

HEADQUARTERS JOINT FORCES NEW ZEALAND

MINUTE 157/2022

7 Jul 22

DDMS-R/OE/03-1003/28

CDF

For Info: CA

For Info: AC SCE

OP TIEKE – ‘TRAINING AT SCALE’ – SUPPORT TO UK OP INTERFLEX TRAINING OF UKRAINIAN ARMED FORCES ARMY PERSONNEL – REVISED OPERATIONAL ADVICE

References

- A. UK CJOPS letter to COMJFNZ dated 27 June 2022
- B. UK Asst Chief Defence Staff letter to IDCC Policy Partners dated 30 June – Training Support by IDCC Nations to the UAF
- C. CDF CUB 01 July 2022 (s6(a))
- D. CDF Weekly Ops Update 05 Jul 2022 (s6(a))
- E. Cabinet Paper – NZ Assistance for Ukraine; Options for Further Support – approved by Cabinet 12 June 2022
- F. Op INTERFLEX 21 day training schedule (as provided by SNO Op TIEKE, s9(2)(a) 27 June 2022)
- G. Email NZDS MA/XO LCC dated 2 Jul 22

Purpose

1. This minute provides CDF with operational advice for OP TIEKE, specifically the potential NZDF support to the UK led Op INTERFLEX training. Op INTERFLEX training will be delivered to Ukrainian Armed Force (UAF) Army personnel to accelerate Ukraine (UKR) forces deployment, rebuild their forces and scale-up their resistance¹. Op INTERFLEX is a sub-set of Op ORBITAL², the overarching operation under which the recent NZ Artillery Training was conducted. This minute supersedes Minute 154/2022.

Recommendation

2. s9(2)(g)(i)

¹ Taken from President Zelensky comments to UK PM on 20 June 2022.

² Op ORBITAL (UK mission to Train, Advise and Assist the UAF) in one shape or another has been in place for 8 years.

Background

3. Reference A offered an opportunity for the NZDF to support ongoing UK Op ORBITAL efforts through a condensed and accelerated training programme desiring to train 10,000 UAF troops before the end of 2022. The aim of this training is to achieve the rapid generation of Battle Casualty Replacements (BCR) for the UAF. The BCR training has been designated Op INTERFLEX, a sub-set of Op ORBITAL. Reference B³ reaffirmed this opportunity, welcoming the contribution from any nation currently committed to the International Donor Coordination Centre (IDCC) to participate in the overall training system. The current UK Armed Forces 21 day training programme is at reference F. The outcome of this training is that UAF soldiers/BCR are trained to 'shoot, move, communicate, medicate' up to Section and possibly Platoon level. The British Army is and will continue to lead the delivery of training for Op INTERFLEX.

4. Reference E states that due to the size of the NZDF, NZ stands to benefit most from committing small, high-value contributions of personnel to fill specific or in-demand roles. It also directs that NZ responses will be weighted to reflect Ukraine's priority needs. The proposed operational contribution contained in this minute nests within the guidelines and principles of reference F and current strategic direction⁴. Additionally this proposal corresponds to several of the framework criteria required by Cabinet for consideration (explored further at para 6(f)).


5. [Redacted] s6(b)(i)
[Redacted]
[Redacted] s6(b)(i)
[Redacted] s6(a), s6(b)(i)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted] Such combined options are outside of the scope of this operational advice.

³ [Redacted] s6(b)(i)
[Redacted]

⁴CDF Operational Directive 12/2022– NZDF Support to Ukraine's Self-Defence (to FRAGO 001)

⁵ [Redacted] s6(b)(i)
[Redacted]

⁶ [Redacted] s6(b)(i)
[Redacted]



Factors Considered for Op INTERFLEX support

6. The options for a contribution to Op INTERFLEX are influenced by the following key factors:

a. **Definition of mission success.** Success in this task would be gauged as per the UK measurement of quantity of UAF soldiers trained. If NZDF were to provide a complete Training SU (SU - a 52 person Sub Unit commanded by a MAJOR) for a 120 day period this could see NZDF training 600 UAF Soldiers. This is considered a realistic and viable goal.


b. **Timeliness.** The summer fighting continues unabated as Ukraine battles for its survival. [Redacted] s6(a)
[Redacted]
[Redacted] s6(a)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

c. **Impact on NZDF ability to respond to domestic or regional contingencies.** LCC has stated this contribution would not impact on directed outputs. [Redacted] s6(a)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

d. **Impact on regeneration of NZ Land Component capabilities.** [Redacted] s9(2)(g)(i)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

e. [Redacted] s9(2)(g)(i)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

7 [Redacted] s6(a)
[Redacted]
8 [Redacted] s9(2)(f)(iv)



- f. **Policy Alignment.** This advice is operationally consistent with the framework as directed by NZ Government for any future contributions to the defence of Ukraine. Specifically it is:

- (1)
- (2)
- (3)
- (4)
- (5)



Assumptions

7. The following planning assumptions have been made when scoping this operational advice:

- a.
- b.
- c.
- d.
- e.



⁹ Detailed costings for either of the options presented have yet to be derived. The C-130 contribution of a 50 person detachment for 9 weeks operating from the UK was \$3.977m. The costs of the Artillery Training Team comprising 27 pers operating within the UK for 35 days was \$1.205m. NB: these total costs included aviation fuel, 105mm ammunition; significant costs that will not be required for support to INTERFLEX.

¹⁰ These will be available in the Training Management Plan (TMP) which the UK Armed Forces will have designed.

s6(a)

- f.
- g.
- h.
- i.

Discussion

The NZDF can accomplish this task.

8. NZ Land Component initial scoping indicates a Training Sub Unit based on an existing combat Sub Unit is a viable, realistic, and for at least two rotations, a sustainable contribution. NZ Army experience with Partner Nation (PN)¹¹ training audiences stands us in good stead for conducting and achieving this style of mission. Detailed planning, complemented by an information gathering visit (as is being conducted by s6(b)(i)) will prepare us to an equal standard of other contributing nations.

Tempo for this style of training is high; its design is evolving.

9. s9(2)(g)(i)

[Redacted text block]

Lessons learned tell us to use an existing structure as the core for the Training Delivery Unit.

10. s6(b)(i) basing Training SU on an existing combat Sub Unit increases the likelihood of success of this mission. s6(a)


[Redacted text block]


This is assessed as reducing unnecessary burden on the Host Nation at a time when their focus is on the Op INTERFLEX objective of training 10,000 UAF BCR's.


¹¹ In particular our training with Iraqi Security Forces as demonstrated in Op MANAWA, training of Afghan National Army Officer Academy through Op RUA, and our training teams through out the SW Pacific.

Options

11. Due to the constant flow on UAF trainees (i.e. a new training audience commencing every week or more frequently) NZ Land Component have two feasible options for fulfilling this operation:

- a. s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)


- b.


- c.


Released under the Official Information Act 1982

¹² Further detail provided in Ref G.

¹³  s6(a)

d.

s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

e.

- d. **Sequel plan:** The future of Op INTERFLEX beyond the final trg delivery date (final course concludes on 25 Oct as per current schedule) is uncertain. NZDF possible contributions to an extension of Op INTERFLEX will be incorporated into future options developed at both HQJFNZ and HQNZDF.

Option Comparison

s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

Risks

13. The following risks have been identified:

a.

s6(a)

s6(a)

b.

c.

Summary

14. The NZDF Op TIEKE contributions have been highlighted by our partners as key contributions to the efforts to support Ukraine. Previous support from the C-130, Logistics specialists, the Intelligence teams and the Artillery training team have each filled critical roles. This potential contribution is seen as a continuum of these largely personnel-centric contributions. [REDACTED] s6(a)

15. This proposed contribution, if delivered in a timely manner, will serve as a proportionate yet much valued element of support to the UAF in their continued fight for their homeland. Training 3-5% of the UAF BCR's, in skills which the NZ Army has proven to be competent in delivering, would be seen as both meaningful and valued; [REDACTED] s6(a)

[REDACTED] s9(2)(g)(i)

16. Noting Op INTERFLEX is currently scheduled to conclude trg of UAF BCR on 25 Oct 22, an earliest operational contribution is recommended to be the most successful in meeting the demands of the UAF and supporting Op INTERFLEX mission objectives.

Recommendations

17. **It is recommended that CDF:**

- a. **Note** that an NZDF contribution would meet a priority requirement from the UAF.
- b. **Note** that the UK (at both an operational and strategic level) welcome an NZDF contribution toward Op INTERFLEX.
- c. **Note** that [REDACTED] s6(b)(i) Canada, Denmark and Finland are considering contributions to Op INTERFLEX.
- d. [REDACTED] s9(2)(g)(i)
- e. **Note** that an NZDF contribution does not compromise our existing domestic or regional contingencies.
- f. **Note** detailed costings are yet to be developed for this Op Advice.
- g. **Note** that Land Component regeneration is not adversely affected by a proportionate and small-scale contribution.

- h. [REDACTED] s9(2)(g)(i)
[REDACTED]
- i. **Note** that if directed this contribution would be reviewed based on demand signal from the UAF, need from the UK MoD, and impact on NZDF existing outputs.
- j. **Approve** the deployment of a reconnaissance team as soon as is practicable.
- k. **Endorse** HQJFNZ conducting prudent planning (including detailed financial assumptions) for the earliest possible contribution through a JOPG process.
- l. [REDACTED] s9(2)(g)(i)
[REDACTED]


J.L. GILMOUR
Rear Admiral
Commander JFNZ

[REDACTED] s9(2)(a)

Annexes

- A. Indicative ORBAT and options for NZDF contribution by month for support to Op INTERFLEX

INDICATIVE ORBAT¹⁴ AND SUPPORT TO OP INTERFLEX OPTIONS 1 AND 2 FOR NZDF CONTRIBUTION SHOWN BY MONTH



s9(2)(g)(i)

Released under the Official Information Act 1982