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• Google released a new COVID-19 information policy for YouTube;
• Twitter has implemented new policies for flagging disinformation content – including
COVID-19 and elections-related disinformation – and makes available disinformation
and accounts it has removed available for research; and
• Microsoft has launched new technologies targeting disinformation – NewsGuard and
Video Authenticator, as part of its Defending Democracy programme.
…and mis/disinformation more general y
3. Meanwhile, mis/disinformation more generally also gained a lot of public attention in
New Zealand during the past few months with media organisations such as Stuff,
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Newsroom NZ, and The Spinoff, and independent organisations such as Netsafe3 and
InternetNZ drawing attention to the problem via public campaigns. These independent
narratives are especially welcome and helpful, as they are less likely to be associated
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with conspiracy theories about state control than if they came from a government agency.
4. Major platforms have also reached out to New Zealand on disinformation issues, through
Ministers and senior officials. This has included engagement as part of Christchurch Call
implementation, in relation to the October General Election, and material relating to the
COVID-19 pandemic. s9(2)(ba)(i)
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5. Similarly, a range of civil society organisations and social enterprises specialising in
disinformation issues has reached out to New Zealand officials to offer engagement and
support on disinformation and related issues. s6(b)(ii)
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Meanwhile, the Classification
Office is currently developing an in-depth survey to help inform a better understanding of
the
public attitudes towards and perceptions of disinformation.
6. In respect of central government activity, processes were put in place by DPMC, the
Ministry of Justice (MOJ) and the intelligence agencies for addressing elections-related
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disinformation. And looking ahead DIA, with the Ministry for Culture and Heritage (MCH),
is scoping a potential review of media content regulation, which may provide an
opportunity to address policy issues relating to mis/disinformation. However, DIA and
MCH are still at the early stages of this work, and the commencement and scope of a
potential review would depend on Ministerial responsibilities and priorities. A more
immediate response for some aspects of mis/disinformation may be needed than could
be delivered by the media content review.
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3 In August, as part of their awareness campaign to help people understand and recognise mis/disinformation,
Netsafe released the result of a national y representative survey of New Zealanders’ perceptions of fake news.
https://www.netsafe.org.nz/yournewsbulletin/
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7. In related work, as noted in the Government’s response to the report of the Royal
Commission of Inquiry, MOJ is progressing work around possible new hate speech/hate
crime legislation, and work is underway to establish a National Centre of Excellence to
focus on diversity, social cohesion, and preventing and countering violent extremism.
We need coordination in order to strengthen New Zealand’s resilience to
mis/disinformation
8. Despite the work that has been undertaken and is ongoing, the system remains
fragmented. It is lacking overarching leadership and coordination, an enduring monitoring
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capability (especially for non-COVID-19 related issues), a policy and referrals framework,
and guiding principles.
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9. Without these we risk continued fragmentation, duplication of effort, lack of strategic
direction or critical mass, and an inability to identify and act on threats before or as they
emerge. Consequently, in the absence of change, there would continue to be a range of
ad hoc activities that do not contribute to a strategic goal of building New Zealand’s
resilience to mis/disinformation.
We recommend the following steps to ensure
coordination of the issue:
Establish a workstream lead and an Interagency Coordination Group
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10. While responsibility for managing dif erent aspects of mis/disinformation will inevitably
remain dispersed, the strategic oversight of lead agencies is necessary to ensure relevant
stakeholders are connected and coordinated, and their actions align with the delivery of
the wider policy direction and, if necessary, response.
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11. While the issue of mis/disinformation crosses multiple portfolios, there are some agencies
that wil be better placed to take the lead on this issue, in particular:
the
• DPMC, as the central agency for coordinating the national security system and host
agency for the Strategic Coordinators that address cross-government work
programmes on significant, related national security issues (Cyber Coordinator,
Foreign Interference and Counter-Terrorism). DPMC is also home to the Prime
Minister’s Special Representative on Cyber and Digital, acting as a senior-level
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interface with the technology and digital sector on security and public safety; and
• DIA, as the lead agency for Digital Safety and Countering Violent Extremism Online.4
DIA administers the Films, Videos and Publications Classifications Act 1993 (and is
therefore responsible for censorship policy), hosts the Digital Safety Group and
Government Chief Digital Officer and, with the Ministry for Culture and Heritage
(MCH), is at the early stages of scoping a potential review of the media content
regulatory system.
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4 DIA and DPMC also jointly lead the government’s Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) work
programme, which wil have significant overlaps with mis/disinformation.
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12. There are potential complications with any one government agency taking the lead. For
example, the perception of an agency such as DIA, which is involved in censorship and
compliance, leading the government’s response to mis/disinformation may reinforce
conspiracy theories about state control of media. However, this kind of narrative is likely
to surface within conspiracy theory circles regardless of which agency is involved.
13. There are also potential resource constraints for agencies picking up new workstreams.
s9(2)(g)(i)
As there is a
need to push ahead with this work as a matter of priority, however,
we recommend that
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DPMC leads this workstream, at least in the short term, working col aboratively with
a group of relevant agencies to coordinate the whole-of-system response.
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14. DIA recently convened a meeting of relevant agencies to consider this paper and we
recommend that these participating
agencies should form the basis of an Interagency
Coordination Group: DIA, DPMC, GCSB, MBIE, MFAT, Ministry of Culture and
Heritage, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Justice, and NZ
Police. The intention is that this group will begin to monitor (within existing resources)
current mis/disinformation risks, start to build connections with non-governmental
partners and, where required, inform and coordinate public communications responses.
Identify a Group of Ministers
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15. Sitting above the agencies,
we also recommend that rather than having a single
Minister responsible for disinformation issues, there should be a group of relevant
Ministers to whom issues can be flagged. Given the nature of the challenge, it is more
appropriate to spread the issue across several portfolios.
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16. Rather than this group meeting on a formal or regular basis, the Interagency Coordination
Group will escalate or flag issues to the group of Ministers as necessary, seeking
decisions on more sensitive policy and communications issues, and ensuring the
the
Government is well informed on mis/disinformation trends.
17.
We recommend that the Ministerial group should comprise:
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•
Minister for National Security & Intel igence, Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern
Mis/disinformation gives rise to and impacts several national security risks, for which the
Minister for National Security & Intelligence has responsibility. The response to
mis/disinformation wil also have implications for other work streams in the national
security portfolio, including countering violent extremism and foreign interference.
•
Minister of Education / Minister for COVID-19 Response, Hon Chris Hipkins
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A key avenue for strengthening resilience to disinformation is through the development
of effective education programmes that ensure continued effort on building science and
numeracy literacy, and new areas of focus around critical thinking and media literacy.
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Disinformation is also one of the most significant risks to our COVID-19 response and
the effective roll-out of a vaccine.
•
Minister of Health / Minister Responsible for the GCSB & NZSIS,
Hon Andrew Little
The Ministry of Health is the lead agency for the COVID-19 vaccine, which is likely to
present our greatest disinformation challenge over the coming year. Many disinformation
narratives may be generated by and/or spread by state actors, which means the
intelligence agencies wil play a key role.
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•
Minister for Broadcasting and Media / Minister of Justice, Hon Kris Faafoi
The Minister for Broadcasting and Media, along with the Minister for Internal Affairs, is
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scoping a review of content regulation which may have overlaps with this work on
disinformation. While yet to be finalised, a review of the way content is regulated in
New Zealand would seek to address gaps and inconsistencies in the current content
regulation framework. The Minister for Broadcasting and Media is also responsible for
work programmes that aim to build a strong and independent media sector which may
assist in providing accurate sources of information to counter dis/misinformation. This
includes the Strong Public Media Programme which is assessing the viability of
establishing a new public media entity and the Investing in Sustainable Journalism
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initiative which aims to protect public interest journalism.
•
Minister of Internal Affairs, Hon Jan Tinetti
In addition to scoping the potential review of media content regulation with the Minister
for Broadcasting and Media, the Minister of Internal Affairs also has responsibility for
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Digital Safety (including CVE online), the Films, Videos and Publications Classification
Act, and setting and monitoring the strategic direction of independent Crown Entity the
Office of Film and Literature.
the
•
Minister for the Digital Economy and Communications, Hon Dr David Clark
The Minister for the Digital Economy and Communications is responsible for the digital
safety work programme, which includes efforts to counter a range of online harms and
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promote online safety.
Develop a strategic framework for Cabinet Consideration
18.
We propose that the Interagency Coordination Group develops a strategic
framework for strengthening New Zealand’s resilience to mis/disinformation.
Agencies would look to take this to Cabinet for endorsement in early 2021 (noting
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that the pre-Christmas period is likely to be filled with RCOI-related issues).
19. Some thinking has already been done by agencies, and subject to Cabinet approval, a
strategic framework might build on the proposals outlined in the following section.
Key
elements of this framework wil need to address the public and statutory mandates
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for monitoring and addressing the disinformation problem, as well as the potential
financial implications for agencies.
20. It wil be essential that this process includes close consultation with academia, civil society
organisations, the media council, and other key public stakeholders to ensure it
encapsulates the views and experience of experts, is transparent, and achieves public
buy-in. It wil also be vital to ensure that this work is appropriately connected to other
relevant national security and social inclusion workstreams. As noted in the Report of the
Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Terrorist At ack on the Christchurch Masjidain, it is
important to recognise that everyone in society has a role in making New Zealand safe
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and inclusive.
Possible elements of a strategic framework on disinformation
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Encourage the creation of a multi-stakeholder forum
1.
Agencies propose engaging with non-government partners and encouraging them
to convene and lead a wider stakeholder group to consider and address the
challenges posed by non-state mis/disinformation.
2. Noting the massive complexity of the mis/disinformation problem, and its all-of-society
impacts,
a col aborative multi-stakeholder forum –
which brings together all
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relevant civil society and academic experts, independent organisations, social
media and tech platforms as wel as relevant government agencies – would be
preferred. A list of potential participants is included at Appendix Three.5
3. Recognising the range of research, awareness and counter-disinformation activities
already being undertaken by media organisations, tech platforms and civil society
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groups/individuals, there is a wealth of expertise within New Zealand that could usefully
be leveraged to build the country’s resilience to mis/disinformation.
the
4. In many, if not most, cases, these organisations wil be better placed than government
agencies to publicly counter the effects of disinformation in New Zealand. This has been
demonstrated recently in efforts from scientists, academia and the media to provide a
steady stream of factual information to counter fake news.
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5. It wil be important, therefore, that any such multi-stakeholder forum be non-regulatory in
nature and that it builds and maintains the public trust. By virtue of its diverse membership,
such a forum wil also be well placed to create a forward calendar of key events and issues
that might be subject to mis/disinformation, as well as to engage in additional outreach to
independent experts, community leaders, key influencers and media.
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5 We are aware that a number of academics have already partnered with NetSafe, media and civil society
organisations to col ectively look at the disinformation problem. In early discussions, they are supportive of an idea
to widen this into something like a multi-stakeholder forum.
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Develop guiding principles to inform how we counter mis/disinformation
6. It is clear from available research and international experience that efforts to mitigate the
effect of disinformation must be based on principles of transparency, integrity,
accountability and stakeholder participation. They must also uphold the principles of a
free, secure and open internet, privacy and New Zealand’s human rights commitments,
including the freedom of expression.
7. For this reason, and noting the examples of the European Commission and the OECD,
the
lead agencies, in consultation with the multi-stakeholder forum, wil develop
and refine a set of Guiding Principles for mitigating non-state mis/disinformation. 1982
8. Recognising that mis/disinformation is not a problem that government can “fix”, these
principles might build on the guiding principles and values underpinning New Zealand’s
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Cyber Security Strategy6 and InternetNZ’s Internet Policy7.
Establish a monitoring function
9. Our ability to understand and if necessary combat mis/disinformation narratives in the
future depends on us establishing the mandate and capability to monitor for harmful
mis/disinformation online, and establishing baselines of such information in social media
now that we can track against later on.
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10. New Zealand government agencies do not generally undertake proactive monitoring of
social media for mis/disinformation, though there have been recent examples: the JIG
and the AOG Insights and Reporting Team conducted COVID-19-related monitoring
during the level four lockdown; the NZSIS undertook low-level activity to identify
disinformation relevant to the 2020 New Zealand General Election; and the NZ Police
Open Source Team has increasingly focused on the c
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the disinformation spectrum.
the
11.s6(a)
in the UK this task is carried out by analysts within the
Cabinet Of ice and the Home Of ice. The equivalent agencies in New Zealand lack the
resources and mandate to do this. There are therefore two plausible ways to establish a
mis/disinformation baseline and to monitor content going forward:
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i. Establishing a new “fusion cell” to monitor for mis/disinformation. This might be
established in DIA within or alongside the CVE Online programme, and comprise staff
6 https://dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2019-07/Cyber%20Security%20Strategy.pdf
“To deepen col aboration and take effective action … we wil work in a way that:
• Builds and maintains trust;
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• Is people-centric, respectful and inclusive;
• Balances risk with being agile and adaptive;
• Uses our collective strengths to deliver better results and outcomes;
• Is open and accountable.”
7 https://internetnz.nz/policy/ “Internet for al ; Internet for good.”
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from a range of agencies with relevant capability (however this would require a
budget); and/or
ii. Procuring from outside of the government sector monitoring and reporting on
mis/disinformation in the New Zealand social media environment. There are some
universities, think tanks and providers who likely have the capability to do this for us
s9(2)(j)
iii. A possible mixture of both options.
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12. For the same reasons that a multi-stakeholder approach is the suggested approach
, it
may be preferable for social media monitoring to be primarily undertaken by non-
governmental, non-commercial partners. Perception issues around government
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agencies carrying out broad monitoring of social media platforms could serve to reinforce
conspiracy theories and narratives of state surveil ance, censorship and enforcement.
13. There is also a mandate issue for agencies that would seek to monitor/assess, and this
would require some careful policy work to address. The interagency group could consider
the models employed by Australia and the UK, which have both stood up ‘research’ teams
to monitor for disinformation, looking at how these operate and under what authorisation
and oversight. This work would further benefit from multi-stakeholder input on the social
licence required to proceed.
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14. Non-government partners already have the capability to combine data analytics and
discourse analysis to highlight key trends and emerging issues, broken down by theme,
geographic area and by demographic. They are also more likely to have or source the
capability to look across dif erent language media. It may be possible for regular
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summaries of key trends and data on pre-agreed risk areas to be produced by these
partners for use by the multi-stakeholder forum and government agencies. This would
also be consistent with a whole-of-society, modern deterrence approach to addressing
the
this problem.
15. Drawing on the capabilities of non-government partners may require a certain level of new
funding, however there are recent COVID-19-related examples of non-government
organisations accessing ex
under isting funding pools to monitor and analyse disinformation.
It
is recommended that the interagency group explores procurement and funding
mechanisms to assess whether anything further would be required.
Create a policy framework, including for assessments and referrals
16. The mis/disinformation spectrum is a broad one, and while most instances of it wil be
content that does not stray into il egality, may be somewhat socially acceptable and often
wil constitute political discourse, there wil be instances when disinformation crosses into
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il egal or dangerous activity. The incitement to attacks against cell towers are a recent
example.
17. That said, mis/disinformation is an online content area where significant harm can be
caused by otherwise legal material. Compared with content and harm types such as Child
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Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (CSEA) material, or Terrorist and Violent Extremist content
(TVEC), mis/disinformation features a much wider spectrum of ‘grey’ content, where the
harm caused can be dif icult to determine as tropes and memes can be used to deliver
coded messages.
18.
The interagency group should therefore work to develop a policy framework for
identifying what areas should be monitored for disinformation and which issues,
based on regular trends reporting, wil require more in-depth analysis and
assessment.
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19. s9(2)(g)(i)
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20.
The interagency group wil also develop a detailed framework for referrals, where
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an instance of mis/disinformation meets a specific threshold (statutory or
contractual) that requires a more direct response. For example:
• A state-sponsored disinformation campaign, to be referred to the Strategic
Coordinator for Foreign Interference and the intelligence agencies;
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• Disinformation used as a tool for radicalisation, to be referred to DIA, the NZ Police
and the intelligence agencies;
• Election-related disinformation, to be referred to the Electoral Commission;
the
• Disinformation that inspires or supports criminal activity, to be referred to the NZ
Police (high tech crimes unit, OS monitoring unit, etc.).
Other referrals may also be required: to the tech platforms themselves, the Race
Relations or Human Rights Commissioners, the Ministry for Social Development, etc.
under
Clear guidelines should be established to inform who refers, to whom, for what purpose
and under what circumstances.
21. More broadly,
the interagency group wil consider a range of other policy
implications relating to the mitigation of mis/disinformation. For example:
• Whether interventions for mitigation of mis/disinformation could be investigated as
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part of the proposed DIA/MCH review of media content regulation;
• a Code of Good Practice that could be agreed with media organisations (as has been
established by the European Commission with European media organisations);
• work to support to the use or development of technology to counter deep fakes; and
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• consideration as to whether a separate disinformation risk profile is required, or if
mis/disinformation should be considered as a dimension of other nationally significant
risks.
Develop holistic strategies for building resilience to mis/disinformation
22. Two of the key tools for building New Zealand’s resilience to disinformation wil be through
the effective coordination of
clear and proactive public communications, and a focus
on
longer term education and social inclusion that leverages work already underway
in schools around active citizenship and online safety.
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23. One of the key lessons learned during the COVID-19 pandemic has been the importance
of timely, clear and coordinated public information, delivered through identifiable and
trusted channels. During the Auckland lockdown, this understanding became even more
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important, with the need for nuanced, community-specific messaging from trusted
advisors.
24. This concept is equally applicable to other risk areas prone to mis/disinformation. But in
order to ensure a coordinated approach to public communications,
lead agencies wil
need to work with the multi-stakeholder forum to develop a communications
framework. This would not need to be overly prescriptive but could ensure that agencies
do not respond to disinformation in an ad hoc fashion. For example, the UK has produced
a “Tool Kit” for agencies to address and respond to disinformation. This might be a useful
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option for helping agencies to calibrate their communications.
25. Key elements of this framework could include:
• That where possible public communications should be proactive, not reactive.
The
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aim should be to build trust ahead of time (e.g. a proactive information campaign on
COVID-19 vaccines) rather than to respond to or shutdown disinformation or its
proponent. Reacting to disinformation can serve to validate rather than counter it.
the
• That where possible public communications should be collaborative – i.e. developed
and delivered in partnership with non-government entities, independent experts and
community leaders.
Government-driven narratives are not always the most effective
communication tools, and they can reinforce conspiracy theories about state control.
under
26.
Another vital part of equipping the population to recognise and manage
disinformation is to use disinformation awareness campaigns (e.g. Netsafe’s “Your
News Bulletin”)
and broader education strategies to develop public understanding of
disinformation. Improving science and numeracy literacy has been shown to reduce
susceptibility to mis/disinformation. And strategies successfully implemented in Finland
and Sweden include the introduction of critical thinking elements into all aspects of the
school curricula. The purpose of this is to build, from an early age, the ability of people to
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distinguish between authentic and false narratives and have the tools to question and fact
check.8
27. New Zealand could implement a similar strategy in order to meet the long-term goal of
building resilience to mis/disinformation. We already have ‘active citizenship’ and online
safety initiatives in schools, and it may not require much from a curriculum perspective to
extend these to include social media literacy and critical thinking tools. Additional funding
may, however, be required. It wil be important for the Ministry of Education and
organisations such as Netsafe (both members of the Online Harms Prevention Group)
and SeniorNet to be part of the multi-stakeholder Forum.
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8 An added benefit of these programmes, which fit within the scope of what is sometimes termed ‘modern
deterrence’, is that they can also build resilience to radicalisation and can provide a boost to other social cohesion
programmes.
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APPENDIX ONE: The mis/disinformation problem
Mis/disinformation9
gives rise to and impacts several national security risks…
1. While dis and misinformation are not new phenomena - and are not neatly confined to the
online environment - the internet has decentralised the production and dissemination of
information, amplifying the volume, speed, and reach of mis/disinformation.
2. Social media presents a particularly effective and low-cost enabling platform, from which
bil ions of users source their news. Echo-chamber dynamics, ‘social proof’ and the pursuit
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of viral content are manipulated by state and non-state actors to place mis/disinformation
into online spaces and boost their prominence. This can be further amplified by users with
pre-existing biases and can raise doubts among those not already predisposed
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conspiracies. Users with lower levels of formal education or literacy in a specific topic, as
well as those communities with an historic distrust in government, are especially
susceptible.
3. The significance of mis/disinformation for national security became particularly apparent
during the 2016 US Presidential election, when disinformation about candidates and
policies was spread by malicious actors to interfere with the electoral process. It has been
further highlighted by an explosion of disinformation during the COVID-19 pandemic (“the
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infodemic”). State actors have used disinformation campaigns to divert blame, showcase
the ‘failings’ of other systems, and are exploiting the situation to achieve longer-term
strategic goals. Non-state actors, meanwhile, have used mis/disinformation to undermine
public health narratives, including by spreading views about the cause and origin of the
pandemic (e.g. claiming it is a bioweapon, or linking it to 5G), questioning the political
motives of lockdowns and mask use, and promoting conspiracy theories about future
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vaccines.
the
4. s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)
And as
mis/disinformation continues to grow and technology evolves (e.g. deep fakes), people
may find it increasingly difficult to discern fact from falsehood. This confusion over what
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is true could not only result in individuals making misinformed choices in their own lives,
it could also have significant consequences for national security:
• the politicisation of scientific fact (e.g. on a range of issues including pandemics and
climate change) contributes to anti-intellectualism and can
undermine effective
policy responses, including on public health responses to COVID-19;
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9
Disinformation is false or misleading content (or the omission of content) designed to achieve a strategic
purpose. Whether the actor producing and disseminating the disinformation is pursuing ideological or commercial
goals, the effort is designed to influence audience perceptions, opinions and/or behaviour (e.g. QAnon conspiracy
theories).
Misinformation is information that is false or misleading but, unlike disinformation, is not produced or
disseminated in pursuit of an underlying ideological or commercial purpose (e.g. anti-fluoride information).
Malinformation is information that may be based in reality, but is spread with the intent of causing harm.
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• mis/disinformation about specific groups of people
can create and amplify social
divisions, challenge national values, foster extremist views and lead to
radicalisation, break down social cohesion and, in some cases, incite violence
towards minority groups;
• mis/disinformation and conspiracy theories can permanently
damage the reputation
of elected officials and/or their policies, undermining the integrity of elections
and democracy more broadly;
• mis/disinformation and conspiracy theories can have a corrosive effect,
undermining
trust in public institutions and the social contract, with attendant consequences
for policy making and service delivery;
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• mis/disinformation can have an
impact on critical infrastructure: conspiracy
theories during the COVID-19 pandemic led people in a number of countries,
including New Zealand, to at ack 5G and other cell towers. A recent British report
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noted the possibility of disinformation being used to overload the power grid through
the false promotion of cheap power during peak hours;
• mis/disinformation can also have
economic repercussions, including through
influencing the stock market and investment decisions. For example, a 2013 tweet
from the hacked account of the Associated Press claiming that former President
Obama had been injured in an explosion, resulted in a brief $130bil ion devaluation
of the US stock market; and
• mis/disinformation can also
undermine confidence in the online environment,
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directly threatening our ability to achieve the vision in the cyber security strategy that
New Zealand is confident and secure in the digital world, enabling New Zealand to
Thrive Online. In addition to the attendant cybersecurity issues this gives rise to, it
can also have significant economic and service delivery impacts, affecting uptake of
digital technology.
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5. Amongst our closest security partners, oversight of the disinformation issue is coordinated
by several dif erent agencies and responses vary from state-controlled counter-narratives
through to funding for civil-society initiatives. A summary of their responses is attached at
the
Appendix Two.
…and infodemics are spreading in New Zealand
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6. New Zealand’s relatively high trust in the mainstream media and government institutions
has largely inoculated the general population from believing disinformation. However, this
did not create total protection against the increase in COVID-19 and elections-related
disinformation that circulated online following the August lockdown in Auckland.
7. The internationalisation of disinformation emanating from the US and/or amplified on US-
based platforms is one factor in this. Anti-mask and anti-lockdown narratives, often
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couched in broad human rights and basic freedoms terms (and often grounded in
narratives linked to the US Constitution), found fertile ground amongst followers of a few
influencers, political parties and some church congregations.
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8. Some of these theories included that the government was intentionally withholding
information from the public, that the outbreak in Auckland was worse than reported, that
the government was “utilising” the outbreak to impose martial law or otherwise erode
human rights, and that the outbreak was intentionally planned to manipulate the election.
9. The significance of this was noted by the AOG Insights & Reporting Team:
s9(2)(g)(i)
. Combined with an increase in the number of
anti-vax views being expressed and shared on social media platforms, this highlights that
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there remains a significant risk for the rollout of a COVID-19 vaccine.
10. More broadly, there was also during this period a proliferation of New Zealand-based
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Facebook groups promoting far-right QAnon theories alleging that the world is run by a
cabal of Satan-worshiping paedophiles who are plotting against President Trump while
operating a global child sex-trafficking ring. The US “documentary”, ‘Plandemic’, which
claims a secret society of bil ionaires is plotting to gain global domination by controlling
people through a COVID-19 vaccine, has also been widely shared in New Zealand.
11. Many people sharing these conspiracies may have good intentions, but they also have a
fundamental distrust of government, “experts” and the media.10 This is also evident within
New Zealand’s Māori and Pasifika communities, where an intergenerational distrust of
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government and media, plus lived experience of systemic neglect and racism are all
factors that have enabled false information to gain traction. One example of this was the
rumour that those who tested positive for COVID-19 would have their children removed
from them by Oranga Tamariki.
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12. There is potentially a Treaty of Waitangi element to this, with racist disinformation
narratives, and disinformation about the Treaty itself, of concern. Additionally, through
engagement with Māori on other digital issues (e.g. Budapest Convention accession,
the
cloud computing and data governance) several partners have identified susceptibility to
disinformation and conspiracy theories among Māori communities as an area of particular
concern.
13. Gendered disinformation has received less public attention, but also poses a significant
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threat internationally and in New Zealand. A recent UK/US report has found that online
spaces are being systematically weaponised against women leaders, with politically
motivated gendered stereotypes and personal attacks posing a serious threat to women’s
equal political participation.
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10 A number of studies also suggest that poor science and numeracy literacy is linked to greater susceptibility to
conspiracy theories and fake news.
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APPENDIX TWO: The international dimension 1. Amongst our closest security partners, work to counter disinformation is coordinated by a
number of dif erent agencies, and responses vary from state-controlled counter-narratives
through to funding civil-society initiatives. This work is evolving very quickly and, as such,
below is only a very brief snapshot of the various parts of Five Eyes’ governments that
are addressing the issue of mis/disinformation. We wil be engaging more closely on this
issue in 2021 to learn more about partner approaches.
2. In Australia, while efforts are underway to understand the domestic social and behavioural
impacts of disinformation, the focus has predominantly been on state-sponsored
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disinformation:
•
Counter-disinformation taskforce hosted by DFAT, set up in June 2020. Focus
Act ed
on tracking and responding to mis/disinformation and malign messaging in the Pacific
and South East Asia
s6(a)
3. In Canada, there has been a dual track approach:
Information
•
Rapid Response Mechanism Canada (RRM), part of the G7 RRM, undertakes
focused research to understand potential foreign threats against Canada, and to
identify tactics and trends. Member also of the Security and Intelligence Threats to
Elections (SITE) task force.
•
Canadian Heritage has the lead on non-state disinformation and takes a multi-
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stakeholder approach in working with civil society to address the problem through
education and awareness campaigns.
•
Public Safety Canada also hosts the
Canada Centre for Community Engagement
the
and Prevention of Violence (Canada Centre), which promotes coordination,
planning, funding and research, and supports interventions.
4. In the UK:
under
•
The Department for Digital, Cultural, Media and Sport coordinates the British
response to disinformation through the interagency Counter Disinformation Cell.
•
A Rapid Reaction Unit within the Cabinet Office was set up to respond specifically
to COVID-19-related disinformation issues, including through working with tech
companies to block harmful mis/disinformation.
•
The Home Office,
through its
PREVENT and RICU teams, has a monitoring function
working on online TVEC and radicalisation, that has also focused closely on
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disinformation over the past year or so.
•
The Government Communication Service created “RESIST”, a counter-
disinformation toolkit designed for both the government and private sector to help
prevent the spread of disinformation.
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5. In the US:
• There are a range of agencies involved in the issue of disinformation, including the
intelligence community, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of
Justice and the State Department.
• Constitutional conventions around freedom of expression and jurisprudence
complicate the issue of disinformation, as does the current state of political discourse
and deeply entrenched political polarisation. This makes disinformation a complicated
issue to address in the US.
We are likely to be invited to join an increasing number of international actions
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6. New Zealand has received numerous requests to share reporting, analysis and
approaches on countering mis/disinformation, from a range of likeminded partners in both
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bilateral and multilateral contexts (in Five Eyes (FVEY) fora, NATO and the Canadian-
hosted G7 RRM).
7. We joined public statements made by the Freedom Online Coalition11 in May and
November. The statement in May read (inter alia):
[T]he FOC is concerned by the spread
of disinformation online and activity that seeks to leverage the COVID-19 pandemic with
malign intent. This includes the manipulation of information and spread of disinformation
to undermine the international rules-based order and erode support for the democracy
and human rights that underpin it. Access to factual and accurate information,
Information
including
through a free and independent media online and offline, helps people take the necessary
precautions to prevent spreading the COVID-19 virus, save lives, and protect vulnerable
population groups. More broadly, FOC members have signalled a need to keep working
on disinformation issues.
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8. At the 3 September meeting of the Aqaba Process, partners recognised the need for
collective work on disinformation issues, recognising the corrosive effects of
disinformation on public safety.
the
9. We expect that likeminded partners wil increase of ers to work together on further actions,
statements, or attributions relating to disinformation. Developing a stronger domestic
approach to mis/disinformation would effectively and credibly support our collective
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understanding and mitigation of the risk.
10. This international work may involve engaging closely with a range of those partners most
constructively engaged in this work. Given the sensitivities involved in working on
disinformation, the principles applied domestically may also stand us in good stead for
international engagement. It is likely that the pool of those able to work well on this issue
would be relatively small at present, composed of a subset of liberal democracies that
belong to the FOC, and where disinformation has not already substantially undermined
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the ability of institutions to engage effectively.
11 A partnership of 32 governments, of which New Zealand is one, working with civil society and the private
sector to support Internet freedom.
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s6(a)
11.
12. As with domestic efforts, multi-stakeholder engagement wil be critical in working
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internationally on this issue. We are potentially well-placed to engage on this, building on
relationships established through the Christchurch Call. Major technology firms have
indicated some interest in further work with New Zealand on disinformation issues. So
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too have civil society organisations prominent in this area (Global Network Initiative,
Global Disinformation Index, Witness, the Web Foundation), many of which participate
actively in the Advisory Network to the Christchurch Call. Such engagement provides an
important opportunity to understand and engage in international work on combatting
disinformation, in ways that are consistent with New Zealand’s approach to internet
governance and international human rights law.
13. A key issue in this international discussion is the absence of a widely accepted forum for
working through disinformation issues. s6(a)
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It
nonetheless indicates sufficient interest and urgency directed to constructive multi-
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stakeholder work on disinformation that it might be possible, with careful work, to build a
stronger platform for collective action on disinformation.
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s9(2)(f)(iv)
Te Puni Kōkiri
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Ministry for Pacific Peoples
Ministry of Social
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Treasury
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