main outcome has been a road map which provides that a political settlement for Bougainville will be agreed by 2025, and implemented by 2027. s6(a)

6 s6(a) under the terms of the BPA, based on the outcome of the consultations the Papua New Guinea Parliament s6(a) is the final

s6(a)

Bougainville – New Zealand’s approach and Bougainville Partnership

decision maker on the question. As the consultations progress, ^{s6(a)}

7 The consultations must also compete with other domestic pre-occupations over the next year – not least the COVID-19 response, fiscal crisis, and national election in June 2022.
^{s6(a)}

8 ^{s6(a)}

New Zealand engagement in Bougainville

9 Officials propose that New Zealand continue its current efforts in Bougainville. This includes monitoring developments, maintaining our range of relationships with Bougainville and Papua New Guinea political leaders and other stakeholders, and coordinating with partners such as Australia and the UN. It also includes maintaining our key development cooperation activities.

10 The Bougainville Partnership² is the major development intervention focused on improving Bougainville’s governance resilience. The Partnership was established by Australia in 2004 to support Bougainville and Papua New Guinea to implement the BPA, and continues to be largely funded and managed by Australia. New Zealand has partnered with Australia since its inception, and contributes approximately 20% towards the cost.³ Findings from a recent review noted the Partnership continued to be relevant and had made positive contributions to peace, stability and economic recovery. In the next phase, we propose to contribute up to NZ\$12 million over four years. The Bougainville partnership sits alongside and complements New Zealand’s other investments in Bougainville notably the longstanding policing support programme.

11 The next phase of the Bougainville Partnership will continue its focus on supporting the Autonomous Government with the drawdown of powers and the post-referendum consultations. It will continue to support community resilience and creating economic opportunities for Bougainvilleans. Effective, practical and neutral support for the political consultations, as well as for governance and the drawdown of powers, will be critical. The Bougainville Partnership’s work to build community resilience and economic opportunities⁴ for Bougainvilleans is also essential for improving the lives of Bougainvilleans which should help, in turn, to provide space and time for Bougainville and Papua New Guinea to undertake the political consultations.

New Zealand support for the Consultations

12 Officials recommend New Zealand continue to engage with ^{s6(a)} the governments of Papua New Guinea and Bougainville, ^{s6(a)}

This outreach is largely led by our High Commission in Port Moresby.

13 As the consultations progress, we expect opportunities to support the process in more specific or targeted ways will arise, for example: support for the moderator or mediation, targeted

² Formerly known as the Governance and Implementation Fund (GIF).

³ The funding split is broadly 80:20 between Australia and New Zealand. Since 2004, New Zealand has contributed NZ\$33m to various initiatives under several phases of the GIF and its successor the Bougainville Partnership.

⁴ The Bougainville Partnership’s support to cocoa farmers through the grant mechanism of the Commodity Support Facility (CSF) and the complementary CARE-run Bougainville Cocoa Families Support (BECOMES) programme have performed well and will continue into the next phase.

Bougainville – New Zealand’s approach and Bougainville Partnership

political engagement, increased technical support for autonomy arrangements or studies of the Realm of New Zealand to see how different models of self-governance operate. s6(a)

We will monitor the situation and provide advice on opportunities for targeted New Zealand engagement, as these become clearer.

New Zealand’s position on Bougainville’s political future

14 s6(a)

15 s6(a)

16 Since the referendum, the context has shifted. s6(a), we have seen an overwhelming referendum result in favour of independence, momentum in Bougainville towards being ‘independence ready’, and political consultations commence. s6(a)
s6(a)

17 s9(2)(g)(i)

s6(a)

s9(2)(g)(i)

s6(a)

Other international partners in Bougainville

18 Australia is the most significant international partner in Bougainville, followed by the United Nations (both have offices in Buka). Other partners with development programmes include Japan and the European Union (the EU will fund Moderator Bertie Ahern and his advisory team and is planning to expand development efforts in Bougainville).

19 s6(a)

Business interests (including mining) from the Philippines and South Korea are also mentioned from time to time. Taiwan previously announced the opening of a trade office on Bougainville but we are not aware of any concrete moves to do so. s6(a)

Bougainville – New Zealand’s approach and Bougainville Partnership

Annex One: History of Bougainville Crisis and Peace Process

The Bougainville crisis was initially triggered by resentment of the social and environmental impact of the giant Panguna mine (owned by Rio Tinto Australia) in central Bougainville and the unequal distribution of its benefits. ^{s6(a)}

The Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) expelled Papua New Guinea forces in early 1990 and declared 'independence'. But in the ensuing anarchy, local leaders, with the support of anti-BRA militias, invited government forces back. Violence between factions and armed criminal gangs split communities and the conflict took on the character of a civil war. Bougainville went from Papua New Guinea's richest province to its poorest.

Internationally supported peace initiatives failed to gain purchase. A ^{s6(a)} move by the Papua New Guinea government to engage foreign mercenaries provided the catalyst for New Zealand-facilitated peace talks in 1997. These talks paved the way for the deployment of unarmed New Zealand and Australian peace monitors to Bougainville.

Further negotiations eventually culminated in the 2001 Bougainville Peace Agreement (BPA) and a constitutional roadmap to determine Bougainville's future. The BPA comprises three pillars: Arrangements for higher autonomy for Bougainville, Island-wide disarmament, and a non-binding referendum on Bougainville's future political status.

Key dates:

- 1946 UN agrees to Australian trusteeship of the former League of Nations Mandated Territory of New Guinea, including Bougainville
- 1972 Rio Tinto (Australia) begins mining copper and gold Panguna, Bougainville
- 1975 Papua New Guinea independence from Australia
- 1988 Landowner disputes at Panguna mine disrupt mine operations and lead to deployment of Papua New Guinea police mobile squads (paramilitary units)
- 1989 Papua New Guinea military deployed to Bougainville. Peace initiatives fail
- 1990 Papua New Guinea forces withdraw from Bougainville. Chaos ensues as BRA elements run amok. Papua New Guinea imposes air and sea blockade.
- 1990 – 1997: various international efforts to broker peace are attempted but none hold and the conflict continues, including significant intra-Bougainville conflict.
- 1997 March. Sandline crisis erupts following the Papua New Guinea government decision to engage foreign mercenaries in Bougainville. Papua New Guinea Cabinet approves strategy for a negotiated Bougainville peace.
 - July: Burnham Declaration signed after New Zealand-sponsored talks between Bougainville factions and other leaders at Burnham Army Camp outside Christchurch
 - October: New Zealand-led Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) deploys to Bougainville
- 1998 January: ceasefire agreed at Lincoln University (the Lincoln Agreement)
 - May: Australia-led Peace Monitoring Group (PMG) replaces New Zealand-lead TMG
- 2001 Bougainville Peace Agreement signed
- 2004 Papua New Guinea's Cabinet endorses the Bougainville Constitution
- 2005 First elections in the Autonomous Region of Bougainville take place
- 2008 Staged process for transfer of various powers to Bougainville commences
- 2019 Referendum on Bougainville's future political status held.
- 2020 Ishmael Toroama elected Bougainville's fourth president.
- 2021 Negotiations between the Bougainville and Papua New Guinea governments agree to settle Bougainville's political future by 2027.

Bougainville – New Zealand's approach and Bougainville Partnership

Annex Two: New Zealand's interests in Papua New Guinea and Bougainville

It is in New Zealand's interests to ensure our voice, our values and our views carry weight in Bougainville and Papua New Guinea to:

- promote stability and long-term resilience, avoiding a return to conflict that might endanger Bougainvilleans, or New Zealanders and other international personnel on the ground, and trigger the need for a humanitarian or security intervention;
- protect our priority relationship with Papua New Guinea;
- s6(a)
- protect peace and stability in the wider Pacific region;
- enhance our reputation as an influential regional actor and a global actor that supports long-term peace; and,
- maintain a presence and influence in a part of the Pacific s6(a)

Currently New Zealand pursues and protects these interests by:

- Remaining a trusted partner to both sides and ensuring whanaungatanga underpins our engagements;
- Maintaining networks and access to people/information in Bougainville and Papua New Guinea;
- s9(2)(g)(i)
- Respecting the mana of both parties s6(a)
- Supporting the political process and maintaining a values-based approach; and
- Continuing current New Zealand development interventions in Bougainville which support and preserve New Zealand's interests as well as achieving long-term resilience outcomes.


Bougainville – New Zealand's approach and Bougainville Partnership

Annex Three: Other Key Information

Released under the
Official Information Act

Bougainville – New Zealand’s approach and Bougainville Partnership

Funding for this activity comes from the Papua New Guinea 4 Year Plan:



Resilience: This activity promotes resilience across three pillars (governance, economic resilience and community cohesion) by: 1. Supporting capacity development and promoting self-sufficiency; 2. Supporting Bougainville’s investment climate and internal revenue sources for economic development; 3. Promoting community resilience, and social solidarity through community grants schemes.

Impact: The long term impact of this activity is a more effective and capable government; inclusive and sustainable economic growth; and strengthened community cohesion and resilience.

Measuring impact: Impact will be measured through a detailed Monitoring and Evaluation Plan and Framework which will specify indicators, data sources and measures that will support regular monitoring of the activity. This includes annual reflective reviews and an independent end of program evaluation.

Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): This activity will contribute to goal 16 – peace, justice and strong institutions, goal 4 – gender equality, goal, goal 8 – decent work and economic growth, and goal 10 – reduced inequalities.









Indo-Pacific Update

fortnight to 9 February 2022



Implications for Aotearoa New Zealand

Trendline

Theme	Trendline	Implications for Aotearoa New Zealand
<p>1</p>  <p>The year anniversary of the military coup in Myanmar passed on 1 February. Widespread violence and economic strife are exacerbating an already difficult humanitarian situation.</p>	<p>s6(a)</p>	<p>s6(a)</p>
<p>2</p>  <p>Cambodia is now ASEAN Chair. s6(a)</p> <p>The ASEAN Ministers' Retreat has been rescheduled for 16-17 February s6(a)</p>	<p>s6(a)</p>	<p>Support for ASEAN centrality is a key principle within our Indo Pacific gameplan. s6(a)</p>
<p>3</p>   <p>In the meantime, Secretary Blinken is to visit Australia, Fiji, and Hawaii February 7-13. Pacific Leaders have been invited by the US to a two-hour virtual meeting, chaired by Fiji. (Advice on attendance by Aotearoa New Zealand is being provided.)</p>	<p>s6(a)</p> <p>The US is still to release is much-anticipated Indo Pacific Strategy. It is likely to be released after the US National Security Strategy document, due out in the coming two months. s6(a)</p>	<p>s6(a)</p>
<p>4</p>   <p>We await the promised draft from the US on their proposed Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, outlining the US's latest thinking on principles, content, and architecture.</p>	<p>s6(a)</p> <p>The US's likeminded partners in the region, including Aotearoa New Zealand, have been supportive of the IPEF initiative 'in principle' since it was announced by President Biden in October 2021. Whilst it may be viewed as a second best approach to the US joining CPTPP, a range of Indo-Pacific countries have welcomed the concept of a cooperation framework serving to deepen US engagement in the regional economic agenda.</p>	<p>s6(a)</p>



Implications for Aotearoa New Zealand

Theme	Trendline	Implications for Aotearoa New Zealand
<p>6</p>  <p>Quad Foreign Ministers will meet in Melbourne on 11 February. The declared focus will be continuing the drive to provide coronavirus vaccines to the region, funding infrastructure in developing nations, mitigating climate change, countering disinformation, disaster relief, and cyber and critical technology.</p>	<p>s6(a)</p> <p>This is the fourth meeting of Quad Foreign Ministers. While expansion of the group is not on the agenda, they are expected to discuss how the Quad can engage with ASEAN and the Pacific Islands Forum.</p>	<p>s6(a)</p> <p>New Zealand is deeply concerned about the impact of the tests on regional stability and continues to strongly support DPRK sanctions implementation alongside our partners. MFAT issued a tweet condemning 'repeated tests' and your office has been provided with talking points.</p>
<p>7</p>  <p>The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) conducted four ballistic missile test launches in January 2022 in violation of UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions. The DPRK's nuclear and missile programme will be a focus of discussions between Secretary Blinken and his Japanese and Korean counterparts on 12 February.</p>	<p>s6(a)</p> <p>Further testing is expected. Enforcement of existing sanctions will be more important than ever in order to restrict the DPRK's access to the materials it needs.</p>	<p>s6(a)</p> <p>The medium-to-long-term outlook remains gloomy. The crisis risks triggering domestic pushback and social unrest. s6(a)</p>
<p>8</p>  <p>Sri Lanka could be facing its worst economic crisis since its independence in 1948. Now a chronic forex crisis is causing shortages of essential goods, including fuel for electricity and milk powder. India has extended relief worth over US\$1.4 billion, with a further US\$1 billion loan under review. Negotiations continue with China, including on new credit lines, with debt restructuring and Free Trade Agreement talks on the table.</p>	<p>s6(a)</p>	<p>s6(a)</p>
<p>9</p>		



14 February 2022

Minister of Foreign Affairs

For approval by

28 February 2022

Solomon Islands - Appointment of New Zealand Head of Mission

BRIEFING Decision Submission

PURPOSE To seek the formal approval of the Governor-General to the appointment of Jonathan Schwass as High Commissioner for New Zealand to Solomon Islands.

Taipitopito whakapā – Contact details

NAME	ROLE	DIVISION	WORK PHONE
Mark Ramsden	Divisional Manager	Pacific Melanesia and Micronesia Division	s9(2)(a)
Rod Harris	Divisional Manager	Protocol Division	

Mā te Tari Minita e whakakī – Minister's Office to complete

 Approved Noted Seen Needs amendment Declined Withdrawn Overtaken by events See Minister's notes**Comments**

Solomon Islands – Appointment of New Zealand Head of Mission

Pito matua – Key points

- Attached for your signature is a letter to the Governor-General seeking her formal approval of the appointment of Jonathan Schwass as High Commissioner for New Zealand to Solomon Islands, with residence in Honiara.
- Approval is currently being sought from the Solomon Islands Government.
- A copy of Jonathan Schwass curriculum vitae is attached.
- The Commission of Appointment will be sent to you for your counter-signature once the Governor-General has agreed.

Jonathan Kings
for Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Tūtohu – Recommendations

It is recommended that you:

- | | | |
|---|--|-----------------|
| 1 | Agree to the appointment of Jonathan Schwass as High Commissioner for New Zealand to Solomon Islands. | Yes / No |
| 2 | Sign the attached letter to the Governor-General and formal submission requesting Her Excellency's approval of the appointment. | Yes / No |

Hon Nanaia Mahuta
Minister of Foreign Affairs

Date: / /

CURRICULUM VITAE

Jonathan Douglas SCHWASS

Date of Birth	s9(2)(a)	
Citizenships	New Zealand	
Languages	Bislama/Pidgin, basic French	
Education	Bachelor of Arts, Victoria University, Wellington Diploma of Journalism, Canterbury	

Employment History	
Jan 2018-Dec 2021	High Commissioner to Vanuatu, Port Vila
2016-2017	Unit Manager, South East Asia Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Wellington
Feb 2014-Apr 2016	Ambassador to Timor-Leste, Dili
Jul 2014-Dec 2014	Special Adviser, Asia-Pacific Regional Integration Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Wellington
Apr 2011-Jul 2014	Deputy High Commissioner to Solomon Islands, Honiara
Sep 2008-Dec 2011	Senior Policy Officer, South/South East Asia Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Wellington
Jan 2000-Aug 2008	Director, Pencarrow Press and Communications, and Director, Context Communications
1998-1999	Freelance journalist
1997-1998	Media Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Wellington (and again in 2004)
1986-1996	Producer/Senior Producer and Journalist/Senior Journalist for Radio New Zealand Current Affairs
1985-1986	Magazine sports journalist in the United Kingdom
1984-1985	Journalist, The Evening Post, Wellington

ROUTINE

2 March 2022

Minister of Foreign Affairs

For information by 11 March 2022

50th Anniversary of Aotearoa New Zealand-China diplomatic relations

BRIEFING Overview Submission

PURPOSE To inform you of MFAT's plans for marking the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Aotearoa New Zealand and China in 2022

Tukunga tūtohua – Recommended referrals

Prime Minister	For information by	18 March 2022
Minister for Trade and Export Growth	For information by	18 March 2022
Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs	For information by	18 March 2022

Taipitopito whakapā – Contact details

NAME	ROLE	DIVISION	MOBILE PHONE
Paula Wilson	Divisional Manager	North Asia Division	s9(2)(a)
David Evans	Unit Manager	North Asia Division	

Mā te Tari Minita e whakakāi – Minister's Office to complete

<input type="checkbox"/> Approved	<input type="checkbox"/> Noted	<input type="checkbox"/> Referred
<input type="checkbox"/> Needs amendment	<input type="checkbox"/> Declined	<input type="checkbox"/> Withdrawn
<input type="checkbox"/> Overtaken by events	<input type="checkbox"/> See Minister's notes	

Pito matua – Key points

- Diplomatic relations between Aotearoa New Zealand and China were formally established on 22 December 1972. MFAT plans to run a series of activities throughout 2022, primarily delivered through our posts in China, to mark the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations. This paper aims to give you visibility of those plans.
- Aotearoa New Zealand marks diplomatic anniversaries on a case-by-case basis, depending on the strength and nature of the overall relationship and the significance of the anniversary.
- Aotearoa New Zealand is marking other significant diplomatic anniversaries in 2022. Likewise, China is marking its 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations with a range of other countries in 2022. ^{s6(a)}

• ^{s6(a), s6(b)(i)}

-
-

- ^{s6(a)} we propose to shape anniversary initiatives around themes ^{s6(a)} tangata/people, aorangi/planet and tōnuitanga /prosperity.
- There are ^{s6(a)} constraints that we have also factored into our plans, including COVID-related restrictions. Our approach is therefore purposely flexible and light-touch. Most initiatives are proposed to take place in China or virtually.
- Any high-level visits between Aotearoa New Zealand and China that take place in 2022 would feature the 50th anniversary as a contextual backdrop.
- A number of external stakeholders have expressed interest in associating their own activities with the anniversary. We have developed guidelines for sharing anniversary branding for activities, aligned with our objectives and themes.
- We will engage with a range of stakeholders from within te ao Māori over the coming months, to ensure that our approach to this anniversary reflects Māori perspectives on our relationship with China in a holistic way, and to ensure Māori business and cultural interests are fully represented through the initiatives.



Mark Sinclair
for Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Tūtohu – Recommendations

It is recommended that you:

- 1 **Note** MFAT's proposed approach to marking the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Aotearoa New Zealand and China ^{s6(a)} **Yes / No**

- 2 **Note** that the range of initiatives during 2022 to mark the anniversary will ^{s6(a)} be shaped around key themes of: tangata/people, aorangi/planet, and tōnuitanga/prosperity. **Yes / No**

- 3 **Note** that MFAT intends to consult with external stakeholders, including Māori stakeholders, on key aspects of this diplomatic anniversary. **Yes / No**

Hon Nanaia Mahuta

Minita Take Aorere / Minister of Foreign Affairs

Date: / /

Released under the
Official Information Act

Pūrongo – Report

Context

1. On 22 December 1972, a joint communiqué was signed by representatives of the governments of Aotearoa New Zealand and the People's Republic of China, formally establishing bilateral diplomatic relations.

2. It is standard practice around the world for governments to mark significant diplomatic anniversaries with other countries and regional entities. Aotearoa New Zealand marks such anniversaries on a case-by-case basis, depending on the strength and nature of the overall relationship and the symbolic significance of the anniversary.

3. Aotearoa New Zealand is also marking other significant diplomatic anniversaries in 2022, including with the US (80th), Japan (70th), India (70th), and South Korea (60th).^{s6(a)}

A number of other countries are also marking significant anniversaries with China in 2022,^{s6(a)}

4. A number of high profile events took place in 2012 to mark the 40th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Aotearoa New Zealand and China, including high-level visits in both directions and a range of other diplomatic, commercial, and cultural initiatives.^{s6(a)}

Benefits of marking the anniversary

5. Like a number of countries, China attaches importance to symbolic anniversaries, and the 50th is a particularly significant milestone (although the 50th is not unique to New Zealand, as noted above)^{s6(a)}

6.^{s6(a)} there are opportunities to use the anniversary to mark the positive aspects of the relationship. This would serve as a reminder of our shared history and people-to-people connections^{s6(a)}

s6(a)

s6(a)

10. The practical risks around organising visits and events in a COVID context have^{s6(a)} been taken into account. We will tweak our planned initiatives accordingly – for example by lowering attendance numbers, or turning in-person events into virtual ones.

Objective, themes, and target audiences

s6(a)

12. s6(a) we have developed^{s6(a)} themes of tangata/people, aorangi/planet, and tōnuitanga/prosperity. Our themes are designed to look both to the past and to the future; celebrating our connections and achievements, and identifying areas for future cooperation. They are broad enough to be used in a flexible way, as opportunities arise^{s6(a)}

We have developed a public-facing 50th anniversary information document, attached as **Annex 1**.

13. Our intention is for our 50th anniversary initiatives to influence Chinese perceptions of New Zealand within China, particularly on the three themes identified. A secondary objective is to underscore in New Zealand the value of the China relationship, and the diverse contribution that New Zealanders of Chinese descent have made and continue to make to New Zealand society. This is likely to be a key focus for some stakeholders, such as the Asia New Zealand Foundation, and we intend to work with them on this.

Examples of initiatives in our 50th anniversary plan

14. We are planning a number of initiatives spread across 2022. These will mainly take place in different parts of China, with a few in Aotearoa New Zealand and also virtually. We are working closely with other New Zealand Government agencies (particularly those with a presence in China) and with other non-government stakeholders to coordinate on initiatives where appropriate. At this stage, few of the planned initiatives are set in stone.

15. The majority of the initiatives^{s6(a)} feature topics such as trade cooperation, women's empowerment, climate change, migratory birds, commemorating the contribution of Rewi Alley, rugby cooperation, along with others. Where relevant, we may use branding or refer to the 50th

anniversary as part of these initiatives. ^{s6(a)}

16. We expect that any high-level visits ^{s6(a)}

would feature prominently within the larger 50th anniversary programme. We would tailor relevant initiatives in our plan to accommodate both the timing and the wider dynamics around such visits.

Visual collateral/branding

17. MFAT will be developing a handful of pieces of visual collateral associated with the 50th anniversary, including a logo, to help with our branding efforts. We assess that these ^{s6(a)} will enable us to get various messages across in an appropriate way. We are developing similar visual collateral for our 60th anniversary with Korea and our 70th anniversary with Japan, for the same reasons.

Consultation with Māori

18. Māori interests are a significant part of our overarching relationship with China, including Māori and iwi business interests (particularly in the primary sector and tourism), cultural connections, and people-to-people engagement. Moreover, in addition to the practical aspects (the “what”) of our bilateral relationship, it is essential that the way in which Aotearoa New Zealand engages with China in terms of our approach and manner (the “how”) is reflective of te ao Māori perspectives on the past, present, and future of the bilateral relationship. MFAT accordingly intends to engage with a range of Māori stakeholders over the coming months to ensure that our approach to this diplomatic anniversary reflects these considerations.

Consultation with other stakeholders

19. There will be initiatives marking the 50th anniversary in both China and in Aotearoa New Zealand led by a range of diverse stakeholders. Many of these will be part of the normal calendar of China-related events run by local government entities, by organisations such as the New Zealand China Council, by think tanks and universities, by business groups, and by community groups. Where appropriate, and in keeping with our standard approach to stakeholder engagement ^{s6(a)} we will consider partnership or collaboration opportunities on a case-by-case basis. We envisage that the simplest way of doing so in most cases would be to allow the usage of branding associated with the anniversary, for initiatives that align with our themes and objectives.

Annex 1: 50th anniversary information document for external stakeholders



50th Anniversary of New Zealand–China Relations



Aotearoa New Zealand and China will mark the 50th Anniversary of diplomatic relations in 2022. The relationship agreement between our two countries was signed on 22 December 1972.

The relationship has grown rapidly since then, and is vibrant and wide-ranging. Through the Anniversary, we plan to celebrate our positive and diverse **Tangata/People** connections, highlight the ways we can work together to protect our **Aorangi/Planet**, and further promote our mutual **Tōnuitanga/Prosperity**.

Our aim is for the Anniversary both to **look back on past achievements, and also to look ahead to what we can further achieve together.**

MFAT will roll out a series of events throughout the Anniversary year. Some examples are set out below. We also want to make the most of the interest, knowledge and experience that exists within New Zealand communities and institutions. We are keen to hear about 50th Anniversary plans you may have, and explore whether there are opportunities for collaboration. For more information, please contact [MFAT post's contact details].

Tangata/People

To celebrate the longstanding people-to-people links that sit at the centre of the Aotearoa New Zealand-China relationship

e.g. Historic connections (celebrating early Chinese communities in New Zealand, Rewi Alley's legacy, historic photos and footage) Rugby, Academic Forum

Aorangi/Planet

To highlight the ways we work with China to protect the planet – and point the way to new initiatives

e.g. Migratory birds, Climate change cooperation

Tōnuitanga/ Prosperity

To underscore the complementary nature of the economic relationship and its contribution to the well-being of our peoples

e.g. FTA Upgrade opportunities, promoting New Zealand products, iwi business engagement, women in the economy, improving the business environment

Aide Memoire: Aotearoa New Zealand – Australia Refugee Resettlement Arrangement

Cabinet decision

- You have been referred the attached MBIE briefing to Minister Faafoi on the Aotearoa New Zealand-Australia Refugee Resettlement Arrangement (the “Arrangement”).
- On 21 February 2022, Cabinet agreed the parameters of **Aotearoa New Zealand’s offer to Australia to resettle up to 150 refugees** who are subject to Australia’s offshore processing system **(annually, for a period of three years)**.
- Cabinet agreed that the offer would extend to individuals subject to Australian offshore processing arrangements located in Nauru, as well as those who had been transferred onshore to Australia. However, Aotearoa New Zealand would only accept referral of the Australian cohort if agreement was reached with UNHCR for their referral.
- **UNHCR has since agreed to refer cases to Aotearoa New Zealand for resettlement from both Nauru and the cohort in Australia.**

Operationalisation of decision

- Since Cabinet’s decision, MBIE and MFAT officials have been working with Australian counterparts to operationalise the offer.
- Officials have drafted an **exchange of letters** between Minister Faafoi and Minister Andrews (attached as Appendix to the MBIE brief). The letter from Minister Faafoi will essentially set out the terms of the Aotearoa New Zealand offer, and Minister Andrews’ letter in reply will accept those terms. The two letters read together will form the Arrangement.
- s6(a)
- MBIE and MFAT officials are in the process of agreeing a joint press statement and communications plan with Australian counterparts. MBIE is also agreeing operational guidelines for implementation of the Arrangement with UNHCR and Australia.
- We have told Australia that our public announcement is contingent on all parties agreeing the joint communications strategy and operational guidelines. We are currently on track to agree these documents by early next week.

s6(a), s6(b)(ii)

s6(a), s6(b)(ii)

Next steps

- We understand Minister Faafoi intends to discuss with you and the Prime Minister the timing of the announcement and who should make it (Minister Faafoi and his counterpart Minister Andrews, or Prime Ministers Ardern and Morrison). We have been advised that Minister Faafoi's office is considering **Thursday 24 March** for the announcement. s6(b)(i)
- In due course will share with you both the communications material jointly agreed with the Australians s6(a)

Australia Division
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
March 2022

Briefing for call with Secretary General Henry Puna, 6 April 2022, 12:30pm

Haurongo – Biography



Henry Puna was Prime Minister of Cook Islands from November 2010 until October 2020. He stood down as Prime Minister in June 2020 to contest the Pacific Islands Forum Secretary General role, taking up a three year term in May 2021.

Puna was educated at the University of Auckland and worked as a lawyer before entering politics. You last spoke with him in France in February 2022.

Ngā whakaritenga - Call logistics

- Greeting: Kia orana Secretary General.
- Puna is transiting Auckland between visits to the UAE and Qatar for Pacific Islands Forum business, and Palau for the Our Ocean Conference.
- Zoom call – s6(a)

Ngā Whāinga – Objectives

- Recognise Puna's commitment to the region, and his actions of leadership at this difficult time. Reassure Puna of New Zealand's commitment to Forum unity and a solution that upholds his mana as a Pacific leader.
- Seek Puna's views on progress towards a resolution. s6(a)
- s6(a)
Register that
New Zealand is supportive of Leaders continuing discussions on this issue.

Ngā Take - Issues

Micronesian Withdrawal

- s6(a)
- s6(a)
- s6(b)(i)
- s6(b)(i)

We understand this will be followed by an in-person Forum Foreign Ministers' Meeting and Leaders' Meeting in the middle of the year, for Leaders to finalise and endorse a resolution.

s6(b)(i), s6(b)(ii)

s6(a)

The Our Ocean Conference presents an opportunity for Micronesian and other Members to meet and exchange views in person.

Regional Security Issues

- Aotearoa New Zealand is gravely concerned about the initialled China-Solomon Islands security agreement.
- The decision taken by Solomon Islands, while sovereign, has regional security implications and risks undermining long-standing practices of working together as a region to respond to security concerns.

s6(a)

Your calls, and those of PM Ardern with Pacific counterparts, have suggested there may be support for dialogue through the Forum.

Papamuri - Background

Micronesian Withdrawal

1. s6(a)

s6(a), s9(2)(j)

s9(2)(j)

2. While Fiji is making sustained efforts to resolve the rift, it remains to be seen whether it is possible to find a resolution that will be accepted by all Forum Leaders s6(a)
s6(b)(i), s6(b)(ii)

3. Federated States of Micronesia, Republic of the Marshall Islands, and Palau have announced pauses on their withdrawals from the Forum. We await notification from Nauru and Kiribati formalising a pause on their respective withdrawals.

4. New Zealand's continues to support Fiji's efforts as Chair to broker a Pacific-led solution for Leaders' consideration at an upcoming virtual Special Leaders' Retreat. Fiji has not set a date for this meeting, s6(a)

s6(a)

Regional Security Issues

5. Our key message is that securing our Blue Pacific, including through the *2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent* (tasked by Leaders in 2019 as a regional response to intensifying geostrategic competition and ready for Leaders' consideration at the in-person meeting this year) relies on Pacific countries acting together to meet common challenges. The Pacific Islands Forum's Biketawa Declaration envisages that security responses in the Pacific region are, in the first instance, matters for Forum Members.

6. s6(a)

7. Forum Members managing security responses in our region is an approach that has served us well. Examples include the current Australian-led Solomon Islands International Assistance Force (SIAF) which involves Fiji, Papua New Guinea, and Aotearoa New Zealand, as well as the long-standing RAMSI mission to Solomon Islands 2003-2017.

*Pacific Regional Division
April 2022*

Released under the
Official Information Act

Briefing for introductory meeting with Harinder Sidhu, Australian High Commissioner, Monday 11 April, 5pm

Haurongo – Biography



High Commissioner Sidhu is a senior career officer with DFAT and was most recently Chief Operating Officer and Deputy Secretary, Service Delivery Group. She has previously served overseas as Australia's High Commissioner to India (2016-2020); and had previous postings in Washington as Lead Negotiator, Finance for Development (2014-2015); Moscow (1994-1998); and Damascus (1990-1992).

Ms Sidhu has held several senior roles in government, including on multilateral issues, climate change, foreign intelligence in the Office of National Assessments, and on defence policy.

The new High Commissioner is conducting a range of introductory calls across the Aotearoa New Zealand system, and met with the Prime Minister on 4 April. ^{s6(a)}

Ngā whakaritenga - Call logistics

- ^{s6(b)(i)}
- Whakapāho – Social media: Great to meet with the new Australian High Commissioner Harinder Sidhu @AusHCNZ. Looking forward to our trans-Tasman partnership getting even closer.

Ngā Whāinga – Objectives

- To welcome High Commissioner Sidhu to Aotearoa New Zealand, and to her new role.
- To reaffirm the importance of Australia to New Zealand across all fronts and to offer your reflections on how we can strengthen the relationship over the coming period, as well as hearing from High Commissioner Sidhu on her plans for her time in the role.
- To acknowledge the post-COVID reopening between Aotearoa New Zealand and Australia, and highlight this opportunity to reconnect across the breadth and depth of the unique trans-Tasman relationship.

Ngā Take - Issues

Relationship fundamentals

- The bilateral relationship between Aotearoa New Zealand and Australia is unlike any other. The high level of integration, instinctiveness in our cooperation and depth of our shared enterprise are hallmarks of the relationship across all areas that matter to us: the

economy, our people, our security and our global interests and ambitions, in particular when it comes to cooperation with our close partners in the Pacific.

- Recent years have seen us tested in many ways (pandemic, natural disasters, terrorist attacks, increasingly challenging geostrategic environment), and we have been grateful for the mutual support (you could offer thanks for Australia's assistance in securing COVID vaccines and therapeutics, including recent donation arrangements to support supply chain gaps in Aotearoa New Zealand).
- The possibility of in-person engagement that comes with the easing of COVID restrictions is welcome across all levels of the trans-Tasman bilateral relationship: government, bureaucracy, indigenous peoples, business, sports, community and within whānau.
- Coming just before the start of a new term of Federal Government in Canberra, this provides us with the perfect opportunity to reconnect and re-forge the person-person relationships that underlie our strength as partners.
- You could flag your desire to host the next Foreign Ministers' Consultations in Aotearoa New Zealand in mid-June for political engagement with your counterpart, and then visit Australia alongside the Prime Minister for the Australia New Zealand Leadership Forum in July.
- Other Ministers will also be looking to connect with their Australian counterparts following the election, and we expect that a number of Ministers will either travel to Australia or host their counterparts over the course of the next year.
- The closeness of the relationship doesn't mean we agree on everything. That is okay. And while we share much in terms of our outlook, our perception of risk, and our understanding of the opportunities and challenges we face, we will not always choose to act in response in exactly the same way. This does not have to be a weakness; indeed the complementarity of our respective trans-Tasman approaches can be harnessed as a considerable strength.

People issues

- The free movement of people is a fundamental hallmark of our relationship, and we are committed to maximising the mutual benefits of our trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement.
- But as High Commissioner, Ms Sidhu must recognise that the concerns we hold about policy decisions made by Australia that disadvantage Aotearoa New Zealand and New Zealanders are real, and they matter. Not only are policies like 501 deportations and the lack of a pathway to citizenship a thorn in the side of an otherwise excellent relationship,
s6(a)

Global issues

- We have a shared assessment of the challenging global strategic environment, and very often closely aligned national responses. Our strategic outlook in the coming decades foresees a world that will be less open, less prosperous, less secure and less free. As our closest security partner and only military ally, we are steadfastly committed to working closely with Australia on national security issues.

- The recent events in Ukraine/Russia reinforce the value of us working together, and with partners, to underscore our joint interests in protecting the international rules-based order. We remain committed to doing so closer to home as well, in pursuit of our mutual objectives of a safe and secure Indo-Pacific region.

Pacific

- We value the in-depth cooperation between us on Pacific issues, s6(a) Recent examples include the Tonga volcano response, our COVID support to the Pacific and close cooperation between our leaders and officials as Forum members work to prevent the Micronesian withdrawal from the Pacific Islands Forum.
- s6(a) it is important that Australia and Aotearoa New Zealand support Pacific-owned and -led solutions to the problems that face the region.

Australia Division
April 2022

Released under the
Official Information Act

Briefing for meeting with H.E. Nina Obermaier Ambassador of the European Union to New Zealand, 12 April 2022

Haurongo – Biography



Ambassador Obermaier [pron: "O-ber-my-er"] is a German national. She presented her credentials in January 2020, becoming the second resident EU Ambassador in New Zealand.

Ambassador Obermaier's arrival in Wellington coincided with the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. ^{s6(a)}

Ambassador Obermaier plays a coordinating role for EU Member States, both for those in Wellington and EU Ambassadors resident in Canberra, several of whom visited last week to present credentials to the Governor-General (Romania, Latvia and Belgium).

Ambassador Obermaier will welcome this opportunity to hear your views directly regarding ^{s6(a)}

Whāinga – Objectives

- Drawing on your experiences at the **Indo-Pacific Forum** in Paris in February, underline Aotearoa New Zealand's credentials as a natural, like-minded partner for the EU across a broad range of global opportunities and challenges.
- Affirm our commitment to working with the EU to **support multilateralism**, human rights, democracy and the rule of law, particularly given Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine.
- Update the Ambassador on Aotearoa New Zealand's **human rights priorities**, including reflecting on your participation at the Human Rights Council in March.
- Note our desire to work with the EU on shared interests in the **Pacific** and the Indo-Pacific.
- Reinforce the strategic as well as economic importance of the **EU-NZ FTA**.

Ngā Take – Issues

Your travel to the Indo-Pacific Forum (Paris, 22 February)

- Reflect on your participation at the Indo-Pacific Forum in Paris in February, co-hosted by the EU. You could note that it was an excellent event to connect with a range of your **European and Indo-Pacific colleagues** (from the EU: Spain and Sweden) at a critical time for Europe, with implications for the Indo-Pacific.
- Your scheduled meeting with EU High Representative **Josep Borrell** understandably had to be cancelled due to the imminent Russian invasion, but you had the chance to meet briefly and look forward to the next occasion.
- You may wish to comment on the sense that the Forum scoped the enormity of the challenges ahead. And that the event underlined the importance and the necessity of **Europe and the Indo-Pacific working more closely together** – strategically and in new configurations – to address the challenges. Need to join up to ensure the stability and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific.
- You could seek Ambassador Obermaier's feedback on the utility of the Indo-Pacific Forum, and views on follow up.

Your travel to the UN Human Rights Council, Geneva:

- Reflect on your participation at the Human Rights Council in Geneva, including delivering Aotearoa New Zealand's national statement – the **first time** a New Zealand Foreign Minister has addressed the High Level Segment since the Council's establishment in 2006.
- The national statement was an opportunity to reiterate the **important role that multilateralism and diplomacy** has and continue the call for Russia to stop its aggression against Ukraine.
- Headline themes addressed in your engagements, in addition to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, included **human rights violations in the Indo-Pacific region**: China/Xinjiang, Myanmar, Cambodia, the Philippines and Papua, as well as the performance of the Human Rights Council in recent years.

Russia/Ukraine

- Express Aotearoa New Zealand's desire to remain closely coordinated with the EU on responses to the invasion and update on latest Government discussions as you see fit. (*Ambassador Obermaier will be well across the Government's response to date.*)

- Pleased to see the high degree of engagement and coordination between EU Member States, NATO, the United States and other partners.

Aotearoa New Zealand has placed sanctions on 496 individuals since 18 March, all of whom are Russian oligarchs, or their close family members, with close ties to the Russian Regime or President Putin. They will not be able to travel here, move assets here, or use our financial systems to hide from sanctions imposed by other countries.

We have provided NZ\$6 million for humanitarian assistance to help Ukraine, and are considering options for further support.

Aotearoa New Zealand has made a contribution of NZ\$5 million in non-lethal military assistance to Ukraine. This includes a contribution to the NATO Trust Fund, which provides much needed fuel, military rations, communications and military first aid kits to support Ukraine.

Aotearoa New Zealand will deploy New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) personnel to further support Ukraine's defence against Russia's invasion, including Intelligence Analysts and support for partner activities related to Ukraine.

[If asked: When additional sanctions will be enacted]:

- We will be announcing more sanctions targets in the coming weeks, and, we expect, months.

[If raised: Expulsion of Russian diplomats in Aotearoa New Zealand]:

- Our ability to maintain channels for diplomatic dialogue with Russia is important to us. s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)
- Our Embassy in Moscow provides a critical point of support for New Zealanders in Russia, and in those countries to which our Embassy is accredited. We would not lightly take any action that could result in us providing reduced support to New Zealanders there.

[If raised: Russia-Ukraine views in the Pacific]:

- We are actively engaging with our Pacific partners on issues of strategic interest to us all, and we encourage the EU to do the same.
- s6(a)

- s6(a)

More than 350 Russian diplomats have been expelled from Europe since 24 Feb. Expulsions have not yet led to diplomatic relations being cut entirely (except for Ukraine and Micronesia) or to ambassadors being recalled (except for Lithuania). The EU itself has expelled 19 Russian diplomats.

COVID-19: vaccines and border settings

- Acknowledge the disruption and suffering caused by the Omicron variant.
- Aotearoa New Zealand greatly values **continued cooperation with the EU** on purchasing and supply of COVID-19 vaccines. Thank the EU again for its role in Aotearoa New Zealand's purchase of 750,000 Pfizer doses from Spain and Denmark in September 2021, as well as helping us to secure vaccines for Fiji.
- Note the Reconnecting New Zealand strategy. We look forward to welcoming travellers from the EU by July this year. Good to hear that Canberra-based European Ambassadors were in Wellington in person last week.

Pacific and the Indo-Pacific

- Reflect on your timely and successful recent travel to Fiji, including the timing in relation to Fiji's role as Chair of the Pacific Islands Forum and Solomon Islands' recent announcement that they will enter into a security agreement with China.
- Aotearoa New Zealand values continued cooperation with the EU in the Pacific, to ensure the stability and prosperity of the region.

EU – New Zealand Free Trade Agreement

- Welcome Ambassador Obermaier's close engagement on the EU – New Zealand FTA as we move towards '**substantive conclusion**' of the FTA.
- You could note that the Prime Minister is currently looking at European travel dates for late June / early July, ^{s9(2)(j)}

s6(a), s9(2)(j)

s6(a), s9(2)(j)

- The **strategic case for the FTA** is stronger than ever. In light of Russia's invasion, it has never been more important for close, like-minded partners like Aotearoa New Zealand and the EU to **reinforce the rules-based international system** and strengthen economic ties.
- An FTA would **bring the EU closer to the Indo-Pacific**, a goal the EU and many of its members have been pursuing with increased vigour. It would reinforce that the EU has an enduring interest in the trade and broader rules architecture of the Indo-Pacific, and remains interested in concluding ambitious trade agreements.
- You could note the continuing importance to Aotearoa New Zealand of receiving a commercially meaningful **goods market access offer from the EU** in particular on beef and dairy – and that we have been very mindful of timing sensitivities ^{s6(a)}
- When the offer arrives, it will be important that it is one Aotearoa New Zealand can work with otherwise it will present significant difficulties for both sides.

s6(a), s9(2)(j)

You could note that Aotearoa continues to progress EU priorities in good faith, even as we wait patiently for a market access offer.

- You could underline the importance of this FTA for the Government's Trade for All agenda, and our expectations of the European Union. This includes for **a FTA that delivers for Māori**. ^{s6(a), s9(2)(j)}

s6(a), s9(2)(j)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

11 April 2022

AIDE MEMOIRE: SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT ON KYUNG YUP KIM EXTRADITION

Key points

- On 13 April 2022, the Supreme Court issued its judgment upholding the extradition of Mr Kim Kyung Yup to China.
- s6(c)
- s9(2)(h)

Background

- In May 2011 China sought the extradition of Mr Kyung Yup Kim, a Korean national and New Zealand permanent resident, to face a charge of intentional homicide allegedly committed in Shanghai. This would be the first extradition from New Zealand to China.
- This extradition case has worked its way through the New Zealand courts for the past decade.
- Mr Kim's case is not a political case – his case does not have any connection to Xinjiang or Hong Kong, nor would his treatment in the Chinese justice system present a risk of being used to create bilateral leverage. Rather he is wanted to face charges of homicide – a serious and non-political criminal matter. The New Zealand Courts have been satisfied that he faces serious criminal charges in China based on evidence which meets the standard for extradition under New Zealand law.
- s6(a)
- As part of that process, New Zealand sought and received from China formal legal assurances on the treatment of Mr Kim should he be returned to China. The assurances concerned not being subjected to torture, fair trial rights, access by New Zealand diplomatic representatives, and non-imposition of the death penalty. China also undertook to provide full and unedited recordings of pre-trial interrogations.
- In an earlier Supreme Court judgment from June 2021, the Court found that notwithstanding the general human rights situation in China, the specific risks to Mr Kim can be addressed by relying on formal diplomatic assurances on how Mr Kim will be treated during his trial, and, if convicted, any imprisonment. The Court found that there were some 'gaps' in the assurances New Zealand had obtained from China around the location of the trial, consular access, and judicial composition. These additional assurances were sought, and formally provided by China as part of Supreme Court process.

Supreme Court's 13 April judgment

- On 13 April 2022, the Supreme Court concluded its consideration of Mr Kim's case. The previous Minister of Justice's 2016 decision has been reinstated by the Court, allowing Mr Kim to be surrendered. The Court decided by majority that the further

assurances provide a reasonable basis on which the Minister of Justice could be satisfied that there was no real risk of Mr Kim being tortured or face an unfair trial on surrender for trial in the PRC.

Next steps

s6(c)

Released under the
Official Information Act



22 April 2022

Minister of Foreign Affairs

For action by

26 April 2022

Solomon Islands-China Security Agreement – Immediate Next Steps

BRIEFING Overview Submission

PURPOSE To seek Ministerial direction on immediate next steps in Aotearoa New Zealand's diplomatic ^{s6(a)} engagement, ^{s6(a)} to the Solomon Islands-China security agreement.

Tukunga tūtohua – Recommended referrals

Prime Minister	For information by	26 April 2022
Minister of Defence	For information by	26 April 2022
Minister of Police	For information by	26 April 2022
Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs	For information by	26 April 2022

Taipitopito whakapā – Contact details

NAME	ROLE	DIVISION	WORK PHONE ^{s6(a)}
Mark Ramsden	Divisional Manager	Pacific, Melanesia and Micronesia	
Tharron McIvor	Acting Divisional Manager	Pacific Regional	

Pito matua – Key points

- Solomon Islands has now signed a Framework Agreement on Security Cooperation with China, announced initially by China on 19 April. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade has not seen the signed agreement, but continues to seek a copy.
- s6(a)

- We recommend ^{s9(2)(f)(iv)} you and ^{s9(2)(f)(iv)} **make representations directly with Solomon Islands** Foreign Minister Jeremiah Manele ^{s9(2)(f)(iv)} seeking to:
 - Reiterate Aotearoa New Zealand's concerns at the regional implications of this agreement, ^{s6(a)}
 - ^{s6(a)} valued, valuable, and values based partner to Solomon Islands; and ^{s6(a)}
- ^{s9(2)(f)(iv), s6(a)}
- ^{s6(a)}
- ^{s6(a)}

s6(a)

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Andrew Needs', with a long, sweeping horizontal stroke extending to the right.

Andrew Needs
for Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Released under the
Official Information Act

Tūtohu – Recommendations

It is recommended that you:

1 s6(a)

Yes / No

2 s6(a)

Yes / No

3 s6(a)

Yes / No

Hon Nanaia Mahuta
Minister of Foreign Affairs / Minita Take Aorere

Date: / /

Pūrongo – Report

Update

1. Solomon Islands has now formally signed a Framework Agreement on Security Cooperation with China, announced initially by China on 19 April. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade has not seen the signed agreement, but continues to seek a copy.
2. s9(2)(f)(iv)

3. Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare, while s6(a) expressing his commitment to the Biketawa Declaration and reaffirming Australia and Aotearoa New Zealand as partners of choice, maintains his stance that the agreement is an expression of Solomon Islands sovereignty and diversification of its partnerships.

4. s6(a)

8. On 19 April, Australian Ministers Payne and Seselja released a joint statement (Annex 2 attached), stating “Australia is deeply disappointed by the signing” of the agreement. The statement echoes Aotearoa New Zealand’s concerns about the lack of transparency and reaffirms that “the Pacific family is best placed to meet the security needs of the region”.

9. The US has publicly expressed concerns in a 19 April statement (Annex 3 attached) on the National Security Council's April 18 Consultations with Australia, Japan and New Zealand in Honolulu. A US delegation led by National Security Council Indo-Pacific Lead Kurt Campbell is presently visiting Solomon Islands, s6(a)

Next Steps

Leader level representations and media engagement

10. We recommend s9(2)(f)(iv) you s9(2)(f)(iv) **make representations directly with Solomon Islands Foreign Minister Jeremiah Manele s6(a)** s6(a) respectively, and continue your engagement with other Pacific leaders in the lead up to the Pacific Islands Forum Leaders' Meeting to:
- Reiterate Aotearoa New Zealand's concerns at the regional implications of this agreement, s6(a)
 - Reinforce our status as a valued, valuable, and values based partner to Solomon Islands; and

s6(a)

s6(a)

13. We have worked closely with Solomon Islands Government over many years s6(a) Our bilateral development cooperation allocation for the 2021-2024 triennium is NZD 88.52m, which includes budget support components for basic education, agreed economic reforms (both long term), and COVID fiscal relief.
14. Solomon Islands continues to experience severe economic impacts as a result of the COVID pandemic, with health, livelihoods and basic services further affected as a result of COVID reaching Solomon Islands in January this year. From a NZD 20m COVID fiscal relief budget you approved in June 2021, a grant contribution of NZD 5.95m in August 2021 targeted youth employment opportunities, border security and maritime safety, governance and inclusion, delivery of basic services and provincial connectivity.

Released under the
Official Information Act

Annex 1 – Updated media points — Solomon Islands-China Security Agreement

- The Solomon Islands-China security arrangement is both unwelcome and unnecessary.
- While we recognise this is a sovereign decision for Solomon Islands, it is also a matter of regional security and will have implications for all Pacific Islands Forum members.
- Pacific Islands Forum members have a strong commitment to support each other to meet our broader ambitions for our region's security as set out in the Biketawa Declaration. As Pacific neighbours, we have worked very hard together to make sure we are meeting one another's needs – including in defence and security. We are ready, willing, and able to support Solomon Islands to address any issues.
- Aotearoa New Zealand has a long-term security partnership with Solomon Islands. We are saddened that Solomon Islands has chosen nonetheless to pursue a security agreement outside the region.
- We are ^{s6(a)} concerned by the lack of transparency regarding the agreement, particularly given its regional implications. It is important that the text of the agreement is released so that we, as Pacific neighbours, can fully understand its implications for our regional security.
- It is critical that we come together as a region at the Pacific Islands Forum to hold a dialogue on this agreement and discuss its regional security implications.

Annex 2 – Australia's Joint Statement on Solomon Islands – 19 April 2022

Joint statement between Australia's Minister for International Development and the Pacific, Senator the Hon Zed Seselja and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister for Women, Senator the Hon Marise Payne

Australia is deeply disappointed by the signing of a security cooperation agreement between Solomon Islands and China, announced by the Chinese Government.

We respect Solomon Islands' right to make sovereign decisions about its national security.

Our consistently stated view, including from the perspective of Australia's national interests, remains that the Pacific family is best placed to meet the security needs of the region.

We are concerned about the lack of transparency with which this agreement has been developed, noting its potential to undermine stability in our region. We continue to seek further clarity on the terms of the agreement, and its consequences for the Pacific region.

We welcome recent statements from Prime Minister Sogavare that Australia is Solomon Islands security partner of choice, and his commitment that Solomon Islands will never be used for military bases or other military institutions of foreign powers.

Australia is consulting the Pacific family in the spirit of regional openness and transparency in a manner consistent with our regional security frameworks.

Through RAMSI and again in response to the recent unrest, the Pacific family has always supported the Solomon Islands to address their security needs. We will continue to strongly encourage the Solomon Islands to engage in regional dialogue and to work with the Pacific family first, including prior to seeking security assistance from China under this arrangement.

Annex 3 – United States Statement on U.S Consultations with Australia, Japan, and New Zealand in Honolulu - 19 April 2022

Statement by National Security Council Spokesperson, Adrienne Watson

On April 18, National Security Council Indo-Pacific Coordinator Kurt Campbell and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Kritenbrink convened a meeting in Honolulu with U.S. Navy Adm. John C. Aquilino, Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and senior officials from Australia, Japan, and New Zealand on developments in the Pacific Islands.

In Honolulu, the officials reaffirmed the four countries' enduring and shared commitment to the Pacific Islands. The United States resolved to intensify its engagement in the region to meet 21st-century challenges, from maritime security and economic development to the climate crisis and COVID-19. We will do this in ever-closer partnership with Pacific Island nations, including through a united Pacific Islands Forum; and together with like-minded countries, within and beyond the region, including in Europe.

Officials from the four countries represented also shared concerns about a proposed security framework between the Solomon Islands and the People's Republic of China (PRC) and its serious risks to a free and open Indo-Pacific. The meeting was part of regular and extensive U.S. consultations with allies and partners on the Indo-Pacific and is part of the announced senior administration travel this week to Hawaii, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands.