

# SHANGRI-LA DIALOGUE

Background briefing Document

Friday 10 June – Sunday 12 June 2022, Singapore



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# TAB ONE: MEETING OVERVIEW

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## Visit Overview: 19<sup>th</sup> Shangri-La Dialogue 2022 (SLD22)

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The annual Shangri-La Dialogue, convened by the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) in Singapore, is the premier forum for Defence Ministers in the Indo-Pacific. The high levels of attendance from Ministers, defence force leaders, and senior security agency officials make it an important focal point for major power relationships and for discussion on contemporary strategic issues.

### Objectives

The Dialogue provides a key opportunity to underscore New Zealand's strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific region, your Defence priorities and our enduring commitment to supporting global peace and security. Our credentials in supporting security issues of significance complement the pursuit of our trade and economic objectives in the region.

The Dialogue offers an unparalleled opportunity for you to conduct bilateral meetings with a range of counterparts and to participate in high-level discussions on regional security issues. In addition to the Forum itself, key side meetings include a [REDACTED] s6(a) [REDACTED], Five Powers Defence Arrangements (FPDA) breakfast hosted by Singapore, and the Cohen's Breakfast hosted by Secretary William Cohen, Former United States Secretary of Defense.

Officials are seeking bilateral meetings with a range of counterparts including Industry, Solomon Islands, Japan, Republic of Korea, [REDACTED] s6(b)(i) [REDACTED], Singapore, [REDACTED] s6(b)(i) [REDACTED], and Canada. You will likely also meet the new Australian Minister of Defence (Minister to be confirmed).

New Zealand's objectives for the Dialogue are to:

- Strengthen and establish personal relationships with Defence Ministers from partner countries after a two year hiatus from in-person meetings.
- Convey New Zealand's position on regional security matters to a high-level audience.
- Hear first-hand the strategic priorities and concerns of key security partners in order to inform New Zealand's defence engagement in the Indo-Pacific region, but also more broadly.
- Promote New Zealand's attendance and engagement at the SLD22.

Key messages to convey include:

- The importance we place on the international rules-based order.
- The importance of regional security dialogues and their role in the wider regional security architecture.
- The promotion of New Zealand Defence's longstanding presence and continued stake in the region.

## Strategic Issues

- Discussions will likely centre on managing geopolitical competition and degradation of the International Rules Based System and international law (including the relationship between China and the US). Russia – Ukraine will naturally feature in many discussions, especially with your counterparts from Europe and Canada, specifically any implications for the Indo-Pacific region.
- Developments on the Korean Peninsula are also likely to feature in many of your engagements.
- Maritime security is an enduring concern for the Indo-Pacific region, and the disputes in the South China Sea are likely to be a key point of discussion in engagements with regional partners. You can expect likeminded nations to continue to call for the maintenance of international law, including rights of freedom of navigation and overflight, and the avoidance of miscalculations. They are also expected to emphasise the importance of presence operations in support of these freedoms.
- Partners' will likely be interested in our perspectives on the South Pacific, especially in light of the China – Solomon Islands security arrangement.

## Minister of Defence Programme

- You will receive an updated programme on arrival in Singapore, as some bilateral meetings are unlikely to be confirmed until that time. Your programme combines bilateral meetings, attendance at plenary sessions, as well as a number of Ministerial lunches and dinners convened by the *I/SS*. These bilateral meetings and events will take place in an unclassified environment.
- This year, you have been invited to deliver a speech and participate in a panel discussion on the topic of '*Climate Security and Green Defence*' during the first simultaneous special session on Saturday 11 June. This is a high profile opportunity for you to convey New Zealand's views on climate security, its implications to New Zealand and the Pacific, and our response to this challenge. Your fellow panellists are yet to be confirmed by the *I/SS*, but are expected to include your counterparts from Canada, a small island nation and a European nation.
- Your speech – as well as all plenary sessions – will be 'on-the-record' and open to the media.



## Delegation

You will be accompanied at the Dialogue by the Secretary of Defence, Andrew Bridgman and the Chief of Defence AVM Kevin Short. The High Commissioner, HE Jo Tyndall, will also be in attendance at the Shangri-La and accompany you for the plenary and special sessions.

Other members of the delegation include:

| Name             | Title   |
|------------------|---|
| Kathleen Pearce  | Head of International Branch                  |
| Mike Thompson    | Director Asia                                 |
| Col Grant Motley | New Zealand Defence Advisor to Singapore      |
| s9(2)(g)(i)      | Intermediate Analyst – Asia Regional          |
| s9(2)(g)(i)      | Intermediate Analyst                          |
| Col Mel Childs   | Personal Staff Officer to Chief Defence Force |

Two policy analysts (s9(2)(g)(i)) will provide logistics and note-taking support to both the Minister and Secretary.

## Briefing

This briefing pack includes background briefs to support you in possible pull-asides with counterparts. Key messages are included for a range of issues and topics that are expected to be raised in bilateral meetings, including briefing on 'if raised' issues s6(a)

Meeting briefs for bilateral and multilateral meetings will be provided to you separately in early June, closer to date of the Shangri-La Dialogue.

*International Branch, Ministry of Defence  
May 2022*

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## IISS SHANGRI-LA DIALOGUE

**19th Asia Security Summit  
10 – 12 June 2022, Singapore**

*Updated 17 May 2022*

### OUTLINE AGENDA

*All events will take place at the Shangri-La Hotel,  
22 Orange Grove Road, Singapore 258350,  
except for dinner on Saturday night, which will be held at the Istana*

*All sessions will be on the record*

### FRIDAY 10 JUNE 2022

|               |  |
|---------------|--|
| All day       | Bilateral meetings between defence ministers and officials |
| 19:00 – 20:00 | OPENING RECEPTION<br>MINISTERIAL RECEPTION                 |
| 20:00 – 22:15 | KEYNOTE ADDRESS AND OPENING DINNER                         |

### SATURDAY 11 JUNE 2022

|               |  |
|---------------|--|
| 08:30 – 08:35 | OPENING OF THE SUMMIT  |
| 08:35 – 09:30 | FIRST PLENARY SESSION<br>NEXT STEPS FOR THE UNITED STATES' INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY   |
| 09:30 – 11:00 | SECOND PLENARY SESSION<br>MANAGING GEOPOLITICAL COMPETITION IN A MULTIPOLAR REGION |
| 11:00 – 11:30 | Break  |
| 11:30 – 13:00 | THIRD PLENARY SESSION<br>DEVELOPING NEW FORMS OF SECURITY COOPERATION              |
| 13:00 – 15:00 | MINISTERIAL ROUNDTABLE<br>LUNCHEON FOR ALL OTHER DELEGATES                         |

15:00 – 16:30 **FOURTH PLENARY SESSION**  
**MILITARY MODERNISATION AND NEW DEFENCE CAPABILITIES**

16:30 – 17:00 **Break**

17:00 – 18:30 **SIMULTANEOUS SPECIAL SESSIONS**

Session 1: **CLIMATE SECURITY AND GREEN DEFENCE**  
Session 2: **MYANMAR: FINDING A WAY FORWARD**  
Session 3: **MARITIME SECURITY: FROM CODES OF CONDUCT TO  
CRISIS COMMUNICATION**

19:30 – 22:00 **ISTANA RECEPTION AND DINNER (BY INVITATION ONLY)**

**SUNDAY 12 JUNE 2022**

08:30 – 08:35 **OPENING OF DAY 2**

08:35 – 09:30 **FIFTH PLENARY SESSION**  
**CHINA'S VISION FOR REGIONAL ORDER**

09:30 – 11:00 **SIXTH PLENARY SESSION**  
**COMMON CHALLENGES FOR ASIA-PACIFIC AND EUROPEAN DEFENCE**

11:00 – 11:30 **Break**

11:30 – 13:00 **SEVENTH PLENARY SESSION**  
**NEW IDEAS FOR SECURING REGIONAL STABILITY**

13:00 – 14:30 **MINISTERIAL ROUNDTABLE**

**CLOSING LUNCHEON FOR ALL OTHER DELEGATES**

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## TAB TWO: BACKGROUND BRIEFS

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### Strategic competition

- The competitive dynamic between the United States and China remains the defining characteristic of the region's strategic environment. [REDACTED] s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]
- We see an increasing potential in the Indo-Pacific for confrontation that could escalate to military conflict. Among the most significant conflict risks are:
  - Increasing Taiwan cross-Strait tensions;
  - Maritime incidents and tensions in the South and East China Seas;
  - North Korea's nuclear and missile development; and
  - Conflicts in and through space and cyber-space.

- [REDACTED] s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

See *Strategic Competition in the Indo-Pacific brief*, for further background

### Russia/Ukraine

- Whilst outside of the Indo-Pacific region, the Ukraine/Russia situation has far-reaching implications for the international rules based order.

- [REDACTED] s6(a)  
[REDACTED] s6(a), s6(b)(i)  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

See *Russia/Ukraine brief*, for further background

### US Partnerships and alliances

- The Biden Administration has given signals of a renewed US commitment to regional engagement, so that the US looks set to be more present in regional fora than it has been in recent years. [REDACTED] s6(a)  
[REDACTED]

- US Secretary of Defense Austin’s speech at the 40th International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Fullerton Lecture in Singapore last year focused strongly on the US’s commitments to its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific and on the need for a resilient regional order based on international law, human rights, transparency and inclusion.
- The US heavily emphasised their desire to strengthen long-established alliances, to build new partnerships and enhance their presence in the Indo-Pacific, including with close partners and allies.

### South China Sea

- [REDACTED] s6(a)
- [REDACTED] s6(a), starting with the submission of the Third Person Note (TPN) to the UN Secretary General on 3 August 2021. The TPN states on the record New Zealand’s legal position on how the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) applies to the South China Sea.
- Since then, the New Zealand Defence Force has participated in the FPDA 50th Anniversary Exercise (Ex Bersama Gold), the UK Carrier Strike Group and [REDACTED] s6(a)

*See South China Sea brief, for further background*

### Indo-Pacific tilt

- In the face of heightened strategic competition, numerous partners have felt compelled to roll out their own framework for engagement in the Indo-Pacific. ASEAN has sought to retain its strategic centre of gravity in the region through the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), which has been designed to enable others to participate in the region through cooperative activities. The AOIP repeats ASEAN’s long held core principles of the 10 nation group, and upholding ASEAN centrality
- Other countries have also articulated their own Indo-Pacific branded policies, such as Australia, Japan, South Korea (“New Southern Policy”), the UK, France, Germany, and most recently the EU. Individual concepts of the Indo-Pacific vary between countries with respect to geographical definition, policy priorities and emphasis on multi, mini or bilateral approaches.
- The Biden administration released their long-awaited US Indo-Pacific Strategy in February 2022. [REDACTED] s9(2)(g)(i)



## Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD)

- In recent years, Japan, India and Australia have sought to step up on a range of regional issues, through their own Indo-Pacific branded strategies or initiatives. This includes their investment in the QUAD, a strategic security dialogue, of which the United States is a core member. These four countries have also markedly increased their regional military presence and cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.
- Last year, US Secretary of Defence Austin shared the United States' desire to look at complementary mechanisms to ASEAN in the region. The QUAD was cited as a structure that could make the region's security architecture more durable. However, some media reports have described the QUAD as an informal alliance, set up to respond to China's economic and military might.
- The most recent meeting of QUAD leaders took place in Tokyo on 24 May 2022, where the four QUAD Leaders released a joint statement, renewing their commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific. Leaders were reported to have discussed a number of issues, including their responses to the War in Ukraine, North Korea's surge in missile testing, challenges to the maritime rules order (East and South China Sea) and the military coup in Myanmar.

## Myanmar

- New Zealand remains deeply concerned about the situation in Myanmar. This is also an issue with serious implications for the stability of the region and for the ASEAN – particularly at a time when the region already faces many complex challenges to its peace and prosperity.
- The New Zealand Chief of Defence Force joined the US-led statement condemning the use of lethal force by the Tatmadaw (Myanmar military) against unarmed civilians on 28 March 2021, alongside 11 counterparts (Australia, Canada, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Denmark, the Netherlands, ROK, the UK and the US).
- New Zealand engagement with Myanmar has been limited to multilateral forums such as the ADMM-Plus and the ASEAN Regional Forum. New Zealand has used our attendance at these forums to raise our concerns about Myanmar. The most recent of these was the ASEAN Defence Senior Officials Meeting-Plus (ADSOM-Plus), in Cambodia on 18 May 2022, where New Zealand reiterated our concerns about Myanmar.

*See Myanmar brief, for further background*

*International Branch, Ministry of Defence  
May 2022*

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**Handling note:**

- *This brief sets out the regional context for your bilateral and multilateral meetings at the Shangri-La Dialogue.*

**Key messages**

- New Zealand is a country in and of the Pacific. We see the Indo-Pacific as our wider home region, in which the Pacific continues to be our primary focus. In our engagement in the Indo-Pacific forums, we seek to ensure that Pacific issues and perspectives are appropriately reflected.
- Our policy aims to build regional resilience and recognises the growing role of India and the importance of the maritime domain.
- In this increasingly contested region, New Zealand's policy is underpinned by a set of principles fundamental to the conduct of our foreign policy and that we see as critical to ensuring peace, prosperity and stability in the region. These are open markets, inclusiveness, transparency, sovereignty, freedom of navigation and overflight, international rules, and ASEAN centrality.
- These principles are reflected in the approach we take to regional issues and in our support for regional architecture and new regional initiatives.
- Openness and inclusivity are especially important for New Zealand. As a small country, our success depends on working with the widest possible set of partners.
- We see a strong correlation between our approach and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) released by ASEAN in 2019. As a long-standing ASEAN dialogue partner, we are committed to supporting the ASEAN-led architecture to respond to contemporary challenges.
- In practical terms, our principles-based approach underpins New Zealand's responses to key issues such as the military coup in Myanmar, and nuclear proliferation by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Our principles are also reflected in our decision to join with others in setting out our legal position on the South China Sea, and the importance we have attached to building regional trade integration and to supporting countries in the Indo-Pacific to respond to climate change.

s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

## Background

New Zealand is first and foremost of 'the Pacific'. But 'Indo-Pacific' has become an accepted descriptor for our wider region – which in strategic and economic terms now demonstrably extends from the western shores of the Americas into the Indian Ocean. In 2022 the term 'Asia-Pacific' no longer captures adequately the full span of New Zealand's interests, our economic and strategic partnerships. It has become increasingly seen as an economic construct, promoting regional trade and economic integration.

2. By contrast, the Indo-Pacific is used to focus on regional order, rules and norms across the spectrum of the region's political, economic and security engagement. New Zealand uses the nomenclature Indo-Pacific in all ASEAN-centred forums, whose membership is drawn from both oceans. It is the best geographical description there is for the group of countries involved in the East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and ASEAN Defence Ministerial Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) because it recognises the importance of the Indian subcontinent and of maritime issues in the region. We also use the term in day to day diplomatic interactions as a descriptor of our wider home region.

3. The Indo-Pacific is the fastest-growing region in the world, home to half of the world's population. The region contributes 60 percent of global GDP, led by the United States, China and Japan. It includes some of the fastest-growing economies and technology superpowers, including India, China and Japan, and emerging markets such as the ASEAN-Five countries. The economic significance of the region is reflected by its range of plurilateral free trade agreements including the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

4. [REDACTED] s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

[REDACTED]

*New Zealand's Indo-Pacific policy approach*

5. New Zealand does not have an Indo-Pacific “strategy” like some of our partners, but rather a “policy approach”. New Zealand’s policy approach continues to be based on the seven principles that we see as critical to ensuring regional peace, prosperity and stability in times of growing insecurity and strategic competition: open markets, inclusiveness, transparency, sovereignty, freedom of navigation and overflight, international rules, and ASEAN centrality. These principles have underpinned our responses to key regional issues, including the military coup in Myanmar, nuclear proliferation by the DPRK and the South China Sea disputes, as well as our focus on advancing the regional trade agenda and addressing climate change.

*Asia Regional Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade*

*May 2022*

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**Handling note:**

- *All regional partners have an interest in this topic*

**Key messages**

- New Zealand's Defence Assessment, published last year, finds New Zealand faces a substantially more challenging and complex strategic environment than it has for decades, and that the principal challenges to New Zealand's security interests will arise from strategic competition and climate change.
- There has never been a more important time for likeminded partners to work together in support of rules-based system and international law.
- In the Indo-Pacific, we are living through a point of intense strategic clarification in international relations.
- Working collectively to uphold multilateralism and established rules and norms remains fundamental – particularly for small states like New Zealand who depend on the international rules based system for our security and prosperity.
- The complex challenges that feature in the wider region need active engagement from a range of partners to support our shared goals of stability and economic integration across the Indo-Pacific.
- We are seeing strategic competition play out in our own region of the Pacific. As Prime Minister Ardern has stated, there are many players who have an interest in our region. While New Zealand is committed to working together where we can, we must also be clear when we have areas of concern.
- We have been clear with all partners that it is important to support long-term resilience outcomes in line with Pacific priorities, and to ensure a peaceful, prosperous, stable, and resilient Pacific. Military competition in our region would undercut that, and is therefore a very clear concern for us.

**Background**

The Indo-Pacific is the central global theatre for strategic competition, and this competition is layering on top of existing regional tensions and fault lines. It is in the Indo-Pacific that the rules based international order, respect for international law and norms and challenges to freedom of navigation and commerce are coming under the most persistent pressure. [REDACTED] s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

2. [REDACTED] s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

The Biden

Administration's Indo-Pacific Strategy (released early 2022) firmly anchors the US in the Indo-Pacific and seeks to strengthen it in the process. The US has a network of formal alliances across the region and its increasing Indo-Pacific investment has also elevated the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the QUAD, with Australia, India and Japan), and helped prompt the AUKUS initiative (with Australia and the UK). [REDACTED] s6(a)

3. [REDACTED] s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

*Implications of Russia's invasion of Ukraine for the Indo-Pacific*

4. Partners are increasingly focused on the implications of what is happening in Ukraine for the Indo-Pacific region, in the context of heightened geopolitical competition. [REDACTED] s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

5. [REDACTED] s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

6. While ASEAN is at the centre of the region's formal architecture (i.e. the East Asia Summit), there is a complex array of other, often overlapping, Indo-Pacific relationships, frameworks and strategies. [REDACTED] s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

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s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

ASEAN leaders released the principles-based “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” (AOIP) in 2019 in an attempt to advance their own vision of the Indo-Pacific. s6(a)

Asia Regional Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade  
May 2022

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**Handling note:**

- *This brief sets out the regional context for your bilateral and multilateral meetings in the wider multilateral architecture of the region.*

**Key messages**

- New Zealand places priority on strengthening and contributing to regional security architecture. This includes ASEAN-centric security fora, including the foreign affairs-led ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the Defence-led ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM)-Plus.
- These forums fulfil an important role promoting understanding, entrenching habits of dialogue, and facilitating practical mil-mil cooperation between participants.
- The ADMM-Plus framework is New Zealand's principal forum for multilateral defence engagement in the Indo-Pacific, a region central to our interests.
- With the current state of regional tensions, ASEAN-centric regional security architecture has an increasingly important role in bringing countries together and providing a forum for discussions.

s6(b)(i)

*[If raised: Expanded membership of the ADMM-Plus]*


- New Zealand respects ASEAN's right to consider expanding the membership should they see the benefits. This remains a matter for ASEAN Defence Ministers to decide.
- On a case-by-case basis, New Zealand supports observers to ADMM-Plus exercises or seminars. However, it must be clear that observer status is not a pathway to membership.
- New Zealand supports countries with direct/demonstrated commitment to the Asia-Pacific being more involved in regional architecture.

*[If raised: Myanmar – an ASEAN member]*

- New Zealand is strongly supportive of ASEAN's five-point consensus. However, greatly disappointed by the lack of adherence to this from the Tatmadaw.
- New Zealand sees action and pressure from international partners such as Australia as a way to urge the Tatmadaw to uphold its undertakings to ASEAN under the Five-Point Consensus.
- While participation at ASEAN meetings is for ASEAN to determine, New Zealand is supportive of ASEAN's decision to have non-political representation from Myanmar

at high level meetings, which we see as an important way to discuss with representatives directly and thereby put pressure on the Tatmadaw.

*[If raised: Engagement with Russia in multilateral forums] Note: New Zealand Defence's engagement with Russia is solely through multilateral forums, such as the ADMM-Plus.]*

- New Zealand stands with the international community in condemning Putin's unjustified and unprovoked attack on Ukraine.
- For working-level engagement in forums with active Russian participation, we continue to discuss approaches with likemindeds for each meeting. Regionally, this includes the ADMM-Plus (which you are scheduled to attend in November) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (officials level).
- Despite Russia's actions violating the ASEAN charter and Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, ASEAN consensus on engagement with Russia is unlikely to be easily reached, if at all.
-  s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

## Background

New Zealand places priority on strengthening and contributing to regional security architecture. In the Asia region, this includes ASEAN-centric security fora, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus). The ADMM-Plus is New Zealand's principal forum for multilateral defence engagement in the Indo-Pacific.<sup>1</sup>

2. These forums fulfil an important role of promoting understanding and managing tensions, entrenching habits of dialogue, and facilitating practical mil-mil cooperation.

### *Defence Engagement with ASEAN*

3. Defence's primary engagement with ASEAN is through the ADMM-Plus governance group meetings. The annual Governance meeting structure includes: a Ministerial Meeting; a Senior Officials' Meeting; and one or more Working Group meetings at the Director level. These meetings are hosted on a rotating basis by the current ASEAN Chair.

4. Each year the ASEAN Chair is afforded the opportunity to shape the focus of ADMM-Plus to a degree, and gets the opportunity to issue a unilateral statement. Cambodia is the 2022 ASEAN Chair. Cambodia's stated objectives as Chair are to

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<sup>1</sup> The ADMM-Plus, comprised of 18 nations (the ten ASEAN nations and eight Plus nations: Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Russia, the United States), enables Defence Ministers representing approximately 90% of the world's militaries, to meet annually to discuss defence issues.

“maintain ASEAN centrality and unity, collectively address common challenges, ensure continuity of our works and uphold a human-centred approach.” Accordingly, Cambodia’s theme for its hosting year is “ASEAN A.C.T. - Addressing Challenges Together” – which reflects “the importance of ASEAN’s spirit as a united family of ten in jointly acting for results to achieve common goals.

s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

*ADMM-Plus Experts’ Working Groups (EWGs) co-chairs*

7. There are seven EWGs in the ADMM-Plus. Each of the seven EWGs bring together working level representatives from the eighteen ADMM-Plus militaries several times a year to undertake practical training, conduct exercises, exchange lessons learned and share best practice. Each EWG co-chairing cycle is three years. These chairs will next rotate in 2024.

| Experts’ Working Group                    | 2021-2024 Co-Chairs |
|---|---------------------|
| Maritime Security                         | Thailand/US         |
| Counter-Terrorism                         | Myanmar/Russia      |
| Humanitarian Assistance & Disaster Relief | Indonesia/India     |
| Peacekeeping Operations                   | Viet Nam/Japan      |
| Military Medicine                         | Brunei/Australia    |
| Humanitarian Mine Action                  | Cambodia/China      |
| Cyber Security                            | Malaysia/ROK        |

8. New Zealand is not co-chairing an EWG in the 2021-2024 term. In the absence of chairing an EWG, New Zealand plans to host a Defence Policymakers' Course and a Future Leaders Seminar for ASEAN partners later this year (COVID-19 border policy dependent). The Future Leaders Seminar will be focussed on Climate Change.


s6(a), s6(b)(i)

### *ASEAN Regional Forum*

10. This Foreign Ministers-led forum fosters political and security engagement amongst 27 member countries. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has four work streams: maritime security; counter-terrorism and transnational crime; disaster management and non-proliferation and disarmament.

11. The only Defence-led component of the ARF is the ARF Defence Officials' Dialogue, which was held on 29 April 2022, and co-chaired by Cambodia and China.

*International Branch, Ministry of Defence  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade  
March 2022*



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**Handling note:**

- *All regional partners have an interest in this topic*
- *Note that further options for New Zealand assistance will be considered at ERS on 7 June, to be confirmed at Cabinet on 13 June.*

**Key messages**

- Aotearoa New Zealand condemns, unequivocally, the unprovoked and unjustified attack by the Putin regime in Russia on Ukraine, which represents a clear violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.
- We stand with the international community in condemning Putin's unjustified and illegal attack on Ukraine.
- Russia's actions egregiously undermine international rules, not only in Europe but also in our shared region – the Indo Pacific. Russia's actions are inconsistent with the fundamental ASEAN principles of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, the UN Charter, and our shared objectives of promoting regional peace and security in the region.
- The international community is paying close attention to the Indo-Pacific and the ASEAN-led regional architecture within, and our ability to uphold and defend the international rules-based order. We must act strongly and decisively in addressing actions such as those perpetrated by Russia against Ukraine, in order to advance our collective objectives in a credible manner.
- New Zealand has provided support to Ukraine via economic, humanitarian, diplomatic and military channels. We continue to assess if there are further areas where New Zealand can provide useful support.

**Background**

*New Zealand's contributions*

- New Zealand has contributed over \$8 million in humanitarian assistance to support the Ukrainian response to Russia's illegal invasion. To support human rights and provide legal assistance New Zealand has contributed NZ\$1m to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and NZ\$0.8m for the international legal responses to the situation in Ukraine, including further funding towards the International Criminal Court's investigation against Russian actions in Ukraine.
- In terms of military contributions, New Zealand has deployed a NZDF C-130H Hercules aircraft and 66 personnel to Europe to provide intelligence, liaison and logistics contributions to partner efforts to support the self-defence of Ukraine. We have also deployed 30 personnel and ammunition to the United Kingdom to train

the Ukrainian Army in the use of the L119 light field gun, as well as donating surplus aiming systems.

- The NZDF has activated its New Zealand-based open-source intelligence capability and contributed surplus equipment to the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
- New Zealand has donated approximately NZD \$15.7 million for the provision of critical military equipment to Ukraine through the NATO Trust Fund and UK Ministry of Defence, and commercial satellite access [REDACTED] s6(a)

### *Russian participation*

Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, likemindeds including New Zealand, have been considering how best to manage Moscow's participation in ASEAN-led architecture, particularly forums with security and defence-related cooperation.

[REDACTED] s6(a)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

*International Branch/ Policy Branch/ Strategic Commitments and Engagements  
Ministry of Defence, New Zealand Defence Force  
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Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA)

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**Handling note:**

- There will be a FPDA breakfast with your counterparts from **Singapore, Malaysia, Australia** and the **United Kingdom** on 11 June. [REDACTED] s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

- [REDACTED] s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

**Key messages**

- Pleased to participate in the 50th FPDA Anniversary last October, and to celebrate the longevity and relevance of these defence arrangements.
- Our regular engagements and exercises have strengthened cooperation and interoperability amongst our nations' forces. The regular tempo of Exercise Suman Protector, supported by the bi-annual exercises Exercise Bersama Shield and Bersama Lima are key to this.
- Note the FPDA's efforts to build capacity in non-conventional areas are also commendable and puts us in good stead to respond to newly emerging threats, as outlined in the FPDA stocktake paper.

[REDACTED] s6(a), s6(b)(i)

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## Background

### *Five Power Defence Arrangements*

The Five Power Defence Arrangements (comprising Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United Kingdom) is one of New Zealand's oldest collective defence arrangements and a cornerstone of our defence engagement in South East Asia. Signed in 1971, it is described as the second oldest multilateral defence arrangement of its kind in the world. It anchors New Zealand's bilateral defence relationships with Malaysia and Singapore and provides an enduring avenue for defence engagement by the United Kingdom in the Indo-Pacific.

2. Last year was the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the FPDA, and a range of activities took place to mark this event. Exercise Bersama Gold took place 8-18 October 2021. The exercise marked the first field exercise for the FPDA since 2019, with the COVID-19 pandemic reducing drills to virtual command post exercises. Exercise Bersama Gold involved sea and air exercises, mostly in the South China Sea international waters between the coasts of Malaysia and Singapore. New Zealand contributed the replenishment ship HMNZS Aotearoa, the frigate HMNZS Te Kaha, and a Royal New Zealand Air Force P-3K2 Orion.

s6(a), s6(b)(i)



*Current and future contributions to FPDA exercises*

6. New Zealand Defence Force ships, aircraft and personnel regularly participate in FPDA exercises. Participation in these exercises provides New Zealand with a regular presence in the region. [REDACTED] s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

[REDACTED]

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**Handling note:**

- *Includes tailored talking points on the Solomon Islands – China security agreement*

**Key messages**

- The stability of our Pacific region matters deeply to New Zealand – our identity, prosperity and security are intertwined. Our security is directly tied to the security, stability and strategic balance of the South Pacific region.
- We work hard to promote strong, independent Pacific governance, human rights and rule of law. We expect other partners working in the Pacific to respect these principles.

s6(a)

*Solomon Islands – China Security agreement (Unclassified talking points)*

- The Solomon Islands–China Security Arrangement is both unwelcome and unnecessary. While we recognise this is a sovereign decision for Solomon Islands, it is also a matter of regional security and will have implications for all Pacific Islands Forum members.
- Pacific Islands Forum members have a strong commitment to support each other to meet our broader ambitions for our region’s security, as set out in the Biketawa Declaration. As Pacific neighbours, we have worked very hard together to make sure we are meeting one another’s needs. Collectively, we are ready, willing, and able to meet the security needs of Solomon Islands.
- It is critical that we come together, as a region, at the Pacific Islands Forum to hold a dialogue on this agreement and discuss its regional security implications. There is widespread support amongst Pacific Islands Forum members for this dialogue to take place at the upcoming Forum Leaders’ Meeting, possibly scheduled for June.
- We are disappointed and concerned by the lack of transparency regarding the agreement, particularly given its regional implications. It is important that the text of the agreement is released so that we, as Pacific neighbours, can fully understand its implications for our regional security.
- New Zealand has a long-standing and close partnership with Solomon Islands, including on security matters. We are deeply disappointed that Solomon Islands has chosen to pursue this security agreement outside the region.

- We refute any allegation that security assistance offered by Pacific partners is insufficient. Our view remains that the Pacific Islands Forum members have the capacity and commitment to meet our region's security needs.

## Background

### *Chinese Foreign Minister visit to the Pacific*

s6(b)(i)

s6(a)

China has also announced publicly that it intends to hold a second China-Pacific Foreign Ministers' meeting in Fiji in hybrid format (excluding Australia and New Zealand). China has proposed that the meeting also adopt a *Common Development Vision* (and associated action plan). [REDACTED]

s6(a), s6(b)(i)

s6(a), s6(b)(i)

s6(a)

7. The NZDF deployment to Solomon Islands has recently been extended from 31 May 2022 to 31 May 2023.

8. There are no present plans to increase the NZDF's current footprint in Solomon Islands. We anticipate that there will be a steady state of between two to five NZDF personnel throughout the deployment timeframe. s6(a)

9. Ministers with Powers to Act will be provided with further recommendations on the future of the New Zealand deployment prior to 31 May 2023.

[Refer to "New Zealand Defence in the Pacific for further background]

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South China Sea

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**Handling note:**

*Brunei Darussalam, China, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam have competing territorial claims in the South China Sea (see map).*

*Non-claimant countries who have submitted their legal position to the UN include **US; Australia; France, Germany and the UK (jointly); Japan; New Zealand.***

**Key messages**

- New Zealand places high value on the peaceful management of maritime disputes in accordance with international law, particularly the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
- We are increasingly concerned about actions and behaviours in the South China Sea, including militarisation and destabilising activities at sea. We have enduring interests in a peaceful and stable region.
- New Zealand continues to call on all claimants to refrain from actions which risk escalating tensions or which undermine the trust and confidence that is needed to achieve an enduring solution. Our decision to submit a diplomatic note to the UN Secretary General outlining our legal position on the South China Sea reflects our concerns about actions in the region which challenge international rules and norms.
- The New Zealand Defence Force has operated in the region including in the South China Sea for decades, in support of regional peace and stability and freedom of navigation and overflight.

- [Redacted] s6(a)

**Background**

The South China Sea remains a major security concern for New Zealand. In recent years there has been a notable pattern of China exerting pressure on other South China Sea claimant states by disrupting resource activities inside their Exclusive Economic Zones, in order to assert China’s claims within its 9-dash line. This has resulted in a number of concerning maritime incidents. [Redacted] s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

[Redacted]

[Redacted] s6(a)

3. [REDACTED], a Third Person Note was submitted to the UN Secretary General on 3 August 2021. This provided the opportunity to state on the record New Zealand's legal position on how UNCLOS applies in the South China Sea. It makes clear that New Zealand neither recognises China's historical rights, nor that its artificial islands are capable of generating an EEZ. The TPN forms part of the exchange of notes on the South China Sea prompted by Malaysia, to which partners including the US, Australia, Japan, China, Viet Nam, Indonesia and the Philippines have responded.

*Map of the South China Sea (with various competing claims)*



*New Zealand defence developments*

4. For nearly five decades New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) ships and aircraft have operated in the South China Sea, both contributing to the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) exercise programme outside China's self-claimed nine dash line and operating within the nine dash line. The prioritisation of deployments to the Middle East, frigate upgrades, and decommissioning of the HMNZS Endeavour reduced New

Zealand's defence presence in the region over the last decade. Despite this, the NZDF continued to undertake P-3K2 maritime air patrol operations in the South China Sea, in support of regional security and exercising freedom of overflight. From late 2021, the completion of the frigate upgrades for HMNZ ships TE KAHA and TE MANA, and the introduction into service of the new fleet tanker, HMNZS AOTEAROA, enables the NZDF to resume a regular naval presence in South East Asia and the South China Sea.

5. Over the past few years, the NZDF operated alone rather than with partners inside China's self-declared nine dash line, [REDACTED] s6(a)

[REDACTED]

6. [REDACTED] s6(a)

[REDACTED]

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## Myanmar

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### Handling note:

- *All regional partners have an interest in this topic*

### Key messages/ Talking points

- More than one year on from the coup, New Zealand remains concerned about the situation in Myanmar, and the deteriorating human rights and humanitarian conditions in Myanmar.
- New Zealand is supportive of ASEAN's Five-Point Consensus. We are greatly disappointed by the lack of adherence to this from Myanmar's military government and urge the prompt implementation of the Consensus.

### Background

#### *Situation in Myanmar*

Fourteen months since the 1 February 2021 military coup, the situation in Myanmar continues to deteriorate. In its attempts to bring the country under its control, the military have killed more than 1,700 civilians and detained a further 10,000 including three quarters of the democratically elected National League for Democracy (NLD) Government. The economy has shrunk by 18%, over 1.6 million people in the formal sector have lost their jobs and the military continues to target civilians including burning down over 6,000 homes, schools, hospitals and places of worship in the past year. Fifty percent of the population have plunged into poverty and over 500,000 have become internally displaced.

#### *Ending the conflict – potential for political dialogue*

2. The Tatmadaw continues its repression of all civic activity; The People's Defence Force (PDFs) and some ethnic groups continue to put pressure on the Tatmadaw. [REDACTED]

s6(b)(i)

3.

s6(a), s6(b)(i)

[REDACTED]. The State Administrative Council (SAC) has blocked requests from the ASEAN Special Envoy to meet with opposition figures.

4.

s6(a)

[REDACTED] s6(a) In April 2021, ASEAN Member States agreed on a Five-Point Consensus, a commitment to peace signed by all ASEAN members which sets out: the need for a cessation of violence; dialogue with all parties for a peaceful solution; appointment of an ASEAN Special Envoy; provision of humanitarian assistance; and a visit by the Special Envoy. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] s6(a), s6(b)(i)

[REDACTED] on 15 October 2021 in an ASEAN consensus decision to downgrade Myanmar's attendance at the upcoming ASEAN-summitry to 'non-political representation'.

5. [REDACTED] s6(a)  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

*South East Asia Division  
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**Handling note:**

- *The security situation on the Korean Peninsula remains a key risk to regional and global security, and a high priority for our defence partners,* [redacted] s6(a), s6(b)(i)

**Key messages**

- New Zealand is committed to supporting the diplomatic effort to persuade North Korea to take concrete steps towards complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation, and abandon its ballistic missile and other weapons programmes.
- The New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) is an active contributor to peace and security on the Korean Peninsula through deployments to United Nations Command in the Republic of Korea (ROK), and maritime surveillance operations in support in United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions against North Korea.

**Background**

North Korea remains one of the most pressing security issues facing the Indo-Pacific. Its nuclear programme and ballistic missiles capability (some of which are assessed as capable of reaching New Zealand) impact key New Zealand political, security, and economic interests, and presents proliferation risks for nuclear weaponry and technology. It also poses a risk to North Korea’s immediate neighbours, the ROK and Japan.

2. As of 25 May 2022, North Korea has launched ballistic missiles on 15 occasions including at least two inter-continental ballistic missiles (the first since 2017), and a Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile on 7 May 2022. All of its ballistic missile tests are in violation of UNSC resolutions. Kim Jong-un has indicated twice, in 2019 and in January 2022 that he no longer feels bound by North Korea’s self-imposed moratorium on nuclear tests and long-range missile tests. Further tests are expected as North Korea aims to deliver on its five year capability development plan, including improvements to inter-continental ballistic missile and nuclear capabilities.

3. [redacted] s6(a), s6(b)(i) Such a test would be the first since 2017 and a grave provocation, which would threaten regional and international stability and undermine the global non-proliferation regime. The Kim Jong Un regime seems to be strengthening its rhetoric around its nuclear programme. In a speech on 25 April, Kim called for the development of nuclear forces “at the highest rapidity” and for improving the quality of nuclear weapons, including tailoring them to different operation purposes and missions. The DPRK has been working on reconstituting its nuclear test site at Punggye-ri and should be in a position to test a weapon “within weeks.” [redacted] s6(a), s6(b)(i)

4. UN sanctions are the international community's key tool to restrict North Korea's access to inputs for its illicit nuclear and ballistic weapons programmes and to encourage it to pursue denuclearisation and a return to diplomacy. From 2006 to 2017 the UNSC passed ten resolutions imposing sanctions against North Korea. The sanctions ban North Korea's export of resources such as coal and sand (revenues that have historically contributed to its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes) and limit the import of refined petroleum to 500,000 barrels per year (a key strategic resource for North Korea's weapons programmes). Humanitarian aid is exempt from sanctions.

5. North Korea continues to violate sanctions by illicitly importing refined petroleum and exporting commodities such as coal and sand. [REDACTED] s6(a), s6(b)(i)

#### *Inter-Korean relations*

6. The ROK's security outlook is dominated by its relations with North Korea which invaded in 1950, leading to the creation of the US-led United Nations Command (UNC) to assist ROK forces, [REDACTED] s6(a), s6(b)(i) An Armistice was signed on 27 July 1953, splitting the Korean Peninsula along a Demilitarised Zone. A Military Armistice Commission was set up by both sides to monitor adherence to the Armistice agreement (although North Korea has since withdrawn).

[REDACTED] s6(a), s6(b)(i)

#### *So what for New Zealand?*

8. New Zealand's national security and economic prosperity rely on protecting peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region: our economy and prosperity are reliant on our ability to trade in a peaceful Indo-Pacific, particularly with the large powerhouse economies of Northeast Asia. A renewal of conflict on the Korean Peninsula (even if currently a remote possibility) would have global ramifications, likely involving major powers, and carries risk for New Zealanders on the Korean Peninsula and in North Asia.

#### *NZDF deployments*

##### *Operation Monitor*

9. In 2021, Cabinet extended the mandate for the NZDF deployment to UNC and its Military Armistice Commission from 31 August 2021 until 31 August 2023. Cabinet also approved increasing the NZDF contribution by three personnel, from nine to 12. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] s6(a), s6(b)(i), s6(b)(ii)



s6(a), s6(b)(i), s6(b)(ii)

*Operation Whio*

10. Since 2018, New Zealand has deployed NZDF P-3K2 maritime patrol aircraft on five occasions to undertake maritime surveillance and monitoring in support of UNSC sanctions against the DPRK. This activity is a coordinated effort s6(a), s6(b)(i), s6(b)(ii)

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### **Key messages**

- In support of the wider New Zealand Government work programme on climate change, New Zealand Defence has taken a proactive approach in promoting global recognition of climate change as a security risk, and to integrate climate change impacts into Defence activities and decision-making processes.
- Climate change remains the central security concern for our Pacific partners. In the 2018 Boe Declaration, Pacific Island leaders affirmed that climate change represents the single greatest threat to the livelihood, security and wellbeing of Pacific peoples.
- Since 2018 New Zealand's Defence Policy has formally recognised the importance of Climate Change. Most recently, the Defence Assessment 2021 recognises Climate Change as one of the two most significant long term trends affecting New Zealand's security, together with Strategic Competition.
- Defence continues to make progress on actions that sit under the four pillar framework—Respond, Adapt, Mitigate and Engage—outlined in the 2019 Defence climate change implementation plan, Responding to the Climate Crisis.
- We are exploring options to hold a Future Leaders' Seminar for ASEAN partners. This seminar would focus on a thematic issue each year, looking firstly at Climate Change, with a focus on the potential impacts on defence readiness and responsibilities and capabilities.

### *Key updates under the Engage pillar*

- The Ministry of Defence continues to support policy partners internationally by sharing policy development best practice—this currently includes Australia, Canada, and Papua New Guinea.
- Defence will be co-chairing the Policy Working Group at the upcoming Pacific Environmental Security Forum, which will be held over 1 – 4 August in the Maldives.
- NZDF also is engaged with a wide range of military partners actively sharing insights and best practice on climate security. This includes adapting exercise scenarios and future operating concepts to include climate security impacts.

### *Key updates under the Mitigate pillar*

- Defence is a participant in the New Zealand Carbon Neutral Government Programme (CNGP), which challenges the public sector to lead by example in emissions reduction and has a goal of Carbon Neutrality from 2025. Toitū Envirocare has verified an initial NZDF-wide emissions database and work is underway to verify all years to the baseline of Financial Year 2016/17.

- This will allow for a greater understanding of the variabilities in Defence operations, regional climate impacts, and financial drivers to support emissions reduction planning (gross and net). The NZDF intends to use FY2016/17 as its base year for CNGP reporting with a gross emission reduction target of 42% by 2030. This base year and target information will be publicly released in the NZDF's Annual Report for FY2021/22. The Ministry is also working to track its emissions as per the implementation plan.
- NZDF is working with the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Authority (EECA) to progress decarbonisation opportunities – including progressive introduction of electric vehicles and charging stations at camps and bases from Financial Year 2021/22, decommissioning the coal boilers at Burnham in Financial Year 2022/23 (other site studies are underway), and introducing electric passenger stairs and electric buggy's at Air Force bases. The NZDF Sustainable Infrastructure Standards became mandatory on 1 March 2021 for all new and retrofit buildings and infrastructure on the Defence estate. These standards incorporate the guidance from the Government and are intended to reduce the embodied and operational carbon of new building projects.

#### *Key updates under the Adapt pillar*

- The NZDF is currently finalising an assessment of their climate change risks for all camps, bases and training areas and their impacts on wider NZDF activities. NIWA were engaged to undertake modelling and a high level hazard assessment. The next step is to undertake specific adaptation planning.
- Capability adaptation is already happening through the introduction of more fuel-efficient ships and aircraft, and increased regional response capability.

#### *Key updates under the Respond pillar*

- The NZDF is expecting to need to respond more frequently to natural disasters, especially in the Pacific as a result of climate change. Future capability decisions will need to take this into consideration.
- Throughout the pandemic, the NZDF maintained essential rapid response capability in the Pacific and developed 'contactless' border procedures to protect vulnerable islands. Activities include air and maritime surveillance to assist Pacific partners protect their maritime EEZs, Search and Rescue, and survey flights following Tropical Cyclones.
- As New Zealand increases its range of engagement following the pandemic, NZDF will be prioritising regenerating readiness to respond to more frequent, severe, or concurrent crises arising from climate change impacts in the Pacific.

## **Background**

### *Climate Change Implementation Plan*

2. This Defence Climate Change Implementation Work Plan, titled Responding to the Climate Crisis: An Implementation Plan, puts actions to the recommendations from the

2018 Climate Crisis Defence Assessment. The plan has been co-produced by the Ministry of Defence and New Zealand Defence Force.

3. The plan highlights Defence's early efforts and commitments relating to climate change and how we will grow best practice and raise our ambition over time. It identifies next steps Defence will take to ensure we are even more prepared for the challenges climate change will bring over the next decade.

4. The NZDF has recently activated a Climate Change Response Programme to coordinate and drive further action to plan for and implement change across the four pillars framework of Respond, Mitigate, Adapt, and Engage.

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**Handling note:**

- *For information. All regional countries have an interest in cyber security.*

**Key messages/ Talking points**

- New Zealand is a member of the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) Experts' Working Group on Cyber Security.
- New Zealand regularly collaborates with partners on cyber security issues. Cooperation and collaboration with our close security partners is essential to our ability to deal effectively with cyber threats.
- Defence is developing a Cyber Security and Support capability to enhance protection of Defence networks.

**Background**

Cyber-enabled threats to New Zealand's security continue to grow in number, scope, and scale. NZDF day-to-day operational and non-operational activities also face increasing cyber threats. New technologies are accelerating this trend.

2. At a national level, New Zealand is experiencing a significant increase in cyber incidents, and has joined a number of other countries to call for an end to this type of malicious cyber activity, which undermines global stability and security.
3. At a whole of government level, New Zealand released an update of its National Cyber Security Strategy in 2019. The Strategy has five priority areas: cyber security aware and active citizens, a strong and capable cyber security workforce and ecosystem, internationally active, a resilient and responsive New Zealand, and proactively tackle cybercrime.
4. New Zealand views cyber as a business-as-usual activity for military operations and a key aspect of interoperability with close partners.
5. To maintain relevant combat capabilities, including interoperability with close partners, Defence is seeking to develop its cyber capabilities to ensure that military commanders have the tools they need to achieve objectives.
6. Defence cyber activities and interests are interdependent with the wider Government's cyber security efforts. Collaboration on cyber across Government and our diplomatic efforts is increasing.

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**Handling note:**

- *Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States are fellow members of the Combined Space Operations initiative and may address this topic in meetings with you.*

**Key messages**

- Work continues across government to develop policy settings relevant to the space domain.
- Through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, New Zealand is participating in work at the United Nations (UN) to reduce space threats through the development of norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviour.
- Defence participates in the Combined Space Operations (CSpO) initiative.
- On 23 February 2022, New Zealand Defence, alongside our other CSpO partners, published the CSpO Vision 2031 statement. This is a major milestone for CSpO and represents a clear public statement of our shared values, guiding principles and objectives with respect to space.

**Background**

Space policy development in New Zealand is carried on an all of government basis, and encompasses diplomatic, national security and economic development interests. The Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment is New Zealand's lead agency for space policy and sector development, and stewards of New Zealand's regulatory regime for commercial space activities.

2. New Zealand made a national submission on Norms, Rules and Principles of Responsible Behaviours in Space to the UN Secretary-General in May 2021.

3. New Zealand's work promoting responsible behaviours in space in the UN context is primarily carried out through the Open Ended Working Group (OEWG) on Reducing Space Threats in Geneva, established by the First Committee of the General Assembly. Additionally, aspects of the issues covered by the OEWG in Geneva would have overlap with some of the work carried out in the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in Vienna, where New Zealand also has an active presence.

4. New Zealand Defence's main contribution is CSpO. It consists of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. It is a non-binding international initiative dedicated to coordinating effort and sharing information about activities in space. Discussion of the development of defence space policy and how to communicate these developments to the wider world, forms an integral part of CSpO's work

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**Handling note:**

- *Countering violent extremism in all its forms, and may be raised by some partners, particularly Southeast Asian partners who are grappling with countering domestic terrorism and violent extremism, [redacted] s6(a)*
- *Note that the CTIF mandate is being considered at ERS on 7 June 2022, to be confirmed at Cabinet on 13 June.*

**Key messages**

- New Zealand has experienced first-hand the impact of violent extremism, in Christchurch in March 2019 and again in Auckland in September last year.
- New Zealand is committed to supporting regional efforts to preserve stability and prevent the Indo-Pacific region becoming a source, or destination for terrorists.
- New Zealand has a whole-of-government engagement strategy on CVE in South East Asia, which identifies opportunities and ways to increase our CVE efforts and to better support the region.

**Background**

*Major trends in countering violent extremism*

Incidents of terrorism in South East Asia have declined in the past seven years, in line with global trends. However, the threat of extremist groups aligned with the Islamic State persists in South East Asia, and remains a concern in strategic security discussions with partners. The Philippines remains in the top ten countries afflicted by terrorism worldwide, with several suicide bombings occurring in the southern Philippines in recent years. Domestic and international movement restrictions as a result of COVID-19 may have reduced in-person radicalisation opportunities, however, extremists have continued to recruit and carry out attacks during the pandemic.

s6(a)



3 It is estimated that over 1,000 fighters from South East Asia travelled to the Middle East to join the Islamic State, with at least 700 remaining held in prisons and camps in Syria, including women and children. Though returning foreign fighters may be few in number, they present a threat due to their experience, prestige, international linkages, and indoctrination, all of which may assist in radicalisation. This was highlighted in the Philippines where foreign terrorist fighters played a significant role in the 2017 siege of Marawi.

4 Outside of those aligned to the Islamic State, there are other violent extremist factions and groups in the region which appear latent but may resurface, including the Jemaah Islamiyah network, a Southeast Asian militant extremist terrorist group.

#### *Singapore's Counter Terrorism Information Facility (CTIF)*

5 The CTIF was established [redacted] s6(b)(i) to respond to an enduring and increasingly multifaceted threat of terrorism in South East Asia. It is the first open source counter-terrorism information and sharing collaboration facility in Southeast Asia. It aims to enable regional militaries and law enforcement agencies to work together to achieve better early warning of terrorist threats in the region.

6 The CTIF consists of representatives from 10 nations, [redacted] s6(a)  
[redacted]  
[redacted] New Zealand currently has one NZDF analyst attached to the CTIF for a period of 15 months (from April 2021 to June 2022). [redacted] s6(a)  
[redacted]  
[redacted]

7

9 While the CTIF is a Singaporean initiative, our participation also provides opportunities for New Zealand to strengthen bilateral security relationships with other regional security partners contributing to the CTIF..

#### *'Our Eyes' Initiative*

10 'Our Eyes' was established by Indonesia to strengthen surveillance and early detection of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) development and activity in the Asia-Pacific. It is primarily an intelligence-sharing strategy. It was launched on 25 January 2018 in Bali, Indonesia. Current members include Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Brunei, Singapore, and Thailand. New Zealand will follow this closely and will support the initiative where we can.

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Ministry of Defence/ NZDF  
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**Handling note:**

- *COVID-19 remains a key topic for all countries in the region*

**Key messages**

- From 25 March 2020, the NZDF supported the All-of-Government COVID-19 response effort. NZDF personnel have been committed to the management, coordination and security of Managed Isolation and Quarantine operations throughout New Zealand, including personnel assigned and seconded to key strategic positions at the national level.
- NZDF's involvement in the Managed Isolation and Quarantine system through Operation PROTECT, has made a significant contribution as a core and critical intervention for keeping New Zealand safe. It has managed the risk of COVID-19 posed by nearly 230,000 people entering at the border and over 3,600 cases from the community.
- The NZDF has deployed more than 6,200 personnel to the Managed Isolation and Quarantine system over the past two years (900 to 1200 personnel committed at any given time), with the majority from the New Zealand Army with 3278. This includes more than 500 Reserve Force personnel.
- The implementation of the New Zealand Governments Reconnecting New Zealanders to the World plan has reduced the demand for Managed Isolation and Quarantine at the border. Consequently the NZDF has ended its commitment and withdrawn all associated resourcing requirements, as the majority of MIQ facilities have decommissioned and future staffing requirements have transitioned to the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment.
- With the closure of this substantial part of Operation PROTECT, the NZDF can look forward to regrouping, refreshing training, and regenerating those capabilities that have been impacted by this significant commitment.

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s9(2)(g)(i)

### Key messages/ Talking points

- The New Zealand Government announced its Budget on 20 May 2022.
- The Minister of Defence has announced that Defence will receive an additional NZ\$662.5 million over four years. This will maintain existing defence capabilities, and support the regeneration and strengthening of the Defence Force following its intensive commitment to Operation Protect, a key component of the Government's COVID-19 response.
- New Zealand's total Defence budget is approximately \$4.9 Billion for 2022/23. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates New Zealand's defence budget to be approximately 1.4% of GDP, according to its latest internationally comparative database. This is a significant increase from 1.15% five years ago.

*(Handling Note: there is not an official Treasury figure for NZ defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP. SIPRI is the major globally recognised comparative data set.)*

- The Minister of Defence has noted that this Budget supports the Government's key current defence priorities of People, Infrastructure and the Pacific. The immediate focus is on force regeneration and the timely introduction of new capabilities into service including the new P-8A and C-130J aircraft, upgraded frigates and littoral capabilities for the Navy, and new Army capabilities including protected vehicles and modern networked C4ISR capabilities.
- Since 2018, the Government has committed NZ\$ 4.5 billion to 12 major defence capability projects – the largest capability investment Defence has ever received.
- These investments will support the NZDF to continue to deliver for New Zealanders across the full range of their requirements, including maritime patrol, tactical transport, search and rescue, and disaster response.
  - The first of four P8-A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft will be delivered later this year.
  - The first C-130J aircraft will be delivered in 2023.

*International Branch/ Policy Branch/ Strategic Commitments and Engagements  
Ministry of Defence, New Zealand Defence Force  
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## Key messages

### Background

- On 8 December 2021, the Secretary of Defence released *Defence Assessment 2021: He moana pukepuke e ekengia e te waka: a rough sea can still be navigated*. (U)
- Defence assessments are not themselves Government policy, but do inform policy decisions. (U)

### Key findings

- *Defence Assessment 2021* finds that New Zealand faces a substantially more challenging and complex strategic environment than it has for decades, and that the principal challenges to New Zealand's security interests will arise from:
  - strategic competition; and
  - climate change. (U)
- [REDACTED] s6(a)  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]
- Growing strategic competition will increase the potential for confrontation and conflict. Even without open conflict, strategic competition will play out across a range of geographic areas in ways that threaten New Zealand's security. (U)
- At the same time, the impacts of climate change are accelerating, and are being felt early and deeply in the Pacific. Climate change is causing more extreme weather patterns and increasing numbers of climate-related natural disasters. Climate change is most acutely affecting states that are less equipped to respond. For some countries, including in the Pacific, the threat from climate change is existential. (U)
- *Defence Assessment 2021* recommends New Zealand's defence policy should shift to be more deliberate, proactive and strategy led, with more explicitly prioritised defence policy objectives. A more strategy-led approach would still, however, require the New Zealand Defence Force to respond to specific events where it is needed, whether in New Zealand or offshore. (U)
- The Assessment further recommends New Zealand's defence policy and strategy should focus on New Zealand's immediate region, and with a particular emphasis on working with partners in the South Pacific. (U)
- An increased priority on the Pacific doesn't mean Defence won't be operating further afield. Defence will always need to be able and prepared to make valuable and credible contributions to addressing security challenges elsewhere, especially in the

wider Indo-Pacific, in line with New Zealand's interests and values, and when directed by Government. (U)

- Further work is now underway to develop the high-level approach set out by the Assessment into a meaningful and actionable strategy, as well as to understand the longer term capability implications. (U)

#### *Impact of subsequent events on the Assessment's findings*

- Much has happened in the international security environment since the Assessment was published. This includes a range of discrete events in the Pacific, as well as the signing of a security agreement between Solomon Islands and China. But the greatest test of the Assessment's findings so far has been Russia's invasion of Ukraine. (U)
- These events, including Russia's invasion of Ukraine, are consistent with the findings of the Assessment, but suggest the strategic environment is changing even more rapidly than the Assessment anticipated. (U)
- The fundamental direction of the policy recommendations set out in the Assessment therefore remains sound, but delivering on that direction will now be even more challenging. (U)

#### **Background**

The above talking points are consistent with the public version of *Defence Assessment 2021*, which was publicly launched on 8 December 2021. This version preserves the essence of the findings of the [REDACTED] s6(a) Assessment that has been provided to Ministers and considered by Cabinet. (R)

s6(a)

3 More detailed analysis on the impacts of Russia's invasion of Ukraine on the findings of the Assessment is included in the Ministry of Defence paper *Russia's invasion of Ukraine: implications for New Zealand's strategic defence policy settings*, provided to the Minister of Defence on 12 April 2022.

*Policy Branch  
Ministry of Defence  
May 2022*