



**(O-leck-see Res-ne-kov)**

**Purpose of call**

This call follows the Prime Minister's call with her Ukrainian counterpart on 19 March 2022 where it was agreed that Defence Ministers would establish direct contact to determine what additional military support Ukraine would value from a small country like New Zealand.



**Key messages**

- Thank the Minister for taking this call given the current situation.
  - Pass condolences for the Ukrainian casualties suffered to date.
- Reiterate New Zealand's strong support for Ukraine's territorial integrity, and its people, and affirm our unequivocal condemnation of Russia's aggression.
  - *Ehara tāku toa I te toa takitahi, engari he toa takitahi*
  - Acknowledge the Minister's address to foreign partners on 17 March and thank him for assurances that military aid will only be used for the defence and protection of Ukraine against Russia.
- Note New Zealand's diplomatic response to the conflict, including: \$6m in humanitarian assistance; immigration support for Ukrainians; and Sanctions

*New Zealand's current military support*

- Thank the Minister for his letters on 7 March and 19 March, which have helped New Zealand identify what equipment is required to defend your country against Russia's unjustified and illegal attack.
  - Note that New Zealand is a small country with a small army and small stores of equipment, hence we will have to prioritise certain lines of support over others.
- Announce New Zealand will provide \$5m to the NATO Trust Fund for military support for Ukraine. In addition, the New Zealand Defence Force will be contributing 1066 body armour plates, 473 helmets and 571 camouflage tactical vests from our own stores.
  - Note you hope that these contributions assist the Armed Forces of Ukraine in its staunch and inspiring defence against Russia.

*Future military support*

- Inform that New Zealand continues to evaluate potential options for further support Ukraine's self-defence, including through partners such as NATO and the United Kingdom.
- Ask for the Minister's views on what further support he would prioritise from New Zealand.

- Enquire if there would there also be value in receiving such support further into the future?
- Enquire about the situation on the ground, ongoing diplomatic negotiations with Russia, and their assessment of the conflict's likely endpoint.
- Thank the Minister for his time, commend Ukraine's staunch resistance to the invasion and undertake to update him on any additional New Zealand military support in due course.

## Background

### *New Zealand's actions against Russia so far*

2. New Zealand has taken swift action against Russia, aligned with the actions of the international community. We have applied targeted sanctions designed to limit severely the Putin regime's ability to continue its war in Ukraine.
3. Our recent actions cover political and diplomatic measures, humanitarian assistance, immigration support, and implementation of New Zealand's first ever sanctions regime outside of UN auspices.
4. The New Zealand Government has moved at pace in recent weeks. In particular:
  - **Humanitarian:** We have increased our humanitarian assistance to respond to the unfolding refugee crisis, and have contributed \$6m NZD to date. New Zealand also provides funding to Ukraine through other means, for example the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund.
  - **Immigration:** On top of earlier decisions extending residency visas and granting border exemptions to incoming Ukrainians, on Tuesday the Government announced a new immigration policy to allow Ukrainian-born New Zealand citizens and residents to sponsor Ukrainian family members to come to New Zealand. This is a demonstration of the priority we place on supporting Ukraine and the Ukrainian people.
  - **Sanctions:** The Government passed the Russia Sanctions Act last week, putting in place a framework which will enable (for the first time) New Zealand to impose sanctions without UN Security Council authorisation. The first tranche of sanctions entered into force on 18 March. This brings us into closer alignment with international partners, and ensure New Zealand is not an avenue for avoiding others' sanctions regimes.
5. On 21 March, New Zealand announced we would provide \$5m to the NATO Trust Fund, 1066 body armour plates, 473 helmets and 571 camouflage tactical vests. s9(2)(g)(i), s9(2)(i)  
s9(2)(g)(i), s9(2)(i) This will be confirmed at Cabinet on Monday 28 March.
6. The materiel pledged to date will be flown from New Zealand to s6(b)(i) on an NZDF aircraft. From s6(b)(i) the materiel will be flown to the established distribution centre in Poland on an s6(b)(i) aircraft. The s6(b) have personnel at the distribution centre who can then forward the material on. The materiel will arrive in Poland in the first week of April.
7. Cabinet consider additional New Zealand military support in the coming weeks once the financial and legal considerations have been fully assessed.

*Read out of the Prime Minister's call with Ukrainian counterpart*

8. [REDACTED] s6(a)
9. [REDACTED]
10. PM Ardern outlined New Zealand's response measure, including sanctions, and our humanitarian aid. She asked PM Shmyhal what more a small country like NZ could do, referring to Ukrainian Defence Ministry requests for equipment which New Zealand did not have or would be too slow in sourcing; and other countries were providing these using the same suppliers we would use. The PM we are looking at what New Zealand could effectively supply, including radio communication equipment and food.
11. PM Shmyhal responded that there was no small or big country, just countries that have reacted. [REDACTED] s6(a)  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]
12. The call ended with the PM stressing New Zealand's ongoing support for Ukraine and that our Ministers will stay in touch.

*Ukrainian Minister of Defense's address to foreign partners*

*"For three weeks now, Ukraine has been defending itself against the Russian aggressor. In our resistance we are driven by a sense of great patriotism and firm awareness of our rightness. We are defending the rights and freedoms of Ukraine and the world. We are confronting the aggressor with the support of the entire civilized world.*

*I thank all the states, international and non-governmental organizations that have provided, are providing and will continue to provide any assistance to Ukraine, especially those who give us military-technical assistance.*

*By working together, we are stopping a terrorist of a global scale.*

*Unfortunately, as in any war, there are those who seek to profit from human suffering. Such characters introduce themselves as "advisers", "assistants", "heads of departments", and even present fake "documents" to prove their "official positions". As the Minister, I responsibly declare: all such persons are scum, looters and traitors who have nothing to do with the defense of Ukraine but work for their own and/or the enemy's pockets.*

*With this in mind, I call on the international community to be vigilant and urge you to seek clarification of the powers of all "authorized persons" in the Embassies and offices of military attachés of Ukraine and to turn all these "lords of war" with fake documents over to law enforcement agencies.*

*I officially confirm that all military aid, down to the last bullet and penny, is and will continue to be used as intended – for the defense and protection of Ukraine from the Russian occupiers. And the only right place for the looters is behind bars.*

*Together we will win!"*

*International Branch, Ministry of Defence  
March 2022*

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NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE FORCE

SUBMISSION TO MINISTER COVER SHEET

<b>Title</b>	MULTI-CATEGORY APPROPRIATION CHANGE - UKRAINE				
<b>Tracking No</b>	NZDF Tracking # 2022-093		Minister's Tracking #		
<b>Importance of the Issue</b>	High	v	Moderate	Routine	
<b>Urgency for Attention/Sign-off</b>	URGENT		Request ministerial response by:		
<b>Contacts</b>	Bridget Musker		Tel: s. 9(2)(a)	A/H: s. 9(2)(a)	
	Fiona Stockdill		Tel: s. 9(2)(a)	A/H: s. 9(2)(a)	
<b>Purpose</b>	To obtain Minister of Finance agreement to a change to the purpose statement of a Vote Defence Force Multi-Category Appropriations (MCA) and the establishment of a new category. Agreement to these changes is required in advance of a Cabinet decision on the 'Ukraine Follow on Support Options' and its associated financial implications.				
<b>Recommendations</b>	<p>I recommend that you:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. <b>Note</b> that Cabinet will be considering a paper on Monday 4 April 2022 for the follow on support options for Ukraine which requires new appropriations and changes to the scope of an existing Vote Defence Force Multi-Category Appropriation.</li> <li>b. <b>Note</b> that Treasury requires that the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Defence agree changes to the Multi-Category Appropriations before Cabinet consider transferring funding into the appropriation.</li> <li>c. <b>Agree</b> to the purpose statement change to the 'Operations Contributing to New Zealand's Security, Stability and Interests' Multi Category Appropriation, as set out in paragraph five of this note.</li> <li>d. <b>Agree</b> to establish the new category within the 'Operations Contributing to New Zealand's Security, Stability and Interests' Multi Category Appropriation, effective 1 July 2022, as set out in paragraph six of this note.</li> <li>e. <b>Forward</b> this note to the Minister of Finance for agreement.</li> </ol>				
<b>MoD/NZDF Consultation</b>	No consultation is required with the Ministry of Defence on this submission as Vote Defence Force and Vote Defence will present separately.				
<b>Minister's Comments</b>					
<b>Minister's Action</b>	Signed/Noted/Agreed/Approved/Declined/Discussion required				
	Referred to:				
<b>Minister's Signature</b>				<b>Date:</b> 04/04/2022	

KR SHORT  
Air Marshal  
Chief of Defence Force

April 2022



Headquarters  
New Zealand Defence Force  
Defence House  
Private Bag 39997  
Wellington Mail Centre  
Lower Hutt 5045  
NEW ZEALAND

NTM 2022 - 093

1 April 2022

Minister of Defence and Minister of Finance

## MULTI-CATEGORY APPROPRIATION CHANGE

### Purpose

1. To obtain Minister of Finance agreement to a change to the purpose statement of a Vote Defence Force Multi-Category Appropriations (MCA) and the establishment of a new category. Agreement to these changes is required in advance of a Cabinet decision on the 'Ukraine Follow on Support Options' and its associated financial implications.

### Context

2. Cabinet will be considering a paper on Monday 4 April 2022 for follow on support options for Ukraine. Two of the options being considered involve the provision of military capabilities which require new appropriations and changes to the scope of an existing Vote Defence Force Multi-Category appropriation.

3. Treasury requirements state that the Minister of Finance and the Minister of the Portfolio (in this case the Minister of Defence) are required to agree changes to Multi-Category appropriations before Cabinet consider transferring funding into the appropriation.

### Multi-Category Appropriation Changes

4. As part of the 2014/15 Estimates, Cabinet agreed to establish 'Operations Contributing to New Zealand's Security, Stability and Interests' Multi Category Appropriation containing two Departmental Output Expense categories in Vote Defence Force, and to incur expenses under Imprest Supply.

5. Since it was established it has become apparent that the purpose statement of the appropriation mentioned above needs to be amended to include the provision of military capabilities overseas. The proposed change, which is due to take effect from 1 July 2022, is set out in the table below:

Appropriation	Existing Purpose Statement	Amended Purpose Statement
Operations Contributing to New Zealand's Security, Stability and Interests MCA (M22) (A27)	The single overarching purpose of this appropriation is the employment of New Zealand's Armed Forces overseas at the Government's direction.	The single overarching purpose of this appropriation is the employment of New Zealand's Armed Forces overseas <b>and provision of military capabilities overseas</b> at the Government's direction.

6. Agreement is also requested to establish the following new category within the Operations Contributing to New Zealand's Security, Stability and Interests Multi Category Appropriation, effective 1 July 2022:

Vote	Appropriation Minister	Title	Type	Scope
Vote Defence Force	Minister of Defence	Military Capabilities in Support of a Rules-Based International Order	Departmental Other Expenses	This category is limited to the provision of military capabilities overseas, as directed by the Government of New Zealand.

7. Treasury were consulted in the preparation of this note.

### Recommendations

8. It is recommended you:

- a. **Note** that Cabinet will be considering a paper on Monday 4 April 2022 for the follow on support options for Ukraine which requires new appropriations and changes to the scope of an existing Vote Defence Force Multi-Category appropriation;
- b. **Note** that Treasury requires that the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Defence agree changes to the Multi-Category Appropriations before Cabinet consider transferring funding into the appropriation;
- c. **Agree** to the purpose statement change to the 'Operations Contributing to New Zealand's Security, Stability and Interests' Multi Category Appropriation, as set out in paragraph five of this note; and
- d. **Agree** to establish the new category within the 'Operations Contributing to New Zealand's Security, Stability and Interests' Multi Category Appropriation, effective 1 July 2022, as set out in paragraph six of this note.
- e. **Forward** this note to the Minister of Finance for agreement.

Agree / Not Agree  
Minister of Defence

Date: 04/04/2022

Agree / Not Agree  
Minister of Finance

Date: 04/04/2022



**Submission to the Minister of Defence**

**RUSSIA'S INVASION OF UKRAINE: IMPLICATIONS FOR  
NEW ZEALAND'S STRATEGIC DEFENCE POLICY SETTINGS**

MoD ref: 037/2022

<b>Type of submission:</b>	Defence assessment for information	<b>For action by:</b>	15 April 2022 Routine
<b>Purpose:</b>	To provide you with a defence assessment examining the implications of Russia's invasion of Ukraine for New Zealand's defence policy settings.		
<b>Cost:</b>	Nil		
<b>Current status:</b>	Final		
<b>Key risks / Limitations:</b>	Nil		

**Recommended actions:**

- a) **Note** the findings of the attached defence assessment, *Russia's invasion of Ukraine: implications for New Zealand's strategic defence policy settings*; and Yes / No
- b) **Note** Defence officials are available to discuss the findings of this assessment with you. Yes / No

MINISTER OF DEFENCE  
Date:



**ANDREW BRIDGMAN**  
Secretary of Defence  
Date: 12<sup>th</sup> April 2022

cc: **KR SHORT**  
Air Marshal  
Chief of Defence Force

<b>MOD contact:</b>	Michael Swain	<b>Ph:</b>	s9(2)(a)
<b>Agencies involved:</b>	MoD, NZDF, DPMC, MFAT, GCSB, NZSIS		

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12 April 2022

Minister of Defence

## RUSSIA'S INVASION OF UKRAINE: IMPLICATIONS FOR NEW ZEALAND'S STRATEGIC DEFENCE POLICY SETTINGS

### Purpose

1. To provide you with a defence assessment examining the implications of Russia's invasion of Ukraine for New Zealand's defence policy settings.

### Background

2. Defence assessments are a channel for the Secretary of Defence to provide advice to Ministers on issues relating to New Zealand's defence policy. Some defence assessments – such as *Defence Assessment 2021: He moana pukepuke e ekengia e te waka* – provide a comprehensive review of New Zealand's strategic environment and overall defence policy settings. Following *Defence White Paper 2016*, the Ministry of Defence instituted a programme of more focussed assessments examining particular issues of defence policy relevance. These more focussed assessment have addressed, for example: [REDACTED] s6(a) climate change; New Zealand's Pacific partnerships; and biosecurity.

### Comment

3. The attached defence assessment explores the strategic impacts of Russia's invasion of Ukraine on New Zealand's defence and national security interests, and tests the findings of *Defence Assessment 2021* in light of the new strategic environment.

4. This assessment has been developed by the Ministry of Defence, and is informed by discussions and consultation with, and related analysis and advice produced by, the New Zealand Defence Force, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Government Communications Security Bureau, and the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service. This assessment directly incorporates input provided by the New Zealand Defence Force and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.

### Next steps

5. The findings of this assessment will be used to inform future defence policy analysis and advice, including the planned defence policy review process.

6. Defence officials are available to discuss the findings of this assessment with you.

## Recommendations

7. We recommend you:

- a. Note the findings of the attached defence assessment, *Russia's invasion of Ukraine: implications for New Zealand's strategic defence policy settings*; and
- b. Note Defence officials are available to discuss the findings of this assessment with you.

**MINISTER OF DEFENCE**

Date:



**ANDREW BRIDGMAN**  
Secretary of Defence  
12 April 2022

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# **RUSSIA'S INVASION OF UKRAINE: IMPLICATIONS FOR NEW ZEALAND'S STRATEGIC DEFENCE POLICY SETTINGS**

**New Zealand Defence Assessment**

12 April 2022

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**MANATŪ KAUPAPA  
WAONGA**  
NEW ZEALAND  
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

# RUSSIA'S INVASION OF UKRAINE: IMPLICATIONS FOR NEW ZEALAND'S STRATEGIC DEFENCE POLICY SETTINGS

## New Zealand Defence Assessment

12 April 2022

- Russia's invasion of Ukraine is an inflection point in global security. The invasion fundamentally challenges the international rules-based system. [REDACTED] s6(a)  
[REDACTED] The invasion further degrades the international strategic environment, with consequent impacts for New Zealand's security interests over both the immediate and longer terms.
- The international response has been strong, rapid and cohesive, and has made broad use of harder edged tools of statecraft. [REDACTED] s6(a)  
[REDACTED]
- The invasion and the international responses are consistent with the findings of *Defence Assessment 2021*. They suggest, however, that New Zealand's strategic environment is changing both more rapidly and more significantly than the Assessment anticipated. [REDACTED] s6(a)
- The fundamental direction of the recommendations provided in *Defence Assessment 2021* for New Zealand's defence policy settings remains sound: Defence should still seek to more proactively pursue New Zealand's security interests, in concert with international partners, with a particular – but not exclusive – focus on the Pacific.

[REDACTED] s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)



Andrew Bridgman  
Secretary of Defence

1. Russia's invasion of Ukraine is an inflection point in global security. One of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council is conducting a premeditated and unprovoked armed attack against another state, without any legal or moral justification, sparking a tragedy with global consequences. Much remains uncertain, both about the trajectory of the war in Ukraine itself and the broader international impacts. But it is clear the invasion signals a further degrading of the global strategic environment with both immediate and longer term consequences, with resulting impacts for New Zealand's security interests.

2. This assessment explores the strategic impacts of Russia's invasion of Ukraine on New Zealand's defence and national security interests, and tests the findings of *Defence Assessment 2021* in light of this strategic environment.

### **Russia's invasion of Ukraine has further degraded the global strategic environment**

*Russia's invasion of Ukraine is a fundamental challenge to the international rules-based system*

3. Over recent years, much international security attention has focussed on the "grey zone": the space between peace and war in which actors seek to pursue their objectives while avoiding or mitigating international responses. Russia has undertaken a range of grey zone activities, [REDACTED] s6(a)

4. While grey zone activities present security challenges, Russia's escalation from using such activities against Ukraine over the past several years, alongside its 2014 annexation of Crimea, to undertaking a full military invasion fundamentally challenges the underlying principles of the international rules-based system, in addition to its transformational impact on European security. [REDACTED] s6(a)

*The international response has been strong, coordinated and cohesive*

5. The international response to Russia's invasion has been strong, rapid and cohesive. NATO and European Union states in particular, together with their global partners and likeminded states (including New Zealand) have put in place very substantial actions

[REDACTED] s6(a) These actions involve broad use of harder edged tools of statecraft, including deep diplomatic and economic sanctions against Russia, the provision of wide-ranging military support for Ukraine<sup>1</sup>, [REDACTED] s6(a)

6. These states have largely acted outside formal United Nations mechanisms – due to Russia's Security Council veto – but have acted in accordance with United Nations principles

<sup>1</sup> International military aid provided to Ukraine since the start of the invasion now includes small arms, missile systems and body armour sets numbering in the tens of thousands, alongside other types of both non-lethal and lethal defensive equipment, as well as military aid totalling in the billions of dollars.

(and indeed have acted in alignment with the United Nations General Assembly resolution demanding Russia “immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders”).

7. But these states have also been clear they will not seek to directly enter the conflict.

s6(a)



11. Although actions taken in support of Ukraine and against Russia have enjoyed broad international – and particularly diplomatic – support, fewer states have taken more practical steps.

s6(a)

*The invasion and the responses are consistent with the findings of Defence Assessment 2021, but accelerated*

12. *Defence Assessment 2021* described increasing strategic competition as a principal challenge to New Zealand’s security interests that will increase the potential for

confrontation and conflict globally. The Assessment described Russia as presenting an acute and ongoing threat to European security, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Assessment also set out that many states, notably including the United States and New Zealand's other close security partners, were seeking to respond to increasing strategic competition in ways that included marshalling collective responses with likeminded states to reinforce the underlying values and principles of the international rules-based system.

13. Broadly, Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the international response are consistent with the analysis set out in *Defence Assessment 2021*, but if anything show that New Zealand's strategic environment is changing more rapidly than the Assessment anticipated. [REDACTED] s6(a)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] s6(a)

15. We now anticipate even further acceleration of global strategic competition. [REDACTED] s6(a)

[REDACTED]

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s6(a)

*But many questions remain unanswered*

21. The longer term impact of the Ukraine crisis will be shaped by the conduct and outcome of Russia's invasion, which remain deeply uncertain.

s6(a)

s6(a)



s6(a)

**The direction of New Zealand's defence policy remains sound, but demands will increase**

*The direction of the policy recommendations of Defence Assessment 2021 remains sound*

25. As described above, Russia's invasion of Ukraine will mean a strategic environment that is consistent with that set out in *Defence Assessment 2021*, but one that is even more rapidly changing and with increasing challenges to New Zealand's security interests. The fundamentals of the policy settings recommended in *Defence Assessment 2021* therefore remain sound, but the drivers for these recommended settings are now more urgent.

26. A further degraded strategic environment further strengthens the case for a deliberate, strategy-led approach to New Zealand's defence policy. As set out in *Defence Assessment 2021*, Defence will need to: take a rigorously prioritised approach to pursuing New Zealand's security interests; proactively shape New Zealand's environment; and act in concert with both other New Zealand agencies and international partners.

27. The logic set out in the Assessment that argues for a primary focus on the Pacific, and on New Zealand's immediate neighbourhood more generally, remains sound. This remains the region where New Zealand's security is most immediately affected, and where New Zealand can have the greatest relative strategic impact.

s6(a)

s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

28. *Defence Assessment 2021* was also clear, however, that a primary focus on the Pacific should not preclude Defence from operating and contributing to international security further afield. The Assessment described the ongoing requirement for Defence to be able to make materially valuable and credible contributions to addressing global security challenges, particularly in the wider Indo-Pacific. These contributions support New Zealand's security partnerships, provide a meaningful contribution to the international rules-based system and enable New Zealand's international standing.

s6(a)

s6(a)

s6(a)

s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

s6(a)

s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

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34. As described above, however, much of the longer term impact still remains uncertain, and highly dependent on events that will take place in coming days and weeks. But the trend of a worsening strategic environment and sharpening competition is clear.

#### **Conclusion**

35. Russia's invasion of Ukraine is one of the most serious global security crises since the end of World War Two. The invasion is a material breach of the international rules-based system that will exacerbate pre-existing negative trends, and means a world that is less

secure and in which New Zealand's interests are under even greater challenge.

s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

36. These increasing demands within New Zealand's region, and more acute international responses further afield, require a responding close examination of New Zealand's defence strategy, force structure and resourcing to ensure Defence remains effective into the future. The planned defence policy review process will be a key mechanism for addressing these issues.

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**From:** Beck, Darren LTCOL  
**Sent:** Wednesday, 20 April 2022 8:54 a.m.  
**To:** 'Defence Portfolio'; Ministerial Services  
**Cc:** Woods, Andy AIRCDRE; Taylor, Kevin  
**Subject:** RE: SEEMAIL FW: Email Question about sending Engineers to Ukraine

Response as follows sir...

*The NZ Government has not considered any deployment of personnel in Ukraine itself, and that is not currently an option. As for other like-minded nations New Zealand has chosen to provide a range of support which does not involve deploying personnel to Ukraine.*

D

**Lieutenant Colonel Darren Beck**  
Executive Officer – Office of the CDF  
Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force  
34 Bowen Street | Wellington 6011

s. 9(2)(a)

[www.nzdf.mil.nz](http://www.nzdf.mil.nz)



**From:** Defence Portfolio [mailto:Defence.Portfolio@parliament.govt.nz]  
**Sent:** Friday, 15 April 2022 7:24 a.m.  
**To:** Ministerial Services <ministerialservices@nzdf.mil.nz>  
**Cc:** Woods, Andy AIRCDRE s. 9(2)(a); Beck, Darren LTCOL  
s. 9(2)(a)  
**Subject:** SEEMAIL FW: Email Question about sending Engineers to Ukraine



For response please.

Ngā Mihi/ Thanks,

s. 9(2)(a)

(he/him)

Military Secretary to the Minister of Defence | Office of Hon Peeni Henare  
Minister of Defence | Minister for Whānau Ora

Associate Minister of Health | Associate Minister of Tourism | Associate Minister of Housing (Māori Housing) |

s. 9(2)(a) Private Bag 18041, Parliament Buildings, Wellington 6160, New Zealand

**From:** Hon Peeni Henare  
**Sent:** Monday, 11 April 2022 12:52 PM  
**To:** Defence Portfolio <Defence.Portfolio@parliament.govt.nz>  
**Subject:** FW: Engineers

PH2292

Ngā mihi



s. 9(2)(a) Private Secretary (Executive Support)

Office of Hon Peeni Henare

E: s. 9(2)(a)@parliament.govt.nz

M: Private Bag 18041, Parliament Buildings, Wellington 6160, New Zealand

Authorised by Hon Peeni Henare, Wellington

**From:** s. 9(2)(a) On Behalf Of Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern

**Sent:** Monday, 11 April 2022 10:22 AM

**To:** P Henare (MIN) <p.henare@ministers.govt.nz>

**Subject:** FW: Engineers

Hi s. 9(2)(a)

Able to accept?

Thanks

s. 9(2)(a)

**From:** s. 9(2)(a) [mailto:s.9(2)(a)@xtra.co.nz]

**Sent:** Sunday, 10 April 2022 15:32

**To:** Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern <Jacinda.Ardern@parliament.govt.nz>

**Subject:** Engineers

Prime Minister , Is there any reason why we cannot send NZ Army Engineers to Ukraine to assist with constructing physical defences against the invading forces?

Cheers

s. 9(2)(a)

the C-130H (NZ) can carry 90 personnel

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**From:** Beck, Darren LTCOL  
**Sent:** Wednesday, 20 April 2022 9:05 a.m.  
**To:** 'Defence Portfolio'; Ministerial Services  
**Cc:** Woods, Andy AIRCDRE; Taylor, Kevin  
**Subject:** RE: [seemail] FW: Skills offer for the Deployment to Germany in support of the UK Military

Proposed response as follows:

*Thank you for your kind offer s. 9(2)(a). The NZDF will be working closely in partnership with likeminded nations to consolidate and coordinate support to Ukraine from a number of European hubs. This support is provided through a large multi-national inter-agency effort with all the necessary skills and experience required to undertake this complex task. Unfortunately the NZDF is not in a position to facilitate private individual offers of support.*

D

**Lieutenant Colonel Darren Beck**  
Executive Officer – Office of the CDF  
Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force  
34 Bowen Street | Wellington 6011

s. 9(2)(a)

[www.nzdf.mil.nz](http://www.nzdf.mil.nz)



**From:** Defence Portfolio [mailto:Defence.Portfolio@parliament.govt.nz]  
**Sent:** Friday, 15 April 2022 7:19 a.m.  
**To:** Ministerial Services <ministerialservices@nzdf.mil.nz>  
**Cc:** Woods, Andy AIRCDRE s. 9(2)(a); Beck, Darren LTCOL  
s. 9(2)(a)  
**Subject:** [seemail] FW: Skills offer for the Deployment to Germany in support of the UK Military



For action please.

Ngā Mihi/ Thanks,

s. 9(2)(a)

(he/him)

Military Secretary to the Minister of Defence | Office of Hon Peeni Henare  
Minister of Defence | Minister for Whānau Ora

Associate Minister of Health | Associate Minister of Tourism | Associate Minister of Housing (Māori Housing) |

s. 9(2)(a)

Private Bag 18041, Parliament Buildings, Wellington 6160, New Zealand

**From:** Hon Peeni Henare  
**Sent:** Wednesday, 13 April 2022 12:04 PM  
**To:** Defence Portfolio <Defence.Portfolio@parliament.govt.nz>  
**Subject:** FW: Skills offer for the Deployment to Germany in support of the UK Military

PH2323

Ngā mihi



s. 9(2)(a) | Private Secretary (Executive Support)

Office of Hon Peeni Henare

E: s. 9(2)(a)@parliament.govt.nz

M: Private Bag 18041, Parliament Buildings, Wellington 6160, New Zealand

Authorised by Hon Peeni Henare, Wellington

From: s. 9(2)(a)@hotmail.co.nz

Sent: Tuesday, 12 April 2022 8:28 AM

To: P Henare (MIN) <p.henare@ministers.govt.nz>

Subject: Skills offer for the Deployment to Germany in support of the UK Military

Dear Minister Henare,

I wish to offer my service, skills and and experience to support the eight strong Logistical Support team that NZ is deploying to Germany, plus indirectly serving NZ, the UK and most importantly the people of the Ukraine u□.

Having the following, I believe I can both add to and compliment the skill sets that are being sent; s. 9(2)(a)

[Redacted text block]

I believe there could be a space for me on the aircraft, if I were to fly as Supernumerary Aircrew; s. 9(2)(a)

[Redacted text block]

I hope that you will look favourably upon this request and offer, I do realise it is not without its difficulties, but I believe they are easily overcome with a will to do so. I can be contact by return email or via s. 9(2)(a) ..

Regards s. 9(2)(a)

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28 Apr 2022

## DOT-POINT BRIEF FOR MINDEF

### UPDATE ON NZDF SUPPORT TO UKRAINE (OP TĪEKE)

#### General

- 65 personnel of a mandated 66 personnel are now deployed. All force elements have arrived, have settled in, and are now well integrated (less one person awaiting their UK security clearance) in their respective locations. The UK have been excellent hosts.
- Our personnel are providing a valued and meaningful contribution to the international efforts to support the Ukraine.
- As our contribution is highly valued by the UK and the International Donor Co-ordination Centre, it is likely that our force elements will be requested to stay longer than the mandated timeline (60 day for the C130H Air Task Group and 90 days for the remainder). Options for this are being prepared by Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand.
- [REDACTED] s6(a) [REDACTED] TVNZ and NewsHub London office are interested in interviewing Air Task Group personnel next week, and this is being facilitated by Defence Public Affairs.

#### Logistics Task Group

- Located at the International Donor Co-ordination Centre (IDCC), Stuttgart, Germany. Consists of 8 personnel: 3 x Staff Officers in the IDCC HQ and a 5 person IDCC Mobile Team (IMT).
- The three staff officers are well integrated into the IDCC HQ. They are also working alongside the Ukraine liaison team who are passing on Ukraine's needs to the IDCC.
- The NZ IMT has become the fourth mobile team, seeing NZ providing 25% of the effort to this critical enabling function. The IMT's effectively scope the suitability of tasks on behalf of the IDCC, who then allocate assets to effect the task e.g. the NZ C-130H.
- As the NZ IMT has an Ammunition Technician, they are in high demand. This was a crucial factor in securing the first task for the NZ C-130 [REDACTED] s6(a), s6(b)(i) [REDACTED]
- A second task for the C-130H is currently being scoped to move Humanitarian Aid from Malta.
- A third task for the C-130H is currently being scoped to move more ammunition. Location TBC.

#### Air Task Group

- Located at RAF Base Brize Norton, UK. Mandated for up to 50 personnel; currently at 49 personnel. Well integrated into UK air operations at Brize Norton.
- First task to [REDACTED] s6(a) [REDACTED] 25-29 April. Task will be a combined effort with the [REDACTED] s6(b)(i) [REDACTED] (also committed to IDCC tasking). The task will primarily focus on moving ammunition (120mm Mortar ammunition). The first flights have been conducted successfully.
- Achieving Diplomatic Clearance for overflight of countries remains a critical requirement to enable the conduct of missions, and is an area of focus.



- The Task Group is experiencing a COVID wave, but this is manageable and personnel are returning to duty following their isolation time.

**Embedded Staff Officers**

- Located in the UK and Brussels, Belgium. A total of 8 personnel. Consists of intelligence personnel, staff officers, and liaison officers. All deployed personnel are well integrated and adding value.



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s9(2)(a)

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