New Zealand
DEFENCE
FORCE
Te Ope Kātua O Aotearoa

NAVY | NZ ARMY | AIR FORCE

New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

STABILISATION OPERATIONS: THE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION

NZDDP–3.21

New Zealand Government

STABILISATION OPERATIONS: THE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION (NZDDP–3.21)

New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication: *Stabilisation Operations: The Military Contribution* (NZDDP–3.21) is issued for use by the New Zealand Defence Force and is effective forthwith for guidance in defence doctrine.

T.J. Keating
Lieutenant General
Chief of Defence Force
Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force

October 2015

AUTHORISATION

Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force is responsible for publishing doctrine and maintaining a hierarchy of such publications. Users wishing to quote New Zealand doctrinal publications as reference material in other work should confirm with the Deputy Director Doctrine whether the publication and amendment state remain extant. Comments on the factual accuracy or proposals for amendment should also be directed to the Deputy Director Doctrine at:

The Doctrine Cell
Directorate of Future Force Development
Capability Branch
Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force
Freyberg House
2–12 Aitken Street
Wellington
New Zealand

DTelN:	349 7477
Telephone:	+64 4 496 0477
Facsimile:	+64 4 496 0699
Email:	nzdf.doctrine@nzdf.mil.nz
NZDF intranet:	http://doctrine/desc/nzddp/3.21.htm

CUSTODIAN
Commander Joint Forces New Zealand
Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand

PREFACE

Scope

New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication *Stabilisation Operations: The Military Contribution* (NZDDP–3.21) is the principal doctrine on stabilisation within the NZDF framework of campaigns and joint operations. The publication provides guidance regarding the NZDF's role within all-of-government stabilisation operations. This publication also provides guidance for operating in support of New Zealand Government agencies, foreign governments and intergovernmental organisations undertaking stabilisation activities.

Purpose

The key purpose of NZDDP–3.21 is to describe the doctrine applicable to stabilisation activities throughout the NZDF. NZDDP–3.21 informs the NZDF's strategic and operational planners and commanders, as well as officials in other government agencies of the nature of stabilisation operations. It describes the inter-agency context wherein military forces are used to deliver the security component of stabilisation. NZDDP–3.21 *Stabilisation Operations: The Military Contribution* also helps to inform a wider, non-military audience involved in stabilisation activities in order to enable a common understanding of the problem.

Application

NZDDP–3.21 provides a model of stabilisation and describes how military activity can coordinate a coherent multinational and multi-agency response to the challenges of stabilisation. NZDDP–3.21 provides an expanded approach to intelligence, the process and output of analysis, and considers cross-government campaign planning.

Structure

- Part 1: *Stabilisation*
  - Chapter 1: *The International System and the Problem of Fragile and Failed States*
  - Chapter 2: *The Stabilisation of Fragile States*
- Part 2: *The Military Contribution to Stabilisation*
  - Chapter 3: *Influence: The Central Idea*
  - Chapter 4: *Operational Guidance*
  - Chapter 5: *Security and Security Force Capacity Building*
  - Chapter 6: *Capacity Building and Economic Development*
- Part 3: *Intelligence, Analysis and Planning*
  - Chapter 7: *Intelligence and Understanding in Stabilisation Operations*
  - Chapter 8: *The Use of Analysis in Stabilisation Operations*
  - Chapter 9: *Planning Stabilisation Campaigns*
- Part 4: *The Conduct of Stabilisation Operations*
  - Chapter 10: *The Conduct of Operations*
  - Chapter 11: *Measuring Campaign Success*
  - Chapter 12: *Anticipate, Learn, and Adapt*

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The New Zealand Defence Force acknowledges its intellectual debt in preparing this publication to a number of military doctrinal publications, listed below:

- NZDDP–3.0 *Campaigns and Operations* (2nd Edition), 2015, Wellington, New Zealand.
- NZDDP–4.0 *Defence Logistics*, 2013, Wellington, New Zealand.
- DM 69 (2nd Edition), Volume 4, *The Law of Armed Conflict* (to be published early 2016).
- AJP 3.4.1, *Peace Support Operations*, 2002, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Brussels, Belgium.
- AJP-3.14 *Force Protection*, 2007, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Brussels, Belgium.
- JDP 0-01, *British Defence Doctrine* (4th Edition), 2014, Ministry of Defence, London, United Kingdom.
- JDP 01 *Campaigning* (2nd Edition), December 2008, Ministry of Defence, London, United Kingdom.
- JDP 3-40 *Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution*, November 2009, Ministry of Defence, London, United Kingdom.
- JDP 5.0 *Campaign Planning* (2nd Edition), 2013, Ministry of Defence, London, United Kingdom.
- JP 3-07 *Stability Operations*, September 2011, Department of Defense, Washington D.C. United States of America.
- FM 3-07 *Stability Operations,* 2008, United States Army, Washington D.C. United States of America.
- JDN 2/08 *Integrated Air–Land Operations in Contemporary Warfare*, 2008, Ministry of Defence, London, United Kingdom.

Other works referenced or relied upon in this publication are listed below.

- *American Security Project*, Bernard Finel and Holly Gell, 2008.
- *Bunch of Five*, Kitson, Faber and Faber, 1997.
- *Burden of Victroy*: The Painful Arithemtic of Stability Operations, James Quinlivan, Rand Corporation.
- *Counterinsurgency Redux*, David Kilcullen, Survival, Volume 48, 2006/7.
- *Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves, Fifth Emerges*, Military Review, May/Jun 2007.
- *Iraqi's Sunni Insurgency*, Alephi Paper 402, Admed S. Hashin.
- *Joint Operations: A Short History*, Dr Stuart Griffin, March 2005.
- *New Dimensions of Human Security*, United Nations Development Report, 1994.
- *The Accidental Guerilla*, David Kilcullen, Hurst and Company, London, 2009.
- *The Convention Against Torture, and other Cruelty, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment*, UN General Assembly, 1984.
- *The Irish War*, Tony Geraghty, John Hopkins University Press, 2000.
- *We Were Caught Unprepared*, Long War Series Occiasional Papers, US Army, CAC Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008.
- *United Kingdom Strategy for Countering International Terrorism*, March, 2009.
- United States Interagency COIN Guide, State Department, Washington D.C. 2007.

CONTENTS

CONTENTS (cont.)

CONTENTS (cont.)

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS (cont.)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Chapter One: The International System and the Problem of Fragile and Failed States

This chapter describes the role of states in the international system and provides a framework for understanding state fragility. Stabilisation generally takes place within fragile or failed states. It is the seriousness of the political, social or economic implications arising from the fragility and possible failure of a state that provides the context for a decision to employ military means in pursuit of stabilisation.

Chapter Two: The Stabilisation of Fragile States

This chapter begins by outlining the purpose of intervention into fragile states and the evolution of the New Zealand approach through experience in counter-insurgency (COIN), peace support operations (PSOs) and recent intervention operations. It then builds a model of stabilisation that is developed from the state model in Chapter 1 before describing the key conflict relationship and how military activity can be used to influence this relationship. It finishes by examining some of the issues that arise in coordinating a coherent multinational and multi-agency response to the challenges of stabilisation.

Chapter Three: Influence: The Central Idea

This chapter takes as its central theme the idea that all activity has influence. Through a sound understanding of target audiences, activity should be focused to achieve the desired influence. It also considers how strategic communications and information operations (IO) can support this. All military action should be assessed by its contribution toward influencing the key conflict relationship and shaping the eventual political settlement. The perceptions, beliefs, attitudes and opinions of individuals and groups are all fundamental to this outcome, so, influence is the guiding idea for the conduct of operations. Analysis, planning, execution and assessment then become a function of two questions: What effect do we want to achieve? What actions will best achieve that effect?

This is not a reprise of a mechanistic form of an Effects Based Approach to Operations, which simply does not work for complex, variable human systems. However, it requires commanders to consider the relationship between effects, the influence necessary to achieve those effects, and the activities to achieve that influence. Everything that we do, every action we take, will have an influence on part of the conflict relationship.

As well as the conflict relationship within the host-nation, there may be a need to shape domestic audiences, key regional leaders and populations, coalition partners, diaspora communities and broader international opinion. The importance of these relationships may wax and wane, but the relationship between the host-nation government, competing elites and the wider population should always remain the focus.

The desired outcome of cross-government activities is to change or maintain the character or behaviour of agreed audiences through physical and psychological means. All multi-agency capabilities can contribute to this process. To achieve the desired outcome, activities need to be coordinated and focused. Psychological effects are the lasting and decisive elements in stabilisation. But this is not easy. Human beings are neither benign nor passive; they will respond to influence in different ways. The inherent risk is that we cannot control how actions, words and images are received and processed. Good analysis and understanding will mitigate this risk.

Chapter Four: Operational Guidance

This chapter provides the reader with an overview of some stabilisation considerations, so that they may contribute to the campaign planning process, and offer operational guidance. It seeks to operationalise the stabilisation model and describes the practical

application of operational art in stabilisation. It briefly considers the issues of leadership and ethics. Finally, it offers some conceptual ideas for the delivery of the military contribution and describes the military principles for stabilisation.

Chapter Five: Security and Security Force Capacity Building

This chapter examines security as the bedrock of stability and looks at the options available to the military commander when deciding what their contribution to security could be.

A state which is unable to exercise a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence may fragment, or even collapse. Where this occurs, the primary role of a military commander is to use their force to arrest this fragmentation and re-establish a safe and secure environment. The military should always consider not only the immediate measures that may be required to deliver a safe environment for all to operate in, but also the long-term drivers of insecurity. If the latter is neglected then any improvement in security may only be temporary. However, in many situations, without security in the short term, there is no possibility of long term progress either.

Chapter Six: Capacity Building and Economic Development

This chapter describes the military contribution to governance capacity building and the wider non-military components of security and justice sector reform. It describes anti-corruption measures and the challenges of developing police capability and discusses the military contribution to economic and infrastructure development. The ability to govern, and to be seen to govern, fairly and consistently becomes a precondition of long-term stability. Regardless of the success of an intervention, international actors will be unable to compensate for a government that does not undertake necessary reform. Success depends on the host-nation government.

Improved governance helps to reduce grievances and marginalise adversarial groups intent on portraying the state as ineffective and corrupt. Conversely, where governance is authoritarian, exclusionary or corrupt, it fosters conflict and undermines the legitimacy of the state. This is often the case where a dominant ethnic, religious, or sectarian group dominates an unrepresentative government. Stability results from both a political settlement and an effective, representative government.

Support to governance has two dimensions, fostering the processes that underpin a political settlement (elite consolidation) and enhancing the state's ability to function (capacity building). The former dimension attempts to allocate power amongst competing elites in order to resolve the conflict. The latter dimension is about generating sufficient institutional capacity for the state to fulfil its survival functions and meet at least some of the expectations of the population. A balance must be struck between these two imperatives. For example, it is common for governments to use public appointments to cement alliances and reduce opposition. Political settlements may depend upon a degree of patronage which undermines broader institution-building initiatives in the short term.

A realistic immediate aim would be to support steps toward good enough governance without undermining parallel processes of elite consolidation. While good governance may be characterised by inclusiveness, accountability, transparency, efficiency, equity, legality, and decency; good enough governance could be defined as the ability of the host government to balance the priorities of powerful elites with basic security, administrative and service delivery tasks on a sustained basis. Accordingly, good enough governance is likely to be relationship and personality-based and only later extends to large-scale institution building.

Poverty can be both a cause and effect of conflict, and should be addressed as part of a comprehensive approach to stabilisation. While aid relieves poverty in the short term, only sustained economic growth can reduce it in the long-term. However, standard economic interventions designed to address familiar development problems are often inappropriate in conflict-affected

societies. In these circumstances, effective programmes require an understanding of how economies change during conflict and how targeted economic and infrastructure development initiatives can prise open possibilities for political settlements and vice versa. For example, improvements in employment prospects not only help raise people out of poverty, but may support an emerging political settlement by bolstering support for host government authorities, while reducing the pool of frustrated under-employed young men and women from which adversaries can readily recruit.

Key areas for development to enable reform include; property rights; policy predictability; legal and administrative reform; trade facilitation; financial services, tax policy and risk ratings.[1] Campaign planners might usefully check that development initiatives address these issues. However, they are not easily resolved and it should be clear that the process of economic and infrastructure development is likely to be a long one, and is wholly dependent on civilian agencies.

Growth requires a stable and secure environment. In helping to deliver this environment, the military will always have a significant, if indirect, contribution to make. Accordingly, while economic measures and reconstruction are not the panacea for stability, they should constitute a significant component of the solution. Priorities for international agencies and forces include measures designed to stabilise the economy, protect, and reconstruct critical economic infrastructure, generate employment, and address any underlying economic drivers of conflict.

Chapter Seven: Intelligence and Understanding in Stabilisation Operations

This chapter describes an expanded approach to intelligence. Stabilisation demands of the joint intelligence (J2) community a far wider span of expertise than conventional operations. Military intelligence has traditionally focused on analysis, based upon doctrinal models and equipment capability; for example, when and where a tank regiment may cross a river. In stabilisation, understanding is about unique human dimensions. The J2 staff is likely to be required to advise on the intricacies of applied sociology or economics as on the adversary order of battle. This is the expanded terrain pertinent to stabilisation.

Chapter Eight: The Use of Analysis in Stabilisation Operations

This chapter describes the process and output of analysis. It explains the imperative to analyse the interaction of key groups and their impact on national politics. Before attempting to solve a problem, it is necessary to understand it. Analysis is the process by which that understanding is achieved, and from which the commander can begin to develop scenarios that test their theory for change, based on a clear grasp of the strategic context. Supported by intelligence, it provides the basic knowledge that informs planning. The output can then inform the joint military appreciation and provide the depth of understanding necessary to plan and execute military operations.

Chapter Nine: Planning Stabilisation Campaigns

Chapter 9 considers cross-government campaign and operations planning. A winning military strategy hinges on the successful union of ends (outcomes), ways (objectives and the paths to them) and means (resources, including time). A significant part of strategy is about weighting the means. A comprehensive approach requires resources to be drawn from a multinational, inter-agency setting and brought to bear at the right time and sequence, and in the right place. The management of this is made all the more difficult because achieving the conditions for success within a comprehensive approach occur at different rates.

[1] Mauro De Lorenzo, *Why Entrepreneurship and Business Climate Reform Should Be the Centrepiece of Peace-Building Operations,* Ibid.

In-theatre planning will be conducted at all levels and in different locations. There will be a profusion of plans that, while linked, will rarely form a neat hierarchy. There can only be one campaign plan however, which must be understood and supported in letter and spirit by all involved. The need for plans to be aligned creates tension between the actors. The skill is to avoid the destructive potential of this tension, and instead use it creatively. Assimilating cross-government objectives into a theatre integrated plan will provide a reference point against which disaggregated yet coherent planning can take place. Planners should then prioritise, synchronise and sequence activity to achieve pan-theatre coherence.

Only in exceptional and unusual circumstances will purely military objectives be appropriate. All activity, military or otherwise, that supports the campaign objectives is conducted for political purpose. Activity conducted in isolation will only achieve short-term narrow effects, or be nugatory and fail to contribute in any meaningful way to the long-term solution. Military planners must constantly ask themselves: 'how does my planned activity support the wider, cross-government/coalition initiative; and, does my plan tie-in sufficient cross-government/coalition support?'

Chapter Ten: The Conduct of Operations

This chapter describes the conduct of military operations using a population focused activity framework. The framework of Shape – Secure – Hold – Develop is a model designed to enable a shared lexicon, a common understanding and characterisation of stabilisation activities in a multi-agency community. It allows the commander to explain their operational design and intent. The commander can use it to describe what activities are being conducted at any given moment, where they are planned to be conducted, and by whom. In this sense, the framework can help operationalise the plan.

At the theatre level, this framework is not applied in a linear or sequential manner. Instead, there is overlap and concurrency of activity, as areas that have previously been secured and held become ready for greater civilian-led development activity, while elsewhere other areas or population groups are still being secured. In contrast, at the tactical level, the framework is more likely to be applied sequentially. Allowing for these differences in approach, the framework has utility across all levels of the operation. In any circumstance, within the framework of stabilisation activity, conventional tactical military activity will take place. It will be necessary within Shape – Secure – Hold – Develop to continue to raid, deter, disrupt, deny, contain, retain, mentor, monitor, conduct surveillance and partner in order to further campaign objectives.

Civilian-led development has a pivotal role in the stabilisation process. Military and civil effort must be aligned so that neither is wasted. This is a key function of the planning process. A military force will require a civilian effort to conduct development. Where the civilian force is missing, a new plan will be required. Hold is described as a separate element of the framework because of the inherent risk in the transition from military-led Secure, through Hold, to civilian-led Develop. Hold is the defining moment in the campaign; the point at which the weight of effort shifts from the military to civilian agencies. It is critical that this civil-led development is planned and cued during Shape and Secure. Hold is the point at which host-nation security forces are likely to be invested into the campaign in strength, and where they begin to assume formal responsibility for local security. In turn, this allows the international forces to progress on to other, new areas and begin to Secure them. It is in this way that campaign influence spreads and progress is made.

The Shape – Secure – Hold – Develop framework has a clear relevance to the United States (US) approach of Clear – Hold – Build. The British and New Zealand version simply reflects the importance we place on Shape in order to develop both understanding and plans, and to cue civilian agency support for subsequent Develop activity; Secure reflects a focus on the population rather than just terrain or enemy; and Develop is used because it describes more intuitively the development of capacity, primarily by civilian development organisations.

Chapter Eleven: Measuring Campaign Success

This chapter describes the factors to consider in the design of campaign assessment. First, determine the conditions to be achieved (outcomes/objectives) of activity and their impact on the wide range of audiences. Second, the time-lag between cause and ultimate effect. The rush to measure the outcome of activity before its condition can be determined can distort decision-making. Some of the conditions, particularly the most important ones that are designed to affect people's perceptions, may take considerable time to mature.

Assessment is a feature of military campaigning and has a role to play both in making better sense of a state in crisis and justifying resources. Assessment is the evaluation of progress, based on levels of subjective and objective measurement in order to inform decision-making.[2] It combines art and science:

- specific metrics should be designed, collected and subsequently analysed – that is the science part
- interpretation demands judgement, intuition, imagination and insight – that is the art part.

Chapter Twelve: Anticipate, Learn, and Adapt

This chapter sets out an approach for military organisations to become anticipatory, learning, and adaptive organisations in order to gain and maintain the initiative. To be fully effective, this will need to be integrated locally, internationally and with inter-agency partners.

---

[2] Joint Doctrine Publication 01,*Campaigning* (2nd Edition) December 2008

PART 1:

STABILISATION

New Zealand **Defence Doctrine Publication**

CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1:

THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AND THE PROBLEM OF FRAGILE AND FAILED STATES

CONTENTS

Introduction

1.01 This chapter describes the role of states in the international system and provides a framework for understanding state fragility. Stabilisation generally takes place within fragile or failed states. It is the seriousness of the political, social, or economic implications arising from the fragility and possible failure of a state that provides the context for a decision to employ military means in pursuit of stabilisation. This chapter provides an understanding of the features of the international system and state fragility that forms the broad framework within which stabilisation efforts are conducted.

Key Terms

Fragile and Failed States

Countries that have a politically significant presence of irregular activity[3] are likely to sit within the spectrum of fragile and failed states.

A Fragile State

A fragile state still has a viable national government, but it has a reduced capability and capacity to secure, protect and govern the population. Without intervention, it is likely to become a failed state.

A Failed State

A failed state is where remnants of a national government, or some form of potential host-nation government, may still exist. However, in such states, the government does not have a monopoly on the use of force, cannot provide security or simple basic services, and is not sufficiently legitimate or effective to protect its borders, citizens, or even itself. It may exert a very weak level of governance and rule of law in all or part of the state but, overall, the mechanisms and tools of governance have largely collapsed.

The Role of States in the International System

The International System

1.02 A characteristic of the contemporary operating environment is the increasing number of transnational actors that seek to shape and influence global affairs. These include inter-governmental organisations (IGOs), international organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and multinational corporations (MNCs). IGOs are organisations 'that may be established by a constituent document such as a charter, a treaty or a convention, which when signed by the founding members, provides the IGO with legal recognition'[4] such as the United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European Union (EU). An NGO is 'a voluntary, non-profit making organisation that is generally independent of government, international organisations or commercial interests', while a MNC has no single authoritative definition but can be understood as 'a company that has branches or subsidiaries outside their home country'.[5] However, in spite of this fragmentation of political influence, states are still central to the international system.

1.03 The number of member states of the UN has increased from 51 in 1945 to 192 in 2009. This indicates the powerful attraction of statehood. Political communities have overwhelmingly sought legitimacy and validation by seeking to establish a recognised state. However internationally recognised borders do not automatically convey statehood. In the eyes of certain local populations, they can be somewhat meaningless (e.g. the Durand Line).[6] For them, statehood is not bound by arbitrary frontiers (largely drawn up by colonial powers), rather their sense of nationhood draws greater expression from a common language, culture, religion, tradition, or history – the Kurdish people are an example of this as they are split between three different countries.

[3] Irregular activity is the use, or threat, of force, by irregular forces, groups or individuals, frequently ideologically or criminally motivated, to effect or prevent change as a challenge to governance and authority. (JDP 01 (2nd Edition)) **Note:** Irregular activity could include a mix of insurgency, terrorism, criminality and disorder.

[4] Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.4.1 *Peace Support Operations.*

[5] Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-01.1 *United Kingdom Supplement to the NATO Terminology Database.*

[6] The Durand line refers to the 2,140 kilometres long porous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

In these instances, instability is not necessarily caused by challenges to the political settlement; it may be inherent in certain societies. Those particularly at risk are post-colonial countries that may be in effect artificial creations of a former colonial power.

1.04 Crises and conflicts are addressed through an international system that is still based on the centrality of the state as well as the purposes and principles of the UN. However, new norms (such as humanitarian intervention and human rights) have developed that both flow from, and underpin this centrality. This includes the responsibility of the state, within its territory, to deliver basic human security.[7]

1.05 The post-1945 international organisational architecture has struggled at times to cope with and adapt to the complexity associated with intra-state violence and instability. Organisations were designed to deal with inter-state conflict. Therefore, the approach has been based on applying the traditional norm of state sovereignty. But, state sovereignty can clash with the need for the international community to address security challenges internal to that state. This has often led to cumbersome, delayed, or absent multinational responses to intra-state conflict and instability.

1.06 A characteristic of fragile states is the inability of their governments to discharge their responsibilities effectively. Insecurity and instability is likely to follow, caused by those with specific grievances and opportunists keen to exploit the vacuum of authority. Frequently the state does not have an effective, or in some cases legitimate, monopoly on the use of violence, which inhibits their ability to prevent or resolve societal conflicts.

Globalisation

1.07 Globalisation is used as a collective term for the processes characterised by accelerating international interconnectedness. For many, these processes are seen as positive. However, globalisation has also sparked grievance and radicalisation in many parts of the world where some see the effects as exacerbating economic inequality, and disrupting traditional bonds and social relations. These effects are magnified by the opportunities globalisation provides for those with grievances to become more powerful, and also by criminal greed. New vulnerabilities[8] have been introduced as economies and societies grow increasingly dependent on national and global financial information and communication networks. Simultaneously, these networks have empowered groups to communicate more effectively within states, across regions, and directly to diasporas across the globe. These processes provide non-state actors with the destructive power and reach previously confined to states.

1.08 Globalisation has important consequences for operations to provide security and stability in fragile states. For the commander there are three consequences in particular that can impact their operational design which are listed below.

- **Unity of Effort.** Many intervening actors are likely to be present in an operational area – the intervening force is but one. Contributing states may have a multi-agency presence and are joined by other international and regional agencies, institutions and organisations, both inter-governmental and non-governmental. In addition, private sector organisations and contractors compete to supply services, products and even security. While unity of command remains the ideal, the complexity of actors rarely makes it achievable. Consequently, establishing and maintaining unity of effort may be the best that can be achieved, and will require a robust decision-making architecture. Without it, effective campaigning will be difficult.
- **Global Communications.** Local actors are also embedded in the mechanisms that form international interconnectedness. Transnational communications

[7] Human security includes: economic security, food security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security. *New Dimensions of Human Security,* UN Human Development Report, 1994.

[8] Such as linked global financial institutions and mechanisms and dependence on energy routes.

and media networks link insecure and unstable societies and the wider international community. These actors have become adept at using such technologies to feed insecurity.

- **Unforeseen Effects.** Interventions designed to have a local effect can have an impact on events and outcomes well beyond the immediate theatre of operations.

1.09 These consequences of globalisation make purely localised conflict increasingly unlikely. They challenge the utility of traditional organisational concepts such as the bounded Joint Force Area of Operation (JFAO) and suggest a network of threats requiring a more sophisticated response.

Functions and Norms of the State

1.10 Figure 1-1 introduces a simple model that illustrates the elements of a stable state: security, including national and human security; economic and infrastructure development; and governance and the rule of law. While these elements can be analysed individually, it is unhelpful and potentially distorting to view them separately. The stability of the state depends upon the manner in which the elements interact and are mutually supporting.

1.11 This is an idealised model.[9] However, as the figure indicates, it is not simply a Western view of the elements of a stable state. Much of the logic incorporated into the model is shared by our adversaries.

1.12 Some states demonstrably fail to provide the functions or capacities suggested but retain a form of stability – the Democratic Republic of Congo from 1970s to 1990s is an example of this. However, they are usually unable to exert effective control over their territory and are liable to have the sort of ungoverned spaces that harbour the types of threats discussed earlier. Others achieve stability through ruthless oppression, nepotism, and patronage. The stability of such states is often temporary and regimes capable of such behaviour are also likely to be amenable to alliances of convenience with the actors most threatening to global security.

[9] JDP 3-40 *Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution.*



Figure 1-1: Elements of a stable state

National and Human Security

1.13 Security has traditionally been understood as national security, concerning itself with territorial integrity and the protection of the institutions and interests of the state from both internal and external threats. However, increasingly, the understanding of security has been broadened to include the notion of human security which emphasises the protection of individuals who seek safety and security in their daily lives. Human security encompasses freedom from fear of persecution, intimidation, reprisals, terrorism and other forms of systematic violence, as well as freedom from want of immediate basic needs such as food, water, sanitation and shelter. Importantly, where the state lacks the ability to meet the human security needs of the population, individuals tend to transfer loyalty to any group that promises safety and protection, including irregular actors. Of note are the following.

- There are obvious overlaps between national and human security. For example, the presence and activities of violent groups both exacerbates the fragility of the state and undermines the safety and security of the people.
- A stable state must protect the most basic survival needs of both itself and its people. This includes the provision of human security for the population in addition to the control of territory, borders, key assets, and sources of revenue.
- A stable state exists within a regional context. As such it may import or export instability across its borders. Security issues that are outside of a host-nation's direct influence will require regional political engagement.

Economic and Infrastructure Development

1.14 The economic infrastructure, level of natural resources, degree of technological development, industrial base, communications network and level of government revenue shape the ability of the state to provide stable governance; however these elements are likely to be less well defined and developed within a fragile state. Wealth determines the quality of life of the people in terms of jobs, basic commodities, health, education, shelter, and energy. In a stable, prosperous state, decisions affecting wealth creation can be made on the basis of calculated risk assessments. This gives confidence to investors. The degree of predictability in the economic environment is a major element in shaping the decisions of international and domestic commercial investors, from the MNCs to the modest market stall holder. Given the increasing mobility of international capital, economies that become fundamentally unpredictable can rapidly lose their viability.

Governance and the Rule of Law

1.15 A stable state has a sustainable political structure that permits the peaceful resolution of internal contests for power. A brittle form of stability can exist using brutality and corruption.

- Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Syria under Bashr Al Asad and the Central African Republic under Francois Bozize are examples of such states. However, such states require a constant demonstration of the power of the state in order to keep their populations in thrall. The prospect of genuine long-term stable governance only occurs when effective influence is exercised over a population and territory by methods viewed as broadly legitimate by the overwhelming majority of the governed.
- The rule of law is fundamental to legitimate governance. However, this general principle is likely to be institutionalised in varying forms dependent upon the social, cultural, and political mores of the particular society. It should always be acknowledged that legitimacy is ultimately defined by the local population rather than by externally imposed criteria.

1.16 **Societal Relationships.** The three elements above encompass the substantive functionalities and competencies of the state. However, the context is also determined by the societal relationships that underpin, and are interwoven with, these elements. In a stable state the social, cultural, and ideological factors that

bind society are broadly consistent with the manner in which state institutions discharge their responsibilities and gain consent from the population.

Key Terms

Security

Security is the term used to describe the combination of human and national security.

Human Security

Human security is characterised by: freedom from persecution, want and fear; adequate provision of essential commodities to sustain life; broader environmental security; and the protection of cultural values.[10]

Personal Security

Personal security is that part of human security which ensures protection of an individual from persecution, intimidation, reprisals, and other forms of systematic violence.

National Security

National security is the traditional understanding of security as encompassing 'the safety of a state or organisation and its protection from both external and internal threats'.

Physical Security

Physical security is that part of National Security that relates to national assets and infrastructure.

1.17 **The Importance of the Political Settlement.** The structures of a state are determined by a stable political settlement forged by a common understanding, usually among elites, that their interests or beliefs are served by a particular way of organising political power. It is the achievement of this common understanding, more than anything else, which is the most important marker of progress in stabilisation.

[10] JDP 0-01 *British Defence Doctrine* (4th Edition) paragraph 1.2.

'In essence political settlements are in place wherever those with the power to threaten state-structures forego that option either for reward (which may simply be personal security), for the sake of belief, or to wait an opportunity to become the government overseeing the existing structures.'[11]

1.18 The political settlement is the mechanism by which states are, ultimately, able to undergo non-violent transformations. This understanding of political settlements underpins how elites should be defined in a stabilisation context. Elites are those individuals or groups with the power to undermine existing political settlements and prevent the establishment of new ones. They can achieve this through their ability to mobilise resources, decisive groups or broad swathes of the population.

1.19 **Erosion of the Elements of a Stable State.** Degradation of any one of these elements of a stable state may lead to erosion of the others. This can in turn create a web of poor governance, economic breakdown, and insecurity that stimulates and exacerbates conflict. This may cause, or be caused by, a collapse in the political settlement that regulates key societal and state relationships. Despite huge contextual variations – and every situation is different – there may be a downward spiral of state fragility. This can be characterised by decline or disintegration at the junction where security and human security, economic development, governance and the rule of law meet, leading to the unravelling of the political settlement. Figure 1.2 illustrates this downward spiral.

[11] *States in Development: Understanding State-Building,* a Department for International Development (DFID) working paper, 2008, page 7.

A Framework for Understanding State Fragility

State Instability

1.20 Socio-economic, political, and environmental factors spawn and exacerbate tensions. The factors that may lead to instability can include:

- disease epidemics
- natural disasters
- chronic economic decline
- demographic pressures
- climate change
- scarce resources
- mass population movements
- government weakness and corruption
- a fragmented sense of identity and nationhood that undermines societal bonds.

1.21 The biggest driver of instability is conflict and its associated violence, which can cause a descending spiral of insecurity and ungoverned space. Ungoverned space refers to areas that are not effectively governed by state authority, although they may be subject to a variety of alternative forms of governance. These factors undermine the existing political settlement, open the space for hostile groups, and attract external actors motivated by profit, ideology, or greed.



Figure 1-2: Fragile States – the downward spiral.

Real-Life Example

A State at a Tipping Point – Somalia 1990–92

By 1990 the Somali population had become disillusioned with the military totalitarian regime. Resource shortages, rampant inflation, an absence of food and water and general deprivation were fuelling a thriving black market. Government corruption was rife. Close monitoring of visiting foreigners, harsh exchange control regulations and excessive control of the population and media became the norm, as did abductions. There was an absence of human security, chronic underdevelopment and a lack of effective government authority and the rule of law. This produced a downward spiral resulting in the collapse of the moral authority of the government along with the political settlement.

In 1991 President Barre was ousted by Ethiopian-backed northern and southern Somali clans. The Somali National Movement in concert with the northern clans' elders declared independence for Somaliland, the northern part of Somalia. President Ali Mahdi Muhammad was selected as interim state president; a fact contested by United Somali Congress, the Somali National Movement and the Somali Patriotic Movement. These competing elites were locked into a battle over resources and power. This rift soon developed into civil war.

The basis of the conflict was clan allegiances, competition for resources, and the collapse of state authority. The unravelling of the political settlement saw competing elites embroiled in a zero-sum struggle for political and economic power.

1.22 A collapsing political settlement can also be the source, not just the symptom, of state fragility. If powerful elites believe that an existing or proposed political settlement is no longer in their interests they may actively seek to undermine it. This may include the use of large-scale violence to undermine the authority of the state. In such circumstances, exacerbating and prolonging human insecurity, under-development, and weaknesses in governance and the rule of law, may be a deliberate and central part of their strategy.

1.23 This combination of structural weaknesses and deliberate human action produces powerful forces that grow in strength and progressively begin to rip the state apart. The purpose of stabilisation, through timely engagement, is to reverse the downward spiral of state fragility and failure. Operations in support of stabilisation prevent, contain and then arrest those conditions which contributed towards instability.

1.24 **Insecurity.** One of the defining features of state fragility and failure is that, to varying degrees, the capacity of the government to contribute effectively to security is degraded. If the situation has deteriorated to the point that foreign military intervention is required, as part of a broad stabilisation effort, it is highly likely that the host government will be unable to provide the basic structures that protect the population from threats to their human security.

1.25 Hostile groups may seek to inflict a level of violence that weakens and discredits host government security forces and destroys the confidence of the population. Preventing and reversing security progress underpins their strategy. This task is made easier for hostile groups by the fact that such societies are often heavily armed. Hostile groups may seek to undermine the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of violence and local security by setting up parallel security and governance structures.

1.26 **Economic Decline.** In fragile or failed states the government's ability to raise and distribute revenue effectively is often severely compromised. This can be caused by a combination of: corruption; poor border control; disincentives to invest; diversion of human and other capital to the security challenge; poverty and an absence of the appropriate mechanisms and tax systems. Thus basic functions, normally provided by the state, may depend upon substantial international assistance.

1.27 Even where significant natural resources exist, these may prove to be a driver of instability as they can provide motivation for irregular groups and external actors to seek control and exploitation of them. For example, the trade in conflict diamonds.

1.28 The point at which economic decline stimulates challenges to the authority of the state differs from country to country. For example, if long experience of poverty generates low expectations of quality of life, then the initial standards of living may be quite low and even relatively minor progress can boost governmental legitimacy in the eyes of the population. Conversely populations that have artificially high expectations may challenge the authority of the state and aspirations will have to be managed.

1.29 Wherever possible, the host-nation government and local people should undertake projects and services themselves. Where this is not possible in the short-term, the transition of responsibilities to ministries and local authorities should be conducted as soon as practicable. It is particularly important that the host-nation government receives credit for any positive developments. The host-nation delivering projects and services tolerably may have more positive, long-term political impact than external actors delivering them well.

1.30 **Weak Governance and the Rule of Law.** The security sector[12] is crucial to effective governance and the maintenance of law and order. Within a population's hierarchy of needs, physical security is essential for effective and durable development and requires well-managed and competent personnel operating within an institutional framework defined by law. By contrast, a poorly managed security sector hampers development, discourages investment and helps perpetuate poverty. There may be important aspects of the conflict which can impact on the structure and functioning of the security sector. These include the following:

- Remnants of a national army or interior forces that are opposed to foreign intervention. These need to be reconciled (or, where this is not possible, defeated), noting that they may subsequently become the foundation for rebuilding a national security force.
- A broad-based insurgency comprising multiple groups that threatens the survival of the state. This can become a magnet for foreign insurgents, as in the case of Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan.
- The proliferation of predatory armed groups and militias for whom war and criminal activity are their main livelihood.
- The emergence of criminal networks, often with regional and international dimensions, protected by armed groups.
- The disappearance of the structures of governance, and the emergence of security voids, which provide opportunities for competing forms of political authority.
- Institutionalised corruption as the primary means of interaction between groups and individuals.

Societal Conflicts in Fragile States

Contesting the Political Order

1.31 At the heart of most societal conflicts is a contest over the nature of the political order. This may be a battle for political power between clearly identifiable sides. However, the conflict is likely to involve a number of indistinct groups with an array of motivations, goals, tactics, and shifting allegiances, which may or may not be aligned with national boundaries. Causes can range from the deep-seated and strategic, to the temporary and local, modified as need and circumstance dictate. Motivations may include a sense of victim-hood, alienation, humiliation, resentment, honour or revenge. Some groups feel a need to challenge modernity, or express loyalty to a clan, tribe, religion, or ideological cause. Others, engaged in criminality, will wish to prevent or reduce interference in their activities, and may not be ideologically driven.

1.32 Developing an understanding of the potentially multiple motivations, goals, tactics, and allegiances of

[12] The security sector is inherently linked to the justice sector and includes: state and non-state armed forces, police and paramilitary units and private military and security companies; intelligence and security agencies; the judiciary, prisons, prosecution and defence legal authorities as well as traditional (e.g. tribal) justice mechanisms; civil management and oversight bodies (including President/Prime Minister, Defence, Interior, Justice and Foreign Affairs Ministries and the legislature); and civil society including the media, NGOs, and professional and religious bodies.

the key conflict groups is indispensable for a successful campaign. If these aspects are assumed rather than studied in depth, it is likely to result in inappropriate and counter-productive operations. In short, understanding what motivates key conflict groups, in particular operational contexts, may be central to designing measures to counter them. A key part is an acceptance that the ideas that drive such groups may be different from Western norms, but could still be seen as attractive and legitimate by sections of the society in conflict.

1.33 Local elites usually seek to adopt persuasive causes to mobilise support, often based on real problems or unresolved contradictions inherent to any society. They seek to situate their activities within a compelling narrative that attempts to explain and justify their actions while simultaneously de-legitimising the motivations and behaviours of opponents. For example, such groups often inflict punishment on petty criminals and pass judgement on disputes within the community to establish themselves as alternative providers of justice. This is designed to both gain favour from the population and illustrate the failure of state justice mechanisms.

1.34 Competing groups will seek to influence the population by communicating a vision of the future, commonly referred to as a narrative. Building such a narrative often involves the strategic manipulation of identity. All individuals possess multiple identities. These may relate to regional, national, religious, ethnic, clan, tribal, or family forms of self-identification. Others relate to occupation, beliefs, or interests. Of the many identities individuals possess, some are more important than

Figure 1-3: An understanding of the potentially multiple motivations, goals, tactics, and allegiances of the key conflict groups is indispensable for a successful campaign.

others in shaping their political attitudes or behaviour. It is these politically significant identities that hostile groups seek to manipulate as part of a wider narrative that attempts to create belief in an us versus them story that paints those seeking to counter their activities as the oppressor. Consequently, developing a unifying counter-narrative that convinces key audiences and undermines the hostile groups' portrayal is a vital aspect of stabilisation. This is examined further in Chapter 3.

1.35 Boundaries between groups are usually blurred, with fluid membership and multiple allegiances.[13] Specific labelling is often misleading. For example, members of the host-nation government may also transition in and out of irregular groups. Such linkages between political power and illicit activity particularly undermine the development of effective governance and the rule of law. However, their fluidity also provides opportunities to change the campaign strategic geometry, as in the case of the Sons of Iraq programme.[14]

1.36 Hostile elements exploit a population where poverty and a lack of effective governance make the population vulnerable to coercion or inducement. Yet hostile elements sometimes provide a measure of physical and economic security for a community, as well as a range of social support mechanisms. An example of this can be seen in the actions of Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon where the organisation assumed some of the functions of the Lebanese state and delivered social, development programmes and ran hospitals and schools. At other times coercion, terror and intimidation can be the main levers of influence. Usually, however, a combination of coercive and supportive methods will be adopted. These tend to concentrate on arresting or reversing any momentum in security and stabilisation provision established by the authorities.

1.37 Central to the societal conflict, there is a battle to exert control over the security environment. At its most demanding, this could include countering a brutal insurgency. Doubt in the ability of the state to achieve this contributes to fragility. In order to prevent, arrest, and eventually reverse this fragility, hostile elements should be thwarted and, just as importantly, seen to be thwarted. The host-nation government should be portrayed as the architect of any success.

Emerging Threats

1.38 Warfare is an enduring element in the international system although its character changes over time. A feature of this evolution is the re-emergence of compound threats. These occur where states or non-state actors choose to exploit all modes of war simultaneously using advanced conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism and disruptive criminality to destabilise an existing order. Such threats emanate from state and non-state actors that have access to some of the sophisticated weapons and systems normally fielded by regular forces. Conflicts are increasingly characterised by a blend of traditional and irregular tactics, decentralised planning and execution, and state or non-state actors who may use both simple and sophisticated technologies in new ways. Access to advanced technology and weaponry has given some non-state groups formidable capabilities such as surface-to-air missiles, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and thermobaric technologies. An example of this is Hezbollah's use of an anti-ship cruise missile against an Israeli Navy Corvette in 2006.

1.39 The power of information and the revolution in technology is a significant enabler in the activity of current and future adversaries. Technology has expanded the operating space through mass communication, creating the potential for the cyber mobilisation of dispersed communities.[15] Groups have seized on the globalisation of information to execute the strategic communications campaigns that are central to their activities. The content and delivery of information has therefore shifted from the mass propaganda of revolutionary insurgents, such as Mao, to highly tailored

[13] An idea explored in David Kilcullen's *The Accidental Guerrilla,* Hurst and Company, London 2009

[14] The 'Sons of Iraq' is a title given to coalitions between Sunni Sheikhs in Iraqi provinces that unite to maintain security.

[15] David Kilcullen, *Counter Insurgency Redux*, Survival Volume 48, Winter 2006/7 page 113.

campaigns. Adversaries have been quick to exploit the mobile phone, internet, and social networking sites for recruiting, training, educating, motivating, and controlling new members. Information now permits targeted individual mobilisation; an alternative to the old mass mobilisation.[16]

1.40 Adversaries, both Individuals and groups, are a shifting, fluid network of disparate people, some of whom specialise in particular functions or tasks. In insurgencies in particular, clusters of cells gravitate towards each other in informal communities of interest – to exchange intelligence and weaponry, reinforce a narrative, train and conduct attacks – and then disperse, perhaps never to meet again. Some groups employ a version of mission command based on intent, ideas, and ideology being passed through both the cyberspace domain and by word of mouth. Insurgency is no longer bounded by the aim of self determination, as was the case with the Peoples Liberation Organisation, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)[17] or the Irish Republican Army. Instability emanating from fragile states and from diaspora and sympathetic populations in developed states can take the form of a franchised, globalised insurgency whose goals encompass profound changes to international order.

[16] Thomas X. Hammes, *Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves, Fifth Emerges,* Military Review, May–June 2007.

[17] ETA: Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (English: Basque Homeland and Freedom).

Figure 1-4: Warfare is an enduring element in the international system although its character changes over time.

1.41 States may choose to convert their conventional units into irregular formations and adopt new tactics. They may also be quick to cooperate with non-state actors where they see mutual benefit. Adaptive adversaries, therefore, combine various types of warfare in the same time and place. Consequently, attempts to counter them are unlikely to be successful if pursued in a linear, sequential or purely military manner. Evolving threats are likely to demand an agile adaptive response. When warfare or conflict, however manifested, impacts a fragile state and its population, a comprehensive approach that combines the military, development, governance, and rule of law measures of different organisations and nations is one means of achieving this.

CHAPTER 2:

THE STABILISATION OF FRAGILE STATES



CONTENTS

Introduction

2.01 This chapter outlines the purpose of intervention into fragile states and the evolution of the New Zealand approach through experience in counter-insurgency (COIN), peace support operations (PSOs) and recent intervention operations. It then builds a model of stabilisation that is developed from the state model in Chapter 1 before describing the key conflict relationship and how military activity can be used to influence this relationship. It finishes by examining some of the issues that arise in coordinating a coherent multinational and multi-agency response to the challenges of stabilisation.

Intervening in Fragile States

Setting Goals: Choosing Ends, Ways, and Means

2.02 Globalisation now makes terror, insecurity, and instability more readily exportable than ever before. This renders concepts of wars of choice and discretionary operations more problematical. By definition, globalised security threats do not remain in isolated geographical locales waiting to be addressed by intervening states. As recent history has shown, such threats manifest themselves directly, suddenly, and where least expected.

2.03 Our contribution to stabilisation may vary, but will always be determined by New Zealand's strategic interests, obligations, and national security imperatives. In some circumstances stabilisation may entail the buttressing of an existing political order, in others it may entail the shaping of interim arrangements following a crisis, while in others it may entail whole-scale state building following the collapse or removal of the previous regime. This rationale is fundamentally different from peace support, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, which are based on impartiality. While some of the activities will be similar, the purpose of stabilisation is explicitly political – stability per se is unlikely to be the sole motivation for New Zealand involvement.

2.04 The New Zealand Government has a degree of discretion as to when and where it commits military forces. There are a number of criteria that the New Zealand Government will consider when determining the extent to which a particular crisis becomes a priority for action. These criteria are:

- the degree of impact upon New Zealand's national security or interests
- does New Zealand have a constitutional or regional obligation
- the degree of domestic and international pressure for New Zealand to act
- does New Zealand have the military capability to contribute effectively?
- each case will be judged against these broad determinants. The more direct the impact of a crisis, and the clearer our ability to mitigate this impact, the greater likelihood there is of New Zealand intervention.

Range of Military Responses

2.05 In support of national security objectives, and invariably within a wider cross-government approach, the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) provides critical capabilities that can support stability, tackle threats at source and respond to crises overseas before they impact upon our national security. To provide this capability the military is able to undertake a wide range of roles, at varying scales, including:

- **Regional Engagement and International Security Cooperation.** In many circumstances instability within a state or region can be reduced by host governments and regional organisations with limited external support from the wider international community. In such a scenario New Zealand may choose to contribute to limited-objective international security cooperation (ISC) initiative such as arms control, counter-drugs operations, military capacity building or security sector reform (SSR).
- **Counter Weapons of Mass Effect Proliferation.** In some circumstances instability may be the catalyst

for the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Effect (WME) technology into the hands of either belligerent states or armed non-state groups such as al-Qaeda. In this scenario it is likely that New Zealand's national security interests and imperatives will be engaged within a counter-proliferation operation along side other nations. Over the period 1994 to 2003 the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) joined forces with the United States Navy (USN), the Royal Navy (RN) and other coalition navies to conduct maritime interdiction operations against vessels bound for Iraq in the Persian Gulf. This was to enforce the UN sanctions against Iraq, including the prevention of the importation of conventional or nuclear weapons technology.

- **Deterrence or Containment.** Instability within one state may provide a haven for groups intent on attacking New Zealand, its allies, or its interests. Where this threat may be effectively deterred or contained, New Zealand may choose to participate in international operations designed to reduce the impact of the activities of these groups. The no-fly zones established by the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), and France after the 1991 Gulf War to stop Saddam Hussein's repression of Kurdish people in the north of Iraq, and the Shia population in the south, are examples. Also, air and maritime operations in the Arabian Gulf and Horn of Africa region have been used to interdict the flow of foreign fighters between unstable states.
- **Stabilisation in Support of Wider State-Building.** In some circumstances state instability engages New Zealand's interests or obligations to such a degree that deterrence will be ineffective.

Figure 2-1: The New Zealand Government has a degree of discretion as to when and where it commits military forces.

Here, the ability to conduct a spectrum of intervention operations – including high intensity warfighting, usually as part of a coalition – will be a more appropriate response. An example is the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation, conducted by North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) as part of wider stabilisation and state-building initiatives within Afghanistan.

Key Terms

Stabilisation

The process that supports states which are entering, enduring, or emerging from conflict, in order to prevent or reduce violence; protect the population and key infrastructure; promote political processes and governance structures, which lead to a political settlement that institutionalises non-violent contests for power; and prepares for sustainable social and economic development.

Peace Support Operations

A generic term describing operations that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means to restore or maintain peace. They are operations carried out under an appropriate mandate. Such operations may include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding.

Insurgency

1. An organised, violent subversion used to effect or prevent political control, as a challenge to established authority.

2. An organised movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.

Counter-insurgency

The set of political, economic, social, military, law enforcement, civil, and psychological activities required to defeat insurgency and address any core grievances.

2.06 The ability to undertake this range of roles affords the New Zealand Government choices for how to use the military instrument of power in support of national security objectives. The scale of military commitment can range through a single adviser, a single unit conducting ISC, to a sizeable joint force (see Figure 2-2). A regional military presence can be used in support of all levels of commitment within the affected country itself and in some circumstances can be applied as the only military activity in support of diplomatic efforts to prevent violent conflict. An early commitment to help prevent a downward spiral in a fragile state will be considerably less onerous for intervening forces than the scale necessary to facilitate restoration. ISC activity to prevent will normally demand a coordinated rather than comprehensive effort. The least intrusive form of response, consistent with the achievement of national objectives and policy imperatives, should be the goal and intervention operations requiring significant resources and persistence are invariably the choice of last resort. Activity to restore will almost always require a comprehensive approach.

2.07 While civilian statesmen, military commanders, and inter-agency partners share a responsibility for the development of strategy, ultimately both the decision to intervene, and the nature of that intervention, will be decided by the Government of the day. It may choose to focus on the exportable threats of instability. Or it may elect to buttress host-nation security forces so that they can contain or defeat it themselves. Where the New Zealand Government decides to intervene with a sizeable joint force, probably as part of a multinational coalition, it selects the most complex response option which carries the greatest amount of risk.

The Evolution of the New Zealand Approach to Stabilisation

2.08 The purpose of this section is to set out the provenance of the New Zealand approach to stabilisation within New Zealand's experiences of 20th century COIN, PSOs, and more recent interventions. It allows current operations to be seen in perspective.

Counter-insurgency

2.09 **New Zealand's Experience of Insurgency and Counter-insurgency.** The majority of previous COIN doctrine is still relevant today. New Zealand's first experience with countering an insurgency was the series of conflicts that erupted against various Maori Iwi in the mid to late 1800s over the issue of land ownership and seizures by the Crown. These conflicts saw British regulars, supported by New Zealand raised militia and 'loyal' Maori irregulars fighting the warriors of the Iwi that had confronted the Crown. These were classic guerrilla campaigns.

2.10 The South African War (1899–1902) had a major impact on both the British Army and the fledgling New Zealand Army. Following the defeat of Boer main forces the war regressed from conventional battles into a protracted and bitter guerrilla campaign and it was into this phase the New Zealand Mounted Rifles (NZMR) contingents deployed. In this second phase the Boers operated in highly mobile mounted detachments (commandos) using raiding tactics. General Kitchener, the British Command-in-Chief in South Africa, adapted the Army's operational concept and this changed concept was largely credited with defeating Boer guerrillas during this second phase. These adaptations were based on population and resource control measures (farm burning, detention, and enforced relocations) which helped separate guerrillas from their support networks, and large scale sweeps, and cordon and search operations. This formed the basis of COIN doctrine employed by Commonwealth forces in the first half of the 20th Century.

2.11 The high-water mark of New Zealand COIN experience coincided with the British retreat from its Empire in the last half of the 20th Century and the rise of the communist threats in South East Asia. Campaigns include Malaya (1948–1960), Confrontation (1960–64), and Vietnam (1965–72). Often referred to as 'classical COIN', these operations have provided many of the lessons current COIN doctrine employs. The Malayan Emergency represented a turning point. Large-scale sweeps as well as cordon and search operations inherited from Kitchener's tactics in South Africa initially produced poor results and were replaced by an ever-increasing reliance on deep patrols cued by improved intelligence. A feature of these new tactics was the use of parachute and helicopter insertions deep into the jungle and the offering of substantial cash sums to induce senior insurgent figures to defect. At the operational level, General Sir Gerald Templer initiated the Briggs Plan which provided unity of command across civil government, police, and military (the so-called 'three-legged stool') and the resettlement of Chinese squatters in protected villages (the so-called 'expanding ink spot') which later formed the basis of the American Clear – Hold – Build approach.



Figure 2-2: The graduated range of military commitment.

2.12 **Thompson's Five Principles of Counter-insurgency**. From his experience in Malaya, Sir Robert Thompson, the UK's Permanent Minister of Defence for Malaya, formulated what have come to be known as Thompson's Five Principles of COIN. These are outlined in the bullets below.

- The government must have a clear political aim to establish and maintain a free, independent and united country which is politically and economically stable and viable.
- The government must function in accordance with the law.
- The government must have an overall plan.
- The government must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerrillas.
- In the guerrilla phase of an emergency, a government must secure its base areas first.

2.13 **Insurgent Tactics and Critical Requirements.** Experience in COIN campaigns over the past half century has also yielded increased knowledge of the tactics and critical requirements of insurgent movements. Insurgents have adopted practices from a wide variety of sources. There is much evidence of influence by Mao Tse-Tung (protracted war), Che Guevara (foco theory), Marighela (urban insurgency), and 19th century European nihilists (propaganda of the deed and word). Some insurgents develop their own approaches and adopt a lessons learnt process from operations and open source material. Insurgents use a variety of tactics that include but are not limited to the following below.

Figure 2-3: Air and maritime operations have been used to interdict the flow of foreign fighters between unstable states.

- **Provocation.** Insurgents carry out acts deliberately designed to prompt opponents, whether coalition forces, governments or sectarian rivals, to overreact in ways that alienate local populations, increase instability and provide propaganda value.
- **Intimidation.** Insurgents seek to terrify and coerce those members of the population, or elements within their own communities, who cooperate with, or support, the government or coalition forces. Furthermore, they may attempt to terrify and coerce members of the security forces, whether local or international, and civilian administrators.
- **Protraction.** Insurgents attempt to draw out the conflict to avoid decisive confrontation with strong security forces, control their own losses, sap the will of counterinsurgents, and preserve their strength after setbacks.
- **Exhaustion.** Through use of carefully targeted attacks, insurgents seek to soak up security forces and government agencies in actions that require major effort, but do not significantly progress their mission, for example force protection tasks, and the protection of facilities and infrastructure.

Key terms

Irregular Activity

Irregular Activity is the use, or threat, of force by irregular forces, groups or individuals, frequently ideologically or criminally motivated, to effect or prevent change as a challenge to governance and authority. **Note:** Irregular activity could include a mix of insurgency, terrorism, criminality, and disorder.

Countering Irregular Activity

Countering irregular activity incorporates military activity with the other instruments of power within a comprehensive approach that deal with the threats to security from irregular activity, while building governance and authority and addressing the underlying causes.

2.14 Insurgencies have a number of critical requirements some of which are listed below.

- **Leadership.** Insurgencies require credible leaders to persuade people to join the group and to motivate and drive the existing membership. They may exert direct control or operate indirectly by mobilising popular support. The larger the group the more difficult it will be to exercise central control without compromising security.
- **A Cause.** Insurgents require a cause, some animating grievance which a charismatic leader can exploit. The stated cause may be a useful cover for a less palatable strategic end-state.
- **Tacit Consent.** While most insurgencies can survive without a large base of active support from within the population, they cannot progress without the tacit consent of a major section of the population. They seek to lever this through a mix of coercion, subversion, and persuasion of the population.
- **Recruits.** Without the ability to maintain a flow of willing recruits, either from within the local population or foreign fighters, insurgents will be vulnerable to attrition, as in the case of the remnants of the communist insurgent Malayan Races Liberation Army, which was reduced to a fugitive existence, isolated and irrelevant, in the Thai border region.
- **Weapons.** In many conflict-riven societies, weapons are freely available and so cutting supply (as was the approach in Northern Ireland) may be impractical.
- **Safe Havens.** Insurgents require areas where they can rest, regroup, train, resupply, and plan their operations, and where they may declare their new political order, as was nearly the case when al-Qaeda declared the Islamic State of Iraq, centred in Al Anbar Province. These will be areas in which counterinsurgents are operationally constrained. Cyberspace is a partial safe haven in which insurgents can recruit, mobilise, raise and move funds, and advance their narrative.
- **Essential Supplies.** Food, water, medical supplies, combat supplies, and means of communication are vital for insurgents. These will tend to be drawn from the local population, or by appropriating

humanitarian aid. If the flow of these supplies is disrupted or uncertain, the insurgency will be undermined.

- **Intelligence.** Insurgents require knowledge of the population in order to target, coerce, intimidate, and recruit as well as provide counter-intelligence to avoid penetration.
- **Finance.** Although insurgencies are inexpensive relative to costs of countering them, they rely on funds generated from two broad sources – illegal activities and donations.
  - Illegal activities can include trafficking, fraud, money laundering, kidnapping, extortion, theft, or any other activities likely to turn a profit. This has two important effects beyond simply providing insurgents with resources. First, it undermines government revenue, authority, and legitimacy, particularly if government officials become implicated in the activities. Second, it leads insurgents into pacts of convenience with organised criminal networks.
  - Donations come from supportive communities or foreign governments motivated by either ethnic, ideological, religious, or geopolitical interests. Such funding can be overt or channelled through a web of connections designed to conceal the health source and route of the donations.

2.15 **The Characteristics of Classical Counter-Insurgency.** Following the success of COIN campaigns in the last half century and an increasing understanding

Figure 2-4: New Zealand military forces spent many years in Vietnam undertaking counter-insurgency operations.

of insurgent tactics and vulnerabilities, COIN doctrine has coalesced around a familiar set of characteristics. These are:

- emphasis on winning the politico-strategic battle while containing the insurgents at the tactical level
- the doctrine of minimum force, meaning 'the minimum force necessary to achieve the aim'
- joint unified command structures integrating civil government, police, and military
- intelligence-based operations including extensive use of turned enemy personnel
- continuous offensive pressure on the insurgents by all elements of the security forces
- small unit, patrol-based offensive tactics, but supported by a large security force maximising its agility and ability to concentrate force provided by air manoeuvre and protected ground mobility
- population/resource control, and self-defence measures, to isolate the insurgent from the support of the population and to enhance the security of that population
- establishing, clearing, securing, and extending base areas to provide safe zones
- emphasis on winning hearts and minds, and on psychological operations (PSYOPS) in general.

Supporting Peace Operations

2.16 **Post World War II.** Following major wars there have often been attempts to regulate the behaviour of states. The United Nation's (UN) Charter represents the most ambitious attempt to establish a global system for inter-state relationships. However, the UN's ability to influence global governance has been constrained by an inability to empower the organisation as it was originally intended. There have been increasing demands for action to defend individual rights and freedoms, resulting in successive shifts in international conduct and the continual evolution of our approach to operations.

2.17 **The Cold War.** Although the UN Charter envisaged an international enforcement capability,[18] Cold War paralysis prevented its delivery. Therefore the UN continues to depend upon the will of member nations to fund and participate in operations for which it provides the mandate. The UN was able to moderate international aggression throughout the Cold War by mounting what came to be known as traditional or Nordic peacekeeping[19] operations. Consent (to be given by all parties to the dispute before intervention) and neutrality of the national contingents were fundamentals to this approach. The existence of large standing forces during the Cold War helped enable these UN missions. Notable successes were achieved during this era, but this period of relative stability ended abruptly, with major implications for the roles, capacity, flexibility, and reach demanded of the UN.

2.18 **Post Cold War – Peace Enforcement.** After the end of the Cold War the UN Security Council (UNSC) became increasingly willing to act. Between 1989 and 1991 the UNSC mandated as many peacekeeping missions as it had done during the preceding forty years. However, it was quickly evident that the traditional concept of peacekeeping was inadequate for contemporary conflicts that were no longer checked by the influence of the two Cold War superpowers. UN capacity was poorly matched to the tasks it faced. In parallel, the concept of enforcing the peace was born.[20] The resultant doctrine compartmentalised PSOs as a type of operation underpinned by a clear international mandate, based on three principles: consent, impartiality, and the application of minimum necessary force.[21]

[18] The UN Charter included the concept of assigned military forces and a Military Staff Committee that was to be formed from the Chiefs of Staff of the UN Security Council permanent members.

[19] The term 'peacekeeping' was not in the UN Charter and was first adopted following the deployment of a UN force to the Sinai in 1956 (UN Emergency Force) to secure a ceasefire between Egyptian and Israeli forces.

[20] The habit of describing peace support roles in terms of the chapter divisions of the UN Charter had become the norm. With no clear legal status for peace enforcement the term 'Chapter VI and a half' was coined in an attempt to rationalise the stance.

[21] Although the inherent right to use force in self-defence is well grounded in law, the range of terms – 'minimum force', 'minimum necessary force', 'restraint in the use of force' (Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.4.1 *Peace Support Operations*) have been prone to wide interpretation.

2.19 The approach taken by Western nations, in responding to the Balkans conflicts involved acknowledging the need for forces to act when consent was lost. The adherence to strict impartiality and the use of minimum force were seen essential underpinnings of consent. Thus a consent line, was seen to divide peacekeeping from peace enforcement, and once consent was lost, military force would default to the use of warfighting techniques. Thereafter consent was unlikely to be regained. This approach failed to provide doctrine for peace enforcement activity, although it did inform those outside the military sphere on the risk of mission creep and the uncontrolled escalation of conflict beyond the combat potential of the deployed peace support force.

2.20 **The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations.** Experiences in Bosnia[22] demanded a more flexible approach be developed for the grey area between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, which utilised a full spectrum of warfighting skills. The UN responded to the perception that it was poorly equipped for the tasks that it faced by transferring mission responsibility to NATO. This set the precedent for the UNSC mandating action by regional security structures and effectively outsourcing peace support. This created a fundamental shift in the context of PSOs – a recognition of a need for an international, inter-agency

[22] Part of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) deployment.

Figure 2-5: New Zealand has deployed military forces to a number of countries around the world to undertake peace operations.

Figure 2-6: No conflict stays still and New Zealand's involvement in a stabilisation task can act as a catalyst for change.

approach to which there is a military contribution – a comprehensive approach, in which the PSO trinity of consent, impartiality, and limits on the use of force, is replaced by a concept of campaign authority, vested in an international coalition or regional security alliance and derived from a mandate.

Recent Intervention Operations

2.21 **A New Paradigm.** The operation to protect the population of Kosovo[23] against Serb intervention was the catalyst for a new paradigm that removed previous assumptions about consent and impartiality.

Intervention operations in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001 have shown that neither the guidelines from classic COIN or PSOs are adequate for tackling contemporary challenges to stability. Military forces have been drawn into wider stabilisation tasks that have gone beyond the delivery of security, and the mechanisms for effective stabilisation planning prior to deployment have been absent both within the NZDF and Ministry of Defence as well as across government. These current operations are fundamentally a competition for the people – for their loyalty, support, and security. Therefore, military forces have had to operate in a 'human-centric' manner.

2.22 New Zealand's response is constrained by the size of its military forces. Other constraints are the lack of deployable capacity amongst the non-security departments, the terms and conditions of service that

[23] United Kingdom Operation AGRICOLA.

allow civilians, such as police advisers, to operate in high risk environments, and the means to integrate planning and delivery of broad-based stabilisation support in failing states.

2.23 **Developing Host-nation Security Capacity.** Security is only an enabler, but without adequate security other vital development cannot take place. Assisting the development of capable host-nation security capacity has been critical to the ultimate withdrawal of international forces. Security capacity building has included military, border, police, and other internal security forces. These local forces have to assume responsibility for the contest for security by first containing, and ultimately neutralising those irregular groups that threaten effective national governance. Therefore, building these units may demand emphasis that matches or exceeds that devoted to adversary-focused activity. Building effective host-nation units is transitory without strong security institutions, such as a capable host-nation ministry of defence with responsive planning, personnel, and procurement processes.

2.24 **Local Civil Development.** Some level of local security, rule of law and national governance are the necessary conditions for re-development of host-nation economic and institutional capacity. The US Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction identified five principles of reconstruction:[24]

- security is necessary for large scale reconstruction to succeed
- developing the capacity of people and systems is as important as bricks and mortar reconstruction
- soft programmes (i.e. governance and economic development) serve as an important complement to military operations in insecure environments)
- programmes should be geared to host-nation priorities and needs
- reconstruction is an extension of political strategy.

Stabilisation: The Need for a New Approach

2.25 Classical COIN campaigns shared a number of similar features. Recent operations, however, reveal significant departures from this classical pattern which together demand a new approach.

2.26 **State Fragility.** In classical COIN, military forces buttressed an existing colonial political order with effective state security, governance, and political structures. Recent operations, however, have been conducted within the context of state fragility and state failure. As such, state-building activities have constituted a significant component of recent interventions in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

2.27 **Complex of Intervening Actors.** In classical COIN military forces and agencies controlled all levers of government. Recent operations, however, have been conducted by a bewildering array of intervening actors within the sovereign territory of another state. As such, the commander is forced to manage sensitivities brought about by working in multinational coalitions, with non-coalition international partners/stakeholders and, most importantly, the host government.

2.28 **Smaller Forces.** The size of intervening armed forces is much smaller than in the 20th Century. Mass matters in wars amongst the people. A recent study suggested that, in crisis interventions, 'although numbers alone do not constitute a security strategy, successful strategies for population security and control have required force ratios either as large as or larger than twenty security personnel (troops and police combined) per thousand inhabitants'[25] For a country with the population of Afghanistan in 2009 this implied the need for some 760,000 local and international internal security personnel.

[24] Reconstruction is the term often used in US Government to describe those economic and governance development tasks identified in JDP 3-40 *Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution.* Taken from *Hard Lessons: the Iraq Reconstruction Experience*, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) dated 2 February 2009.

[25] *Burden of Victory: The Painful Arithmetic of Stability Operations,* by James T. Quinlivan, published by the RAND Corporation. Specific examples in the study included British interventions in Northern Ireland and Malaya.

Real-Life Example

Hezbollah's Principles of War [26]

Adversaries have doctrine too. These principles were designed specifically to defeat Israel, a technologically advanced enemy. This is an example of a contemporary, adaptive approach by a capable irregular actor.

- Avoid the strong, attack the weak – attack and withdrawal.
- Protecting our fighters is more important than causing enemy casualties.
- Strike only when success is assured.
- Surprise is essential to success. If you are spotted, you have failed.
- Don't get into a set piece battle. Slip away like smoke, before the enemy can drive home their advantage.
- Attaining the goal demands patience, in order to discover the enemy's weak points.
- Keep moving; avoid formation in a front line.
- Keep the enemy on constant alert, at the front and in the rear.
- The road to the great victory passes through thousands of small victories.
- Keep up the morale of the fighters; avoid notions of the enemy's superiority.
- The media has innumerable guns whose hits are like bullets. Use them in battle.
- The population is a treasure – nurture it.
- Hurt the enemy and then stop before he abandons restraint.

[26] *We were Caught Unprepared,* US Army CAC Combat Studies Institute Press, Long War Series Occasional Paper No 26 2008.

2.29 **Global Networks.** Classical insurgencies were usually generated and resourced locally; consequently, the outcome of classical COIN campaigns was locally determined. In contrast, recent conflicts have been generated and resourced by international support networks which have provided funds, supplies (including weapons) and recruits. In addition, the presence of global media, the internet, and communications networks has allowed instant coverage of conflicts thus furnishing non-state armed groups with a global reach previously confined to states. The outcome of contemporary operations is becoming increasingly globally determined.

2.30 **Complexity of Hostile Groups.** Classical COIN typically constituted a binary struggle. However, recent operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, the ongoing Syrian Civil War, and the war in Libya, all had or have numerous violent factions fighting yet other within a general climate of insecurity and instability. Internal violent opposition to government authority – irregular activity – may be motivated by grievances against the state or those keen to exploit state fragility. At times, groups with different motivations, aims, and allegiances will form ad hoc alliances of convenience. Moreover, grievances may mutate over time. Rather than one simple unifying idea different groups may have multiple grievances that overlap. Resistance to the intervening force may become a cause in itself. At other times irregular actors may simultaneously hold government posts or transition in and out of government. As a result, boundaries between groups become blurred and memberships fluid. In failed states, instability may result from fighting between groups competing for local authority, as has been the case in Somalia, the Great Lakes region of Africa, and Southern Sudan.

2.31 **Lethality.** The lethality of our adversaries has been markedly increased through easy access to sophisticated weapon systems and inexpensive technologies; sharing successful tactics and techniques; and innovation. For example, by 2006 weaponry used by Hezbollah in southern Lebanon was being deployed in Afghanistan by organisations linked to the Taliban. In addition, radicalisation of hostile groups (supported by small elements of the diaspora) has increased their ambition to use weapons of massed effect (WME).

2.32 For the foreseeable future stabilisation campaigns involving NZDF force elements are likely to be conducted in the sovereign territory of a fragile, conflict-affected state. Here successful operations will entail an element of stabilisation and state-building. In contrast, however, instability may result from other forms of irregular activity besides insurgency. These include warring factions (e.g. South Sudan), large-scale criminality (e.g. Somalia), cartels (e.g. Colombia), foreign fighters (e.g. Yemen), or piracy (e.g. Horn of Africa).

2.33 Irregular activity is likely to be at the heart of any threat to the stability of a state, and a capable insurgency is the most threatening instance of irregular activity. Countering these threats will be central to the stabilisation effort. This is illustrated in Figure 2-8.

2.34 While the NZDF may be involved in the provision of security and countering irregular activity, they will also need to contribute to the wider stabilisation effort. It is this wider context which makes stabilisation so complex. The political context will be dynamic; it is unlikely that initial political guidance to the commander will be sufficient in itself, or sufficiently enduring, to ensure that the continually evolving strategic context is adequately captured. In addition, political sensitivities may inhibit a clear public articulation of the strategic rationale. Rapidly changing events can render previous judgements and appreciations obsolete. The commander must be engaged as part of a continual strategic and operational review that relates changing conditions on the ground to the political purpose of operations.

2.35 There will be different perspectives, the situation will look different when viewed from capitals, strategic headquarters, or in-theatre. The challenge will be to align these perspectives. One of the paradoxes of these environments is that they can appear mired in strategic stalemate. There can be a perception over months or even years of a lack of any progress. Domestic populations and policymakers will be uncomfortable with the appearance of stalemate. However, these interventions should be based on a calculated strategic choice that brings together the capacity and strategic interest considerations outlined above. The commander should play their part in helping to shape domestic understanding of the ebb and flow of these conflicts. It will be important to retain focus on campaign shifts, not tactical incidents. Shaping the political settlement within a conflict-riven society is inherently difficult and groups hostile to that effort have a vested interest in prolonging the conflict to wait out the intervention.

2.36 The Clausewitzian dictum that war has its own grammar but not its own logic is at the heart of the military contribution to stabilisation. The strategic and political purpose of operations is central to these types of integrated campaigns. In traditional warfighting, the commander could afford to be relatively unconcerned about the nuances of political purpose. The requirement to defeat the enemy carried its own logic and provided sufficient guidance. This was certainly true of NATO planning in the Cold War, and in operations such as the recapture of the Falkland Islands. In contrast, in stabilisation, victory in combat will not necessarily achieve the political goal.

Differences Between Classical COIN and Contemporary Stablilisation	
Classical COIN	**Contemporary Stabilisation**
Effective state insitutions	State fragility and failure
Single counter-insurgent	Multitude of intervening actors
Large conscripted army	Small expeditonary joint force
Local conflicts	Global networks and conflict dynamics
Single enemy (the insurgency)	Multitude of irregular actors
Guerrilla and symmetric threats	WME

Figure 2-7: Differences between Classical Counter-insurgency and Contemporary Stabilisation.

The New Zealand Approach to Stabilisation

Utilising the Characteristics of the New Zealand Service Personnel

2.37 Any New Zealand approach to stabilisation needs to maximise the qualities of our service personnel. With many of the current conflicts being a competition for the support of the population, i.e. 'human-centric', the NZDF is well placed to successfully undertake stability operations. The characteristics and attitude of the NZDF personnel, regardless of Service, coupled with their ability to establish good relations with the local population enables them to mitigate many issues that arise during operations. This has bought praise for New Zealand's stabilisation efforts from areas as diverse as the Solomon Islands, East Timor, and Afghanistan. The neutrality and ability of NZDF personnel to work in an honest and collaborative manner has greatly improved cooperation.

2.38 NZDF personnel are a mixture of cultures and backgrounds. The fundamental characteristics that typify this modern Kiwi service person are:

- independence
- initiative
- strong junior leadership
- endurance
- conscientiousness
- adaptability.[27]

Stabilisation in the Pacific

2.39 New Zealand has been involved in two long running stabilisation campaigns in the Pacific; Timor Leste and the Solomon Islands. Both campaigns had very different origins, actors, adversaries, issues, and solutions. NZDF commanders and staff need to remain mindful that stabilisation operations conducted in the South West Pacific region could be subtlety different than similar operation in the rest of the world. These differences arise from New Zealand's:

- geographic location within the region
- strong and growing cultural links and strong affinity to the pacific peoples – the Polynesian people are not strangers
- need to take a very long term view of the stability of failed and failing states in the region
- long-term defence, e.g. the Mutual Assistance Programme, and developmental ties with the Polynesian nations in the Pacific.

[27] *The Way of the New Zealand Warrior,* New Zealand Army, Wellington, 2007.



Figure 2-8: Stabilisation, Irregular Activity, and Counter-insurgency.

2.40 Therefore, while the guidelines outlined in this publication have utility globally the commander and their staff must remain aware of New Zealand's strong geographic, cultural and military links when operating in the pacific region and use their judgement to tailor their operational plans accordingly.

The Stabilisation Model

2.41 There are some generic tenets which underpin success. These generic tenets combined with the characteristics of NZDF service personnel enhance the chance of success. In addition to the essential requirement for a political settlement, discussed in Chapter 1, there are three broad, overlapping areas of progress that underpin successful stabilisation efforts: security, governance and development. Figure 2-9. illustrates the key tasks that fall within these areas. There are a set of core functions critical to the survival of the state. These are:

- a monopoly on the use of violence
- the ability to raise revenue
- the ability to rule through law.

2.42 The tasks that fall out of the stabilisation model should be understood as part of the process that fosters the authority and legitimacy of the host government in the eyes of the population. This leads ultimately to the accommodation of competing elites within a workable political settlement.



Figure 2-9: Stabilisation model.

Building Human and National Security

2.43 Traditionally, security forces have focused on national security, however defined. The UN Commission on Human Security has proposed a framework for countries experiencing violent conflicts. It emphasises the need to ensure public safety, address immediate humanitarian needs as well as begin rehabilitation and reconstruction. In a stabilisation environment the lack of human security can be acute and it is critical that this is addressed if the situation is not to spiral out of control. Part of this involves creating the conditions that safeguard individuals from violence. However, it also relates to the immediate needs for a decent life, such as food, water, sanitation, shelter, employment, and education.

Fostering Host Government Capacity and Legitimacy

2.44 Fostering host-nation government capacity and legitimacy does not imply a particular form of governance, but does require the restoration of state survival functions. It may also mean helping that government to: reduce corruption; improve its practical ability to administer the state; become more open and transparent; and be seen as the only legitimate, impartial deliverer of justice, although this can also include government-sanctioned use of non-state traditional/ customary justice mechanisms. The military contribution is described in Chapter 6.

'Good governance and safe cities are reciprocal: where inhabitants are free from fear, and where safety is improved for citizens and neighbourhoods, interaction among people, among groups, and with the public institutions becomes possible. This in turn creates an enabling environment. Good for the inhabitants in the city, for the quality of their life and for economic development.'

UN-Habitat,
Safer Cities Programme

Stimulating Economic and Infrastructure Development

2.45 The aim of improving the economic situation and restoring basic services and infrastructure is likely to be twofold: first to provide support to those in need, and second, to boost support for the host-nation government. Projects should make maximum use of local knowledge, skills, manpower, and materials. Given the key requirement to foster host-nation governance, it is important that all actions are linked to national priorities, programmes, and structures. The long-term sustainability of service delivery should also be considered. It is better to provide essential services that are good enough and which can subsequently be taken on by local providers, rather than those which are optimal but are unlikely to be maintained due to a long-term shortfall in local capacity. Chapter 6 describes the military contribution.

Permissiveness

2.46 The model in Figure 2-9 shows the scope and nature of the tasks required if a successful outcome to a stabilisation mission is to be achieved. This is clearly a multi-agency endeavour and the military will usually only be responsible for the delivery of a proportion of these tasks. The key purpose of military involvement should focus on improving the security situation sufficiently to allow the appropriate civilian organisations to operate effectively. It is principally the results of the actions of these other organisations which will bring about the long term, self-sustaining solutions required. In addition to establishing a robust security framework, the military may, in non-permissive circumstances, be required to contribute to wider stabilisation tasks. Consequently, the following factors may need to be considered.

- At times the environment will be so unsafe that only the military can operate in it. Where such a major gap in civilian stabilisation capability delivery exists, the commander will need to manage the tension between immediate, visible security progress, and the longer term, sustainable reconstruction and development of the state. This tension has often been the cause of friction between civilian agencies and the military.

- As the NZDF should expect to be deployed in a crisis, a clear priority should be arresting the rapid downward security spiral. The manner in which immediate needs are met may, however, affect long-term development and governance structures in a way that could undermine the authority of the host government. Equally, agencies whose focus is on long-term sustainability may need to accept that, for both political and military reasons, demonstrable early progress is required. This progress should be consistent with the needs and priorities of the local population.

Key Term

Comprehensive Approach

An approach that responds effectively to complex crises by orchestrating, coordinating and de-conflicting the activities of the military, other government departments and, where possible, international organisations and non-governmental organisations. **Note:** The delivery of a comprehensive approach goes well beyond technical cooperation. It entails integrated and cooperative efforts directed towards a shared goal.

Permissive and Non-permissive Environments

Permissiveness is the ability of civilian actors to access an area without the need for protection. However, to be effective many tasks require the active engagement of the local population, who will only do so if they feel that it is safe, even after we have gone. In assessing the level of permissiveness, also consider security from the local population's perspective.

Levels of permissiveness vary between organisations and activities; an area that is non-permissive for one may be permissive for others. Actions by one group may enhance or undermine the level of permissiveness for others. Military action may bring temporary security to an area thus, for a time, increasing the general level of permissiveness. However, it may also draw more response from adversaries when the military withdraws, with the result that some agencies may find they can no longer operate in areas that were previously safe for them.

2.47 Figure 2-10 uses the stabilisation model to illustrate the relationship between permissiveness and the military contribution. In non-permissive environments the military may provide degrees of support to most or all of the key tasks. As permissiveness increases, civil tasks should be handed over, as soon as is practicable, to the host government and/or other agencies within the coalition.

2.48 Whether civilian access can be guaranteed or not, civilian expertise should be integrated into operational planning and execution of stabilisation tasks. In this way the commander is provided with a fuller understanding of how operations designed to have immediate impact on the ground can influence longer-term sustainable local capacity development, and hence host-nation authority and legitimacy.

Shaping the Key Conflict Relationship

2.49 **Influence.** Individuals and groups derive their views and form their perceptions through a complex process of absorption through many different conduits and media. It is the combination of what audiences hear and what they perceive or experience (the interaction of the word and the deed), interpreted through the prism of their culture, history, and traditions that determines their opinion and behaviour. Consequently, all military activity should be understood as exerting influence. Communication and influence is examined in much greater depth in Chapter 3.

The Key Conflict Relationship

2.50 The campaign must reshape and stabilise a series of key relationships. The primary relationship is the triangular one between the host-nation government, competing (violent) elites[28] (of which there may be several) and the wider population. Elites are those individuals and groups with the power (including capacity for significant violence) to undermine existing

[28] Elites are those individuals and groups with the power (including the capacity for significant violence) to undermine existing political settlements and prevent the establishment of new ones.

political settlements and prevent the establishment of new ones. It is this set of relationships that holds the key to a sustainable political settlement. Significant relationships also exist that involve the international forces' domestic audiences, regional and international populations and actors, as well as between the intervening actors themselves. The significance of these other relationships will be critical if collapse of domestic support is not to occur; but the importance of the relationships between the host government, competing elites and the local population should be the focus of influence.

2.51 Figure 2-11 illustrates the central relationship in societal conflicts. All stabilisation activity should be planned, executed, and assessed in terms of the influence brought to bear on this relationship.

2.52 **Host Government.** Stabilisation interventions involve either supporting an extant government, or contributing to the establishment of a government where none exists. This does not mean that our support is unconditional. It is legitimate, indeed essential, to seek to influence the conduct, attitudes and even, within the bounds of what is politically acceptable, the composition of that government. Improving the quality of governance is an essential aspect of stabilisation.

2.53 **The Authority of the Host Government.** A political settlement is unsustainable if the host-nation government is unable or unwilling to build sufficient authority and legitimacy. A state's authority is dependent upon the successful amalgamation and interplay of the four factors listed below.

- **Mandate.** The perceived legitimacy of the mandate that establishes a state authority, whether through the principles of universal suffrage, or a recognised and accepted caste/tribal model.
- **Manner.** The perceived legitimacy of the way in which those exercising the mandate conduct themselves, both individually and collectively.



Figure 2-10: The military contribution to stabilisation tasks.

- **Consent.** The extent to which factions, local populations and others consent to, comply with, or resist the authority of those exercising the mandate. Consent, or its absence, may range from active resistance, through unwilling compliance, to freely given support.
- **Expectations.** The extent to which the expectations and aspirations of factions, local populations and others are managed or are met by those exercising the mandate.

2.54 **Competing Elites.** Political settlement will entail the accommodation of competing elites, sometimes referred to as elite consolidation. Elites will accommodate themselves to political settlements on the basis of self interest. Negotiation and peace agreements may be a part of a political settlement, but they are not synonymous. A clear cut victory of one set of actors over another could lead to a political settlement if the losers believe that the chance of improving their position through further conflict is limited; personal security can be a strong motivation for accommodation. However, unequivocal victories in complex societal conflicts are rare. Usually, success is based on including elements of hostile groups in the political system. Those unwilling to reach an accommodation, known as irreconcilables, must be removed.

2.55 **The Wider Population.** The third element in the central conflict relationship is the wider population. The population should be the focus. As indicated previously, current conflicts fundamentally involve a competition for the people. Considerations include the following below.

- Ideas such as winning hearts and minds, population focus and securing the population have become staples of policy and doctrine. However, they can be interpreted, and used as a guide for action, in counterproductive ways.
- Winning the hearts and minds of the population in terms of its attitudes to the international forces is of secondary importance. If widespread, outright hostility will impede stabilisation, however it is not the relationship between the international forces and the population that is critical. People are unlikely to ever be happy or even content about a prolonged foreign military presence. What is important is the attitude of the population to the host-nation government relative to rival elites seeking its support and mobilisation. It is the population's perceptions of its government that



Figure 2-11: The key conflict relationship.

are critical, and it is these that the international forces should seek to influence.

- The population's perception of security directly influences people's judgements on the competence, authority and legitimacy of the government. It is vital, therefore, that there is a government face to security provision. Improving the security of an area, while it can create space and time for other stabilisation efforts, may have less positive, long-term political impact if all it does is build people's confidence in the foreign military capability. The population should have confidence that, ultimately, the host-nation government can sustain adequate security provision, as set out in a credible narrative.

Working with Partners

The Command and Control Challenge

2.56 Multi-agency operations require unique military command and control arrangements. Central authority is not achieved easily in stabilisation, which is characterised by multinational and interagency actors, who work to balance power through individual agendas within a loosely-knit web of bi- and multi-lateral engagement mechanisms. Some structures and organisations are dysfunctional with no clear lines of authority and a blurring of responsibilities. Levels of military authority (theatre, formation, unit etc.) do not always align with civilian counterparts. The plethora of actors involved may find it difficult – sometimes even impossible – to engage the host-nation with a unified voice and even to understand the basis of their relationships with each other. The web of relationships does not fit neat military notions of Command and Control (C2); they can appear almost anarchical. Although partner agencies can function based on shared values, informal rules, and practical protocols, it will take a shared top-down vision, patience, willingness to compromise and a degree of organisation to achieve unity of purpose.

2.57 One of the most important facts for a commander to establish is who is responsible to whom and for what? Although New Zealand may lead some small operations in the South Pacific, it is most likely that it will be working within a multinational environment[29] as a supporting partner, for example with the US, UK, or Australia. In these cases, followership can be as important as leadership and the commander should recognise where their approach should be subordinate to that of the alliance or coalition. This can be extended to include civil figures such as High Representatives who have no formal military command authority, but possess a mandate to coordinate civil and military activity.

2.58 In the absence of formal authority over other agencies, the commander needs to build tacit authority using their powers of persuasion. Through their personal engagement, they should establish mechanisms for cooperation and coordination that allow some degree of control – not over the people of other nations and agencies – but over the coherence of their activities with the commander and with one another. The military's ability to coordinate and integrate is part of their smart power in stabilisation. While a commander can still exert full authority over their subordinate military chain of command, with other nations and agencies they can only use influence underpinned by they tacit or personal authority.

The Host-nation Government

2.59 The relationship between intervening actors and the host-nation government is likely to be dynamic and, at times, fraught; interests do not always coincide and methods may not be compatible. A paradox is that success generates new challenges. For example, as the situation improves, the host government begins to feel more secure and develops greater capacity, so it will be more likely to assert itself. This can lead to differences in approach, such as over the timing and focus of operations. Generally, this should be welcomed

[29] Most joint operations conducted outside New Zealand territory will be in conjunction with other nations' forces, and are thus termed 'multinational'. Some of these operations will be conducted within a framework of formal agreements. In such cases, there are two main distinctions: combined operations involve the participation of elements of more than one nation, usually allies; coalition operations are ad hoc arrangements between two or more nations unified by a common mission. These are the most common form of operation conducted by the NZDF.

as a sign of progress. However, it must be clear that our support is conditional upon harmonisation of strategic interests. This influence should be exerted as diplomatically as possible.

2.60 Host-nation spokesperson should be given prominence; joint patrols should be the norm; local advice and participation should be sought in information operations, and the message delivered by local people; the physical presence of the intervening forces should be reduced as soon as practicable.

Integrated Approaches

2.61 In war we aim to overwhelm our enemy by integrating manoeuvre with fires. In stabilisation, we strive to achieve a similar effect on a wicked problem[30] by integrating all the levers that our society can muster. A comprehensive approach is often, incorrectly, assumed to be synonymous with a cross-government approach. While a coherent government response is an essential element, a comprehensive approach is a much broader multi-agency and, often, multinational response. The frictions and difficulties associated with developing a coherent, cross-government approach multiplies in multinational operations. Taking a comprehensive approach involves more than just talking to the political or development adviser. Mutually supporting cross-departmental and multi-agency effort should enable comprehensive tactical activity to deliver overwhelming campaign effect.

2.62 Our opponents understand the importance and the fragility of a comprehensive approach and therefore are likely to use tactics that deliberately target and drive away vulnerable civil actors. By exploiting this fracture point adversaries aim to prolong the campaign, undermining the collective will and perseverance of the coalition. If successful, this leads to shortfalls in delivery as progress is hampered by the absence or weakening of civil expertise and capability. Reducing our delivery of comprehensive effect is an area where our opponents seek freedom of manoeuvre, both to spoil the authority and credibility of the host-nation and to supplant it with its own.

2.63 In stabilisation, the notion of impartiality or neutrality has limited relevance. Civilian participants will automatically become part of the conflict. Civilian targets are often more lucrative than military ones. Attacks on civil capability can quickly undermine the broader stabilisation efforts and are likely to have greater impact on the domestic audiences of intervening actors. Given this reality, the idea of a shared enterprise should be continually defended and promoted.

2.64 A comprehensive approach requires an understanding of the different philosophies which will shape attitudes towards priorities. For example, the military will tend to focus on relatively short-term security deliverables while the development community will tend to give priority to broader, longer-term challenges. While there is no purely military solution to complex societal conflict, neither is there a purely developmental one. The President of the World Bank made the point that even the term 'security' may have different meaning to a soldier in body armour and an NGO worker living in a village.[31]

2.65 When New Zealand is a supporting partner in a coalition it cannot expect to exert the same degree of control over the conduct of operations as it can for national operations. However, the commander should seek to maximise the influence New Zealand brings to bear. This requires an understanding of the doctrine, procedures, approaches and priorities of the lead partner.[32] New Zealand's contribution will need to be shaped in a manner consistent with this framework. Achieving influence may also demand a particular level of resourcing, and while commanders will advise, this is ultimately a matter of political choice. In any

[30] A 'wicked problem' is a phrase used in social planning to describe a problem that is difficult or impossible to solve because if incomplete, contradictory, and changing requirements that are often difficult to recognise. Moreover, because of complex interdependencies, the effort to solve one aspect of the wicked problem may reveal or create other problems.

[31] Robert B. Zoellick, in a speech to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Geneva, 12 September 2008, quoting an unnamed Canadian development official in Afghanistan.

[32] In the case of the *US, see the US Government Counterinsurgency Guide,* 2009.

circumstance, commanders will need to be frank with the coalition command as to their force's capability.

Transitions

2.66 Campaigns pass through a number of transitions as they progress. A key leadership function is analysis of the conditions required to enable an early transition of tasks to civilian actors and the host government. As the environment becomes less permissive, civil capacities decline. This draws in the military. As security and capacity building efforts begin to take effect the military progressively hands back functions to the appropriate authorities, bearing in mind that this may need to be revisited given that it is a characteristic of such campaigns to ebb and flow. Transitions call for fine judgement and close consultation between commanders and national, international, and host-nation actors.

2.67 Timely transitions meet the expectation of the host-nation government and its population while generating a positive momentum. They enhance campaign credibility, which helps turn passive consent into active support. Their result should be the release of the military to their primary tasks – security and SSR – and a reduction in force profile. In contrast, poorly timed and conceived transitions create opportunities for hostile groups, especially if the host government fails to adequately discharge a responsibility that was previously being successfully undertaken by us. Such an outcome severely undermines population confidence in the government. However being too cautious can lead to a dependency culture that institutionalises and prolongs the international presence. Further guidance on transitions are contained in Chapter 10.

Real-Life Example

Timely and Premature Transitions: East Timor

The timely Australian-led International Force East Timor (INTERFET) deployment in September 1999 responded to widespread instability following the previous month's referendum. The mission was to stabilise the situation in order to allow for transition to a United Nations (UN) Transitional Administration. The mission was widely seen as a success. Upon full independence in May 2002 the mission transitioned again to the UN Mission in Support of East Timor which was tasked with supporting post-independence development. This was deemed sufficiently successful to begin, in 2005, the process of ramping down the UN presence with the establishment of a new Office to oversee completion of the mandate by August 2006. Many commentators, at this point, saw the international involvement in East Timor as a model for successful stabilisation and transition.

However, in May 2006 the capital, Dili, was once more the scene of widespread violence. The proximate cause was the dismissal of 594 members of the Timorese Armed Forces, but, as the Secretary General's report stated in August 2006, 'it is now evident that those events were only the precursor to a political, humanitarian and security crisis of major dimensions.' An Australian-led force was redeployed to stabilise the situation again and allow for a reformed UN Mission in Timor (UNMIT) to take over. UNMIT had its mandate extended for the third time in February 2009. East Timor illustrates the dangers of withdrawing support for a fragile state too early. The transitions from INTERFET to the successive UN Missions saw a gradual ramping down of international support. At each stage the judgement was made that the situation was improving sufficiently to allow transition. However, the underlying weaknesses of the state had not been sufficiently addressed and a major re-engagement of the international community was required to arrest a rapid downward spiral in a still fragile state.

PART 2:

THE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO STABILISATION

CONTENTS

CHAPTER 3:

INFLUENCE: THE CENTRAL IDEA

CONTENTS

Introduction

3.01 This chapter takes as its central theme the idea that all activity has influence. Through a sound understanding of target audiences, activity should be focused to achieve the desired influence. It also considers how strategic communications and information operations (IO) can support this. All military action should be assessed by its contribution toward influencing the key conflict relationship and shaping the eventual political settlement. The perceptions, beliefs, attitudes, and opinions of individuals and groups are all fundamental to this outcome, so, influence is the guiding idea for the conduct of operations. Analysis, planning, execution, and assessment then become a function of two questions: What effect do we want to achieve? What actions will best achieve that effect?

3.02 This is not a reprise of a mechanistic form of an effects based approach to operations, which simply does not work for complex, variable human systems. However, it requires commanders to consider the relationship between effects, the influence necessary to achieve those effects, and the activities to achieve that influence. Everything that we do, every action we take, will have an influence on part of the conflict relationship.

3.03 As well as the conflict relationship within the host-nation, there may be a need to shape:

- domestic audiences
- key regional leaders and populations
- coalition partners
- diaspora communities
- broader international opinion.

3.04 The importance of these relationships may wax and wane, but the relationship between the host-nation government, competing elites and the wider population should always remain the focus.

3.05 The desired outcome of cross-government activities is to change or maintain the character or behaviour of agreed audiences through physical and psychological means. All multi-agency capabilities can contribute to this process. To achieve the desired outcome, activities need to be coordinated and focused. Psychological effects are the lasting and decisive elements in stabilisation. Human beings are neither benign nor passive, they will respond to influence in different ways. The inherent risk is that we cannot control how actions, words, and images are received and processed. Good analysis and understanding will mitigate this risk.

Key Terms

Influence

The power or ability to affect someone's beliefs or actions. Or a person or thing with such ability or power.

Communicate

To share or exchange information or ideas, or convey an emotion or feeling (verbal or non-verbal). A two-way dynamic process.

Target (Designated) Audience

An individual or group selected as the object of influence.

3.06 Influence is achieved when we change the behaviour of the target audience through the coordination of all military actions, words, and images. It is not just about messages or media, but about how the combination of the word and the deed are portrayed, interpreted and understood by audiences through a lens of their own culture, history, religion, and tradition. Influence is challenging, requiring subtle understanding of target audiences that is difficult to achieve. It will be contested with adversaries who may have a significant cultural advantage.

Figure 3-1: Influence is achieved when we change the behaviour of the target audience through the coordination of all military actions, words, and images.

Key Terms

Narrative

Communication that portrays a story designed to resonate in the mind of the audience, which helps explain the campaign strategy and operational plan.

Theme

An overarching concept or intention, designed for broad communication application.

Message

A narrowly focused communication directed at a specific target audience.

Conduit/Channel

A means by which a message is transmitted or received.

Applying Influence within the Campaign

Understanding Target Audiences

3.07 People from different cultures both behave and think about the world in different ways. The commander should first try to understand how people from different cultures think and what symbols, themes, messages, etiquette, and practices are most likely to resonate with them. This should include systems of reciprocity, kinship, allegiances, and social obligations. Analysis and intelligence, discussed in Part 3 generates this understanding.

3.08 In failed or failing states, oral traditions are usually strong. Word of mouth compensates for low literacy rates and is the principal means by which messages are passed between opinion formers and local populations. Use of verbal and audio messaging is likely to have greater effect than the written word. Customs of storytelling in such societies and the modern introduction of mobile communication systems ensure that messages good and bad, true and untrue can be transmitted very rapidly. Commanders will need to ensure that their messaging is timely, accurate, and persistent to pre-empt rumour and manage the distortion inherent in verbal messaging.

3.09 Populations will usually be sensitive to any slight, humiliation, or attack on their culture by outsiders, be that real or perceived, deliberate, or unintentional. Misunderstanding can lead to mistrust and increased tension. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) representatives, deployed cultural advisers, resident expatriates, and locally employed civilians can provide invaluable advice and the skills to decode and understand cultural nuance. Messages delivered by foreign spokesmen can lack credibility and, regardless of content, are not as well received as those from familiar, trusted sources. International forces should seek to use established channels for messaging. Where these are absent or insufficient, they will need to build relationships with key leaders and the population in order to establish viable channels.

Influence as a Contest

3.10 Adversaries may use sensational acts of terrorism to influence populations, the purpose of which is to generate a widespread sense of fear and descent into chaos. Cheap digital cameras and remote internet connections, combined with simple narratives to shape both local and global perceptions, facilitate this. A video of the murder of the American contractor Nicholas Berg by Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi, probably initially sent from a computer somewhere in Iraq, was copied onto Internet sites and within 24 hours had been downloaded half a million times. Adversaries' messages are highly tuned to specific audiences. They know that opinions can be changed and it is this knowledge that empowers and enables them, even when they cannot win a physical contest. Victory in combat may be irrelevant if the adversary can continue to fight in a virtual battle space of ideas and maintain credibility.

Real-Life Example

An Adversary's View of Influence

Abu Mussab al-Zawahiri points out those short-term goals require the support of the masses, and that they know the enemy (Coalition Forces) is trying to separate them from the masses. Zawahiri states that al-Qaeda must "avoid action that the masses don't understand or approve of." Indeed, the letter instructed Zarqawi to stop broadcasting the slaughter of hostages on the Internet. Whilst Zawahiri is not condemning the practice per se, and to some degree justifies it, he argues that by exercising restraint, influence can be maximised: "the general opinion of our supporter does not comprehend that, and that this general opinion falls under a campaign by the malicious, perfidious, and fallacious campaign by the deceptive and fabricated media. And we would spare the people from the effect of questions about the usefulness of our actions in the hearts and minds of the general opinion that is essentially sympathetic to us."

3.11 Adversaries can have as much difficulty as us in trying to explain complex issues to local and global audiences. Yet despite his tirade against the media in the quote above, he starkly acknowledges their importance: "I say to you: that we are in a battle, and that more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. And that we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our Umma."[33]

3.12 Adversaries usually have a comparative advantage over intervening forces and agencies because they share religion, ethnicity, culture, history, and geography with the people. Even in situations where New Zealand forces might share common language and ethnicity (allowing for example every member of a foot patrol to read the graffiti, talk and listen to the population) the culture of the insurgent movement may still not be well understood. This is made much harder where we do not share a language and all communication with the population has to be conducted through an interpreter.

3.13 In stabilisation, the state's authority, legitimacy, and reach are in direct competition with their adversaries. Adversaries may make strong use of religious or cultural narratives, norms, or imagery. They may also choose to place the conflict within existing ethnic tensions. Their proximity to local populations may have either a coercive or persuasive effect. This can aid them in the construction of a simple, culturally attuned, and emotive message to support their cause.

3.14 The commander's strategy for winning the influence contest can easily be undermined by actors and events outside of their control; corruption, ineptitude, and chronic failings of the host government are possible examples. The attitudes, policies, and actions of New Zealand, or its allies on all manner of seemingly unrelated issues can also impact on efforts to achieve influence in-theatre.

3.15 Speed of response is vital. First impressions count and the commander should reinforce his message through synchronised words, deeds, and images in advance of counter narratives proffered by adversaries – be first with the truth. The most powerful and convincing messages are factually true and are mutually reinforced through our actions. However, much messaging will cover subjective issues where the truth is not self-evident, or differs according to individual perception or cultural values. Commanders may wish to capitalise on subjectivity where the benefits (e.g. legitimate military deception) outweigh the potential risks.

Narratives

3.16 The narrative seeks to explain the actions of the main protagonists. Commanders should explain the purpose of their presence in theatre and develop an appropriate narrative for each audience. The narratives that resonate best are those which embrace the concepts and language of target audiences; known as the 'stickiness of the message'. International forces should all understand the narrative of their activities. All

[33] Umma: The global Muslim community – al-Qaeda's ultimate source of strategic success and future.

actions should be planned and executed to support this narrative, and not the other way around. At times this will involve the controlled and coordinated release of themed information, while at other times it may involve specific security operations amongst local populations. Both words and actions reinforce the narrative as does the persistent manner in which both are carried out.

3.17 Narratives should be flexible so that they are not undermined by local messages designed to respond to contemporaneous events. They should also be consistent with both the strategic communication strategy and, where possible, narratives of the host government. Strategic level narratives set out broad themes which are reinforced by tailored, flexible local messages, creating a hierarchy of related messages. Characteristics of a good narrative include:

- it is clear and credible and it explains the campaign
- it is acceptable to all intervening parties and the host government
- it is linked to New Zealand's political objectives
- it supports local messaging
- it is able to be backed up by coherent physical activity and imagery
- it has a positive impact on a variety of target audiences.

Figure 3-2: Influence includes understanding systems of reciprocity, kinship, allegiances, and social obligations.

Real-Life Example

Counter Narratives – An Adversary's Narrative

In November 2006 al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia issued a statement justifying attacks on Shi'ites and the coalition forces in language designed to provide a unifying narrative to a splintered Sunni insurgency:

"The arrows of the [Sunni] mujahadeen focused on the occupying crusader enemy until the black hatred of the Shia in Iraq for the Sunnis became obvious...This sect, alongside the invading Crusader forces, became the tip of the spear in the fight against the mujahadeen."[34]

Note: The use of terms such as occupation, Crusader and the play upon sectarian and religious fissures in Iraqi society. Other statements have played upon traditional Sunni Arab suspicion and enmity towards the Persians. This refers both to Iran, and to the Shia politicians in power in Baghdad who had, or were perceived to have, links with the Iranian regime.

3.18 Recent operations have shown that some of the most successful mechanisms for spreading messages lie at either end of the technology spectrum. In Iraq and Afghanistan, ancient and traditional mechanisms for discussion such as Shuras and Loya Jirgas[35] carry great weight. At the other end of the spectrum, emerging media outlets such as blogs and social networking sites can be highly effective. However, the most credible mechanisms are the many daily interactions between the population, host government and international forces. For example, daily contact during security sector reform between liaison and mentoring teams and the host-nation security forces generates thousands of individual opportunities to reinforce key messages, but one that is seldom used systematically. Each member of the host-nation security force provides a channel to their friends and family. Every action, inaction, interaction and transaction sends a message. All should be consistent with the narrative. Influence operations need some discipline and care in execution, as with a kinetic fire plan.

3.19 Adversaries will have their own narrative which should be analysed, countered, or rebutted. If an adversary's narrative can be discredited, acquiescence to the host government's authority and legitimacy should follow. The commander should seek to identify the potential resonances and frictions between adversarial narratives and local audiences. Where friction is identified, a counter-narrative should be developed to exploit it.

Actions, Words, and Images

3.20 Gaining and holding an audience's attention is as important as crafting the message. The most powerful tool is the image. The more dramatic, the more attention it attracts and the more it will endure. Visual images, where culturally acceptable, can resonate and persuade, shaping social and political agendas.

Real-Life Example

The Adversary Aligning the Word and the Deed

In discussing the way ahead, Zarqawi analyses the various groups that are present – the Kurds, the Shia (for whom he reserves his most bitter hatred), the Americans, and the (Shia dominated) Iraqi military and security forces. In addition to setting out his reasons for initiating a bitter civil war along sectarian lines (Sunni v Shia), he sees the importance of influence and perceptions. In terms of selling his carefully prepared narrative he states: "Perhaps we will decide to go public soon, even if in a gradual way, so that we can come out into the open. We have been hiding for a long time. We are seriously preparing media material that will reveal the facts, call forth firm intentions, arouse determination, and become an arena for jihad in which the pen and the sword complement each other."

Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi

[34] From Adelphi Paper 402, *Iraq's Sunni Insurgency* by Ahmed S Hashim.

[35] Shuras and Jirgas are similar. They are meeting or councils called to discuss and resolve issues. The Loya Jirga is a large meeting called to discuss a major event such as the choosing of a new king.

3.21 The standard adversarial use of the image is the propaganda of the deed. This might be an act of violence conducted against an enemy (usually the host government or intervening actors), whose visual impact or symbolic value summons support from sympathetic communities. It is part of a process of narrative construction and reinforcement, and it may constitute the core of the adversary's influence strategy. Targets tend to be selected for their symbolic impact, amplifying their ability to resonate meaning to their audience. The attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon are contemporary examples.

The Influence Framework

Influence – Organisation and Capabilities

3.22 **Strategic Communication.** Strategic communication is the articulation of cross-government guidance on influence and supports the synchronisation of the words and deeds of friendly actors to maximise desired effects. As the term implies, being pitched at the strategic level, many of the ways and means used to conduct strategic communication fall outside the remit of the commander. Strategic communication messages are coordinated at the national strategic level through targeting and IO or through the national information strategy (NIS).[36] Strategic communication also provides the framework for the delivery of psychological effects at lower levels, where the operational military contribution is known as influence activities. Strategic communication has two overlapping aspects – that relating to crisis management and that concerning enduring requirements.

[36] New Zealand does not yet have a National Information Strategy or a formalised process to develop strategic communication messages.

3.23 **Coordinating New Zealand's Message.** During crisis management and military operations, strategic communication is guided by the narrative, laid out in a cross-government information strategy.

- **Cohesion.** Cohesion is achieved by a common understanding between partners on the ways and means to achieve crisis resolution objectives. Nationally, cohesion is required between government departments and agencies, and between the New Zealand Government and its domestic audience. Cohesion is particularly important in the context of coalition and alliance operations, given that our adversaries will attempt to disrupt coalition unity.
- **Coherence**. A clear and simple high-level narrative explains the stabilisation mission, the purpose and the role of its participants, and is aimed at supporting the operational and tactical activities undertaken by the deployed forces. Coherence is achieved through the use of clear, mutually supportive themes and messages, which resonate with our target audiences. These should cover the full range of issues relevant to crisis resolution for all phases of a campaign; include contingencies for high-risk adverse events – although this will likely be impossible at first – and guard against ambiguity and scope for misinterpretation. Coherence is challenging at any time; where national objectives differ and our forces face multiple cultures in-theatre it may be impossible to achieve.

3.24 **Coalitions and Alliances.** A single, integrated strategic communication plan should be the aim. This aspiration is likely to be limited by different national objectives, legal frameworks, and constitutional or cultural positions. It is likely that a coalition strategic communication plan will be modest in scope and bland in order to achieve consensus between partners. Not all partners will have national plans to fall back on, but New Zealand will seek to reflect the agreed coalition

communication plan in its own information strategy. In the absence of a coalition information strategy, the strategic communication vision of the lead nation is likely to prevail.[37] New Zealand is still to develop a formal pan-government process to coordinate and produce a NIS.[38]

Key Term

Fires

The use of weapon systems to create a specific lethal or non-lethal effect on a target.

The Commander's Influence Tools

3.25 The commander's role is initially to establish the results necessary to exert the desired influence. Assisted by their staff, they then derive the activities required to realise those effects, and subsequently orchestrate them during execution (see Figure 3-3). Joint action provides a framework to support this process by ensuring that all capabilities and types of activity are considered and, where appropriate employed, to realise both physical and psychological effects in the most efficient and effective manner. Though joint action organises activities by type, these should not be viewed as discrete nor exclusive groupings. While convenient to visualise activities as primarily seeking either a physical or psychological effect, the realisation of any one effect may require the orchestration of many types of activity or, for example, the specific employment of physical means (fires) to realise psychological effect. The aim

[37] For example, the US view (and emerging NATO view) of Strategic Communication is the coordinated use of Public Affairs, Information Operations and Public Diplomacy.

[38] **The National Information Strategy.** At the highest levels within the UK, strategic communication is coordinated through cross-government Information Strategy Groups. These are normally chaired by a 2* official from the Foreign & Commonwealth Office and produce a national information strategy in relation to a particular operation. Each national information strategy aims to articulate the strategic level narrative that will be used across the UK Government. It contains details of:

- the campaign objectives and end-state
- information objectives
- target audiences
- core script
- key themes and messages related to campaign progression
- lines to take
- channels of communication
- measures of effectiveness
- Planning factors and constraints. The national information strategy should be part of the Chief of the Defence Staff's Directive to the operational level, enhanced with military-strategic guidance. Operational planners should note that information objectives may be considered as decisive conditions and themes as supporting effects, or as factors and constraints in their own analysis and planning processes, to be coordinated with other government departments or agencies, and international partners.

Figure 3-3: The Commander's Influence Tools – aligning actions, words and images in time and space.

of joint action is to achieve synergy between different purposeful activities; organising them by type simply provides structure and aids the allocation of planning and execution responsibilities.

3.26 Fires and manoeuvres clearly achieve psychological, as well as physical consequences. Additionally, the commander has a range of non-lethal tools specifically tailored to manipulate information, or perceptions of that information once received. These include: information operations (IO); media operations (Media Ops); civil-military operations (CMO); and operations security (OPSEC). All these operations need to be fused into an approach that is coherent with both fires and manoeuvre. This approach needs to use coordination mechanisms, adapted from time sensitive targeting procedures, which involve inter-agency partners and those responsible for the delivery of non-lethal effects, to achieve synchronised influence activity at the local level.

3.27 During stabilisation the range of tools is supplemented by other activities, such as security sector reform, infrastructure, or governance projects, which present opportunities for delivering a coordinated message. While these do not fit easily within the generic types of activity, the underpinning logic of joint action is equally pertinent to their consideration and application.[39]

3.28 The practical detail of how the military commander can make best use of influence tools is covered in Parts 3 and 4. The commander should always keep in mind that their role is to align the appropriate selected actions, words, and images of the coalition forces in time and space on the correctly identified target audiences. By doing this he may change behaviour and achieve influence that will bring about a political settlement. Figure 3-3 illustrates that the military contribution to stabilisation is to achieve influence through the correct balanced and synchronised interaction of lethal and non-lethal activities in a manoeuvrist manner.

[39] Operational planners should note that information objectives may be considerations as decisive conditions and themes as supporting effects, or as factors and contraints in their own analysis and planning process, to be coordinated with other govenment departments or agencies, and international partners.

CHAPTER 4:

OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE

CONTENTS

Introduction

4.01 This chapter provides the reader with an overview of some stabilisation considerations, so that they may contribute to the campaign planning process and offer operational guidance. It seeks to operationalise the stabilisation model and describes the practical application of operational art in stabilisation. It briefly considers the issues of leadership and ethics. Finally, it offers some conceptual ideas for the delivery of the military contribution and describes the military principles for stabilisation.

The Practical Application of Operational Art

The Differing Requirements in Stabilisation

4.02 Operational art is the theory and practice of planning, preparing, and conducting campaigns. It concerns a commander's skill in orchestrating tactical actions in concert with other agencies to achieve the desired outcome. It is realised through a combination of the commander's expertise and intuition, and the staff-assisted processes of campaign design and execution. It translates creative and innovative thinking into practical action.

4.03 In stabilisation, operational art should be based on a detailed understanding of the local political dynamics, and an in-depth knowledge of the friendly, neutral, and adversarial groups. The political nature of stabilisation requires a people-focused approach, based on the personal judgements of the commander. A critical challenge will be to adapt the thinking, organisation, tactics, and procedures of the force to the requirements of stabilisation rather than conventional war.

The Commander's Role

4.04 The commander should place themselves – and select and place their staff – in positions of influence across the multi-agency force if the latent potential of that force is to be unlocked and synchronised. They will need to balance the requirement for information with the opportunity for action in order to make timely decisions, and they will need to become an expert in recognising when good enough will do.

4.05 Stabilisation will confer on a commander a political status by virtue of their negotiations with government representatives to resolve an inherently political problem. It is the commander's access to politicians, diplomats, and other agency leaders that will shape the operational art. They will need to become an advocate for the appropriate use of the military instrument and canvas multi-agency support for it.

Organising for Influence

4.06 Any commander will expect to plan and execute military operations. But in stabilisation, military operations will be seen as a political act with wide-reaching potential consequences. The commander, therefore, will often have to consult others before acting. They may also need to employ comprehensive means from outside their command chain, in which case it is their powers of persuasion, rather than direction that will secure them. Since military headquarters are not conventionally structured to operate by persuasion, they may need to be adapted, restructured, and trained for it. The staff are also unlikely to have the developed skill-sets and experience required at the outset of the campaign. The commander may therefore wish to recruit experts who can provide them with the advice that they require both in-theatre and by exploiting reach-back.

The Commander's Relationship with the Host-nation

4.07 The relationship between an international force and the host-nation is elastic; it can be pulled and placed under tension, but it must not be allowed to break. A commander will balance the needs of their force with the competing priorities and approaches of the host-nation. The international forces' support will be conditional.

The Commander's Relationship with Other Actors

4.08 The commander will utilise operational art across multiple relationships in addition to the host-nation. These include coalition partners, national capitals, and other regional players. The commander should be adept in making a case for the necessary freedoms and permissions to use force, sensing the diverse political nuances at work within their force. These will translate into tangible agreed measures such as Rules of Engagement (ROE). Having understood the explicit and implicit constraints, operational design will need to accommodate national caveats as they apply to parts of the force. As a coalition or alliance partner, the commander will need to recognise when to lead and when to follow, and to explain their logic to the national chain of command. Their relationship with the senior national diplomat (Ambassador, High Commissioner or a Special Representative) will be critically important since this is the nexus of diplomatic and military instruments to achieve unity of effort, and is also the key point of access and influence between them. Together they must set the tone and share the judgement as to how the elastic can be stretched or eased with the host-nation. It is by understanding which levers are available to influence host-nation government behaviour, and how they may be employed, that the levers become mutually reinforcing. This will be based on a mix of personality and process. Of these, the most important is personality.

Leadership and the Legal Requirements

Introduction

4.09 There is plenty of military literature in support of developing leadership, but surprisingly little guidance on ethics. Ethics inform law and they go beyond law. This section summarises the key legal principles that underlie armed conflict, which are themselves rooted in ethics, and also those aspects of leadership that are pertinent.

Leadership

- **The Contemporary Environment.** Some ethical aspects to leadership that are important and need highlighting:
  - the commander needs to appreciate their subordinates' difficulties in balancing the risks to their own troops, against the need to offer maximum protection to the civil population
  - the possible absence of a well-understood, common moral code, especially when operating with a large mix of host-nation military and civilian organisations
  - the risks associated with the reality of unity of effort in place of unity of command
  - the pressures of working in the glare of the global media. The commander should be resilient, despite demands to respond to short term shocks
  - the political nature of the role of the military commander.

4.10 **Projection of Personality.** Field Marshal Viscount Slim said that: 'first and foremost military leadership is about the projection of personality. It is that combination of persuasion, compulsion, and example that makes other people do what you want them to do'.[40] He went on to say: 'The first thing the population will want after war is security, and if the interveners won't or can't provide it they will look to someone else who can. So, it is essential to dominate the security space and introduce the rule of law from day one, moment one – even if, at the start, soldiers have to do it…'[41] It is in this situation that the commander needs to provide the clearest leadership. The commander's subordinates will transition between combat and peaceful interaction with the locals regularly. Force elements engaged in warfighting can be expected to support local governance and economic development as soon as combat ceases. It is important therefore, that a commander clearly thinks through these issues and potential tensions. At critical points in the campaign the commander will need to find ways to impose their will on the chaos and articulate their vision. Such was the case in 2008 when General Petraeus updated his Coalition campaign guidance in Iraq, see Annex A to this chapter.

[40] Slim, *Leadership in Management,* Australian Army Journal, Issue 102, November 1957.
[41] Ibid, page 94

4.11 **Support to Subordinates.** Military leaders are responsible for delivering national aims within national laws and ethical standards. Leaders are responsible for the standards of their subordinates. The pressures of prolonged stabilisation missions will require leaders to be aware of signs of stress in both individuals and units. Commanders sometimes need to de-escalate a situation and this may mean risking their own men and woman's lives in order to protect the lives of the local population.

4.12 **Cultural Tolerance versus Immutable Standards.** Lieutenant General Sir John Kizsley[42] identified the cultural requirement of the contemporary coalition commander as an ability to respect the differences of others while still achieving effective command. He identified four attributes essential for a coalition commander:

- political acumen
- diplomacy
- applied intelligence
- mental stamina.

4.13 Lieutenant General Kizsley's four essential attributes apply to any senior military leader, but they become particularly important when operating with forces and agencies from other nations. Local culture does not relieve the commander of their responsibility for maintaining ethical and moral standards. They will

[42] Senior British Military Representative to Iraq 2004–5.



Figure 4-1: Stabilisation operations require New Zealand Defence Force personnel to have skills in cultural tolerance, political acumen, and diplomacy.

need to strike a balance between tolerating what is acceptable behaviour in one culture, and condemning that which is unacceptable in any circumstance. Through all its actions and messages, the international force should lead by example, demonstrate compassion and empathy for the population, maintain the moral high ground and provide a moral compass for others.

Coalition Considerations Add Further Complications

4.14 **Dealing with Mistakes.** Mistakes are inevitable, and the commander will need to acknowledge when things do go wrong. They will try to minimise the risk of their subordinates operating outside the law (in combat, prisoner handling, or engaging with the population), behaving insensitively or causing excessive collateral damage. Where these do occur, they should be ready to respond swiftly and honestly.

Legal Requirements

4.15 The fundamental principles that underlie the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) are military necessity, humanity, distinction (or discrimination), and proportionality. These have strong ethical roots. The increasing reach of International Human Rights Law further controls the behaviour of armed forces and affords protections and rights in certain situations to those who are affected by military operations.[43] In stabilisation operations, there may also be good political or military reasons for exercising a greater degree of self-restraint than is legally required.

4.16 **The Principles of Distinction and Proportionality.** The principle of distinction (or discrimination) requires that combatants only attack military objectives and use means/methods of attack that can be applied so as to discriminate between military objectives and civilians/civilian objects. The principle of proportionality requires that the anticipated loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian property or a combination thereof, incidental to attacks on military objectives, must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained.

4.17 **Determination of Target Value.** When dealing with a high value target, who will often be an individual, the same principles of proportionality and distinction apply. What may differ is that the direct military advantage expected to be gained will generally be greater than for a low ranking (or low value) individual. Thus, as a matter of law, proportionality may allow a higher level of collateral damage for high value targets than for a gunman. However, the potential negative effect of even legitimate and justifiable collateral damage should be weighed against the potential advantage.

4.18 **Minimising Unwanted Outcomes.** The commander should not only determine the kinds of weapons to use and how to employ them, but establish whether lethal means are permitted – or even desired.[44] He will consider the objectives to be achieved and the possible consequences of the actions needed to achieve those objectives. For example, bombs delivered by fixed-wing close air support may destroy the source of small arms fire from a building in an urban area; however, lower-calibre direct fire weapons may be more appropriate. This is not only because of the risk of collateral damage to nearby buildings and non-combatants, but also to the effect on the community and the overall impression given to the civilian population in the media which may undermine strategic objectives. Sometimes explaining that you have chosen not to engage may be the best course of action. Tactical commanders should always have an eye on the wider strategic objective; fires should only be used when necessary.

4.19 **Policing and Countering Irregular Activity.** The purpose of policing is to maintain law and order, usually with the consent of the population. In stabilisation, military forces aim to defeat adversaries in order to establish civil authority. Once the aim is achieved, these

[43] See NZDF Manual of Armed Forces Law, DM 69 (2nd Edition) Volume 4, *The Law of Armed Conflict* (to be published early 2016).

[44] Details will be given to the commander in the operation-specific Rules of Engagement Profile.

same forces must preserve that security until host-nation police forces can assume responsibility. This wider policing task will be unfamiliar. Although there is a clear difference between combat and policing, for New Zealand forces at least, stabilisation requires that the military contribution must be able to adapt to both.

4.20 **Maintaining the Rule of Law.** Maintaining the rule of law entails very different ethical obligations than fighting to establish it. Effective security exists when institutions, civil law, courts, prisons, and effective police are in place and can protect the recognised rights of individuals. Typically this requires that:

- operations continue to neutralise adversaries to the extent that they are no longer a threat to the government's authority
- institutions necessary for law enforcement (including police, the judiciary, and prison services) are functioning
- such institutions are credible and the population has faith in their ability to resolve disputes
- where a functioning civil authority does not exist, the military may be required to help establish an interim government.

4.21 **Corruption.** Our very presence changes the situation in unforeseen ways. Corruption takes many forms. For example, it can be a factor in local procurement, bribes being demanded on the street for safe passage or security, and non-meritocratic awards of jobs. Citizens have a pragmatic sense of what is corrupt and what is culturally acceptable. Where corruption on a grand scale is occurring under the cover of the security provided by our forces, the commander will need to make it clear to the host government that our cultural norms are being flouted.

Lose Moral Legitimacy, Lose the War

4.22 During the Algerian war of independence between 1954 and 1962, French leaders decided to permit torture against suspected insurgents. Though they were aware that it was against the law and morality of war, they argued that:

- this was a new form of war and these rules did not apply
- the threat the enemy represented – communism – was a great evil that justified extraordinary means
- the use of torture against insurgents was measured and non-gratuitous.

4.23 Officially condoning torture had several negative consequences. It empowered the moral legitimacy of the opposition, undermined French moral legitimacy, and caused internal fragmentation among serving officers. In the end, failure to comply with moral and legal restrictions against torture severely undermined French efforts and contributed to their strategic failure, despite significant tactical successes. Illegal and immoral activities made the French extremely vulnerable to enemy propaganda inside Algeria among the Muslim population, as well as in the United Nations and the French media. Torture also degraded the ethical climate throughout the French Army. France eventually recognised Algerian independence in July 1963.

Setting the Parameters

4.24 **Identifying the Parameters.** Wider cross-government activities need to be set within defined parameters. Kitson conceived four such parameters which formed a generic frame[45] within which operations could be successfully conducted. By working within his defined frame, a government and its supporting allies should be able to use force successfully in support of stabilisation objectives, without damaging their position, generating a freedom to operate. While not excluding the possibility of operating outside of the frame, Kitson suggested that by doing so, it would be 'highly probable that the use of force will do more harm than good.'[46] The parameters he identified were:

[45] Kitson, *Bunch of Five*. Faber and Faber Ltd. (1997), page 284.
[46] Kitson, *Practical Aspects of Counter-insurgency*, Kermit Roosevelt Lecture delivered May 1981, Upavon: Tactical Doctrine Retrieval Cell: Annex A to DCinC 8109 dated 11 June 1981, page 5.

- the establishment of good coordinating machinery
- the creation of a political atmosphere that allows government measures to be successful
- the setting up of effective intelligence networks
- a steadfast adherence to the rule of law.

4.25 **Updating the Parameters.** These four parameters are still valid today, but require some modification for the current operating environment. Together they bound the freedom to operate.

- **Comprehensive Coordination Mechanisms.** Put in place structures and mechanisms to coordinate a fully comprehensive approach, from the strategic to tactical levels, to direct and execute the campaign. In a fragile or failed state these mechanisms can act as a spine or nervous system to connect the government with regional and local leaders.
- **Influence to Achieve the Appropriate Political Settlements.** Assess and implement appropriate security, governance, and development measures to achieve the necessary political settlements. The influence thus created will reshape the relationship between the host-nation government, competing political elites and the wider population.
- **Understanding and Intelligence.** To develop understanding through the establishment and continuous refinement of intelligence organisations and campaign continuity initiatives. This will help underpin analysis, shape the campaign plan to win the active support of target populations, and direct offensive action against hostile groups to cause long-term damage to them.
- **Governance through the Rule of Law.** Perceived inequalities in the administration of the law, and real or apparent injustices, are triggers for instability. It is of paramount importance that all actions taken by a government and its agents in attempting to restore stability are legal.

Establishing Comprehensive Coordination Measures

4.26 **Managing Tensions.** There will be tensions between the various agencies. Coordinating machinery must be designed to reduce and work through them. They must be robust enough so that when breakdowns occur there is a process by which reconciliation can



Figure 4-2: The parameters of the freedom to operate.

occur. This is described in the US Inter-agency Counter-insurgency (COIN) Guide as 'an integrated conflict management system.'[47] The likelihood of friction within a national structure is high, but increases in coalition operations. Coordination mechanisms must also be capable of coherent linkage with the host-nation and the commander should involve themselves in their design. Since adversaries will seek to exploit the fault lines that exist within any alliance or coalition, particularly one that is reliant on the comprehensive approach to generate stabilisation, coordination mechanisms should mitigate the risks inherent in the coalition.

4.27 **Achieving Integration.** Successful comprehensive mechanisms involve real integration, including, collocation of civil and military headquarters, shared staff, common processes, and coterminous boundaries. Provincial Reconstruction Teams are examples of structures employed to achieve better integration in the delivery of national support to local governance and development in both Iraq and Afghanistan since 2002. Integrated processes should include combined regular updates, a combined theatre integrated plan and inter-agency campaign assessment and synchronisation boards. Technical interoperability between information systems is critical, but rarely achieved. In a new campaign, the commander should strive for this from the outset.

Influence to Achieve the Appropriate Political Settlement

4.28 The commander should generate confidence in the perception that the host-nation authorities will prevail, and will be supported by the international community for as long as is necessary. However, there may be occasions where it is necessary to threaten to withdraw in order to motivate the host-nation's government. Host-nation authority may enable an accommodation with decisive elites, and lever the active support of target populations.

Effective Understanding and Intelligence

4.29 **Understanding and Intelligence Requirements.** Relevant, accurate, and timely intelligence is critical to the successful conduct of any campaign. In stabilisation that requirement for intelligence should be translated into understanding. Understanding is essential to taking and subsequently holding the initiative. Chapter 7 discusses the detail of intelligence and understanding, but a few specific points are highlighted below.

4.30 **Early Investment.** At the outset of the campaign it is unlikely that commanders will have a complete understanding of the environment. Early allocation of forces and coalition assets, purely for the purpose of gaining understanding, should be considered before other activities are undertaken. The first commanders deployed will often want to achieve decisive results during their tour, and there can be logic to nipping an insurgency in the bud. But action must be predicated on understanding; it may be better to build the detailed picture first. Early investment in intelligence and understanding will pay dividends in the long-term.

4.31 **Establishing Intelligence Networks.** Understanding a multi-faceted networked problem requires a networked, task-organised intelligence structure to gather and exploit information. If influence is the central idea, intelligence-enabled understanding is the way influence is cued. Intelligence – both multinational and host-nation – must be harnessed by active management of information and analysis. In creating these networks advice should be sought from international organisations and non-government organisation (NGO), many of whom will have been operating in the area long before military forces deploy. While not all may be willing to be a formal part of the intelligence network, some may be persuaded to engage informally, if only for their own force protection.

Governance through the Rule of Law

4.32 **Legitimacy.** Over the last thirty years the legal framework for operations has developed in both breadth and complexity and now must take account of host-nation sovereignty and changes in both New Zealand domestic and international law. There has also been an increase in the emphasis on human rights legislation.

[47] US Interagency Counter-insurgency Guide, page 37.

In spite of this, today's legal framework is as much an operational enabler as a constraint. New Zealand's adherence to the law, while others do not, should be exploited to underpin legitimacy, driving a wedge between the adversary and the population.

The Mandate

4.33 **Implications.** The mandate provides the legal framework to conduct operations. It also provides direction on freedom of action and constraints.

4.34 The commander may find it helpful to list the activities that they intend to conduct and consider whether the mandate they have to operate under supports those activities. Where it does not, they should seek to amend it to ensure that it provides them with the maximum freedom of action, while limiting that of the adversary. The following aspects are pertinent:

- **Powers of Arrest, Detention, and Internment.** The mandate should lay down what, if any, powers of arrest, detention or internment are permitted. This will particularly be the case when police primacy is inapplicable, and the military is leading the fight against criminality. The mandate should specify who is permitted to detain those arrested and what rules apply to such detention. If the police are unable to act effectively against criminals, the commander may need to make the case for additional mandated powers.
- **Access.** The mandate will need to cover access to ports and airports, exemptions from custom duties, visas, local taxes, driving licences etc.
- **Immunity.** New Zealand forces overseas will probably require some degree of immunity from host-nation law, and this must be included in the mandate. As a minimum, such immunity should provide protection from criminal liability and protection from civil claims. Failure to gain, or maintain, appropriate immunity could undermine the strategic viability of the operation.

Key Terms

Types of Mandate

The highest legal authority is a United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR). Mandates can also take the form of Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs), Military Technical Agreements (MTAs), Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs), or a host-nation request for support under their domestic law, which may be more constraining. However, the form of the mandate is no guide to the limits to freedom of action it provides, which can only be deduced by analysis of the specific mandate for a given operation. A UN Mandate (drafted by committee) is seldom clear-cut; therefore the commander needs to know how to use this to his advantage.

4.35 **Key Questions.** There are a number of questions the commander should ask when considering the mandate.

- How has the government categorised the stabilisation operation and which laws and obligations apply?
- Do any of these laws require interpretation?
- What are the implications for operations?

Access	Jurisdiction over criminal offences
Basing	Multitude of intervening actors
Overflight	Status of contractors
Carriage of arms and ammunition	C2 of own forces

Figure 4-3: Aspects of a mandate that can affect operational freedoms and constraints.

4.36 **Rule of Law.** The mandate must address which legal system is going to be applied in the theatre. The legal status of coalition forces with respect to host-nation military and police forces must be established. Recognition of where primacy in law enforcement rests is critical, as is an understanding of the local legal system. All New Zealand's support should be conditional to adherence to acceptable codes of behaviour. For example, New Zealand would be unable to support any legal system that condones torture or other cruel, inhumane or degrading punishments.[48]

An Activity Framework

4.37 Chapters 1 and 2 described a model for stabilisation based on:

- security
- economic and infrastructure development
- governance and rule of law.

4.38 All three elements build towards achieving an appropriate political settlement. When trying to describe a theory for change, it is useful to have a framework to describe stabilisation activity. The purpose of any framework is to provide a model that enables a shared lexicon; a common understanding can then be developed in a multi-agency community. The commander should be able to use it to articulate to their civilian counterparts the key elements of the plan: what is to be conducted, where and by whom. In this sense it helps to operationalise the plan.

4.39 The Operational Framework; Shape – Deter – Seize Initiative – Dominate – Stabilise – Enable Civil Authority[49] is still relevant in stabilisation, as it is to all military operations, but it was designed for a different purpose, conventional warfighting, focused on the enemy. Stabilisation requires a population-focused framework. A number of frameworks already exist:

- clear – hold – build[50]
- understand – shape – secure – hold – build[51]
- engage – secure – develop.[52]

4.40 The precise framework is arguably less important than the integrated approach and shared understanding derived from the model; no one framework is necessarily more correct than any other. The NZDF;'s stabilisation framework[53] complements the Operational Framework. This stabilisation framework consists of the following:

- shape
- secure
- hold
- develop.

4.41 This stabilisation framework builds on proven counter-insurgency theories and enables closer conceptual linkage to governance and development. It has an obvious and necessary relationship to the US approach of Clear – Hold – Build, but reflects the importance that New Zealand places on Shape in order to develop understanding and plans as well as cueing civilian agency support for subsequent Develop activity. Secure is used to reflect a focus on the population rather than just terrain or enemy. Hold seeks to highlight the critical transition from military-led security to civilian-led development and articulates the risk in this period of consolidation and transition. Develop is used because it describes more intuitively the development of capacity, primarily by civilians. Security progress should be seen not just as a sequential series of steps into whose footprints civil actors can move, but rather as the creation of conditions and windows of opportunity through which others must be ready to move, to exploit, and develop campaign momentum.

[48] *The Convention against Torture and Other Cruelty, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment* (1984), Article 1(1).
[49] NZDDP–3.0 *Campaigns and Operations* (2nd Edition).
[50] The most demanding of three approaches to counter-insurgency described in the US Army and US Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24.
[51] In use with ISAF in Afghanistan: Julian Alford and Scott Cuomo, *Operational Design for ISAF in Afghanistan*, A Primer, Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 53, 2nd Quarter 2009.
[52] Draft UK AFM Part 1, Volume 10 *Counter-Insurgency.*
[53] This is the same framework that the UK has adopted.

4.42 A key in stabilisation is aligning military and civil effort so that neither is wasted. A military force will require a civilian effort to conduct development. Civil-military Operations (CMO) under Shape – Secure – Hold, will not be sufficient. The purpose of the military contribution is to set the security conditions for cross-sector exploitation with the necessary momentum. Where the civilian force is missing or lacks momentum, there can be no Develop and the strategic initiative will swing back to the adversary. In this case, a new plan will be required.

4.43 The apparently sequential articulation of the framework; Shape – Secure – Hold – Develop, must not be confused with its application and execution. At theatre level it is definitely not a sequential process. There is overlap and concurrency, as Figure 4-4 illustrates. The higher the level of the operation at which the activity is being described, the more concurrency and overlap there is likely to be. At the tactical level activities take place within a higher level, concurrent plan. At the theatre level, it is the need to seize the initiative that demands the framework is not applied in a linear manner in which only one activity is being conducted at a single moment, or in one area. Rather, the framework provides for a span of activity to enable a comprehensive approach in which, at any one given moment, one or all of its components may be enacted. To do otherwise would be to cede space, time, and ultimately the initiative to the adversary. There are a number of constants that run throughout the campaign, such as engagement, analysis, assessment and an aim towards transition. Most importantly of all, influence is the overarching effect that all the elements of a stabilisation campaign will seek to achieve. Therefore, the framework can be described as sitting within an all-embracing sphere of influence that is the net effect which security, governance, and development activity seeks to deliver.

Shape – Secure – Hold – Develop as a Framework for Stabilisation Activity

4.44 The framework is developed in the Chapter 10. Here, the meaning of its four elements, and how they interact, is considered only briefly.



Figure 4-4: The changing emphasis and concurrency of shape, secure, hold, and develop.

4.45 **Shape.** Shape is about preparing the operational environment and starts the process of understanding the problem. Shape is where multi-agency planning begins. Shape activity initiates the contest for security with the adversary. The aim is to build a coalition for joining up security, governance, and development activity, and to design a military force that is complemented by an appropriate weight of civilian effort. At the strategic level it will define objectives and secure resources; at the operational level it will achieve comprehensive campaign design. At the tactical level it will improve understanding and help build local governance structures to meet the needs of the population.

4.46 It envisages wide engagement with multi-agency actors in order to shape and influence them, and in turn to influence and shape its own plans. It includes offensive operations such as raids and Special Forces strike operations, designed to disrupt the enemy, denying them safe havens and gaining intelligence. Elements of Shape – liaison and key leadership engagement, for example – continue throughout the campaign.

4.47 **Secure.** Secure describes activity to deliver security in a defined area. It is focused on the population, but it can also include the securing of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) own line of communication and vital infrastructure. As international forces may be deployed after the campaign has reached a critical point, adversaries may have identified key terrain and vital ground, such as the national capital. This will be a priority for early Secure activity. Where there is no insurgency, it may not be necessary to conduct security operations. In operations where there is an insurgency, security forces will need to neutralise and isolate insurgents and irregulars in order to create the space and conditions for Hold and Develop activity. Secure is the point at which the adversary is confronted throughout his depth and made to fail; where international forces seize the security initiative in order to deliver enduring security to the local population. Violence should be expected to spike as adversaries fight to protect their footholds. Both military force and comprehensive measures need to be fused to support the commander in his task of separating the adversary from popular support. Resources – both military and inter-agency – will invariably be a constraint on concurrency – in Iraq in 2004/5 the tempo of security operations was limited by the availability of American funding for rebuilding homes damaged in battle. At this stage there may be little opportunity for major development initiatives due to a lack of permissiveness, however money can be used successfully to enhance persistent security.

4.48 **Hold.** After securing an area it will usually be necessary to Hold it. Hold is about shifting the balance in favour of the 'good guys'. Failure to do so may impact on the ability to maintain the initiative. Operational design should match the aspirations to Secure with the availability of forces to Hold. This necessitates close coordination between offensive operations and SSR strands of the campaign plan. It is possible that discrete military activity will be required to Hold only temporarily, for instance to buy time and space for other activity, but this is likely to be rare. Hold is the critical point at which other government agencies (OGA), International Organisation (IOs), and NGOs begin to invest significant effort in a semi-permissive environment, and is the point at which the emphasis of being the supported element shifts from the military to the civilian organisations. Typically, it is also at this point where host-nation forces deploy in greater strength in order to provide security, perhaps raising non-standard security forces (village militias etc.) as a temporary expedient to generate the necessary mass. Additionally, it is at this stage the rule of law is restored and the government is physically re-connected to its population via local elections and visits by ministers. This will create the vital links necessary between the people and their legitimate government. The adversary is likely to be investing his resources in protecting critical areas and his networks. Simultaneously, he may adapt to discredit and undermine progress, for example, through intimidation and mass-casualty terrorist attacks. Host-nation forces will need sufficient training and capability to carry out the security tasks, thereby releasing international forces to move on to Secure elsewhere. Hold is an act of tangible commitment that should start to inculcate in the population a sense of hope based upon demonstrable

progress. This confidence should be apparent through increasing intelligence tips. Engagement with reconcilable adversaries should be sought from a position of advantage, and this may be the moment to exploit discreet links generated through Shape to fracture the opposition.

4.49 **Develop.** The term Develop, rather than 'build' is used because it focuses on the wider aspects of capacity building, rather than on infrastructure alone. This activity includes investment and the development of governance structures and functions such as customs and excise, the legislature and the judiciary. Its benefits will usually be delivered by civilian actors operating within an increasingly permissive environment. The security initiative, now gained, must be consolidated and further strengthened during Develop. It is for this reason that Hold without being ready to Develop risks dislocating the campaign.

The Security Principles of Stabilisation

4.50 Principles serve as the foundation for action, but they are not inflexible rules. They provide a way of thinking about a particular problem from a particular perspective, in the case of this joint doctrine note, the inherent political and multinational requirements of stabilisation at the theatre level. The following security principles of stabilisation are derived from analysis of New Zealand and Allied doctrine, recent operational experience and lessons learned, and history. They encapsulate the issues articulated in the previous chapters and should be used to guide military planning and execution. They are included in this section specifically to help civilian readers better understand the military approach.

4.51 The purpose of New Zealand military participation in security and stabilisation operations is the achievement of the desired New Zealand political end-state. This should be at the forefront of the commander's campaign planning, implementation and assessment efforts, noting that this may require adaptation where political aims change in light of the conduct of the campaign. The aim of stabilisation activities is to either achieve a political settlement between the host-nation government, competing elites and the wider population or to create the environment where a suitable host-nation government can be established by the completing elites and wider population. Critics of stabilisation missions cite unachievable goals, this may be to misrepresent the purpose, which may be demanding, yet wholly pragmatic. To have utility, military activity, and particularly the use of force, should shape and drive this political settlement as a part of the solution to security and stabilisation problems. The different interests, goals and methods of coalition nations and host-nation competing elites, may create tensions of political purpose. The commander has a key role in shaping the conditions for, and providing a military perspective on, this dynamic process.

Understanding the Context

4.52 A common understanding is the basis of a common approach, but it cannot be assumed. To understand the contextual aspects of security and stabilisation operations, anthropological, religious, ethnographic, social, political, and economic information is required to inform campaign analysis and assessment. It is essential that the broad conflict dynamics are understood and agreed, and the analysis shared with all appropriate partners. The establishment of an effective and adaptive intelligence mechanism may require restructuring the intelligence architecture. Effective intelligence gathering is proactive and aggressive. The intelligence organisation should provide for the greatest possible level of information exchange between nations, government departments, and multinational and local security forces at all levels. The commander is, initially, faced with uncertainty in the planning process, which should diminish with focused intelligence gathering and analysis. Growing and maintaining this intelligence capability should form a central part of planning and execution. Effective and imaginative knowledge management in-theatre and at home is critical. This requires early investment in, for example, cultural advisers and databases, to manage challenges to continuity and roulement. From understanding, flow the campaign big ideas, or theory of change.

Focus on the Population

4.53 The inability of a state to provide for the basic needs of its population can be both the cause and result of insecurity and instability. Failed states fail their people and are more open to manipulation and radicalisation. A desperate population will turn to any provider, including potential adversaries, when basic needs are not met. Similarly, adversaries will seek to fill the vacuum of needs where the government is absent or ineffective. The commander should identify what the military may be required to contribute to human security tasks, recognising that military provision is a last resort and that the main responsibility lies with international organisations and the host-nation government. Failure to provide for the population's needs may undermine the foundations of stabilisation as the people struggle for survival. Political progress is unlikely to take place in the midst of chronic human insecurity. Focusing on the population does not mean ignoring the adversary, on the contrary, the contest for security will be fought amongst the population and for its support. The population may not like us, but the military aim is not the pursuit of popularity, it is to husband respect and prevent the adversary from gaining influence and security control. People need to believe that their situation is more likely to improve under the government than its adversaries. There will be a dynamic relationship between the international forces' own and the opponents' narratives, and the perception of audiences should be considered when planning courses of action. The adversary must be marginalised.

Foster Host-nation Governance, Authority, and Host-nation Capacity

4.54 All governments exercise control through a combination of consent and coercion. Legitimate governments function with the tacit consent of the governed and are generally stable, whereas regimes generally considered illegitimate rule entirely, or mainly, through coercion. The more a state relies on coercion, the greater the likelihood of collapse if that power is disrupted. Legitimate governance can be undermined by many issues including:

- corruption
- greed
- incompetence
- bias
- disregard for the rule of law
- disenfranchisement.

4.55 However, legitimacy is determined by the local population, not imposed externally. Coalition partners should not try to replace the functions of the government. They should work with it to rebuild its capacity and competence by establishing local trust in governance based on consistent and fair, rather than arbitrary, application of the law. All coalition actions should aim to foster host-nation authority and capacity in order to underpin enduring stability. The military contribution is primarily in the field of security capacity, but should contribute to the wider development of robust institutions.

4.56 Capacity-building and state sector reforms (SSR) are essential parts of the overall stabilisation solution and will require significant investment in time, resources and the commander's attention. The commander will need to design a coherent, effective capacity-building and SSR operation, albeit in concert with allies and partners, in a way that overcomes the inefficiencies inherent in a multi-lateral enterprise. The goal is to field capability at a tempo that matches the demands of the changing problem. Host-nation capacity facilitates the international forces' reassignment to new areas in order to spread campaign and government authority, and is the enabler of transition and eventual withdrawal. SSR is not about creating forces that look like ours, and nor is it necessarily about creating what the host-nation wants. Forces should be appropriate to the local cultural and security context, agreed by the host-nation, and sustainable. Tensions may arise when there is a divergence between the plans and activities of the host-nation and coalition partners. Timely diplomacy should produce a road map that is acceptable to both sides if momentum and unity is to be maintained.

Key Term

Unity of Effort

Military force is but one element required for the delivery of security and stabilisation. The collective contribution of all actors is required and must be coordinated to ensure unity of effort in every facet of the mission.

4.57 Cross-government and inter-agency cohesion is vital but relationships and processes have no agreed template. In the past, a single New Zealand leader may have had authority over all New Zealand government agencies. However, in a contemporary campaign, such unity of command is unlikely. Consequently, once the Theory of Change[54] has been agreed, the commander should focus on achieving unity of effort. Much will rest on willingness to collaborate in a way that each participant agrees to accept constraints in order to achieve a degree of unity. This will be challenging, the mission will throw together disparate organisations, with different philosophies and cultures. Once this essential unity of effort has been agreed, and the tone set by the leaders, it needs to be implemented through tailored committee structures and competent liaison at every level. Some actors, for example NGOs, may be unable or unwilling to participate in such formal mechanisms. In these cases, de-confliction may be the best that can be achieved. Intellectual and physical support will be required, for example, protection, intelligence, and communications that only the military may be able to provide. When formed, committees will: agree priorities and designate main effort; allocate responsibilities; apportion resources; and coordinate activity while mediating differences of opinion. All should realise that as the campaign progresses, there will be shifts between the supporting – supported relationship, along with changes to the main effort. Even these terms will need to be discussed and their meaning agreed. Unity of effort should be manifested in a joint, inter-agency plan, shared planning tools and perhaps a tailored, integrated headquarters to ensure that all levers of power are maximised to deliver influence. Uncoordinated activity and disagreement will present structural and conceptual gaps – opportunities adversaries will exploit.

[54] A Theory of Change is a strategy of blue print for achieving large scale, long term goals. It describes the pre-conditions, pathways and interventions necessary for an initiatives success.

Real-Life Example

Unity of Effort – Borneo 1963–66

Commonwealth forces defeated a complex insurgency actively supported by Indonesian forces infiltrating across the border. A combination of security, judicial and political action based on a coordinated civil-military plan, and extensive use of psychological operations, suppressed the urban insurgency. The conflict was displaced to the jungle interior, where ultimately a well-coordinated approach led to the insurgents' defeat. Extensive manoeuvre, using aviation, created an illusion of large-scale military presence, the impact of which was amplified by highly aggressive, but carefully targeted, military action. Sensitive handling of the local population led to Commonwealth forces, rather than the insurgents, being regarded as the providers of security. Through a well-orchestrated combination of physical and psychological effects, the Commonwealth succeeded in the complete demoralisation of Indonesian forces and the defeat of the internal insurgency. This enabled an enduring political settlement in the north of Borneo that led to the provinces of Sarawak and Sabah remaining secure within the Federation of Malaysia.

Isolate and Neutralise Irregular Actors

4.58 The primary role of the military is to provide sufficient security for the people and control over the operating environment. Security cannot be achieved solely through the presence of military forces, or just by killing or capturing adversaries. Unlike in general war, the objective is not the defeat or destruction of the enemy, but neutralisation of a threat to stable society. Neutralisation can take many forms, isolating the adversary is one while integrating their leaders into the government is another. In the Pacific environment integrating the leadership is just as common as isolating the enemy. But isolation of the adversary is attractive as it makes them irrelevant through loss of legitimacy and erodes their popular support. Isolation may begin

the process of accommodation but campaign success is likely to require the irreconcilable elements to be killed or captured. Military forces will have to fight and win in the environmental and non environmental domains.[55] The environmental domains may include significant combat operations to establish the host-nation government's monopoly on the use of force, and provide a secure environment for the population. There is a growing contest for domination of the information domain. For example, websites supporting violent extremism grew from twelve in 1998 to over 4000 by 2008[56] and approximately 10,000 by 2013.[57] Additionally, the host government should provide the people with a more credible vision of the future than the adversary, and tangible human security in the short-term.

4.59 Adversaries must not be allowed any safe havens. Ways and means include physical population control, border security, international legal, and diplomatic action to limit financial or political support and removal of internet-based virtual havens that propagate support, training and doctrine. In instances where isolation cannot be achieved or is insufficient, targeted strikes to complete neutralisation are required. The commander may choose to keep their adversaries constantly under pressure and on the move, or contain them within an area where they can be monitored and exploited. Commanders should consider military activity not just for its security and political effects, but also the impact it will have on the adversary's cohesion and confidence. Seizing the initiative and thus denying it to the adversary is key; it creates momentum, demoralises adversaries and shows tangible security progress. These proactive measures come at a price.

Key Term

Consent

Consent is the minimum requirement, but it is not enough. Credibility must act as a lever to shift tacit consent into active support for the campaign. New Zealand forces must be perceived to be both legitimate and credible locally (especially amongst opinion-forming elites), regionally and with New Zealand audiences.

Exploit Credibility to Gain Support

4.60 Credibility is capital; it can be lost or exploited. It is used to change the conflict. The commander should adapt to the political and social dynamics, managing expectations. Their approach should be to under-promise and over-deliver. This will ensure that both they, and their force, are credible to all parties. New Zealand should seek to create campaign momentum; moving from a situation of partial opposition, through consent (which can be passive), to one in which the host government enjoys the active support of the vast majority at the expense of the adversary. As a result, there will be an increased flow of actionable intelligence and recruits and an acceptance of governance by the people, for example, by voting in elections.

4.61 Credibility is delivered and leveraged on a number of levels. The adherence to local cultural norms and high professional standards by security forces will generate basic credibility for the force, but not credibility for the enterprise. Instead, this requires the host-nation government to articulate a vision that is matched by action. Coalition and host-nation actions should mutually reinforce, deliver benefit, generate consent and support the narrative that articulates how the population's lives will change for the better if it gives its support. This theory of change is key to campaign success.

Prepare for the Long Term – Perseverance and Sustainability

4.62 The stabilisation of a failed or failing state will tend to take a long time. It will require the provision of

[55] There are five environmental and four non-environmental domains. The environmental are: Land, maritime, Air, Space, Electromagnetic Spectrum. The non-environmental are: Information, Cyberspace, Time and Human.
[56] Bernard Finel and Holly Gell, *American Security Project,* 2008.
[57] Rohan Guunaratuna, International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research.

significant cross-government resources, immersion in the problem, and demonstration of resilience in the face of short-term set-backs.

4.63 The protracted nature of security and stabilisation campaigns presents a challenge. The political desire to balance the cost of national commitment to the stabilisation campaign against other domestic priorities may inadvertently communicate a lack of resolve, resulting in a short-term approach to campaign design and resourcing. A lack of continuity of approach may also result. One of the principal adversary strategies is to outlast the international deployment, such as in Somalia. The local population must be convinced that external support for their government will be sufficient and enduring. Indications of transitory engagement will undermine the credibility of the campaign. Against this should be set the danger of creating a sense of permanence amounting to dependency, and leading to a perception of occupation.

4.64 Early investment in supporting infrastructure, specialist capabilities and capacity building are essential, both for the successful conduct of the campaign and as an indication of national commitment. Many fragile states return to conflict after the departure of external military assistance. Even if the New Zealand commitment is time limited, forces should generate capabilities and the mind-set that can adopt the necessary long-term approach, before transition or withdrawal.

Anticipate, Learn, and Adapt

4.65 Complex, uncertain, and dynamic operating environments demand continuous anticipation, learning, and adaptation. Adversaries will adapt, so must New Zealand forces if their adversaries are to be outwitted.

4.66 Constant change is a defining characteristic of such operations. Anticipation and adaptation should therefore be seen as a sign of initiative, an active process that the commander should drive throughout the campaign. Assessment mechanisms should be established to identify and interpret the results of the NZDFs' own, and other actors' actions, to exploit success and correct errors. The commander should be robust, yet apply their judgement to assess whether setbacks are temporary or require a change of approach. Adversaries, due to their structure, size of organisation and agility, may adapt more rapidly. Coalition forces should not just learn and adapt quickly in a reactive manner but anticipate at sufficient relative tempo in order to seize or retain the initiative. One relative advantage that coalition forces will normally hold is the use of technology.[58] The commander should establish staff structures and procedures to drive change, including to equipment and structures. Reach-back can build continuity and mobilise the institutional capacity out-of-theatre to support the campaign.

[58] Such as weapons systems, information systems, command and control systems, surveillance systems.

ANNEX A:
MULTINATIONAL FORCE – IRAQ, COMMANDER'S COUNTER-INSURGENCY GUIDANCE [59]

HEADQUARTERS
MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE – IRAQ
BAGHDAD, IRAQ
APO AE 09342-1400
15 July 2008

- **Secure and Serve the Population.** The Iraqi people are the decisive 'terrain'. Together with our Iraqi partners, work to provide the people security, to give them respect, to gain their support, and to facilitate establishment of local governance, restoration of basic services, and revival of local economies.
- **Live Among the People.** You can't commute to this fight. Position Joint Security Stations, Combat Outposts, and Patrol Bases in the neighbourhoods we intend to secure. Living among the people is essential to securing them and defeating the insurgents.
- **Hold Areas that have been Secured.** Once we clear an area, we must retain it. Develop the plan for holding an area before starting to clear it. The people need to know that we and our Iraqi partners will not abandon their neighbourhoods. When reducing forces and presence, gradually thin the line rather than handing off or withdrawing completely. Ensure situational awareness even after transfer of responsibility to Iraqi forces.
- **Pursue the Enemy Relentlessly.** Identify and pursue AQI [al-Qaeda in Iraq] and other extremist elements tenaciously. Do not let them retain support areas or sanctuaries. Force the enemy to respond to us. Deny the enemy the ability to plan and conduct deliberate operations.
- **Generate Unity of Effort.** Coordinate operations and initiatives with our embassy and interagency partners, our Iraqi counterparts, local governmental leaders, and non-governmental organisations to ensure all are working to achieve a common purpose.
- **Promote Reconciliation.** We cannot kill our way out of this endeavour. We and our Iraqi partners must identify and separate the 'reconcilables' from the 'irreconcilables' through engagement, population control measures, information operations, kinetic operations, and political activities. We must strive to make the reconcilables a part of the solution, even as we identify, pursue, and kill, capture, or drive out the irreconcilables.
- **Defeat the Network, not just the Attack.** Defeat the insurgent networks to the 'left' of the explosion. Focus intelligence assets to identify the network behind an attack, and go after its leaders, financiers, suppliers, and operators.
- **Foster Iraqi Legitimacy.** Encourage Iraqi leadership and initiative; recognise that their success is our success. Partner in all that we do and support local involvement in security, governance, economic revival, and provision of basic services. Find the right balance between Coalition Forces leading and the Iraqis exercising their leadership and initiative, and encourage the latter. Legitimacy in the eyes of the Iraqi people is essential to overall success.
- **Punch above your Weight Class.** Strive to be 'bigger than you actually are'. Partner in operations with Iraqi units and police, and employ 'Sons of Iraq', contractors, and local Iraqis to perform routine tasks in and around Forward Operating Bases, Patrol Bases and Joint Security Stations, thereby freeing up our troopers to focus on tasks 'outside the wire'.
- **Employ All Assets to Isolate and Defeat the Terrorists and Insurgents.** Counter-terrorist forces alone cannot defeat al-Qaeda and the other extremists; success requires all forces and all means at our disposal – non-kinetic as well as kinetic. Employ Coalition and Iraqi conventional and special operations forces, Sons of Iraq, and all other available multipliers. Integrate civilian and military

[59] Issued by General Petraeus, Commanding General Multinational Force Iraq, *COIN Guidance* dated 15 July 2008.

efforts to cement security gains. Resource and fight decentralised. Push assets down to those who most need them and can actually use them.

- **Employ Money as a Weapon System.** Use a targeting board process to ensure the greatest effect for each 'round' expended, and to ensure that each engagement using money contributes to the achievement of the unit's overall objectives. Ensure contracting activities support the security effort, employing locals wherever possible. Employ a 'matching fund' concept when feasible in order to ensure Iraqi involvement and commitment.

- **Fight for Intelligence.** A nuanced understanding of the situation is everything. Analyse the intelligence that is gathered, share it, and fight for more. Every patrol should have tasks designed to augment understanding of the area of operations and the enemy. Operate on a 'need to share' rather than a 'need to know' basis; disseminate intelligence as soon as possible to all who can benefit from it.

- **Walk.** Move mounted, work dismounted. Stop by, don't drive by. Patrol on foot and engage the population. Situational awareness can only be gained by interacting with the people face-to-face, not separated by ballistic glass.

- **Understand the Neighbourhood.** Map the human terrain and study it in detail. Understand local culture and history. Learn about the tribes, formal and informal leaders, governmental structures, and local security forces. Understand how local systems are supposed to work – including governance, basic services, maintenance of infrastructure, and the economy – and how they really work.

- **Build Relationships.** Relationships are a critical component of counter-insurgency operations. Together with our Iraqi counterparts, strive to establish productive links with local leaders, tribal sheikhs, governmental officials, religious leaders, and interagency partners.

- **Look for Sustainable Solutions.** Build mechanisms by which the Iraqi Security Forces, Iraqi community leaders, and local Iraqis under the control of governmental institutions can continue to secure local areas and sustain governance and economic gains in their communities as the Coalition Force presence is reduced. Figure out the Iraqi systems and help Iraqis make them work.

- **Maintain Continuity and Tempo through Transitions.** Start to build the information you'll provide to your successors on the day you take over. Allow those who will follow you to virtually 'look over your shoulder' while they're still at home station by giving them access to your daily updates and other items on SIPRNET. Encourage extra time on the ground during transition periods, and strive to maintain operational tempo and local relationships to avoid giving the enemy respite.

- **Manage Expectations.** Be cautious and measured in announcing progress. Note what has been accomplished, but also acknowledge what still needs to be done. Avoid premature declarations of success. Ensure our troopers and our partners are aware of our assessments and recognise that any counter-insurgency operation has innumerable challenges, that enemies get a vote, and that progress is likely to be slow.

- **Be First with the Truth.** Get accurate information of significant activities to your chain of command, to Iraqi leaders, and to the press as soon as is possible. Beat the insurgents, extremists, and criminals to the headlines, and pre-empt rumours. Integrity is critical to this fight. Don't put lipstick on pigs. Acknowledge setbacks and failures, and then state what we've learned and how we'll respond. Hold the press (and ourselves) accountable for accuracy, characterisation, and context. Avoid spin and let facts speak for themselves. Challenge enemy disinformation. Turn our enemies' bankrupt messages, extremist ideologies, oppressive practices, and indiscriminate violence against them.

- **Fight the Information War Relentlessly.** Realise that we are in a struggle for legitimacy that in the end will be won or lost in the perception of the Iraqi people. Every action taken by the enemy and United States has implications in the public arena. Develop and sustain a narrative that works and continually drive the themes home through all forms of media.

- **Live our Values.** Do not hesitate to kill or capture the enemy, but stay true to the values we hold dear. This is what distinguishes us from our enemies. There is no tougher endeavour than the one in which we are engaged. It is often brutal, physically demanding, and frustrating. All of us experience moments of anger, but we can neither give in to dark impulses nor tolerate unacceptable actions by others.
- **Exercise Initiative.** In the absence of guidance or orders, determine what they should be and execute aggressively. Higher level leaders will provide broad vision and paint 'white lines on the road,' but it will be up to those at tactical levels to turn 'big ideas' into specific actions.
- **Empower Subordinates.** Resource to enable decentralised action. Push assets and authorities down to those who most need them and can actually use them. Flatten reporting chains. Identify the level to which you would naturally plan and resource, and go one further – generally looking three levels down, vice the two levels down that are traditional in major combat operations.
- **Prepare for and Exploit Opportunities.** 'Luck is what happens when preparation meets opportunity' (Seneca the Younger). Develop concepts (such as that of 'reconcilables' and 'irreconcilables') in anticipation of possible opportunities, and be prepared to take risk as necessary to take advantage of them.
- **Learn and Adapt.** Continually assess the situation and adjust tactics, policies, and programs as required. Share good ideas (none of us is smarter than all of us together). Avoid mental or physical complacency. Never forget that what works in an area today may not work there tomorrow, and may or may not be transferable to another part of Iraq.

DAVID H. PETRAEUS
General, United States Army
Commanding

CHAPTER 5:

SECURITY AND SECURITY FORCE CAPACITY BUILDING



CONTENTS

Introduction

5.01 This chapter examines security as the bedrock of stability and considers the options available to the military commander when deciding what their contribution to security could be.

5.02 A state which is unable to exercise a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence may fragment, or even collapse. Where this occurs, the primary role of a military commander is to use their force to arrest this fragmentation and re-establish a safe and secure environment. The military should always consider not only the immediate measures that may be required to deliver a safe environment for all to operate in, but also the long-term drivers of insecurity. If the latter is neglected then any improvement in security may only be temporary. However, in many situations, without security in the short term, there is no possibility of long term progress either.

Addressing the Drivers of Insecurity

The Politics of Conflict in Stabilisation

5.03 Of 20 failed states in 2008 almost all were experiencing violent conflict or political violence.[60] At the heart of the political problem lies a contest between the way political power is organised, and who wields that power. A commander will need to convince decisive elites that their interests are best served through an accommodation with the approved political settlement, rather than renewed conflict. Where this is not possible, the use of military force can influence and alter the political dynamics, which may remove the barriers to any accommodation.

Decisive Actors

5.04 Everyone present has the potential to influence the course of events in ways which may be positive or negative. The commander will strive to understand the full range of actors; their motivations, aspirations, interests, and relationships. A generic way of dividing actors into five categories based on their aims, methods and relationships are:[61]

- adversaries
- belligerents
- neutrals
- friendly
- spoilers.

5.05 These generic categories can be tailored to the specific needs of stabilisation in fragile and failed states.

5.06 **Adversaries.** Terms such as insurgents, irregulars, terrorists, jihadists, warlords, and criminals are commonly used in stabilisation and Counter-insurgency (COIN) literature, and each nation and organisation has different understandings of these terms. Here they are all covered by the term adversary. Adversaries may oppose either the host government or the international forces, or both. Some of them can be actively and violently hostile, while others will be antagonistic. Not all violence will be perpetrated by adversarial groups, in many societies low level violence has long been a characteristic of politics. Many less ardent adversaries will stop short of significant violence against coalition forces or government authorities in their day to day behaviour, but may provide materiel or moral assistance to more hostile elements. Their reasons for providing such support will not necessarily be personal antagonism towards the host government but may, for example, be based on traditional understandings of hospitality and obligation (e.g. Pashtunwali), coercion, or fear of reprisals. Motivation and commitment will be variable across and within groups, and some adversaries will be irreconcilable. Many may be receptive to concessions, or a path back into the mainstream, in the form of limited or national settlements and confidence-building measures. Constant assessment and probing will reveal fault-lines within and between adversarial groups which can be exploited to change the conflict geometry.

[60] UK Strategy for Countering International Terrorism, March 2009.

[61] See the UK publication JDP 5-00 (2nd Edition) *Campaign Planning* for further detail.

5.07 **Belligerents.** Belligerents are primarily hostile to each other. Their motivations, intentions and relationships may be influenced by historical grievance, self-interest, ideology, religion, or ethnicity. While belligerent hostilities are usually not directed towards New Zealand forces, they contribute to the societal conflict in destabilising ways. Examples include competing tribes and warlords, nationalist groups, or religious organisations attempting to influence local or national power structures through the use of violence. Coalition forces found that during recent operations in Iraq adversaries have attempted to mobilise belligerent groups by focusing their existing ideological, religious or ethnic tensions towards the international force. An example of this is al-Qaeda's attempt to mobilise Sunni tribes to oppose coalition forces in Iraq by playing on pre-existing Sunni–Shia tensions, and claiming that coalition forces were supporting a general de-Sunnification of Iraq's political elite.

5.08 **Neutrals.** Neutrality covers those who may stop short of active opposition to the host government at the one end, through passive consent, to those who support it but with reservations, at the other. The conflict produces uncertainty for neutral actors with the potential for both risk and reward. Groups in this category will often play a critical role in the campaign, especially if they constitute a large proportion of the population. Historically, the passive acquiescence of neutrals has proven to be vital to the success of an insurgency. This group cannot be expected to support the host-nation government until it has clearly shown that it is likely to prevail.

5.09 **Friendly.** Friendly actors broadly support the host-nation government and the international force. They may include members of host-nation government institutions (including the security forces), dominant groups within the political settlement under contest and, if fortunate, large sections of the population. Building and then maintaining a broad coalition of friendly actors (which may be in competition with one another) is part of the operational art in stabilisation.

5.10 **Opportunists.** Opportunists are referred to as spoilers in some doctrine and academic works, but this term is more descriptive of their role in stabilisation situations. They exist in all conflict-affected countries. They tend to be highly enterprising and adaptable, making use of the conflict environment to further their interests. In some cases opportunists have an interest in maintaining the status quo and may attempt to frustrate progress or prevent any change harmful to their interests. Examples include arms dealers, pirates, and smugglers. Some opportunists may not have a decisive impact on the situation, but criminal gangs operating in organised networks, possibly across national borders (for example, Columbian and Mexican drug cartels) can have a significant destabilising effect. Criminal opportunists and adversaries will exploit the nexus of interests, sharing lines of communication and exploiting instability for their own ends. Opportunists – such as some of the tribal groups in Iraq in 2007 – can be helpful in changing the conflict geometry, but as with all the above groups, should be constantly re-evaluated, not least for long-term rather than declared goals.

5.11 **Shifting Allegiances.** Assessment based on observed behaviour is useful, but can be misleading. Applying labels such as adversary or irreconcilable is a way to organise our thinking when dealing with a problem. However, they should be used with care. Groups are rarely fixed and bounded entities, and seeing them as such can inhibit the commander's understanding of social interactions and deprive them of opportunities for influencing key actors. People have many shifting identities and allegiances, and the categories cross-classify each other in complex ways. Warlords, for example, may start as belligerents, squabbling amongst themselves, but then be drawn into the conflict and act as adversaries. And, as al-Qaeda is recruiting fighters as young as fourteen, although they may be radicalised individuals, it would be absurd to say that they are all irreconcilable. Any categorisation must balance the need to organise our approach to a problem with building walls to compartmentalise and using labels to describe things that are in reality porous and ambiguous.

5.12 **Tailored Approaches.** A well-targeted, differentiated strategy for engaging the various actors can transform the strategic geometry of the conflict.

Such a strategy may allow the commander to co-opt adversarial or belligerent groups into the emerging political settlement. Consequently, efforts should be focussed on:

- supporting, protecting, empowering, and reassuring friendly groups and neutrals, for example, by giving public credit for changes in force posture
- persuading, providing incentives to or compelling belligerents, opportunists and reconcilable adversaries
- marginalising, disempowering and targeting irreconcilable and actively hostile adversaries.

Establishing Human Security

5.13 Where violence is extreme, daily life effectively stops; produce cannot get to market, children cannot attend school and large parts of the population are displaced. People become preoccupied with their immediate needs – food, security, health, and survival. When conflict causes people to flee their homes and villages, their vulnerability to predators, disease and malnutrition increases, often dramatically.

Protecting the Population

5.14 Where the state lacks the capability or will to meet human security needs, individuals tend to transfer loyalty to any group that promises to meet those needs,

Figure 5-1: Military delivery of medical aid or food can sometimes politicise humanitarian assistance.

including adversarial groups such as insurgents and foreign fighters, as well as belligerents and opportunists. These groups can exploit human insecurity by providing money, basic social services and a crude form of justice. Winning the contest for human security therefore, is fundamental to the development of host-nation government authority and, ultimately, the security of the state.

5.15 Providing protection for the population stimulates economic activity and supports long-term development and governance reform. Importantly, it generates confidence in local people about their own local security situation – their collective human security – and an economic interest in ongoing stability. It also denies adversarial groups one of their principal strategies for expanding their support base. To provide protection the commander can employ a range of techniques. Not all will be popular:

- static protection of key sites, such as market places and refugee camps
- persistent security in areas secured and held, e.g. intensive patrolling and check points
- targeted action against adversaries, e.g. search or strike operations
- population control, e.g. curfews and vehicle restrictions.

Providing Humanitarian Assistance

5.16 Human security may include protection from deprivation and disease as well as protection from violence. Conflicts can generate large-scale population movement which, in turn, can trigger a famine or an epidemic. Where development or humanitarian agencies are absent, international forces may need to provide emergency shelter, health care or food aid within the limits of their existing capacity. However, military delivery of aid may further politicise humanitarian assistance and is not always welcome by external agencies. New Zealand forces should only undertake humanitarian assistance in close consultation with the International Development Group (IDG) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) or with international organisations working through these departments.

Developing Secured Areas

5.17 As well as isolating the adversary from the population, securing key areas helps to support economic activity, enable major infrastructure projects and encourage effective governance and rule of law. Once the situation allows, such areas should be consolidated and expanded. It will be critical to bring the weight of a comprehensive approach to bear at the right time and place. Concepts such as secured development zones can provide a focal point by concentrating security, local governance, and development activities to be mutually reinforcing. Rapid integration of local government apparatus, including security committees, together with initiatives that generate local employment and economic growth will be critical to maintaining security and stability.

Security Force Capacity Building

5.18 Providing protection for civil society and expanding security and development zones has, historically, involved greater security force ratios and been more difficult than first expected. The number of forces required to carry out security tasks in stabilisation may exceed those needed during conventional combat operations. Often there will be hard choices to be made between allocating New Zealand troops for concurrent capacity building operations and operations to isolate and neutralise adversaries, recognising that these tasks require different skills and structures. Ultimately, success will involve recruiting, training, possibly equipping host-nation security forces, and embedding with them. It may also entail the creation of non-standard security forces, such as village or neighbourhood guards, in order to reach the critical mass that population protection demands. Today, when New Zealand and other coalition nations have fewer forces than in the past, capacity building is ever more important.

5.19 In addition to bolstering security force numbers, host-nation forces lower the profile of intervening actors and reinforce the security capacities of the state. In contrast, sectarian or poorly disciplined forces may fuel the conflict. The host-nation government may require firm advice, as well as financial support, to sustain the capabilities required. Previous capacity building efforts

have foundered due to a lack of sustainability; vehicles have been delivered without the means to maintain them, for example.

5.20 Integrating host-nation security forces into the campaign also provides a vehicle for on-the-job training and mentoring. Care should be taken to ensure that they are not over-loaded before they are demonstrably capable. In the early stages of their development, examples of their tactical employment may include:

- static guarding and border security tasks
- patrolling areas that have earlier been secured, such as development zones
- facilitating local contacts to gain intelligence while working with us to overcome language barriers and develop our cultural understanding
- conducting deliberate, limited offensive operations, having been set up for success by international forces
- protecting host government officials.

5.21 It is likely that a range of combined arms functions, such as joint fires, airborne surveillance and personnel recovery, will be required to underpin the host-nation capability to conduct operations. In the Pacific environment additional functions such as logistic and health support and aero-medical evacuation are also needed to support operations. If local forces do not yet possess these capabilities, then international forces may be required to fill the gap even after host-nation units have achieved combat readiness. A coherent reform programme is likely to include the provision of Monitoring, Mentoring and Training Teams (M2T)[62] and the simultaneous delivery of: equipment and infrastructure; operational support through the provision of logistics; and support to financial and managerial systems.

5.22 Once an acceptably secure environment is established and public order restored, the commander should consider moving from an international military security lead to an host-nation lead. This will be a political as well as a security judgement. There are at least two options: transition from international forces to a host-nation military security lead; or transition direct to a civil (police) lead, i.e. police primacy. In either case, the international community is likely to be asked to assist the host-nation government to generate basic policing capacity so that the rule of law can be seen to apply. Developing civil security capacity and police forces is touched on in Chapter 6. Since New Zealand has no equivalent force to a gendarmerie, military commanders may be drawn into policing and interior security matters. Commanders may need to improvise using military police and other re-rolled forces, augmented with any deployable police specialists that are available from contributing nations.

5.23 Police primacy should be the ultimate goal as it can bolster the perception of progress and reinforce the impression of hostile groups as criminals rather than freedom fighters. It demonstrates the host-nation government's commitment to governing through the rule of law. Police primacy will often be unachievable until relatively late in the campaign and may even be an alien concept in some societies. Premature police primacy can be disastrous.

Real-Life Example

Failure to Prioritise – Afghan National Police

The Afghan National Police (ANP) was the least competent of the Afghan Government's forces, with little training or investment. The ANP was not an international priority in the early stages of the insurgency and received significantly less money and attention than the Army. Key problems included the failure to conduct follow-on mentoring (making them more susceptible to local warlords), not providing significant institutional reform in the Ministry of Interior (MoI), and not curbing deep-seated corruption in both the ANP and MoI. Although the ANP was vital to establishing order in urban and rural areas, it lacked any semblance of a national police infrastructure, with little oversight at provincial or district levels. These deficiencies affected not only the COIN campaign, but also security more broadly.[63]

[62] M2T is covered in detail in Annex A, Chapter 10.

[63] *RAND COIN in Afghanistan,* JDW Volume 45, Issue 51, 17 December 2008.

5.24 The generation and subsequent training of host-nation security forces should be conducted in a coordinated manner with broader security, stability and reconstruction (SSR) initiatives such as the development of civilian oversight bodies, judiciary and detention institutions, as well as transitional justice mechanisms and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes. Chapter 6 deals with the military contribution to these broader governance and institutional aspects of SSR, while training host-nation forces is covered in more detail in Chapter 10.

Countering Adversaries

5.25 Direct military action against adversaries may be a central component of a stabilisation campaign. In which case, setting the conditions for a negotiated political settlement will entail breaking the ideological or financial links within and between different adversarial and belligerent groups, as well as between them and the broader population.

Understanding Adversarial Groups

5.26 Developing and maintaining an understanding of the motivations of different adversarial and potentially violent groups allows the commander to tailor his approach to each.[64] It may be that the most effective way of countering some of these groups is to reach an accommodation from a position of strength through formal accords or local bargains. There may be a number of actively hostile and irreconcilable adversarial groups, and countering these requires a balanced mix of the use of:

- force
- money
- detention.

[64] For more detail see Chapter 8.

The Use of Force

5.27 International forces should expect to meet resistance. As they mount the challenge to restore security, that resistance can be expected to grow. In its most demanding form this could come from committed, irreconcilable, and well-organised adversaries. Such resistance may set up a fierce contest for the initiative, freedom of movement, authority, the provision of security and the popular support of the local people in areas of symbolic, political, economic and security significance. Campaign progress may dictate the need to prioritise effort in such areas, where the adversary may be at his strongest. A reactive stance may have attractions, but a purely defensive posture risks fixing the force. Failure to wrest the initiative from adversaries who have gained popular support and sapped host-nation government authority can undermine the campaign fatally. Offensive air, land, maritime, and special operations in a targeted, measured and highly discriminate manner, supported by the full range of capabilities from other participating agencies, will be needed. Such operations are likely to be designed to:

- decapitate adversarial command structures by killing or capturing key leaders
- defeat adversarial armed groups where they hold something that has particular operational or political significance
- disrupt or destroy adversarial offensive, support, and propaganda capabilities
- deny adversarial groups safe havens from where they may launch attacks or challenge legitimate governance.

5.28 Offensive operations should minimise civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure. If not, they risk undermining the broader influence campaign. An operation that kills five low-level adversaries is counterproductive if collateral damage leads to the recruitment of fifty more. Sometimes the more force used, the less effective it is. The dilemma is that adversaries will often choose to fight amongst the people for just this reason.

5.29 There is a risk that operations to secure an area simply displace an adversary to a new safe haven beyond the commander's control. If this happens, they can regroup, possibly gaining strength, and strike where the host government and international forces and agencies are less able to respond. An alternative may be to isolate adversarial groups, seek to gain information and disrupt their activities. In some circumstances it may be better not to strike but to gather intelligence for later decisive actions, including seeking an accommodation with the adversarial groups.

The Use of Development Assistance

5.30 In the battle to influence decisive actors, the judicious use of targeted development assistance can help persuade both individuals and groups to accept the authority and legitimacy of the host government. It can be a substitute for force. In particular, development assistance can be used for direct security programmes such as the funding of host nation forces, or indirect, consent-winning initiatives such as the settling of specific grievances before they become sources of disaffection and resentment. The controls placed upon its use by accounting procedures should reflect the requirement for agility and risk, as with all rules of engagement (ROE). Existing targeting mechanisms can be easily adapted to make them more comprehensive in composition.

5.31 Examples of the use of development assistance for security effect include:

- recruiting non-standard security forces on short or long-term contracts
- funding weapons buy-back under DDR
- compensating civilians for disruption, inconvenience or loss brought about as a result of military activity in the area
- short-term job creation
- counter-narcotics alternative livelihood programmes
- offering rewards for the capture of prominent insurgents
- the provision of temporary accommodation for key leader meetings.

5.32 Operational experience has shown that the use of development assistance to fund consent-winning activities can make a significant contribution to security effect. For example, improved security can be the secondary effect of quick impact projects (QIP) as part of a development programme. However, under the current New Zealand aid focus and associated funding rules, such projects need to be linked to longer-term economic development. The commander will wish to access the widest possible source of funds, see Chapter 7.

The Use of Detention

5.33 Arrest, detention, trial, and imprisonment will ideally be conducted by the host-nation judicial system. International military forces will wish to employ such civil mechanisms wherever possible. However, as will often be the case when the host-nation government lacks an effective police force, an independent judiciary, or a penal system with the capacity or resolve to be effective, it may be necessary for New Zealand forces to conduct military detention operations. A well-coordinated screening and interrogation mechanism can have the added bonus of providing a valuable source of actionable intelligence and a direct channel to the adversary. This, in turn, enables more precise targeting and stimulates the perception of progress, restraint and legitimacy. However, there are risks associated with detention operations. The factors affecting the execution of detention operations are described in detail in Chapter 10.

5.34 Effective detention operations must identify the motivations of those held and provide incentives that weaken the links within the adversarial network. In this way, the reconcilable can be separated from the irreconcilable.

5.35 Those detained must swiftly be brought under due legal process to bolster perceptions of normality and the rule of law. This underscores the need for the collection and proper handling of evidence to ensure that individuals can be successfully dealt with by appropriate courts.

CHAPTER 6:

CAPACITY BUILDING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT



CONTENTS

Introduction

6.01 This chapter describes the military contribution to governance capacity building and the wider non-military components of security and justice sector reform. It describes anti-corruption measures and the challenges of developing police capability. The ability to govern, and to be seen to govern, fairly and consistently becomes a precondition of long-term stability. Regardless of the success of an intervention, international actors will be unable to compensate for a government that does not undertake necessary reform. Success depends on the host-nation government.

6.02 Improved governance helps to reduce grievances and marginalise adversarial groups intent on portraying the state as ineffective and corrupt. Conversely, where governance is authoritarian, exclusionary, or corrupt, it fosters conflict and undermines the legitimacy of the state. This is often the case where a dominant ethnic, religious or sectarian group dominates an unrepresentative government. Stability results from both a political settlement and an effective, representative government.

6.03 Support to governance has two dimensions, fostering the processes that underpin a political settlement – elite consolidation – and enhancing the state's ability to function – capacity building. The former dimension attempts to allocate power amongst competing elites in order to resolve the conflict. The latter dimension is about generating sufficient institutional capacity for the state to fulfil its survival functions and meet at least some of the expectations of the population. A balance must be struck between these two imperatives. For example, it is common for governments to use public appointments to cement alliances and reduce opposition. Political settlements may depend upon a degree of patronage which undermines broader institution-building initiatives in the short term.

6.04 A realistic immediate aim would be to support steps toward good enough governance without undermining parallel processes of elite consolidation. While good governance may be characterised by inclusiveness, accountability, transparency, efficiency, equity, legality, and decency; tolerable governance for the people could be defined as the ability of the host government to balance the priorities of powerful elites with basic security, administrative, and service delivery tasks on a sustained basis. Accordingly, good enough governance is likely to be relationship and personality-based and only later extends to large-scale institution building.

Addressing Critical Governance Functions

Determining the Military Contribution to Governance

6.05 Determining the military contribution to governance will require an understanding of what constitutes good enough governance in context. Local security levels will affect the capacity of international forces to contribute to wider governance. Given limited resources of time, money, troops, and organisational capacities, prioritisation of those tasks that may fall to the military will be essential. Where possible, governance activities should be implemented by international civilian agencies and enabled, only where necessary, by the military.

6.06 In non-permissive environments civilian access will be limited. However, security is usually conditional on a degree of popular consent and this, in turn, may be conditional on the restoration of basic governance. Accordingly, military forces may be drawn into those governance areas essential for early progress. Military substitution for absent civilian actors should be temporary. Civilian expertise must be integrated into planning through reach-out, or by in-theatre governance advisers.

6.07 **Occupation.** International forces may be designated as an occupying power. Occupation exists whenever an area is placed under the authority of external military forces. This will occur after a conflict in which an enemy has been defeated (known as belligerent occupation) or may occur where international

forces are deployed to restore law and order in the absence of a formal treaty or agreement with that state. The latter, however, is likely to be as a result of a UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) or other legal mandate, and thus may not amount to occupation in legal terms.[65] Occupation establishes a legal relationship between international forces and the civilian population, involving rights and responsibilities on both sides, such as the protection of the population and the administration of the territory. Here military substitution for absent civilian governance actors is both an operational necessity and a legal obligation.

Governance Tasks

6.08 Local confidence is likely to be enhanced by demonstrable participation of host-nation authorities. International forces should work through government agencies to generate local capacity and influence. We must be prepared to become involved in tasks for which we have to carry out much of the planning and delivery, but for which ultimate responsibility lies with local authorities. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are examples of integrated civil-military structures that enable governance and reconstruction activity to be coordinated where the security situation prevents civilians from working freely. The following paragraphs describe examples of governance tasks in which military forces may find themselves engaged.

6.09 **Protection of Civilians.** Where a host-nation government is unable to provide security, international forces may be required to fulfil this basic state function. Military forces should expect to be drawn into policing as well as military security tasks.

6.10 **Restoration of Essential Services.** Local services, such as food, water, sanitation, shelter and health care, contribute to human security. The military contribution may be optimised in supporting local and international humanitarian and development organisations to expand their access to the population. Where these agencies cannot operate, the military contribution could include:

- restoration of potable water supply and sanitation – while respecting local customs
- enabling the supply of power and fuel to homes
- assisting local authorities to reopen markets
- restoration of local hospitals, schools and clinics.

6.11 **Engagement and Conflict Resolution.** Societal conflicts are rarely resolved quickly or decisively; negotiated settlements are usually necessary locally and nationally. International forces are likely to be involved in negotiations that assist communities to connect with the government. Typical tasks may include:

- providing a secure environment for negotiations
- direct and regular engagement with key elites and government authorities
- settling disputes, for example over land and property seizure
- public outreach and information programmes
- enforcing ceasefires and support to transitional justice arrangements.

6.12 **Supporting Elections.** Fair and secure elections are good indicators of stability. However, if elections are conducted too early they may provoke an increase in violence. The commander should assess their likely impact on security and advise host-nation government and international agencies accordingly. Considerations include:

- how local elites, government authorities and international organisations are perceived locally and nationally will impact the plan for delivering an election
- the election should be implemented by the host-nation government where possible
- international authorities may be required to deliver the election where local authorities generate feelings of intimidation and insecurity.

[65] See NZDF Manual of Armed Forces Law, DM 69 (2nd Edition) Volume 4, *The Law of Armed Conflict* (to be published early 2016).

6.13 **Anti-Corruption.** Corruption undermines confidence in the state, impedes the flow of aid, concentrates wealth into the hands of a minority and can be used by elites to protect their positions and interests. It affords adversaries propaganda opportunities, and contributes to wider crime and instability. Yet there is no absolute test of corruption; practices that are acceptable in some societies are considered corrupt in others. Some, however, such as bribery, embezzlement, fraud, and extortion are universally considered corrupt. Others, such as nepotism, patronage, or preferred client systems are less clear; local customs should guide the assessment.

6.14 **Grand and Petty Corruption.** It may help to distinguish between grand and petty corruption. Grand corruption is at the highest levels of government and erodes confidence in the rule of law. Petty corruption involves the exchange of small amounts of money or the granting of minor favours by those seeking preferential treatment. The critical difference is that grand corruption distorts the central functions of the state whereas the impact of petty corruption is at a lower level, where people interact with agents of the state. Although it may be within local norms, petty corruption can affect the local economy and security, and thereby the legitimacy of the state. It may be rife in the host-nation police forces.

6.15 **Anti-Corruption Measures.** Anti-corruption measures are likely to directly affect those elites on which a political settlement depends – they will resist. Anti-corruption measures may need to be tempered so that they do not undermine local accommodations. Once anti-corruption initiatives are in place, international forces may need to support:

- integrated coalition efforts to eradicate grand corruption
- enforcing codes of conduct for host-nation security forces and civil servants
- training in ethics and standards of conduct for security forces
- monitoring deployed security forces to prevent opportunistic extortion
- audit, prosecutorial, and judicial support
- tracking the movement of aid such as food, clothing, and weapons
- overseeing contract management procedures, for example, in dispersing reconstruction funds with local companies
- ensuring security forces are properly paid and the funds accounted for
- whistle-blower protection schemes.

6.16 These measures may assist international forces to develop accountable host-nation forces that accept the need to operate in a non-predatory and transparent manner. We should expect resistance to the notion of public accountability at first. Ultimately, if grand corruption threatens campaign progress, then international partners may need to make their support conditional upon host government reform.

Building on Local Capacities

6.17 Coalition governance efforts should build on the foundations of existing capacity, however informal or insubstantial. The best solution is to join local, functioning centres of power to the national authority of the host-nation government. This is easy to say but is often difficult to achieve. In Afghanistan the local goal is frequently to reinvigorate the lapsed power of the Malik (the government's representative) and the Khan (the tribal leader) to balance that of the Mullah (the religious authority), thereby creating an informal system of governance – one that is imperfect, and does not deserve the term architecture – but that connects the dots between central and local authorities. This is an example of working with the grain of local life, in this instance, Pashtunwali. By building on existing structures, the expansion of governance is more likely to succeed than a system imposed by outsiders.

6.18 Where local institutions are absent or ineffective, then alternative forms of non-state authorities are likely to fill the vacuum. These may derive their status from a mix of coercion and local incentives. If

this has occurred, there may be no choice but to create new authorities from scratch. Local knowledge and an assessment about those locals who wield influence will be critical in determining what is likely to work and what will not. But new institution-building initiatives could make matters worse by eroding the local, informal capacity; in which case strengthening local forms of governance may be a better option. However, where local authorities are criminal or insurgent-based, there may be no choice.

Capacity Building Guidelines for the Military Commander

6.19 **Consult Widely.** Develop relationships with a broad set of local actors. It is dangerous to pick or empower winners, not least due to the risk of misjudging the ability of local elites to gain the confidence of the population. Take an inclusive approach and work with a broad spectrum of local actors.

6.20 **Foster Local Ownership.** Prioritise that which people really want according to their circumstances (e.g. demands will differ between urban and rural areas), and avoid supply-driven initiatives dominating the agenda. Encourage locals to take the lead.

6.21 **Look Beyond the State.** Important capacities exist outside state institutions; in civil society, tribal groups, religious organisations and the private sector. These capacities will be crucial gap-fillers in the short term, and even when formal state institutions strengthen they are likely to remain a source of local influence and parallel capacity.

6.22 **Balance Effort.** Improved stability requires a balance of effort between capacity-building initiatives and those activities that are aimed at stopping the violence.



Figure 6-1: The security and justice sectors.

6.23 **Aim for Transition from the Start.** Plan for transition to international civilian or host government agencies to help manage local expectations about on-going external support. This keeps the imperative for host-nation self-reliance at the forefront of the measurement of campaign success. Transition planning should be based on realistic benchmarks being met, balanced with time imperatives.

Reforming the Security and Justice Sectors

Accessible Security and Justice

6.24 The security and justice sectors deliver a fundamental function of government and are the cornerstone of state sovereignty. They comprise those institutions responsible for national security, and safety and justice for the population – this is far more than the security forces. In addition to military forces, intelligence services, militia and police, the security sector includes judicial and penal systems, oversight bodies, the Executive, parliamentary committees, government ministries, legislative frameworks, customary or traditional authorities, and financial and regulatory bodies.

6.25 When functioning effectively, the security and justice sectors contribute to a generally safe environment for the population. These sectors also contribute to wider regional security, for example through effective coastal and border protection.

Real-Life Example

The Political Implications of Security Sector Reform: de-Ba'athification

On 22 May 2003, the same day the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) approved Resolution 1483 recognising the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) as the temporary governing authority in Iraq, the CPA issued Order Number 1 eliminating all Ba'ath Party structures and banning senior party members from service within Iraq's public sector. The order, which became known as de-Ba'athification required the immediate dismissal of all in the top three layers of management within the Iraqi government if he or she had been a full member of the Ba'ath Party.

Because the vast majority of senior leaders in Saddam's regime were Ba'ath party members, the order effectively fired most senior leaders in the Iraqi government. Lieutenant General Sanchez, Commander of Coalition Forces in Iraq later said "the impact of this de-Ba'athification order was devastating … Essentially, it eliminated the entire government and civic capacity of the nation. Organisations involving justice, defence, interior, communications, schools, universities and hospitals were all either completely shut down or severely crippled, because anybody with any experience was now out of a job."

One week after issuing the de-Bathification order the CPA issued Order Number 2, entitled Dissolution of Entities, which abolished virtually the entire Iraqi security sector including the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Information, the Ministry of State for Military Affairs, Iraqi Intelligence Service, National Security Bureau, Directorate of National Security and Special Security Organisation. The order put some 500,000 men, with guns in their hands, immediately out of work, many without any compensation.

The impact of these orders was immediate. Sunnis tended to equate the orders with a general de-Sunnification of the government. In Mosul, where the then-Major General Petraeus was commanding the 101st Airborne Division, disbanded military members demonstrated for several days before sparking a riot in which eighteen US soldiers were wounded. Petraeus later said that the order sparked anti-coalition sentiment amongst Sunni, which fuelled the nascent insurgency in Iraq creating tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands of additional enemies.

6.26 Societal conflicts create ideal conditions for the proliferation of predatory armed groups, criminal networks and opportunistic crime. In turn, the population's experience of state security forces can be extremely negative: security forces may perpetrate human rights abuses; judicial systems may be weak, corrupt or dominated by sectarian interests; and prisoners may be held in inhumane conditions.

6.27 Those opposing the government will prey on perceptions of injustice by depicting the state as ineffectual and corrupt, and international forces culpable by association. It is, therefore, essential to show progress towards a security sector that is effective, legitimate, transparent, just, and subject to the rule of law.

Challenges to Reform

6.28 Ideal preconditions for reform will rarely exist because justice and security underpin a country's balance of power and, in some circumstances, the fragile political settlement from which a government's authority is derived. Attempts at reform may challenge vested interests and upset existing power relationships. Reform is primarily a political undertaking and not merely a technical activity.

Determining the Military Contribution to Reform

6.29 Opportunities to drive through change may result from the negotiations leading to a political settlement. For example, on the back of initiatives to demilitarise society; as clauses within formal peace agreements; as conditions attached to foreign aid; or following elections. The New Zealand contribution is likely to be determined by a team drawn from the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) and may range from providing temporary training teams to rebuilding whole areas of defence and national security.

6.30 If possible, analysis to establish the scope of the security, stability and reconstruction (SSR) programme – and by implication the military contribution – would result from a full assessment involving both the host-nation government and international partners. It would include:

- the priorities of other nations involved in the provision of equipment, training, and infrastructure
- an estimate of the pace and cost of reform
- agreement with the host-nation government regarding the size, shape, role, governance arrangements and priorities for its security and justice sectors
- agreement on the broad structures of the security and justice sectors and their impact on society.

6.31 Alternatively, the commander may need to conduct a pre-assessment in the absence of host-nation and international civilian agencies, based on assumptions. A full assessment should follow as soon as possible. The assumptions may include:

- the likely role, size, structure, and budget of the military and police forces, and judiciary and penal systems
- priorities for early capacity building (for example, whether the army or police take priority) and within this, what security capabilities are needed first, and at what scale, to support the campaign
- the need for immediate disarmament, as a security imperative, ahead of any full Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) programme.

Specific Military Tasks

6.32 Likely military tasks include the:

- demilitarisation of society
- reform of the defence ministry
- initial generation and subsequent development of the armed forces.

6.33 However, the military contribution may expand to include the initial development of host-nation policing and support to the promotion of judicial and law enforcement institutions. A detailed consideration of the issues that arise when working with host-nation forces is provided in Chapter 11, but a few of the key areas are outlined below.

6.34 **Initial Generation of Host-nation Forces.** In some instances the commander may need to rely on non-state security forces to support the campaign. Parallel development of basic support structures for host-nation forces is essential.

6.35 **Management of Host-nation Forces.** The operational capability of local forces is likely to reflect the quality of basic administration; pay, feeding and equipment husbandry. International training teams should establish the fundamentals of effective administration parallel to operational training, unless the commander has consciously decided to resource these functions as part of the operational design.

6.36 **Education.** A programme of education will help to ensure that both the population and their new security forces understand their role and responsibilities. The programme should emphasise a culture of service to the people and an understanding of the relationship between the armed forces and the state.

6.37 **Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration.** Significant armed groups, or a disproportionately large military, are likely to impact security. While some of these groups could be put to work on behalf of the state to generate mass and bolster local security, other groups will require inclusion in an arms management programme and their members re-trained and reintegrated back into civil society. DDR usually forms part of wider post-conflict restoration processes. Its aim is to ensure that combatants, and their weapons, are taken out of the conflict and provided with a transition package so that they do not seek to return to arms again. As such, DDR is not just a technical military activity, but a political process with economic and social consequences:

- disarmament initiatives may encourage a local arms trade
- early disarming may leave a security vacuum which may be filled by younger, new combatants. It may change factional security balances, setting conditions for reprisals
- ex-combatants who are detained in encampments can create unrest
- funded re-integration programmes – such as jobs and skills training – may be required to prevent militia leaders from re-forming their groups.

6.38 While MFAT and the United Nations (UN) may offer DDR expertise, there is no universal model. Each situation is unique. International actors must adopt a consistent approach and provide the means to monitor and evaluate progress.

6.39 **Host Government Ministry Reform.** NZDF personnel provide advice to host government officials within a range of ministries. Assistance may include advice on policy, strategy, risk assessment, capability development, budgets, resource management, and procurement.

6.40 **Developing Host-nation Police Services.** The responsibility for on-going internal security should ideally be provided by a demilitarised police force with a mandate for law enforcement and strong links to the judiciary. Ideally, this sees the creation of a community-based police service, with a clear separation between the roles of the police and the military. However, while police primacy for internal security remains an aspiration, community policing models assume consent, which is unlikely to be achievable in the midst of violent conflict. The policing model must be realistic.

6.41 **Military Input.** Coalition military forces may need to lead on police basic training, leaving specialist training, such as evidence handling and forensic investigation, to others who may be private contractors. Their role is discussed further in Chapter 9.

6.42 **Restoration of Judicial Institutions.** In many developing states, the primary sources of justice are traditional ones. These include tribal elders, religious authorities, and informal local courts administering long-held rules and customs. During the initial stages of a campaign, military forces may be involved in the identification of local key leaders and any informal justice mechanisms to incorporate them into the reform process. International forces may also be required to begin the refurbishment or reconstruction of facilities, possibly including court houses and prisons.

Key Term

Transitional Justice

Transitional justice refers to the range of mechanisms available to address war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and other significant human rights violations. Instruments include direct prosecutions (through domestic, international or hybrid courts), truth and reconciliation commissions, reparations schemes and ad hoc tribunals. Any transitional justice scheme is likely to be part of a wider reconciliation process and is best delayed until a secure environment is achieved. Local actors' choice of instrument will depend on the nature of the conflict, the extent of the violations and culturally specific attitudes to human rights, justice and impunity.

6.43 **Border Forces.** Effective border control is essential to combat regional criminality and the movement of foreign fighters. Additionally, in the absence of significant natural resources, customs and immigration duties are often a major source of government revenue. International forces may be tasked to patrol borders and mentor customs, immigration and border control agencies.

6.44 **Intelligence and Security Services.** Intelligence and security services (ISS) are normally located within central government reporting directly to senior decision-makers. In conflict-affected countries, intelligence and security services are routinely misused, often acting as a repressive arm of the state. It is common for there to be a proliferation of intelligence and security services, serving different power blocs within government and the security forces. In addition, there may be rivalry between the intelligence and security services and the armed forces. The commander should track local intelligence and security services activities, those factors that will lead to a lack of transparency, and the extent of any inter-service rivalries.

6.45 **Enduring Partnership.** Following the successful transfer of security responsibility to host-nation authority, coalition nations may offer a security sector development and advisory team, and continuity training support in their respective countries. As with prevent activity, these soft power strategies can be highly effective, but in the interests of brevity are not covered in this publication.

Economic and Infrastructure Development

6.46 Poverty can be both a cause and effect of conflict, and should be addressed as part of a comprehensive approach to stabilisation. While aid relieves poverty in the short term, only sustained economic growth can reduce it in the long-term. However, standard economic interventions designed to address familiar development problems are often inappropriate in conflict-affected societies. In these circumstances, effective programmes require an understanding of how economies change during conflict and how targeted economic and infrastructure development initiatives can prise open possibilities for political settlements and vice versa. For example, improvements in employment prospects not only help raise people out of poverty, but may support an emerging political settlement by bolstering support for host government authorities, while reducing the pool of frustrated under-employed young men and women from which adversaries can readily recruit.

6.47 Research of some African states suggests that for every year a state is in decline, it will take at least one year in recovery. This ratio can easily be greater as states can sometimes lose 7–8 per cent of their total economic product in a year of conflict. Achieving this

level of growth is difficult at the best of times.[66]

6.48 Key areas for development to enable reform include:

- property rights
- policy predictability
- legal and administrative reform
- trade facilitation
- financial services
- tax policy and risk ratings.[67]

6.49 Campaign planners might usefully check that development initiatives address these issues. However, they are not easily resolved and it should be clear that the process of economic and infrastructure development is likely to be a long one, and is wholly dependent on civilian agencies.

[66] Jeffrey Herbst, *Confronting Fragile and Failed States in Africa,* RUSI Whitehall Report 2-08: International Peace-Building for the 21st Century, The Tswalu Protocol and Background Papers, John Mackinlay, Terence McNamee, and Gred Mills (ed).

[67] Mauro De Lorenzo, *Why Entrepreneurship and Business Climate Reform Should Be the Centrepiece of Peace-Building Operations,* Ibid.

Figure 6-2. During stabilisation operations, effective border control can be important. The New Zealand Defence Force may be tasked as part of an international force to patrol and monitor borders, customs, and immigration.

6.50 Growth requires a stable and secure environment. In helping to deliver this environment, the military will always have a significant, if indirect, contribution to make. There may also be times when more direct military involvement in economic development will be necessary; for example, when conditions restrict civilian movement or when civilian agencies have not yet arrived on the ground. Although security and governance reform remain priorities, early attention to economic growth increases the likelihood of success.[68] Accordingly, while economic measures and reconstruction are not the panacea for stability, they should constitute a significant component of the solution. Priorities for international agencies and forces include measures designed to stabilise the economy, protect and reconstruct critical economic infrastructure, generate employment and address any underlying economic drivers of conflict.

Addressing Critical Development Needs

Determining the Military Contribution to Development

6.51 There are fundamental differences in both approach and timeframe between stabilisation and development:

- development activity focuses on poverty reduction and addressing the drivers of poverty over the longer term
- stabilisation focuses on violence reduction, while addressing the drivers of conflict it has greater immediacy and visibility in the short term.

6.52 Conflict is a significant driver of poverty and vice versa. Consequently, New Zealand forces will often find themselves working in theatre alongside, supporting or being supported by targeted development programmes. The key New Zealand partner in the delivery of in-theatre development assistance is likely to be the International Development Group (IDG), within MFAT or similar development agency. The commander should therefore understand the drivers underlying the IDG approach to enable effective cooperation.

6.53 IDG is responsible for managing the New Zealand Government's aid to developing countries and supports longer term economic growth programmes to help tackle the causes of poverty, such as conflict and state fragility. Its work forms part of a global promise to support progress towards the UN Millennium Development Goals.[69] Therefore no funds may be spent on military equipment of any type, and that all expenditure must contribute to the overall goal of reducing poverty.

6.54 At the strategic level, cooperation between IDG/MFAT and the military may involve joint assessments and the development of shared objectives. At the operational level it will require cooperative implementation planning or pre-deployment training. At the tactical level it could involve the secondment of IDG development advisers into deployed military headquarters or the military execution of IDG-funded projects.

6.55 In addition to IDG, there could be an array of development organisations represented in-theatre, all with highly individual aims and objectives. The commander will need to build relationships with the more significant of these organisations. The commander should also assess the potential effects these projects could have on stability within the region, as well as the potential effects of friendly security operations on current or planned development projects. The commander should seek to synchronise and coordinate activities with those of the host-nation and development agencies, ideally within a single integrated theatre plan (see Chapter 9).

[68] Collier P, Hoeffler A, & Soderbom M (2007) *Post-Conflict Risks.* Centre for the Study of African Economics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, UK.

[69] The UN Millennium Development Goals:
- halve the number of people living in extreme poverty and hunger
- ensure that all children receive primary education
- promote sexual equality and give women a stronger voice
- reduce child death rates
- improve the health of mothers
- combat HIV & AIDS, malaria, and other diseases
- make sure the environment is protected
- build a global partnership for those working in development.

6.56 In a permissive environment, the military contribution to economic and infrastructure development should be minimal, limited to maintaining the security necessary for others to operate and move freely. In volatile environments adversaries are likely to target development workers, be they government or non-government, host-nation or intervening, military or civilian. PRTs containing military and civilian capabilities may be critical to achieving local development. The commander should be aware of the potential risks development workers face within the area of operations, consider what priority should be accorded to their protection, and advise them of potential security risks.

6.57 In those circumstances in which civilian agencies are unable to deploy as part of the integrated campaign plan international forces may be requested to initiate specific, high priority, localised development tasks. These may include generating employment opportunities, infusing money into local economies, restoring and protecting essential infrastructure or supporting the restoration of market activity. The commander should, where feasible, use local knowledge, skills, manpower, and materials as well as link local development initiatives to national priorities, programmes and structures. The military presence will have a significant impact on local economies, and the advice of civilian specialists will be vital.

Real-life Example

Provincial Reconstruction Teams

PRTs are civil-military organisations designed to operate where the freedom of movement for civil agencies is constrained. They are usually delivered by a single nation. Originally designed to extend the reach of the government beyond the capital, PRTs had three objectives when introduced in Afghanistan: to improve security; extend the authority of the government; and to promote reconstruction. The approach was later introduced into Iraq. The reality is that each PRT's role, structure and approach has been defined by the priorities of the donor country – there is no single model.

US PRTs are military-led comprising mainly military personnel with support from other US Government departments and often including contractors working on police and military reform. The New Zealand PRT comprises approximately 120 military personnel. The PRT's forward operating base (FOB) is located near Bamyan City and it operates three/four combat outposts. The PRT is not collocated with a Battlegroup or Task Force. It consists of four patrols, base security and a quick reaction force, a small CMO team, some engineers and logistic personnel. The primary focus of the New Zealand PRT is security but it does assist with the management and coordination of reconstruction and development activities. The New Zealand PRT is the nucleus of a wider Bamyan PRT which includes New Zealand Police, NZAID, USAID and Singapore Armed Forces representatives. The New Zealand PRT works closely with the personnel of the wider Bamyan PRT in order to support their governance, law and order, and reconstruction activities. PRT funding is usually from contributing nations, (NZAID provides approximately NZ$8m), although some comes from international sources such as the UN. US in-country allocation for nineteen PRTs in Afghanistan was $450m in the 2007 financial year.[70]

The New Zealand Government eventually transitioned the New Zealand PRT away from a military-led and-staffed organisation to one that is civilian-led and mainly staffed by civilian personnel.

The following characteristics and observations about PRTs are derived from reports on a variety of multinational experiences:[71]

- PRTs are shaped by the contributing nation's political priorities and capabilities
- PRT field operations are enhanced where interagency organisations exist in nations' capitals
- common funding promotes unity of effort
- pre-deployment training significantly improves staff coordination in the field
- civilian leaders shift the focus from security to longer-term development
- the military role in reconstruction can lead to a short-term focus
- PRTs add most value to SSR when they partner host-nation security forces
- evaluation of the impact and effectiveness of PRT activity is generally poor
- PRTs are most effective when integrated as a component of a wider strategy.

[70] The UK PRT in Helmand comprised 120 people of which 80 were civilians from UK, US, Denmark and Estonia. It worked closely with the UK Helmand Task Force. It was led by a director (2*) from FCO with deputies from DFID and MOD. Its focus was on capacity building, working to a province-wide plan agreed between the government of Afghanistan and its international partners covering politics and reconstruction, governance, rule of law, security, economic and social development, counter-narcotics, and strategic communications. It was collocated with the Task Force Headquarters in Lashkar Gah and had stabilisation teams in outlying districts. These teams worked closely with the local international military and depend on them for security.

[71] This list is derived from Robert Perito et al: *Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations,* Princeton University, January 2008.

Stabilising the Economy

6.58 In addition to security, monetary policy is fundamental to stabilising an economy. Military activity in the field of monetary policy is likely to be limited to enabling safe passage of World Bank or International Monetary Fund officials to key ministries and meetings, and ensuring the security of critical financial institutions, infrastructure and stockpiles. The international force should also be careful not to undermine monetary policy by, for example, making large cash payments in foreign currency. Instead they should reinforce currency stabilisation initiatives by making payments to contractors in the local currency at local rates. Economies cannot stabilise until levels of violence begin to fall, allowing local people to re-establish normal patterns of economic life.

6.59 Economic recovery often follows a predictable pattern and can easily be seen to fit within the activity framework for stabilisation described in Chapter 4 *Operational Guidance.*

6.60 **Shape.** In the initial stages of an intervention economic recovery is unlikely. The commander may be confronted with a deteriorating economic situation as well as a declining security situation.

6.61 **Secure.** During operations to secure a locality, combat with armed adversaries may contribute to a declining economy. However, once international forces have managed to secure an area, the local population should perceive it is safe to return to more normal modes of economic activity. These areas can serve as a magnet attracting both trade and local migrants, which in turn stimulates further demand.

6.62 **Hold.** Attracted by improvements in the security situation, host-nation government authorities and international agencies descend on the locality and generate demand for local goods and services such as housing, restaurants, hotels, interpreters, and skilled labour. Such donor consumption provides further stimulation to the local economy, although it is unlikely to generate sustained growth. Major projects will be planned as quick-impact tools, such as micro-loans for small business start-up.

6.63 **Develop.** International agencies can now undertake targeted investment in specific sectors. This can range from agricultural rehabilitation to health clinics, schools and large infrastructure projects. Donor investment provides a third impetus to growth. International agencies should guard against so-called 'Dutch disease' whereby rapid surges in investment increase the exchange rate, making exports less competitive. Inward investment does not need a risk-free environment; but investors do need to be able to assess and manage risk.

6.64 While a reduction in violence is likely to stimulate a restoration of normal economic activity, local growth may depend on targeted international development assistance. If international interventions are successful, growth will be self-sustaining. As a result, successful businesses can expand and begin making longer-term investments, entrepreneurs may start to re-appear and locally-financed reconstruction can resume.

6.65 As violence fluctuates, so too do local economic conditions. Once areas have been secured, they have the potential to become important centres of economic recovery and the commander should be aware of the impact that security has. Plans should identify mechanisms for accessing development funds and channelling them into areas that are held at the necessary tempo – economic action relative to the contested security situation – in order to promote further development, minimise gaps in delivering security or economic progress, and transition to host-nation responsibility.

Reconstructing Essential Infrastructure

6.66 Infrastructure is fundamental to economic recovery. There is two generic types of infrastructure; economic and social. Economic infrastructure such as transport networks allow freedom of movement, trade and social interaction; telecommunications systems support every element of society from the host government, to the private sector, to the media and the wider population; and power generation facilities constitute the engine room of economic production. Social infrastructure such as hospitals and schools are important for the social well-being of a nation.

6.67 When prioritising and sequencing infrastructure projects it is useful to distinguish between infrastructure associated with essential government services such as hospitals, schools, water and sanitation, and infrastructure associated with the country's economic capacity such as transport links, telecommunications, significant commercial facilities and power generation and distribution systems. Both are important, however, whereas the former are associated with the immediate well-being of the population, and are dealt with in Chapter 6, the latter are essential for the immediate recovery of the economy.

6.68 Although airports, railways, ports, and communications facilities may represent iconic projects, if they do not come with air traffic controllers and ground crew, train drivers, shipping masters and engineers to maintain them, they are unsustainable. One of the most damaging aspects of long-term conflict is the departure of the most highly trained people in the economy, many of whom will never return. The only way to replace these is to train a new generation, something that takes significant time and effort. Prioritisation and expectation management are essential.

6.69 The military contribution to infrastructure development is likely to be an enabling one. However, in environments in which civilian agencies are absent or unable to move freely, intervention forces may need to implement critical infrastructure reconstruction tasks themselves. In these circumstances the military contribution might include:

- priority repairs, to and protection of, national transportation infrastructure – airports, roads, bridges, railways, ports
- restoration and protection of essential telecommunications infrastructure
- repair and protection of important commercial facilities and key assets associated with economic production, import, and export – vital for revenue generation
- repair and protection of key power generation facilities and distribution systems
- training and developing host-nation expertise.

Generating Employment

6.70 Unless local people have a reasonable prospect of restoring their livelihoods and improving their living standards, support for the host government is likely to be low. Activities which stimulate economic growth and generate employment may be crucial to stability.

6.71 When international forces and agencies occupy an area they stimulate economic recovery through increased demand for goods and services as well as targeted development initiatives. In some circumstances, international forces and agencies may sponsor large-scale employment programmes – cash for work programmes – as a temporary solution to mass unemployment. These are often low-wage job opportunities for unskilled workers and are designed to minimise interference with more traditional and profitable sectors. Such initiatives, however, should be translated into sustained employment prospects based on traditional transactions amongst the local population. The agricultural and fishing sectors are central to the well-being of the population. The commander should familiarise themselves with local crops and seasonal cycles, and understand how these are used by adversaries to generate funds, and how they may relate to surges in the level of violence. The location of markets, areas of primary production which support them, and the transport routes and storage facilities enroute are all critical components of the sector. The commander may be required to ensure safe access from the farm gate to market and security for local consumers. In some circumstances, direct assistance to producers will be required to accelerate both the recovery of agricultural and fisheries production, and the repatriation of the displaced rural population. Possible military tasks include:

- repair to enabling agricultural and fisheries infrastructure – irrigation systems, power generation and distribution systems, fishing vessels, etc
- provision of supplies, including an adequate supply of fuel
- protection of post-harvest storage facilities
- mediation of land or fisheries disputes.

Real-Life Example

'Farm Gate to Market' Supply Chains in Afghanistan

A contributory factor to the increase in Afghan opium production is the way in which dealers purchase the crop from farmers, particularly in the more volatile and insecure areas. Often dealers will contract to purchase the entire crop and provide sizeable cash deposits to farmers prior to planting. Dealers will also arrange to collect the harvested product directly from the farm gate. This process significantly reduces the risks incurred by the farmer; from crop failure, the threat of eradication, and in transporting the product over insecure roads. While the profit margins on conventional and illicit crops may be broadly similar, conventional crops are often stolen by criminals or taxed by corrupt policemen on the way to market. This erodes the economic viability of legitimate crops and substantially increases the financial and personal risks inherent in this form of agriculture.

Accordingly, the international community is taking a more effective approach to countering narcotics production by offering more competitive, less risky alternatives, based on an understanding of the value chain for agricultural production in Afghanistan. This approach identifies the steps between growing the crops and selling them in the market place. Its objective is to reduce the risk incurred by the farmer during different parts of the economic chain. In some areas this has increased the incentives for legitimate crop production through contract purchasing of crops in advance of planting and arranging for their collection direct from the farm gate after harvest. The intention has been to make farmers perceive that legal agriculture is economically viable and entails less risk than growing poppies.

6.72 While hiring local labour and issuing contracts boosts incomes and generates broader economic growth, care should be taken to minimise potentially disruptive effects on local labour markets, in particular, pay scales. International forces should seek to avoid creating large disparities in wages between that which can be earned on the local market or working for the host government and that which is possible working for international forces and agencies. Commanders usually need to remunerate local staff at higher levels to attract quality personnel and compensate for added risks associated with supporting international forces. However, salaries should not be so far above local market rates that they entice skilled workers or professionals to leave important jobs in the community for less important, but better paying jobs working for international actors. It is particularly important to get this right with respect to security force wages. Local personnel working for international forces should not make more money than those working for the host-nation army or police.

Addressing the Economic Drivers of Conflict

6.73 Development initiatives, where possible, should be designed directly to confront the economic and political drivers of conflict, and not simply execute programmes based on narrow technical considerations. This adds complexity to typical development activities, which do not usually need to consider conflict dynamics. The commander should develop an understanding of the drivers of societal conflict and be an advocate for those development activities that best address the causes of local instability. Critically, the commander will need to ensure that development does not reinforce divisions.

6.74 If inequality or discrimination is central to the conflict then development activity should be broadly based. A perception that development is being distributed unequally may lead to resistance from aggrieved local groups. In these circumstances, programmes should be judged on whether they strengthen one party to the conflict at the expense of others, in addition to traditional considerations of effectiveness and efficiency. Equally, if powerful warlords

are central to the conflict, there must be a concerted effort not to allow development activity to finance the rebuilding of old ownership structures.

6.75 The commander should consider who benefits and who risks exclusion from development initiatives and programmes, and the potential negative effects. A particularly useful tool is the Red Cross Better Programming Initiative. This explores the potential impact of development programmes on the connectors and dividers between people, allowing planners to gauge more accurately the likely effects of programmes and projects on conflict dynamics. Experience shows that the delivery of aid may exacerbate the conflict by having the following unintended consequences:

- it may be misappropriated by adversaries
- it may distort local markets
- it may benefit some groups and not others, causing further tension
- it may substitute for local resources, freeing them up for further conflict
- it may legitimise the cause of competing factions and adversaries.

Quick Impact Projects

Overview

6.76 Quick Impact Project (QIPs) are characterised as short-term, small-scale, low-cost, and rapidly implemented initiatives that are designed to deliver an immediate and highly visible impact, generally at the tactical level. Their primary purpose is to facilitate political and economic progress and attempt to generate confidence in, if not consent for, the host government. By design, QIPs should leverage consent, however on occasions access may be all that can be achieved. In non-permissive environments, where it is deemed that the project is critical for early stabilisation and cannot wait until the security situation improves, the military might implement QIPs. In more permissive environments, it is only where there is a capability gap that cannot be filled by another actor, or where the military possess particular specialist skills, that QIPs are likely to be implemented by the military. Where possible QIPs should aim to complement not contravene longer term development requirements.

Categorising Quick Impact Projects

6.77 It is useful to clarify the differences in QIPs. The bullets below distinguish between the two types of QIPs.

- Direct QIPs: critical and rapidly implemented security, governance, or development projects that directly support a goal on the path to stability. Direct QIPs have tended to focus on key elements of security – such as the repair and refurbishment of police stations and vehicle check points – critical enabling infrastructure – such as market places, roads, and bridges – or the delivery of essential services – such as schools and health clinics.
- Indirect QIPs: rapidly implemented security, governance, or development projects that serve primarily as instruments of influence and are designed to generate consent for the host government or international forces, thereby indirectly contributing to stability.

Real-Life Example

Examples of Direct Quick Impact Projects in Recent Operations[72]

Reconstruction of womens' clinic in Suai, Timor Leste.

Construction of wells in villages in Timor Leste in order to provide them with potable water.

The reconstruction of schools in Timor Leste in order to help the local communities get back to a normal life.

Provided funding for a local contracting to fence the local rubbish dump in Suai, Timor Leste in order to stop local inhabitants from foraging through the rubbish.

[72] Gordon, S. (2009) *Stabilisation Quick Impact Projects*. In Draft, Stabilisation Unit, London, UK.

6.78 Indirect QIPs focus on influencing perception and gaining consent. They have been used to communicate positive messages, provide incentives for compliance, facilitate key leader engagement or demonstrate tangible benefits from peace. Indirect QIPs are particularly effective where lack of demonstrable progress is seen as an important driver of instability. Examples include the construction of parks and the refurbishment of stadia, the clearance of waste or drainage systems, and broader infrastructure refurbishment programmes. Often, the most appropriate indirect QIPs are ones which cluster projects by visibly rolling out initiatives in sufficient numbers to create the perception of systematic change.

6.79 When using QIPs for these purposes the commander should be clear on:

- who will provide the consent?
- what will the beneficiaries of the QIP consent to?
- what purpose this will serve?
- why might the commander expect to generate the consent through the use of the QIP?
- how long is the consent expected to endure?

Accessing Funding for Quick Impact Projects

6.80 Where a PRT or similar organisation exist, much of this activity will be funded, planned, and implemented by development agencies coordinated through this organisation. In these circumstances, development and security activities will need to be mutually reinforcing within a civil-military integrated theatre plan. In other circumstances however, the commander needs to understand the various sources of funding, in order to capitalise on opportunities for QIPs as they arise. This involves understanding the purpose of different funds, the regulations governing their use, the basis on which funds are allocated, and how to rapidly access them. The commander, where possible, should make use of the specialist advice of a military stabilisation support team, or individual stabilisation advisers and development advisers. Given the funding process, commanders will need to exercise judgment in selecting QIPs, which must be defined by their influence on the population, not their impact on the operational tour.

6.81 The sources of funding for QIPs are varied and change frequently. Therefore, the commander and their staff need to identify those sources as part of their initial planning and then maintain regular contact so that they are alerted to changes as early as possible.

Guidelines for the Effective Use of Quick Impact Projects

6.82 As discussed in Chapter 3, all military action should be assessed by its actual or potential contribution toward influencing the key conflict relationship within the society and shaping the eventual political settlement. It is on this basis that the utility of each QIP must, ultimately, be assessed. To help the commander balance short and long-term imperatives and avoid unintended consequences, a number of guidelines for the effective use of QIPs are provided:

- **Influence.** Ensure that there is a strategy for communicating the positive benefits of the project; that politically significant communities are included; and that key leaders are engaged. Use the project to promote understanding, if not reconciliation, across sectarian divides and shape the emerging political settlement.
- **'Do No Harm'.** Ensure that the project is conflict-sensitive and avoids creating or exacerbating conflicts, jealousies or rivalries by the selection of beneficiaries.
- **Participation.** Ensure that the host community and local government are involved in planning, design, and delivery.
- **Efficiency.** Ensure resources are used in the most efficient and cost-effective way and that the project is not diverting resources from more important ones.
- **Timeliness.** Ensure that the project will be implemented or completed in a timeframe relevant to the commander's overall campaign.

- **Sustainability.** Address recurrent costs associated with the project.
- **Coordination.** Ensure the project complies with national priorities and is coordinated with the activities of other relevant actors.
- **Delivery.** Ensure that the most appropriate agency delivers the project, favouring local expertise and civilian agencies whenever practicable.
- **Monitoring and Evaluation.** Ensure there is a plan for assessing the project's effectiveness as well as its impact on the overall conflict dynamics.

PART 3:

INTELLIGENCE, ANALYSIS, AND PLANNING

CONTENTS

CHAPTER 7:

INTELLIGENCE AND UNDERSTANDING IN STABILISATION OPERATIONS

CONTENTS

Introduction

7.01 This chapter describes an expanded approach to intelligence. Stabilisation demands of the joint intelligence (J2) community a far wider span of expertise than conventional operations. Military intelligence has traditionally focused on analysis, based upon doctrinal models and equipment capability; for example, when and where a tank regiment may cross a river. In stabilisation, understanding is about unique human dimensions. The J2 staff is likely to be required to advise on the intricacies of applied sociology or economics as on the adversary order of battle. This is the expanded terrain pertinent to stabilisation.

The Demands of Stabilisation

Information and Intelligence

7.02 Information and intelligence are defined as follows.

- **Information.** Unprocessed data of every description, which may be used in the production of intelligence. Information concerns facts.
- **Intelligence.** The product of processing information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. The term is also applied to the activity that results in the product and to the organisation engaged in such activity.

7.03 The relationship between information and intelligence is best illustrated by the use of an example. There are armed civilians at a given location, in an area frequented by insurgents fact – information. From supporting information it is deduced that these armed men are from a local private security company – intelligence. Had the initial information been acted on immediately, there could have been a friendly fire incident. Both information and intelligence will inform decision-making. Information acted on without analysis incorporates a higher degree of risk, but time imperatives or an inability to corroborate may force the pace of decision-making.[73] Therefore, intelligence product by its nature should be productive.

The Pre-eminence of Intelligence

7.04 Effective, accurate and timely intelligence is vital in any operation. It will not only drive decision making and subsequent planning, but it will also enable assessment and the ability of the force to anticipate, learn, and adapt. Commanders' direction is fundamental to setting these priorities, and to the intelligence effort. Operations are command-led and intelligence-enabled. Intelligence drives operations and, equally, successful operations generate information that can be processed and analysed to produce intelligence. Although intelligence may be produced and disseminated by J2 staff, they require the support of joint operations staff (J3) and joint plans staff (J5), as forces will need to be deployed to gain information.

7.05 The natural dynamic, especially in warfighting, is to acquire targeting intelligence to engage and defeat the enemy through faster decision-action cycles. The intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) effort is synchronised by the J3 staff, which, by definition, is focused on the current battle. However, in these operations, it is necessary to shift the balance between collection efforts for immediate targeting and those for longer-term intelligence, in order to develop understanding. In stabilisation missions, tactical actions frequently have strategic consequences, and tactical intelligence may have operational or strategic value. Once generated, intelligence must be treated as a common resource – available in useable form to whomever needs it.

Understanding

7.06 Understanding is the accurate interpretation of a particular situation, and the likely reaction of

[73] The dismantling of the security apparatus in Iraq helped lead to anarchy. It was based upon an incomplete understanding of Iraqi society. Subsequent attempts to re-establish a security infrastructure excluded ex-Baath'ists for political reasons and hence automatically excluded a significant sector of society from engagement with the state.

groups or individuals within that situation. It ensures that timely and appropriate measures are developed to influence competing elites and the wider population. Understanding is derived from continuous analysis and engagement with the decisive actors. It requires a progression through shared knowledge and awareness, and a deep understanding and knowledge of complex issues including cultural, political, financial, commercial and linguistic sensibilities of local individuals and groups. Therefore, J2 continuity is crucial. Intelligence staff and others in key appointments must become immersed in the theatre. The challenge is to institutionalise intuition and create an accessible corporate memory. The intelligence architecture should be designed to support understanding by, for example, early investment in databases, network-enabled reach-out, and novel approaches to continuity, such as using retired experts on contract.

7.07 **Understanding Group Dynamics.** Identifying the motivation of decisive groups requires a detailed understanding of individual leaders, those around them, and their interactions. It is important to determine how adversarial groups will mobilise the means and methods to conduct violence, and their sources of political, economic, and popular support. Such groups will always be part of a complex social and political dynamic. Their objectives will be arrived at according to their position in the political order. For this reason, the military must understand the relationship between themselves and all other friendly, neutral, belligerent, adversarial groups, and the potential consequences and perceptions of their actions.

Early Establishment of Effective Structures and Networks

7.08 The Western way of warfare assumes information superiority. However, in stabilisation, commanders should assume that that they will deploy with an incomplete understanding of the situation. In order to develop timely knowledge, awareness, and understanding, intelligence structures and networks between intelligence communities need to be established early. Important insights can be gained by establishing strong channels to multinational partners, other government agencies (OGAs), international organisations, possibly some non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and from open-source material. Designing an effective information management system is a pre-cursor to sound decision-making.

Flow of Intelligence

7.09 In conventional combat operations against a defined adversary, the enemy's intent is usually identified and assessed at the strategic level and confirmed by operational and tactical level activity. In stabilisation missions, the flow of intelligence is reversed. Military intelligence organisations must adapt to this change. Small groups and individuals may alter their stance quicker than conventional military opponents. Commanders should instil into their J2 and wider staffs this idea of building the intelligence picture from the bottom up. Sources of intelligence are likely to be non-traditional and the environment may be best understood through engagement with local religious, economic, or social leaders, local contractors, and NGOs. J2 staff should be trained to access and analyse these different sources, and to determine the accuracy of the information given, according to the potential bias and intent of the source. This calls for the use of some different analytical techniques that differ from those employed in conventional warfighting.

The Find Function

7.10 A systematic approach and long-term investment are required to allow understanding to be built up over time. Hostile threat groups must be identified and neutralised. This will involve finding their networks and systematically unravelling them. Irregulars, particularly leaders and core activists, will seek anonymity amongst the population. They will use them as cover and hosts, with or without their knowledge and consent. J2 must acquire information to help the commander differentiate between the irreconcilable activists, the opportunists, criminals, the reticent supporters, and the non-supporters within a group. This allows exploitation of potential fracture points and the splitting of irreconcilable from reconcilable elements.

The granularity and timeliness of information required to enable precise strike is not easily obtained, and the act of striking may in itself cut the flow of intelligence.

Relationship with the Population

7.11 The relationship between the security forces and the population is linked to the application of force and its impact on trust. The greater the degree of trust, the greater the flow of information. The active support of the population is central to long term success. Protecting it against intimidation or attack by adversaries, as well as from any unintended results of action taken by friendly forces, is essential for intelligence gathering. For this reason, when an operation is being considered, an essential question is: 'How will it impact on the population who will be providing me with information in the future?'[74] Only when this has been answered can the commander make a properly informed decision as to whether to proceed as planned, or to look for alternative ways to exploit their situational understanding.

Vulnerabilities

7.12 **Host-nation Vulnerabilities.** Hostile groups will seek to infiltrate host-nation organisations and security forces, intimidate potential sources, feed deceptive information, and use civilians locally employed by international forces in intelligence gathering roles. They will have their own collection plans and will pursue them aggressively, potentially with support from external states.

7.13 **Own Force Vulnerabilities.** The capability to intercept non-secure communications is now commercially available and is used by irregular adversaries. Controlling the use of personal mobile telephones and social networking sites on the internet by New Zealand forces in-theatre is difficult but essential. As well as the more obvious threat to operational information, an adversary may seek to exploit information on home locations. This exploitation could include harassment or worse of family and friends.

Counter-intelligence

7.14 Counter-intelligence produces intelligence related to the identity, capability, and intentions of hostile individuals or organisations that may be engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion or terrorism directed against New Zealand forces. Counter-intelligence staffs provide intelligence to support the development of force protection measures. This involves contributing to the assessment of the adversary's intent, risks, capabilities and their opportunities afforded to mount attacks. Counter-intelligence staff should be included in the planning of significant cross-government and host-nation programmes, to advice on any security requirements.

7.15 A counter-ISTAR plan is required. This includes thorough record-keeping, the screening of locally employed civilians and host-nation forces, possibly by use of biometric technology, and robust information protection policies. Care should be taken, however, to avoid damaging relationships that have been painstakingly built up with local forces.

A Systematic Approach

Developing High-quality Intelligence

7.16 A common theme in post-operational reports is the lack of high-quality intelligence. Even when good intelligence is available, it is rarely in the right form and requires further analytical work to be developed into high-grade targeting intelligence. This is not a new problem; nearly 40 years ago in low intensity operations, General Sir Frank Kitson described two interlinked functions that he believed underpinned successful operations. The first involves collecting background information, and the second further develops this into contact information. Kitson himself recognised that this division was an oversimplification, and that it belied the highly dynamic, symbiotic, and mentally intensive

[74] Lieutenant General Sir John Kizley interviewed by Russell W Glenn, Shrivenham, United Kingdom, 12 April 2007.

analytical process that it entailed. This basic model is still valid. Refined, the two functions become:

- generation of an intelligence picture to underpin understanding
- development of target intelligence.

Generating an Intelligence Picture to Underpin Understanding

7.17 Wide situational awareness and understanding are developed through what Kitson referred to as 'background information'. Detail is important here. The intelligence picture informs the campaign plan, engagement strategies, and wider comprehensive activities to win the active support of target populations and achieve political accommodation with key elites. It will draw information from many sources, both military and civilian, including information gained from debriefing, interrogation, and informant handling. On its own, however, this intelligence picture is unlikely to be sufficiently refined to target specific groups or individuals (step one of the joint intelligence preparation of the battlefield process).

7.18 **Developing Target Intelligence.** High-quality targeting intelligence is required to direct kinetic or non-kinetic activities against specific groups or individuals, whilst reducing collateral risk. It is achieved by clearly defined problems (IR's) with focused tasking and analysis designed to zero-in on adversarial groups. This requires the explicit direction and involvement of the commander, not least as it is likely to require the commitment of resources. Forces should be deployed for the specific task of gaining information and refining

Figure 7-1: Wide situational awareness and understanding develop background information. The intelligence picture informs the campaign plan, engagement strategies, and wider comprehensive activities.

intelligence. Following a direct kinetic or non-kinetic activity material is usually exploited that feeds the intelligence cycle providing a targeting focus for future operations.

7.19 **The Virtuous Cycle.**[75] The process described above takes information and transforms it into targeting intelligence. It is the intelligence picture that forms the body of knowledge from which targeting intelligence is derived. The model below illustrates how the process of continual refinement should work. It is not fixed in duration, and at each stage the commander will need to decide whether it requires further intelligence development, or if they wish to act on what they know at that point in time. The commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), based on the commander's own hypothesis of the conflict and the way to resolve it – the theory of change – act as the engine for the process.[76] The PIRs force J2 to focus effort and challenge the hypothesis (continuously testing the campaign big ideas).[77] The process requires the J2 to build and refine a richer but sharper picture, whilst either confirming the hypothesis or leading the commander to adjust it.

7.20 There are two further aspects of this model that should be considered and are outlined below.

- **Patience.** At each point at which the commander draws deductions, they will need to weigh the benefits of immediate action against the potentially greater benefits that may be gained from further

[75] Virtuous Cycle: Recurring cycle of events, the result of each one being to increase the benefit of the next. Concise Oxford English Dictionary (COED), 11th Edition, 2004.

[76] Hypothesis in this case means the commander's assessment of how the conflict will develop and how they expect adversaries will act and react, as the commander attempts to realise their theory of change.

[77] Campaign 'big ideas' are the main idea(s) behind the commander's campaign design.



Figure 7-2: The Virtuous Cycle.

refinement. Clearly a decision to gather further information risks missing perhaps fleeting opportunities. Nevertheless, premature exploitation not only causes set-backs in the spiral, but may have far wider implications including support of the wider population being lost through unintended consequences, or the loss of New Zealand forces' grasp of the adversaries' pattern of life (painstakingly built up) due to tightened operations security. This business should not be viewed in terms of tour lengths. Building a pattern of life in a foreign society is a long-term investment. In the long run, time invested in growing intelligence capital will pay dividends. Once the intelligence picture has been sufficiently developed, the two intelligence functions; understanding and targeting will have a synergistic outcome.

- **Multiple Cycles.** Throughout a campaign there are likely to be multiple cycles operating, both in and out of theatre. Each network or adversarial group could require its own analytical cycle. Gathering information to fuel these cycles relies on the prioritisation and coordination of collection assets, and the adoption of organisational structures and information sharing protocols, which differ markedly from those employed in more conventional warfighting operations.

7.21 **Applying Pressure to Adversarial Groups.** The focused and systematic application of intelligence assets and the tightening of the virtuous cycle will apply pressure to adversarial groups. They are likely to improve their counter-measures, making finding them more challenging. For example, they may stop using communications systems and reduce their inner-circle to remain cloaked. Operations security and covert operations that protect security forces' sources of information will be crucial to maintain the visibility of adversarial groups. This will demand tight control of exploitation. The paranoia that successful intelligence and wider operations induce in adversarial groups can be advantageous. Not only may it reduce their freedom of manoeuvre and cause paralysis, it can also have destructive effects within their organisations. It can cause them to self-destruct, increase intimidation on the population – thus losing their support – or create panic that forces them to take risks and exposing them to further security force action. However, direct action may have unintended consequences for wider intelligence operations or cause the groups to mutate into something more dangerous.

Coordination and Application of Intelligence Assets

Functions and Capabilities

7.22 Intelligence coverage will invariably have major gaps and the J2 must tell the commander what it can and more importantly, cannot cover. Collection must be legal, prioritised, and coordinated to prevent duplication of effort and missed opportunities. Intelligence constructs have been designed to allow synergy between the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR), his intelligence requirements, and the availability of collection capabilities, including assets from wider intelligence agencies. Different types of intelligence sources also need to be coordinated to achieve independent corroboration of responses to CCIR. Care needs to be given to the tracking of requests for information, and information management should be an active rather than a passive function. The following collection capabilities have particular value. Competition for these often scarce resources will be fierce, both between different levels of command and the variety of operations being conducted at a particular time.

7.23 **Human Intelligence.** Human intelligence (HUMINT) is a category of intelligence derived from information provided by, or collected on, human sources and individuals of intelligence interest, as well as the systematic and controlled exploitation, by interaction with, or surveillance of, sources or individuals.

7.24 **Human Intelligence Sources.** Sources range from passive informal walk-ins, routine liaison and key-leader engagement, to more active source handling and interrogations. All personnel in contact with actors across the joint force area of operations (JFAO) will inevitably be dealing with potential HUMINT sources. However, while HUMINT may be obtained from a wide

variety of sources, the development and exploitation of informants[78] is the preserve of specialist organisations, such as the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) and the Field HUMINT Platoon of 1st New Zealand Military Intelligence Company. Specialist HUMINT capabilities are limited and deployment should be prioritised to achieve maximum effect. HUMINT encompasses the management of human sources and is likely to include information gained from detainees, refugees and the civilian population; it will often require language support.

7.25 **The Value of Human Intelligence.** Building HUMINT source networks is a long-term process. HUMINT is tasked like any other ISTAR asset, but getting results may take considerable time and is dependent on access to the right sources, which must be handled by the right people.[79] HUMINT (along with signals intelligence) is particularly good at providing evidence of people's intentions, motivations, wants and fears, as well as the effect of friendly action on them; thus developing an understanding of the context within which decisions are made. At its best, it is literally a conversation with the adversary. This understanding is vital in order to positively influence the situation; other ISTAR assets cannot develop this, only support it.

Key Term

Human Intelligence

Service members will constantly be in contact with local civilians, either as part of planned engagement or through patrol opportunities. Such interactions will only have enduring value if they are conducted with the support of interpreters or language-trained personnel, and if the results are disseminated into the intelligence chain for wider use. Basic unit collection and collation systems lie at the heart of this process.

7.26 **Signals Intelligence/Electronic Warfare Intelligence.**[80] Signals intelligence/electronic warfare intelligence from national and military capabilities will be essential to the operational and tactical levels of command. Signals intelligence and electronic warfare intelligence can provide real-time intelligence from a range of platforms. They can be used not only to identify geographic positions, but also to build a picture of the adversary's network and to provide real-time insights into intentions and objectives.

7.27 **Imagery Intelligence.** Imagery intelligence is intelligence derived from imagery acquired by sensors, which can be ground based, sea borne, or carried by air or space platforms. It can be delivered via tactical, operational, and strategic collections assets and has been proven to be a force multiplier on operations in Northern Ireland, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Its uses range from general area surveillance design to contribute to an understanding of the operational theatre, through to the production of target packs for individual operations, and right down to providing cueing action against specific targets.

7.28 **Geospatial Information.** Geospatial information comprises facts about the Earth referenced by geographical position and arranged in a coherent structure. It describes the physical environment and includes data from the aeronautical, geographical, hydrographical, oceanographic, and meteorological disciplines. Geospatial information includes data, products, and services in graphic, textual and digital form, which may be used to support navigation, targeting, and situational awareness. It can be critical to precision strike.

7.29 **Geospatial Intelligence.** Geospatial intelligence is the integration and analysis of imagery and comprises image intelligence and geospatial information. It provides a geospatial framework to establish patterns or to aggregate and extract additional intelligence. It

[78] Known as covert human intelligence sources (CHIS).

[79] HUMINT operators need to be credible in both experience and perception. Some of this activity is covered by the HUMINT annex in the particular HQJFNZ ISP and is tightly controlled.

[80] The generic term to describe communications intelligence and electronic intelligence when there is no requirement to differentiate between these two types of intelligence, or to represent fusion of the two. Electronic warfare is often referred to as tactical signals intelligence.

provides the means to collate, display and precisely locate activities and objects, and assess and determine their interrelationships, in order to understand a situation. Geospatial intelligence units generate mapping and sophisticated briefing products, and rely on specialist communications and information systems (CIS).

7.30 **Open-source Intelligence.** Open-source intelligence is derived from publicly available information, as well as other unclassified information that has limited public distribution or access. Major sources of information include public meetings, libraries, the internet and the media. It can be a rich source to support understanding of the local population's needs and assessment of military activity. Qualified linguists may be required to exploit local media, ranging from web-sites to religious sermons, or even graffiti. Having discussions with locals around capacity building provide open-source intelligence but many such opportunities are missed.

7.31 **Measurement and Signature Intelligence.** Measurement and signature intelligence is scientific and technical intelligence derived from the analysis of data obtained from sensing instruments, for the purpose of identifying any distinctive features associated with the source, emitter or sender, that will facilitate the latter's measurement and identification. This includes the collection and management of biometric data. The results of measurement and signature intelligence facilitate the detection, tracking, and identification of targets or systems; and describe the distinctive characteristics of fixed or dynamic targets. Requests for information should be put through New Zealand Defence Intelligence (NZDI) Collection Coordination and Information Requirements Management (CCIRM) Office.

7.32 **Biometric Data Collection.** Understanding can be significantly enhanced by the use of biometric data. This is costly and it may take time to gather a sufficient volume to be effective. Early decisions and investment are required. Legal and procedural protocols for sharing the information gathered with other security agencies, including the host-nation, are also required.

7.33 **Technical Intelligence.** Technical intelligence concerns foreign technological developments, and the performance and operational capabilities of foreign materiel, which have or may eventually have a practical application for military purposes. Evaluation of equipment employed by hostile groups can provide useful technical intelligence, which contributes to assessing their capability and links to wider support. This is primarily provided by Explosive Ordnance Device (EOD) teams that exploit captured weapons and explosive devices and analyse post-incident forensic evidence. Additional support can be provided by reach-back to the Defence Technology Agency (DTA). Technical intelligence product tends to be used in support of force protection measures. In particular, intelligence on the capabilities and construction of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) assists the counter-IED process. However, technical intelligence capabilities can be used more widely. For example, technical intelligence can help to establish which external support networks in-theatre irregular groups are exploiting.

7.34 **Intelligence Exploitation.** The detailed forensic exploitation of captured documents, electronic media, and technical material can provide vital intelligence, as can the in-depth exploitation of captured personnel through tactical questioning, interrogation and biometric techniques.

7.35 Tactical exploitation is:

- closely allied to technical intelligence, and provides focused intelligence support to develop actionable intelligence
- supporting the development of wider situational awareness
- enabling the development of effective counter-threat measures.

7.36 Tactical exploitation uses a variety of collection and exploitation techniques to provide multi-source, responsive intelligence for specific purposes, or to contribute to all-source assessment. Initial exploitation takes place in-theatre and is linked to DTA and OGA in New Zealand for more forensic analysis. Tactical

exploitation is likely to be an increasingly important means of intelligence gathering as adversaries make more use of technology, for example, in information and communications technology. As with technical intelligence, the preservation of forensic detail requires training.

Supporting Functions

7.37 **Key Leadership Engagement.** Key leaders are engaged as a source of information, to achieve influence and for assessment. Key-leader engagement should only be conducted by personnel with suitable experience and authority. Trust and rapport need to be built up, which takes time. Individuals in senior positions and those with particular personal access may need to remain in post beyond the standard tour length. Engagements, such as a meeting with a local senior official, should be recorded, or the insight will be lost.

7.38 **Screening.** Screening is the process of identifying and assessing individuals who may have knowledge of intelligence value. Screening is not in itself an intelligence collection technique, but it is a filter to identify those who could be of value. These individuals may be high-level officials, adversary foot soldiers, or ordinary members of the public who could provide useful intelligence. Screening, where possible, should be conducted by trained operators, however all military personnel need to know the basics, including how to recognise potential HUMINT sources and ways of soliciting information of potential value. Even routine engagement with the people must be exploited.

7.39 **Arrest, Detention and Internment Operations.** Such operations present an opportunity to gather and exploit documents, information technology and HUMINT. This should be done strictly in accordance with the Law of Armed Conflict, the specified Rule of Engagement (ROE) and the NZDF's HUMINT policy.

> *I want to reassure you about our situation. The summer started hot with operations escalating in Afghanistan. The enemy struck a blow against us with the arrest of Abu al-Faraj, may God break his bonds. However, no Arab brother was arrested because of him. The brothers tried and were successful to a great degree to contain the fall of Abu al-Faraj as much as they could.*
>
> **Letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi, allaying fears that al Faraj's arrest would compromise them, July 2005**

Organisational Requirements

7.40 **A Single Intelligence Environment.** All intelligence should be available to those who need it, in usable form. Intelligence and reports collected by national and multinational agencies, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), may be useful at the tactical level. Conversely, material collected by foot patrols may have strategic importance. This makes the centralised coordination of collection and processing resources and the sharing of intelligence through a single intelligence environment vital. Intelligence communities of interest must be identified and re-assessed throughout a campaign. Accessibility must be a characteristic of intelligence, and any tendency to over-classify and compartmentalise intelligence product must be addressed. The commander needs to ensure that trust with intelligence agencies is maintained. The intelligence community is one based on norms that emphasise trust and discretion; a balance must be struck between the need to know and the need to share. Sources and methods for gaining intelligence must be protected from accidental or ill-conceived compromise by the wider recipients. At the same time, it is important to share intelligence widely in order to reap the maximum benefit from it. This is amplified in a

multinational and cross-government environment, where risk will be viewed differently. Intelligence should be written for release. Paragraphs should be individually classified so that lower-classified material or 'tear lines' can be distributed more widely.

7.41 **Interoperability.** Organisational structures, procedures, and interoperability challenges between military and non-military intelligence agencies (including those of the host-nation), will present obstacles that need to be overcome. It is essential to strive for a common intelligence picture.

7.42 **All-source Intelligence Cell.** An all-source intelligence cell, sometimes referred to as a 'fusion cell', comprises a military command element and a task-organised production section for processing information and intelligence, to provide all-source intelligence products. All-source intelligence cells augment tactical intelligence cells throughout a force and may contain OGA. The cell coordinates closely with J2 Plans to ensure that intelligence products meet the commander's needs, and that information requirements and requests for information raised during processing are addressed accordingly. The senior all-source cell commander is the primary interface with the commander.

7.43 **Network-enabled Reach-back.** In-theatre commanders and staff require reach-back, i.e. access to rear-based communities of subject matter experts. The role of these networks is to exploit the (often latent) intellectual capacity that can be tapped in support of the theatre. Reach-back encompasses areas such as analysis on psychological profiling and previous adversary patterns of activity. Senior mentors are another source of corporate memory. This will ensure that knowledge and expertise can be leveraged even if they are not physically deployed. Knowledge networks should be coordinated by Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand (HQJFNZ) on behalf of the theatre commander, and formed from personnel recently returned from the operation, along with those relevant experts in wider defence, industry, academia, and government.

Key Term

Fusion Cell

An all-source intelligence cell that comprises of a military command element and task-organised production section for processing information and intelligence, to provide all-source intelligence products.

7.44 **Military Intelligence Liaison Officers.** To facilitate information sharing between multinational organisations, military intelligence liaison officers may be employed. Military intelligence liaison is overt contact between members of friendly organisations, including host-nation military and police organisations that, by virtue of their official positions, have access to information of potential intelligence value. The overt nature of this activity means that an organisation contacted will know the status of the military intelligence liaison officer and the reason for interest. Military intelligence liaison is most effective when rapport and a mutual sense of trust have been developed between individuals. Trained intelligence personnel must undertake this task.

7.45 **Wider Distribution of Intelligence Expertise.** To facilitate the effective analysis of information and its broader access up, down, and across the chain of command, a wide distribution of intelligence staff across the force is required. This should extend down to sub-unit level. The intelligence staff, ideally who can speak the local language, must also be distributed among host-nation military and police forces to acquire intelligence and, ultimately, to help them to build a self-sustaining host-nation intelligence capability. Commanders need to resource this wider distribution of intelligence staff, either through the provision of additional specialist intelligence personnel, or through the training of generalists for the role. However it is achieved, emphasis should be placed on the ability of all intelligence staff to analyse human and signals intelligence.

7.46 **Improving Tactical Intelligence Capability.** To maximise their potential, NZDF force elements (and staff) need to report assiduously what they observe on the ground and in meetings. This behaviour must be inculcated in pre-deployment training. Everyone must be briefed on the types of information that they are trying to obtain, and the methods and postures needed to extract it. Force elements require the technical means to pass information up and across the chain of command, as well as to input their own information requirements. The flow of intelligence is not a one-way street and, to be effective, generalist units will require access to wider information, so as to focus their intelligence gathering role.

7.47 **Specialist Intelligence Units.** The formation of theatre-specific intelligence force elements may be required to enable the exploitation of specialised surveillance and reconnaissance, HUMINT, and host-nation capability. Historically, in Kenya, Malaya, Northern Ireland, and Rhodesia, the formation of such specialist units significantly enhanced the military intelligence capability to understand and neutralise adversarial groups.

Exploiting Technology

7.48 Establishing an effective intelligence organisation requires major investment, both within and outside the theatre, and should be done from the outset of the campaign. Experience shows that investment made at the earliest stages will prove to be cost-effective in the long run. If done well, it will create savings in other areas, such as force protection.

7.49 The requirements for the communications and information systems are outlined in the following.

- **Shared Databases.** Intelligence databases, in which information is available to different agencies in a common format, are a non-discretionary vital capability. This lesson was learned and successfully implemented by the British Army in Northern Ireland in the 1970s and 1980s, but has been overlooked in more recent operations. Since then even more powerful data mining techniques have been developed, which can form a powerful collective memory.
- **Networks and Infrastructure.** Robust CIS networks, linking both military and non-military intelligence organisations, are critical to the gathering and exploitation of intelligence. Advances in web-based systems should be capitalised to enhance information sharing, which is constrained by traditional hierarchical chains of command. Procedures must be established so informal networks can rapidly be established, and information accessed between and across various levels of command within the security force and wider agencies.
- **Technical Compatibility.** System and software incompatibilities must be addressed in order to allow information sharing at required levels. Security will always be an issue, and some classification protocols will undoubtedly have to be adapted. However, even in multinational environments, systems can still remain secure whilst allowing the necessary access.
- **Emerging Technologies.** The integration of technologies such as face recognition and side-scanning radar down to the lowest levels will significantly enhance operational effectiveness. This is especially true in theatres where there is a lack of national personal data (such as national insurance numbers and driving licence details) or where Western militaries find facial recognition difficult.

Real-Life Example

Evolving an Intelligence Framework – Northern Ireland

In 1994 Northern Ireland had over 37 separate intelligence-gathering computer systems operating. Their focus was detection before, during, and after paramilitary activity, with a particular focus on the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). Key to the transformation was an electronic spring-clean of the military intelligence cupboard. Throughout the Irish Republican Army (IRA) ceasefires of 1995 and 1997–98, the British Army energetically transformed its armoury of computers. The scale and cost of this programme reflected the Army's belief that it would continue to fight an intelligence war in Northern Ireland and that the surveillance war would increasingly become part of normal life in England.

The use of two systems in particular were force multipliers: VENGEFUL, dedicated to vehicles, and CRUCIBLE, for people (the former linked to the Northern Ireland vehicle licensing office, the latter was capable of 'holding a personal file containing a map/ picture showing where a suspect lived as well as details of family and past'). The two systems provided total cover of a largely innocent population, the sea within which the terrorist fish swam.[81]

[81] Taken from *Geraghty, Tony, The Irish War,* John Hopkins University Press, 2000.

ANNEX A:
UNDERSTANDING THE ADVERSARY

7.50 Describing adversaries is difficult. Different terms and definitions are used for insurgents, irregulars, terrorists, and criminals. Furthermore, different nations and organisations derive different meanings from these terms, depending on the context.

7.51 Understanding the motivation of adversaries in a particular operational context is a prerequisite to designing measures to counter them. Military action to counter adversarial groups is usually required when normal law enforcement agencies cannot contain the level of routine violence. An approach based on categorisation of their likely ends, ways and means can be useful

Key Term

Adversaries

Groups who oppose the host government and international force, and who possess a willingness to employ violence against them, in addition to other subversive techniques such as instigating civil disorder by exploiting legal demonstrations, strikes, or exacerbating political discontent.

Ends

7.52 **The Range of Adversaries.** Numerous adversarial groups can affect the campaign simultaneously. They may come from diverse states and ethnic groups, and include foreign fighters and warlords. In most cases, adversarial groups will pursue specific objectives, be they economic or political.

7.53 **Aims and Objectives.** Groups mobilise, unify, and define themselves around an aim or goal. This will shape the organisational structure and approach that the organisation adapts to politics and the use of violence.

It can be helpful to categorise adversarial groups. but it is not always straightforward to do so. Four broad categories of adversarial groups may be identified:

- host-nation insurgents
- global insurgents
- local power-brokers
- adversarial opportunists.

7.54 Each group is likely to align itself, for reasons of expediency, with other adversarial groups (which may include states).

7.55 **Host-nation Insurgents.** The host-nation insurgents will require popular support or acceptance. They may be nationalist and focused on an internal civil struggle, albeit with an ideological element. These groups are motivated to gain some state control and therefore they are often amenable to reconciliation through compromise on both sides. The support of an external state may also be a factor. The many proxy wars that took place in the 20th century are examples of this, as are aspects of contemporary operations. Classical counter-insurgency theories, such as Mao's Protracted War,[82] still provide useful models to orientate military officers to the basic ends, ways and means of such nationalist groups.

7.56 **Global Insurgents.** Global insurgents will look to exploit the conflict for wider political purposes. Typically, their aim will be a regional outcome, or the destruction of the existing political order. Examples include Chechnya, Somalia, and East Timor, as well as Iraq and Afghanistan in the form of al-Qaeda cells and foreign fighters. The nature of their aims and objectives makes reconciliation unlikely. The focus of any intervention should be to separate global insurgents from local groups, and neutralise them. The utility of a joint force area of operations (JFAO) is challenged by global insurgents who work across such boundaries.

[82] The coordination of political and military action through a three-phase strategy of strategic defence, strategic equilibrium, and the strategic offensive.

7.57 **Local Power Brokers.** In some regions, local power brokers may predominate. The aim of such groups is to keep central governance weak. These groups are usually tribal and sometimes criminal. They may not aspire to political control, but rather to maintain local autonomy and power through mobilisation of support from the local population. Engagement may be necessary to prevent their alignment with, or exploitation by, insurgent groups.

7.58 **Adversarial Opportunists.** Opportunist groups, such as arms dealers, smugglers, people traffickers, pirates, and narco-criminals are motivated by greed and criminal activity. The absence of effective rule of law allows them to flourish. These groups are unlikely to be decisive and it may not be necessary to establish a political accommodation with them. Once sufficient governance and law and order have been established, their influence will be reduced by the host-nation. In contrast, these groups may need to be dealt with locally in order to demonstrate government authority and to gain the support of the local population. Opportunist groups may acquire wealth, which can be exploited by other adversarial groups, and which may deny revenue to the host-nation. One example of this is the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, initially a political movement, but which now incorporates armed criminal groups who sustain its activities from oil theft and ransom, which diminishes the oil revenue of Nigeria by more than $1 billion a year.

Ways and Means

7.59 **Finding a Cause.** The leadership of adversarial groups will use a persuasive cause to mobilise support, based on real grievances or unresolved contradictions with the host-nation government. Adversaries will select causes that range from the deep rooted and strategic, to the temporary and local. They will use a compelling narrative to justify their actions, while simultaneously depicting the motivations and behaviours of their opponents as illegitimate.

7.60 **Invalidating the Cause.** Where causes do not fully align with the real motivation of a group, they provide a fault-line that international forces can exploit to separate the adversary from the wider population. Where the cause is valid, political action is required to deny leverage to the adversary. If the cause is not valid, it should be demonstrated that adversaries cannot deliver their promises, or that their achievement will have disastrous political and social consequences.

7.61 **Alternative Delivery.** The adversary may challenge the delivery of human security and establish parallel governance structures. The host-nation will need to demonstrate that it can deliver security, justice, governance, and economic prosperity more effectively than its adversaries.

7.62 **Accommodation Strategy.** Commanders may need to strike accommodations with less-hostile adversarial groups. This is not ‘short-termism’, but may be essential for long-term success. It is by these means that the commander may re-establish links between the national government, local authorities, and the population. These activities need to be conducted with the full knowledge of the host-nation government. Money and other resources may be useful levers to achieve such accommodations.

Critical Requirements of Adversaries

7.63 All adversarial groups are likely to have the following critical requirements. Following analysis, it should be possible to identify those requirements most suitable to be targeted. Potential approaches are described in the grey boxes below.

7.64 **Figureheads.** Some groups may have a figurehead that embodies the cause and unifies support; this is not the same as leadership. Figureheads may not directly control the actions of adversarial groups, but mobilise popular support.

7.65 The host-nation government needs to compete against the figurehead without reinforcing their credibility. In some instances the government may be able to use a narrative to counter a figurehead, but often the government will have to work around the figurehead rather than risk bolstering their cause.

7.66 **Leadership.** All groups require leadership. A group's leader(s) may exert direct control or operate indirectly. The larger the group, the more difficult it will be to exercise central control without compromising security. Identify, analyse, and undermine the leadership. Well-judged strike options to neutralise individuals can also coerce others to desist or seek reconciliation.

7.67 **A Cause.** Groups require a cause; some animating grievance capable of being exploited.

7.68 **Freedom of Movement.** Freedom of movement is dependent on the tacit consent of, and the ability to blend in with, the local population. Physical movement can be restricted by population control and legal means, such as identity cards linked to a database. Interdicting lines of communication has proved to be difficult in the past, but offers high returns when successful. The most effective long-term solution is to isolate and neutralise the adversary by separating them from the people.

7.69 **Recruits.** Without the ability to maintain a flow of willing recruits, either from within the local population or foreign fighters, groups will be vulnerable to attrition. Paying-off potential recruits or offering them alternative opportunities can erode the recruiting base. Breaking the ideological link between the leaders and recruits may best be achieved through indirect means. Analysis of Palestinian groups in Lebanon showed that measures taken to prevent the radicalisation of young men should be directed at their fathers and not the youths themselves.

7.70 **Weapons.** The means to fight are a critical requirement. In many conflict-riven societies, weapons are freely available and so cutting supply may be impractical. Limiting access to weapons is difficult in armed societies. Even in unarmed societies, global markets, and networks mean that high-tech weaponry, traditionally confined to states, may be available to our adversaries. Coercion of states may limit or abate supply, but will not prevent it indefinitely; good intelligence and diplomacy will only go so far. Where no commercial product is available, adversaries improvise, often using very low-tech equipment. Equipment and adaptive tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) (including attacking their weapon production system) are our best mitigation.

7.71 **Safe Havens.** Groups require secure areas where they can rest, regroup, train, resupply, and plan their operations without fear of interdiction. Cyberspace is a partial safe haven in which insurgents can recruit, mobilise, raise and move funds, and advance their narrative. Both virtual and physical safe havens should be identified and monitored. If no intelligence advantage is likely to accrue, they should be attacked and denied to keep pressure on the adversary.

7.72 **Essential Supplies.** Food, water, medical supplies, combat supplies, and means of communication are vital for adversarial groups. These will tend to be drawn from the local population, or by appropriating humanitarian aid. If the flow of these supplies is disrupted or uncertain, the threat will be undermined. Since these will often be delivered through a network in the population, the best approach will be to isolate the adversary from popular support.

7.73 **Intelligence.** Adversarial groups require knowledge of the population in order to target, coerce, intimidate, and recruit, as well as to provide counter-intelligence to avoid penetration. Counter-intelligence analysis, operations security, and good TTPs – to spot dickers[83] and informants for example – will reduce the adversary's ability to generate intelligence. Again, since the adversary's collection systems move among the population, separating the adversary from the population is critical.

7.74 **Finance.** Although irregular activity can be inexpensive relative to the costs of countering it, groups rely on funds generated from two broad sources: illegal activities and donations.

7.75 Work comprehensively to identify the physical and virtual networks for raising, moving, and hiding money. Identify the physical links in-theatre and break

[83] A 'dicker' is a colloquial term used to describe seemingly innocent by-standers who are actually monitoring and reporting on security force activities.

them. Attack the nexus between the illicit activity that generates revenue and the adversaries that use it.

Exploiting the Contemporary Operating Environment

7.76 **Events of Propaganda Value.** Adversarial groups orchestrate violence to have the maximum effect on targeted audiences. The media effect of this violence may be more important than the physical damage, since the act of violence is often designed to undermine international efforts and build their own support base. Understanding the effects sought by adversarial groups can assist in establishing defensive and offensive measures to counter them. Figure 7-3 illustrates some of the desired effects of violence by adversaries.

7.77 **Outcomes to Undermine the Host-nation's/ Intervention Forces' Objectives.** The following paragraphs are the generic, but not exhaustive, outcomes that adversarial groups may wish to achieve on target audiences through violence.

- **Undermine Political Resolve.** An example may be an act of terrorism used to undermine international political resolve.
- **Unhinge a Comprehensive Approach.** Attacks on vulnerable civilian agencies may create a perception within the comprehensive community that security is inadequate, so preventing them from operating.
- **Dissipate Security Forces' Effort.** Widespread insecurity may dissipate and fix the security effort to static protection tasks, thereby reducing the freedom of manoeuvre of the commander.



Figure 7-3: The desired outcomes of violence by adversaries.

- **Provocation.** Violence may be designed to provoke an over-reaction that will deepen popular grievances against the security forces and government.
- **Create Disorder.** Attacks designed to create disorder and weaken government control may enhance tacit support and freedom of manoeuvre.
- **Increase Discontent.** Disorder is likely to foster popular discontent and the perception of the host-nation government's inability to deliver security.
- **Intimidate the Population.** Violence may be designed to coerce and compel local support.
- **Recruitment.** Acts of violence can stimulate the recruiting base, particularly among young disenfranchised men who crave the kudos, comradeship, and opportunities that come from being in a fighting organisation.
- **Underpin Credibility.** The capability to deliver violence may demand a response from government and security forces, thus conferring status and credibility on a group out of proportion to its size and popular support.

ANNEX B:
COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS

7.78 The relationship between New Zealand's strategic and operational intelligence organisations is mapped in Figure 7-5.

7.79 **New Zealand Defence Intelligence.** The Defence Intelligence Branch is responsible for providing strategic intelligence analysis, policy, and coordination for the (New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) Intelligence function. It also monitors potential crisis areas in accordance with designated priorities set by Chief Defence Force (CDF).

7.80 **Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand.** Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand (HQJFNZ) Joint Intelligence Branch (J2) supports Commander Joint Forces New Zealand's (COMJFNZ) as well as providing intelligence support and oversight for deployed NZDF elements. HQJFNZ has operational command of any deployed all-source intelligence cell which, through forward-deployed liaison officers, provides operational-level links to other government agencies, and NZDF's Geospatial Intelligence New Zealand (GNZ) organisation.

7.81 **Joint Task Force Headquarters.** A Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters will usually have an integral intelligence organisation, adjusted or augmented to meet its requirements. This may include an all-source intelligence cell, and support from strategic intelligence organisations and agencies, or from outside the intelligence community, providing local, regional, or cultural expertise.

7.82 **Joint, Inter-agency and Multinational Operations.** The command and control of the intelligence process on coalition operations must reflect the need to integrate with joint, inter-agency and multinational partners so that situational awareness is maximised. National and local agreements should outline the architecture, access, and processes to be adopted. National caveats can be mitigated through the use of 'tear lines' where necessary.



Figure 7-4: Geospatial information describes the physical environment and includes data from the aeronautical, geographical, hydrographical, oceanographic, and meteorological disciplines.



Figure 7-5: The structure of the New Zealand Intelligence Community.

CHAPTER 8:

THE USE OF ANALYSIS IN STABILISATION OPERATIONS

CONTENTS

Introduction

8.01 This chapter describes the process and output of analysis. It explains the imperative to analyse the interaction of key groups and their impact on national politics. Analysis is the process by which that understanding is achieved, and from which the commander can begin to develop scenarios that test their theory for change, based on a clear grasp of the strategic context. Supported by intelligence, it provides the basic knowledge that informs planning. The output can then inform the joint military appreciation and provide the depth of understanding necessary to plan and execute military operations.

The Nature of the Analysis Process

8.02 Strategic and regional analysis does not necessarily start with crisis or immediate planning. It can be part of deliberate planning and should have assisted the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) Strategic Planning Group (SPG) in reaching their conclusions on national strategy. An operational-level commander would hope to have a considerable amount of information and intelligence available to them. However, in reality, this is often not the case, as in Kosovo in 1999 when even basic campaign planning data was scarce. Analysis is primarily for the benefit of the commander. They are the main recipient of it, and are also the main contributor, due to their theatre-wide perspective and access to other leaders and actors. The commander should develop their own analysis team drawn from their headquarters, and where possible include coalition partners and other government agencies (OGAs).

8.03 Analysis is the examination of the relationship between elements to obtain the optimal understanding of the operational context, and anticipates its likely development. Climate and topographical details, sources of water and energy, features, and their implications (e.g. Helmand River and 'Green Zone'; Kajaki Dam and Khyber Pass) will shape courses of action (COAs) and possible responses. An analysis of the people involved, their wealth, society and culture, their neighbours, and their relationships will also be critical to campaign design. However, a commander will rarely be able to develop the sophisticated, nuanced understanding of how other actors make their policy decisions, or how an unfamiliar economy, society, or individual and collective psychology of leaders and citizens actually work. Caution should be exercised in trying to model human systems and the results of military action against them. Human groups are not physical systems, and the science of systems analysis has limited utility in modelling human behaviour; an understanding of sociology[84] and anthropology[85] is probably more relevant.

8.04 Initial analysis conducted jointly by the military and OGAs should inform the theory of change: a robust thesis on the ways and means required to resolve a problem. It primes campaign planning but must not be done just once. Analysis should be continuously refined and the assumptions challenged. A combination of continuous analysis and assessment should identify changes and identify the potential effect of planned activities, allowing the commander to refine their plan and minimise undesirable consequences.

8.05 Analysis factors will vary from one situation to another. NZDDP–5.0 *Joint Operations Planning* suggests factors that apply to all operational scenarios include: geo-strategic, the physical environment, actors and their involvement, and national and regional infrastructure. These are pertinent and should be analysed, but stabilisation will always require analysis of the politics of the conflict, with groups as the focus, in order to determine how influence can be applied to achieve the desired political settlement.

Focusing On Political Analysis

Political Order

8.06 A detailed political and social analysis should identify:

- the decisive social groups and the source of their political authority

[84] Defined in the Concise Oxford English Dictionary (COED) as 'the study of the development, structures, and functioning of human society. The study of social problems.'
[85] Defined in the COED as 'the study of mankind, especially of its societies and customs.'

- their interactions – including their political alliances, interdependencies, and rivalries
- and the critical economic and political resources over which these groups compete and cooperate.

8.07 A broad classification of groups is contained in Chapter 5, groups may be seen as friendly, neutral, belligerent, opportunist or adversarial, or a combination of these. Finally, it will identify their propensity for violence. The resulting picture of the political order is likely to look very different from Western democracies.

Social Groups

8.08 Any human collective can be considered as a social group, whatever its size. When participants unite around common goals they become a social group. Typically, these draw upon unifying social distinctions such as language, ethnicity, tribe, clan, religion, income, and qualifications. Once unified, the participants are then able to cooperate with each other – groups might then monopolise resources, thereby excluding others, to achieve their goals. No social group exists in isolation. All are affected by their interaction and competition with other groups; they are likely to be mutually interdependent and reactive. This is what is meant by a conflict eco-system. As a result of globalisation, this eco-system may have wider regional and even international consequences. Western culture is heavily individualist and tends to emphasise the propensity for individual, rational decision-making. In other cultures, group identities are likely to be shaped by the objectives and tribal links of the collective group. Identifying the

Figure 8-1: No social group exists in isolation, all are affected by their interaction and are likely to be mutually interdependent and reactive.

decisive groups and their identities, and then persuading them to support the government through focused influence campaigns, may be more effective than killing and capturing adversaries.

Gaining Support

8.09 It is likely that dominant groups will enjoy privileged and unrepresentative access to political and economic resources in fragile states. They may own the sources of wealth, enjoy the support of powerful allies, and use military force to intimidate or defend the population. Part of the commander's task is to remove or ameliorate these obstacles to legitimate political control, so that the government is able to gain the support, or at least the consent, of the majority of the population. To do this, the government will need to demonstrate that the benefits it offers are preferable to those offered by other groups.

Reversing Social Fragmentation

8.10 Establishing a legitimate regime around an identified group can be difficult. The group should be empowered so that the population becomes contentedly reliant on it. However there will be other competing groups trying to undermine its authority. International intervention is likely to assist the selected groups to attain sufficient economic, political, and military authority so that they can command the allegiance of the wider population through the provision of resources. In failed or failing states the means to achieve this may be absent, and where people have little experience of centralised government, this can be difficult to achieve. Intervention must also counter the causes of state fragmentation. 'Accidental guerrillas'[86] result from the atomisation of society, the absence of effective justice and governance, and catalyst factors, such as the presence of foreign troops. The population will need to be turned away from its dependence on adversarial hostile and belligerent forces by, fracturing these groups and their linkages to the population.

Application of Resources

8.11 The offer of economic, political, and military resources to the decisive group could be used to stimulate internal reform of host-nation neutral and friendly groups. Any changes that result from this offer needs to be consistent with the local political realities and avoid the impression of imposing inappropriate external systems. The involvement of international organisations such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, United Nations (UN) and the South Pacific Forum (SPF) to support the emergent regime will be necessary. These organisations not only provide critical economic and political resources, but also confer legitimacy on the regime, which adversarial and belligerent groups lack.

Networks

8.12 It is useful to consider social groups as a network of networks. The different strategies and aims of each group affect the others. Commanders should map the geography of the social and political networks, identifying the relations between groups and their mutual interaction. These networks may not be confined to a specific province or country; many networks are transnational. In order to defeat the network and not just the attack, it may be necessary to involve the international community in support of the friendly regime, whilst simultaneously denying critical resources such as money, political favour, media access, legitimacy, and weapons to adversarial groups from transnational networks.

Elites

8.13 Political elites are small groups that hold disproportionate power. Those that are capable of achieving a political accommodation with decisive groups need to be identified and persuaded. The leaders of elites are invariably the product of the

[86] In *The Accidental Guerrilla,* 2009, David Kilcullen describes the factors that lead significant groups to conform to the methods of terrorist and insurgent groups without sharing their political motivation.

social group, representing its collective character and objectives, rather than necessarily determining them. Such leaders are the channels through which the commander can achieve an effect on the group. The aim is to identify them and understand their relationships, their potential influence, and their sources of power.

Working through Elites

8.14 Political analysis may help to identify the elites that should be empowered and those that should not. It may be that the elites that are capable of winning popular support and stabilising the country may not offer the preferred solution. However, providing that their behaviour can be modified, working through them may be preferable to promoting elites who do not have the credibility to achieve the necessary popular support. Having identified credible elites through whom to work, it should be made clear that support for them will be conditional. Deciding those leaders and elites that are to be supported is a significant political choice and, at the start of a campaign, the military commander's assessment may be vital. The commander's early encounters with local actors are likely to provide critical evidence on which the judgement may be based.

The Importance of Geographical Locations

8.15 **Geography is important.** One of the consequences of violence erupting in fragile or failed states is that populations begin to migrate and concentrate around group identities. They move to places that have symbolic, political, economic, and security value to them. Furthermore, the significance of cultural and religious symbols may spur the government to make their security a priority, to invest in their protection as they might for critical national infrastructure. It may also delegate authority and responsibility to regional authorities for this purpose, thereby creating a local political accommodation with competing elites. Thus geographical locations have operational significance, as they become focal points for influence by political, economic, and military means.

How to Conduct Political and Social Analysis

8.16 Centre of Gravity (CoG) identification and analysis lies at the heart of operational art. In stabilisation, the myriad groups likely to impact the outcome – and their varied political objectives – demand detailed analysis. For this reason, CoG analysis demands a different focus from conventional campaigning.[87] The deductions made from CoG analysis will help the commander choose on whom, when, and where to exert influence. In turn they will help to define the commander's decisive conditions.

Defining Centres of Gravity

8.17 A CoG is a moral, political, or physical centre of power characterised by what it can do and the influence it can exert. This influence is the sum of its critical capabilities. Because the ultimate aim of stabilisation is a political settlement, it may be useful to think of CoGs as the elites or leaders of the decisive groups that are in competition within the conflict eco-system. Multiple CoG analyses are likely to be required on the decisive groups, in order to understand them and their relationships with each other.

Multiple Centres of Gravity Analysis

8.18 Understanding the impact of the decisive groups – friendly, neutral, opportunist, and belligerent and adversarial – demands analysis of a range of sociological, financial and other motivations. The greater the understanding of the controlling elites that can be achieved, the better the ultimate plan to re-balance the conflict relationship. Success will depend on developing a detailed intelligence picture to identify those covert irregular groups and their leaders, and to provide evidence to support the analysis and subsequent planning. This picture will emerge from early prevent activity and be reinforced by shape operations.

[87] Different from that described in the British JDP 5-00 *Campaign Planning* (2nd Edition), paragraph 2E2.

Analysing of Critical Requirements

8.19 Having determined the multiple CoGs through an iterative process of identifying their critical capabilities, the commander can then begin to identify and analyse their critical requirements and their critical vulnerabilities. A CoG is not usually attacked directly, but is unlocked by neutralising its critical capabilities by threatening, denying, or attacking those critical requirements that can be reached; commonly these are their critical vulnerabilities. In this way, it may be possible to simultaneously attack or undermine numerous adversarial critical requirements, while protecting those of groups deemed friendly. Critical requirements and critical vulnerabilities are likely to be a mix of political, economic, and military attributes. From these the commander can begin to describe a series of decisive conditions pertaining to each decisive group, which must be met for the stabilisation operation to achieve the desired end-state (the political settlement).

Key Terms

Stabilisation Centres of Gravity Analysis

Critical capabilities: Primary moral, political or physical attributes that allow the CoG to exert its influence in the context of a given scenario, situation or mission.

Critical requirements: Essential conditions, resources and means for a CoG to be fully operative.

Critical vulnerability: Derived from critical requirements, these are essential conditions, resources and means that, if successfully threatened or attacked, will fatally weaken the CoG.

Friendly Centres of Gravity Analysis

8.20 Because an adversary's CoG may be difficult to identify initially, a good starting point may be to examine the CoGs of friendly groups, since empowering them should help contribute to the development of a stable state. The government is likely to be the principal, decisive friendly group, and its critical capability will be its ability to govern.

8.21 The analysis should include:

- the political order the government seeks to establish
- the extent of its control and the extent to which it can exert its authority throughout the country
- the level of support of competing elites and the wider population it requires to govern; and the basis of its legitimacy.

8.22 Once these factors have been considered, the critical requirements can be identified. These may include economic resources, governance structures, and effective security forces. The government will also require the active support of other elites and a sustainable political settlement amongst with its competitors. Once these critical requirements are identified, the analysis can move on to the government's critical vulnerabilities. These may be derived directly from the critical requirements. For example, if the critical requirement is an ability to govern, then a critical vulnerability is that which will prevent it from governing effectively. Once identified, these vulnerabilities must be protected or reduced; in many cases through the reform of governance structures.

Opponent Centres of Gravity

8.23 Analysis will identify the adversaries' elites and critical capabilities, their political objectives, and how they are challenging the government. The staff must identify how the adversarial groups view themselves, as well as identifying their goals, their objectives, and how they mobilise themselves and their supporting population in pursuit of these. In order to achieve their own political goals, adversaries will have critical requirements, which will also be political, economic and military. The staff must seek to understand the narrative that adversaries will use to exploit grievances in other target groups, and the political and social dynamics that give context to their behaviour. Each group will depend on critical requirements, such as the freedom to exploit extortion for financial gain, or unrestricted movement through checkpoints. These requirements must be identified and their weakness – that is, their critical vulnerabilities – exploited.

Nested Centres of Gravity

8.24 CoG analysis may reveal that one group will become a critical requirement, and critical vulnerability, of another. The conflict relationship between groups, and the means of changing it, can begin to be deduced. Indeed, analysis may identify that a third group is such a critical requirement to a number of competing elites that it may become a CoG within the conflict relationship. When trying to influence groups (neutral, belligerent or opportunist) to support government, the commander should seek to use constructive acts to gain leverage. For example, by providing the key resource that a group needs, the commander may be able to alter the inter-group relationship, and shift a local balance of power. Conversely, where a friendly group such as the government is obstructing campaign progress, it may be appropriate to deny a critical requirement until its behaviour is modified. The support to all groups by international partners should be seen as conditional.

Real-Life Example

Identifying Critical Vulnerabilities

There are fracture lines within insurgencies. In March 2007 in an open letter, a Sunni insurgent leader questioned al-Qaeda Iraq's lack of consultation over setting up an Islamic state. The breaking up Iraq had never been a goal of the main-stream Ba'athist 'honourable resistance' movements. This fundamental difference over ends, as well as friction over ways and means (attacks on civilians for example, and al-Qaeda Iraq's challenge to tribal power structures), was a major factor in the Anbar Awakening.[88]

[88] From Adelphi Paper 402, *Iraq's Sunni Insurgency* by Ahmed S Hashim. Note that the 'Anbar Awaking' refers to the first province where Sunni tribal Sheikhs formed an alliance of ad-hoc armed forces to provide security for their province.

Cross-Government Analysis

8.25 Typically, military Joint Intelligence (J2) organisations are ill-equipped to conduct political and social analysis. Expertise should be brought in or exploited through reach-out. This may include:

- sociologists and anthropologists
- psychologists to profile individual leaders
- host-nation cultural and political experts
- seeking to understand local economic markets and conditions
- other security experts (police, organised crime, customs, and excise).

Methodologies

8.26 Many analytical techniques can be employed to assist with inductive and deductive analysis such as Brainstorming, Link Analysis and Environmental Scanning and this list is not exhaustive. One methodology used extensively by North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the United States (US) is political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information, physical terrain and time (PMESII-PT). Other human terrain analysis tools, such as social network analysis and human-geospatial products, may help to analyse the links between and within groups. In order to provide robust and predictive assessment, analysts must understand the advantages and disadvantages of various analytical techniques employed and they must be appropriate to the context of the environment and the intelligence problem. Underpinning robust and predictive assessment, analysts must have a firm understanding of the bias and fallacies within the group and external to the group, that has the potential to undermine the objectivity of the assessment.

CENTRE OF GRAVITY ANALYSIS		
QUESTIONS	**DEDUCTIONS**	**CONCLUSIONS**
• Who are the decisive groups in the conflict?[90] (Friendly, neutral, belligerent and adversary CoG).	• Identify the causes and symptoms of the conflict, and the conflict relationships that currently exist. • Identify the decisive groups in the conflict-ecosystem as the campaign's multiple CoGs. • Identify from what or where does the decisive group derive its power? Alternatively, since the relationship will be one of mutual benefit, what, or who does the group influence? • Identify the political elites/key leaders in the decisive groups and determine the influence they have on their groups and the wider situation.	• Prioritise the groups and elites to be empowered or supported, reassured, persuaded, or marginalised.
• What are the political goals of each of the decisive groups? (Critical capabilities).	• Identify the key resources/issues for which decisive groups are competing, and which will form the basis of their political goals. • Identify the basis of mobilisation to achieve their goals and thus the power base they require, e.g. ethic, national, tribal, religious, economic, class, ideological. • Identify the political order they seek to create or exploit to achieve their goals.	• Identify the potential political settlement and specific accommodations that are likely to be achievable on each decisive group to meet New Zealand interests. This will range from modification of the behaviour of some groups to the neutralisation of irreconcilable groups.[91] • Determine how to engage with the political elites through economic, military, and diplomatic means, in order to achieve the political settlement required. This may include the removal of some leaders to change the behaviour of the group, or neutralisation of other groups.
• What are the groups' primary economic resources? (Critical requirements/vulnerabilities).	• To achieve their goals, all groups need economic resources to sustain themselves. They need money, fuel, materiel, food, etc. The staff should identify the economic resources that are critical to the attainment of the group's goals, and determine how they are likely to be attained.	• The means that is available to facilitate or impede access to economic resources. This is a key area of political leverage over friendly, neutral, belligerent, and adversarial groups. (May form a decisive condition or supporting effect).

Figure 8-2: Centre of Gravity analysis on decisive groups.

[89] Note that decisive groups will need to be defind at a macro level to prevent being immersed in detail. Additionally, creating too may splinter groups may be expedient in the short term, but will make longer-term management by the host-nation very difficult. The ultimate goal is to unite groups within a viable state.

[90] Note that multinational and host-nation partners may have differing opinions on what accommodations are acceptable.

CENTRE OF GRAVITY ANALYSIS		
QUESTIONS	**DEDUCTIONS**	**CONCLUSIONS**
• What are the groups' primary political resources? (Critical requirements/vulnerabilites).	• Identify the local, national and transnational political alliances/rivalries that enable or impede the group from achieving its goals. • Identify the institutions of government that the group is able to use or needs to use to achieve it goals (judiciary, prison system, police and militias).	• The means of consolidating or fragmenting the alliances of the decisive groups. The means of protecting and supporting friendly groups from adversaries while exposing those of the adversaries. • The measures necessary to increase the political authority of friendly groups. The kinship links of friendly and hostile groups that often act as key political resources. (May form a decisive condition or supporting effect).
• What are the decisive groups military resources. (Critical requirements/vulnerabilites).	• Identify military resources, access to arms, ordnance, and recruits.	• Identify the measures to reinforce or degrade this capability of particular groups. This may have transnational political implications. (May form a decisive condition or supporting effect).

Figure 8-2: Centre of Gravity analysis on decisive groups (cont.)

The Output of Analysis

Centre of Gravity Analysis Matrix

8.27 Figure 8-2 lays out a series of iterative questions focused on the groups, which should continually be addressed and refined throughout the campaign. These questions, supported by more-detailed analytical tools, enable the staff to capture the output of the analysis of decisive groups in a CoG matrix. Each group's CoG, critical capabilities, requirements and vulnerabilities, and linkages to other groups can then be refined and the means to influence specific groups can be deduced. Annex A to this chapter offers examples of CoG analysis matrices on a (generic) government and an adversarial group. Although CoG analysis may be conducted on multiple groups, in a complex operating environment the commander may wish to select a focal CoG linked to the campaign end-state. For example, a candidate focal CoG could be popular support for the host-nation government, from which it derives its ability to govern – its critical capability.

Schematics and the Map

8.28 Although the CoG matrix is a useful tool for analysis, the relationships between decisive groups are best represented on a map schematic. This, along with the initial CoG matrix, can then be developed during the operational appreciation to prioritise and synchronise military and non-military activity through the realisation of decisive conditions. Although they risk over-simplifying the situation, schematics can help to unify understanding and ensure that the big ideas do not get lost in detail. An example of a conflict relationship schematic to capture the dynamic between decisive groups is at Annex B to this chapter, which can be produced on the agile campaign planner. At the tactical level, analysis will be looking at streets and local kinship networks.[91] A common approach is required to ensure that there is a clear link between all levels of command.

[91] As represented by the population support overlays in United States Field Manual 3-24 *Counter-insurgency* (Appendix B-6).

Depicting Groups by Attitude to the Political Settlement

8.29 Figure 8-3 is an illustration of mapping the attitude of specified groups towards the local government at a given time. This technique may help to generate shared understanding and approaches – both military and non-military – to determine how to influence the behaviour of groups. Figure 8-3 shows that attitudes and behaviour of groups change over time and therefore should be constantly re-assessed.

Advice

8.30 Understanding developed through analysis should enable commanders and partners to provide informed advice to ministers or strategic partners. A good understanding of the problem and the potential scenarios that might emerge will help inform both political and operational choices. This can be particularly useful when deciding upon early levels of investment, modification to military and OGA structures, and the capabilities likely to be required in-theatre.



Figure 8-3: Mapping decisive groups by attitude to government.

ANNEX A: GENERIC EXAMPLE OF OUTPUT OF CENTRE OF GRAVITY ANALYSIS

8.31 Centre of Gravity (CoG) analysis is the process used to determine the relative strengths and weaknesses of the principal protagonists. The United Kingdom's Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 5-00 *Campaign Planning* (2nd Edition) considers:

- bi-polar
- multiple
- non-opponent
- and focal point CoGs.

8.32 They all share a common approach, only the factors applied, and the situation for which they are best suited, differ. This annex adds texture to the process to better support security and stabilisation tasks; in a contested environment, a commander is likely to require CoG analysis for multiple (decisive) groups – friendly, neutral, belligerent and adversarial. Focal CoGs are intended for complex situations involving many actors.

CENTRE OF GRAVITY ANALYSIS MATRIX: FOCAL FRIENDLY CENTRE OF GRAVITY	
Campaign end-state. The political settlement/political order required – achieved through reaching a political accommodation with each decisive group to accept it. Political accommodation/modification of behaviour required. Determine the modification of behaviour and political system of local government that is acceptable to competing elites to achieve a political settlement (for example representative, not corrupt).	
1: Centre of Gravity *The elite of the group*	**2: Critical Capabilities** *What operationally decisive thing is the centre of gravity able to do, or trying to do?*
The host-nation central government.	The ability to independently govern and control competing elites.
4: Critical Vulnerabilites *What stops a centre of gravity from acting?*	**3: Critical Requirements** *What does a centre of gravity need in order to be able to act?*
Any threat to the critical requirements, typically from the insurgency but also from competing elites, internal incompetence, or corruption (real or perceived). Decisive conditons will aim to eliminate vulnerabilites and ensure that the critical requirements are met.	**Legitimacy.** The government must mobilise domestic support around coherent shared understandings or ideologies (be they ethnic, nationalist, religious, or political). It must communicate its intentions; an effective narrative is necessary. **Economic base.** The ability to raise funds consistently, particularly through taxation. **Security.** The monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. **Legal system.** The rule of law is necessary for political and economic stability. This is achieved by an independent and impartial judiciary to administer justice and enforce individual rights. **Other departments of state.** Specially those that meet the basic needs of the people. Political alliances with elite groups domestically and internationally.

CENTRE OF GRAVITY ANALYSIS MATRIX: BELLIGERENT OR POTENTIAL ADVERSARIAL GROUP	
Campaign end-state. The political settlement or political order required – achieved through reaching a sustainable political agreement with each decisive group. Political agreement/modification of behaviour required. Determine what modification of behaviour is required to achieve agreement. The cessation of violence outside the law imposed. To adhere to the national and relevant international law and relinquish desire for autonomy. Neutralisation of the group.	
1: Centre of Gravity *The elite of the group*	**2: Critical Capablities** *What operationally decisive thing is the centre of gravity able to do, or trying to do?*
The elite of the belligerent or adversarial group.	Ability to challenge the host-nation government. Mobilise population against the government by refence to political idealogy, or religious or ethnic identities.
4: Critical Vulnerabilites *What stops a centre of gravity from acting?*	**3: Critical Requirements**[93] *What does a centre of gravity need in order to be able to act?*
Contradictions in or inadequacy in idealogy/legitmacy. Information campaigns demonstrate that the goal and objectives they seek are impossible or dangerous. They cannot deliver the benefits they offer without the support of the host-nation government and wider international community. Their dependence on economic, politcal, and military resources may be exploited or interdicted. The group can be weakened by osolating it from its critical requirements through military and non-milirary means. Decisive security conditions will address these vulnerabilites of the insurgency.	Monopolise critical political resources (internal and external), and local and global alliances. Local kinship links will be crucial, as will alliances with other subversive groups globally. Monopolise critical economic resources. Monopolise military resources.

[92] For examples of critical requirements, see Chapter 7, Annex A.

ANNEX B:
SCHEMATIC OF CONFLICT RELATIONSHIPS



Figure 8-4: Conflict relationships.

CHAPTER 9:

PLANNING STABILISATION CAMPAIGNS

CONTENTS

Introduction

9.01 This chapter considers cross-government campaign and operations planning. The following points should be considered in cross-government campaign and operations planning.

- A winning military strategy hinges on the successful union of ends (outcomes), ways (objectives and the paths to them) and means (resources, including time). A significant part of strategy is about weighting the means. A comprehensive approach requires resources to be drawn from a multinational, inter-agency setting and brought to bear at the right time and sequence, and in the right place. The management of this is made all the more difficult because achieving the conditions for success within a comprehensive approach occur at different rates.
- In-theatre planning will be conducted at all levels and in different locations. There will be a profusion of plans that, while linked, will rarely form a neat hierarchy. There can only be one campaign plan however, which must be understood and supported in letter and spirit by all involved.
- The need for plans to be aligned creates tension between the actors. The skill is to avoid the destructive potential of this tension, and instead use it creatively.
- Assimilating cross-government objectives into a theatre integrated plan will provide a reference point against which disaggregated yet coherent planning can take place. Planners should then prioritise, synchronise and sequence activity to achieve pan-theatre coherence.

Figure 9-1: One of the most important outputs of planning is an agreed understanding of how activity will exert influence.

9.02 Only in exceptional and unusual circumstances will purely military objectives be appropriate. All activity, military, or otherwise, that supports the campaign objectives is conducted for political purpose. Activity conducted in isolation will only achieve short-term narrow effects, or be nugatory and fail to contribute in any meaningful way to the long-term solution. Military planners must constantly ask themselves: 'how does my planned activity support the wider, cross-government/coalition initiative?' and 'how does my plan tie-in sufficient cross-government/coalition support?'

The Planning Environment

The Stabilisation Approach

9.03 The cross-government nature of stabilisation operations requires an all-of-government (AOG) approach. Within New Zealand government departments their internal planning mechanisms will be largely unchanged. At the national strategic–level the Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination (ODESC) will establish a watch group to monitor the situation and appoint a lead department. ODESC will also provide advice and expertise on how to coordinate a New Zealand Government stabilisation plan. This should comprise a common assessment, common strategic aims and objectives, departmental targets, and a sequence and priority of activity. It does not replace any single departmental planning process but is designed to achieve integration and coherence at the strategic and operational levels.

9.04 Assuming that a significant military contribution is required, it may be that an existing Joint Service Plan or contingency plan previously developed by the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) can be modified. NZDDP–5.0 *Joint Operations Planning* provides further details on strategic and operational level planning.

Comprehensive Campaign Planning: A Generic Approach

9.05 **Purpose.** The purpose of a campaign plan is to develop, synchronise, and sequence all the lines of military, political, economic, and social activity necessary to achieve strategic objectives. It should be as broad as possible, taking into account factors such as the influence from neighbouring states, culture, religion, history, and politics. The planning team should be drawn from a broad spectrum also. It should include military, government, academics, regional experts, business, partner nations, and alliance members, amongst others. Managing this complex group is best achieved by dividing the group into planning teams, each of which focuses on a specific area; for example, on aspects of the economy, development, security, or vital infrastructure. Teams' plans should then be reviewed and integrated by an executive board.

Key Term

Joint Strategic Assessment Team

Stabilisation planning lends itself to the formation of short-duration, ad hoc planning teams that will confront the accepted norms and practices while seeking practical alternatives. An example from the United States is the Joint Strategic Assessment Team (JSAT) that was formed in Iraq in 2007. It was given the task of producing a joint, inter-agency, multinational campaign plan in just over one month. Its methodology was: 'starting with a political plan, then devising an influence plan to achieve it, and only then developing military, economic and governance activities to achieve it'. The team was headed by a senior State Department civilian and an army colonel. The handpicked team had 24 members, including representatives from the intelligence, diplomatic, military, economic, information, doctrine, and academic communities. A similar JSAT was formed to focus on the Afghanistan–Pakistan regional issue in 2008.

- **Output.** The output from the campaign plan should be a framework from which other work flows and from which clear missions and tasks can be easily derived. The key takeaways should be a few big ideas that set the tone for subsequent operations and activities. Through further analysis and planning,

these big ideas are refined and expressed in the military as:

- operation plans (OPLANs)
- operation orders (OPORDs)
- fragmentary orders (FRAGOs).

9.06 Having provided context for the conduct of future work, the campaign plan should designate objectives- or time-based leads for subordinate tasks; for example, security sector reform, antinarcotics, agricultural reform, and infrastructure development.

9.07 **Influence and Strategic Communication.** One of the most important outputs of planning is an agreed and shared understanding of how activity will exert influence. Specifically, planning must identify the principal tenets of the New Zealand narrative and establish how strategic communication, narrative and influence will be stitched together with objectives, outputs, activity and risks in a realistic gearing with inputs (such as resources). Influence should become the guiding reference point for activity, and strategic communication should set out the narrative clearly and simply, explaining the stabilisation mission, its purpose, and the role of its participants. It should be aimed at supporting the operational and tactical activities undertaken by the deployed forces. Influence and strategic communication must also be capable of dynamic adjustment since the effects sought will not just happen. They will only be realised through constant effort and refinement of the means.

9.08 **Campaign Review.** While progress towards objectives will require monitoring, a full campaign review should only be conducted once a suitable time period has elapsed. This in-depth review of the plan should only occur at major intersections; for example, where there has been a recognisable shift in the strategic geometry and the future direction of the whole campaign needs further refinement. Reviews carried out too frequently, or at lesser junctions, may not reflect the real effects of activity and could skew the overall direction of the campaign. Progress checks, however, should be carried out at regular intervals – every six weeks is the battle rhythm adopted in United States theatre headquarters

9.09 **Comprehensive Planning at the Operational Level.** Like the strategic level, there is no universal template for collaborative planning at the operational level. However, a possible variation in inter-departmental collaboration uses three illustrative scenarios in which the military acts:

- alone
- in loose cooperation with national agencies as part of a multi-agency operation
- with close inter-agency collaboration under a unified cross-government plan.

9.10 In complex tasks, not even the third scenario goes far enough in ensuring that the operational campaign plan is knitted into the cross-government strategy and supports other government agencies' (OGAs) plans. As a result, a fourth scenario is offered. This envisages a theatre integrated campaign plan (TICP) being developed. This provides for the operational-level design and campaign management of a complex stabilisation task that includes a challenging level of insecurity. Ideally it will cascade from the strategic plan, but it may also be facilitated and led by the military. Its purpose is to provide the mechanism whereby strategic objectives are realised through integrated tactical military, governance, and development activity.

9.11 **Subsidiary Planning.** If a conventional approach is taken to developing a campaign plan, it will reflect primarily military activity. This risks incoherency and ultimately failure in its execution, because the military, governance, and development plans will be insufficiently linked. Even where there is a robust cross-government strategy, military activity must be aligned in theatre, thereby linking the campaign plan's objectives with the strategic outputs. The goal is not a military plan that works comprehensively; it is a comprehensive plan. Departmental representatives can then work out in detail the individual plans that will support the strategic goals and the TICP. Ideally even these would be integrated, but in practice each department will need to make its own plans. Constant coordination must take place at every stage and at all levels of the planning process to minimise inter-departmental divergence.

Where the NZDF is engaged in a multinational mission, options may include focusing its contributions into a New Zealand area of operations, which will enable significant freedom in the design and execution of the local campaign – but this is likely to present resource challenges as the demands rise, as well as fall, with the ebb and flow of security activity. Alternatively, pooling New Zealand effort in an international resource construct may enable us to tap greater resources and permit clearer limits to be placed on the New Zealand resources that are committed. The ability to control campaign design and execution will be mainly delivered through the lead coalition nation. The key is to balance New Zealand aspirations (ways) with our ability to resource them (means). Where the New Zealand contribution is reliant on external means, such as US Agency for International Development (USAID) funds, then it may need to accept less autonomy over ways.

9.12 **Planning Timeframes.** Since the cross-government strategy looks out to a strategic aim that may be several years away, a TICP may need to set a lesser horizon. A six-month to three-year period is probably appropriate, noting that lower-level OPLANs, OPORDs and FRAGOs, as opposed to a campaign plan, will typically be valid for between six months and a matter of days. Similarly, civil partners will produce, for example, country plans and business plans to direct and manage their equivalent tactical activity.

9.13 **Other Government Department Planning Methodologies.** A guiding principle of a truly comprehensive approach is that institutional familiarity will enhance collaborative working and trust between entities. Just as familiarity with North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and Five Eyes doctrine will enhance conduct in multinational operations, an understanding of partners' methodologies should enhance integrated planning, be they government or international organisations. Each has its own unique approach. The commander should understand the different tools and methodologies so that they know how the different organisations function and how they can interact with, and influence, one another. The military should know the constraints and freedoms under which others may operate, such as their approach to risk. The commander or their Chief of Staff should recognise when to invite OGA planners into this process. Early personal contact between the commander and staff with key OGA representatives is critical to developing personal trust and understanding. Ideally this will start before pre-deployment training and continue as the campaign progresses. Understanding each other's terms helps.

9.14 **Synchronisation of Planning and Activity.** In comparison with civil agencies, military operational headquarters are well staffed. The capacity to plan different options and contingencies simultaneously is unlikely to be matched by civil partners. Military staffs trained in common procedures to meet tight timelines have a unique potential to support and integrate inter-agency planning and activity. Civil partners are therefore likely to produce focused plans that support specified options. They may select potential solutions earlier than military headquarters. Incoherence will result if these different approaches remain disconnected. Some form of 'gearing mechanism' is required that allows the synchronisation of planning and activity.

9.15 **Stakeholder Analysis.** Identifying the range of stakeholders and their command chains early in the endeavour may be more complex than it appears. A simple stakeholder analysis to identify who is responsible for what, and to whom, should be an early task. Actors and their influences may be depicted diagrammatically to show formal and informal relationships – in essence, a stakeholder network can be drawn up. The purpose is to identify the framework of empowered actors with whom the commander can engage. Identifying the network and understanding the motivations and interactions of the players is often lengthy and complicated. A series of linked questions have been developed to help and are listed below.

- WHO are the relevant actors?
    - Who are the predominant interlocutors with whom I need to interact in order to enable holistic planning and to deliver coherent execution/ delivery?
- WHAT are their motivations?
    - What is their mandate and constraints?

- WHY are they involved?
  - What are their specific interests and objectives?
  - How may they be affected by the proposed crisis resolution and theory of change, and what are their likely responses?
- WHAT does their involvement mean to me?
  - What can I expect to leverage from them and, conversely, what are they likely to want to leverage from me?
  - What steps do I need to take to integrate them into, or exclude them from, my process? What must I do?
  - How can discipline be imposed on their engagement? i.e., who is the lead interlocutor with each player?

9.16 **Multi-agency Leadership.** A comprehensive response to any situation is most likely to succeed if a single figure, ideally formally empowered, draws together and orchestrates the activities of the various agencies involved. How the role may be agreed, and the formal authority that the leader could be granted, varies on a case-by-case basis. For New Zealand national campaigns, which would most likely take place in the South Pacific, an ambassador/high commissioner, a political appointee, or a military commander may be appropriate. In multinational operations undertaken by the United Nations (UN), the Special Representative of the Secretary General is likely to be the multi-agency leader. On other occasions when there is no framework nation, it is not uncommon for an individual to emerge, often by force of character, as the accepted leader. The ability to build consensus and work in collaboration with civilian partners, as well as other military cultures, will be essential qualities of the theatre commander, and will have a significant impact on the whole character and conduct of the campaign. It is unlikely, however, that conditions will exist that enable overall authority to be vested in one person – authority is more frequently vested in committees with a responsibility to integrate and coordinate activity.

9.17 **Committee System.** Where multinational and multi-agency engagement is required to solve complex issues, a hierarchy of committees can facilitate successful collaboration between departments. The committee system complements the normal departmental chains of command, and allows the key civil, political and military figures to develop a shared analysis and provide coherent direction to their own planners. An excellent example of this system was the British authorities' response to the Malayan Emergency (similar arrangements were also developed in Northern Ireland). Whether a single leader or committee system is used, both models will require a tiered system of collaborative committees to synchronise and coordinate activity, they will act as the nervous system in a failed or failing state.

9.18 **Effective Consultation.** Pre-deployment training should include key advisers and partner representatives, so that the commander can initiate consultation and begin to build not only their team, but the cross-departmental one. The commander will also want to develop early the working practices to deliver a comprehensive approach.

9.19 **Managing Relationships.** The in-theatre commander will need to manage a variety of relationships, including those with: Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand (HQJFNZ), in-country representatives from the New Zealand Government, international and bilateral partners, and above all, with local power centres within the host-nation. These power centres may include residual or new governments, powerful interest groups, political elites, opportunists, or even hostile groups. Consider the following points below.

- Commanders are selected for their ability to create and foster key relationships as well as understanding host-nation cultural and political sensibilities.
- Personal time, energy, and resources are required to develop and maintain constructive relationships. Established agreements and relationships may quickly falter; they need to be tested and assessed, and steps taken to rebuild them or to modify processes if required.
- The skill of persuasion is paramount and many will demand the commander's time – a deputy commander is likely to be required.

- The roulement of commanders and key staff will impact relationships. Continuity is particularly important in fragile states where personal contact is often more important than institutional links. Handing over key relationships, therefore, will take time – a week may be too short.

9.20 **Providing Texture for Senior Leaders.** Occasional direct communication between theatre and the New Zealand Government can add welcome evidence to strategic decision-makers. This should complement, not circumvent, the chain of command and is a two-way process. Direct access, though not welcomed by all, can be important in moments of crisis or opportunity, where the commander's experience and judgement can be passed directly and explicitly – often melding personal observations and uncorroborated reports to give a more nuanced picture. Not only can this provide Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force (HQNZDF) with texture and context, it also allows strategic leaders and officials to explain the impact of in-theatre events on the political scene in the New Zealand.

9.21 **Commander's Inner Circle.** The commander may choose to form a select group of close and trusted advisers. This inner circle may include senior retired military or diplomatic personnel with a particular knowledge of host-nation issues or the wider region. The group should be supported by the commander's most capable and experienced staff officer and might be codified as the Commander's Initiatives Group (CIG). OGA leaders are likely to have similar arrangements and informal meetings between the groups are likely to be useful. Without a small but dedicated support staff, any outputs from these informal meetings are unlikely to be integrated with the more formal processes. Therefore, empowering a small secretariat will help unity of purpose.

9.22 **Decentralised Command.** Where high levels of public interest and scrutiny exist, the temptation may be to retain control at the highest level of command. Local knowledge and relationships are, however, pivotal to timely decision-making at the tactical level. It may be difficult to apply the tenets of mission command because of the strategic impact of inappropriate actions and messages applied locally. Yet, decentralised decision-making and the wider application of mission command is important to enable junior commanders to seize fleeting opportunities – for example, by judging when to use overwhelming force – thereby generating tempo.[93] Successful decentralisation relies on junior commanders understanding the theatre commander's intent and applying good judgement. Demanding, well-resourced training that replicates the conditions in-theatre is the key enabler.

9.23 **Delegation of Capability.** The delegation of capability should go hand in hand with decentralised command. Some capabilities traditionally held at the operational level may need to be permanently allocated to the tactical level. An example of this may be the allocation of unmanned aerial systems down to sub-unit level.

9.24 **Understanding and Employing Coalition Capabilities.** Many implications flow from working with coalition partners, and no list will be wholly inclusive.[94] Understanding coalition partner capabilities is essential to inform the employment of forces. Some fundamentals are listed below.

9.25 Identify the strengths and weaknesses of contributing nations' forces, their national objectives and motivations, and their capabilities and caveats.

- Each nation may have a different interpretation of similar doctrinal terms. The commander should explore how coalition members view their role in terms of doctrine, activities, and Rules of Engagement (ROE).

- All contributing nations have national chains of command to which they are likely to refer major decisions. This extends the planning process and introduces delays between planning and execution.

[93] Tempo is not the pace of operations per se; rather it is one's speed of action and reaction relative to the adversary.

[94] One valuable guide is the American-Britain-Canada-Australia-New Zealand (ABCA) Coalition Operations Handbook. This is regularly updated, and provides commanders with a reference to promote interoperability in multinational operations.

A multinational planning cycle may follow these steps:

- plan
- consult
- plan
- consult
- agree
- plan
- refine
- consult
- issue
- orders.

- The commander should socialise potentially novel or contentious elements of the plan with involved parties in order to avoid misunderstanding and delay. No elements of the plan should come as a surprise to those taking part, whether military or civilian. Proactive coalition management will include direct briefings in the capitals of contributing nations.

- When working as a supporting partner in a coalition, it is necessary to understand and consider adapting to the doctrine, routine, and procedures used by the senior partner. This will be critical if the commander wishes to synchronise and influence decisions made at the higher level. In reports and when expressing views, the use of understatement and New Zealand-specific terminology should be avoided.

9.26 **Regional Engagement.** Planning must include a regional dimension. Instability may be exported from fragile states, threatening regional security. Neighbouring states will have some political, security, economic and social influence on the affected state – for good or bad. Securing their active support for the political settlement may be necessary, and should ideally take place as a preventative measure, so avoiding the need for intervention. Regional engagement should include, for example, the protection of international borders, denial of safe haven for irregular groups, management and return of refugees, and garnering support for wider, regional security initiatives. In certain circumstances, a regional security consensus will be required that is capable of integrating the host-nation within a regional context. The international force may need to align its area of influence with its area of interest – greatly increasing the area of operations. Regional engagement can then be used to restrict the flow of money, men and materiel in support of local irregular actors. Conversely, failing to engage with the wider region and imposing artificial boundaries will almost certainly foment regional instability and result in an unachievable campaign plan.

Considerations for an Integrated Headquarters

9.27 **The Case for a Theatre Integrated Headquarters.** Integration and synchronisation can be achieved in a number of ways. These include exchanging empowered planning staff, by the physical collocation of headquarters, or ultimately developing a fully integrated campaign staff in a single headquarters. In non-permissive environments, the military may be well placed to provide a platform on which OGAs base themselves until the situation improves. This allows civil and military planners to integrate and interact in pursuit of their own mandated tasks, identify areas of mutual support, and de-conflict.

9.28 The political, multinational, and multi-agency nature of stabilisation means that a different headquarters construct will probably be necessary. An integrated headquarters may differ from a purely military one in the following ways.

- The operational commander is likely to focus on factors that affect strategic decisions. The focus of subordinate tactical headquarters will be similarly elevated. In a multinational operation, national areas of focus and command chains will exacerbate this blurring of the levels of command.

- Staff structures need to evolve to accommodate these changes. Choices will need to be made between the relative efforts afforded to non-kinetic or soft effects, such as influence and engagement, and direct, kinetic activity or hard effects. Although they are not mutually exclusive, the ratios of effort will vary at different levels of headquarters and with campaign progression. A commander will need an enlarged Joint Plans (J5)/J35 staff.

- The underlying tempo of staff activity – battle rhythm – is generally slower, since military effort needs to be synchronised with the governance and development lines of operation, and it seeks a human, psychological effect, which takes time to develop and then assess. However, overall activity, particularly Joint Intelligence (J2) and Joint Operations (J3), may be as fast as in conventional operations. The political interface, too, absorbs time.
- The multinational, multi-agency nature of the operation will require tailored structures into which partners can plug. All-source information will need to be analysed, fused, shared, protected, and exploited. Information management will be critical.

9.29 **Design of an Integrated Headquarters in Stabilisation.** Adaptive force generation will be required to create the structures and organisations, both within the integrated headquarters and more widely within the construct of the force. The design will differ from that required to support conventional operations. While the constituent elements and staff branches may be broadly similar, they will have a different emphasis, some roles may change and this will be reflected in their relative size and influence. The operational headquarters will need to be capable of conducting high-level inter-agency planning, while concurrently supporting and enabling tactical-level military activity. The following observations outlined in the bullets below are worth noting.

- Multi-agency synchronisation of the mission's objectives must be achieved at the operational level. Whatever model is adopted, it must promote coherence across all activity, both military and civilian. There is unlikely to be a civilian organisational level that matches up with a corps or divisional headquarters.
- The operational headquarters should remain focused on delivering synchronised output, rather than on process per se. The guiding mantra for headquarters design should be 'form follows function'. This requirement drives the trend towards larger and better integrated planning branches – notably J2, J5, J35, and Joint Finance (J9) – whose precise composition needs to reflect their expanded responsibilities and which will change shape over time.
- The J3 function executes operational-level activity while coordinating and supporting tactical-level output. This includes the command and control of assigned tactical manoeuvre units in the short term, which has the benefit of generating situational understanding that can be fed back into the planning process. Although this is not significantly different from warfighting, the span of activity sets it apart.
- The headquarters needs a process that encourages learning and adaptation.
- As the planning horizon will be greatly extended, cells and branches must record the planning assumptions that they used to develop their plans. This will mitigate the effects of staff turn-over and loss of corporate knowledge. A trickle posting system for the staff can help, but this has its own problems, as staff members who do not train together before deployment often never gel as a team.

9.30 Headquarters' structures constantly evolve, and new ideas for getting the best out of an inter-agency approach are being tested. One such evolution being used increasingly by the United States is the joint inter-agency task force (JIATF). JIATFs have been used by the United States in a number of ways to deal with challenges outside the singular remit of the Department of Defence. They have a potential utility for stabilisation. The table below summarises the strengths and limitations of these relatively novel organisations.

PURPOSE
• To address a specific trans-departmental issue. For example, the standing United States Task Force for the Horn of Africa and Africa Command (AFRICOM) have embedded State and Justice Department manning, as well as US AID, to reflect the cross-cutting characteristics of the challenges that each faces. • To share resources, information, planning and execution approaches. • To empower decision-makers. • To use network of networks to overcome stovepipes and lack of resources.
CHARACTERISTICS
• Has a single-agency lead (appropriate to task), with other agencies (national and international) embedded. All United States JIATFs are currently Defence-led. • A memorandum of understanding formalises arrangements between agencies. • Usually adopts a single-issue focus. • Adopts collaborative approaches focused on outcomes rather than process. • Effective across complex operational environments. • Uses reach-back direct to decision-makers in the United States.
CONSTRUCT
• Form follow function. No two JIATFs are the same. • Mission analysis identifies the outcomes and skills that are required. • The team structure (lead agency, numbers, support, and workspace) is designed around analysis. • Processes within each JIATF are based on the agreement codified in the memorandum of understanding. • Inter-agency staffing contributes to wide connectivity in-theartre and, through reach-back, to cross-government resources.
STRENGTHS
• Successfully cuts across agency and departmental stovepipes. • Each JIATF is outcome-focused.
WEAKNESSES
• Dependent on personalities and almost exclusive single-nation participation. • Inadequate structural capacity to expand beyond single-issue focus.

Figure 9-2: Principle Characteristics of a United States Joint Inter-agency Task Force.

9.31 **Advisers and Analysts.** The headquarters is likely to have embedded within it a number of additional experts, advisers, and analysts drawn from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) and partner departments and agencies. For more information on advisers and analysts, see Annex A to this chapter.

Points of Emphasis for the Design of a Headquarters

9.32 The ability to expand, adapt, and contract as the campaign demands. Learning organisations cannot stand still. There may be occasions when a function becomes too large or too complex for a single staff branch to manage. In this case, the branch may have to reorganise and separate out from the integrated headquarters to form a functional headquarters of its own. An example is Multinational Security Transition Command – Iraq, which was formed for a specific purpose and commanded at three-star level.

9.33 Liaison officers are critical. They enable a commander to extend their reach as they attempt to influence others. Key liaison officers should be personal

appointees by the commander, who should consider how best to empower them. A headquarters' design must cater for in-coming liaison officers, allocating the connectivity and information systems, and giving access to information that allows them to integrate effectively.

9.34 Visitors may provide a means of communicating with important target audiences, such as allied nations, the home base, superior headquarters, and local leaders. Briefing and managing them is an important business, not peripheral or nuisance activity.

9.35 Media and press briefings should be accessible to local, domestic, and internationally accredited media. Media access to the commander and principal staff should be enabled rather than restricted.

9.36 Reach-back will enable the headquarters to tap additional resources. If properly constructed and organised, reach-back provides rapid, tailored information, with the appropriate level of fidelity, and acts as a sounding board for the commander and staff.

9.37 **Operations Security.** Recent security and information assurance studies have re-defined the relationship between protective security and operations security. There is a requirement for specific operations security posts and training at the practitioner and command levels. Further detail can be found in NZDDP–2.2 *Security* and Defence Force Order (DFO) 51(1) *Protective Security,* Chapter 24.

9.38 **Creating Synergy with Host-nation Headquarters.** As the campaign develops, there may be an increased need to integrate with host-nation staff, for example to plan joint operations or share analysis. Full collocation or embedding key personnel may be options, but the solution will need to balance operations security against campaign cohesion. One method of achieving this is to establish joint coordination centres to provide a formalised, but air-locked, relationship.

9.39 **'Connectivity' of the Commander.** For the duration of their appointment, whether they are in-theatre or not, the commander should have the ability to remain connected and engaged. Although others can assume responsibility for routine decision-making, the pivotal role of the commander in shaping the campaign means they should never be beyond reach. Secure systems that enable the commander to remain engaged (even remotely) must be resourced.

9.40 **Tour Lengths.** In protracted operations, consideration should be given to the benefits of longer tours for the commander and their key staff. Where possible, New Zealand's national approach should be linked to the coalition's approach. This should be an early consideration when transitioning from a contingent operation to a campaign footing.

Working with the Host-nation

9.41 **Overload.** Working constructively with the host-nation is a delicate task, largely because governments of fragile states are likely to have immature structures and capabilities. There may be a dearth of talent, exacerbated by under-investment in human capital and an exodus of experienced people. Host-nation authorities can easily be overwhelmed by many good ideas coming at speed from a variety of well-meaning external agencies. Overloading the host-nation in this manner results in disenchantment and paralysis. Less engagement, in this case, is often more. A staff branch should be charged with regulating the engagement with the host government.

9.42 **Generating a Productive Relationship.** Our aim will be to enable host-nation authorities to have legitimate control over their own affairs. To that end, we need to understand the host-nation's concerns and aspirations, as its views should shape our overall approach. If this is not done from the start, the host-nation may force unwelcome alterations to the plan at a later stage.

9.43 **Local Politicking.** Local politics will impose various constraints, which may generate friction. Local politicking will generate internal tensions within the host-nation's government as, for example, ministries jostle for position or key personalities within government

manipulate and manoeuvre for personal or political advantage. The commander needs to be attuned to these tensions.

9.44 **Sovereignty.** As the host-nation's sovereignty begins to mature (as a result of UN Security Council resolutions or local elections), its government will become less receptive to external guidance, and seek to exercise greater autonomy. This can give rise to tensions with and between its international partners over the conduct and direction of the campaign. There is a danger that much progress and success could be undone if this situation is not handled sensitively. Military commanders and their civilian partners must be prepared to work through these difficulties. They are, perversely, a manifestation of the success achieved so far.

9.45 **The Importance of Cultural Symbols.** The significance of cultural symbols, including events, times, and places, should be carefully studied and understood. In certain societies symbols may include tangible objects such as the national flag, insignia, icons, and saints/martyrs, or intangible ones such as particular dates in the calendar. These symbols can have a powerful motivating effect and, where possible, should be capitalised upon. Equally, if symbols are misjudged, misapplied, or misunderstood, this will have a detrimental impact.

Planning Tools

9.46 **Planning Horizons.** At the start of planning, understanding of the situation and task will be limited. Identifying the conditions required for ultimate success will be difficult. However, as the campaign unfolds and understanding develops, so the objectives and the conditions required to realise them will be refined. This may lead to a shift in planning horizons, they may initially be short, but increase as the campaign develops. The horizon should be long enough to consider strategic issues, but not so long that the linkages between activities and objectives become nebulous. To help achieve this, the notion of short-, medium- and long-term objectives can be useful. Long-term objectives articulate the broad strategic vision, short- and medium-term objectives are the building blocks to realise it.

Campaign Planning

9.47 **The Foundations of Planning.** Crisis response planning addresses three questions as outlined in the bullets below.

- What are the features of the current situation?
- What should the more favourable situation look like in the future?
- What is the commander's theory of change?

9.48 A commander should start their operational appreciation armed with a basic situational understanding and a working definition of the strategic aim. The commander will begin the process of campaign design by conducting their own analysis, in order to frame the problem. They will consider two campaign planning concepts in particular:

- the end-state, which should be derived from the strategic objective
- centres of gravity (CoGs).

9.49 These will form a foundation for subsequent planning and help identify initial decisive conditions. Since there should be only one military campaign plan – the TICP – this must incorporate cross-government objectives and activity, and non-military representatives will be critical to developing it. In planning for a cross-government stabilisation plan, or in its absence when the TICP is filling the gap, the principal outputs of the planning team are agreement on, and cross-government support for, the campaign objectives and their building blocks. Stabilisation objectives must be coordinated. If possible, the activity to achieve these objectives (or decisive conditions) should also be agreed. The task for the commander and their civilian counterparts is to plan and coordinate activity within and across different lines of operation, in order to realise the campaign objectives. This is the definitive cross-government activity in stabilisation.

9.50 **Adjusting the Planning Approach.** The planning tools of end-state, campaign objective, and decisive conditions may benefit from some adjustment. Within stabilisation, purely military goals are inappropriate. Instead, it is helpful to think in a broader, political context since it is the political settlement that delivers long-term stability. It may also be helpful to view activity, from the strategic to the tactical level, through the prism of building security, stimulating economic, and infrastructure development, and fostering host-nation government capacity and legitimacy. This is the stabilisation model, and is reproduced in Figure 9-3. The campaign end-state, objectives, and decisive conditions should be defined and agreed within this broader framework, and will be shaped by the nature of the intended political settlement. The military has a role to play, to a greater or lesser extent, in all the areas of the stabilisation model as indicated in the key of the stabilisation model below.

Developing a Theatre Integrated Campaign Plan

9.51 **Integration at the Operational Level.** At the heart of a TICP should be the means in time and space to influence the decisive groups, in order to enable a political settlement. The operational commander, working with host-nation and multinational and cross-government counterparts, may need to broker a series of separate, lesser political accommodations at the local level. These will be achieved through bespoke and synchronised economic, governance, and security activities targeted at decisive groups and their centres of power and influence, as depicted in Figure 9-4. This shows how activity varies at a local level, at any given moment in time. Such localised solutions must remain within the bounds of the New Zealand's political purpose and they must support its longer-term objectives. As the campaign progresses, the locations and relative weight of effort will also shift.



Figure 9-3: The stabilisation model.

9.52 **Focusing Campaign Objectives on Decisive Groups.** In NZDDP–3.0 *Campaigns and Operations* (2nd Edition) an objective is defined as 'a clearly defined and attainable goal for a military operation for…achieving some other desired outcome that is essential to a commander's plan towards which the operations is directed.' Lines of operation are used to visualise the relationship between decisive conditions, the campaign's objectives, and by inference, the end-state or outcome. Many campaign plans use lines of operation that are focused on security, governance, and economic development. A useful alternative approach is to focus the campaign objectives and resultant lines of operation on the decisive groups, as it is the influence brought to bear on them that will rebalance the conflict relationship and achieve a positive outcome. The sum of comprehensive measures required to influence each group can be defined in decisive conditions, which should reflect the inter-dependencies between individual decisive conditions, and the relationship between each condition and operational CoGs and campaign objectives. As was explained in Chapter 2, CoG analysis can be used to identify the decisive groups and their critical capabilities and vulnerabilities, from which decisive conditions can be derived. If the decisive groups form the focus of campaign objectives, such outputs of CoG analysis can be readily captured in a campaign plan.



Figure 9-4: Localised approaches to Influence.

9.53 **Stabilisation Decisive Conditions.** Where campaign objectives are achieved by a combination of local conditions leading to a political accommodation, these local conditions may be viewed as decisive conditions (i.e. the localised approaches represented above). Although this is a military term, it should not be seen or defined as a military condition, but rather as a cross-government one.[95] The important element in campaign planning and management is to ensure that this level of activity (decisive conditions), which might largely be planned and managed on discrete lines of operation, is properly coordinated, synchronised, and resourced across all lines. For example, activity on a development line of operation must be coordinated and cued with the security line in order to move from hold to develop.[96] Equally, activity to isolate and neutralise one decisive group might need to be coordinated with an accommodation or empowerment of another. Activity on any one line of operation should complement activity on the others. If it fails to do so, a gap will develop between the lines of operation that adversaries and competing elites can exploit.

9.54 **Supporting Effects.** Supporting effects realise decisive conditions. They are achieved primarily through tactical operations but, like decisive conditions, they should not be seen as an exclusively military activity, but a combination of human security, host-nation governance, and economic effects. Figure 9-5 shows how supporting effects drawn from the stabilisation model are, in turn, brought together in order to achieve a decisive condition.

9.55 **Visualising a Theatre Integrated Plan.** Where a cross-government stabilisation plan exists, the TICP will be subordinate but complementary to it. Where no such plan exists, the TICP will need to compensate and should be supported by all government departments and agencies. The key challenge in preparing it is the agreements that need to be struck in order to get cross-government and multi-agency buy-in. The commander's job, whether they are military or civilian, is to articulate the purpose, priorities, and resources in the plan and, where necessary, arbitrate over competing interests. There are various techniques for doing this. Using a

[95] MFAT and IDG will have their own equivalent terminology to 'decisive conditions'.
[96] Hold and develop are stages in a proposed operational framework for stabilisation operations that is detailed in Chapter 10.



Figure 9-5: Decisive conditions for stabilisation.

traditional campaign schematic with decisive groups as the campaign objectives is one, but notable in the Crocker/Petraeus plan[97] is the method adopted to visualise the plan on a map. This showed how activity across lines of operation was integrated and focused in order to satisfy local requirements in time and space. In this way, the geographical representation of decisive conditions, supporting effects or activities allowed cross-government actors to visualise the plan. It may assist the military to explain to its civilian counterparts the inter-dependence of activities in order to realise objectives and decisive conditions. An example of such a TICP briefing schematic is at Figure 9-6. Military readers will note that the traditional symbol of a decisive condition or supporting effect has been replaced by the stabilisation model spheres. Their relative size indicates the weight of effort between security, governance, and economic measures over time.

9.56 **Conceptualising the Campaign Plan for Key Audiences.** Traditional military campaign design is impenetrable to most civilian audiences. Instead, commanders and staff should find words and images that explain clearly and convincingly what they are trying to achieve. The model that General Petraeus used to articulate his strategy to target al-Qaeda Iraq (AQI) for audiences such as Congress is at Figure 9-7.

Military Coordination

9.57 **Supported and Supporting Relationships.** The established military concept of supported and supporting relationships can be used to describe the primacy of the security, economic, or governance efforts at any given point in time. Where activity is focused on population centres to achieve a decisive condition, the supported/supporting relationship will evolve as the security situation improves and economic and governance activities assume a greater weight of effort. Relationships will also change as a result of transitions.

9.58 **Organisational Requirements.** Planning meetings and committees will need to be organised into a battle rhythm. These include comprehensive policy planning groups, joint force planning groups, bespoke staff planning groups to plan, prioritise and synchronise targeting activity to achieve a specific

[97] A campaign plan for Iraq issued in May 2007. It was designed by the US Ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker, and commander of US forces in Iraq, General David Petraeus.



Figure 9-6: Campaign shifting in emphasis over time.

influence. In order to synchronise outputs and to deliver integrated effects, the composition of these bodies is adjusted to ensure appropriate multinational, civil, and host-nation partner's representation. Collocation of key organisations and individuals makes this much easier to achieve. Technology should be exploited to enhance integration. Decisions on the location of cross-government headquarters will drive the requirement for communications and information systems (CIS) infrastructure and liaison.

9.59 **Civil-military Integration.** Even when it has been possible to establish an integrated civil-military headquarters, it may be necessary to retain some degree of separation, as different organisations operate under different legislation and policy. There is also a need for organisations to be auditable and to be able to manage staff in accordance with their own conditions of service. Nevertheless, separation should be minimised and the planning process should be as inclusive and comprehensive as possible. This inclusive approach will be underpinned by four guiding principles:

- proactive engagement
- shared understanding
- outcome-based thinking
- collaborative working.

9.60 The key to achieving coherent planning is to ensure that effective and integrated command and control mechanisms are established at all levels. Sequencing and synchronising decisive conditions with civilian counterparts, in order to achieve campaign objectives, is the key part of this process. Both decisive



Figure 9-7: A conceptual view of General Petraeus' strategy to target al-Qaeda Iraq.

conditions and campaign objectives may take time to deliver, however. So that the criteria for progress can be established, additional short-term objectives, consistent with the campaign plan, such as supporting tasks and other activity, may need to be established. These should be specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and timely (SMART).

Military Plans

9.61 **Military Objectives and Lines of Operation.** The military will produce its operation plan or order to support its contribution to cross-government stabilisation plans or TICP. The military plan will describe how to achieve decisive conditions and campaign objectives made at the higher (theatre) level. To achieve their military objectives, a commander will need to coordinate activity across other generic lines of operation – security, governance, and economic development – so that they can sequence, synchronise, and resource military activity across their area of operations.

9.62 **Candidate Lines of Operation.** Lines of operation will be selected to fit the purpose. The military is likely to be focused on four key areas of activity drawn from the stabilisation model at Figure 9-3. These may form candidate lines of operation within a military plan.

- **Isolate and Neutralise Adversarial Groups.** Offensive activities to isolate and neutralise adversaries will be required. At the same time, the introduction of wider comprehensive measures should undermine the adversaries' support base. It is through a combination of attrition and marginalisation that either an accommodation can be leveraged, or the adversary can be rendered irrelevant or increasingly vulnerable.

- **Establishing a Secure Environment.** Experience has shown that to be successful in stabilisation, military operations need to focus on the population, and provide human and physical security. Such operations should not only focus on the local population alone, but also on the civilian community engaged in stabilisation activities, since it is essential to enable non-military organisations to implement the economic and governance measures that deliver long-term stabilisation. Although operations to secure base areas may have a defensive characteristic, these are not static tasks. Some offensive operations will be required to maintain the initiative, write-down adversaries, and provide depth to the defence. Operations to secure populations require mass and persistence, and are resource intensive. Initially, they are likely to focus on securing key centres of political, military, and economic importance: seats of national power and critical national infrastructure such as ports, power stations, and communication centres for example. Once secured and controlled, these areas will need to be expanded so as to demonstrate tangible progress to the local population. Such expansion will require further security mass and the integration of host-nation security forces.

- **Establishing Territorial Integrity.** Any viable state must be capable of establishing and maintaining its own territorial integrity (a survival function of a state). Fragile or failed states tend to be incapable of guaranteeing their own territorial integrity, which prolongs state fragility. Porous borders threaten security by allowing adversaries to exploit sanctuaries in neighbouring countries. Lack of border control also denies the government vital tax and excise revenue, and encourages the black economy. Efforts to improve border control need to be cross-governmental and multinational. While the military can develop some capacity, wider governance and economic measures will be critical in developing the border control system including its administration, legal authority, and the ability to collect and manage revenue without corruption.

- **Capacity Building and Security Sector Reform Tasks.** A fundamental task will be to develop and support a durable, legitimate and effective host-nation security force that is capable of managing the security situation on its own. Indeed, this will be a key determinant of campaign progress as host-nation forces take over from international forces via transition. In the short to medium term, the security sector reform (SSR) programme needs to generate the mass to supplement the international forces, and then integrate the newly created host-nation

security force units into the overall mission. This both creates the necessary mass required to secure the environment, and helps establish legitimacy. It will also improve intelligence by exploiting local knowledge and helping to overcome cultural and linguistic barriers. The long-term objective is to transition authority and responsibility for security to the host-nation security force.

- **Information Operations.** Given their pivotal contribution, the commander may wish to accord information operations their own separate line of operation. If so, this line will need to be coordinated with other partners who may also be conducting information operations in support of their own activities.

9.63 **Additional Candidate Lines of Operation.** Other campaign lines of operation may drive some security operations, for example, security support to elections or measures to enforce ceasefires. Additional lines that have been used in previous military plans include:

- influence
- diplomatic
- political
- regional engagement
- rule of law
- counter-narcotics
- restoration of essential services
- transition
- engagement and reconciliation.

Further Planning Considerations

Operating Amongst the People

9.64 **The Need for Mass.** Balancing the requirement to protect the population while concurrently neutralising hostile groups will always be a challenge. Generating a security force that has the mass and capability to satisfy these concurrent requirements is a major element of any stabilisation campaign. Both contemporary experience and historical evidence indicate that force level ratios quickly become an issue of operational importance, particularly when resources are tight. Economy of force operations has limited application, and there is nearly always a need to build sufficient mass quickly, in order to consolidate any gains made and to deliver persistent security. Insufficient mass will often result in losing the initiative and a tendency to become fixed in isolated locations. As a planning yard-stick, the number of security force personnel per 1000 head of population (expressed as a force ratio) can be a useful mechanism to indicate the mass required. Some historical analysis has suggested a figure of around 20:1000, although this figure is dubious. The exact ratio required will depend on a number of variables, but recent ratios achieved in Iraq are in the order of 1:20 (coalition/Iraqi Security Forces personnel to civilian population). A number of different strategies may generate and maintain these force ratios. For example:

- building host-nation security capacity through SSR
- raising local militias or ‘home guard’ units
- using coalition or host-nation surge forces
- re-tasking forces rapidly from areas that demand a lower security profile.

9.65 **Persistent Security.** To be effective over time, a favourable perception of the security situation must pervade the joint force area of operations (JFAO). To achieve this, once an area has been secured, it must be held – failure to do so will result in a loss of confidence in the security forces. A lack of persistence undermines the perception of the host-nation’s and international forces’ ability to protect the population. Where areas were once secured, but not subsequently held, the adversary may inflict retribution or intimidate inhabitants. Therefore, prior to investing in an area, a plan to generate and maintain persistent security, and to kick-start development activity, will be required.

9.66 **Adopting an Incremental Approach.** To achieve the necessary force ratios and persistence, an incremental approach to security may be required.

Initial investment in softer areas may be advantageous before moving into the heartlands of hostile groups. For example, securing areas that are in danger but, as yet, have not fallen under the control of the adversary may be a priority for early investment. This may have to be balanced with conducting concurrent punitive activities against the adversary in other contested areas, in order to isolate and neutralise them. Such an approach may generate a number of quick wins that can help develop positive perceptions amongst local, domestic, and international audiences, generating momentum in the campaign, while allowing the force to consolidate. It also provides the time and space necessary to build capacity within the host-nation security forces, before committing them to the fight. Once sufficient force levels and capabilities have been developed, further operations with host-nation security forces can be conducted to secure the heartlands.

9.67 **Competing Demands and Risk.** Competing demands will require commanders to identify and manage risk. For example, on the one hand, the need to satisfy the political pressure to limit casualties may demand high levels of force protection and a stand-off approach; on the other hand, to gain the confidence of the local population the force will have to engage in face-to-face contact with them. Commanders will need to identify where risk exists and be able to articulate it up the command chain. They will then need to manage that risk.

9.68 **Managing Economic Risk.** There will also be risk when implementing economic measures and balancing the short- and long-term needs of the population. Three areas that should be considered are outlined below.

- **Bias.** The apparent disproportionate allocation of economic resources to one group of the population may inadvertently stimulate grievances in another. Great care needs to be taken to assess the likely impact of economic measures, with an assessment taken across the whole community, and not just on those to whom the measures are being applied.
- **Destabilising the Economy.** The introduction of some economic measures may inadvertently and sometimes rapidly de-stabilise the local economy. In Iraq for example, the practice of paying locally employed contractors in United States dollars quickly caused inflation and created distortions in the market, which the local population could not cope with.
- **Unbalancing the Social Class Structure.** The short-term and expedient employment of the professional and educated classes by international forces can compete with the host-nation's needs. In Kosovo, most interpreters employed by the international community were teachers, lawyers, or similarly educated professionals. Their pay far exceeded that of their professional peers who were being paid by the fledgling government, and so their skills, essential for the development of the human capital of the country, were misdirected.

9.69 **Corruption.** Corruption is present in fragile states, and is endemic in failing and failed ones. Indeed it could be a major contributor to a state's decline and, if left unchecked, may remain a significant threat to recovery. Corruption is invariably difficult to eradicate. Where it exists, there is a hierarchy that can encompass the whole of society. In some cultures, certain levels of what may be considered corrupt practices will be perfectly normal in the eyes of the host-nation's population. However, where it begins to effect the pace and efficiency of the recovery, it must be addressed through administrative, judicial, and legislative measures. If it is perceived that New Zealand and multinational forces are associated with corrupt organisations, our legitimacy will also be tarnished and international forces will lose the support of the population.[98]

Force Protection

9.70 Force protection is a key enabling activity to sustain operational effectiveness and generate freedom of action. A failure of force protection at the

[98] For example, in Vietnam, the South Vietnamese government was widely regarded as corrupt by its population and this discredited many of the initiatives that the United States sought to introduce through it.

tactical level can result in casualties, which may have a disproportionate impact at the political or strategic level. For example, the use of improvised explosive devices against coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, the number of casualties that they have inflicted, and the resultant media and public attention illustrate the importance of force protection.

9.71 In planning, joint force protection[99] is predominantly an iterative risk management activity that requires a thorough J2 assessment of all possible threats and hazards. The detailed assessment must then be analysed to determine a range of measures to counter the identified threats and hazards. These measures will comprise a balance of proactive or offensive means, and reactive or defensive means depending on the severity of the threat. In a multinational and multi-agency environment, this process is complicated by varying levels of acceptance of risk, and hence differing approaches to force protection. The joint force commander may also have to consider the force protection of OGAs, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and international organisations so that they may continue to be effective and achieve the campaign end-state. Coordination at the planning stage is essential to providing a coherent approach across the JFAO.

Integrating the Force

Design and Composition of the Force

9.72 Western standing military forces have generally been configured for state-on-state industrial warfare and so, at the start of any stabilisation campaign, it is likely that the force will have to be adjusted and new capabilities created. This is in contrast to conventional warfare where force packages are assembled from already trained force elements held at readiness.

9.73 Force design will impact how military activity is conducted and may trigger changes in individual and unit roles, their composition, their equipment, their operating procedures, and their training. These changes will only deliver the operational success sought if the force design is right. If the initial deployment of the force is on the basis of a contingent intervention operation that then transitions to a stabilisation campaign (e.g. Iraq 2003–2004), then the force may have to adapt its approach, structures, equipment, and composition while in contact. Equally, since the operational context will evolve, so the security force will need to adapt: force design and force adaptation are separate, but linked activities. Even the best-designed force must remain agile, adaptive, and responsive to the ever-changing demands of the operational theatre.

9.74 The initial composition and any need to adapt the force should be one of the major deductions to fall out of the commander's analysis. A typical force composition is likely to contain the following generic elements.

- **Framework Forces.** Framework forces enable and conduct the bulk of the routine security operations. They will largely be focused on securing key installations, locations, and population centres. Units will normally have their own areas of responsibility and should be capable of autonomous action. Likely tasks include:
- **Population Security.**[100] Some elements of the force will conduct operations that directly protect the population. This means living amongst the people. Involvement over time provides enhanced knowledge of, and an intuitive feel for, their specific area. The aim is to become as confident and competent operating in this environment as the adversary. Integrating host-nation security forces as quickly as possible is essential.
- **Infrastructure Security.** Another element will conduct the control activities necessary to secure essential infrastructure and facilities.
- **Manoeuvre Outreach.** A manoeuvre element will attempt to create security throughout the area of

[99] Force Protection is described in NZDDP–3.0 *Campaigns and Operations* (2nd Edition) as the 'measures and means to minimise the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, materiel, operations, and activities from threats and hazards in order to preserve freedom of action and operational effectiveness'.

[100] US Joint Doctrine Publication JP-3-07 *Stability Operations* has more information on population security.

operations by its presence within it. The manoeuvre element should conduct routine presence patrolling, normally from secure locations, and should be capable of gathering information for intelligence.

9.75 **Strike Forces.** Strike forces are used against high-value targets, and often in depth. They should be resourced and trained according to the task, and will need to act on high-grade intelligence. Although these strikes are usually kinetic, they should be supported by information operations either before, or where the interests of operational security require it, immediately after the completion of their task.

9.76 **Surge Forces.** Surge forces are deployed to reinforce framework forces in order to achieve specific effects. They can be a separate part of the overall force package and based over the horizon or in country, and redeployed where needed. They can be used in support of strike forces, or as a reserve for a specific operation. Although good for achieving temporary localised mass, they lack the finely tuned awareness of framework forces and will require liaison officers, continuity personnel or local security forces attached to them to provide local knowledge. Alternatively, surge forces can be generated by output from the SSR process.

9.77 **Capacity-building Task Forces.** Capacity-building task forces are made up of specialists who, subject to policy, are likely to be embedded in host-nation units. If embedded, they must be capable of ensuring their own force protection, but must be trained, equipped, and resourced to carry out their primary function as trainers, advisers, and embeds, even in non-permissive security environments. They should have a deep cultural understanding of the local population and will need to build robust working relationships with the population. They are likely to have to work in demanding, often spartan conditions. In order for capacity-building task forces to be effective, the commander must ensure that there is sufficient force protection and risk mitigation measures for what are often small, detached, and isolated groups. They may also deliver capabilities that the local forces lack, such as air and health support.

9.78 **Special Forces.** By virtue of the quality of their personnel and their high level of training, special forces are ideally suited to fighting irregular forces in complex terrain, and to gathering intelligence. As they are a scarce and valuable resource, they are employed in accordance with some enduring principles, the foremost of which is that they are employed for strategic effect. This often means they are used in support of the theatre-level main effort, which may not be the stabilisation line of operation or indeed in New Zealand's area of operations at all. With their broad spectrum of roles, capabilities, and core characteristics, special forces can represent a significant force multiplier for the operational commander. They have a critical role in shaping the operational environment and setting the conditions for entry or engagement by the main force. The following points in the bullets below should be considered.

- As special forces activities are planned and executed in pursuit of strategic objectives, they will always be commanded at the highest level. This can create tensions at the operational and tactical levels, as special forces are likely to operate in the same operational environment as other forces.

- Special forces strike activities are likely to be specifically targeted at causing maximum destruction to the adversary, its leadership, and its network. These activities are likely to draw heavily on scarce military resources such as intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR), human intelligence (HUMINT), and air assets.

- The operational commander should forge a sound, trust-based working relationship with the special forces commander, allowing them to work through issues together. This will allow the activities of all force elements to be prioritised and sequenced, so as to maximise the availability of assets to all users and to minimise any potential adverse effects.

- Procedures at the tactical level that help de-conflict what is likely to be an already cluttered operational environment must be worked up so that all force elements can pursue their own goals without fear of compromise, interference, or reprisal.

9.79 **Joint Enablers.** Joint enablers are those actions, capabilities or services undertaken in order to enable the successful conduct of activities essential to the achievement of the end-state.[101] The force elements that undertake these actions or provide the capabilities or services can often prove to be a very large proportion of a stabilisation force. The requirement for joint enablers should not be underestimated. For example, in Afghanistan in 2009, the United Kingdom's commitment was split more or less equally between troops interacting with the local population, and those in enabling, support, or staff functions.

Real-Life Example

Joint Force Integration: Borneo Campaign 1963–1966

Borneo has often been described as the 'helicopter war' because of the way in which this developing technology allowed Commonwealth security forces to consistently out-manoeuvre their numerically superior opponents.

Operating out of permanent forward bases, helicopters were able to move ground forces rapidly into the heart of the jungle to cut off insurgents. This gave the impression that the security forces were everywhere at once, and had a major psychological impact. However, these helicopters and the ground forces that they supported were only the spearhead of a remarkable joint operation. The Royal Air Force (RAF) was at the forefront of a logistical supply line stretching back to Singapore, which was only viable due to the less-heralded efforts of the various Commonwealth navies and constant RAF shuttle runs forward. Further, the prospect of RAF offensive intervention deterred the Indonesian Air Force and helped maintain escalation dominance. The various roles of the Royal Navy (RN) were equally low-profile, but no less important. Aside from re-supply, the RN helped to keep northern Borneo free from incursions from the seaward flank, and worked tirelessly up and down the rivers inland where it became a popular presence and useful source of intelligence in its own right.[102]

9.80 **Third Force.** Unlike New Zealand, some coalition partners employ a third force for internal security, such as a gendarmerie. Their duties include the containment of serious civil disorder, which delegates the conduct of routine community policing functions to a separate element of the police force. In the right circumstances, these 'third force' elements can lead the conduct of internal security and population control tasks, which will release the military for other tasks.

9.81 **Specific Focus Task Forces.** Depending on the complexity of the threat, there may be a need to develop specific focus task forces that target narrow aspects of the armed conflict. These task forces will usually have cross-government representation, possibly including security services. For example, if the adversary has a dynamic improvised explosive device (IED) capability, then it may be necessary to develop a specific task force that targets the whole of the network and IED system, to bring the threat under control. Areas that could require specific focus task forces with a diminishing military involvement are:

- counter-IED
- counter-terrorist
- counter-narcotics
- counter-corruption.

9.82 **Non-regular Militias and Cadres.** As a short term measure to free-up other security resources or to generate sufficient mass, the commander may consider using locally recruited militias and other cadres. Being lightly armed, they can provide point security and guard vital installations such as government buildings and businesses. They should not be trained or empowered to conduct offensive operations, nor arrest and detain people. These militias may be drawn from armed civilian groups including concerned local citizens and former irregular parties to the conflict, or they may be the rump of the previous host-nation's security forces which, hitherto, have remained outside the SSR process. Should this option be considered, the competing advantages and disadvantages will have to be carefully weighed and judged; the key criterion is that these home guard units must be brought under host-nation control.

[101] For more information on joint enablers, see NZDDP–3.0 *Campaigns and Operations* (2nd Edition).
[102] Taken from Dr Stuart Griffin, *Joint Operations: A Short History,* March 2005.

Over time, these groups should either be formally incorporated into the host-nation security infrastructure through the SSR process, or be given new skills and returned to civilian occupation through disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration.

9.83 **Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance.** ISTAR staff, capabilities, processes, and force elements develop situational understanding. An integrated system of systems is required to collect, analyse, and disseminate information that becomes intelligence. The joint, interagency, international demands on the ISTAR system are likely to exceed the available capabilities. Consider the following points.

- Capability will be required throughout the intelligence cycle (direct – collect – process – disseminate). An over-emphasis on collect should be avoided since other areas will have less capacity. For example, there will probably be insufficient staff to process information and produce intelligence, insufficient bandwidth to disseminate the product, and insufficient information systems connectivity to access it. Commanders and staff will therefore need to select and manage their information requirements carefully.
- ISTAR requires its own command and management structure to enable selective exploitation and generate greater tempo.
- The range of collection capabilities must be a balance between:
  - endurance and responsiveness and flexibility
  - wide area surveillance and high-resolution, narrow-focus capabilities
  - point-to-point systems and those that can be more widely networked
  - high-cost and highly capable, but relatively scarce, capabilities and those that can be fielded more widely, in greater numbers and cheaper.
- The precise kinetic attack of physical targets with low-yield weapons will drive a requirement for commensurately higher levels of resolution in our understanding of targets.
- Non-kinetic targeting will place an emphasis on understanding that is beyond that seen in operations that are more conventional.
- The ISTAR system must support the measurement and assessment of effect in both the human and all the environmental domains if support to the targeting process is to be effective.

Air–Land Integration[103]

9.84 Recent coalition experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has highlighted the requirement for air–land integration in the battle against a less sophisticated, yet tactically savvy, adversary. The success that was achieved came from hard-won experience, as well as massive investment in technology, equipment, and joint training. Consider the following points.

- Conducting effective air–land integration in a multinational context will demand greater levels of joint integration and training. This carries attendant training implications, such as the development and practice of commonly understood and applied tactics, techniques and procedures.
- Planners will need to apply judgement in establishing the balance of capability between strike and find assets. Often the capability will be present in a single asset, and therefore prioritisation will be critical.
- It may be difficult to develop equally successful air–land integration in host-nation forces. In addition to the financial, practical, and technical hurdles to be overcome, there likely will be political sensitivities. For example, providing this level of capability to a force that may be vulnerable to penetration by adversaries carries risk.
- Planners need to identify the effect sought and not be prescriptive as to which capability they need, noting that the effect could be delivered by a variety of different air assets.

[103] For a detailed description of air–land integration, see United Kingdom Joint Doctrine Note 2/08 *Integrated Air–Land Operations in Contemporary Warfare.*

Sustainment and Personnel

9.85 **Logistics in Context.**[104] Stabilisation activity is likely to take place within a state with weak or inadequate infrastructure. This complicates logistics. It also places greater demand on the commander as logistic decisions, such as basing, will have an impact on their freedom of action. The logistic architecture will be shaped by a wide variety of factors that may be outside of the commander's control. Some issues will require considerable cross-government effort to resolve and will be complicated by host-nation factors; for example, clearances for over-flights, basing issues, and access to port facilities. Once decisions in these areas have been made, they are difficult to reverse and can prove very costly to change later on. Early logistic decisions will have a long-lasting impact on the campaign, the structure of the force, and the conduct of operations. Logistics are both a planning factor and a constraint on the commander's freedom of action.

9.86 **The Joint Logistics Contribution to Wider Campaign Success.** The Joint Logistics (J4) contribution can present opportunities to generate wider and enduring stabilisation success. This can be achieved by aligning military logistic planning with the longer-term needs of the host-nation. To be successful, it will require foresight, simplicity, and cooperation in logistic planning. To realise this wider campaign success, there will be a need for visibility and a clear understanding of national, inter-agency, multinational, NGO and host-nation development goals. Such transparency may engender partnerships and joint ventures where the immediate requirements of enabling military capability may align and converge with medium- to longer-term development needs. Such levels of cooperation may also present a more efficient means of delivering campaign objectives and sustaining the force over time, through an interagency approach. These initiatives will be subject to considerable friction, and solutions will need to have inbuilt agility and redundancy. Particular attention should be paid to stimulating economic growth, as the mere presence of a foreign military may destabilise and unbalance economic and infrastructure development activities.

9.87 **Developing Host-nation Capacity.** Throughout a campaign, a great deal of money will be spent on supplying and sustaining the force. Where feasible, some of this expenditure should be used to develop in-country capacity where military and host-nation needs align. In identifying suitable development areas, care has to be taken to avoid distorting local markets, while ensuring that the deliverables are transferable to the local economy following redeployment of the force. It should also recognise the need to overturn illegal activities such as corruption, and the threats and risks posed to local producers. This latter area may be tackled through realistic and competitive pricing of commodities for joint force sustainment, which represents a ready market for the local economy. Reducing illegal activity can be achieved through opportunities to develop alternative livelihoods. Areas for consideration are discussed below.

- **In-country Supply Initiatives.** Over time and through early investment, the need to run expensive, contracted hub and spoke supply chain operations should be reduced and complemented by developing the host-nation's capacity to meet the force requirement. Where appropriate, adopting a long-term view of sustainable agricultural development may also assist in marginalising illegal markets. In concert with other agencies and contractors, recent operational initiatives have incentivised local producers through the development of local food crop production, including in-country commodity and fuel processing chains. While not entirely military in nature, these initiatives do have beneficial spin-offs for the military, but need considerable inter-agency cooperation in order to be realised. This needs to be balanced in order not to inflate prices of locally purchased commodities making them unaffordable for the local inhabitants.

- **J4 Infrastructure Development.** Where military J4 requirements for road, power, and water and fuel pipelines converge with host-nation and interagency development aspirations, infrastructure development initiatives may be shaped to satisfy all users'

[104] Logistic planning considerations are covered in detail in NZDDP–4.0 *Defence Logistics* and the other four-series joint doctrine publications.

requirements. For example, producing bottled water within secure and insecure facilities both reduces the costly movement of high-bulk, local-value products, and enables the development of much needed local infrastructure and skills and the employment of a local workforce. The requirement to maintain and repair local infrastructure must also be considered from the outset, so that infrastructure development is both appropriate and sustainable.

- **Developing Human Capital.** Capacity building involves developing things and people. Neither can work effectively in isolation; for example, new, well-equipped hospitals without trained staff cannot deliver their intended services. Therefore, sustainable development also means generating capacity within the host-nation's human capital. A common feature of states with instability is a brain drain. The longer this goes on, the harder it is to stop, and the more difficult it becomes to reverse. Consideration must be given to developing human capital throughout all levels of the host-nations' blue- and white-collar workforce. J4 can contribute to this by engaging local contractors and by using local services. Training and mentoring will mitigate some of the short-term risks inherent in this approach, but the enduring effect on stabilisation is self-evident. This approach will converge with the initiatives of other actors involved in capacity building, for example in SSR.
- **Inter-agency Contracting.** Long-term development and human capital investment can be achieved through well coordinated interagency contracting. This will include specific caveats on the requirement to let local subcontracts, to use local services; and to employ local people. This may not occur at the outset; but over time, local stakeholders must be brought into the process, with the aim being that the scale of their involvement eventually displaces that brought in from outside of the country, giving them a greater share.

9.88 **The Logistic Footprint and its Effect on Operations.** The traditional way in which logistic lines of supply are implemented (1st, 2nd, 3rd, and reach-back) will not always apply in stabilisation missions. The logistic architecture will be dictated by the security situation, for example, the extent to which civilian contractors can freely move around. The complexity of the sustainment, maintenance and joint health plans requires early engagement, and logistics planners must feature in any joint reconnaissance. The logistic footprint that is established will set limits on the tempo of operations, and should be at the forefront of planning. Logistic infrastructure will always be vulnerable to interdiction, as well as to regional and strategic events, some of which may not be under the control of the joint force. Long lead times and the ability to flow personnel and materiel through the inter-/intra-theatre joint logistic node will determine relative priorities. When operating in a land-locked region, the land lines of communication may also be subject to commercial pressures and prioritisation of movement that are, once again, outside the commander's control. Tactical constraints imposed by an inadequate logistic capability could have operational and strategic implications. Greater reliance on 'just in case' logistic support, rather than 'just in time', will have an impact on the physical footprint of the logistic support chain, which must be considered in terms of its impact on the local community, as well as on military capability.

Key Idea

Commanders Aide Mémoire for Logistic Planning in Stabilisation

As well as fostering close links between the J3, J5 and J4 staffs, the commander should strive to develop a strong rapport with their J9 and any civil advisors assigned to the headquarters.

Protocols, memorandums of understanding, status of forces agreements, host-nation law, contraband, and customs regulations will all need to be established and will take time and effort to negotiate.

Lines of communications (strategic, operational and tactical) will be particularly prone to strategic and regional 'shocks'. It may require engagement at diplomatic and strategic levels to establish and maintain these lines of communication. At the operational and tactical levels, sea, air, road, and rail networks; air dispatch; and ports of disembarkation are all important and will affect the conduct of campaign.

Dependencies for combat service support may include not only own forces, but also coalition forces, host-nation forces, other entitled personnel (OGAs, NGOs), contractors on deployed operations, third country nationals, locally employed civilians, and detainees, among many others. The commander may also need to consider the provision of essential services to the local population, and humanitarian assistance.

The potential for this list to grow to unmanageable proportions is often overlooked. The bottom line is that logistic support, in its widest sense, is almost certain to include more than just the force itself, and the level of commitment to it will be governed by both expedience and policy.

Force protection of logistic assets can be a major concern. The difficulties of providing the myriad logistic support needed to sustain the force across a widely dispersed JFAO should not be underestimated. It will require significant joint combat and combat support assets to deliver, and therefore must be considered as a deliberate operation and not routine sustainment business.

Health considerations such as casualty evacuation and clinical guidelines and governance will, in large part, impact the planning process. Multinational procedures will need to be established, and memoranda of understanding and protocols agreed with coalition partners. Guidelines for dealing with host-nation, nationals, third party nationals, contractors deployed on operations, and others will also need consideration and agreement.

Communications and Information Systems

9.89 **Information Exploitation.** Timely information is critical to effective decision-making and the efficient application of resources. The sharing and exploitation of information in order to gain individual and corporate knowledge should be seamless throughout the planning process and be continued throughout execution. The array of ISTAR and other data feeds and information can quickly lead to information overload. The commander will need to prioritise the limited resources available for information exploitation if they are to gain maximum effect from all the information available.

9.90 **Information Management.** In order to exploit information effectively, sound information management is required. This transcends electronic working practices or the delivery of CIS, and must be resourced and sufficiently prioritised across all functional areas. Information management is important because:

- poor information management will lead to ineffectual information exploitation
- without good information management, the force will not be able to generate, store, and access its corporate memory
- without well-resourced information management and effective information exploitation, the force will not be capable of learning and adapting at tempo.

9.91 **Interoperability.** Multinational and multi-agency operations require an enhanced degree of interoperability. As New Zealand is most likely to be a supporting partner in any coalition, it will need to ensure it has connectivity with the lead framework nation. Equally, if it is to act as the lead or framework nation itself – in an operation in the South Pacific, for example – then it must understand and fulfil its obligations to supporting partners. Whatever the case, there will be a premium on interoperability of CIS and commonality of tactics, techniques and procedures. Difficulties in communicating at the tactical level, as well as issues such as friendly electronic counter measures impairing friendly communications; can be resolved by developing common procedures and exchanging liaison officers and communications equipment. Early consideration of the operations security implications is required.

9.92 **Reach-back or Reach-out?** Reach-back is traditionally the term used to describe the ability to communicate directly back to headquarters and other capabilities in New Zealand. It can offer a deployed force access to information resources and analysis not immediately available in theatre. Not only will it provide connectivity for those who are preparing to deploy, it should also enable connectivity to be established with those who can contribute to the clarification of intelligence in theatre. However, the concept of reach-back only to New Zealand is too narrow. There will be other reach-out resources that a commander will wish to tap.

9.93 When confronted by a globalised conflict, the New Zealand-centric focus of reach-back may be too constraining. Rather the process should aim to enable a secure global reach to any organisation that can contribute to the fight. In that case, reach-back is perhaps a less useful term and should be changed to 'reach-out'. To be effective, the process must be supported by an appropriately resourced CIS infrastructure, which includes sufficient bandwidth.

Private Military and Security Companies

9.94 Private military and security companies (PMSCs) are a feature of the contemporary operating environment. Their use by governments and international organisations complicates the framework within which commanders operate. The planning considerations discussed in this section apply to PMSCs and help to distinguish them from contractors on deployed operations.

9.95 Although there is little regulation, most registered PMSCs sign up to an industry code of conduct. However, commanders are likely to encounter an array of international PMSCs under contract to different governments, not all of whom will share New Zealand's culture, goals, or values. Indeed, adversaries may contract with PMSCs, and others may be contracted for purely commercial interests. All of this increases the complexity of the operating environment.

Tensions between Campaign Objectives and Contractual Obligations

9.96 Participants in conflict are likely to have different agendas and objectives, although it is hoped that within a single nation's contribution, most should be working towards similar goals or pursuing common themes. PMSC activity will always be focused on contracted performance objectives, whereas military activity focuses on campaign progress. Tensions can arise between the military and PMSCs when government departments contract PMSCs for security or development activities.

Capabilities and Services

9.97 PMSCs offer both armed and unarmed services. When working for commercial clients most will be unarmed, but armed capabilities are offered where either the threat or the contract requires it. When considering how the presence of PMSCs should be managed, the key question should not be whether they are armed or unarmed, but whether their use may have an adverse impact on the campaign.

9.98 **Armed Capabilities.** PMSC capabilities can range from the purely defensive, such as close protection of diplomats, to providing combat support to military operations. Two broad capability areas may be considered (as outlined below).

- **Security Support.** Armed security support may provide protection for personnel or assets worldwide, in support of military, governmental, and commercial organisations. These companies may deliver training packages for clients that include skill sets the New Zealand Government would consider the prerogative of the military, such as special operations and civil-military operations.
- **Military Support.** Some commercial PMSCs are prepared to agree contracts that could have an adverse impact on the security and political environment of the host-nation, either through the nature of the capabilities provided, or through the manner in which the contract is fulfilled. Mercenary groups still exist that offer to engage in offensive operations.

9.99 **Unarmed Capabilities.** PMSCs can provide a variety of services that seek to minimise the operational risk to clients operating overseas. More recently, this category has developed capabilities in the security and justice sectors, in order to compete for stabilisation contracts. This includes the development of SSR and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes. The broad range of services offered by PMSCs to clients, include the following.

- **Training.** Military and police training for governments as part of SSR programmes, and security awareness training to commercial organisations, civilians and diplomats deploying to hostile environments.
- **Development.** Services may include reconstruction, governance, mine survey and clearance, and aid delivery.
- **Intelligence and Research.** Some PMSCs have the ability to provide tailored intelligence and research services.
- **Corporate Tracker and Insurance Services.** These services are based on risk analysis, intelligence work, and global threat awareness and assessment programmes, including hostage rescue and extraction.

Private Security Company Analysis

9.100 It is helpful for the commander to focus their analysis of PMSCs on some specific areas. This will help determine the likely risks and benefits of interaction with any particular PMSC.

- **General Background.** Gain an understanding of the PMSC, its reputation, culture, history, ethos, other contracts and other operating locations, and, if it is a member of a professional association of private security companies.
- **Head Office.** Confirm the location of the PMSC's head office; which national laws may apply; and which major stakeholders have an interest in the PMSC, including government departments.
- **The Client.** Understand with whom the PMSC is contracted and over what time. Develop an awareness of the client ethos and attitude, goals, agendas and approach to risk. Determine the likely client responses to a range of potential threats or challenges. Identify the relationship between the NZDF and the client, and whether any responsibilities or liabilities may exist. Understand the different rules and regulations that apply, depending on which client sets the contract.
- **Capabilities and Services.** Understand the nature of the contract, whether armed or unarmed, which services are to be provided, and which are not provided. Understand performance parameters and contract management procedures. Identify potential benefits or shortfalls that may subsequently have a bearing on military operational planning. Understand the capabilities that the PMSC has offered, and has the skills to offer.
- **Location.** Determine where the contract is to be performed; the threat environment, what support or resources may be required, what military facilities exist in the area, and what potential demands may emerge.

- **Employees.** Identify the nationality of PMSC employees, their backgrounds[105] and motivations, their likely ethics and operating procedures, their military or law enforcement experience and training, and their national government's position[106] on the crisis at hand.
- **Use of Force.** Gain a clear understanding of the PMSC's rules guiding its employees in the use of weapons; what weapon training may have been provided; how those rules relate to the Rules of Engagement (ROE) for New Zealand forces; and host-nation procedures and authorisations for the use of weapons ranging from small arms to heavy weapons. Any such differences identified will need to be reflected in the PMSC risk assessment.
- **Information Sharing.** Consideration should also be given to the obligation (or otherwise) to share relevant aspects of the threat assessment and other information to enhance the survival of the PMSCs contracted to, or supporting, coalition operations. Because of the nature of their likely tasks, PMSCs may be operating under higher threat thresholds that other deployed contractors. They can be useful sources of information and their threat assessments can, in turn, help to clarify the overall picture. It may also be helpful to establish a command and control node to exchange information and deconflict activity such as convoy moves; a civil-military operations centre is one possible example.

[105] While New Zealand, United Kingdom, and United States PMSC employees are frequently former special forces, regular military forces, or law enforcement personnel, it has been alleged that some personnel employed by other PMSCs may be former special police with service under oppressive or harsh regimes.

[106] For example, South Africa has drafted legislation that would, when enacted, prohibit its citizens from participating in conflicts or crises opposed by the South African Government.

ANNEX A:
ADVISERS AND ANALYSTS

9.101 There are a variety of advisers and analysts that may be available to the commander, who will provide specialist advice and contribute to the planning process within the headquarters. These advisers may be serving officers, others may be New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) civilian employees, or public servants from other government agencies (OGA) who bring with them specific knowledge and expertise that will help the staff develop and refine critical elements of the plan. As well as being integrated members of the command group, the advisers should also prove to be a valuable source of contact with other government departments and agencies, thereby further strengthening the bonds that cement the comprehensive approach. This annex provides an overview of the responsibilities of main advisers.

9.102 **Defence Adviser.** Defence advisers will tend to experienced civil servants who work within the host-nation's defence ministry. Their role is to build capacity by working with key defence leaders – both politicians and senior civil servants – and advise them on how to improve their organisation, develop their personnel, and implement their plans.

9.103 **Policy Adviser.** Policy advisers are most likely from Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) or the local diplomatic post, and work directly to the commander. Their role is a bridging one that ensures that national policy takes proper account of the needs and views of the deployed commander and, in turn, that the deployed commander understands that they are acting within Government policy. The policy adviser provides advice to the commander and staff on the full range of defence, national, and international policy. The adviser can also be used to support the development of new policy for use within the theatre of operations.

9.104 **Legal Adviser.** Legal staff officers serving in the NZDF are qualified barristers and solicitors who are likely to have specialised in criminal law. They are also likely to specialise in international humanitarian law and the use of force. The legal staff officer's overriding duty is to provide the commander and other service personnel with independent, accurate, relevant, timely and robust legal advice. They also have a key responsibility to guide planners on the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) principles of necessity and proportionality, and the Rules of Engagement.

9.105 **Media Adviser.** Media advisers are NZDF employees, either military or civilian, who provide advice to the commander and the media operations staff on all aspects of media presentation and handling. They are responsible for coordinating theatre media activities with HQJFNZ and others, in order to maximise media potential and to complement any developed New Zealand information strategy. They also support the in-theatre military spokesperson.

PART 4:

CONDUCT OF STABILISATION OPERATIONS

CONTENTS

CHAPTER 10:

THE CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

CONTENTS

Introduction

10.01 This chapter describes the conduct of military operations using a population focused activity framework. The framework of Shape – Secure – Hold – Develop is a model designed to enable a shared lexicon, a common understanding and characterisation of stabilisation activities in a multi-agency community. It allows the commander to explain their operational design and intent. The commander can use it to describe what activities are being conducted at any given moment, where they are planned to be conducted, and by whom. In this sense, the framework can help operationalise the plan.

10.02 At the theatre level, this framework is not applied in a linear or sequential manner. Instead, there is overlap and concurrency of activity, as areas that have previously been secured and held become ready for greater civilian-led development activity, while elsewhere other areas or population groups are still being secured. Building momentum and progress in this way allows investment in new areas and expansion of influence. In contrast, at the tactical level, the framework is more likely to be applied sequentially. Allowing for these differences in approach, the framework has utility across all levels of the operation. In any circumstance, within the framework of stabilisation activity, conventional tactical military activity will take place. It will be necessary within Shape – Secure – Hold – Develop to continue to raid, deter, disrupt, deny, contain, retain, mentor, monitor, conduct surveillance and partner in order to further campaign objectives.

10.03 Civilian-led development has a pivotal role in the stabilisation process. Military and civil effort must be aligned so that neither is wasted. This is a key function of the planning process. A military force will require a civilian effort to conduct development. Where the civilian force is missing, a new plan will be required. Hold is described as a separate element of the framework because of the inherent risk in the transition from military-led Secure, through Hold, to civilian-led Develop. Hold is the defining moment in the campaign; the point at which the weight of effort shifts from the military to civilian agencies. It is critical that this civil-led development is planned and cued during Shape and Secure. Hold is the point at which host-nation security forces are likely to be invested into the campaign in strength, and where they begin to assume formal responsibility for local security. In turn, this allows the international forces to progress on to other, new areas and begin to Secure them. It is in this way that campaign influence spreads and progress is made.

10.04 The Shape – Secure – Hold – Develop framework has a clear relevance to the United States (US) approach of Clear – Hold – Build. The British and New Zealand version simply reflects the importance we place on Shape in order to develop both understanding and plans, and to cue civilian agency support for subsequent Develop activity; Secure reflects a focus on the population rather than just terrain or enemy; and Develop is used because it describes more intuitively the development of capacity, primarily by civilian development organisations. It is important to remember that the adversary may also have a framework for their activity.

Shape

10.05 In this section the purpose of Shape and the nature of engagement is explained. The following section deals with Secure and offers some considerations for the use of force, and some implications of Rules of Engagement (ROE) and targeting. The third section discusses Hold. The fourth section addresses the Develop activity including training, economic development, transition and reconciliation. The final section, under the heading of Measuring Campaign Success, examines assessment.

Key Idea

Likely Context in which to Shape

In the opening stages of an intervention, the adversary is likely to have mounted a credible challenge to the authority of the host-nation government. In certain areas, they may hold the initiative in terms of being able to offer 'security' or 'protection' or a 'viable political alternative' to the population, or to key elements of it. Some of this may be real, in the sense that they maintain a presence on the ground among key populations, in safe havens for example; and some may be perception, created by fleeting attacks and their own disruptive and influence operations. They will seek to maximise their influence by manipulating all available media (for example, the internet, radio and TV images), and through the use of coercive means.

A significant and natural advantage held by the adversary is that they will be operating from, and among the people that they are claiming to represent. They will already have established a connection with the population, and be able to influence them and their community leaders through their own narrative and, when necessary, their coercive acts.

The adversary will already have established their influence mechanisms and support networks, and have developed their tactics, techniques and procedures. As the operation progresses, they will refine and adapt these to pitch their strength against our weakness. They will carry out detailed analysis after every encounter on how we conducted operations, our intentions and our capabilities especially if they feel their Operations Security (OPSEC) has been compromised.

In developing their narrative and building their influence, the adversary will not be constrained by the need or desire to tell the truth (as New Zealand perceives it to be). They are likely to index their words and actions against a different set of values and use a different logic to our own. Their application of violence is unlikely to be bounded by any of the rules of warfare that international forces would normally apply.

In the early stages of the campaign, it is likely that the adversary will hold the initiative in the competition for the minds of the people.

The Purpose of Shape

10.06 As perceptions, beliefs, attitudes, and opinions of individuals and groups all matter, so influence becomes the guiding reference point for stabilisation. Shape begins the influence process. It comprises four elements. These are a combination of:

- developing situational understanding
- influencing specific audiences to attain specific outcomes in planning and resource terms
- persuading and empowering other actors to make choices that are advantageous to our own aims
- conducting limited offensive operations in order to keep adversaries off-balance.

10.07 All of these elements need to be refined as the operation progresses. Successful Shape activities will require engagement with groups, actors and elites on the widest possible scale using words and messages that are backed up by kinetic and non-kinetic activity.

10.08 Throughout Shape, influence is central and all activity can directly contribute to, or detract from it. During previous counter-insurgency training force elements were told that 'every contact leaves a trace'. This holds true. Everyone, no matter what their level of involvement, will leave some impression, however faint. Since everything said or done exerts a degree of influence good, bad, intended or otherwise. Bringing structure and order to Shape activity will focus the effort to harness desired conditions for success.

- **Developing Understanding.** The first element of Shape is the intellectual engagement to develop an understanding of the operational environment. Some US doctrine notably that used in International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has 'Understand' as a separate element of the framework: Understand – Shape – Secure – Hold – Build. Cross-government resources must be committed to find out what is happening and why, and to begin to understand the dynamics. Understanding the adversary is only one aspect of the mosaic. An orientation on wider factors, such as history, culture and values is also essential. It

is important to identify who are the competing elites and who wields true power. This is not necessarily the same as those who hold positions of authority. Groups, societies, tribes and allegiances must be determined in order to facilitate the development of a coherent plan. The political, social and economic dynamics must be mapped in order to exercise influence. Empowering the host-nation government and gaining the support of key elites and the wider population will be pivotal. Traditional enemy-oriented military intelligence will be inadequate and it will be necessary to adapt existing intelligence structures and build more comprehensive organisations.

- **Developing Options.** Armed with sufficient understanding, Shape activities can become more proactive. Commanders can begin to deduce what supportive and coercive actions are required on specific groups in order to alter the operational situation. Supportive actions are used to empower and influence key elites and gain the consent of target populations. Coercive actions are used to neutralise adversarial groups, or isolate them from their support base. Thereby either brokering an accommodation on behalf of the host government or setting the conditions for their defeat. Military plans must support the cross-government objectives set out in any theatre integrated campaign plan (TICP). Commanders need to work with both the host-nation government and their civilian counterparts in order to secure agreement and resources for their proposals. The commander needs to become an advocate for cross-government support to the campaign. In addition the commander should be able to articulate the requirement to other partners. It is largely the commander's own planning that determines the

Figure 10-1: Offensive operations apply and maintain pressure in order to contain their destabilising activities.

requirement, but it is also their personality and powers of persuasion that will deliver it. This is not discretionary; it is a fundamental aspect of the commander's role. Once options are agreed, they should be prioritised across all Lines of Operations (LOOs). Each activity in the plan will require resourcing and may involve partners agreeing to compromise their own activities for the greater campaign good. Partners will bring their actions to bear. In turn the military provide resources and secure locations, to support those partners in order to enable them to deliver their contribution.

- **Offensive Operations.** Offensive operations are integral to Shape, and have two purposes. Firstly, they apply and maintain pressure on adversaries in order to contain their destabilising activities. Secondly, they build intelligence that either contributes to understanding or triggers further, more precise strike operations. In this way the security forces can keep adversaries off-balance in the early stages, and Shape them for more decisive activity later in Secure and Hold. If they do not already have it, it is during these latter activities that the security forces will wrest the initiative from the insurgents.

Engagement Strategy

10.09 Shape is delivered by an engagement strategy – or more accurately, a series of them – that need to bring both adversarial and friendly groups into the political process. The objective is to build constructive relationships between the host-nation government, competing elites, and the population, if necessary, enabled by the coalition. Figure 10-2 provides an example of the sorts of triangular relationships that are needed to achieve a successful engagement strategy. The key is that the coalition must both enable and support the building of effective relationships between the host-nation elements, rather than interposing between them. In practice, finding channels to engage with individuals and groups may not be the difficulty. There will be direct and covert channels to all parties,



Figure 10-2: Engagement relationships.

including exchanges in the media. The difficulty is to engage with a purpose, and this requires policy to be established as the basis for initial and subsequent productive engagement. For example, an adversary based outside the country, tentatively exploring the possibility of an accommodation, will wish to know their legal status, should they wish to return. This may demand formulating and agreeing a legal and policy mechanism, such as conditional immunity for a probationary period prior to full amnesty. When dealing with irregulars, it can be difficult to verify their claims to leadership. This may entail setting tests, such as a tangible reduction in violence in a given place, to establish their authority and commitment.

10.10 **Elements of an Engagement Strategy.** At its most complex, the coalition will contribute by forming a series of triangular relationships with:

- the host-nation government and competing elites
- competing elites and the host-nation population
- the host-nation government and its population.

10.11 A further, potentially complicating, dimension may be the need to situate this engagement strategy regionally.

10.12 **Key Leader Engagement.** It is necessary to capture the views of community leaders. Both for the purpose of developing understanding of the situation, and in order to influence them. Much of this key leader engagement (KLE) will be part of a deliberate, intelligence-led process to target specific individuals influence them and the groups that they lead. This will include: informal gatherings, social meetings, discussion groups and engagement with local leadership for example. Some of this engagement can be achieved by the commander in person, however, it is helpful to spread the burden. Deputy commanders, senior staff officers and deployed New Zealand government officials can be especially useful in this regard. The trick is to apply some deliberate coordination and planning to KLE and then share the information generated. It may be useful therefore to develop a management system for all engagement that the intelligence community can also access. Carefully selected advisers[107] will aid understanding, advise on key leader engagement, and assist with the creation and maintenance of meaningful KLE relationships. There are numerous reasons why influence may be sought through KLE, examples are:

- **To Secure Agreement for Objectives and Resources.** It will not be possible to identify all objectives, in all time frames at the outset of the campaign. Many will emerge as the campaign progresses. Political and adversary action may also force adjustments to the plan. For the military commander, KLE will be necessary with the host-nation ministries and international organisations in order to gain their support and to coordinate, synchronise and prioritise activity in order to achieve the building blocks of the decisive conditions that realise campaign objectives. This requires powers of advocacy to inform and build consensus. KLE will also be necessary to negotiate and prioritise the allocation of resources to achieve common objectives.
- **To Reinforce the Authority of Legitimate Leaders.** Engaging with certain individuals or groups can legitimise their position, while ignoring others can weaken theirs. Therefore, it is important to select the right leaders and engage with them in the appropriate manner. This is important in order not to be seen to be bolstering an unpopular but possibly legitimate regime. Transparent engagement with the host-nation government at every level encourages the population to recognise their authority.
- **To Restore Confidence and enable Reconciliation.** Restoring public confidence in their government is a key objective. The aim is to engage in concert with the government, although in practice this can be complex. The host-nation may not have a strategy. It may have a different set of engagement priorities whose pursuit may actively obstruct the attainment of New Zealand's objectives. Alternatively, the host-nation may have links to some groups that New Zealand does not, and vice versa. In Iraq, the coalition had good connections to some elements

[107] See Annex A to Chapter 9.

of the Sunni insurgency, whereas the Government had better connections to the Shia militias. A mechanism was developed to harmonise and exploit both channels. Engagement to test the ground for accommodation is a vital first step towards ultimate reconciliation. The conflict will be settled by locals not outsiders, through an agreed framework of confidence-building measures.

- **To Obtain Information.** Information may be gathered through KLE. It will provide texture and context, ideally through prolonged and widespread engagement and ideally on the basis of personal relationships. This information may be processed through the intelligence system and then acted upon.
- **To Deliver Targeted Messages.** Using locals – including tribal and other informal structures – as the conduit for messages into their communities has greater impact than an outsider delivering the same message. However, the message can be corrupted and should therefore be disseminated down multiple channels.
- **To Provide Feedback.** Engagement also enables those delivering messages to judge whether or not they are having their intended effect on target audiences. If properly targeted, it is a valuable, though subjective, contribution to campaign assessment.

Engagement with Neutral and Friendly Groups

10.13 **Leadership.** It can be difficult to identify the legitimate leaders within a community, especially in the early stages. It may also be difficult to distinguish between those that hold apparent authority, and those who hold positions of real influence. In some countries, ministers are merely bureaucratic functionaries with the real power being wielded by those close to the national leader through their position in the social, religious or tribal hierarchy. In most failing states, corruption is rife and often leaders are tainted by it. Equally, elites are likely to be tainted by criminality. Commanders will be wary of compromising their own legitimacy but will have to deal with elements that may not conform to western values.



Figure 10-3: Example of a route to reconciliation: Confidence building measures used in the 'Sons of Iraq' Engagements in 2007.

10.14 **Host-nation Government Representatives.** Engagement takes place from the highest level of government through to routine business at the local level. It can be conducted directly with government representatives or through the use of liaison officers embedded within key ministries. There may be differences between how central and local government operates so a parallel approach be needed. Patience and tact are essential. Choosing people with the right skills is critical.

10.15 **Host-nation Security Forces.** Capacity building provides an opportunity for engagement with host-nation military, paramilitary and police forces. Soldiers are also members of society, each with their own network of contacts. Engagement may occur through a combination of embedded training and mentoring, partnering and liaison. The purpose is:

- developing understanding of host-nation force capabilities, structures and doctrine
- assessing jointly their capacity and how they may best be used to conduct or support operations
- designing appropriate security sector reform (SSR) and associated training mechanisms that deliver an effective security force capable of combined operations and that will eventually be capable of transitioning to independent operations.

10.16 All contacts with host-nation forces are an ideal two-way channel for messaging, understanding and influence if it occurs within a structured plan. This is further discussed in Annex A: Developing Host-nation Security Forces.

10.17 **Regional Engagement.** Stability will require engagement with neighbouring states, and therefore regional engagement. Engagement manages the risk that instability will be exported thus threatening the entire region. Equally, neighbouring countries may exert political, security and economic influence that has the potential to be both positive and negative. Regional engagement should be politically led. Operational necessity or the absence of capacity may require a commander to conduct this task, not least to arrange technical matters, such as cross-border security coordination. Diplomatic sensibilities relating to regional engagement may affect the host-nation and New Zealand (and potentially coalition partners). This requires the host-nation and diplomatic representatives of coalition partners to be informed of any military or coalition developments relating to regional engagement before, or as, they occur. Significant investment in liaison may be required and boundaries set to avoid imposing artificial lines on seamless problems.

Engaging with Adversaries

10.18 Engagement with adversaries is highly sensitive and commanders need to provide clear guidance on it to the force. In reality, engagement with the adversary is conducted directly or indirectly at the tactical level every day through contact with the local population. In any group there will be a spread of commitment and a mix of reconcilable and irreconcilable members. The aim is to distinguish between them and accommodate with the reconcilable, and kill, neutralise or isolate the irreconcilable, particularly the leadership element. Engagement will add tension to the group. Achieving accommodations may break its cohesion and foster mistrust and internal tensions. Identifying these tensions and exploiting them generates opportunities. Conversely, there are risks in developing tensions within adversary groups as it may focus hostility towards the intervening force.

10.19 **Internees and Detainees.** Frequent engagement with adversaries will be when they are held as internees and detainees. They represent a valuable information resource, and this may be exploited provided such exploitation is conducted in a lawful manner.

10.20 **Security Accommodations.** A commander may have to broker local security accommodations in order to stabilise the situation. An example is the arrangements that tactical commanders may broker with groups of concerned local citizens to contribute to the local security situation. While, in certain circumstances, these may be necessary at the tactical level, they will have operational and, perhaps, strategic repercussions.

These must eventually be addressed, in particular with the host-nation. Any such security accommodations should, where possible, be established from a position of strength. Offensive operations may be used as a precursor to establish that firm basis. Security accommodations, by definition, involve compromise and risk on all sides. The terms of the accommodation are negotiable. The declared reason why an adversary seeks an accommodation may not be his ultimate objective. Some of the groups engaged in Iraq in 2007, for instance, sought an accommodation with Multinational Force-Iraq to fight al-Qaeda in the short-term as a precursor to their strategic goal of changing the political balance. Adversaries will typically demand release of prisoners and operational restrictions, such as a cessation of raids. If and when these cards are played it is politically and militarily sensitive. They demand the full engagement of politicians, diplomats, intelligence agencies, international organisations (such as the (United Nations) (UN)) and military commanders. Due to the security risk of ceding hard-won initiative, it is a test of operational art. As Musa Qal'eh in 2007 illustrated, security accommodations are not guarantees. But taking risk is essential for campaign momentum.

10.21 **Negotiating with Reconcilable Adversaries.** This could be the most important form of engagement, as it may be the first step towards conflict transformation. If the military are involved, some considerations are listed below.

- Prior to commencing negotiations ensure that the local culture and issues are well understood.
- Negotiation is a delicate process. The broad terms, such as no deal that undermines the host government, must be clearly set from the outset. Frequently the parties will initially be divided by a gulf of misunderstanding and misperceptions. Identifying these, much less starting to address them, will not be possible until the process of exploration starts. Setting definitive boundaries, such as whether or not the release of prisoners is contemplated, is likely to be counter-productive. Negotiation is not a sign of weakness; rather it confronts the adversary and forces them to decide whether or not to join the political process. They should be left in no doubt as to the alternative of not joining the process.
- Offering conditional immunity from prosecution may permit an accommodation, without granting a general amnesty which may more properly be part of reconciliation.
- Once started, engagement may generate a momentum that transforms the campaign. These relationships carry risk and may be seen by the government as threatening. Transparency is essential as suspicion that the international coalition is brokering a separate deal has the potential to cause a strategic rift. The government will need to share an assessment of the risks and see how they are to be mitigated, for instance by the collection of biometric data which will allow tracking of those involved. The coalition should remain engaged until a political settlement is achieved.

Offensive Operations

10.22 Shape through engagement continues throughout the campaign.[108] It occurs in areas where Secure – Hold – Develop is being enacted and also in areas where security force presence has yet to be established. In both these situations, adversaries will seek to secure or create their own safe havens. They will do this to: secure a population to their own cause; force-generate or recuperate; or to develop and protect funding and resource streams. Although military resources will inevitably be stretched, the adversary cannot be allowed the freedom of action that these ungoverned spaces afford, unless it is to our advantage. Instead, even though our force may be largely committed elsewhere, some activity will be necessary to raid, disrupt, and deter into these areas, or at least understand through intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR).

10.23 Such operations are particularly suitable for Special Forces and host-nation Specialist Forces, where the capability exists. In addition, local militia cadres may be established with appropriate mentoring and enablers. This provides a twin benefit of establishing mass and a force that demonstrably addresses local security

[108] See Figure 4-4, Chapter 4.

concerns. Through such forces and their outposts, there is scope to build an early connection with the local community and to garner intelligence. However, there are clearly risks to be weighed.

10.24 These include:

- the sustainment burden
- the inherent risks of isolated bases
- the requirement to provide reinforcement, often through the use of fires with the associated risks of collateral damage
- and the trustworthiness and motivations of cadres if used and the risk of retribution to the local population if the cadres fail.

Secure

Key Idea

Likely Context in which to Secure

The adversary's ability to interpret our intentions, adapt and counter security forces' efforts may improve. By continually modifying their approach, they aim to find weaknesses and negate advantage. They may employ a variety of means to bolster and broaden their appeal to the population, and may expand the span and tempo of their activity to demonstrate continued relevance.

Because they recognise that the conflict is principally about gaining influence over the population and supplanting ideas, they will refine, and possibly redefine, their narrative as they try to maintain the initiative and the perception that they still offers a viable alternative. They may attack legitimate authorities and their partners.

The adversary will extract every advantage from being almost indistinguishable from the local population. They will seek sanctuary and establish safe havens in areas in which those who oppose them will find it most difficult or dangerous to operate.

The Purpose of Secure

10.25 The Secure phase involves overt competition between the host-nation forces, supported by the intervening force, and the adversaries to create an environment of normality. In Secure, it is necessary to apply a balanced focus between the population, competing adversaries, and infrastructure. However, it will be vital to strike the right balance in the use of force for the population to be convinced that their security needs can be adequately met. During Secure violence may spike. The military will need the full support of all inter-agency partners to wrest the security initiative. Secure may not be quick.

Focus on the Population

10.26 Securing vital national infrastructure and implementing measures to re-establish and maintain control of key populations, such as significant ethnic minorities, through the provision of rule of law and basic public services, is central to legitimacy. Securing an environment that provides populations with the opportunity to go about their daily lives without the fear of violence is paramount. The goal must be pragmatic. Not a complete absence of violence, but its reduction to levels containable by host-nation forces and where normal life can be resumed. It may be possible to secure an area without force, through implementing economic and governance measures.

10.27 **Measures to Control the Population.** In order to separate the adversary from the population, the commander may introduce control measures. These will temporarily restrict some freedoms. This will have an influence upon perceptions of the government and the security forces. The commander may risk resentment and alienation in the short term in order to isolate the adversary and deliver better security in the mid term, or continue to allow the adversary access to the population. Measures therefore need to be applied with care and coordinated with an active information operation that explains the situation. All such measures must be in accordance with the applicable law. Some control measures are outline below.

- **Curfews.** A curfew can constrain an adversary's freedom of movement and temporarily quells civil unrest. It can be employed as an economy of force measure. It must not be used for collective punishment. This is against international law.
- **Barriers and Check Points.** Barriers and check points control and canalise movement, protect property and help isolate adversaries. In many circumstances, adversaries rely on vehicles to transport weapons and munitions. Check points and barriers may be used to enhance the physical security of certain vulnerable locations, such as markets and offices.
- **Establishing Who is Who.** The key to operating effectively amongst the people is knowing who is who. Population censuses, public records such as ration records or identification cards, network analysis, biometric data and evidence collection all combine to deny the adversary the anonymity on which he depends.

The Use of Force

10.28 **Striking the Balance.** Militaries have a bias for high-tempo, kinetic operations intended to defeat the enemy. Such approaches, which are critical to success in armed conflicts, can be counter-productive in stabilisation operations. Properly applied force, however, can gain moral and physical ascendancy over an adversary. As stabilisation operations are generally conducted amongst the civilian population, this can create some security risks for armed forces, as well as increase the potential likelihood of collateral damage where force is used. Collateral damage resulting from the use of force can erode any military advantage gained by targeting a legitimate military objective. Commanders are required by the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) to manage this by balancing the principle of military necessity against the principle of humanity.[109] Commanders should not allow an unwillingness to apply force when necessary to cede the initiative to an adversary.

10.29 **Law of Armed Conflict.** The use of force must be consistent with LOAC, as well as other applicable national and international legal obligations. For most operations in which New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) engages, ROE are issued and promulgated as orders.

10.30 **Rules of Engagement.** ROE are orders given by the highest level of military command that delineate the circumstances and manner within which force will be used to achieve a mission. NZDF ROE are orders of the Chief of Defence Force and are approved by the New Zealand Government. The factors influencing the formulation of ROE are:

- law, including LOAC and other international law, applicable UN Security Council Resolutions and New Zealand Domestic Law
- national policy, including political and diplomatic factors
- operational considerations.[110]

10.31 ROE may permit activity up to and including but not beyond what is permitted by the LOAC. While a commander may take unilateral action to make the ROE more restrictive than originally intended, he or she may not make them more permissive without authorisation from the issuing authority. The commander should also constantly monitor the validity of the ROE. He or she should know how and when to request changes to them, if and when circumstances change. A change is generally obtained by submitting a ROE Request. NZDDP–06.1 *Rules of Engagement* (2nd Edition) provides the process to be followed.

10.32 **Rules of Engagement Cards.** ROE cards will be issued to Service members detailing when they may and may not use their weapons or other means of force as mandated by LOAC and applicable ROE.[111]

10.33 **Rules of Engagement in Coalition Environments.** When a mission is to be conducted

[109] DM 69 (2nd Edition) Volume 4, Chapter 7, Section 1 (to be published early 2016).

[110] DM 69 (2nd Edition) Volume 4, Chapter 1, Section 6 (to be published early 2016).

[111] Including the use of force within the electromagnetic spectrum and cyberspace domains.

in a coalition environment, including those missions conducted with host-nation consent, it is often the case that force contributing nations will develop their own or variations of coalition ROE to ensure that that they conform to their own national legal requirements. Alternatively, a coalition ROE may be adopted with caveats and/or amplifications as necessary. This may have particular implications in respect of interoperability; as such commanders need to pay particular attention to this when operating in a coalition environment. An Operations Directive (OPDIR) will generally be issued as part of the operational planning process with a legal annex detailing the legal basis for the mission. This will reference documents such as bilateral treaties and arrangements including status of forces agreements, which create the legal basis and parameters for the mission. Where a mission partner has not issued or promulgated an ROE Profile for a mission, commanders may be able to offer limited assistance to that partner. The best way to initiate such assistance would be for the commander to seek direction from a member of NZDF Defence Legal Services.

10.34 **Considerations.** In respect of the use of force in the conduct of stabilisation operations, it is important for commanders to consider the following points.

- It is generally better to modify behaviour by other means than by using force. This needs a subtle combination of incentives and disincentives that allows the commander to retain control without losing the initiative. Appropriate demonstrations of force, without resorting to actual use of force, can also have a powerful deterrent effect. This may allow us to secure areas without resorting to the use of force.
- The minimum amount of force is that force commensurate with the task, which may still include a significant range of fires to achieve the aim. It should not be confused with minimal force; this is the smallest amount of force that can possibly be used and may not enable the task to be achieved.
- The use of force must be proportionate at all times. Well-crafted ROE assist in this regard.
- Use of euphemistic language that obscures the reality of, necessity for or legitimacy of armed conflict is unhelpful. Terms such as police action can create confusion in the minds of the commander, staff, and external observers. Describing armed conflict as armed conflict will help avoid doubt.

10.35 **Recording the Use of Force.** Adversaries seek to undermine public confidence in the security forces by the use of propaganda or the spread of misinformation. Ideally, the government and security forces should be first with their message. Where they are not, they must be able to challenge and refute the adversary's version of events, particularly when lethal force has been used. In addition, allegations as to whether the use of force was appropriate are not uncommon and such allegations can also be made in support of claims for compensation. Commanders should seek to manage this through the use of after action reports, incident reports and other means of recording the details surrounding use of force. Recording requirements will often be detailed in national or coalition standing orders.

Containing and Disrupting the Adversary

10.36 **Detention.** It is plausible that New Zealand forces may be required to conduct detention operations in the context of stabilisation operations. Detention operations can be politically sensitive and there are legal obligations that must be complied with in the conduct of such operations. Commanders should ensure that they have sought appropriate authority before engaging in detention operations. Specific direction is provided for those situations where such a need arises. Such direction will normally be issued with the OPDIR and may also be detailed in orders issued alongside ROE. In addition, an aide memoire as to the conduct of detention operations may be issued.

10.37 The NZDF-approved Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 2.5(A) *Captured Persons, Material and Documents* and its New Zealand Supplement provides further guidance on the procedures for the handling and administration of captured persons and their effects. It also provides guidance on the interrogation of captured personnel, as well as the procedures for the handling and reporting of captured materiel and documents.

Mission specific directions may be issued where relevant and necessary.

10.38 **Isolate and Neutralise the Adversary.** This is a principle for the military contribution covered in Chapter 3. By attacking adversaries' critical requirements (Annex A, Chapter 7) they can be isolated and neutralised. Generally, the goal is to neutralise, rather than kill, and to make them irrelevant in security and political terms. Some considerations are:

- population control measures help shape and set the conditions for isolation
- framework operations deter and disrupt the adversary, forcing them into the open
- intelligence-led operations cause attrition and fracture leadership
- rapid information exploitation can generate tempo
- use of the judicial system and detention helps demonstrate effective host-nation Rule of Law
- measures may be needed to isolate the Joint Operations Area and secure the country's borders
- adversary lines of communication should be placed at risk
- cross-government and multinational mechanisms deny financial support
- an information operations campaign disrupts adversary influence mechanisms.

Targeting and Influence

10.39 **The Targeting Process in Stabilisation.** Targeting is the process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. Information on targeting can be found in the NZDF approved ADDP 3.14 *Targeting* and its New Zealand Supplement. It provides a methodology for the development, planning, execution, and assessment of kinetic and non-kinetic effects. Targeting relies on the effective coordination of activity by numerous organisations across different lines of operation (LOO). The selection, authorisation, and prioritisation of targets require the personal involvement of the commander. The aim is to achieve a specified objective.

10.40 **Focus.** Targeting identifies the options, both physical and psychological, to create affects that support objectives. Some targets are best addressed using activities with a primarily physical effect, while other targets are best engaged using psychological activities such as civil-military cooperation, information operations, direct engagement, negotiation, and political, economic, and social programmes.

10.41 **Consequences.** The impact of poor targeting can be severe. Successful targeting requires:

- clear understanding of the objectives sought and their possible consequences
- prioritisation and sequencing to balance demands and resources
- balancing short-term impact against longer term considerations
- well considered measures of effectiveness
- the management of unintended consequences.

10.42 **Targeting Directives.** Where use of force is authorised by LOAC and ROE, a Targeting Directive may be issued and promulgated.

10.43 **Collateral Damage.** Collateral damage adversely affects public confidence, support from New Zealand and host-nation legitimacy. Adversaries will often use sensitive, cultural or religious sites to carry out operations. When responding, the precise use of force may minimise collateral damage. Adversaries may try to:

- goad security forces into overreaction
- lead them into sensitive areas where there is greater potential for collateral damage
- deceive the security forces into believing civilian areas or sensitive sites are harbouring adversaries, when they are not
- make the security forces so concerned about

collateral damage that they cede the initiative

- create a dilemma between inaction and unpopular action.

Hold

Key Idea

Likely Context in which to Hold

Failures suffered by the adversary could force them to move, thereby displacing and disrupting them. However, borders and rigid boundaries offer the adversary the possibility of re-establishing elsewhere.

As an adversary's influence is diminished, and the balance of the initiative begins to swing away from them in areas that have been secured, they will be increasingly compelled to act against the seams of the inter-agency and multinational effort, seeking to discourage and discredit them.

The adversary will undermine any host-nation economic or government development successes. In its early stages, progress made by these programmes may be fragile.

They will be forced into a more covert stance and may switch focus to terrorism.

They may ask to talk, possibly to buy time to re-group, especially if their goal is to husband resources for a subsequent, longer term internal power struggle.

The Purpose of Hold

10.44 Hold – of a secured area – is about demonstrating commitment and establishing the conditions for civilian-led development. Once achieved, they must not be lost. Hold is also about developing hope. Hold can be considered to be a pivot on which campaign progress is balanced and the point at which progress can be most readily assessed. During this stage the lead shifts from military to civilian organisations. Any failure to Hold after Secure will cause the government and security forces to lose credibility. During Hold, government forces, generated earlier by SSR, deploy with appropriate capabilities to that area. This should create a sense of permanence that strengthens the belief that the security forces have regained control. In turn, it should further the translation of consent into active support. Hold is a statement of intent and an act of commitment. It is critical because the population will only fully commit their support to government security forces when they conclude that the government will prevail and their own safety will be assured by government forces.

10.45 **Focus on Policing.** It is possible during Hold that the transition to a host-nation security force lead on policing may occur. It may have been necessary to develop sufficient mass for this through capacity building and SSR. Ideally, host-nation police forces, possibly paramilitary ones, will have been available at this stage. If not, it will be necessary for other forces to fill the gap. Since not all armed forces have a mandate to police, some enabling legislation may be needed. International forces must live among the population and partner host-nation forces if they are to establish effective security and a policing function that serves the population. Information gained from the population by holding an area can be exploited to influence or inflict damage against adversaries.

10.46 **Synchronising Comprehensive Measures.** While an effective security force presence must be retained, other decisive factors will be the speed of governance initiatives and economic progress. The aim is not merely to deliver freedom from persecution, want and fear, but simultaneously to provide essential commodities such as water and food and enable a functioning society again at the local level. This means going with the grain, such as working with tribal structures. At the same time enabling the central government to re-connect (or connect) with its people. Wherever possible, projects should be linked to longer-term priorities on the economic and governance LOO. However, the imperative is to achieve the human security objective.

Key Term

Human Security

Human Security is characterised by: freedom from persecution, want and fear; adequate provision of essential commodities to sustain life; broader environmental security; and the protection of cultural values.

Develop

Key Idea

Likely Context in which to Develop

The adversary may continue to disrupt our efforts at long-term development. However, as their security deteriorates, they will find it more difficult to offer a convincing alternative.

Their behaviour could become increasingly extreme. They may reframe their concepts of victory and defeat, arguing that they can win merely by not losing.

Adversaries are likely to target host-nation vulnerabilities, recognising that in Develop, most activity will have an overtly civilian lead.

They will tell the population that the international forces' security is transient, and state that they will be there, amongst them, long after we have gone.

As government measures gain greater traction, some adversaries may become more open to the suggestion of reconciliation. Their structures may fracture.

The Purpose of Develop

10.47 In Develop, comprehensive measures are implemented to build host-nation organisational capacity and stimulate the economy. This enhances government credibility and delivers improving conditions. Success should further erode the support base of adversarial groups and create the conditions for political settlements. Concurrent, early investment in both short and long-term projects will be required. Develop comprises a mix of political, social and economic development, capacity and infrastructure building and SSR. The goal is for the development effort to be coordinated by the host-nation government. Local governance structures should be used to engage with the population in order to give them a stake in their future, a sense of ownership, and to ensure that effort is clearly prioritised. Economic, social, infrastructure and political aspects of Develop are not primary responsibility of international military forces. However, these forces may still be needed in a supporting role. Commanders should engage in and influence these processes and may need to use military capability to plug gaps, without becoming fixed or entangled.

Training Host-nation Forces

10.48 SSR is one of the key outputs of building capacity. The goal is effective, accountable, and non-predatory security forces that serve the population and the nation. This endeavour is likely to constitute a principal element of the military contribution to the Develop phase. Generic guidance is contained at Annex A.

Governance

10.49 **Likely Governance Tasks.** Governance will be defined at the strategic level and coordinated with civilian partners. Military involvement will depend on the level of security. At first, tasks may include the identification of key leaders and government officials and the measures to support and empower their offices. There may be relevant skills in, for example, national and local governance and utility management, within regular forces and sponsored reserves. As host-nation governance structures and processes grow, they should become responsible for the delivery of public services and budgets. At this stage they can take on the mantle of the military run security committee architecture, further linking governance and security.

10.50 Economic Development

10.51 **Likely Economic Tasks.** The long-term development of the economy will be led by other government agencies (OGA) and international organisations. An early assessment of what needs to be done will be necessary as this is a critical component of pre-campaign planning as is early engagement with OGAs and other agencies such as non-governmental organisations (NGO). Military presence on the ground ahead of other organisations and agencies will enable them to contribute to any assessment. Specialists, particularly from the Reserves,[112] with their civilian skill-sets, can assist.

Transitions

10.52 **The Use of Transitions.** Achieving objectives is likely to be incremental, usually over a long period. Transition describes the transfer of authority and responsibility for the delivery of predefined, discrete functions between one set of actors and another. The first transition that may occur is where local agencies are unable to cope and the international force provides external support to restore and maintain essential services. Then, as capacity builds, responsibility will be handed back incrementally to the appropriate local authorities until they have restored full host-nation control. As with all transitional phases, such as a rearward passage of lines, elements of both sides of the transition will be off-balance until the new state of affairs attains a steady state. Periods of transition between agencies provide opportunities for adversaries to discredit and disrupt stabilisation and development efforts. It is important to note that a transition may not work. This may be for a variety of reasons. Therefore, it may be necessary to take a step back and resume a Hold posture.

10.53 **The Link between End-states and Transitions.** The end-state should be expressed as the achievement of defined levels of political and economic stability within a self-sustaining security environment. Activity on all LOOs will transition to a host-nation lead. This may occur either at a localised level or as part of a larger, national process of transition. Early in planning, the conditions required for them (particularly the final ones that allow the force to redeploy) are identified and resourced.

10.54 **Planning Transitions.** The campaign will mature in stages. Transitions may be constrained by the different national strategies within the coalition and local events. There may also be sensitivities over control and timing. Transitions alter the balance of supported/supporting relationships and the requisite changes must be covered in detail during the transition planning phase. Smooth transition may be assisted by the creation of Military-to-Civil Transition Teams. The rate of transition is often used as an indicator of campaign effectiveness, so commanders should expect to come under pressure to accelerate the transition process.

10.55 **Conditions.** There will be a debate about whether transitions should be time or conditions-based. Time-based conditions set clear benchmarks and can galvanise the effort (including the host government). However, they risk handing the initiative to the adversary by laying out the limits of our commitment, or transferring authority and responsibility before the key conditions have been met. Conditions-based transition planning is also problematic because it appears open-ended. Achieving conditions identified in the plan can take far longer than first anticipated. Setting good enough conditions and then assessing them objectively are essentials of a conditions-based strategy. In practice, the approach is likely to be constrained by an uneasy amalgam of both these approaches, as they represent the political reality. One external indicator is the behaviour of certain NGOs such as International Committee of the Red Cross and Médecins Sans Frontières. Their withdrawal to other higher priority areas may be indicative that the crisis has passed. This may support or act as a check to any military assessment of the suitability for transition. Where the decision to amend or ignore certain conditions is not in the commander's authority, he should robustly explain the consequences of failing to grasp local issues and circumstances to transition planning.

[112] These are the Royal New Zealand Navy Volunteer Reserve, the Territorial Force, and the Air Active Reserve.

10.56 **Risks.** Possible risks involved in transitions include the following list below.

- **Misalignment of Authority and Responsibility.** Transitions that involve the migration of authority but not responsibility should be avoided. For example, where security operations in an area are transitioned to local command, but remain reliant on the international forces' military capability and hence the international forces carry the risk.
- **Progressive Loss of Situational Awareness.** As international forces hand over more responsibility, they risk losing situational awareness across the campaign's PMESCII-PT environments. It is at this precise moment that the need for situational awareness is at its greatest. This can be ameliorated, for example, by increasing embedded mentors and stand-off surveillance. However, this is likely to coincide with a desire to reduce the military footprint, rather than to increase it in any way.
- **Set-backs.** Transitions may not work. The strategy should consider the potential to re-assume a Hold posture if, after a trial period, security conditions are not sustained. The force may be asked to re-engage to prevent collapse. Before transitioning, the commander should establish the policy parameters.
- **Surrender of Control.** As responsibility is progressively transferred, influence and negotiation become the primary tools for guiding the development programme. Influence and negotiation become the primary tools for the commander, in place of direct action.

Reconciliation

10.57 **Understanding Reconciliation.** Reconciliation has to be lasting and self-sustaining and depends upon the viability of the political settlement previously described in Chapter 1. The military contributes by creating the right conditions and usually focuses on SSR and disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR). This involves:

- providing a secure environment for meetings between protagonists
- initiation of meetings between protagonists, noting that the international force is unlikely to be seen as impartial.

Real-Life Example

Reconciliation Case Study – Sierra Leone

The United Kingdom's (UK) military contribution to reconciliation was important in a number of ways:

It provided the overarching framework in which reconciliation took place. The Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) and its predecessors were so fragmented that, without the UK military involvement, they may have remained a serious obstacle to reform. The UK military designed and maintained the first functioning command structure for some time. In the early days advisers took on direct command roles.

The UK military played a critical role in the DDR process, by running the absorption of former combatants into the new military and retraining the RSLAF.

The continuing UK presence meant that the RSLAF remained relatively non-politicised, playing a role as both catalyst and conscience.

The persistent presence of UK advisers increased societal confidence and reconciliation and curbed the political activities of senior RSLAF officers.

ANNEX A: DEVELOPING HOST-NATION SECURITY FORCES

Introduction

10.58 A key military contribution to security sector reform (SSR) is assisting in the development of host-nation security forces. This is about developing host-nation forces so that they are capable of delivering the nation's long-term security needs without over reliance on outside assistance. In the short-term the process will also create sufficient mass to assist in stabilisation and begin the process of transition. Although it is part of Develop in the stabilisation activity framework, in order for it to contribute effectively to Secure and Hold, it will usually need to begin early in the campaign. This must be reflected in the analysis and planning cycles. In most cases, the commander should only be expected to be tasked with training the military elements of the host-nation security forces. OGAs, private military and security companies (PMSCs) should take responsibility for the development of other elements (the police, the courts or prisons, and protection of key individuals and locations) of the security infrastructure, although this will depend on circumstances. Whatever the overall allocation of responsibilities, it is key that the development of the host-nation security force is considered as an integrated whole. Although this initially increases the size of the challenge, it is a necessity to avoid the creation of costly imbalances that will ultimately delay or prevent effective development.

10.59 A significant factor with host-nation force SSR is the concurrent and complementary development of the host-nation Police Force capability, with appropriate supporting judicial processes and systems. This concurrent and complementary development gives the opportunity for the host-nation government and population to understand, and hopefully gain respect for, the separate roles performed by the host-nation military and police forces. If one force has its capabilities enhanced and developed in a disproportionate manner it can delay or undermine the overall aims of the SSR.

Planning

10.60 **Scope of the Plan.** A force that has been invited to assist a host-nation government to train forces should be ample time to prepare before any deployment. Where such time is not available, possibly due to an unforeseen contingency or change in situation, well-considered contingency plans may provide the basis for abbreviated planning and preparation. Worst case, the force may have to deploy as-is and develop its plans on the fly, accepting the commensurate increase in risk. If it is to be effective any such plan must include the allocation of sufficient funds and specialist personnel for the task.

10.61 **Scope of the Task.** Usually a commander is given the task of taking existing, weak, host-nation security forces and transforming them into a more effective body rather than building a force from scratch. This task will often be made more difficult because the in-situ organisations may be corrupt and incompetent; they may also have lost the confidence of the population. Clearly, it is important that any comprehensive training plan deals with all these aspects, but it must also ensure that the process does not undermine the host-nation government's ownership or authority.

10.62 **Assessment.** When beginning to consider the nature of the problem, it is helpful to determine the framework within which the task must be carried out. Addressing the following questions below is a good place to start.

- 'What J1–J9 capacity do they need for the long-term?' Define what organisational and institutional capacities are required for the enduring sustainability of the new force.
- 'What do we need the host-nation security forces to do?' Articulate the tasks required of the host-nation security force, taking into account the host-nation's own long-term security needs and objectives. Special consideration should be given to the long-term sustainability and affordability issues that will be left to the host-nation to deal with.

- 'What additional capabilities do they require in order be able to operate on their own?' Define the level of capability required of a host-nation security force if it is to carry out operations independently.
- 'What can they do now and what changes will be required if they are to sustain security in the long-term?' Establish the degree of political/legal mandate at the point of intervention.

10.63 **Key Factors.** The following factors should be considered below.

- **Non-military expertise.** Civilian security experts may provide commanders with a broader understanding of the longer-term training and implementation considerations involved in developing host-nation security capacity. This may be particularly valuable in those parts of the sector that are outside the immediate expertise of the military. As the military has limited policing, legal, and penal sector resources, OGAs, PMSCs and other agencies can assist by providing deployed expertise.[113]
- **Funding.** Sources of funding and the processes for timely expenditure must be resolved early in the planning phase. This is the most effective way of ensuring adequate resources are made available to military commanders who will provide the lead for such activity.
- **Risks.** When the security environment is hostile, there is often an imperative to build host-nation military and policing capacity quickly. However, experience shows that there are significant risks in any rapid development programme that is not adequately planned and resourced. Some examples are listed below.
  - A development programme that is too rapid may compromise the recipients' training and fitness for role. For example military, with little training or competent leadership are likely to be ineffective, corrupt and potentially hostile to the population.
  - Early development of a reformed security sector using host-nation tribal or similar structures may seem to offer a quick solution. However, although it may be superficially attractive and deliver some short-term security, in the longer-term it may prejudice the more enduring aspirations for impartiality and independence.
  - Insufficient or inadequate security vetting of recruits for the sector, usually conducted against time pressures, is likely to lead to a high proportion of corrupt or criminal elements within security forces.

10.64 **Embedding Policy.** The commander should carefully consider the policy guidance that they receive regarding the embedding of New Zealand mentors and trainers in the nascent host-nation force. Clearly, there are advantages to allowing embedding into the structures of host-nation units. However, there are disadvantages and risks that will need to be considered too. As the policy covering each circumstance will be different, so the commander must consider their own case, and make recommendations to the chain of command as appropriate.

Early Implementation

10.65 **Impact of Environment.** Initially, military capacity building tasks will focus on creating sufficient host-nation capability to contribute to maintaining security; Hold. At this stage the environment may still be non-permissive and other government departments (OGD) deployment constrained. This complicates the delivery of early capacity building, as the commander may have to take responsibility for the delivery of all security force capacity building activities, many of which are outside the core expertise of their force.

10.66 **Benefits of Successful Capacity Building.** Initial capacity building should be aimed at:

- reinforcing, and ultimately replacing, intervention forces on the ground and contributing to the establishment and maintenance of law and order
- developing an initial host-nation capability and

[113] In some cases, when there is no capacity to provide trainers, then contracted experts may be employed. These are often retired personnel from the New Zealand of other nation's police, judiciary and prison services.

increasing their numbers by focusing on raising and training military forces

- improving our own situational awareness through intelligence gathering and shaping operations, and through better cultural understanding and engagement
- local forces that provide an ideal channel for focussed messaging to their wider family groupings and the population they interact with
- delivering mutual benefit through combined operations with host-nation forces.

Sustained Development

10.67 **Training.** Initially, basic training is the priority and should focus only on essential skills. Specialist skills can be developed once there is sufficient confidence to progress and a suitable infrastructure is provided. Host-nation security forces are unlikely to have the technical skills, equipment or budget to maintain high technology capabilities which would soon become unserviceable. Collective training will be necessary to prepare host-nation units to assume the greater responsibilities that will lead to transition. Any programme of exercises should be progressive and test all levels of command, ultimately including political-military decision makers. A programme of education will be required to ensure that host-nation security forces understand their new role, responsibilities and relationships across the sector and the community.

10.68 **Mentoring.** Mentoring will usually focus on assisting the host-nation military forces to improve their own systems and processes. Depending on policy, it may also involve New Zealand mentors embedding with host-nation units. In this respect, mentors and trainers provide the essential link between both the host-nation and the intervention forces, and have a significant role to play within the transition process. The integrated headquarters should have a dedicated staff branch dealing with SSR[114] that maintains close links to the corresponding host-nation government departments.

[114] Often the J7 Branch is re-rolled and augmented to be the staff focus of SSR. The formation (JTF or JIATF) Deputy commander as a suitably senior officer may provide high level focus for such activity.

Experience from recent operations suggests the following:

- Mentors should be carefully selected to cope with the inevitable frustrations of dealing with poorly trained forces. They will require more extensive pre-deployment training than those involved in other roles.
- Continuity of personnel and a consistent approach is required if mentoring is to progress smoothly. Tour lengths for mentors should be long enough for relationships to be forged and for a deep understanding of how best to develop the host-nation force.
- The nuances of language, culture, and behaviour must be addressed, either through formal training or through dedicated interpreters.
- The structure of the mentoring organisation should be adaptable so that it is the best possible fit with the host-nation units it is supporting. This may have to be continuously reviewed, particularly as host-nation capacity is progressed.
- Mentors embedded at various levels, from government ministries to tactical units need to have ready access to each other. This allows them to monitor and influence decisions made across host-nation forces and, where necessary, inform both those involved in the SSR process and the higher military chains of command.

10.69 **Monitoring.** Defined as ‘stand back and observe; only advising in particular circumstances’, this normally includes measuring progress against prescribed objectives at set intervals. Monitoring is usually conducted through the partnering of intervention and host-nation units. This approach can be beneficial, particularly during transitions. Partnering arrangements can cover both training and the conduct of operations. The longer such arrangements are in place, the greater the benefit to the host-nation force.

10.70 **Monitoring, Mentoring, and Training.** Monitoring, mentoring and training (M2T) is a generic term used to describe military support to host-nation

armed forces during the development of local capacity and its subsequent transition to host-nation security responsibility. This term is used to describe the Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLT) in Afghanistan.

Supporting Issues

10.71 **Infrastructure Support.** In addition to the capability to conduct operations, military capacity building must include basic administrative support and the development of a functioning Defence Ministry and chain of command structure. A coherent programme should focus on the provision of training and mentoring teams as well as the simultaneous delivery of equipment logistic support and infrastructure, and delivering financial and managerial support for the security forces.[115]

10.72 **Moves towards Transition.** As host-nation forces progress towards transition of security responsibility and authority, there will need to be even closer relations with host-nation staffs. This will enable mutually planned and run operations to be carried out and a well-defined handover to take place. A clear understanding of the command relationship and responsibilities between our own and host-nation forces will be critical to the successful transition of authority. This should include information operations promoting the host-nation forces, as they are unlikely to have their own capability.

10.73 **Vetting.** Plans to build and train a host-nation military force require transparent and fair systems for vetting personnel, particularly in the case of officer applicants. The vetting process needs to include an examination of the applicant's background, previous record and, possibly, political affiliations. The standard for officers should be set higher than for others, even if this slows the process of building the force. There may be a requirement to develop and/or accredit the host-nation's security vetting process to ensure that it is fit for purpose. This will help to build trust between the host-nation and the intervention forces that in turn will facilitate the exchange of information and intelligence as a part of force development and contribute to successful transition.

10.74 **Relationships with the Local Community.** In stabilisation it is crucial to engender trust between host-nation security forces and the people. Measures must be put in place that prevents the growth of self-serving, predatory security forces. As host-nation forces become increasingly active, they will be tested by a hostile security environment and exposed to the population, possibly for the first time. They must be seen to be providing impartial security on behalf of the state and their actions must be deemed legitimate by the local population. This will form the basis of their long-term effectiveness.

10.75 **Local Militias.** When a nation is faced with instability and disorder the local population may establish their own militias and cadres for security purposes. This reality cannot be ignored as the issue of local militias is based on the natural desire for local security. The issue, therefore, is one of managing the process through integration or Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR).

10.76 **Wider Aspects of Security Sector Reform.** Military personnel involved in developing host-nation military forces should understand how their mission integrates with other aspects of the security sector. The commander must be ready to assist in some of the wider aspects of SSR should circumstances demand it. The extent of military involvement in these areas cannot be predicted. However, it may include police reform, support to judicial reform, the establishment of effective border control forces, and intelligence and security services.

10.77 **Alignment of Coalition Approaches.** In a large scale capacity building endeavour, it is likely that a number of different nations will contribute to the overall process. While this effectively spreads the burden, it can create weak seams between contributors. It is therefore important to align the various coalition approaches in order to ensure that these potential weaknesses are prevented.

[115] There are several ways of delivering training teams. The most popular being dedicated mentoring teams or through the Provincial Reconstruction Teams that link SSR to wider reconstruction and governance.

Key Idea

Security Sector Reform – 10 Top Tips From Military Commanders[116]

Non-Discretionary. SSR is a non-discretionary task. The later it is started, the longer the intervention.

Consultation, consultation, consultation. Creating forces that look like your own is one of the biggest mistakes that you can make. You need to go with the grain but equally you need to apply standards that create real capability. Be realistic. Some things just cannot be achieved because of cultural resistance. Consultation and coordination with all the partners is essential. SSR involves lots of players. Many of the problems are because not everyone is on the same page. Some resist coordination. There is an extensive body of international expertise on SSR – use it.

Organisation. Train, Equip, Mentor, and Organise are good headings. Expect to create new structures in your own organisation. And you will need to find qualified, talented people. Equally, you may have to work with, not around, existing local security structures. SSR makes strange bedfellows: tribes and militias may enjoy broad support or have utility. If so, use them. But plan their future concurrently.

Ministries. Creating fighters at the execution end of SSR but ignoring the policy end will undo any progress you make. Local ministries are rife with power struggles. Once started these struggles are difficult to control. Reforming ministries requires civilian and military experts.

Prioritisation. You will be tempted to focus on the military. But treating the police and justice system as afterthoughts can lead to mission failure. None of this is sequential. It must be concurrent.

Embedding. Embedding is risky. However, it is right at the heart of effective mentoring and training. We have to live and serve alongside the locals if we are to lead by example. To be more than 'goons with guns', local forces must be accountable – to their internal disciplinary system, their civilian leaders, and the population.

Vacuums. Conflict breaks down any system that may have been there. Criminality, militias and warlords will fill the vacuum. Your goal is to dominate these vacuums. SSR allows you to transition that dominance to local partners.

Patience. Accept that creating effective local forces takes time, patience and sustained commitment. Poor decision-making, such as going for mass over quality at first, haunts you. Even the best plan may not get it right first time; you may need to go back, test and adjust to get the forces you (and they) need.

Balance. Getting the balance right between training them too quickly (to get them into the fight) or training them too slowly (to make them fully qualified) is difficult. If you drive them too quickly they unravel when pushed. Drive them too slowly and they fail to have impact. Mentoring and close-marking helps.

The Basics. If paid and fed, the locals are more likely to fight. If not, they become predators. Getting the basics of administration right cuts out cronyism and corruption; you get real capability, not ghost soldiers.

[116] JDP–3.40 *Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution.*

CHAPTER 11:

MEASURING CAMPAIGN SUCCESS

CONTENTS

Assessment

11.01 **Achieving and Measuring Success.** There are two factors to consider in the design of campaign assessment. First, determine the conditions to be achieved (outcomes/objectives) of activity and their impact on the wide range of audiences. Second, the time-lag between cause and ultimate effect. The rush to measure the outcome of activity before its condition can be determined can distort decision-making. Some of the conditions, particularly the most important ones that are designed to affect people's perceptions, may take considerable time to mature. Assessment is a feature of military campaigning and has a role to play both in making better sense of a state in crisis and justifying resources.

11.02 **Assessment.** Assessment is the evaluation of progress, based on levels of subjective and objective measurement in order to inform decision-making.[117] It combines art and science:

- specific metrics should be designed, collected and subsequently analysed – that is the science part
- interpretation demands judgement, intuition, imagination and insight – that is the art part.

11.03 **Metrics and their Interpretation.** Over time, metrics allow an assessment of campaign progress. Metrics define what is to be measured. In simple terms metrics define the campaign's progress in measurable terms and may be both quantitative and qualitative in nature. Metrics may be unique to each operation, difficult to define, and possibly difficult to collect, but must cover the political, security, economic and social aspects of any activity. They will usually be defined by the senior coalition partner. They should be:

- specific
- measurable
- achievable
- relevant
- timely.

11.04 **Consistency and Credibility.** Discipline, accuracy and consistency in the use of metrics are essential. The intervening force's credibility will be damaged if data, for instance on attack statistics or what is defined as a significant act, can be made to appear contradictory or misleading. For example, a multi-barrel mortar attack can be recorded and reported as one incident, or several. The media and adversaries will be quick to exploit apparent inconsistencies. Errors and inconsistency in the use of metrics can also lead to false results that may adversely affect the course and tempo of the campaign.

11.05 **Designing Assessment.** Traditionally Joint Plans (J5) designs and implements assessment to inform campaign progress. A separate cell within the headquarters may be required to provide a shared, comprehensive assessment of campaign progress. There is a significant difference between measurement and assessment. The first indicates, for example, 'how much?' but the second addresses the 'so what?' Measurement itself requires diligent consideration to ensure consistency of results against an agreed standard. This allows reliable comparative evaluation of performance and progress over time. However, planning a campaign based on assessment is like driving with both eyes on the rear-view mirror. Even given a high degree of confidence in the validity of assessments, they represent a historical snapshot and do not forecast the future. The principle for the design of assessment conducted at the campaign level should be to record tidal movements, not wave patterns. These movements have to be selected in advance, and studied for long enough to derive strategic patterns; yet the leadership will wish to set new questions as the situation evolves. Nor is it the case that once objectives are met that they will necessarily endure without allocation of effort.

Assessment Categories

11.06 There are broad categories of assessment that produce the answers to the following three questions:

- are we doing the right things?
- are we doing things right?

[117] NZDDP–3.0 *Campaigns and Operations* (2nd Edition).

- are the right things, done properly, getting us where we want to go or need to be within the desired timescale?

11.07 Measures of effectiveness (MOE) helps answer the question – are we doing the right things? MOE provides the means for determining progress and successful achievement of the objective or end-state. MOEs for each objective need to be developed to determine whether the desired conditions are being produced. MOE typically describe expected benchmark changes in physical or moral conditions that indicate progress towards the accomplishment of the objective. MOEs should allow the commander to evaluate whether the operation is creating the desired conditions, as well as any undesired consequences that might jeopardise the accomplishment of their objective or mission. MOE are critical because their use in evaluating progress may influence decisions regarding the conduct of operations and the allocation of resources.

11.08 Measures of performance (MOP) are the 'assessment of task performance and achievement of its associated purpose'. It is an evaluation of what actions have been completed rather than simply what has been undertaken – are we doing things right? The commander may draw on MOP to inform decisions, but it is essentially tactical business. In general there is a quantitative and qualitative nature to MOP.

11.09 Campaign effectiveness assessment (CEA) is defined as the 'evaluation of campaign progress, based on levels of subjective and objective measurement in order to inform decision-making.' It considers the timely progress of the campaign – are the right things, done properly, getting us where we want to go or need to be within the desired timescale? CEA is, predominantly, the commander's concern. Due to the planning and assessment effort necessary to review campaign progress properly, CEA is conducted to a timetable that best meets a commanders needs, based on the scale, complexity and tempo of operations. CEA may be carried out daily or weekly, but is likely to occur on a monthly (or longer) basis.

11.10 **Campaign Assessment Hierarchy.** There is a hierarchical relationship between campaign objectives, decisive conditions, supporting effects, and activities.



Figure 11-1: Assessment categories.

Decisive conditions are the specific combination of circumstances deemed necessary to achieve a campaign objective. Supporting effects are the intended consequences of actions or activity.
Figure 11-1 shows how the three categories of assessment relate:

11.11 **Assessment Planning.** As decisive conditions, supporting effects, and activities are derived, assessment measures must be simultaneously developed for each. Consideration should also be given to the identification of unintended consequences and the development of appropriate measures to capture them. Planning for evidence gathering (what is to be gathered, when, by whom and for what purpose) is conducted collaboratively. An assessment framework could be used (see below). Assessment includes operational analysis to evaluate, develop and incorporate lessons identified. A Red Team[118] can help to refine the understanding of what has been achieved.

11.12 **Assessment in all the Domains.** Evidence across the physical, virtual and cognitive domains is needed. Results of activities conducted in the environmental domains will generally be easier to measure. However, in stabilisation measuring psychological effects in the human domain may deliver greater insights. How people feel and what people think will be vital indicators of campaign progress. Much evidence for physical MOE can be obtained from routine J2 and J3 reporting. Cyberspace domain information

[118] For further information on Red teaming see the DCDC Guidance Note – *Guide to Red Teaming (2nd Edition).*

Figure 11-2: Assessment includes operational analysis to evaluate, develop, and incorporate lessons identified.

may be obtained from media output analysis, including internet and on-line sources along with analysis of the more traditional broadcast and published media. Insights into the human domain may be obtained from Rules of Engagement (HUMINT), Signals Intelligence and wider human factors research. In stabilisation, the need to understand the perceptions of target groups places a premium on representative material gathered by opinion polling and focus group engagement, for example.

Real-Life Example

Campaign Assessment Framework – an Example from Afghanistan, 2009

The Campaign Assessment Framework (CAF) reflects the Commander's Intent and the conditions that enable success. The framework is nested within Joint Force Commander-Brunssum's (JFC-B) campaign framework. All operation plans are synchronised and linked to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) End-state. The CAF reflects the Line of Operation (LOO) set by the Afghan National Development Strategy, which is owned by the Government of Afghanistan. The specific LOO are: Security, Governance and Development; each of which has to achieve specified enduring effects to achieve the Commander's Intent.

11.13 **Looking Beyond Military Activity.** A risk is that assessment will be conducted by government departments to validate their own activities. While not entirely nugatory, it may provide different departments with differing understanding of overall progress. What may be deemed good progress by one could be perceived as a setback by another. For this reason, CEA should link into a broader assessment process that is designed to capture and, at the highest level, provide a unified indication of campaign progress. There is currently no cross-Government or multinational stabilisation assessment methodology, and therefore this will demand a high level of information sharing and collaboration. This makes it essential that these issues are discovered and resolved during planning.

11.14 **Integrating Non-Military Evidence.** Evidence should not be limited to military sources. Other government departments (OGDs) can provide useful information, often through departmental assessments such as diplomatic cables. The headquarters should use its access with imagination, for example, data on attendance at health clinics. Visits to a clinic may be discretionary, for instance for routine treatment, or non-discretionary, for life-saving intervention. If the security situation is poor, the number of discretionary visits will drop. If they rise, it may be that the population perceive an improvement in their security, and feel more confident about venturing out. By examining the reasons for attendance, an indirect assessment of perceived security is obtained. Where raw data is provided from non-military or governmental sources, such as from a non-governmental organisation (NGO), care must be taken to ensure consistency of reporting criteria, to avoid slewing comparative results over time if the data set is modified.

Points to Consider When Evaluating Evidence in Assessment

11.15 **Reducing Bias.** Evidence must be evaluated before it can be used to support decision making. Noting human vulnerability to intentional deception, unintentional bias and groupthink, peer review, objectivity and moral courage are essential.

11.16 **Integration.** In Iraq following the 2007 Crocker/Petraeus review, an integrated assessment staff was assembled. They were called the Joint Strategy Plans and Assessments team. This enabled comprehensive review and adjustment to an integrated plan. It encompassed all LOO, tracking for example, take-up of small business micro-loans.

Real-Life Example

Integration in action – an example from Afghanistan

In December 2008, the Afghan Assessment Group (AAG) formed in Headquarters ISAF to institutionalise and lead a process of integrated assessment that combined products from the Afghan Government, UN Assistance Mission Afghanistan, embassies, NATO and other campaign partners. The AAG consists of a leadership and integration element and two assessment branches: the Operations Analysis Branch; and the Lessons Learned Branch. In addition, the AAG is capable of drawing upon wider analysis through reach-out. The AAG enables transparent sharing of information between the wider community, both horizontally and vertically, to form an integrated picture of overall campaign progress.

Using Assessment to Support Decision Making

11.17 **Informing Judgement.** MOP and MOE inform reviews of current plans, while CEA supports longer term plans. Periodically, all the trends derived from analysis must be brought together to prompt and set some of the parameters for a strategic conversation. This may be known as a Commander's Assessment and Synchronisation Board, but critically, it brings together the leaders of all the key partners to take stock and issue new comprehensive direction.

11.18 **Linkages.** The link between activity and conditions is often apparent – for example, between fires and their physical conditions. This may be less evident in stabilisation. Although changes in behaviour and attitude may be associated with identifiable activity, only history will judge whether those effects were caused by specific activities. Even when strong causal relationships are identified, care must be taken to ensure that they are applied in a contextually sensitive manner, as the cause and effect linkage may be circumstantial and difficult to replicate.

CHAPTER 12:

ANTICIPATE, LEARN, AND ADAPT

CONTENTS

Adaptive Adversaries

12.01 Adversaries exploit the opportunities that global communications provide to publicise the propaganda of the deed, to mobilise transnational support, and to share the tactics that capitalise on our vulnerabilities. This gives them resilience and agility; some adapt at unprecedented rates. We have to anticipate, learn, and adapt if we are to succeed. These should not be seen as linear or sequential activities, but mutually supporting attributes that shape military action.

Cultural and Organisation Requirements

12.02 This chapter sets out an approach for military organisations to become anticipatory, learning, and adaptive organisations in order to gain and maintain the initiative. To be fully effective, this will need to be integrated locally, internationally and with inter-agency partners.

The Requirement

To Anticipate

12.03 A force which is able to anticipate is better prepared than one which is simply responsive. Anticipation involves looking ahead and predicting what may happen in the future, and then instigating pre-emptive measures to shape and exploit events; it is key to seizing and maintaining the initiative. This requires a sophisticated understanding of the operational environment and competing groups. The aim is to derive a position whereby it is possible to assess how these target groups are likely to react to a given situation. Anticipation is an attribute that should be common in all military thinking and present from pre-deployment planning to tactical action. To achieve it, commanders will need to apply a continuous process of learning and a refinement of understanding.

To Learn

12.04 **Challenges to Learning.** Although learning is a collective activity, individual leaders can play a crucial role in its development. The responsibility for learning rests with commanders, who will need to drive the process and overcome institutional inertia to it. To overcome this, innovation should be instilled into all officers through education, training and through the conduct of operations.

12.05 **Measures of Effectiveness.** The ability to learn within a military organisation is tightly linked to the measures of effectiveness (MOE) process – to act, to measure, to learn. Within stabilisation, the desired conditions are principally focused on changing the perceptions of target audiences. The identification of assessment criteria is essential and requires a balance of judgement and empirical evidence supported, but not driven, by statistical evidence. Traditional MOE such as equipment destroyed or enemy dead is unlikely to be appropriate within a stabilisation environment. More detail on MOE is given in chapter two.

To Adapt

12.06 **Enhancing the Ability to Adapt.** In order to become adaptive, it is necessary to develop the organisational structures, mechanisms and procedures that facilitate rapid conceptual and physical modification, and innovation. The challenge this poses for the armed forces of a western democratic state are significant. While a non-state adversary's primary focus is only the current conflict at hand, the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) is by necessity, forced to prepare and structure for a far wider range of other tasks. The traditional focus on inter-state warfighting, combined with the level of political and procedural accountability involved in major conceptual or structural change can restrain adaptation.

12.07 **Timely Adaption.** The fostering of an adaptive environment is not risk-free. By constantly seeking change, the need for persistence becomes neglected. Judgement is needed to weigh up potential risks before implementing change.

- **Adaptation v Persistence.** To maintain pressure on the enemy, and to achieve military objectives, there will be moments when the commander may judge that more time is needed for the effects of a particular

Figure 12-1: New Zealand Defence Force personnel have to be trained to anticipate, learn, and adapt if they are to succeed against adversaries.

activity to be realised – to persist. Just because there are high levels of violence and casualties does not necessarily mean the mission is failing. In such cases, changes should be delayed and the commander must ensure that this need to persist is clearly articulated and understood within and outside the military.

- **Timely and Appropriate Implementation.** Major adaptations, for example to reorganise or retrain the force, take time. They are even more demanding when forces are heavily engaged in operations. Ideally, windows of opportunity will be identified in which to make changes, but it is more probable that the need for change will only be identified after forces have been heavily committed. Adaptation in such a case may carry significant risk and may only be achievable by withdrawing elements of the force from contact. Where this entails giving ground, the commander will need to articulate the risks and benefits of maintaining the current approach against instigating the necessary changes.

Real-Life Example

Anticipation – Slim in Burma

Field Marshal The Viscount Slim, when commander of the 14th Army in Burma in 1942, realised that his force, at that time optimised for fighting in close jungle in the north of the theatre, was not correctly trained or configured to exploit the situation when he broke out into the open plains of the south. Months before he would achieve this breakout he re-organised and trained his Army for the demands of mobile warfare to exploit the future situation.

12.08 **The Physical Ability to Adapt.** In addition to an intellectual quality, there must be the physical ability to instigate change across NZDF's components of capability[119] in a pre-emptive and agile manner. Such agility will be underpinned by retaining sufficient breadth of expertise within Defence, which can be rapidly exploited to meet the demands of a specific situation. A commander will be focused on their ability to adapt existing capabilities to meet the requirements of the theatre. This will often require new and novel approaches, and the development of new technologies, to then be inculcated into the force through training. Such developments may impact on investment priorities in the equipment and force preparation programmes. Gaining the authority, budgets and physical means to instigate change are pre-conditions to adaptation. A key policy decision will be whether New Zealand is embarking on a very short-term intervention operation or a longer campaign. This will set the tone for the level of pan-Defence investment and commitment. A campaign footing will be required as soon as transition to an enduring operation becomes clear. But this is a difficult judgment to make. Moreover, it is a political decision rather than a military one. Although the decision to move to a campaign footing may trigger the necessary investment, such as theatre specific training teams and infrastructure, it is likely to be at an opportunity cost for the government or even Defence, and might entail losing, or re-prioritising other capabilities and programmes.

Learn and Adapt Cycles

12.09 **Levels of Anticipation, Learning, and Adaption.** Anticipation, learning and adaptation are relevant at all levels of command. At the strategic level, the end state and campaign objectives are defined within the wider comprehensive plan – these may need to be revised if earlier assumptions are disproved. At the operational level, as commanders learn more about the environment and their own force's effectiveness within it, the campaign objectives may need adapting. Within the force, commanders must establish responsive mechanisms that not only encourage and facilitate learning at the operational and tactical levels, but also adaptation at the necessary tempo. Examples are in-theatre induction and refresher training or Counter-insurgency (COIN) Academies used in Iraq and Afghanistan. The commander must ensure that an atmosphere of learning exists within the entire force. Confidence in this can only be provided by the continuous, honest and aggressive extraction of lessons and their incorporation into the campaign design.

[119] PRICIE – Personnel, Research and Development, Infrastructure, and Organisation, Concepts, Doctrine and Training, Information Management, Equipment and Logistics.

Commanders should ensure that the mechanisms to question assumptions and to share best practice are established. These must be between levels of national command, but also across levels of command at both the multinational and inter-agency levels.

12.10 **Critical Deductions.** Lessons are often only identified when errors have been made. A key deduction will be to determine whether the error was caused due to poor execution (a relatively simple issue to address), or an incorrect approach. The latter is more challenging to remedy and will require greater effort to address it. The pre-eminent question we should ask is:

- are we doing the right things?
- are we doing things right?
- are the right things, done properly, getting us where we want to go or need to be within the desired timescale?

12.11 **Learn and Adapt Cycle.** The most successful examples of adaptation use a 5-step cycle. The NZDF uses a systematic and internationally validated Systems Approach to Learning (SAL) that supports training, education and workplace experience systems. The SAL is the approved methodology for analysis, design and development. An adaptation of the Analysis, Design, Development, Implementation and Evaluation (ADDIE) model, the SAL model should be applied while on operations, during training and daily work. The first step is to analyse. This is driven by constant review of the operational environment and the military capability required to identify gaps and determine the change in approach necessary – perhaps through practical experience, applied research or drawing on intellectual or innovative thinking. Once a problem has been identified, further information may be required to identify a solution and may require a collection methodology to be designed and conducted. Collection may occur as the result of a focussed effort to address a problem identified at a higher level, or when the expected outcomes of an activity were either not met or exceeded. Once enough information to satisfy the analysis and design stage has been gathered, a solution may be developed. A solution or a decision about the change of approach should be made and codified either through policy, the campaign plan, doctrine, Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) or tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). In the implementation stage, those tasked and resourced during the Design Stage will develop and action an implementation plan. This will see the solution inculcated into the organisation, primarily through education and training, but also through organisational changes and the employment of new technologies and equipment, in order to alter practice,



Figure 12-2: The New Zealand Defence Force Systems Approach to Learning.

finally evaluation monitors implementation to confirm that it has been successful. This is shown graphically in Figure 12-2.

12.12 **Increasing the Tempo.** Any system for capturing lessons needs to be supported by evidence for analysis. The commander has an important role in ensuring honest and open reporting, which may reveal poor performance or lack of success. The NZDF derives lessons from many routes including:

- lessons identified in post-operational reports and theatre headquarters
- post-tour debrief of commanders and senior staff at the Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand (HQJFNZ)
- post-operational interviews conducted by single-Service training centres.

12.13 Because the NZDF's force elements are not specifically optimised for stabilisation, the tempo and coverage of these processes should be monitored for their sufficiency to complete the learn and adapt cycle. To achieve this, the three step learn and adapt cycle needs to be conducted at two levels. They are intrinsically linked, but necessarily revolve at different speeds.

12.14 **Strategic Level.** At this level, the cycle is concerned with institutionalising patterns of practice, organisational structures and equipment procurement. This provides the foundation for operational capability. It is enacted via the agencies that are responsible for extracting lessons and developing concepts and ideas. Necessary changes may be captured in revised policy and/or codified within NZDF joint doctrine, and implemented through changes to the equipment programme, and/or implemented through appropriate education and courses within training establishments. It should balance the requirements across the span of military tasks (both now and in the future). This process is slow as it needs to gain wide consensus before change is accepted but also requires alignment of funding and resources at the portfolio level as well as a need to meet programme and project governance and methodology. The commander has a role in influencing and accelerating this cycle.

12.15 **Theatre Level.** The theatre level is concerned with the specific requirements of the campaign. At this level the cycle must be quick enough to maintain the initiative. The process will be driven by the commander, who can codify new approaches through the production of local guidance, and by changing the structure of the force. This will require both new organisations and processes, and existing ones to be bent out of shape. For example, a decentralised approach to stabilisation will require intelligence processes that are sufficiently de-centralised to work out how a network of adversaries both links with other networks and with the population; the emphasis shifting from finding to understanding. Similarly, it will be necessary to design and implement at high tempo an Information effort that will resonate with locals, rather than rely on over-centralised Information Operations approaches. Local guidance can take the form of commander's guidance notes, an operational handbook, headquarters' SOPs or force element TTPs. Whatever its form, the commander should have the resources to inculcate it rapidly into the force through the adaptation of organisational structures, leadership and training, either as an aspect of in-theatre continuation training or as part of pre-deployment training.

12.16 **Releasing the Potential.** In-theatre mechanisms, supported by staff capacity, are needed to allow the force to learn and adapt quickly. This is done by sharing experience, identifying best practice, and codifying them. Simple techniques such as in-theatre training camps and the use of force elements with recent experience to train incoming ones are effective. Mission command and decentralised control must underpin a force's ability to learn and adapt, and an open atmosphere must be developed with an institutional understanding to operate across, if not break down hierarchical layering. Allied with Communications and Information Systems (CIS), opportunistic networks can be established to exploit the experience and initiative of individuals at all levels, and allow them to adapt. The use of these emerging media needs careful management to ensure that bad practices are not spread as well as good, but their potential for positive effect is significant.

12.17 **Networks via Reachout.** Tapping the expertise that exists in the home-base may be achieved by linking the commander to a network of experts in New Zealand (or wider) through a single point of contact. This spiders-web of contacts and subject-matter experts might be coordinated through, for example, either the Operational Team or J8 at HQJFNZ, to deliver tailored responses to questions for which the expertise is not available in theatre. This approach may be used to develop understanding about the motivations of interlocutors, or finding a wider range of potential levers to influence host-nation leaders.

12.18 **Completing the Loop.** Effective concepts that have been proved effective on operations should be codified and incorporated into doctrine. This will ensure that such enduring lessons are inculcated through training and education into future generations. It is important that organisational structures and mechanisms are continually assessed to ensure best practice. The deployment of operational lessons teams into theatre, to hunt for lessons and to advise on priorities in order to effect the necessary changes in the NZDF should be seriously considered as part of any theatre/campaign plan.

12.19 **Adaptive Employment.** Customised capabilities are needed to conduct stabilisation. These range from high-end combat capabilities optimised for precision strike, through the training of host-nation forces, to the support of host-nation governance. None is likely to possess sufficient skills or experience to do them all well. Some tasks require specialist preparation. Certain appointments need the right individual, with continuity of appointment often being critical. To achieve this, commanders need to allocate unit tasks and appoint individuals selectively on their merits. This requires adaptive force generation and manning polices. Commanders will need to shape force generation processes, and influence personnel selections for critical tasks.

12.20 **Total Immersion.** Understanding local conditions and culture is always challenging for those who are deployed for the short term. Some states, and even regions within them, may merit the employment



Figure 12-3: Network via reachout.

of military officers who become specialists in the personalities, culture and geography of a region. This can be achieved through immersion and repeated tours. These officers can develop personal relationships and the local awareness that may provide the means to enable deployed task forces to anticipate events and adapt to local conditions.

Enabling an Anticipatory, Learning, and Adaptive Organisation

12.21 The following list provides some guidance to commanders on activity to enable organisational anticipation, learning and adaptation:

- Anticipation:
  - develop an in-depth understanding of the operating environment in order to recognise patterns and the significance of fragmented activity. Make plans based on this knowledge enabled by commanders having the opportunity to think and reflect
  - gain an understanding from multinational, inter-agency and joint sources of how target groups are likely to react to a given situation and prepare for it in advance.
- Learning:
  - consult widely to understand local political, cultural and social dynamics outside the military's traditional field of expertise
  - coordinate closely with governmental and non-government partners at all levels of command
  - develop a military culture that challenges institutional assumptions of the situation, both formally and informally
  - foster open communications between senior officers and their subordinates
  - be open to solutions suggested from the field
  - solicit the understanding of local people (hostile and friendly) and be sensitive to their evaluation of the situation in the conflict zone.
- Adaptation:
  - establish rapid mechanisms to disseminate lessons
  - develop doctrine and practices locally
  - establish in-theatre training facilities (for national and host-nation forces).

ANNEX A:
FORCE PREPARATION

The Requirement

12.22 **Maintaining the Edge.** Force preparation must not become separated from the operational environment; it must replicate the complexity and challenges that are likely to be demanded. The increasing complex demands of the operational environment and the growing range, reach and adaptability of adversaries requires an agile, adaptive approach. Anticipation and learning is necessary to prepare and adapt the force accordingly – conceptually, physically and morally – in order to identify and respond to emerging threats as well as exploit opportunities. Early investment will be essential for the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) to make the decisions necessary to equip commanders and trainers with the resources required in time.

12.23 **Balance of Preparation.** Only a limited number of the NZDF's available force elements are likely to be optimised for the demands of stabilisation. Therefore tailored individual, collective and mission specific preparation is required. There are three broad areas of force preparation:

- **Education and Training.** Developing the education and training mechanisms to plan and execute comprehensive activity. These should include a deep understanding of the utility of force and alternative methods of realising security objectives or conditions. Additionally, a greater emphasis on intelligence preparation and the gathering and exploitation of actionable intelligence from a wider variety of sources will be required, underpinned by effective information management.
- **Mind-set.** Establishing the culture and mind-set within a force for security and stabilisation.
- **Tactics.** The inculcation of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to conduct the range of military operations and activities within a complex stabilisation operation.

12.24 **Organisational Education.** Education develops mental power and understanding; training prepares people, individually or collectively, for given tasks in given circumstances; train for what is known, educate for the unknown. Operations will always be uncertain. Notwithstanding efforts to anticipate, it is impossible to predict, or plan for all eventualities. Therefore, there must be a degree to which the military react to events. Education provides a flexible and resilient foundation upon which to build the training. To be effective, professional stabilisation education will need to be conducted at a lower level than perhaps it has been undertaken previously to develop the understanding required early enough to be of real value. Additionally, revisions to professional military education should give greater emphasis to inter-agency and multinational integration.

12.25 **Self-Education.** Self-education is an essential part of building wider expertise. Commanders and staffs now have to be capable of much more than the professional management of military force. Acknowledging the vast and varied nature of writing on this subject, the selective additional material, most developed by our traditional friends is available on the NZDF Doctrine Intranet site.

Effective Preparation

12.26 **Warfighting Ethos.** Preparation must maintain our ability to succeed in a violent and austere environment. This will establish and strengthen the common standards of conduct and achievement to create trust and understanding that enables the integration of joint activity. The assumption that readiness for warfighting alone will provide the necessary qualities and expertise to conduct stabilisation missions with limited additional preparation is incorrect. Instead, the development of sufficient stabilisation understanding and expertise, and the right mind-set within the force, during both generic and mission specific preparation will be vital.

12.27 **Preparing for Stabilisation.** Stabilisation requires appropriate force structures, doctrine and experience to operate effectively with a wide spectrum of multinational, inter-agency and host-nation partners. Additionally, the requirement to influence the population, provide security and develop host-nation capability is likely to be manpower intensive. Organisations solely based on lean warfighting structures are likely to be inadequate without significant augmentation and preparation. This is relevant to Maritime, Land and Air force elements and force generation must take this into account.

12.28 **Replicating the Operating Environment.** Training and exercises need to be conducted in the conditions and environments that most closely represent the complexity, intensity and scale that might be expected on operations. Training must develop familiarity and proficiency in operating with coalition forces, resulting, as far as possible, in cultural understanding, interoperability and procedural alignment to develop the cohesion required. In particular, it is essential that personnel be exposed to training that as closely as possible reflects the sights, sounds, sensations and decision making challenges that will be encountered on operations. This includes the need to give commanders experience during training that will allow them to develop an understanding of the different levels of the operation.

12.29 **Train as Intended to Operate.** All stabilisation forces should train as they intend to operate in order to develop the teamwork, understanding and procedures that will be needed for a specific operation. This will require units to gain increased exposure to a wide range of military, civilian and multinational capabilities during preparation so that dispersed individuals and units are able to function as an effective network. This will challenge traditional models of force generation where Joint and Multinational preparation is reserved for the final stages only. In order to operate as a network, greater Joint, inter-agency and multinational integration will be required at lower tactical levels. Stabilisation requires greater emphasis at lower command levels in the use of Command and Control (C2) applications, exploiting information, conducting engagement and controlling organic and Joint fires. Additionally, training as forces intend to operate should not be interpreted as advocating rigid force structures. The stabilisation environment will require the ability to force package in a more dynamic comprehensive manner and decentralise decision making.

12.30 **Infrastructure.** The provision of appropriate training infrastructure is an essential requirement for effective individual and collective preparation. Adequate infrastructure must therefore be developed to enable the education and training of individuals and units to support stabilisation. A balance will need to be struck between long-term investment in fixed infrastructures and more modular and deployable assets to enhance flexibility.

12.31 **Exploiting Technology.** Technology and networked capabilities should be exploited to enable dispersed civil-military elements to train together from home locations as well as to simulate the complexity of, and interaction necessary in, the operating environment. Whenever possible, systems and data used in simulations and synthetic training should be the same as are being used for real. This demands ready access to the relevant data sets and systems to enable the physical and cultural characteristics of the operational theatre to be represented. Additionally, a networked deployable capability will enhance in-theatre training whilst exploiting resources remaining in New Zealand through reachout. This can support connectivity and information sharing between those about to deploy, those in theatre and those with recent operational experience. These networks are commonly known as communities of practice.

Wider Preparation

12.32 **Preparing the New Zealand Support Base.** The NZDF, in conjunction with other government departments (OGDs), will need to develop and implement methods that allow access to the resources of the New Zealand support base in order to assist with comprehensive stabilisation activities. Direct support will typically include: access to New Zealand based reserve forces, specialised and contractual capabilities;

and resort to the resources and capacity of both state and commercial sectors, such as the provision of health care. At the same time, it may be necessary to put in place measures to safeguard the New Zealand support base and lines of communication in the event of an attack or threat.

12.33 **Health.** Confidence in the effectiveness and availability of health care provision and services will be a critical factor in supporting the Moral Component. For short notice operations that take place outside temperate zones, consideration will have to be given to the scale of prophylaxis and health preparation required. Similarly, time may need to be allocated for acclimatisation and conditioning when operating in unfamiliar, challenging conditions.

12.34 **Welfare Support.** Sufficient camp infrastructure and welfare support must also continue to be developed for deployed NZDF forces and, equally importantly, for their families and the force elements left behind. This must increasingly be provided throughout New Zealand and elsewhere as Service personnel settle their families away from military bases. Such welfare support must also include the ability to manage the media and protect families from intrusive reporting.

12.35 **Acquisition Cycle.** For equipment to be successfully exploited on operations, it must be introduced in such a way as to allow the necessary training prior to operational employment. This will require sufficient equipment to be held to enable both preparation for and concurrent engagement on operations, and means that the supporting capabilities required for preparation should be accounted for in acquisition decisions. Equipment acquisition must also be timely, thus the Capability Management Framework will require considered tailoring especially for Urgent Operational Requirements (UOR). The management of UOR post a campaign will require careful consideration in relationship to cost of ownership and core capability requirements.

GLOSSARY

Terms and Definitions

The references quoted in brackets in this glossary are source documents. The source documents are listed below.

AAP-6 *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions for Use in NATO*

ADDP 2.0 *Intelligence*

ADDP 2.3 *Geospatial Information and Services*

ADDP 3.11 *Civil Military Operations*

ADDP 3.14 *Targeting*

ADFP 04.1.1 *Glossary*

AJP 3.4.1 *Peace Support Operations*

AJP 3.4.4 *Allied Joint Doctrine for Counter Insurgency*

JDP 0-01 *British Defence Doctrine* (3rd Edition)

JDP 0-01.1 *United Kingdom Glossary for Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions*

JDP 01 *Campaigning* (2nd Edition)

JDP 2-00 *Intelligence* (3rd Edition)

JDP 3-00 *Campaign Execution*

JDP 3-40 *Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution*

JDP 3-62 *Combat ID*

JDP 3-70 *Battlespace Management*

JDP 3-80.1 *PYSOPs, OPSEC, and Deception*

JDP 5-00 *Campaign Planning*

JP 1-02 *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*

JWP 3-45.1 *Media Operations*

NZDDP–00.1 *Command and Control in the New Zealand Defence Force*

NZDDP–3.0 *Campaigns and Operations* (2nd Edition)

NZDDP–4.0 *Defence Logistics*

NZDDP-D *New Zealand Defence Doctrine* (3rd Edition)

Adversaries (JDP 3.40)

Groups who oppose the host government and international force, and who possess a willingness to employ violence against them, in addition to other subversive techniques such as instigating civil disorder by exploiting legal demonstrations, strikes, or exacerbating political discontent.

Agency (JDP 0-01.1)

A distinct non-military body which has objectives that is broadly consistent with those of the campaign.

Analysis JDP 01 (2nd Edition)

- The examination of all the constituent elements of a situation, and their interrelationships, in order to obtain a thorough understanding of the past, present and anticipated future operational context.
- In intelligence usage, a step in the processing phase of the intelligence cycle in which information is subjected to review in order to identify significant facts for subsequent interpretation. (AAP-6).

Area of Operations (NZDDP–3.0)

An area of operations (AO) is an operational area defined by the joint commander for land or maritime forces to conduct military activities. Normally, an AO does not encompass the entire JFAO, but is sufficient in size for a joint commander to accomplish assigned missions and protect forces.

Area of Interest (NZDDP–3.0)

An area of interest is that area of concern to the joint commander. It includes the area of influence and adjacent areas, and extends into enemy territory for current or planned operations. This also includes areas occupied by enemy forces that could jeopardise the accomplishment of the mission.

Campaign (NZDDP-D)

A controlled series of simultaneous or sequential operations designed to achieve an operational commander's objective, normally within a given time or space.

Campaign Authority (JDP 01)

The authority established by international forces, agencies and organisations within a given situation in support of (or in place of) an accepted (or ineffective, even absent) indigenous government or organisation.

Note: It is an amalgam of four inter-dependent factors: the perceived legitimacy of the authorisation or mandate for action; the perceived legitimacy of the manner in which those exercising the mandate conduct themselves both individually and collectively; the degree to which factions, local populations and others accept the authority of those executing the mandate; and the degree to which the aspirations of factions, local populations and others are managed or met by those executing the mandate.

Campaign Design (JDP 01)

Campaign Design develops and refines the commander's (and staff's) ideas to provide detailed, executable and successful plans.

Campaign Effectiveness Assessment (JDP 01)

Evaluation of campaign progress based on levels of subjective and objective measurement, in order to inform decision-making.

Campaign End-state (JDP 01)

The extent of the Joint Force Commander's contribution to meeting the National Strategic Aim.

Campaign Management (JDP 01)

Campaign Management integrates, coordinates, synchronises and prioritises the execution of operations and assesses progress.

Campaign Objective (JDP 01)

A goal, expressed in terms of one or more decisive conditions that needs to be achieved in order to meet the National Strategic Aim.

Campaign Rhythm (JDP 01)

The regular recurring sequence of events and actions harmonised across a Joint force, to regulate and maintain control of a campaign.

Centre of Gravity (NZDDP-D)

That characteristic, capability or locality from which a military force, nation, or alliance derives its freedom of action, strength or will to fight at that level of conflict. The centre of gravity at each level of conflict may consist of a number of key elements. Also called CoG.

Civil-military Cooperation (ADDP 3.11)

The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the joint commander and civil actors, including the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and nongovernmental organisations and agencies.

Civil-military Operations (ADDP 3.11)

Operations conducted in support of military operations, or in times of emergency, aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of a military force or civil operation and reducing the negative aspects of military operations on civilians.

Close Air Support (AAP-6)

Air action against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces.

Coalition (JP 1-02)

An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action.

Collation (AAP-6)

In intelligence usage, a step in the processing phase of the intelligence cycle in which the grouping together of related items of information or intelligence provides a record of events and facilitates further processing.

Collection (AAP-6)

The exploitation of sources by collection agencies and the delivery of the information obtained to the appropriate processing unit for use in the production of intelligence.

Combat Service Support (AAP-6)

The support provided to combat forces, primarily in the fields of administration and logistics.

Combat Support (AAP-6)

Fire support and operational assistance provided to combat elements.

Command (NZDDP–00.1)

The authority that a commander in a military Service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of their rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organising, directing, coordinating and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale and discipline of assigned personnel.

Note: It comprises three closely inter-related elements: leadership, decision-making (including risk assessment) and control.

Commander's Intent (NZDDP–3.0)

A formal statement, usually in the concept of operations or general outline of orders, given to provide clear direction on the commander's intentions.

Comprehensive Approach (NZDDP-D)

An approach that responds effectively to complex crises by orchestrating, coordinating and de-conflicting the activities of the military, other government departments and, where possible, international organisations and nongovernmental organisations.

Contingency Plan (AAP-6)

A plan which is developed for possible operations where the planning factors have identified or can be assumed. This plan is produced in as much detail as possible, including the resources needed and deployment options, as a basis for subsequent planning.

Contingency Planning (JDP 5-00 (2nd Edition))

Planning, in advance, for potential military activity in the future.

Contingents (JDP 0-01.1)

Force elements of one nation grouped under one or more multinational component commanders subordinate to the Joint Task Force Commander.

Control (NZDDP–00.1)

The authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organisations, or other organisations not normally under their command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives. All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated.

Counter-intelligence (NZDDP–2.1)

- That aspect of intelligence devoted to destroying the effectiveness of hostile foreign intelligence activities and to the protection of information against espionage, individuals against subversion and installations, equipment, records or material against sabotage.
- That aspect of intelligence devoted to identifying, assessing, monitoring and counteracting the threat posed by hostile intelligence activities and organisations or individuals engaged in overt, covert or clandestine activity such as espionage, sabotage, subversion or terrorism.

Countering-irregular Activity (JDP 01)

The coordinated measures, incorporating military activity with the other instruments of power within a Comprehensive Approach that deal with the threats to security from irregular activity, while building governance and authority and addressing the underlying causes.

Counter-insurgency (AJP-3.4.4 – proposed modification to AAP-6 definition)

- The set of political, economic, social, military, law enforcement, civil and psychological activities

required to defeat insurgency and address any core grievances. (AJP-3.4.4 – Proposed modification to AAP-6 definition).

- Those military, paramilitary, political, economic psychological and civic actions taken to defeat insurgency. (AAP-6).

Crisis Management (BDD (5th Edition))

The process of preventing, containing or resolving crises before they develop into armed conflict, while simultaneously planning for possible escalation.

Crisis Response Planning (JDP 5-00 (2nd Edition))

Planning, often at short notice, to determine an appropriate military response to a current or imminent crisis.

Deliberate Planning (NZDDP–5.0)

A continuous planning activity that identifies a range of potential military responses to possible scenarios.

Decisive Condition (JDP 01 (2nd Edition))

A specific combination of circumstances deemed necessary to achieve a campaign objective.

Directive (NZDDP–3.0)

- A military communication in which policy is established or a specific action is ordered.
- A plan issued with a view to putting it into effect when so directed, or in the event that a stated contingency arises.
- Broadly speaking, any communication which initiates or governs action, conduct or procedure.

Failed State (JDP 3-40)

A failed state is where remnants of a host-nation government, or some form of potential host-nation government, may still exist.

Note: However, in such states, the government does not have a monopoly on the use of force, cannot provide security or simple basic services, and is not sufficiently legitimate or effective to protect its borders, citizens, or even itself. It may exert a very weak level of governance and rule of law in all or part of the state but, overall, the mechanisms and tools of governance have largely collapsed.

Fires (NZDDP–3.0)

The use of weapon systems to create a specific lethal or non-lethal effect on a target.

Force Protection (AAP-6)

All measures and means to minimize the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, equipment and operations to any threat and in all situations, to preserve freedom of action and the operational effectiveness of the force.

Fragile State (JDP 3-40)

A fragile state still has a viable host-nation government, but it has a reduced capability and capacity to secure, protect and govern the population. Without intervention, it is likely to become a failed state.

Framework Nation (JDP 3-00 (3rd Edition))

Forces generated under a 'framework nation' are commanded by an officer from that nation, which also provides a significant proportion of the staff and support to the headquarters.

Note: The framework nation is also likely to dictate the language and procedures adopted.

Fratricide (JDP 3-62)

The accidental death or injury which occurs when friendly forces engage their own forces believing either them, or their location, to be an enemy target.

Geospatial Information (ADDP 2.3)

Spatial data and other related information exploited to produce geospatial intelligence and other geospatial products such as maps and charts.

Geospatial Intelligence (ADDP 2.3)

Intelligence derived from the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information about features and events, with reference to location and time.

Human Intelligence (ADFP 04.1.1)

A category of Intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. Also called HUMINT.

Human Factors (JDP 3-62)

The study of how humans behave physically and psychologically in relation to particular environments.

Human Security (JDP 01)

Human Security is characterised by: freedom from persecution, want and fear; adequate provision of essential commodities to sustain life; broader environmental security; and the protection of cultural values.

Humanitarian Assistance (AAP–6)

As part of an operation, the use of available military resources to assist or complement the efforts of responsible civil actors in the operational area or specialized civil humanitarian organizations in fulfilling their primary responsibility to alleviate human suffering.

Imagery Intelligence (ADDP 2.0)

Intelligence derived from the exploitation of imagery, acquired by photographic, radar, electro-optical, infra-red, thermal and multi-spectral sensors, which can be hand-held, ground-based, seaborne, or carried by air or space platforms.

Immediate Planning (NZDDP–5.0)

Operational planning that is undertaken within a compressed time scale to meet short-term, and usually unexpected, security challenges or crises.

Influence Activities (BDD (5th Edition))

The capability, or perceived capacity, to affect the character or behaviour of someone or something.

Information (AAP-6)

Unprocessed data of every description that may be used in the production of intelligence.

Information Management (JDP 01)

The integrated management processes and services that provide exploitable information on time, in the right place and format, to maximise freedom of action.

Information Strategy (JWP 3-45.1)

Coordinated information output of all government activity, undertaken to influence approved audiences in support of policy objectives.

Insurgency (AAP-6)

An organised movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.

Intelligence (AAP-6)

The product resulting from the processing of information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. The term is also applied to the activity which results in the product and to the organisations engaged in such activity.

Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (JDP 3-00)

The prioritised integration, coordination and synchronisation of capabilities and activities to acquire, process, and disseminate information and intelligence, to support the planning and execution of operations.

Inter-governmental Organisation (AJP 3.4.1)

An organisations that may be established by a constituent document such as a charter, a treaty or a convention, which when signed by the founding members, provides the organisation with legal recognition.

Interoperability (NZDDP-D)

The ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to, and accept services from, other systems,

units of forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.

Irregular Activity (JDP 01)

The use, or threat, of force, by irregular forces, groups or individuals, frequently ideologically or criminally motivated, to effect or prevent change as a challenge to governance and authority.

Note: Irregular Activity could include a mix of insurgency, terrorism, criminality and disorder.

Joint (NZPPP–3.0)

Connotes activities, operations, organisations, etc in which elements of more than one Service of the same nation participate.

Joint Action (JDP 01)

The deliberate use and orchestration of military capabilities and activities to realise effects on other actors' will, understanding and capability, and the cohesion between them.

Note: It is implemented through the coordination and synchronisation of Fires, Influence Activities and Manoeuvre.

Joint Commander (NZDDP–00.1)

The Joint Commander, appointed by the Chief of Defence Force, exercises the highest level of operational command of forces assigned with specific responsibility for deployments, sustainment and recovery.

Joint Enablers (JDP 3-70)

Operational activities that do not have an end unto themselves and are likely to be discrete lines of operation in achieving the end-state. Their principle purpose is to enable other activity to take place.

Joint Force (Adapted from ADFP-04.1.1(101))

A force which is composed of elements of the Navy, Army and Air Force, or two or more of these Services, operating under a single commander.

Joint Force Planning Group (JDP 0-01.1)

The Joint Force Planning Group, attended by the Joint Force Commander and normally chaired by their COS, is the forum where progress against the Campaign Plan is analysed and measured. From this assessment will come direction on contingency planning that can be undertaken to capitalise on favourable developments or indeed help to offset or overcome setbacks.

Joint Operations Area (JDP 0-01.1)

An area of land, sea and airspace defined by a higher authority, in which a designated Joint Task Force Commander plans and conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. A Joint Operations Area including its defining parameters, such as time, scope and geographic area, is contingency/mission specific.

Joint Task Force Commander (NZDDP–00.1)

The Joint Task Force Commander is the operational – and probably deployed – commander of a nominated joint force, normally exercising this authority under operational control.

Lead Nation (JDP 3-00 (3rd Edition))

Forces generated under a 'lead nation' are commanded by an officer from that nation, from their own Joint Force Headquarters (augmented with Liaison Officers, and potentially staff officers, from across the multinational force). The lead nation is responsible for planning and executing the operation, to which others contribute National Contingents and National Contingent Commanders.

Lines of Operation (NZDDP–3.0)

In a campaign or operation, a line Decisive Points in time and space on the path to the centre of gravity.

Main Effort (JDP 01 (2nd Edition))

The concentration of capability or activity in order to bring about a specific outcome.

Manoeuvre (NZDDP-D)

- A movement to place ships or aircraft in a position of advantage over the enemy.

- Employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission.

Manoeuvrist Approach (NZDDP-D)

The manoeuvrist approach seeks to shatter the enemy's cohesion through a series of actions orchestrated to a single purpose that creates a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope. The manoeuvrist approach focuses commanders at every level on exploiting enemy weaknesses, avoiding enemy strength and protecting friendly vulnerabilities.

Materiel and Personnel Exploitation (JDP 3-40)

The systematic collection, processing and dissemination of intelligence obtained as a result of tactical questioning, interrogation and the extraction of data from recovered materiel.

Measurement and Signature Intelligence (AAP-6)

Scientific and technical intelligence derived from the analysis of data obtained from sensing instruments for the purpose of identifying any distinctive features associated with the source, emitter or sender, to facilitate the latter's measurement and identification.

Measurement of Activity (JDP 01)

Assessment of the performance of a task and achievement of its associated purpose.

Measurement of Effect (JDP 01)

Assessment of the realisation of specified effects.

Measures of Effectiveness (JP-1-02)

A criterion used to assess changes in system behaviour, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. Also called MOE.

Measures of Performance (JP–1-02)

A criterion used to assess friendly actions that are tied to measuring task accomplishment. Also called MOP.

Media Operations (JDP 0-01.1)

That line of activity developed to ensure timely, accurate, and effective provision of Public Information (P Info) and implementation of Public Relations (PR) policy within the operational environment, whilst maintaining OPSEC.

Military Risk (JDP 01)

The probability and implications if an event of potentially substantive positive or negative consequences taking place.

Military Strategic End-state (JDP)

The extent of the Military Strategic Commander's contribution to meeting the National Strategic Aim, reached when all the Military Strategic Objectives have been achieved.

Military Strategic Objective (JDP 01)

Goals to be achieved by the military in order to meet the National Strategic Aim.

Mission Command (NZDDP-D)

Mission command is a philosophy for command and a system for conducting operations in which subordinates are given clear direction by a superior of their intentions, the result required, the task, the resources and any constraints. However, subordinates are allowed the freedom to decide how to achieve the required result.

Multi-agency (JDP 01 (2nd Edition))

Activities or operations in which multiple agencies, including national, international and non-state organisations and other actors, participate in the same or overlapping areas with varying degrees of inter-agency cooperation.

Multinational (AAP-6)

Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organisations, in which elements of more than one nation participate.

National Security (JDP 3-40)

The traditional understanding of security as encompassing 'the safety of a state or organisation and its protection from both external and internal threats'.

National Strategy (JDP 01)

The coordinated application of the instruments of national power in the pursuit of national policy aspirations.

National Strategic Aim (NZDDP–D)

The Government's declared purpose in a particular situation, normally expressed in terms of reaching a future desired outcome.

National Strategic Objective (NZDDP-D)

A goal to be achieved by one or more instruments of national power in order to meet the National Strategic Aim.

Non-governmental Organisation (JP 1-02)

A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organisation dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. Also called NGO.

Open Source Intelligence (ADDP 2.0)

Intelligence derived from publicly available information, as well as other unclassified information that has limited public distribution or access.

Operating Space (JDP 01)

All aspects of a Joint Operations Area within which activities, both military and non-military, take place. See also Joint Operations Area.

Operational Analysis (JDP 0-01.1)

The use of mathematical, statistical and other forms of analysis to explore situations and to help decision-makers resolve problems. Facts and probabilities are processed into manageable patterns relevant to the likely consequences of alternative courses of action.

Operational Art (NZDDP-D)

Operational art is the skilful employment of military forces to attain strategic goals through the design, organisation, sequencing and direction of campaigns and major operations. Operational art translates strategic into operational and ultimately tactical actions.

Operational Environment (JP 1-02)

A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander.

Operational Intelligence (ADDP 2.0)

Intelligence required for the planning and conduct of campaigns at the operational level.

Operational Level (NZDDP-D)

The operational level of conflict is concerned with the planning and conduct of campaigns. It is at this level that military strategy is implemented by assigning missions, tasks and resources to tactical operations.

Operation Order (AAP-6)

A directive, usually formal, issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation.

Operation Plan (AAP-6)

A plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession.

Note: It is usually based upon stated assumptions and is the form of directive employed by higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans and orders. The designation 'plan' is usually used instead of 'order' in preparing for operations well in advance. An operation plan may be put into effect at a prescribed time, or on signal, and then becomes the operation order. Also called OPLAN.

Operations Security (JDP 3-80.1)

The discipline which gives a military operation or exercise appropriate security, using active or passive means, to deny a target decision-maker knowledge of essential elements of friendly information.

Peace Support Operations (NZDDP-D)

A generic term describing operations that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means to restore or maintain peace. They are operations carried out under an appropriate mandate. Such operations may include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and peace-building.

Personal Security (JDP 3-40)

That part of human security which ensures protection of an individual from persecution, intimidation, reprisals and other forms of systematic violence.

Physical Security (JDP 3-40)

That part of National Security that relates to national assets and infrastructure.

Reachout (JDP 3-00)

Access to external expertise, information or functions.

Security (NZDDP–2.1)

The condition achieved when designated information, materiel, personnel, activities and installations are protected against espionage, sabotage, subversion and terrorism, as well as against loss or unauthorised disclosure. The term is also applied to those measures necessary to achieve this condition and to the organisations responsible for those measures.

- measures taken by a command to protect itself from espionage, sabotage, subversion,
- observation, annoyance or surprise.
- a condition which results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures to ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences.
- with respect to classified matter, it is the condition which deters unauthorised persons from attempting to gain access to official matter affecting national security.

Security Intelligence (ADDP 2.0)

Intelligence on the identity, capabilities and intentions of hostile organisations or individuals who are or may be engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion or terrorism.

Security Sector Reform (JDP 01)

The reform of security institutions to enable them to play an effective, legitimate and accountable role in providing external and internal security for their citizens under the control of a legitimate authority and to promote stability.

Signals Intelligence (ADDP 2.0)

The generic term to describe communications intelligence and electronic intelligence when there is no requirement to differentiate between these two types of intelligence, or to represent fusion of the two.

Single Intelligence Environment (JDP 2-00)

A Defence-wide approach and environment, enabled by architecture and process, through which appropriate and timely intelligence reaches the user based on operational need, rather than command hierarchy, classification or method of collection.

Situational Awareness (JDP 0-01.1)

The understanding of the operational environment in the context of a commander's (or staff officer's) mission (or task). Also called SA.

Stabilisation (JDP 3-40)

The process that supports states which are entering, enduring or emerging from conflict, in order to prevent or reduce violence; protect the population and key infrastructure; promote political processes and governance structures, which lead to a political settlement that institutionalises non-violent contests for power; and prepares for sustainable social and economic development.

Strategic Objective (JDP 01)

A goal to be achieved by one or more instruments of national power in order to meet the National Strategic Aim. See also National Strategic Aim.

Surveillance (AAP-6)

The systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means.

Supporting Effect (JDP 3.40)

The intended consequence of actions.

Sustainability (AAP-6)

The ability of a force to maintain the necessary level of combat power for the duration required to achieve its objectives.

Sustainment (ADDP 4.0)

The provision of personnel, logistic and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment of the mission or the national objective.

Target (AAP-6)

The object of a particular action, for example a geographic area, a complex, an installation, a force, equipment, an individual, a group or a system, planned for capture, exploitation, neutralisation or destruction by military forces.

Target Acquisition (JDP 2-00)

The detection, identification, and location of a target in sufficient detail to permit the effective implementation of Fires or Influence Activities.

Targeting (ADDP 3.14)

Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritising targets and matching the appropriate response to them taking account of operational requirements and capabilities.

Notes: Targeting is an integral part of Joint Action. It underpins the use and orchestration of all capabilities and activities (fires, influence activities and manoeuvre) to ensure that they are focused on realising intended effects.

Technical Intelligence (AAP-6)

Technical Intelligence concerns foreign technological developments, and the performance and operational capabilities of foreign materiel, which have or may eventually have a practical application for military purposes.

Tempo (JDP 0-01.1)

The rate or rhythm of activity relative to the enemy, within tactical engagements and battles and between major operations. It incorporates the capacity of the force to transition from one operation of war to another.

Theatre of Operations (JDP 01)

A geographical area, or more precisely a space, defined by the military-strategic authority, which includes and surrounds the area delegated to a Joint Force Commander (termed the Joint Operations Area), within which he conducts operations.

Time Sensitive Targets (ADDP 3.14)

A joint force commander designated target requiring immediate response because it is a highly lucrative, fleeting target of opportunity or it poses (or will soon pose) a danger to friendly forces.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AAG	Afghan Assessment Group
ADDIE	Analysis, Design, Development, Implementation, and Evaluation
AFRICOM	Africa and Africa Command
AJP	Allied Joint Publication
ANP	Afghan National Police
AOG	All-of-Government
AQI	al-Qaeda in Iraq
BDD	British Defence Doctrine
C2	Command and Control
CAF	Chief of Air Force
CAF	Campaign Assessment Framework
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear
CCIR	Commanders Critical Information Requirement
CCIRM	Collection, Coordination and Information Management Office
CDF	Chief of Defence Force
CEA	Campaign Effectiveness Assessment
CHIS	Covert Human Intelligence Sources
CIG	Commders Initiatives Group
CIS	Communication and Information Systems
CMO	Civil-military Operations
COA	Combined Operations Area
COA	Concept of Analysis
COE	Centre of Expertise
COE	Centre of Excellence
CoG	Centre of Gravity
COIN	Counter-insurgency
COMISAF	Commander International Stabilisation Force
COMJFNZ	Commander Joint Forces New Zealand
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
DCDC	Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DFID	Department of International Development
DTA	Defence Technology Agency
E&R	Engagement and Reconstruction
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
ETA	Environment Threat Assessment
ETA	Euskadi Ta Askatasuna
EU	European Union
FCO	Foreign and Colonial Office
FOB	Forward Operating Base
FRAGO	Fragmentary Order
GCSB	Government Communications Security Bureau
HQJFNZ	Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand
HQJOC	Headquarters Joint Operations Command
HQNZDF	Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IDG	International Development Group
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IGO	Inter-governmental Organisation
INTERFET	International Force East Timor
IO	Information Operations
IR	Intelligence Requirements
IR	Information Requests
IRA	Irish Republican Army
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISC	Information Systems Command
ISS	Intelligence and Security Services
ISG	Information Strategy Groups
ISTAR	Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance
JDP	Joint Doctrine Publication
JFAO	Joint Force Area of Operations
JFC-B	Joint Force Commander-Brunssum's
JIATF	Joint Inter-agency Task Force
JSAT	Joint Strategic Assessment
JTF	Joint Task Force
JTFC	Joint Task Force Commander
JTFHQ	Joint Task Force Headquarters
JWP	Joint Warfare Publication
J2	Joint Intelligence
J3	Joint Operations
J35	Current Operations Plans

J4	Joint Logistics
J5	Joint Plans
J9	Joint Finance
KLE	Key Leader Engagement
LOAC	Law of Armed Conflict
LOO	Lines of Operation
MASINT	Measurement and Signature Intelligence
MFAT	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
M2T	Monitoring, Mentoring and Training
MNC	Multinational Cooperation
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MOE	Measures of Effectiveness
MOP	Measures of Performance
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NIS	Network Information Service
NZAID	New Zealand Agency for International Development
NZDDP	New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication
NZDF	New Zealand Defence Force
NZDI	New Zealand Defence Intelligence
NZMR	New Zealand Mounted Rifles
NZSIS	New Zealand Security Intelligence Service
ODESC	Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination
OGA	Other Government Agency
OGD	Other Goverment Departments
OMLT	Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team
OPDIR	Operational Directive
OPLAN	Operational Plan
OPORD	Operational Order
OPSEC	Operations Security
PIR	Priority Intelligence Requirement
PIRA	Provisional Irish Republican Army
PMESII-PT	Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information, Physical Terrain, and Time
PMSC	Private Military Security Company
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSO	Peace Support Operations
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
QIP	Quick Impact Project
RNZN	Royal New Zealand Navy
ROE	Rules of Engagement
RSLAF	Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces
SAM	Surface to Air Missile
SAL	Systems Approach to Learning
SCI	Strategic Commitments and Intelligence Branch
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SPF	South Pacific Forum
SPG	Strategic Planning Group
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SSR	Security, Stability, and Reconstruction
SSR	State Sector Reform
TICP	Theatre Integrated Campaign Plan
TTP	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNMIT	United Nations Missions in Timor
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UOR	Urgent Operational Requirements
US	United States
US AID	United States Agency for International Development
USN	United States Navy
WME	Weapons of Mass Effect

INDEX

HEADQUARTERS NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE FORCE 2015
www.nzdf.mil.nz