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Privacy, Covid-19 and the 'Serious Threat to Public Health' exception
John Edwards
6 November 2020 at 17:28
COVID-19 is often described as an unprecedented threat to public health.
While New Zealand has experienced pandemics in the past, the epidemiological characteristics of this
virus, the global nature of its spread and re-spread and the connected nature of our lives domestically
and internationally means controlling COVID-19 will require both ongoing vigilance and speed of
response to the threat of community re-infection.
Knowing who is potentially at risk, being able to rapidly and effectively locate positive cases (and
isolate them and their close contacts) has been critically important in NZ’s science-based approach to
fighting the virus. This brings personal information and privacy into play.
Serious threat to public health or safety exception
Fortunately, the architects of both the 1993 and 2020 Privacy Act envisaged a scenario where the
collection, use and disclosure of personal information would be needed to combat a serious threat to
public health or safety.
They designed the
serious threat to public health or safety (‘public health exception’) specifically for
this purpose. This exception permits the
collection,
use and disclosure of personal information
where it is necessary to prevent or lessen a serious threat to public health or public safety[1]. It
is worth noting that the serious threat exception was amended in 2013 to remove the words “and
imminent” at the advice of the Law Commission to make it easier for agencies to use.
While the serious threat to public health and safety exception has existed since 1993, it is
unsurprisingly (and fortunately) very rarely used. People are more familiar with the parallel exception
for a serious threat to the health and safety of an individual. As a consequence, agencies appear to
feel uncertain about how to use the public health exception where the threat affects a community or
wider section of the population.
Given this and the ongoing nature of the COVID-19 public health risk, I thought it would be useful to
provide guidance on how agencies can make use of the public health exception. After all, if you cannot
make use an exception designed for a serious threat to public health during a global pandemic, when
could you use it?
How can agencies determine whether a public health exception is
applicable?
To make use of the Privacy Act’s public health exception decision-makers within an agency need to
believe, on reasonable grounds, that:
a serious threat to public health and safety exists;
that the collection, use or disclosure of personal information is necessary to prevent or lessen the
serious threat; and
in the case of health agencies, that it is either not desirable or not practicable to obtain
authorisation from the individual concerned[2].
The key thing to remember here is that we are talking about
public health. As such, a decision-
maker’s “reasonable belief” regarding both the existence of a serious threat and the extent to which
the use or disclosure of personal information is necessary to prevent or limit this serious threat should
be on made on health grounds and based on current best practice epidemiological or clinical advice.
This makes the serious threat to public health exception an ideal regulatory tool for dealing with a
dynamic, evolving public health threat like Covid-19 where the “rules” need to keep adapting to meet
live challenges.
The Ministry of Health has the lead role in advising the Government and New Zealand on whether a
situation represents a serious threat to public health. The issuing of an epidemic notice and the
ongoing advice from the Ministry of Health makes it very clear that Covid-19 represents a serious
ongoing threat to public health.
The Ministry of Health is also responsible for coordinating and disseminating best practice scientific
advice on what is necessary to prevent or lessen the threat of COVID-19. This by extension includes
the information necessary in order to monitor and control the risk to New Zealand from the movement
of people across our border, and track, trace, isolate and quarantine infection risk within New Zealand.
Agencies are entitled to rely on this advice in making decisions regarding whether the collection, use
and sharing of personal information is necessary to prevent or lessen the threat posed by the
transmission of Covid-19.
Is information sharing about groups of individuals permitted?
Another question I am regularly asked is whether the public health exception allows for the sharing of
aggregated information regarding groups of individuals. The Privacy Act differentiates between serious
threats to public health and safety and individual health and safety for a reason.
Public health is, by definition, focussed on keeping the community well and on groups of people rather
than individuals. This provides a basis for the collection, use and disclosure of personal information
about a
class of individuals that is reasonably considered to be necessary based on relevant criteria,
rather than on an individualised basis. Again, the reasons for sharing aggregated data about a class of
individuals (for example people seeking to enter New Zealand or people testing positive and their
close contacts, or people working in at-risk situations) should be based on best-practice health advice.
Given the ongoing nature of the threat it is likely that agencies involved in pandemic management will
need to continue to share information and will need to make regular assessments of the extent to
which the “serious threat to public health and safety” exception still applies as they do so.
Good privacy practice still applies – maintaining trust and confidence is
critical
Even where the public health exception is being relied on, good basic privacy practice remains
important in order to maintain trust and confidence of the community. Like the
Civil Defence National
Emergencies (Information Sharing) Code 2020, the public health exception applies to the source of
personal information (2), use (10) and disclosure (11) information privacy principles. The other
principles, including those covering collecting only what is necessary, safe storage and security,
access by individuals to their own data, and ensuring accuracy before disclosure still apply.
Maintaining trust and confidence also involves agencies being transparent about what data they’re
collecting and what it will be used for. If specific data needs to be collected and then shared for the
Covid-19 response, best practice would see an agency advising individuals of this at the time of
collection or when an individual was signing up for or receiving a service (for example, when making a
booking to come to New Zealand). This could also mean that agencies do not need to rely on the
public health exception, as onward use or disclosure for Covid-19 purposes was one of the purposes
of collecting the information in the first place.
Lessons from the Ministry of Health’s recent reliance on the serious threat
to public health and safety exception
I recently conducted an
Inquiry into the Ministry of Health’s disclosure of Covid-19 patient
information to emergency services providers. The Ministry of Health relied on the public health
exception to disclose this information. In undertaking this Inquiry, I was mindful of the statutory
requirement for the Privacy Commissioner to have regard to the need for “government and businesses
being able to achieve their objectives efficiently” (Privacy Act 2020, 21 (a) (iii)). I consider agencies
may find my recommendations and findings in that Inquiry useful when considering their use of the
public health exception.
First, I found the Ministry appropriately considered the basis on which it disclosed health information
about Covid-19 patients to emergency services providers when relying on the serious threat to public
health exception. The Ministry made a considered, risk-based assessment based on best scientific
information about the nature of the virus and how it was spread, and what was known about its
prevalence in the community, and determined that all emergency service providers should receive
regular aggregated information regarding positive cases.
Second, I agreed with the Ministry’s judgement that the serious threat exception was
not available as
a basis for providing such information to Members of Parliament, or officials of territorial authorities, as
sharing identifiable information was not necessary to prevent or lessen the risk of a serious threat
(based on scientific evidence) and therefore did not meet the public health exception.
While supporting the Ministry’s evidence-based judgement regarding the disclosure of patient
information to emergency services providers I made the following recommendations:
Where a decision has been made to release or share information in order to prevent or lessen the
serious threat to public health presented by Covid-19, the need to continue to do so should be
regularly reviewed. Agencies should establish processes to ensure these reviews take place
regularly and are based on best practice evidence about the virus and its management.
It is critically important that all parties disclosing, receiving and using the information understand
the basis of the information sharing and scope of their obligations in respect of the information. A
memorandum of understanding can be a useful way to achieve and record this. Such documents
should set clear expectations about the appropriate security and use of the information being
disclosed, give clear direction on non-retention beyond clinical relevance and detail how often an
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review/assessment needs to be undertaken to ensure that there is still a legitimate reason for the
disclosure.
When in doubt – Ask Us
The public health exception is specifically designed to provide agencies with the ability to collect, use
and disclose personal information where it is necessary to safeguard the lives of New Zealanders.
The principle-based nature of the exception means it is ideally suited to a dynamic, evolving situation
like Covid-19. It allows agencies to make risk-based decisions on current best practice advice.
I understand that agencies are unfamiliar with the use of this exception. OPC is available to assist
agencies with advice, including peer review of Memoranda of Understanding to provide a framework
for disclosures of personal information that are necessary to avoid prevent or lessen a serious threat
to public health or public safety.
[1] See Information Privacy Principles 10 (use) and 11 (disclosure). For the avoidance of doubt, from 1
December 2020 the exceptions for principle 2 (source of personal information) are being expanded to
include collection necessary to prevent or lessen a serious threat to the life or health of the individual
concerned or any other individual.
[2] Health Information Privacy Code Rule 11(2)
Please visit our Privacy and COVID-19 page for further information on the impact of COVID-19 on privacy in
Aotearoa.
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