pwc.co.nz
Indicative
Business Case
for Wellington
Bus Rapid
Transit
A report for the NZ
Transport Agency,
BRT – Indicative
GWRC and WCC
Business Case
July 2015
July 2015
Strictly confidential
Strictly confidential
Table of contents
Executive summary
iii
The Indicative Business Case
xiv
Introduction
1
1.
Strategic case
2
1.1
Background
2
1.2
Why is BRT important for Wellington?
5
1.3
The case for change
7
1.4
Strategic context
19
1.5
Conclusions
23
2.
Economic case
24
2.1
Process for economic assessment
24
2.2 Options considered
25
2.3
Approach to cost benefit analysis
31
2.4 Cost benefit analysis results
37
2.5
Approach to multi criteria analysis
39
2.6 Multi criteria analysis results
42
2.7
Discussion of trade-offs
44
2.8 Preferred options for Detailed Business Case
46
3.
Financial case
48
3.1
Implementation costs
48
3.2
Funding sources
51
3.3
Current funding status
53
4.
Commercial case
54
4.1
Procurement strategy
54
4.2 Commercial development opportunities
68
5.
Management case
69
5.1
Integration with other corridor projects
69
5.2
Next steps for delivery of BRT
71
5.3
Project risks
74
5.4
Monitoring achievement of benefits
75
5.5
Conclusions
76
Appendix A
Investment Logic Map
79
Appendix B
Options description
80
Appendix C
Cost benefit analysis technical appendix
88
Appendix D
Detailed multi-criteria analysis results
122
Appendix E
Restrictions
130
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Glossary
AML
Average minutes late
BCR
Benefit-cost ratio
BP
Bus priority
BRT
Bus Rapid Transit
CBA
Cost benefit analysis
CSF
Critical success factor
D&C
Design and construct
DBB
Design, bid and build
DBC
Detailed Business Case
DCM
Design, construct and maintain
ECI
Early contractor involvement
EEM
The Transport Agency’s Economic Evaluation Manual
EL
Equivalent time to a minute late
GPS
Government Policy Statement on Land Transport Funding
GT
General traffic
GWRC
Greater Wellington Regional Council
IBC
Indicative Business Case
ILM
Investment logic mapping
KPI
Key performance indicator
LRT
Light Rail Transit
LTP
Long-Term Plan
MCA
Multi-criteria analysis
N2A Plan
Ngauranga to Wellington Airport Corridor Plan 2008
N2A Strategy
Ngauranga to Wellington Airport Corridor Strategy
NLTF
National Land Transport Fund
NLTP
National Land Transport Programme
NPV
Net present value
O&M
Operations and maintenance
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PPP
Public-private partnership
PT
Public transport
PTOM
Public Transport Operating Model
PTSS
Wellington Public Transport Spine Study
RLTP
Wellington Regional Land Transport Plan 2015
RLTS
Wellington Regional Land Transport Strategy 2010-40
RONS
Roads of National Significance
RPTP
Wellington Regional Public Transport Plan 2014
SH1
State Highway 1
The Transport Agency
New Zealand Transport Agency
VKT
Vehicle kilometres travelled
VOC
Vehicle operating costs
VoT
Value of time
WCC
Wellington City Council
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Executive summary
This business case assesses the case for a proposed investment in Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) in Wellington
City.
BRT in its most comprehensive form is a high-quality, high capacity bus system that improves upon
traditional bus systems. Modern, comfortable, high-capacity buses travel in dedicated lanes, separated
from general traffic, parking, turning traffic and other impediments. Passengers board from raised
platforms (slightly higher than street level), having paid their fares electronically.
BRT is the proposed solution to improving public transport (PT) through the PT Spine, from the Railway
Station to Newtown and Kilbirnie. In its entirety, BRT will involve increasing the amount of roadspace
dedicated to buses, increased intersection priority for buses, using high-capacity buses and delivering
operational and user improvements. This business case focuses on BRT infrastructure only that will
provide dedicated roadspace and intersection priority for buses.
This business case follows the New Zealand Transport Agency (the Transport Agency) business case
approach. This approach is based on the Treasury Better Business Cases guidelines, which are organised
around the five case model designed to systematically test whether an investment proposal:
is supported by a robust case for change – the ‘strategic case’
will deliver optimal value for money – the ‘economic case’
is commercially viable – the ‘commercial case’
is financially affordable – the ‘financial case’, and
is achievable – the ‘management case’.
This document is an
Indicative Business Case (IBC). Its objectives are to confirm the preferred way
forward for the proposal and to develop a short-list of options for further detailed analysis. It focuses on
developing the strategic and economic cases for the project and includes an outline of the financial,
commercial and management cases.
It is anticipated that this IBC will be followed by a Detailed Business Case (DBC), which will develop the
preferred BRT option in detail, including detailed design and a detailed economic evaluation, as well as
detailed consideration of financial, commercial and management aspects.
The IBC has been developed collaboratively between three partner organisations – the Transport Agency,
Greater Wellington Regional Council (GWRC) and Wellington City Council (WCC).
Strategic Case
Background
The Ngauranga to Wellington Airport Corridor Plan 2008 (N2A Plan), developed by GWRC in
collaboration with WCC and the Transport Agency and now included in the Regional Land Transport Plan
2015 (RLTP), outlined a multi-modal strategic plan to improve the way people travel around Wellington
City and their access to key destinations and amenities.
The Wellington Public Transport Spine Study (PTSS) was a key action arising from the N2A Plan. The
PTSS investigated the feasibility of a large number of different options for creating a high-quality ‘PT spine’,
arriving at a short-list of three options: bus priority, BRT and Light Rail Transit.
BRT was identified as the preferred option. Following community consultation in March 2014, the
Regional Transport Committee agreed to progress BRT detailed planning and design, and to enable its
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implementation to be included in the 2015 RLTP1. GWRC, WCC and the Transport Agency agreed to work
together to develop an IBC for BRT to provide clarity on the option to be taken forward for detailed design.
The BRT solution proposed for Wellington, developed for Wellington’s unique context, involves:
running of low-emission high-capacity buses:
o along dedicated bus lanes, separate from general traffic (at grade, and using the same
intersections)
o between the Railway Station and Newtown/Kilbirnie (see
Figure 1 below)
o at a frequency sufficient to cater for demand and growth
signal priority for buses at intersections (where deemed feasible)
improved stop and station facilities
integration with the new simpler and more efficient bus network for Wellington City
a number of operational improvements, including integrated fares and ticketing, the development
of mobile timetables and improvements in the provision of real-time bus location information.
Figure 1. Proposed BRT route
Source: PTSS presentation to stakeholders and interest groups (August 2013)
1 Greater Wellington Regional Council (13 May 2014), Minutes of the Regional Transport Committee, 4 March 2014;
minute 3.2.b.
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This business case is for one part of this BRT solution – the physical infrastructure (roadspace and
intersection priority, and stop/station infrastructure). The other elements of the BRT solution are
currently undergoing their own assessment processes. For example, a business case for integrated fares
and ticketing has been recently prepared.
The physical BRT infrastructure is a key element of the wider solution, as it is the part that enables faster
and more reliable PT journeys. However, it is only one element – it needs to be considered as part of the
full BRT solution. The full benefits of the physical infrastructure can only be achieved with the
implementation of all the other parts of BRT.
In addition, the BRT solution is itself just one part of a wider transport solution planned for the Ngauranga
to Airport corridor. Other aspects of this transport solution include state highway improvements, cycling
infrastructure improvements, and addressing conflicting traffic demands at key locations.
The case for change
People travelling in Wellington consistently experience congestion, particularly at peak periods and at key
network bottlenecks. The PT Spine corridor is particularly congested.
Bus users who travel along the PT Spine currently experience longer journey times compared to private
vehicles. Bus services can also be unreliable. This is primarily a result of congestion along the PT Spine
and buses having to compete with general traffic (and other buses) along the majority of the route. This
limits the attractiveness of PT services to Wellington commuters. It restricts the ability for PT to attract
new users and to shift private vehicle users to PT.
Together, these issues harm productivity – both for commuters who spend longer getting to and from work,
and for organisations for which moving from place to place is a key part of their business. Congestion also
impacts on freight movements. This limits Wellington’s economic growth potential.
Giving buses priority both over roadspace and at intersections will enable faster and more reliable PT
journeys. This will help make bus travel more attractive relative to private vehicles, which will remain in
general traffic congestion. Because buses can carry far more people than private vehicles, giving them
priority increases the carrying capacity of the whole corridor, and allows more people to travel along the PT
Spine at peak periods.
Faster and more reliable journeys via BRT will drive improvements in the productivity of workers and
businesses, and drive increases in Wellington’s economic growth. Empirical evidence suggests that the
economic benefits from even relatively small improvements to speed and reliability could be substantial,
particularly for individual businesses2.
Relatively slow and unreliable PT services, and the lack of a coherent and permanent PT Spine, has not
helped the development potential of land around the PT Spine for higher-value uses, which is part of WCC’s
land-use plans. Consequently, Wellington is not maximising the potential land-use along the PT Spine
corridor.
There are benefits to acting now. Congestion is already heavy at peak times and is limiting productivity and
economic growth. Future population and economic growth will exacerbate it, but the problem exists today.
Furthermore, PT patronage has begun to plateau.
However, one of the key benefits of BRT as a PT initiative is that it can be implemented incrementally.
There may be merit in staging the implementation, or altering the timing to coordinate with other transport
projects.
2 See for example: Eddington, R. (December 2006), The Eddington Transport Study: Main report: Transport’s role in
sustaining the UK’s productivity and competitiveness.
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Implementation of BRT, along with other planned PT initiatives, has the potential to create a major step-
change in the delivery of PT in Wellington. PT will become increasingly attractive and competitive with
private vehicle travel, allowing more people to travel along the PT Spine corridor at peak times, with many
achieving much faster and more reliable journeys, as well as freeing up road space on other corridors.
As an example of the impact that investment in PT can have, significant recent investment in Wellington’s
rail network has seen corresponding increases in patronage, as potential users respond to improved levels
of service.
If Wellington wants to be a 21st century city, it needs to have a 21st century transport network, of which a
21st century PT network is a vital component. Wellingtonians and their goods need to be able to move
around the city quickly, reliably, comfortably, and in large numbers. This is how Wellington can continue
to grow, while still providing a high quality of life for its residents.
Strategic context
BRT is consistent with the strategic direction set by Central Government, the Transport Agency, GWRC and
WCC, as outlined in the relevant strategic and planning documents. It is consistent with the plans for
increasing PT mode share, and it will help alleviate congestion and improve productivity and economic
growth. The relevant strategic and planning documents include:
The Government Policy Statement on Land Transport Funding (GPS)
The Transport Agency Statement of Intent 2014-18
The Wellington Regional Land Transport Plan 2015 (RLTP)
The Wellington Regional Public Transport Plan 2014 (RPTP)
WCC’s 2015-25 Long-Term Plan (LTP)
WCC’s draft Urban Growth Plan.
The GPS has increasing economic growth and improving productivity as the primary objectives for land
transport expenditure. The expectation is that land transport funding will be directed into high-quality
projects and activities that will support this objective. Consistent with this, economic growth is a key
objective in the RLTP.
The RLTP notes a number of regional pressures, including traffic congestion and network capacity
constraints, reliability of the transport network, and PT capacity and mode share.
Making quality investments in the area of public transport is highlighted in the GPS as an important
strategic response to the goals of improved productivity and economic growth. Increasing peak period PT
mode share is stated as a key outcome desired by the RLTP, as is reducing severe road congestion.
The N2A Plan is now included as a chapter in the RLTP, titled the Ngauranga to Airport Corridor Strategy
(N2A Strategy). One of the seven strategic responses set out in the N2A Strategy is “developing a high
quality and frequency PT priority ‘spine’”. Other strategic responses relate to capacity improvements on
State Highway 1 (SH1) and addressing conflicting transport demands at the Basin Reserve.
The RPTP sets out the current programme for improvements to Wellington’s PT services over the next 10
years. The PT Spine, from the Railway Station to Newtown and Kilbirnie, is central to the delivery of the
overall plan. Implementing BRT along the PT Spine is considered the “immediate priority” for the
Ngauranga to Airport corridor, alongside addressing conflicting transport demands around the Basin
Reserve.
While BRT is clearly well-aligned with the relevant strategic documents, a key issue is the alignment and
dependencies with the Transport Agency’s Roads of National Significance (RONS) programme – in
particular, the Basin Bridge and Mt Victoria tunnel duplication projects. These projects are another part of
the response to the N2A Strategy.
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The PTSS assumed that both of these projects would occur before BRT was implemented and the BRT
option was assessed as such. However, resource consent for the Basin Bridge has since been declined (this
is currently under appeal), and this has led to the Transport Agency re-evaluating the Mt Victoria tunnel
duplication (this process is ongoing). In the economic case, we consider options that allow for a BRT
solution without these RONS projects.
Key findings
There is a demonstrable problem with the current PT network along the PT Spine.
The corridor is congested, particularly at peak times and this is forecast to worsen.
It is difficult to increase PT patronage and mode share under the current circumstances. Buses are
not segregated from general traffic. Wellington’s bus services are perceived by the public as being
less attractive and less reliable than private vehicle journeys.
The issues with PT are restricting envisaged redevelopment of land around the southern and
eastern ends of the PT Spine into higher-value uses, and limiting the potential economic activity in
these areas.
A BRT solution can help address these problems. BRT can:
provide faster and more reliable bus journeys along the PT Spine
increase the corridor carrying capacity along the route
help improve the bus user experience
contribute to increasing PT patronage and PT mode share along the PT Spine
help grow the total number of people able to travel along the PT Spine during peak periods.
This will help drive Wellington’s economic and productivity growth. It will also encourage greater
economic activity in the areas surrounding the PT Spine.
BRT is consistent with the strategic direction set out by Central Government, GWRC and WCC. It is a key
initiative in terms of implementing Central Government’s focus on improving productivity and economic
growth. BRT will also help achieve a number of GWRC’s and WCC’s objectives, in particular economic
growth, urban regeneration and improved accessibility. BRT along the PT Spine is the most important and
most beneficial PT project currently being considered for Wellington, and is a key element of all current
transport plans for the Wellington region.
Economic Case
This economic case is based on a best practice decision making approach for infrastructure projects and the
level of detail appropriate for an IBC. A small set of options have been developed, differing across the key
areas of material difference. These options are subjected to two types of economic assessment:
1. A qualitative assessment against a set of agreed criteria, typically referred to as a multi-criteria
analysis (MCA).
2. A quantitative assessment, involving the development of benefit-cost ratios for the options. For a
transport project such as this, this assessment is undertaken with reference to the Transport
Agency’s Economic Evaluation Manual (EEM).3
3 NZ Transport Agency (1 July 2013), Economic evaluation manual.
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Options considered
The reference case
In the economic assessment, all options are assessed relative to a ‘base case’ scenario. This represents what
is expected to happen if the project does not go ahead. The costs and benefits of the BRT options are
determined relative to this reference case.
The reference case is not a ‘do nothing’. It is a ‘do minimum’, and includes other projects along the PT
Spine and ongoing maintenance spending for example.
The reference case for BRT includes or assumes:
the current network of bus lanes and bus priority across Wellington City
currently planned roading improvements. In particular:
o The Basin Bridge and associated improvements; or another grade separated solution
o Mt Victoria tunnel duplication, and associated improvements to Ruahine Street
o All other Wellington RONS
changes to Wellington bus services as a result of the Wellington City Bus Review, including:
o Revisions to bus network running patterns
o Optimisation of bus stops locations
o Other user improvements
the complete implementation of the Public Transport Operating Model (PTOM) contracts
the introduction of integrated fares and ticketing (as currently envisaged by that project’s business
case)
the use of high-capacity buses (eg double-decker) on some Wellington City bus routes, where
warranted by demand
buses will run at a frequency necessary to cater for demand and growth.
The BRT options
The Working Group considered that the most material features of the options, and hence those where
different variants should be considered, were the degree of dedication of the bus lanes and the degree of
intersection priority given to buses.
The BRT option in the PTSS assumed complete dedication and intersection priority, such that buses could
essentially move freely throughout the route without congestion. The Working Group wanted to consider
some variants of this BRT solution that involved lower degrees of dedication and priority. In effect, the
Working Group wanted to assess options that spanned a continuum from the PTSS BRT option to the PTSS
Bus Priority option.
Four distinct options were developed to reflect this continuum:
Physically separated bus lanes along the full route, operating at all times (in effect, the PTSS BRT
option)
Bus lanes along the full route, operating at all times
Bus lanes along selected parts of the route to target key congestion areas, operating at all times
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Bus lanes along the full route, but only operating at peak times.
In addition, a separate option was considered, based on a detailed possible plan recently developed by
WCC, for bus priority improvements along the Central and Newtown branches.
Table 1 sets out the type of roadspace and intersection priority assumed for each of the core options.
Table 1. Key elements of core options
Option #
Type of roadspace dedication
Level of intersection priority
1
Improved bus priority
Limited priority
2
Bus lanes, along the whole route, at peak periods
Limited priority
3
Bus lanes in targeted locations, 24/7
Limited priority
4
Bus lanes, along the whole route, 24/7
Full priority
5
Physically separated bus lanes, along the whole route,
Full priority
24/7
BCR and MCA results
Table 2 presents the estimated benefits, costs and the benefit-cost ratios (BCRs) for the core BRT options.
All dollar values shown are net present values over 40 years.
Table 3 shows the MCA scores for the core
options.
Table 2. Costs, benefits and BCRs – core BRT options
$m NPV
1
2
3
4
5
Benefits:
Travel time benefits
5.9
15.3
19.0
28.1
32.9
Additional PT user benefits
0.0
0.0
0.0
5.8
6.0
Reliability benefits
5.9
15.3
19.0
28.1
32.9
Walking benefits
0.1
0.3
0.3
16.4
17.1
Emissions reductions benefits
0.1
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.4
Agglomeration benefits
0.9
2.3
2.8
4.2
4.9
Decongestion (dis)benefits
(4.9)
(4.4)
(4.3)
(4.0)
(3.7)
Reduction in vehicle operating cost benefits
3.8
10.7
11.0
13.3
17.5
Total benefits
11.8
39.7
48.0
92.2
108.1
Costs:
Capex
24.3
72.1
43.4
97.2
132.9
Opex (savings)
(2.4)
(20.8)
(22.8)
(36.8)
(45.4)
Total costs
21.9
51.3
20.6
60.4
87.5
Benefit-cost ratio (benefits/costs)
0.5
0.8
2.3
1.5
1.2
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Table 3. Results of multi-criteria analysis – core BRT options
Ref
1
2
3
4
5
case
1. Increased economic activity
2. Improved multi-modal network
efficiency
3. Improved accessibility
4. Increased PT patronage
5. Improved PT user experience
6. Minimise emissions
7. Minimise impacts on physical
environment / amenity
8. Affordable / value for money
9. Alignment / integration with other
infrastructure & services
Negative effects
Positive effects
Discussion of trade-offs
The options involve a range of different types of BRT solution, each with different pros and cons.
Wellington can have the highest quality BRT system considered (Option 5), but this comes at a cost. The
analysis of the intermediate options shows that there is an opportunity for Wellington to achieve a
significant proportion of the benefits of a high-quality solution for a much lower cost.
For example, Option 4 is cheaper than Option 5, but still enables significant benefits to be achieved through
having dedicated bus lanes along the full BRT route. Option 3 is considerably cheaper still, but still enables
a considerable improvement over the reference case in terms of the ability to move people around the city.
All the options move people along the PT Spine faster and more reliably, to varying levels, than is currently
the case. But they vary quite a lot according to the other objectives and strategic goals they satisfy.
Option 3 enables considerable improvements in moving people around the network. However, the
discontinuous nature of the bus lanes means that it is unlikely to have the type of transformational effect
that Option 5, and to a lesser extent Option 4, would have. Options 4 and 5 could provide a material step-
change in Wellington’s PT infrastructure.
BRT can be implemented incrementally. Instead of a one-off transformational step-change, incremental
improvements could be made over time. For example, it is possible to deliver Option 3 now and then
further develop the infrastructure by effectively moving to Option 4 or 5 at a later date.
As well as significant financial implications, high-quality BRT solutions also have costs in terms of their
effects on other road users. As more dedication and priority is allocated to PT, more of the roadspace must
be taken away from general traffic and/or parking (or the road is widened, with consequent environmental
effects).
Finding a solution to conflicting transport demands at the Basin Reserve is critical to implementing a high-
quality BRT system. Without such a solution, the Transport Agency will not duplicate the Mt Victoria
tunnel and the Kilbirnie branch of the proposed BRT solution will not be able to proceed.
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The BCRs for the option variants without the Kilbirnie branch are substantially lower than those that
include it. Also, the option variants without the Kilbirnie branch are likely to overstate the true BCR of
implementing BRT in the absence of the RONS – without the Basin Bridge (or a solution of similar
effectiveness), the actual traffic outcomes for trips from Newtown will likely be inferior to those modelled.
Preferred options
The preferred options from the economic analysis are Options 3 and 4.
The PTSS envisaged a BRT solution with physically separated lanes along the full route from the Railway
Station to Newtown and Kilbirnie. However, the economic analysis has demonstrated that this is not the
only sensible approach to implementing a BRT solution.
The majority of the travel time benefits can be achieved by providing additional priority to buses at and
around key intersections along the route. The economic analysis has shown that a targeted approach to
BRT could provide a cost effective improvement to bus services along the PT Spine.
Option 3 will deliver a very good outcome in terms of moving people around Wellington City faster and
more reliably, for an up-front capital investment of $59m (compared to $174m for Option 5). It also has
lower adverse impacts on traffic and parking than Options 4 and 5.
Options 3 and 4 have indicative benefit-cost ratios of 2.3 and 1.5 respectively. These are relatively high for
a PT project. The roadspace dedication of Option 3 could also be combined with the intersection priority of
Option 4 to deliver even greater benefits.
The economic analysis suggests that Options 3 and 4, or a combination of them, are appropriate options for
further consideration. Option 3 appears the best value-for-money approach – a good outcome for a
relatively low cost. But if a high-quality, more transformational, outcome is desired, Option 4 appears the
best approach – this is a lower cost version of Option 5, achieving a large proportion of the benefits.
Wellington can have the highest quality BRT solution possible (Option 5) if it desires. However, it will cost
a lot more than Options 3 and 4 and involve more substantial effects on other road users and the physical
environment. The economic analysis suggests that Option 5 may not be the best use of resources.
Options 3 and 4 have been identified as the preferred options on the basis that they deliver much of the
benefits of Option 5 but with a more efficient use of resources.
These options also do not preclude upgrades to a higher-quality solution in the future. If Option 3 is
chosen today, Options 4 or 5 could still be implemented at a later date if warranted.
It is also recommended that, if physically possible, only options that include the Kilbirnie branch are
considered further. A key result from the consideration of the different option variants is that the Kilbirnie
branch is essential to the viability of a BRT solution. This helps to partially illustrate the effect of complete
transport networks. Designing a network as a whole enables optimisation across the PT network, as well as
other road users.
Financial Case
Expected costs
BRT is expected to involve a capital investment of between $31m and $174m, depending on the option
chosen. This may be spread over time, depending on the form and timing of the implementation.
Assuming the current funding arrangements for PT in Wellington are retained, the Transport Agency will
fund 51% of BRT, with the remainder to be funded by GWRC and WCC. It is expected that WCC will fund
the majority of this remainder, as current arrangements involve WCC funding road-related infrastructure,
which comprises most of the expected capital cost.
In addition, operating savings are expected from BRT due to more efficient bus operations. These savings
will benefit GWRC, as the funder of bus operations.
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Current funding status
The National Land Transport Programme (NLTP) sets out the items to be funded by the Transport Agency
via the National Land Transport Fund (NLTF) for a 3-year period, based on the programmes and activities
submitted through RLTPs. This is set every 3 years, but can be varied during that period. The NLTP 2015-
18 includes two BRT related activities: GWRC’s Bus Rapid Transit Implementation Plan 2015-18 (intended
for DBC phase, total cost approximately $3m) and WCC Wellington City BRT Infrastructure Improvements
(total cost $60m). Both activities have ‘proposed’ status, which means that funding approval may be given
when an application is made in 2015-18 provided further evidence is required to confirm the assessment
profile and provide confidence in the funding priority and availability of funds.
The DBC phase will provide further certainty about the total cost of BRT implementation. To ensure
enough local share is available for BRT implementation, WCC and GWRC will need to continue to factor
the results of the IBC and future DBC phase into their respective annual and long term planning processes.
Commercial Case
There is a range of possible procurement models across a spectrum of public and private sector
participation with associated risk transfer. These models include: traditional models, relationship based
models, privately financed models, and managing contractor procurement models.
The most appropriate procurement model for BRT will be determined in the detailed business case.
Factors that will impact the assessment of the procurement approach will include:
Implementing BRT could be relatively straight forward with well-defined objectives and tangible
outcomes. There might be few identifiable factors that would of themselves suggest a change from a
traditional procurement model.
The BRT project is likely to be funded through standard methods by the Project Partners.
The BRT project is not overly complex. Costs, risks and scope can be well defined. Traditional
models fare better in these situations, and there are not likely to be factors which would prohibit
traditional models from being applied.
There are three Project Partners. However, this can be well managed as roles and responsibilities
are clearly defined, for example continuing existing policy delineating local roads, state highways
and PT operations. The BRT project should be able to follow existing policy.
The cost of designing and constructing the BRT infrastructure will vary considerably depending on
the preferred option chosen. Option 3 is a low cost for an infrastructure project. Option 5 is far
more substantial.
The practicalities, or otherwise, of bundling the design and construction of the BRT infrastructure
with the delivery of BRT services (and allied services as appropriate).
Management Case
There are a number of projects along the PT Spine and wider Ngauranga to Airport corridor that the BRT
project needs to coordinate with. A separate workstream is currently underway, developing a sequencing
and programming plan for all the corridor projects. At the moment, it makes sense for the BRT project
team to continue to be a part of that workstream. However during any subsequent DBC the specifics
around timing and integration with other projects will need to be determined.
The physical BRT infrastructure could be delivered as a single project or in multiple stages. It could also be
combined with the delivery of other projects in the same location, including potentially combining
consenting processes.
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There are a number of project risks, many of which could lead to BRT not being fully delivered. However,
these should be able to be adequately managed.
There is nothing in terms of delivery which, at this stage, appears prohibitively difficult or likely to suggest
that this project should not proceed. There is nothing in the management case that suggests that the next
stage of more detailed assessment should not be undertaken.
The next step in the assessment process is a DBC. Key items not undertaken at the IBC stage are: detailed
design and optimisation of BRT options; detailed transport modelling of all options; fully quantifying all
the costs and benefits for all options; and detailed development of the financial requirements, and the
funding, procurement and management plans. These will all be part of a DBC.
A key decision to be made before any DBC begins is whether the different elements of the detailed
assessment are to be undertaken together or separately. The entire DBC, including all the design work,
could be procured and undertaken as one project. Alternatively, it could be split into multiple pieces and
undertaken in stages.
Recommendations
This IBC provides support for more detailed analysis of BRT to be undertaken in a DBC. The economic
analysis suggests that the options that are most appropriate for further consideration are Options 3 and 4.
Furthermore, nothing in the financial, commercial or management cases has indicated that a DBC should
not proceed. There are a number of items that will need to be addressed at that stage, such as approval of
funding, determining the appropriate sequencing and coordination with other projects and determining a
procurement strategy. However none of these are sufficiently problematic that a DBC should not proceed.
Finding a solution to conflicting transport demands at the Basin Reserve is critical to the ability to
implement a high-quality BRT system. Without such a solution, the economic viability of the BRT project
is reduced considerably. We understand that the Transport Agency is committed to finding such a solution
and it is recommended that the BRT project continue to proceed on that basis (with additional
consideration given during a DBC).
A DBC for BRT is recommended – of Options 3 and 4, or a combination of both, or Option 3
moving to Option 4 at a later date.
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The Indicative Business Case
What is an IBC?
The role of the IBC is to identify the preferred way forward for an investment proposal. It is used to
provide evidence of reducing a long list of investment options to a short list, ensuring that only investment
options which present a compelling case are investigated further. In doing so, the IBC attempts to avoid
significant time and expense being dedicated to options which should not proceed.
The IBC re-confirms the preferred option’s (from previous analysis, in this case the PTSS) alignment with
the strategic context of the organisation(s), confirming the case for change and the need for the investment.
It demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed investment in and indicates the efficiency of the proposal.
Furthermore, a feature of the IBC is that key issues and risks are highlighted at an early stage. This can
help to identify options which should not proceed or to frame detailed analysis at the DBC stage. In
addition, it can guide stakeholder engagement after issues have been highlighted.
An IBC does not investigate each option in the level of detail necessary to approve implementation. That
will occur at the subsequent DBC stage. The IBC involves an indicative assessment only, whereas a DBC
will analysis the effects of the options in much more detail.
What does this IBC aim to do?
BRT was the option preferred by the PTSS for improving PT along the PT Spine corridor from the Railway
Station to Newtown and Kilbirnie.
This IBC for a BRT solution recommends a preferred way forward for further investigation. It considers a
set of possible options, and recommends an approach for detailed analysis which justifies the time and
expense of the investigation. Analysis is at a broad level for each of the options, recognising the work that
has been previously completed and the value of the potential investment.
In particular, this IBC aims to:
re-confirm the strategic context and BRT’s role within the strategic context (in the strategic case)
confirm the rationale for BRT and the case for change (in the strategic case)
recommend the preferred options for further analysis (in the economic case)
demonstrate the effectiveness of the options (in the strategic case and the economic case)
show the indicative costs, benefits and disbenefits of the options, thereby demonstrating the
potential efficiency of the options (in the economic case)
highlight risks and trade-offs of the BRT options (in the economic case).
Information base
To determine the costs and the transport effects of the options considered, we have relied on analysis
undertaken for the PTSS. We have not undertaken additional analysis of costs or transport effects in this
regard. The PTSS evidence was considered suitable for an IBC. This information:
was peer reviewed as part of the PTSS
was obtained relatively recently, and within a timeframe where traffic patterns may have changed
but are not likely to have changed significantly as to materially affect the validity of the IBC
conclusions
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is detailed enough to allow analysis at an IBC, including interpolations for different options.
We note that the options considered in this IBC are slightly different from the options considered in the
PTSS. We have used professional judgement, tested with relevant experts including GWRC’s transport
modelling team, to make assumptions and interpolations to derive estimates for our options from the PTSS
information.
This evidence was considered sufficiently robust to undertake an indicative assessment of the options. A
more detailed evidence base will be required to consider any options in detail as part of any subsequent
DBC.
The Better Business Case approach
The business case approach, following Treasury’s Better Business Case guidelines, is relatively new. Less
than a handful of IBCs have been completed to date, and benchmarks for the level of the analysis and the
level of the evidence base required have not yet been determined.
While this IBC was being developed, the Transport Agency released the 2015-18 NLTP Investment
Assessment Framework, which includes updated expectations regarding the preparation of IBCs. The
broad framework for investment decisions under an IBC is the same as we previously understood it to be.
Identifying the strategic fit of the problem, the issue or opportunity to be solved, the effectiveness and
economic efficiency of the proposed solution, to drive value for money investments, remain key elements of
the investment assessment framework.
The analysis in this IBC supports the decision making process under the 2015-18 NLTP Investment
Assessment Framework. The final decision for funding will not take place until after a DBC is prepared.
How does this IBC align with the new IBC guidelines?
The aim of the IBC is to recommend the preferred way forward for further investigation – this has not
changed. However, the expectations of the IBC have been clarified. These expectations, and the extent to
which this IBC aligns with them, are outlined below.
The size of the report commensurate with the complexity of the exercise
Implementing BRT is likely to be a relatively simple transport project, with clear roles and responsibilities
for the Project Partners, following existing policy. There is not significant scope for novelty, in terms of the
options developed or the procurement process. The level of funding is toward the low end of the scale of
transport projects subjected to the business case process.
This IBC takes an approach for preparing analysis commensurate with the level of complexity, ensuring
that the analysis is fit for purpose.
Continue the progressive case and include a clear line of sight to support evidence collected
This IBC documents the re-confirmed alignment to strategic objectives, and confirms the problem
identified and the case for change. It was determined that the PTSS evidence was appropriate to use as a
basis for this IBC, with additional information provided by GWRC’s transport modelling team as
appropriate. We note that it could be considered that more detailed evidence, particularly for the
‘intermediate’ options, than that collected for this IBC would better satisfy these new expectations.
Detail the long list of options, ensuring a wide range of options has been considered
We outline the list of options considered in the economic case. The long list of options was developed by
the project Working Group and takes into consideration a range of quality levels for BRT (ie the degree of
intersection and road priority), with variants based on a range of possible timings.
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Show that the options optimise value for money
The indicative economic efficiency of the options is shown in the cost-benefit analysis. The cost-benefit
analysis was taken a step further than the PTSS economic evaluation, assessing a broader range of benefit
categories where this has been possible.
Justify how the short listed options were selected and why the other options were rejected
The five cases document the process that was undertaken to select the preferred option. The MCA and the
CBA, within the economic case, provided the primary information used to consider the relative merits of
the options. The discussion and conclusions sections set out the rationale for the options considered to be
worth further analysis.
Demonstrate the short list of options aligns with the other elements of the programme within the
programme business case as well as within the overall case for change
The preferred options identified align strongly to the strategic context and propose a value for money
solution to the problem identified. This is set out in the strategic case, as well as the discussion of the
trade-offs between options.
A collaborative, no surprises approach
The project Steering Group and Working Group, made up of officials from the Project Partners, met
regularly while developing the IBC. The IBC was developed in a collaborative manner, with input from the
Project Partners.
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Introduction
This business case assesses the case for a proposed investment in BRT in Wellington City.
This business case follows the Transport Agency business case approach. This approach is based on the
Treasury Better Business Cases guidelines, which are organised around the five case model designed to
systematically test whether an investment proposal:
is supported by a robust case for change – the ‘strategic case’
will deliver optimal value for money – the ‘economic case’
is commercially viable – the ‘commercial case’
is financially affordable – the ‘financial case’, and
is achievable – the ‘management case’.
This document is an
Indicative Business Case. Its objectives are to confirm the preferred way forward
for the proposal and to develop a short-list of options for further detailed analysis. It focuses on developing
the strategic and economic cases for the project and includes an outline
of the financial, commercial and
management cases.
It is anticipated that this IBC will be followed by a DBC, which will develop the preferred BRT option in
detail, including detailed design and a detailed economic evaluation, as well as detailed consideration of
financial, commercial and management aspects.
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1. Strategic case
1.1 Background
This section provides background information on the business case. It sets out what we mean by BRT in
the context of this IBC, the process that has led to an IBC for BRT being undertaken, and the organisations
leading the development of the business case.
1.1.1 What do we mean by ‘BRT’?
Bus Rapid Transit in its most comprehensive form is a high-quality, high capacity bus system that improves
upon traditional bus systems. Modern, comfortable, high-capacity buses travel in dedicated lanes,
separated from general traffic, parking, turning traffic and other impediments. Passengers board from
raised platforms (slightly higher than street level), having paid their fares electronically.
Standards have been developed to assess how close a given BRT system is to the above ideal. The Institute
for Transportation and Development Policy assigns gold, silver and bronze rankings, depending on the
quality of a BRT system. Many cities have started with an existing bus system and developed a customised
BRT version that fits with the city’s specific circumstances.
A specific BRT solution has been proposed for Wellington’s context. It involves elements of the above ideal
standard, tailored to suit the constraints of the PT Spine corridor.
1.1.2 The Wellington context
Ngauranga to Airport Corridor Plan
The N2A Plan, developed by GWRC in collaboration with WCC and the Transport Agency, outlined a multi-
modal strategic plan to improve the way people travel around Wellington City and their access to key
destinations and amenities.
The N2A Plan has been updated and included as a chapter within the RLTP, now entitled the N2A Strategy.
Consistent with the N2A Plan, it includes a package of seven measures or strategic responses from across
all transport modes and networks. The strategic responses are:
Developing a high quality and high frequency PT priority ‘spine’.
Implementing safety and capacity improvements to SH1.
Addressing conflicting transport demands at the Basin Reserve.
Reallocating traffic between Ngauranga and the CBD.
Improving key walking and cycling routes.
Continuing a programme of travel demand management measures.
Identifying and addressing network vulnerabilities.
Integration with other Ngauranga to Airport and PT transformation activities will be critical to the success
of BRT in Wellington.
Wellington Public Transport Spine Study
One of the recommendations of the 2008 N2A Plan was to undertake a feasibility study for a high-quality
PT system. This resulted in the PTSS.
A BRT solution for Wellington was the preferred option in the PTSS, finalised in 2013. The BRT solution
proposed for Wellington, developed for Wellington’s unique context, involves:
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running of low-emission high-capacity buses
o along dedicated bus lanes, separate from general traffic (at grade, and using the same
intersections)
o between the Railway Station and Newtown/Kilbirnie (although most services would run
beyond the area of the BRT infrastructure)
o at a frequency sufficient to cater for demand and growth
signal priority for buses at intersections (where deemed feasible)
improved stop and station facilities
integration with the new simpler and more efficient bus network for the whole of Wellington City
a number of operational improvements, including integrated fares and ticketing, the development
of mobile timetables and improvements in the provision of real-time bus location information.
In March 2014, following community consultation, the Regional Transport Committee agreed to progress
BRT detailed planning and design, and to enable its implementation to be included in the 2015 RLTP.
GWRC, WCC and the Transport Agency set up a joint project team to work on the detailed design and
planning of the BRT spine corridor. This IBC is a component of the work being undertaken by the joint
project team.
Indicative Business Case content
The BRT solution and the associated detailed design and planning have been split into a number of
different elements for assessment and implementation. This IBC only relates to the physical infrastructure
for BRT – the creation/extension of dedicated bus lanes and intersection priority, as well as any additional
or improved stop/station infrastructure.
These are critical elements of BRT, particularly the roadspace allocation changes and intersection priority.
They are the parts that make it ‘rapid’,4 as well as reliable and will drive improvements in accessibility and
network efficiency.
Elements of the BRT solution that are being assessed and implemented separately are:
the use of high-capacity buses
integrated fares and ticketing
operational and user technology improvements
the Basin Bridge, Mt Victoria tunnel duplication, and other roading improvements that will be
integral to implementing the BRT.
These elements together with the physical infrastructure addressed in this IBC form the comprehensive
BRT solution. The full benefits of each element will be achieved with the full implementation of all the
other parts an in integrated manner.
A key dependency for part of the BRT solution is the Basin Reserve roading improvements. Finding a
workable solution to conflicting transport demands through the Basin Reserve area is necessary to
maximise the benefits of BRT. Most notably, implementing BRT from the Basin Reserve to Kilbirnie is only
possible with a duplicate Mt Victoria tunnel. That will only occur if the associated Basin Reserve
improvements are made.
4 We note that in Wellington’s context this does not conflict with the speed limits on the roads along the BRT route.
Rather it means the ability for buses to travel along the route with minimal delays.
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Another key part of the wider BRT project is optimisation of the bus network. Following the 2011
Wellington City Bus Review, a new bus network is proposed to begin operating in Wellington City in mid-
2017. The new network will change the services and routes currently used, providing the same level of
service with fewer buses. This will reduce the number of buses travelling along the PT Spine, particularly
the Golden Mile, helping to alleviate the congestion caused by multiple buses trying to use the same lane at
the same time.
1.1.3 The Indicative Business Case stage
This IBC is an important step in the assessment process for BRT. Consistent with the decision of the
Regional Transport Committee, it is focussed solely on BRT solutions, as opposed to the wider range of
solutions considered in the PTSS.
The IBC is not intended as the only step between the PTSS (and the Regional Transport Committee
decision) and implementation of a BRT solution. It is an IBC only, which is anticipated to be followed by a
DBC, as per the Transport Agency’s business case approval process (based on the Treasury’s Better
Business Cases), and an implementation plan.
The role of the IBC is to identify and evaluate all reasonably feasible BRT solutions and narrow the scope of
high net value options down to a few that can be subject to detailed design, costing and analysis in the DBC,
which is the next step in the assessment process after the IBC. A possible scope for a DBC is outlined in the
management case.
This two stage IBC then DBC process recognises that there are a number of options for how BRT could be
configured and the outcomes delivered. It is necessary to evaluate all feasible options to identify the option
that will deliver the best value for money for Wellington.
1.1.4 The project partners
This IBC is a collaborative exercise across three partner organisations – GWRC, WCC and the Transport
Agency. A joint project team has been established to develop the IBC.
Greater Wellington Regional Council
GWRC is the organisation primarily responsible for overall regional planning, including land-use, land
transport and PT planning. GWRC is also responsible for the PT network and delivering PT services across
Wellington. It undertakes asset management planning, including for new works, manages the operation of
the network, and is responsible for arranging funding and contracts for service delivery.
GWRC led the development of the PTSS, with support from WCC and the Transport Agency.
Wellington City Council
WCC is the Road Controlling Authority for the majority of the roads forming the BRT corridor and has
responsibility for planning, operations, management and maintenance of these roads.
WCC is also responsible for land-use planning in Wellington City. It prepares and updates various area
plans, to give effect to the relevant strategic directions for transport planning for the city. WCC has
provided advice throughout the business case process regarding the consistency of planned land use and
the transport investments proposed.
New Zealand Transport Agency
The Transport Agency is the crown entity responsible for planning and investing in land transport
networks, managing the state highway network and providing access to, and use of, the land transport
system.
The Transport Agency is the host government agency for the development of the IBC. Under current NLTF
investment criteria, it might fund approximately 50% of the capital cost of BRT implementation and
approximately 50% of the cost of operating the BRT.
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In its role as manager of the state highway network, the Transport Agency is leading and funding the
Wellington Northern Corridor RONS programme. Elements of the BRT are dependent on the construction
of the Basin Bridge, Mt Victoria tunnel duplication and Ruahine Street improvement projects.
Other stakeholders
There are a number of additional stakeholders which will likely have influence on the eventual project
outcomes. These include:
Wellington Inner City Residents and Business Association
Wellington City Council Accessibility Advisory Group
Wellington Civic Trust
Retail NZ
Public Transport Voice
Wellington Property Council
Bus operators and the Bus and Coach Association.
These organisations were all involved in the development of the PTSS.
1.2 Why is BRT important for Wellington?
A 21st century city
21st century cities are proactive rather than reactive. They stay ahead of the demand curve rather than
struggle to keep pace with demand. They offer attractive places in which to live, work and do business.
21st century cities have 21st century infrastructure networks. Strong infrastructure, including transport
infrastructure, enables vibrant city life and a prosperous economy. It transforms prosperity into social
enrichment and a higher quality of life. The importance of infrastructure to modern civilisation cannot be
overstated. It allows large groups of people to occupy small spaces. Modern cities could not have evolved
without it.5
To be a 21st century city, Wellington needs to have a 21st century transport network, of which PT is a vital
component.
A successful PT network
A successful PT network is one that:
has sufficient capacity to safely move large numbers of people at any one time
moves them quickly and reliably
can attract new users from existing car users (thereby reducing congestion)
offers a competitive alternative to private transport
improves accessibility to key employment destinations and amenities
maximises land use and development by encouraging people to live and work in new areas.
This is the type of PT network that drives productivity improvements and economic growth. It can greatly
assist in development of areas in need of revitalisation. It gives more options to more people – about how
5 PwC (February 2014), Cities of Opportunity: Towards Auckland’s future.
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to travel, where to live, where to work, and where to play. It allows greater numbers of people to work in a
given area, driving agglomeration and knowledge transfer.
There is a well proven direct relationship between development of transport networks and economic
growth and prosperity. Rapid growth in the scale of transport networks and improvement in their cost and
economic efficiency has been one of the major drivers of economic advancement through the 19th and 20th
centuries.6
The relationship between transport and economic growth for a city like Wellington remains relevant and
important notwithstanding it has a mature economy and existing transport networks. However, the focus
should be on maximising the efficiency and performance of the existing networks and infrastructure rather
than looking for transformational change through investment in new networks.
Removing bottlenecks and constraints so that transport networks can move people efficiently, reliably,
safely, comfortably and with minimal environmental impacts will continue to underpin economic success
and prosperity. It will ensure that people are efficiently connected to their work, that they are able to make
the best use of their work and leisure time (less time commuting and more effective planning facilitated by
reliable services), businesses can cluster and goods can be transported more efficiently so reducing costs for
businesses.
BRT in Wellington fits exactly with the principle of making existing networks more efficient and effective.
Users of BRT and other users of the road space are expected to benefit from considerably reduced travel
times and greatly enhanced travel time reliability. As well as reducing bus congestion, BRT is expected to
grow PT patronage, which will assist in moderating the growth in demand for road space by non-PT
vehicles, and help alleviate congestion.
Cities of opportunities report
Periodically, PwC produces a global report entitled ‘Cities of Opportunity. It assesses a number of global
cities’ social and economic performance against a set of key indicators. This assessment has been used to
gain insight into how cities around the world are performing and what we can learn from them.
PwC has not assessed Wellington to date, but Auckland has been assessed. In 2012, Auckland scored a
creditable 16th place against 28 cities, across all variables. However, for transport Auckland ranked 27 out
of 28. In particular, Auckland achieved low results in the areas of mass transit coverage and cost of public
transport.7
We don’t know where Wellington would be placed in these rankings. However, investment in a high-
quality PT system could ensure Wellington is comparable with the more successful 21st century cities – the
ones with the best quality transport networks and thriving city economies.
6 See for example: Eddington, R. (December 2006), The Eddington Transport Study: Main report: Transport’s role in
sustaining the UK’s productivity and competitiveness.
7 PwC (February 2014), Cities of Opportunity: Towards Auckland’s future.
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1.3 The case for change
This section sets out the case for change. It considers the nature of the problem, the benefits of investing in
BRT, and the merits of investing now.
The question at hand is whether Wellington’s current PT system provides the right quality of service or
whether it need to be improved, and if the latter whether the incremental benefit is worth the cost of doing
so.
The underlying problem is that buses compete with general traffic (and other buses) along a congested
corridor. This makes bus journeys slow and unreliable. Consequently, use of buses is not maximised.
BRT will improve PT journey times and reliability for existing users, help attract more users, and thus
improve the carrying capacity of the corridor and address network congestion for all users, particularly at
peak periods.
1.3.1 The problem
A facilitated investment logic mapping (ILM) workshop was held on 30 March 2015 with representatives
from the project partners and selected key stakeholders. The Investment Logic Map is included in
Appendix A. The group identified the following three underlying problems:
1. Congestion, within the constrained PT Spine corridor, will continue to adversely impact levels of
service
2. A failure to grow bus patronage, due to unattractive and unreliable PT services compared to private
vehicles
3. A failure to maximise the capacity of the PT Spine corridor is restricting Wellington’s economic
potential.
These problems are current issues that will be exacerbated by Wellington’s forecast population and
economic growth.
The RLTP includes a number of targets for PT patronage, mode share and journey times. In addition, WCC
has various land-use plans and objectives. The three problems are currently impacting on the ability to
achieve those targets and objectives.
Problem 1: Congestion, within the constrained PT Spine corridor, will continue to adversely
impact levels of service
Demand for travel along the PT Spine is such that this corridor can be heavily congested, particularly at
peak times. The heaviest congestion typically occurs along the Golden Mile and around the Basin Reserve
and Mt Victoria tunnel areas.
Congestion along the PT Spine corridor leads to longer, less reliable journeys for both general traffic and
PT. This has a number of adverse effects.
Congestion is resulting in journey times that are longer than they could be
Congestion makes journey times significantly longer than they would otherwise be. In the case of the PT
Spine, this is not just a future problem – it is significantly congested today.
Table 4 shows the current average peak journey times to the CBD from Newtown and Kilbirnie, for both PT
and private vehicles. It also shows PT journey times if there was no congestion.
Current congestion levels add significant time to the average journey to the CBD, particularly for PT users
and particularly from Kilbirnie. Bus users from Kilbirnie could halve the length of their trip if there was no
congestion.
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There can also be significant congestion during weekends. The much more varied nature of weekend
journeys (compared to the weekday peaks) can cause capacity issues on certain parts of the road network.
Table 4. Average journey times to the CBD (Willis St) (2011, morning peak)
Public transport
Private vehicle
PT without
congestion
Time
Speed
Time
Speed
Time
From Newtown
17 min
12 kph
9 min
21 kph
8 min
From Kilbirnie
18 min
15 kph
14 min
32 kph
10 min
Sources: (1) 2011 times: PTSS Short List Evaluation Modelling Report; (2) PT without congestion times:
based on BRT travel times, PTSS Option Evaluation Report.
Note: We understand that current PT journey times are around the same average level as those in 2011.
Table 5 illustrates forecast travel times, in relation to the extent of the congestion problem expected by
2031. Again, it shows that bus journeys along the PT Spine could be considerably quicker if there was no
congestion. In particular, trips from Kilbirnie could take only around half the time if there was no
congestion.
Table 5. Forecast average bus travel times along PT Spine corridor (2031, morning peak)
Minutes
Travel time from Newtown
Travel time from Kilbirnie
With
With
No
%
No
%
forecast
forecast
congestion difference
congestion difference
congestion
congestion
to Elizabeth Street
13.9
6.3
-55%
to the Basin Reserve
5.1
3.4
-33%
to Courtenay Place
8.5
5.2
-39%
14.7
6.6
-55%
to Willis Street
13.1
8.4
-36%
19.3
9.8
-49%
to the Railway Station
18.3
11.9
-35%
24.5
13.3
-46%
Source: PTSS Option Evaluation Report
Notes: (1) The ‘No congestion’ times are those forecast to occur with BRT, which assumed no bus
congestion along the entire route.
(2) Trips from Kilbirnie do not currently go past the Basin Reserve, and so Elizabeth Street is used as
alternative reference point for that route.
(3) The journey times assume the completion of Basin Reserve roading improvements and a duplicate Mt
Victoria tunnel.
Longer travel times directly impact the time available to individuals to do other things. Every extra minute
spent commuting is a minute not spent either working or in some leisure activity.
Longer travel times also affect productivity. In addition to reducing the amount of time available for
commuters to work, it also means longer journey times for freight and commercial trips that rely on
travelling through the PT Spine and the CBD. Longer journey times also reduce the accessibility and
connectedness of businesses within the city. Traffic congestion restricts Wellington’s ability to achieve the
level of economic growth that it is otherwise capable of.
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Congestion also has adverse environmental impacts. Longer journey times, and more time spent idling,
increases emissions, resulting in localised air impacts as well as contributing to global problems.
Journeys are unreliable
Congestion not only makes travel slower, it also makes it less reliable.
Table 6 shows the proportion of
current bus trips that are considered on-time (for all trips operated by NZ Bus, who operate the majority of
services that use the PT Spine).
This data shows that while most buses start on time, a significant number run either early or late.
Table 6. Reliability of routes operated by NZ Bus (year to June 2014)
Start of route
End of route
All stops
On time
91%
45%
69%
Source: Greater Wellington Regional Council
Reliability is also a key factor in the decisions of travellers about whether to take the bus or use a private
vehicle.8 Poor reliability is a key driver of the inability to increase PT patronage, as discussed further below
and reliability is a key driver of customer satisfaction. Customer satisfaction surveys suggest that improved
reliability of services is highly desired by customers.9
There are currently a high number of commuter trips along the PT Spine corridor
Wellington residents from the southern and eastern areas travel along the PT Spine into the CBD. Over
14,000 trips are made from southern and eastern areas to the CBD along the PT Spine during every
morning peak period. Around 31% of these trips are on buses.10
At peak times, between 110 and 135 buses per hour currently travel along the Golden Mile in each direction.
This is a large number of buses, and often leads to significant bus-on-bus congestion, even in areas where
bus lanes exist.
By way of comparison, Auckland’s two main bus entry routes to its CBD are Symonds St and Fanshawe St.
These currently carry around 140 and 120 buses per hour respectively during the morning peak. These are
considered very congested routes, and Auckland Transport is currently considering options for increasing
the capacity of these corridors.
One of the outcomes of the 2011 Wellington City Bus Review was a programme to better optimise the
current route network to provide the same level of service with fewer buses. This will reduce the number of
bus services travelling along the PT Spine, and in particular the Golden Mile, helping address the current
bus-on-bus congestion.
8 Gravitas (19 September 2014), 2013/14 Public Transport Passenger Satisfaction Survey, Research report prepared
for Greater Wellington Regional Council.
9 Ibid.
10 PTSS Short List Evaluation Modelling Report.
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Figure 2. Bus congestion on Courtenay Place
Source: GWRC
Buses can sometimes run at capacity
Some specific bus services currently run at close to or in excess of capacity at peak times and so leave
people behind at stops.
The optimisation of the network following the Wellington City Bus Review and the introduction of high-
capacity buses on some routes are designed to help address these capacity issues.
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Problem 2: A failure to grow bus patronage, due to unattractive and unreliable PT services
compared to private vehicles
Wellington’s bus network is considered to be relatively unattractive compared to private vehicles to the
average commuter. This is due to a number of issues, including:
longer average travel times than corresponding car journeys (the biggest difference is for outlying
suburbs such as Miramar and Island Bay)
unreliable wait times and journey times
a lack of capacity to carry more passengers in the peak, due to bus size constraints and an inability
to effectively add additional peak services to already congested bus corridors
some perceived stigma around buses and PT in general
relatively inexpensive car-parking available to many commuters.
The recent increases in rail patronage following investment in the network shows that investment in
improving PT services can lead provide incentives for users to switch from private vehicles to PT.
Bus mode share is relatively low along the PT Spine
Around 31% of peak trips from the southern and eastern suburbs to the CBD are via a bus. This is a
relatively low PT mode share for such a key urban commuter route. PT mode share is higher for trips from
Northern and Western suburbs. As another comparison, around 45% of peak time trips to Auckland’s CBD
are via PT (including trips from distant areas and from areas without good access to PT).11
In addition, bus patronage has begun to plateau, and bus mode share is forecast to decrease (se
e Figure 3
below).
Figure 3. Forecast bus trips from southern and eastern suburbs to CBD without BRT
(morning peak)
8,000
25%
7,000
20%
6,000
5,000
ge
PT patronage
15%
are
sh
rona
PT mode share
t 4,000
pa
T
10%
mode
3,000
T
P
P
2,000
5%
1,000
0
0%
2021
2031
2041
Source: PTSS Option Evaluation Report
11 Auckland Transport, City Centre Future Access Study (2012), Supporting Report: Sections 2-6, para 68.
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Increasing public transport mode share is challenging
Congestion could be partly alleviated by shifting private vehicle users onto PT, particularly during peak
periods. Buses have a much larger corridor-carrying capacity than cars so increasing PT mode share would
allow more people to travel along the PT Spine at a given time, and could reduce average journey times.
However, there are barriers to achieving this.
The lack of current separation between buses and general traffic along the PT Spine means buses encounter
the same congestion as other traffic, making all journeys slower and less reliable. This limits the
opportunity to switch private vehicle users onto buses, since there is no time-based incentive to change
modes.
Problem 3: A failure to maximise the capacity of the PT Spine corridor is restricting
Wellington’s economic potential
WCC’s future land-use plans include redevelopment of much of the land surrounding the southern and
eastern ends of the PT Spine, to higher-value uses.
A key element of these plans is improving PT through the redevelopment areas and to the CBD, consistent
with standard planning practice for intensification of cities, along with improvements to walking and
cycling. Since the surrounding roads are already congested, the best method of providing transport for
denser developments is through the provision of high-quality PT and improved walking and cycling
facilities.
However, the current PT options add to challenges involved in redeveloping these areas. Simply, the
current state of the PT network is not of sufficient quality to help encourage more dense residential and
commercial development in these areas.
There are examples from other locations of improved PT driving urban redevelopment and higher property
values. In Auckland’s Britomart precinct, the extended rail line and new station has been the catalyst for
significant redevelopment of the area. Auckland’s Northern Busway has also led to significant increases in
land values in the areas around the stations.
1.3.2 The proposed investment
The BRT solution proposed for Wellington, developed for Wellington’s unique context, involves:
the running of low-emission high-capacity buses
along dedicated bus lanes, separate from general traffic (at grade, and using the same intersections
as general traffic)
between the Railway Station and Newtown/Kilbirnie (
see Figure 4 below)
at a frequency that caters for current demand and can be refined to accommodate growth
buses given signal priority at intersections
improved stop, station and interchange facilities that accommodate feeder services
integration with the new simpler and more efficient bus network for the whole of Wellington City
a number of operational improvements, including integrated fares & ticketing, electronic off-bus
ticketing, and improvements in the provision of real-time bus location information.
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Figure 4. Proposed BRT route
Source: PTSS presentation to stakeholders and interest groups
Much work has already been progressed on elements of the BRT system, such as operational improvements
and integrated ticketing. These elements are not included in this IBC.
This IBC evaluates the merits of a number of options for the physical infrastructure component of the BRT
solution (roadspace and intersection priority, and improved stop/station/interchange infrastructure).
Parallel processes are being undertaken to assess the other elements of the BRT solution.
The physical infrastructure is a key element of the full BRT solution. It is the component that contributes
the most to enabling faster and more reliable PT journeys. However, it is one of a number of components
that together represent the comprehensive BRT solution. The full benefits of the physical infrastructure
can only be achieved with the implementation of all the other parts of BRT.
BRT is itself one part of a wider Regional PT Plan and the Ngauranga to Airport corridor Strategy. Other
aspects of this transport solution include state highway improvements, cycling infrastructure
improvements and addressing conflicting traffic demands at key locations.
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1.3.3 Benefits of Bus Rapid Transit in Wellington
The ILM workshop identified the following four key benefits of implementing BRT along the PT Spine:
1. Improved road and PT network efficiency
2. Increased bus patronage
3. Improved bus user experience
4. Increased economic activity in proximity to the PT Spine.
In general, these benefits will accrue directly to PT users, car drivers and passengers and freight and
commercial businesses with vehicles travelling along the PT Spine corridor, as well as businesses and other
parties owning or occupying land located along the corridor. The benefits experienced by these parties will
flow through to the Wellington economy.
Benefit 1: Improved road and PT network efficiency
Faster and more reliable public transport journey times
BRT will reduce travel along the PT Spine corridor by physically separating buses from general traffic.
Table 5 showed that journey times could be reduced significantly if there is no congestion. For example,
trips from Kilbirnie could take only around half the time if there were no congestion constraints.
The journey times i
n Table 5 assume buses do not experience any congestion. Therefore, these journey
times represent the best possible outcome of implementing BRT to remove congestion and are consistent
with the highest-quality option considered in the economic case. If a lower quality BRT solution is adopted
(for example, with less roadspace or intersection priority), buses would continue to experience some
congestion, although less than current levels, and the travel time savings and travel time reliability
improvements will not be as great.
Productivity improvements and economic growth
Faster journeys have significant benefits for the productivity of workers and businesses. The time saved
becomes available for doing things that could not be done whilst travelling, increasing the output of
workers and businesses and/or decreasing their costs. Businesses can also move goods around faster,
enabling more goods to be moved by less people and less vehicles.
For many businesses, transport is necessary to their operations and can have a disproportionate impact on
profitability. Reducing travel times, even by small amounts, can have significant benefits for individual
firms.
Reliability is also very important to workers and businesses. Evidence suggests that the benefits from
making journeys more reliable can be much greater than those from making the journeys quicker, and that
this is even more so in the case of PT networks.12 It is also a conventional benefit of transport investments
under the EEM.
Faster and more reliable journeys also result in improved accessibility between Wellington locations,
producing agglomeration benefits. Improved transport accessibility broadens firms' potential labour pools,
enabling firms to reach more skilled workers, over a wider base. Improved transport accessibility also
facilitates business-to-business interactions, be it improved supply chains or knowledge sharing and
transfer mechanisms. The result of improved accessibility is productivity improvements for businesses in
Wellington, driving GDP growth.
12 See for example: Eddington, R. (December 2006), The Eddington Transport Study: Main report: Transport’s role in
sustaining the UK’s productivity and competitiveness.
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Faster and more reliable journeys via BRT are expected to drive improvements in the productivity of
workers and businesses, and drive increases in Wellington’s economic growth. Empirical evidence suggests
that the economic benefits from even relatively small improvements to speed and reliability could be
substantial, particularly for individual businesses.13
Improved commute times to and from the CBD
As well as allowing existing commuters to get their place of work faster, reduced journey times expands the
area which is within a 30-minute commute of the CBD (sometimes considered a proxy for a reasonable
commuting distance). This effectively increases the potential pool of CBD workers and allows people to live
further away but still get to work in a reasonable time.
In particular, the current 25 minute journey time from Kilbirnie to the CBD means that the majority of
households east of the airport are outside a 30-minute commute. Reducing the time from Kilbirnie to 13
minutes will make commuting from these suburbs to the CBD much more efficient than it is now. It also
makes these PT journeys quicker relative to private vehicle trips from the same locations.
Increased carrying capacity along the PT Spine via a higher capacity mode
Making more of the existing road space available to buses through the use of dedicated bus lanes will
increase the carrying capacity of the corridor. Since buses have a much greater corridor-carrying capacity
than private vehicles, allowing buses to travel faster along the PT Spine, and shifting private users onto
those buses, increases the number of people who can travel along the PT Spine at any given time.
The use of larger buses will further increase the carrying capacity of the corridor, and address any crowding
issues. This will be particularly beneficial during peak periods.
Benefit 2: Increased bus patronage
BRT will involve faster, more reliable bus journeys, on new, larger, and less crowded buses. The overall
experience for users will be considerably improved. This will provide incentives for commuters to use the
bus rather than other transport modes and so is expected to drive increases in PT patronage and mode
share.
BRT also integrates very well with the rest of the PT network. In particular, buses can travel on both the
BRT route and other parts of the bus network, meaning passengers do not have to transfer between BRT
and non-BRT services (except where they are transferring from/to rail). This was a key benefit of BRT over
Light Rail in the PTSS, and is expected to help increase patronage and mode share growth.
Table 7 shows the increases in PT patronage expected if a high-quality BRT solution is implemented.
Table 7. Forecast PT patronage (morning peak)
Wellington region
Trips from southern and eastern
suburbs to CBD
Without BRT
With BRT
% increase
Without BRT
With BRT
% increase
2021
35,600
36,300
2%
7,000
7,400
6%
2031
34,000
34,800
2%
6,800
7,270
7%
2041
35,200
36,100
3%
7,100
7,650
8%
Source: PTSS Option Evaluation Report
13 Eddington, R. (December 2006), The Eddington Transport Study: Main report: Transport’s role in sustaining the
UK’s productivity and competitiveness.
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With a high-quality BRT system, it is possible that future patronage could exceed the levels shown i
n Table
7. The best example of BRT in New Zealand is Auckland’s Northern Busway.
Figure 5 shows that since it
opened in 2008, its patronage has exceeded official projects by a considerable amount (over 1 million extra
passengers annually). We note however that BRT along the PT Spine and Northern Busway are not entirely
like-for-like examples – the Northern Busway involves physical separation to a degree not even considered
for Wellington, while surrounding population growth and existing PT mode share also differ.
Figure 5. Auckland’s Northern Busway – actual patronage vs pre-construction forecast
3.0
)
2.5
Actual
yearre
Forecast
2.0
p
n
oillim ( 1.5
e
ag
n
o
1.0
atr
tal p
To
0.5
0.0
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
Source: Auckland Transport; Parliamentary Question #1239, 27 February 2008.
Note: Actual values only include buses which travel between the CBD and the busway stations. They do
not include buses which travel to other locations on the North Shore.
A BRT solution along the PT Spine is expected to not only increase patronage from the southern and
eastern suburbs, but also increase patronage from other areas. This is an example of the network benefits
of investing in improved PT infrastructure – the improved user experience in one location drives increases
in usage across a much wider area of the network.
If patronage can be increased, and the average number of passengers per bus increased, this will improve
operating efficiency and reduce per-unit costs. This will allow farebox recovery to be improved.
Benefit 3: Improved bus user experience
BRT will increase the attractiveness of the bus network along the Spine. In particular, BRT will:
reduce bus journey times
improve the reliability of bus journeys and reduce wait times
enable increased frequencies (where warranted by demand)
utilise larger high-capacity buses
utilise new larger high-capacity and better quality buses
include improvements to infrastructure at bus stops and interchanges
include improvements to ticketing, real-time information, and other user services.
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All of these items will improve the user experience and make bus travel a more attractive alternative to
private cars.
Some of the benefits are appropriately attributed to elements of the BRT solution not considered in this
IBC, for example the benefits of integrated ticketing. The economic case of this IBC only includes benefits
attributable to the physical BRT infrastructure.
Benefit 4: Increased economic activity in the proximity of the PT Spine
There is substantial evidence that the provision of high-quality PT increases land values in the areas
alongside PT corridors14. The higher values encourage conversion of property to higher-value uses.
This effect along the PT Spine corridor will be particularly beneficial in its southern and eastern ends where
WCC is encouraging redevelopment of the current relatively low-value land uses into more high-value
activities. In some areas, such as around Adelaide Road, WCC has developed plans for a denser area of
residential and mixed-use developments, to replace the existing light industrial and low-intensity
residential uses. The improved PT provided by BRT will encourage this redevelopment, which is currently
not occurring in part due to perceived poor quality PT.
Other benefits
BRT will increase the number of viable transport choices available to potential users. This option value is
beneficial regardless of whether or not they use BRT. Implementing BRT and achieving the various
benefits set out in this section, will significantly improve the quality of the PT services along the PT Spine
corridor. This is expected to increase the attractiveness of buses as an alternative to car travel.
Increased PT mode share along the PT Spine will help limit the number of car trips to and from the suburbs
to the south and east. This can help improve amenity and create more liveable communities in those areas.
More liveable, pedestrian-friendly neighbourhoods are particularly important when areas are being
intensified and denser residential development is occurring.
Importance of enabling roading projects
The RONS projects through the Basin Reserve and Mt Victoria areas are key enablers of elements of BRT.
Without them, the magnitude of the benefits from implementing BRT will be constrained. The integration
of BRT with these projects is discussed in more detail in the next section.
1.3.4 When is the right time to invest?
There are benefits to acting now
The three problems identified are current issues, which will be exacerbated by future growth:
There is already heavy congestion along the PT Spine, and in Wellington generally, at peak times.
Bus patronage is static and bus mode share is expected to decline without improvements in services
(see Figure 3 above).
Plans to redevelop urban areas are not supported by the current PT network.
The sooner BRT is implemented, the sooner these issues can be addressed and the consequential economic
and quality of life benefits achieved.
The longer the timeframe for implementing BRT the more difficult it will be to encourage people to switch
to PT. The forecast decrease in PT mode share is partly the result of current and planned investments in
road and cycling infrastructure without corresponding investments in improving PT. There is a risk that,
14 See for example: Jones Lang LaSalle (January 2015),
CrossRail: Identifying opportunities; Grimes A. & Liang Y.
(May 2008),
Bridge to Somewhere: The Value of Auckland’s Motorway Extensions.
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without a signal that PT improvements will come soon, many travellers may switch from buses to cars and
the use of cars as opposed to PT could become further ingrained.
A key benefit of BRT is that it can be implemented incrementally
BRT does not need to be implemented all at once. It would be possible to construct the physical
infrastructure in stages. For example, the Golden Mile improvements could be made first, with the rest
following at later dates. Bus users would still benefit from the faster journeys in this part of the corridor.
In fact, this approach would be consistent with targeting improvements to the more heavily congested parts
of the corridor first with the remaining parts of the corridor being developed as they become more heavily
congested in the future.
Also, the construction of the physical infrastructure does not necessarily have not occur at the same time as
the implementation of other parts of the full BRT solution – such as integrated ticketing, or high-capacity
buses. While the full benefits of the individual components of the full BRT solution will not be achieved
until all elements are in place, some benefits will be available as each part of the solution is introduced.
In the economic case, different timing and staging of the options is considered. In addition, the
management case discusses the Ngauranga to Airport corridor programming and sequencing workstream
that this BRT project is a part of, which is considering key dependency issues between the different parts of
the wider Ngauranga to Airport corridor transport solution.
1.3.5 The existing evidence base
In general, the current problem and the likely benefits of a high-quality BRT solution are well defined.
The evidence on current transport conditions, such as patronage and journey times, is very good. This is
based on robust data about actual PT trips in Wellington. The forecasts of future transport conditions are
based on the transport modelling undertaken for the PTSS. This modelling was detailed and robust.
However, the PTSS only modelled one BRT option and one bus priority option. A number of different
variants of BRT are evaluated in this IBC. These variants essentially form a continuum between the bus
priority and BRT options used in the PTSS. Additional transport modelling has not been undertaken for
this IBC and so it has been necessary to make assumptions about the likely transport effects for the
intermediate options. We note that this type of detailed modelling will be a key component of any
subsequent DBC.
In addition, the PTSS BRT option assumed the successful completion of the Basin Bridge and Mt Victoria
tunnel duplication projects prior to BRT implementation, and the transport modelling was undertaken on
that basis. As discussed in the next section, this is not guaranteed. The economic case makes assumptions
about how the modelled transport effects would change if BRT was implemented without these roading
projects.
Connections between businesses and their employees and between businesses are a key economic growth
factor. There is extensive literature that addresses the importance of these connections and the vital role
transport networks play in this context.
Estimating the magnitude of the impact transport networks have on connecting people and businesses is
difficult and is dependent on the context, although the impacts are likely to be significant. Monetary values
of the likely impacts are considered in the economic case.
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1.4 Strategic context
This section considers the alignment of BRT with Wellington’s strategic direction and relevant planning
documents.
BRT is a key initiative in terms of implementing the high-level strategic direction of Central Government as
this relates to the Wellington Region. The clear focus of the GPS is improving productivity and economic
growth. Some of the key benefits of BRT are helping alleviate congestion, reducing PT journey times,
increasing transport capacity and encouraging urban redevelopment. All of these impacts will contribute to
improved productivity across the region.
BRT will also help achieve a number of GWRC’s and WCC’s objectives, in particular economic growth,
urban regeneration and improved accessibility. BRT, and PT services in general, can play an important
city-shaping role to help WCC achieve its plans for redevelopment and changes in land-use.
The comprehensive BRT solution is also an important part of the suite of transport improvement projects
currently taking place and planned for the Wellington region in the near future – including the RONS
projects, the implementation of the new bus network for Wellington City and implementation of new PT
operator contracts. BRT is important to realising the full benefits from these projects.
As is recognised in a number of GWRC and WCC land transport plans, BRT along the PT Spine is the most
important and most beneficial PT project currently being considered for Wellington.
1.4.1 Alignment of BRT with relevant organisational strategies
and objectives
The overriding purpose of any investment in BRT, in addition to addressing the problems identified earlier,
must be to help the project partners implement their strategic objectives. The alignment of BRT to the
relevant strategic and planning documents is outlined below.
Central Government and the Ministry of Transport
Central Government and the Ministry of Transport set the high-level strategic direction of land transport
investment in New Zealand.
The GPS sets out the government’s priorities for expenditure from the NLTF over the next 10 years. The
GPS is informed by the National Infrastructure Plan and sets out how funding is allocated between
activities such as road safety policing, State Highways, local roads and PT.
The current GPS was released in December 2014 and comes into effect in July 2015. It supersedes the 2012
version, which was current at the time the PTSS was undertaken.
The 2015 GPS continues and reinforces the Government’s focus on increasing economic growth and
productivity as the primary objective for land transport expenditure. The expectation is that land transport
funding will be directed into high-quality projects and activities that will support improved productivity
and economic growth.
Making quality investments in the area of PT is highlighted in the GPS as an important strategic response
to the goals of economic growth and productivity.
The National Infrastructure Plan sets out seven specific goals for transport infrastructure, including the
achievement of “a public transport system that is robust and effective and offers a range of user options that
will attract a greater percentage of long term users.”
As one of New Zealand’s larger cities, Wellington receives a significant share of NLTF funding. Local
organisations play a key role in ensuring that this funding is directed into activities that will support the
GPS priorities of productivity and economic growth.
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BRT is a key initiative in terms of implementing the high-level strategic direction of Central Government.
Key benefits of BRT, reducing PT journey times, increasing transport capacity and encouraging urban
redevelopment, will contribute to improved productivity across the region and so support the GPS focus on
improving productivity and economic growth.
New Zealand Transport Agency
The Transport Agency is responsible for implementing the strategic direction set out in the GPS. It
administers the NLTF, is responsible for planning and funding of the State Highway network and provides
funding to local and regional authorities for approved transport projects.
Consistent with the GPS, the strategic focus of the Transport Agency (as set out in its Statement of Intent)
is on delivering improved transport services that contribute to economic and productivity growth.
One of the Transport Agency’s five short-term strategic priorities is “making the most of urban network
capacity”. This is seen as an important step in making transport networks more efficient, for the benefit of
the economy. PT improvements are seen as an important part of achieving this objective.
With its ability to significantly increase the corridor carrying capacity of the PT Spine, BRT is a key
initiative in terms of better utilising Wellington’s current urban road and PT network.
Greater Wellington Regional Council
Economic development is the overarching objective of the Wellington Regional Strategy, developed by
GWRC in 2012. Improving the quality of infrastructure, including transport, is an important enabler that
will assist the Region achieve its economic growth potential.
The 2015 RLTP (and its predecessor the 2010 RLTS) provides an overall context for investment in
Wellington’s transport network over the next 10-30 years. The RLTP notes a number of regional pressures,
including traffic congestion and network capacity constraints, reliability of the transport network, and PT
capacity and mode share. It also sets out a number of objectives for land transport including economic
growth, consistent with the GPS direction, but also wider objectives such as improved safety, resilience and
liveability.
Increased PT use, and improved PT journey times and reliability, are stated as being key outcomes that
GWRC will seek to achieve over the next 30 years. Other key outcomes include reducing severe road
congestion and improving land use and transport integration.
The N2A Plan, now incorporated into the RLTP, supports the development of a high quality PT spine
through central Wellington as a priority project. Implementing BRT along the PT Spine is considered the
“immediate priority” for the Ngauranga to Airport corridor, alongside addressing conflicting transport
demands around the Basin Reserve.
The 2014 RPTP sets out the blueprint for investments in PT in the region over the next 10 years. It gives
effect to the components of the RLTS, and aims to deliver an effective, efficient and integrated PT network
for the people of Wellington.
Wellington City Council
The key focus of WCC’s draft 2015-25 LTP is economic growth. It asks Wellingtonians to make a choice
between “unlocking Wellington’s economic potential” and a path of lower economic growth.
A key initiative in the draft LTP to promote economic growth is inner city regeneration. Improving PT is
stated as being a critical element of this. Another of the draft LTP’s initiatives is providing “real transport
choices”. Implementing a high-frequency bus service along the PT Spine, improving connectivity between
the CBD and the southern and eastern suburbs, is stated as a critical part of these initiatives.
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The LTP identifies the proposed redevelopment of the area around Adelaide Road as an important
regeneration project. WCC has also developed an ‘Adelaide Road Framework’ that sets out its vision for
redevelopment over the next 10-20 years of the area into a more intensive area of residential and mixed-use
developments.
The Wellington Urban Growth Plan 2014-43 lists implementing a high-frequency bus service along the PT
Spine as a key transport project to be delivered over this period, in order to allow the City to grow and
accommodate the forecast increases in population.
BRT will help achieve a number of WCC’s objectives – in particular, economic growth, urban regeneration
and improved accessibility. BRT, and PT services in general, can play an important city-shaping role to
help the council achieve the redevelopment and land-use patterns that it envisages.
1.4.2 Integration of BRT with related projects
As discussed above (and in the management case), BRT is part of a wider set of projects along the
Ngauranga to Airport corridor. Integration with these activities will be critical to the success of
implementing BRT in Wellington. Further details about selected specific projects are discussed below.
Roads of National Significance
The proposed BRT route, as identified in the PTSS, includes two roading projects which are part of the
Transport Agency’s RONS programme of works:
The Basin Bridge project involves grade separation of Buckle Street on the northern side of the
Basin Reserve, to separate north-south movements along Cambridge/Kent terrace and Adelaide
Road and east-west movements along Buckle and Patterson Streets.
The Mt Victoria tunnel duplication project involves the creation of a new tunnel through Mt
Victoria parallel and adjacent to the existing general traffic tunnel. It also includes widening of
Ruahine St.
The PTSS assumed that both of these projects would be completed before BRT was implemented, and the
BRT option was assessed in the PTSS on this basis. However, since the PTSS was completed, resource
consent has been declined for the Basin Bridge. This decision is currently under appeal. This has also led
to the Transport Agency re-evaluating the tunnel duplication project.
Finding a solution to conflicting transport demands at the Basin Reserve is critical to the ability to
implement a high-quality BRT system. Without such a solution, the Transport Agency will not duplicate
the Mt Victoria tunnel, and the Kilbirnie branch of the proposed BRT solution will not be able to proceed.
Furthermore, the benefits of delivering BRT along the Newtown branch would be limited since buses would
continue to be held up in congestion around the Basin Reserve.
This IBC assumes that there will be a solution at the Basin Reserve (either the Basin Bridge or a solution of
similar effectiveness), and that the Mt Victoria tunnel duplication will proceed. However, the economic
case also considers each BRT option without the Kilbirnie branch, a proxy for how the options would
proceed in the absence of the RONS projects being completed. As the economic case shows, the benefits of
BRT are severely limited if an adequate solution is not found for the Basin Reserve.
We also note that advancing the planning and design of a BRT solution along the PT Spine may assist with
the consenting of the Basin Bridge and other inner city RONS, given the comments by the Board of Inquiry
around the lack of integration with other modes and projects.
Cycling infrastructure
There is a potential for a number of upgrades to cycling infrastructure along and around the PT Spine
between now and when BRT is implemented. WCC is currently in the process of developing a Cycling
Framework and Network Plan. This includes a cycleway from Island Bay to the CBD, through elements of
the PT Spine along Adelaide Road and Kent and Cambridge Terraces.
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Implementing a BRT solution will not inhibit the provision of additional cycling infrastructure or the
upgrade of existing cycle lanes. However, the allocation of available roadspace between competing uses
(general traffic, PT, cycling, parking) is an important component of any ultimate transport solution along
the PT Spine and will need to be carefully considered.
There is also the potential for BRT and cycling infrastructure to be designed together, to create a more
effective integrated solution, including the development of joint BRT/cycling facilities. Integrated
construction may also be an efficient approach to implementation.
The design of the street layouts should consider the potential for upgrading cycling infrastructure at the
same time as BRT implementation, or at least allow for the implementation of additional cycling
infrastructure at a later date. These details will be considered during any subsequent DBC. In the
management case, we discuss integration with other components of the Ngauranga to Airport corridor
transport programme.
High capacity buses
Use of high capacity buses as part of the BRT solution is being assessed under a separate process, and is not
part of this IBC.
As part of the outcomes of the 2011 Wellington City Bus Review and the PTSS, GWRC has resolved to
introduce high capacity buses on some routes independent of any decision around the provision of physical
BRT infrastructure. It is expected that many of the selected routes will coincide with the PT Spine or points
of it.
The benefits from the increased corridor carrying capacity of high capacity buses make them worth the
investment even with the current levels of bus priority along the PT Spine. However, there are clearly even
more benefits available if the high capacity buses can travel along dedicated lanes free of congestion and
benefit from priority measures at intersections. Without BRT, the full extent of the potential benefits of
high capacity buses will not be realised.
Operational improvements to bus services
There are a number of operational PT improvements occurring and proposed to occur over the same broad
time period as BRT, and that are part of the wider BRT solution. These include route optimisations and
service improvements resulting from the Wellington City Bus Review, the introduction of integrated fares
and ticketing across the region, as well as revised PTOM contracts for the bus operators.
These operational improvements will lead to better outcomes from the provision of the physical BRT
infrastructure. More importantly, the full benefit of these operational improvements can only be achieved
with the implementation of the physical infrastructure.
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1.5 Conclusions
There is a demonstrable problem with the current PT network along the PT Spine.
The corridor is congested, particularly at peak times. This is limiting Wellington’s economic
growth potential, as well as having other wider impacts.
It is difficult to increase PT patronage and mode share under the current bus service offering.
Buses are not segregated from general traffic, which means that they get caught in the same
congestion as private vehicles.
Wellington’s bus services are perceived as being less attractive and less reliable than private vehicle
journeys, and for the majority of people buses are not the preferred way to get around Wellington
City.
The issues with PT are restricting envisaged redevelopment of land around the southern and
eastern ends of the PT Spine into higher-value uses, and limiting the potential economic activity in
these areas.
These are current problems which will be exacerbated by future growth.
A BRT solution can help address these problems. BRT can provide faster and more reliable journeys along
the PT Spine, and help improve the bus user experience. This can create incentives for private vehicle users
to shift to buses, contributing to increasing PT patronage and PT mode share along the route. BRT can also
increase the corridor carrying capacity along the route, enabling more people to travel along the PT Spine
during peak periods.
Together, BRT will enable more people to travel along the PT Spine, faster, more reliably, and in greater
comfort. This is likely to have a significant impact on the productivity of Wellington’s workers and
businesses, and help drive future economic growth. It will also encourage greater economic activity in the
areas surrounding the PT Spine.
BRT is consistent with the strategic direction set out by Central Government, GWRC and WCC. It is a key
initiative in terms of implementing Central Government’s focus on improving productivity and economic
growth. BRT will also help achieve a number of GWRC’s and WCC’s objectives, in particular economic
growth, urban regeneration and improved accessibility. BRT along the PT Spine is the most important and
most beneficial PT project currently being considered for Wellington, and is a key element of all current
transport plans for the Wellington region.
This IBC only relates to the physical BRT infrastructure, not the various other elements of the BRT
solution. If the other elements are introduced but not the physical infrastructure, the full benefits of the
elements adopted will not be realised. The benefits of bigger buses, better ticketing, and operational
improvements will be limited if the part of BRT which leads to faster more reliable journeys is not adopted.
In addition, the ability to achieve the full benefits of BRT is contingent on finding, and implementing, an
adequate solution to conflicting transport demands around the Basin Reserve. Without this, the benefits of
BRT are considerably reduced.
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2. Economic case
2.1 Process for economic assessment
2.1.1 Two types of economic assessment are undertaken
This economic case is based on a best practice decision making approach for infrastructure projects and the
level of detail appropriate for an IBC. A small set of options have been developed, differing across the key
areas of material difference. These options are subjected to two types of economic assessment:
1. A qualitative assessment against a set of agreed criteria, typically referred to as an MCA.
2. A quantitative assessment, involving the development of benefit-cost ratios for the options. For a
transport project such as this, this assessment is undertaken with reference to the EEM.
The use of both types of assessment together is very important for an IBC. Ideally, a quantitative
assessment of an option’s benefit and costs should provide decision makers with a clear view of the best
value for money option. Decision makers should be able to clearly evaluate options across quality, quantity,
timeliness and cost dimensions. Invariably, however, a quantifiable approach either does not pick up, or
not fully quantify, all aspects of an option that are relevant to the decision that needs to be made.
Moreover, fully quantifying all costs and benefits across all options is only undertaken at the DBC stage.
The qualitative assessment allows a more rounded assessment of the options across a scope of measures
that are important to decision makers.
2.1.2 Other economic assessments of BRT
An economic assessment of a BRT solution was undertaken as part of the PTSS. In the PTSS, MCA was
used to reduce a long list of options to a shortlist of three. Then those three options were subjected to a
quantitative assessment, and the BCRs developed were a key component of the ultimate conclusion that
BRT was the best of the three options.
In this economic case, we consider a number of different BRT solutions, one of which is essentially the
same as the PTSS BRT option while the others differ in small but important ways.
If the project proceeds to DBC stage, a more detailed economic assessment will be undertaken at that point.
The BRT solution will be able to be optimised to a much greater degree of detail than is possible or
appropriate in this IBC, and all costs and benefits will be quantified (where possible). The DBC economic
assessment will be quantitative – we do not expect a MCA to be used as well.
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2.2 Options considered
2.2.1 Approach to specifying the options
The specification of the different options needs to be closely aligned with the purpose of the IBC. In
particular it needs to be:
broad enough in scope so as to demonstrate that a genuine assessment of the range of potential
approaches to solving the problem is being undertaken
at a level of detail that allows meaningful comparison on the material differences in option
outcomes, without expending significant time and resource on a comprehensive and detailed
design.
The last point is critical. Detailed design and costing will be undertaken as part of any subsequent DBC
stage. At the DBC stage, a great deal can be done on specific options to optimise both costs and benefits.
The goal of the options design and specification in the IBC is to undertake a ‘like for like’ comparison of
options at a higher level to understand substantive differences between costs and benefits.
With this IBC, the project starts from the basis that BRT has been identified as the preferred strategic
response to the problem. In other words, the option specification is not revisiting other approaches to
solving the problem.
The options used in this IBC differ across the quality and extent of the BRT solution, and different staging
of implementation over time.
2.2.2 The reference case
In the economic assessment, all options are assessed relative to a ‘base case’ scenario. This represents what
is expected to happen if the project does not go ahead. The costs and benefits of the BRT options are
determined relative to this reference case.
The use of a reference case also allows consideration of whether implementing BRT is better than not doing
so (not just consideration of which option is best).
The reference case is not a ‘do nothing’. It is a ‘do minimum’, and includes other projects along the PT
Spine and ongoing maintenance spending for example.
The reference case for BRT includes or assumes:
the current network of bus lanes and bus priority across Wellington City
currently planned roading improvements, in particular:
o the Basin Bridge and associated improvements; or another grade separated solution
o Mt Victoria tunnel duplication, and associated improvements to Ruahine Street
o all other RONS in Wellington City
changes to Wellington bus services as a result of the Wellington City Bus Review, including:
o revisions to bus network running patterns
o optimisation of bus stops locations
o other user improvements
the complete implementation of the PTOM contracts
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the introduction of integrated fares and ticketing (as currently envisaged by that project’s business
case)
the use of high-capacity buses (eg double-decker) on some Wellington City bus routes, where
demand warrants it
buses will run at a frequency necessary to cater for demand and growth.
We note that this is very similar to the reference case used in the PTSS. The only material difference relates
to the treatment of high-capacity buses. The PTSS did not include high-capacity buses in the reference case
– their costs and benefits were instead included in the PTSS BRT option. But the introduction of these
buses is not being considered separately, and is likely to occur regardless of whether physical BRT
infrastructure is constructed. Therefore, the costs and benefits of high-capacity buses are excluded from
the BRT options set out below.
2.2.3 The BRT options
Approach to developing the BRT options
The options considered in this IBC were developed by the Working Group (which was established to
develop the IBC). The Working Group considered that the most material features of options, and hence
those where different variants should be considered, were the degree of dedication of the bus lanes and the
degree of intersection priority given to buses.
The BRT option in the PTSS assumed complete dedication and intersection priority, such that buses could
essentially move freely throughout the route without congestion. The Working Group wanted to consider
some variants of this BRT solution that involved lower degrees of dedication and priority. In effect, the
Working Group wanted to assess options that spanned a continuum from the PTSS BRT option to the PTSS
Bus Priority option.
Four distinct options were developed to reflect this continuum:
Physically separated bus lanes along the full route, operating at all times (in effect, the PTSS BRT
option)
Bus lanes along the full route, operating at all times
Bus lanes along selected parts of the route to target key congestion areas, operating at all times
Bus lanes along the full route, but only operating at peak times.
In addition, a separate option was considered, based on a detailed possible plan recently developed by
WCC, for bus priority improvements along the Central and Newtown branches.
The Working Group also wanted to consider some variants of these options, based on:
the timing of construction and implementation
a lower-quality solution, or no solution at all, for the ‘Kilbirnie branch’.
The options are described in the sub-sections below. In additio
n, Appendix B provides a more detailed
description of each option.
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The BRT route
The proposed route for BRT is shown i
n Figure 6. For ease of description, we have split the route into three
‘branches’.
The Central spine: From the Railway Station, the route follows Lambton Quay, Manners St,
Courtenay Place, and Cambridge and Kent Terraces to the Basin Reserve.
The Newtown branch: From the Basin Reserve, the route continues south along Adelaide Road
and Riddiford St to the corner of Constable Street.
The Kilbirnie branch: From the Basin Reserve, the route continues east through the Mt
Victoria tunnels, along Ruahine Street, Wellington Road and Kilbirnie Crescent.
All options follow this same route. However some options have different levels of priority, or different
implementation timings, for different branches.
Figure 6. Proposed BRT route
Source: PTSS presentation to stakeholders and interest groups (August 2013)
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Summary of the options
There are five core options considered in this economic case.
Table 8 sets out the type of roadspace and
intersection priority assumed for each options – the key components of the options. Each option, and the
types of priority, are described in more detail further below.
Table 8. Key elements of core options
Option
Type of roadspace dedication
Level of intersection priority
1
Improved bus priority
Limited priority
2
Bus lanes, along the whole route, at peak periods
Limited priority
3
Bus lanes, in targeted locations, 24/7
Limited priority
4
Bus lanes, along the whole route, 24/7
Full priority
5
Physically separated bus lanes, along the whole route,
Full priority
24/7
Option 1 – Improved bus priority and other modes improvement
This option is based on a detailed possible plan recently developed by WCC, for bus priority improvements
along the Central spine and Newtown branch.
It provides for additional bus lanes between the Railway Station and Newtown, in certain locations where
none currently exist. It also provides for bus signal priority at a greater number of intersections along the
route, using the ‘B phase’ method.
Some of these bus lanes will only operate at certain periods, depending on inter-peak congestion levels.
Improvements are also made to cycle infrastructure, along Adelaide Road, through the Basin Reserve and
along Kent and Cambridge Terraces.
This option assumes there is no construction of the Basin Bridge, or any solution of similar effectiveness. It
includes dedicated bus lanes and cycle infrastructure through the Basin Reserve area that are incompatible
with the Basin Bridge proposal. As currently designed, this option cannot be implemented if the Basin
Bridge, or another solution of similar effectiveness through the area, is constructed.
Option 2 – Peak bus lanes and limited priority
Continuous bus lanes are provided along the Central spine, and the Newtown and Kilbirnie branches.
These lanes would
only operate at peak periods.
Buses will get signal priority at intersections, using the
‘B phase’ method.
Where no bus lane currently exists, general traffic lanes or parking spaces will be converted to bus lanes
during peak periods.
Option 3 – Targeted bus lanes and limited priority
Bus lanes, and possibly other bus priority measures, are provided
in selected areas along the
Central spine, and the Newtown and Kilbirnie branches. The areas and measures selected will be based on
targeting key congestion areas and key intersections.
The exact location of the new bus lanes and priority measures will be determined at a later date, but key
areas include the Golden Mile, the intersection of Manners St, Courtenay Place and Taranaki St, the
intersection of Kent/Cambridge Terrace with Vivian St, the south and eastern entries to the Basin Reserve,
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the intersection of Adelaide Road and John St, Ruahine St, and the intersection of Wellington St and
Kilbirnie Crescent.
Buses will get signal priority at intersections, using the
‘B phase’ method, where there is a bus lane
immediately prior to the intersection.
Where no bus lane currently exists, general traffic lanes or parking spaces will be converted to bus lanes.
Option 4 – Bus lanes and full priority
Continuous bus lanes are provided along the Central spine, and the Newtown and Kilbirnie branches.
These lanes would
operate at all times.
Buses will get signal priority at intersections. This includes both
pre-emption of signals before the bus
arrives at the intersection, and the
extension of phases, where feasible.15
Where no bus lane currently exists, general traffic lanes or parking spaces will be converted to bus lanes.
Option 5 – Physically separated bus lanes and full priority
This option is designed to be, in effect, the PTSS BRT option.
Continuous bus lanes, physically separated from general traffic, are provided along the Central
spine, and the Newtown and Kilbirnie branches. These lanes would
operate at all times. (Note that the
bus lanes in Options 2, 3 and 4 are not physically separated from general traffic.)
Buses will get signal priority at intersections. This includes both
pre-emption of signals before the bus
arrives at the intersection, and the
extension of phases, where feasible.
Where no bus lane currently exists, general traffic lanes or parking spaces will be converted to bus lanes.
Timing of construction assumed in core options
Table 9 presents the timing of construction assumed in our core options. In each case, the Central spine is
implemented as soon as possible (following the completion of the assessment and consenting processes).
The Newtown and Kilbirnie branches are constructed as soon as the RONS projects (Basin Bridge and Mt
Victoria tunnel duplication) are completed.
Table 9. Timing of construction assumed for core options
Central spine
Newtown branch
Kilbirnie branch
Option 1
Immediately
To coincide with the
n/a
completion of the RONS
Options 2-5
Immediately
To coincide with the
To coincide with the
completion of the RONS
completion of the RONS
Note: (1) ‘Immediately’ assumes it is completed prior to 2019. (2) The RONS (Basin Bridge and Mt
Victoria tunnel duplication) are assumed to be completed prior to 2025.
Timing variants for Options 2, 3, 4 and 5
Multiple variants of options 2-5 are considered in addition to the core options. They include the following
variations:
15 ‘Pre-emption’ means the ability for the bus’ signal to turn green before the bus arrives at the intersection, so that it
does not need to stop at the intersection. ‘Phase extension’ means the ability for a green signal phase to be
extended, so that a bus can pass through before the signal turns red. Both have been successfully implemented in a
number of cities worldwide, including Brisbane, Cleveland and Chicago.
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delaying implementation of the Central spine, so that it is constructed at the same time as the
branches (variant ‘a’)
not building any physical BRT infrastructure along the Kilbirnie branch (variant ‘b’)
only constructing bus lanes in targeted locations (ie Option 3) along the Kilbirnie branch.
The combinations considered are set out i
n Table 10.
Table 10. Variants of core options considered
Delay the
No Kilbirnie
Targeted
Delay the
Central Spine
branch
Kilbirnie branch Central spine,
AND targeted
Kilbirnie branch
Option 1
-
-
-
-
Option 2
Option 2a
Option 2b
-
-
Option 3
Option 3a
Option 3b
-
-
Option 4
Option 4a
Option 4b
Option 4c
Option 4ac
Option 5
Option 5a
Option 5b
Option 5c
Option 5ac
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2.3 Approach to cost benefit analysis
The cost-benefit analysis was conducted alongside the MCA to provide a monetised assessment of the net-
benefits of the options. It is consistent with current applied best practice transport economic evaluation
procedures, including the EEM.
Broadly, the approach to evaluate the standard transport benefits of BRT requires several steps:
1. Identify and describe the options to be evaluated, including a do-minimum and the options
2. Define the transport modelling process
3. Identify the streams of economic impacts accruing from the project and define the calculations that
must be completed in order to value them. The economic impact includes nationwide benefits and
costs, not just the core funding costs.
Appendix C provides more detail regarding the procedures
for conducting the core transport evaluation.
4. Identify any qualitative, or non-transport assessments that are required, including significant non-
monetised impacts and national strategic factors.
5. Calculate economic efficiency and sensitivity test the results.
The economic evaluation of transport services, such as BRT, should focus on the transport benefits alone.
The aim of this evaluation is to produce a benefit-cost ratio (BCR) that compares the transport benefits of
the project with the project costs to determine its overall economic efficiency
. Table 11 describes the types
of costs and benefits which were included in this evaluation, where data permitted.
Table 11: Costs and benefits included in the economic evaluation
Costs
Benefits
Construction costs
Transport service user benefits (for
both new and existing users) including:
Operating costs
o Travel time benefits
o Additional PT user benefits
o Reliability benefits
o Walking benefits
Road traffic reduction benefits (vehicle
operating cost (VOC) savings and travel time
cost savings)
Environmental benefits
Agglomeration benefits
Where the BRT options create adverse effects, these are accounted for as negative benefits, rather than
costs, as per EEM guidelines.
In line with the EEM, our main analysis covers a 40 year evaluation period and uses a 6% discount rate.
Sensitivity testing is performed using (i) a 30 year, 8% discount rate scenario, and (ii) a 60 year, 4%
discount rate scenario.
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2.3.1 Key inputs and assumptions
Our core information base was the outputs from the transport modelling undertaken for the PTSS by
GWRC. We did not undertake any additional modelling of transport effects as part of this IBC.
Our Option 5 is designed to match the PTSS BRT option, and hence we applied the PTSS BRT modelling to
it. In addition, we assumed that the transport effects (eg journey times) of Option 1 are materially similar
to the PTSS Bus Priority option (minus the Kilbirnie branch). The reference case was also assumed to be
the same for both the PTSS and this analysis.16
The use of the PTSS outputs for Options 1 and 5 represented the ‘bookends’ of our analysis. The transport
effects of Options 2 through 4 were determined by interpolation, using methods developed in conjunction
with GWRC.
The key metrics from the transport models were for the two hour am peak period in 2031, and covered
travel time savings and patronage from Kilbirnie and Newtown to the CBD, in the reference case, and the
bus priority and BRT options.
Table 12 below shows the PTSS patronage forecasts.
Table 13 and Table 14 show the PTSS travel time
savings, relative to the reference case.
Table 12: Local growth in patronage to the CBD (2031 am peak period)
Area
Reference case
Bus Priority
BRT
Miramar
1320
+ 60
+ 170
Kilbirnie Lyall
680
+ 40
+ 80
Mt Victoria/
790
+ 20
- 50
Hataitai
Island Bay
1,140
+ 20
+ 100
Newtown
790
+ 30
+ 90
Total
4,710
+ 170
+ 400
Source: PTSS Option Evaluation Report
Table 13: Travel time savings from Kilbirnie relative to the reference case (2031 am peak
period, minutes)
Kilbirnie to
Reference case
Bus Priority
BRT
Elizabeth St
13.9
- 1.1
- 7.6
Courtenay Pl
14.7
- 1.1
- 8.1
Willis St
19.3
- 1.5
- 9.5
Rail Station
24.5
- 2.7
- 11.2
Source: PTSS Option Evaluation Report
16 As discussed above, the key difference is the inclusion in our reference case of high-capacity. The cost and benefit
values were adjusted to exclude the effects of the larger buses in our options.
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Table 14: Travel time savings from Newtown relative to the reference case (2031 am peak
period, minutes)
Newtown to
Reference case
Bus Priority
BRT
Basin
5.1
- 1.4
- 1.7
Courtenay Pl
8.5
- 1.4
- 3.3
Willis St
13.1
- 1.8
- 4.7
Rail Station
18.3
- 3.0
- 6.4
Source: PTSS Option Evaluation Report
For the intermediate options, GWRC determined an interpolation method based on the relativity of
expected travel time savings between the options. This method was used to determine the values for travel
time savings, patronage, operating costs and car vehicle kilometres travelled. The method identified key
intersections and the impact of the level of bus priority and dedication measures on travel time savings, for
each option.
Appendix C includes further details.
2.3.2 Key modelling results
Average travel times for Options 1 and 5
The PTSS data included different journey times to different parts of the CBD. The approach to our analysis
was to use a weighted average method, based on the proportion of travellers expected to travel from
Newtown and Kilbirnie to the specific destinations along the routes.
We assumed the patronage weights shown i
n Table 15 for travellers from Newtown and Kilbirnie to the
CBD to generate the weighted average travel time along the routes. We assumed that the demand
breakdown for Newtown and Kilbirnie travellers is the same across all the options, based on forecast
patronage values from the PTSS.
Table 15. Weights for travellers along the Newtown and Kilbirnie routes by destination
Newtown to
Per cent of
Kilbirnie to
Per cent of
travellers
travellers
Basin
10%
Elizabeth St
10%
Courtenay Pl
10%
Courtenay Pl
10%
Willis St
40%
Willis St
40%
Rail Station
40%
Rail Station
40%
The PTSS disaggregation of travel times into segment allowed the travel time savings for the variants
without the Kilbirnie branch to be derived. We assumed that the buses travelling from Kilbirnie will be
able to benefit from the infrastructure when travelling along the Central spine when this infrastructure is
completed.
The weighted average travel time savings for Options 1 and 5 are shown i
n Table 11.
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Table 16. Weighted average travel time savings (2031 am peak, min)
Travel segment
Option 1
Option 5
Newtown to CBD
2.2
4.9
Kilbirnie to CBD
1.9
9.5
Interpolation approach for intermediate options
For the intermediate options, we interpolated the travel time savings shown above using an allocation
method based on the expected impact on easing congestion, relative to the PTSS BRT option. GWRC
identified key intersections and the impact of the level of bus priority and dedication measures on travel
time savings, for each option.
Appendix C has further details.
Table 17 below shows the weighted average travel time savings for the core options considered.
Table 17. Weighted average travel time savings for the core BRT options (2031 am peak,
mins)
1
2
3
4
5
Time savings (mins)
1.4
4.3
4.5
6.5
7.6
Figures for patronage were interpolated using the same method as the travel time savings
. Table 18 below
shows the additional patronage for the core BRT options.
Table 18. Additional PT patronage for core BRT options (2031)
1
2
3
4
5
Additional patronage
50
146
162
272
390
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2.3.3 Calculation of costs
Capital and operating cost values are also sourced from the PTSS work. These were developed by Davis
Langdon, and peer reviewed. As with the transport effects, we apply the PTSS Bus Priority and BRT costs
to Options 1 and 5, and then interpolate to develop the costs for the other options.
Capital expenditure
Table 19 below shows the indicative costs of the bus priority and BRT options from the PTSS work.
Table 19: Capital expenditure of construction ($2013 m)
Bus Priority
BRT 2
Central spine
16.1
79.8
Newtown branch
5.9
29.4
Kilbirnie branch
14.1 1
25.6
General allowances
5.0
9.8
Design and construction
9.8
32.2
contingencies (20%)
Total construction cost
58.6 3
173.5
Source: Wellington Public Transport Spine Study Appendix E Option Cost Methodology
Note: (1) Option 1 does not include the Kilbirnie branch. However we use the PTSS value for this part of
the route to help interpolate the values for other options. (2) The BRT values exclude the amount included
in the PTSS for high-capacity buses, since these are part of the reference case for our analysis. (3) The
Bus Priority values exclude amounts for the Constable St part of the route, since this is not part of any
BRT option.
The interpolation method used for capital costs differed to that applied to journey times, given the different
drivers of the values. Our method uses professional judgement to determine the relative costs of each
option compared to the ‘bookends’. The approach used a different relative allocation for road
infrastructure and signalling and telemetry.
Table 20 and
Table 21 set out the approach used to interpolate
the capital costs.
Table 20: Infrastructure cost allocation
Option 1
Option 2
Option 3
Option 4
Option 5
Bus Priority
Midway between
BP costs plus 25%
Midway between
BRT costs
costs
BP and BRT costs
BP and BRT costs
Table 21: Signalling cost allocation
Option 1
Option 2
Option 3
Option 4
Option 5
Bus Priority
Same as BP costs
Same as BP costs
Same as BRT costs
BRT costs
costs
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Further detail is contained i
n Appendix C
Operating expenditure
The PTSS assumed savings in operating costs for both the bus priority and BRT options, relative to the
reference case. The operating costs relate to the bus operations (eg fuel, vehicle maintenance etc) and a
10% contingency has been applied to the total regional cost of providing public transport services. The
PTSS did not specifically include costs for maintenance of the new infrastructure. We have assumed that
the maintenance costs of the whole roadway are materially similar as the do-minimum scenario, on the
basis that the segment of the road would need to be maintained anyway. For example, if kerb-side parking
is removed and converted to a bus-lane, the existing renewals budget would have some proportion
allocated to the road segment anyway.
For the intermediate options, opex savings are allocated proportionate to the travel time savings.
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2.4 Cost benefit analysis results
This section presents the results of the CBA, using the approach discussed in the previous section.
All costs and benefit figures are present values. This allows a like-for-like comparison between costs and
benefits that have different timings. But, notably, the cost figures shown here are lower than the actual cost
that will eventually be incurred – which is presented in the financial case.
2.4.1 The core options
Table 22 presents the estimated benefits, costs and the benefit-cost ratios for the core BRT options. All
dollar values shown are net present values over 40 years.
Table 22. Costs, benefits and BCRs – core BRT options
$m NPV
1
2
3
4
5
Benefits:
Travel time benefits
$ 5.9
$ 15.3
$ 19.0
$ 28.1
$ 32.9
Additional PT user benefits
$ 0.0
$ 0.0
$ 0.0
$ 5.8
$ 6.0
Reliability benefits
$ 5.9
$ 15.3
$ 19.0
$ 28.1
$ 32.9
Walking benefits
$ 0.1
$ 0.3
$ 0.3
$ 16.4
$ 17.1
Emissions reductions benefits
$ 0.1
$ 0.3
$ 0.3
$ 0.3
$ 0.4
Agglomeration benefits
$ 0.9
$ 2.3
$ 2.8
$ 4.2
$ 4.9
Decongestion (dis)benefits
-$ 4.9
-$ 4.4
-$4.3
-$ 4.0
-$ 3.7
Reduction in vehicle
$ 3.8
$ 10.7
$ 11.0
$ 13.3
$ 17.5
operating cost benefits
Total benefits
$ 11.8
$ 39.7
$ 48.0
$ 92.2
$ 108.1
Costs:
Capex
$ 24.3
$ 72.1
$ 43.4
$ 97.2
$ 132.9
Opex (savings)
-$ 2.4
-$ 20.8
-$ 22.8
-$ 36.8
-$ 45.4
Total costs
$ 21.9
$51.3
$ 20.6
$ 60.4
$ 87.5
Benefit-cost ratio
0.5
0.8
2.3
1.5
1.2
2.4.2 Sensitivity analysis
We have performed sensitivity testing on three key assumptions: construction cost, the value of time and
the value of the agglomeration benefits, in three individual sensitivity tests. We applied an extra 20% to
costs, an extra 25% to the value of time for PT users and changed the agglomeration benefit calculation to
25% of all other benefits (to match the PTSS economic evaluation).
As a result of the suggestions from the peer-review, we also performed sensitivity testing on the reliability
benefits and walking benefits to ensure that the overall BCR results were not unduly influenced by these
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two benefit categories. For the reliability benefits, we reduced the value of the benefits by 69%.17 For the
walking benefits, for the sensitivity test we only included the walking benefits to new PT users and excluded
the theoretical benefits to existing PT users who walk further due to the stops being further apart.
The overall results are robust to the sensitivity tests and the key results remain valid. One result in
particular stands out. When the construction costs are an additional 20% higher (ie with the contingencies
that are an additional 40% above the PTSS point estimates), options 3 and 4 retain BCRs above 1,
indicating the strength of these two options. The extra reliability and walking sensitivity tests do not
change the overall outcome for these options, either as individual sensitivity tests or combined as an overall
sensitivity test of conservative assumptions (BCRs 1.7 and 1.0 respectively).18
Further details are i
n Appendix C.
2.4.3 Variants of core options
The results for the variants of the core options are presented i
n Appendix C. There are two key results.
The options which did not include the Kilbirnie branch had significantly lower BCRs than the core options.
The Kilbirnie branch is a very important part of the BRT solution, most notably through the significant
reduction in travel times from eastern suburbs that can be achieved with additional BRT infrastructure
along that part of the route.
The options which involved a delay in the construction of the Central spine had higher BCRs than the
corresponding core options. While this might suggest that delaying construction has merit, we note that
this result should be viewed with caution. This type of result, where delay to the implementation of a
project increases the BCR, is not uncommon across economic cost-benefit analysis.
17 As indicated i
n Table 6, the reliability of buses along all stops is 69%, and therefore 31% of buses are not on time.
Therefore, we applied a factor of 0.31 to the reliability NPV for all the options as a sensitivity test.
18 Conservative assumptions refers to conservative values for costs (extra 20%), reliability benefits (factored down by
69%) and walking benefits (benefits only accrue to new PT users).
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2.5 Approach to multi criteria analysis
This section sets out the approach used to undertake the MCA.
The MCA has two stages.
Firstly, options are assessed against a set of critical success factors (CSFs) – things that an option
must have if it is to be considered further.
Secondly, those options which meet the CSFs are then scores against a set of evaluative criteria.
2.5.1 Critical success factors
Table 23 shows the CSFs determined for BRT. These were developed by the Working Group.
Table 23. Critical success factors
A reduction in bus-on-bus congestion
A reduction in PT journey times along the PT Spine
An increase in reliability of PT journeys along the PT Spine
An increase in PT patronage in Wellington city
An increase in PT Spine corridor carrying capacity
It was considered that all of the options, and the variants of each, meet each of these CSFs. Therefore, all
options described earlier are subjected to the full economic assessment.
2.5.2 The MCA evaluation framework
Project objectives and criteria
Nine ‘project objectives’ were developed by the Working Group, to use as a basis for the MCA. Each option
is assessed against each of the objectives.
These objectives were developed by the Working Group, initially at the ILM workshop and then at a
subsequent workshop. They were deemed to cover the key problems identified, and attempting to be
addressed, and the key areas which were relevant to a decision to invest.
To help the scoring process, a number of more specific criteria were developed for each objective. Each
option is scored against each criterion. Then the scores for the criteria are averaged to derive the scores for
each objective (the criteria for each objective are unweighted).
Table 24 presents the nine project objectives and the criteria for each.
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Table 24. Multi-criteria analysis evaluation framework – project objectives and criteria
• 1.1 PT Spine corridor throughput
• 1.2 Ability to drive intensification of development and economic activity
1. Increased economic activity
• 1.3 Increase in the value of land use along the PT Spine
• 1.4 Increase in residential population along the PT Spine
• 2.1 Reduction in PT journey times
• 2.2 Increased reliability of PT journeys
2. Improved multi-modal
• 2.3 Reduction in vehicle operating costs
network efficiency
• 2.4 Improvement in ability to move goods and services around the city
• 2.5 Operational resilience (level of interaction with other modes)
• 3.1 Increase in PT Spine corridor carrying capacity
• 3.2 Improved options for mode choice
3. Improved accessibility
• 3.3 Reduction in bus-on-bus congestion
• 3.4 Reduction in PT journey times
• 4.1 Increase in PT patronage in Wellington city
4. Increased PT patronage
• 4.2 Increase in PT mode share in Wellington city
5. Improved PT user
• 5.1 Increase in PT user satisfaction
experience
• 5.2 Increase in ease of use of PT
• 6.1 Assessment of emissions (buses)
6. Minimise emissions
• 6.2 Assessment of emissions (mode shift)
• 7.1 Land take
• 7.2 Construction effects
• 7.3 Visual effects
• 7.4 Noise effects
• 7.5 Heritage effects
7. Minimise impacts on
• 7.6 Loss of town belt
physical environment /
• 7.7 Ecological effects
amenity
• 7.8 Safety impacts
• 7.9 Impacts on residential amenity
• 7.10 Localised urban centre commercial impacts
• 7.11 Loss of parking
• 7.12 Traffic and transport effects
• 8.1 Benefits
8. Affordable / value for
• 8.2 Capex
money
• 8.3 Opex & maintenance
• 8.4 Rates impact
9. Alignment / integration
• 9.1 Alignment with strategic documents (eg GOS, RLTP, LTP, Urban Growth Plan)
with other infrastructure &
• 9.2 Alignment with specific projects (eg RONS, cycling)
services
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Scoring system
Each criterion, and objective, was scored against the 7-point scoring system presented i
n Table 25.
A 7-point scale was preferred by the Working Group to the 5-point scale used in the PTSS. It was
considered that 3 levels of positive effects would allow a better discrimination between the options.
Table 25. Scores used for multi-criteria analysis
Numerical score
Colour used to
present results
Significant positive effects (or alignment)
+3
Some positive effects (or alignment)
+2
Minor positive effects (or alignment)
+1
Neutral
0
Minor negative effects (or alignment)
-1
Some negative effects (or alignment)
-2
Significant negative effects (or alignment)
-3
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2.6 Multi criteria analysis results
This section presents the results of the MCA, using the framework discussed in the previous section. This
section just presents the results for each objective, and only for the core options. The actual numerical
scores, the underlying results for the individual criteria, and their rationale, and the scores for the option
variants, are all presented i
n Appendix D.
Table 26 shows the MCA scores for the core BRT options.
Table 26. Results of multi-criteria analysis – core BRT options
Ref
1
2
3
4
5
case
1. Increased economic activity
2. Improved multi-modal network
efficiency
3. Improved accessibility
4. Increased PT patronage
5. Improved PT user experience
6. Minimise emissions
7. Minimise impacts on physical
environment / amenity
8. Affordable / value for money
9. Alignment / integration with other
infrastructure & services
Negative effects
Positive effects
Considering the scores separately by objective allows the differences between each option to be better
understood. However, the scores can be aggregated, to derive one score for each option.
Table 27 presents
the aggregate scores, if all objectives are given the same weights.
Table 27. Unweighted aggregate MCA scores – core BRT options
Ref
1
2
3
4
5
case
Unweighted score
Negative effects
Positive effects
Unweighted scores can be misleading however. They implicitly assume that all objectives are of equal
importance, which is rarely the case. In the case of BRT, the first five objectives were identified during the
ILM workshop as of the greatest importance. The Working Group considered that giving these objectives,
collectively, double the weighting of the other four objectives was a reasonable way of accounting for this.
Table 28 presents the aggregate scores, if the objectives 1-5 are collectively given double the weight of
objectives 6-9.
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Table 28. Weighted aggregate MCA scores – core BRT options
Base
1
2
3
4
5
case
Weighted score
Negative effects
Positive effects
We note that these are same as the unweighted aggregate scores. We have tested the sensitivity of the
scores to different weightings, and have concluded that the scores (in particular, the differences between
options) are relatively robust to changes in the weights of the objectives.
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2.7 Discussion of trade-offs
The options involve a range of different types of BRT solution, each with different pros and cons. In this
section we discuss the trade-offs between
what the options deliver and
how they deliver them.
The cost vs quality trade-off
Wellington can have the highest quality BRT system considered (Option 5), but this comes at a cost.
Option 5, effectively the BRT solution envisaged in the PTSS, provides a very high-quality bus system.
Buses are physically separated from general traffic, and have full priority over general traffic at
intersections. However, not unexpectedly, Option 5 is also the most expensive of those considered.
Our analysis of intermediate options shows that there is an opportunity for Wellington to achieve a
significant proportion of the benefits of a high-quality solution for a much lower cost.
For example, Option 4 is cheaper than Option 5, but still enables significant benefits to be achieved through
having dedicated bus lanes along the full BRT route. Option 3 is considerably cheaper still, but still enables
a considerable improvement in terms of the ability to move people around the city over the reference case.
The transformational approach vs cost efficient approach
All the options move people along the PT Spine faster and more reliably, to varying levels, than is currently
the case. But they vary quite a lot according to the other objectives and strategic goals they satisfy.
Option 3 enables considerable improvements in moving people around the network. However, the
discontinuous nature of the bus lanes means that it is unlikely to have the type of transformational effect
that Option 5, and to a lesser extent Option 4, would have.
Options 4 and 5 could provide a material step-change in Wellington’s PT infrastructure. With dedicated
lanes along 100% of the route, the look and feel of these solutions would be quite different to Option 3.
These highest quality options are more likely to lead to significant shifts in land use along the corridor, and
drive intensification and increase economic activity around the PT Spine.
However, BRT can be implemented incrementally. Instead of a one-off transformational step-change,
incremental improvements could be made over time. For example, it is possible to deliver Option 3 now,
and then further develop the infrastructure by effectively moving to Option 4 or 5 at a later date.
The road space allocation trade-off
As well as significant financial implications, high-quality BRT solutions also have costs in terms of their
effects on other road users. As more dedication and priority is allocated to PT, more of the roadspace must
be taken away from general traffic and/or parking (or the road is widened, with consequent environmental
effects).
Dedicated bus lanes along the full route will almost certainly involve the removal of some sections of
general traffic lanes (eg Ruahine St, Kent and Cambridge Terraces), and the removal of some kerb-side
parking (eg Courtenay Place, Adelaide Road). They would also make it more difficult to introduce
separately cycle lanes within the existing roadspace.
Furthermore, if buses are given complete priority at intersections, this could have a significant impact on
other road users. Indicative network modelling undertaken for the PTSS suggests that the potential overall
impact of fully-separated BRT on the wider transport network is moderate but manageable. This is
equivalent to Option 5 – a BRT solution providing a lower level of dedication could result in significantly
reduced impacts on other road users. This analysis, however, has highlighted a number of critical
intersections where affording priority to buses would provide significant benefits but might also result in
adverse impacts for other road users. These intersections are likely to be the focus of design efforts during
any subsequent DBC phase.
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Option 2, in an attempt to improve peak period mobility while retaining kerbside carparking during the
interpeak and off-peak periods, does not appear to provide an efficient use of resources. The cost of putting
in the infrastructure does not appear to be justified on the basis of the peak-period benefits.
It is important to note that the PT users and private vehicle users are not necessarily two distinct groups of
people – the majority of PT users also travel via car for some trips. High-quality public transport provides
options and viable choices to all travellers, so that they choose the best mode for each particular trip.
The timing trade-off
The analysis shows that the option variants in which construction is delayed to match the timing of the
RONS projects, have higher BCRs than the core options, in which the Central Spine segment is constructed
earlier. This highlights a classic timing trade-off found with cost-benefit analysis. It is not uncommon for
delaying construction to increase a BCR, due to the discounting process of large capital costs.
Constructing BRT early has tangible advantages not included in the narrow scope of the cost-benefit
analysis. For example, construction demonstrates commitment to developing the network infrastructure
and could encourage earlier mode shift to PT.
The impact of the RONS projects
As discussed in the strategic case, finding a solution to conflicting transport demands at the Basin Reserve
is critical to implementing a high-quality BRT system. Without such a solution, the benefits yielded from
duplicating the Mt Victoria tunnel will likely be considerably lower, and the Kilbirnie branch of the
proposed BRT solution will not be able to offer the same benefits as envisaged with the RONS projects in
place.
The option variants which do not include the Kilbirnie branch illustrate the best the BRT could offer
without the RONS. The BCRs for these variants are substantially lower than those for the core options. In
many cases, these BCRs are below one. This illustrates how important this part of the route is to achieving
the full benefits from BRT.
Furthermore, the BCRs for the option variants without the Kilbirnie branch likely overstate the true BCR of
implementing BRT in the absence of the RONS – the modelled benefits overstate the likely benefits in such
a situation. Without the Basin Bridge (or a solution of similar effectiveness), the actual traffic outcomes for
trips from Newtown will likely be inferior to those modelled.
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2.8 Preferred options for Detailed Business Case
The preferred options from the economic analysis are Options 3 and 4.
Pragmatic value-for-money options are preferred
The PTSS envisaged a BRT solution with physically separated lanes along the full route from the Railway
Station to Newtown and Kilbirnie. However, the economic analysis has demonstrated that this is not the
only sensible approach to implementing a BRT solution.
The majority of the travel time benefits can be achieved by providing additional priority to buses at and
around key intersections along the route. The economic analysis has shown that a more targeted approach
to BRT could provide a more cost effective improvement to bus services along the PT Spine.
Option 3 will deliver a very good outcome in terms of moving people around Wellington City faster and
more reliably, for an up-front capital investment of $59m (compared to $174m for Option 5). It also has
lower adverse impacts on traffic and parking than Options 4 and 5.
Options 3 and 4 have indicative benefit-cost ratios of 2.3 and 1.5. These are relatively high for a PT project.
The roadspace dedication of Option 3 could also be combined with the intersection priority of Option 4 to
deliver even greater benefits.
The economic analysis suggests that Options 3 and 4, or a combination of them, are appropriate options for
further consideration. Option 3 appears the best value-for-money approach – a good outcome for a
relatively low cost. But if a high-quality, more transformational, outcome is desired, Option 4 appears the
best approach – this is a lower cost version of Option 5, achieving a large proportion of the benefits. It
would also be possible to implement Option 3 initially and progress to Option 4 over time.
Table 29 a
nd Table 30 summarise the MCA scores and BCRs for Options 3 and 4.
Table 29. Multi-criteria analysis scores for the preferred options
Base case
3
4
1. Increased economic activity
2. Improved multi-modal network efficiency
3. Improved accessibility
4. Increased PT patronage
5. Improved PT user experience
6. Minimise emissions
7. Minimise impacts on physical environment /
amenity
8. Affordable / value for money
9. Alignment / integration with other
infrastructure & services
Negative effects
Positive effects
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Table 30. Benefit-cost ratios of the preferred options
Option
3
4
BCR
2.3
1.5
Wellington can have the highest quality BRT solution possible (Option 5) if it desires. However, it will be
cost a lot more than Options 3 and 4 and involve some more substantial effects on other road users and the
physical environment. The economic analysis suggests that Option 5 may not be the best use of resources.
Options 3 and 4 have been identified as the preferred options on the basis that they deliver much of the
benefits of Option 5, but with a more efficient use of resources.
These options also do not preclude upgrades to a higher-quality solution in the future. In Option 3 is
chosen today, Options 4 or 5 could still be implemented at a later date if warranted.
The Kilbirnie branch is very important
A key result from the consideration of the option variants within the economic analysis is that the Kilbirnie
branch is essential to the viability of a BRT solution. This helps to partially illustrate the effect of complete
transport networks. Designing a network as a whole enables optimisation across the PT network, as well as
with other road users.
It is therefore recommended that, if physically possible, only options that include the Kilbirnie branch are
considered further.
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3. Financial case
The financial case covers the detailed financial costing, including both capital and operating expenditure.
It discusses funding implications, including the extent to which funding for BRT is currently included in
council LTPs.
3.1 Implementation costs
Table 31 shows the expected total capital expenditure for implementing each of the core BRT options
identified in Sectio
n 2.2. These amounts are specified in 2015 dollars. The capital expenditure will
increase with inflation over time. Inflation has not been included but would need to be taken into account
when using these values for budgeting purposes.
Table 31 also shows the expected savings in operating expenditure. As discussed in the economic case, it is
expected that BRT would lead to reduced operating costs for buses, largely due to reductions in journey
times. These operating cost savings are expected to increase over time. The savings expected in 2031 are
included i
n Table 31. These are also expressed in real 2015 dollar terms. The operating costs exclude any
specific allocation for maintenance of the BRT infrastructure. We note that some maintenance costs will
already be included in the do-minimum (eg the costs of maintaining the section of a road which is currently
kerb-side parking but converted to a bus lane should be similar). We have assumed that the operating costs
for the BRT infrastructure are not materially different to the do-minimum scenario. This can be
investigated in greater detail in the DBC stage.
The cost amounts in the table are consistent with those used in the economic case. As discussed in that
case, they are sourced from the PTSS, with assumptions made for the intermediate options.
Table 31. Expected total capital expenditure and annual operating expenditure savings for
each core BRT option ($2013 m)
Option
Total capital
Annual operating expenditure
expenditure ($m)
savings in 2031 ($m)
1
30.9
0.3
2
95.7
2.6
3
58.8
2.9
4
127.2
4.6
5
173.5
5.7
Capital expenditure components
There are different components of the capital expenditure that may be subject to different funding
arrangements.
Table 32 presents the capital expenditure values for key components, for the core options.19
19 Note that any costs of projects included in the Reference Case are not included in this table. For example, the costs
of duplicating the Mt Victoria tunnel and associated widening of Ruahine Street are not included. These costs relate
to the incremental costs of implementing BRT, over and above the costs incurred in the Reference Case.
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Table 32. Capital costs for the core BRT options, disaggregated into key components ($2013
m)
Option
1
2
3
4
5
Site Preparation Works
0
3.2
0
3.2
6.4
(Within Existing Carriageway)
Traffic Management, Road
10.5
27.8
16.0
27.8
42.8
Alterations
Signalling/Controls
3.6
3.6
11.7
43.2
43.2
Stations/Ticketing and Fare
1.3
1.5
1.8
1.5
1.5
Collection Systems
General Allowances
14.9
43.1
27
43.1
64.5
Other
0.6
8.4
2.2
8.4
15.1
Total
30.9
97.5
58.8
127.2
173.5
Time profile of capital costs
Table 33 shows the time profile of capital expenditure for the core BRT options.
The core options focus on a staged approach to construction. Each of these options are assumed to be
implemented in stages – the Central branch immediately, and then the Newtown and (except for Option 1)
the Kilbirnie branch once the RONS projects are complete. There is considerably uncertainty over the
possible completion date of the RONS projects, and hence the expenditure profiles need to be viewed with
caution.
Table 33. Time series of capital costs for the core options ($2013 m)
Option
1
2
3
4
5
2016
-
-
-
-
-
2017
-
-
-
-
-
2018
22.6
51.0
27.0
74.2
102.8
2019
-
-
-
-
-
2020
-
-
-
-
-
2021
-
-
-
-
-
2022
-
-
-
-
-
2023
-
-
-
-
-
2024
8.3
47.4
31.8
53.0
70.7
2025
-
-
-
-
-
This IBC does not include likely depreciation profiles of the assets. We note that the depreciation levels will
be important if the funding organisations intend to fund future renewals by funding depreciation over time.
This work will be undertaken in any subsequent DBC, for the option(s) considered in that phase.
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Cost uncertainty
The capital cost values shown above are based on the estimates developed for the PTSS. They include an
amount for contingencies, equal to 20% of the other costs. The operating costs also have a contingency
factor applied. A contingency of 10% has been applied to the total regional cost of providing public
transport services.
There is inherent uncertainty over the potential capital costs for investments like this. Business cases often
express the capital expenditure values as a probability range. This is not undertaken in this IBC. The PTSS
expenditure values that are the basis of our analysis were not determined with a range (only a central
estimate), and hence considering higher percentiles is not possible.
We have used other mechanisms to consider the effect of uncertainty. As per the approach in the PTSS, the
cost estimates used for our main BCRs include an amount for contingencies (20% of other costs). We have
also undertaken sensitivity testing of these cost values in the economic case. We have tested the suitability
of this approach to considering cost uncertainty in an IBC with the Transport Agency.
While the capital cost estimates are adequate for providing guidance on the relative cost of the options for
the purpose of this IBC, they will need to be updated in detail for the DBC.
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3.2 Funding sources
Assuming the current funding arrangements for PT in Wellington are retained, BRT will be jointly funded by the Transport Agency, GWRC and WCC.
Table 34
and
Table 35 show each organisation’s share of the required funding, for the core BRT options5, assuming these funding arrangements continue. It shows total
capital cost, and the annual opex in 2031. As with previous tables, these are in real 2015 dollars and so do not include the effects of future inflation. .
We understand that there is some ambiguity over the future funding arrangements for stop and station infrastructure. However, under current and historical
funding arrangements, it is assumed that GWRC will fund the remainder of the cost that the Transport Agency will not.
It is also possible that alternatives to the current PT funding arrangements could be considered for BRT, particularly if some of the options considered in a DBC
have different capex/opex ratios.
Table 34. Funding required for the core BRT Options 1 - 3 ($2013 m)
Option
1
2
3
NZTA
GWRC
WCC
NZTA GWRC
WCC
NZTA
GWRC
WCC
Total
Total
Total
cost
cost
cost
cost
cost
cost
cost
cost
cost
Capex
Road alterations
10.5
5.4
5.2
31.0
15.8
15.2
16.0
8.2
7.8
Signalling / controls
3.6
1.8
1.8
11.7
6.0
5.7
11.7
6.0
5.7
Stations/ticketing and fare
1.3
0.7
0.6
1.5
0.8
0.7
1.8
0.9
0.9
collection systems
Other
15.5
7.9
7.6
51.5
26.3
25.2
29.3
14.9
14.4
Capex total
30.9
15.8
0.6
14.5
95.7
48.8
01.7
46.2
58.8
30.0
0.9
27.9
Opex (2031)
-0.3
-0.3
-2.6
-2.6
-2.9
-2.9
Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.
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Table 35. Funding required for the core BRT Options 4 and 5 ($2013 m)
Option
4
5
NZTA
NZTA
GWRC
Total
GWRC cost
WCC cost
Total
WCC cost
cost
cost
cost
Capex
Road alterations
31.0
15.8
15.2
49.2
25.1
24.1
Signalling / controls
43.2
22.0
21.2
43.2
22.0
21.2
Stations/ticketing and fare collection systems
1.5
0.8
0.7
1.5
0.8
0.8
Other
51.5
26.3
25.2
79.6
40.6
39
Capex total
127.2
64.9
0.7
61.6
173.5
88.5
0.8
84.3
Opex (2031)
-4.6
-5.7
-5.7
Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.
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3.3 Current funding status
If BRT is to be delivered, the three funding organisations will need to allocate the required funding in their
respective plans and budgets.
The NLTP sets out the items to be funded by the Transport Agency via the NLTF for a 3-year period, based
on the programmes and activities submitted through RLTPs. This is set every 3 years, but can be varied
during that period. The NLTP 2015-18 includes two BRT related activities: GWRC’s Bus Rapid Transit
Implementation Plan 2015-18 (intended for DBC phase, total cost approximately $3m) and WCC
Wellington City BRT Infrastructure Improvements (total cost $60m). Both activities have ‘proposed’
status, which means that funding approval may be given when an application is made in 2015-18 provided
further evidence is required to confirm the assessment profile and provide confidence in the funding
priority and availability of funds.
The DBC phase will provide further certainty about the total cost of BRT implementation. To ensure
enough local share is available for BRT implementation, WCC and GWRC will need to continue to factor
the results of the IBC and future DBC phase into their respective annual and long term planning processes.
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4. Commercial case
The Commercial Case presents a range of approaches to the procurement of the BRT options, sets out the
pros and cons of each, and provides an indicative assessment of the most suitable options. Any subsequent
DBC will have a more detailed assessment, and a preferred option will be selected.
As with the rest of this IBC, the commercial case is focused on procurement of just the physical BRT
infrastructure, not the other elements of the wider BRT solution (eg high-capacity buses). However, the
management case considers options for procuring this BRT infrastructure together with new cycling
infrastructure, roading improvements, or other physical changes to the roadspace. We also consider the
potential of the procurement options to work with an integrated provision approach.
The indicative assessment of procurement options in this section focuses on a number of qualitative
factors, particularly:
cost competitiveness, and the ability of the different models to ensure strong market tension
the ability of the procurement model to meet construction deadlines
the effectiveness of the procurement model at transferring risk from the project sponsors over its
design, construction and building life, enabling greater certainty of costs
the ability of the model to accommodate unexpected changes to scope or original specification
during procurement and construction due to potential changes in the Wellington transport
network over the analysis period (eg uncertainty around the timing of the Basin bridge)
the procurement model’s ability to deliver innovation in asset design, construction and
management, achieving lower whole-of-life project costs.
This commercial case also discusses opportunities for commercial development.
4.1 Procurement strategy
Below we outline possible strategies for the procurement of the design, construction, ongoing maintenance
and operations of the physical BRT infrastructure.
Our approach to this analysis is as follows:
Procurement models: An overview of the characteristics of potential procurement options.
Project components and application to the BRT options: An outline of the different
components of each procurement model and how the different procurement options might be
applied in the context of this project. This allows us to consider the pros and cons of different
procurement approaches at a more granular level; in particular, the policy implications associated
with different risk allocation and the transfer of rights.
Preliminary evaluation and recommendations: We consider the merits of each option with
respect to the BRT context, and provide indicative recommendations for the option(s) which are
likely to be most suitable.
4.1.1 Defining procurement models
There is a range of possible procurement models across a spectrum of public and private sector
participation with associated risk transfer. These models include:
Traditional models: The Project Partners would individually enter into contracts with an
expressly identified risk allocation. The effectiveness of these arrangements tends to rely on the
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ability of the Project Partners to define their performance requirements prior to tendering and to
have a clear identification, understanding and quantification of risks.
Relationship based models: The Project Partners would enter into a collaborative relationship
agreement with appropriate parties to define requirements, understand risks and undertake the
works. These approaches generally collectively share risk on a ‘no fault, no blame’ basis with
incentives built in to equitably share additional or reduced value to the Project Partners by
outcomes actually achieved, thereby encouraging enhanced performance. Such approaches include
the (Early Contractor Involvement) ECI model and Alliance contracting.
Privately financed models: The Project Partners would enter into contracts with a fixed risk
allocation on a whole-of-life basis, such as public-private partnership (PPP) models.
Managing contractor procurement models: The Project Partners would appoint a Managing
Contractor as the head contractor who would engage subcontractors on behalf of the Project
Partners to deliver the works and would typically be paid a management fee and incentive
payments for achieving target price, schedule and other key parameters.
Table 36 provides a high level summary of the key characteristics of different examples of these models and
how they could be applied in the BRT context. All of these models have been applied to infrastructure
procurement in Australasia and internationally.
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Table 36. Characteristics of different procurement models and application to the BRT options
Model description
Project Partners’ risks
Contractor’s risks
Payment mechanism
Use
Design then construct/
Scope does not meet
Design does not meet
Fixed price (though
Best suited to projects where:
design bid build (DBB)
needs
brief (though there is risk
subject to disputes, claims
to the Project Partners
and variations)
Each Project Partner’s
The Project Partners
Scope changes
that this is disputed
specifications can be
individually contract with
clearly articulated before
between design and
Progress payments based
separate entities for the
Site conditions
construction contractors)
on milestones or cost of
tender
design and construction
Whole-of-life asset
work completed
phases of the project for the
Specifications are unlikely
ownership risks
Construction timetable
to change and where each
segments they are responsible
breaches
Whole-of-life,
Project Partner is best
for.
Operational risks
maintenance and lifecycle
Cost of works (except for
type costs are retained by
placed to manage non-
Disputes between design
agreed variations).
the Project Partners
construction project risks
and general contractor
(though may be
over responsibility for
separately contracted
Design is relatively
issues cause delays
out).
uncomplicated, where the
and/or mean some
key procurement
contractor risk is pushed
objective is ensuring a
back to the Project
strongly competitive
Partners
construction tender
Separate design and
One design is repeated
construction contracts
over
may lead to a design that
Relationship with design
is not buildable or that is
team may be more
not cost effective from a
interactive, which can
construction perspective.
reduce specification risks;
Lack of clarity over roles
however, it can also be
and responsibilities
harder to manage scope
between Project Partners
Operational risks best
managed separately
No upfront funding
constraints
Low scope for innovation.
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Model description
Project Partners’ risks
Contractor’s risks
Payment mechanism
Use
Design and construct
Similar to DBB approach
Constructed design does
As per DBB.
Similar to DBB but tends to
(D&C)
but risk of disputes
not meet brief
be a quicker process as there
between design and
is one tender process and
The Project Partners seeks
construction contractors
Construction timetable
D&C can overlap. Relative to
tenders to provide a
is addressed
breaches
DBB, it is better suited to
(typically) fixed price for
more complex designs where
design and construction.
May increase risk that
Cost of works (except for
there is a need for a closer
scope does not meet
agreed variations).
relationship between the
needs as there is generally
design and construction
greater separation
teams.
between the client and the
design team
Assumes the Project
Partners can specify
required outcomes clearly
at the outset.
Design, construct and
Similar to the DBB approach:
As per the D&C model, and
As per D&C
DCM contractor retains
maintain (DCM)
also maintenance risk for the
responsibility for some
Scope definition
term and scope of the
Maintenance costs are
lifecycle maintenance, so
Contractor retains
maintenance contract.
paid periodically by WCC
these models suit projects
responsibility for
Scope changes
Effective risk transfer can be
and/or GWRC. Incentive
where there is:
maintenance, but typically
Site conditions
limited by the lack of private
arrangements and
these models do not extend
finance at risk.
competitive tensions
Opportunity to introduce
beyond the first major
Cultural and heritage
during the original bid
D&C innovation on a
lifecycle phase (5 to 7 years,
risks
phase can drive the DCM
whole-of-life basis
depending on the project).
contractor to provide
Operational risks
some reduced
Need to create longer
term alignment of
Residual ownership and
maintenance costs,
asset performance risks
although this will depend
interests between the
beyond the term and
on the relative value of
contractor and the owner
scope of the maintenance
the maintenance works
Desire for a different risk
contract.
and the D&C component.
allocation.
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Model description
Project Partners’ risks
Contractor’s risks
Payment mechanism
Use
Early Contractor
All risks retained
D&C types of risks accepted
During the design
The ECI model has been
Involvement (ECI)
exclusively by the Project
by ECI contractor following
development phase, the
used when cost, risks and
Partners during
agreement on D&C.
ECI contractor is
scope cannot be
Typically, the preferred
development and
reimbursed at agreed
sufficiently defined
contractor (ECI contractor) is
definition phase
rates on a time basis.
upfront and where there
selected under open
are opportunities to
competition for a whole of
When the ECI converts to
Based on preliminary
access contractor
project contract (ie including
a D&C, the risk allocation
design and draft
innovation in design and
design development, design
profile is as per the D&C
construction contract, the
development.
and construction).
contract, including whole-
contractor prepares a
of-life ownership and
fixed price to undertake
ECI should reduce
Typically, agreements are
operational risks
construction. Price is
opportunity for successful
staged, and a D&C contract is
prepared on an open book
claims and variations
entered into with the ECI
However, these risks
basis utilising standard
compared with D&C only
contractor following the
would likely be lower as
rates and margins
if the risk allocation of the
detailed definition phase.
major D&C risks should
originally bid by the
underlying D&C is
have been dealt with
contractor. This price may
different. This reflects the
A further contract would
during the development
then be market tested.
ECI’s involvement during
likely then be entered into to
and definition phase.
development, better
provide maintenance and
The Project Partners
understanding of the
(potentially) operations
would engage an external
Project Partners’
services.
auditor to verify the price
requirements and project
prepared prior to fixing in
risks and more clearly
the D&C contract.
defined allocation of
Payments are made
responsibilities and risks.
similar to the D&C
arrangement.
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Model description
Project Partners’ risks
Contractor’s risks
Payment mechanism
Use
Alliance
Alliances are predicated on ‘no blame’ and collective
Non-owner parties are
Typically used in high risk
assumption of all project risk basis (ie parties share ‘pain’).
typically guaranteed
projects where it is
An Alliance relationship is
reimbursement of their
difficult to effectively
formed between key project
The Project Partners share the risks during the D&C phase
direct project costs and
define and transfer risk
participants, which include
with the Alliance participants. The extent of the Alliance
payment of corporate
and there is uncertainty
the Project Partners and non-
participants’ financial exposure to adverse risk outcomes
overheads in an open-
around scope definition,
owner participants (eg
depends on specified sharing arrangements but is
book arrangement.
design complexity,
designer, constructor, other
generally limited to their margin (corporate overhead and
delivery complexity, and
key stakeholders, etc). The
profit). The Project Partners remain fully exposed to the
Targets for cost, schedule
complex interfaces which
relationship must be
underlying project procurement costs, including the
and other key result areas
will influence design and
collaborative for the Alliance
resultant costs of the occurrence of all project risks.
are developed jointly
construction outcomes.
to be effective.
during pre-construction
All asset ownership and whole of life risks are retained by
phase. If actual delivery
The model provides early
Options are available to
the Project Partners.
is better than agreed
collaboration of the
develop the Target Outturn
Operational risks are retained by the Project Partners.
targets all participants
designer and contractor
Cost (TOC) in a competitive
share reward (‘gain-
in the project, providing
environment. However, most
share’). If delivery does
opportunities to access
alliances have tended to use a
not meet agreed targets, a
construction expertise in
single party to develop the
pre-agreed ‘pain-share’
the development of the
TOC. This relies on the owner
formula applies (where
design, definition and
implementing approaches
the margins of non-owner
construction
that create appropriate cost,
participants will be at
programming.
quality and scope tensions,
risk).
and the right level of expertise
to critically validate the TOC,
Construction and other
including risk quantification.
costs are paid over the
course of the construction
A further contract would
period on the basis of
likely then be entered into to
reimbursement of cost
provide maintenance and
incurred (monthly).
(potentially) operations
services.
A key feature of Alliances is
the gain share pain share
incentive mechanism.
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Model description
Project Partners’ risks
Contractor’s risks
Payment mechanism
Use
Public Private
Some risks are common to the Majority of D&C and
The Project Partners
Where there is a clear
Partnership (PPP)
DBB/D&C models including:
maintenance risks on a
make service payments
measurable service output
whole-of-life basis are
once the project delivers
against which
Generally, a private sector
site conditions (possibly)
transferred to a private
the services at the
performance can be
contractor (or contractor
sector consortium, which
required standard (ie post
measured.
consortium) is responsible for cultural and heritage.
has full ownership risk
commissioning).
the design, construction,
Additional risks include:
over the assets. (No
Consortium pays D&C
Where there are
operation, maintenance and
service, no payment;
sub-contractors during
opportunities for
finance of the infrastructure
transfer back risk
substandard service,
construction through
significant effective risk
over an extended period
reduced payment).
private financing, which is
transfer to the private
(typically 25-30 years).
market changes that
sector (including D&C
cannot be adapted to due
subsequently repaid to
Private sector consortium
consortium from the
and whole-of-life risks).
This is a typical long-term,
to the long term PPP
has full exposure (of all its
Project Partners’ service
whole-of-life approach to
contract.
capital invested) to
Where there is
payments over the term of
infrastructure delivery.
opportunity for private
The Project Partners will only
consequences of design,
the contract.
construction and
sector innovation in any
Risk allocation is determined
bear the risk that is
maintenance judgments
or all aspects of the
The payment mechanism
up front for the period of the
specifically allocated to the
and trade-offs over the
links with a key
project (D&C, finance,
contract, including
individual organisation. This
life of the project.
performance indicator
O&M) to add value.
maintaining the
means that all unspecified
(KPI) and service
infrastructure and providing
risks are borne by the private
Where benefits can be
specifications regime and
the services to a pre agreed
sector consortium.
realised through a whole-
provides for reduced
condition for the duration of
of-life approach to design
payments for poor
the concession.
and costing, ie there is a
performance or lack of
strong connection
Risk transfer, bundling of
availability during the
between the specific
whole-of-life costs and
concession.
design, construction
incentives from having private
materials and the level
In theory, the PPP model
finance at risk can drive
could involve the
and type of maintenance
increased innovation.
consortium assuming
costs.
patronage risk (eg having
payments linked to the
number of PT users).
However, there is
currently limited appetite
from private sector
financiers to take
‘patronage risk’ and it is
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Model description
Project Partners’ risks
Contractor’s risks
Payment mechanism
Use
even less likely in the
context of GWRC
managing the public
transport services.
Privatisation
Control over the
All risks rest with private
Negotiated through the sale
May be applicable to
infrastructure or land
party.
process.
certain small components
Full transfer of rights to the
transferred to the private
of the project only (eg
private sector through sale.
sector.
redevelopment of land
surrounding new stations,
Ability to ensure quality of
if this is currently owned).
service over the long-term
could be challenging.
Funds from any sale could
be used to offset the costs
of any of the other
procurement methods.
Public provision
All risks reside with the
N/A
N/A, as there is no
Not suitable as a full
individual Project Partners for
contractual party
procurement option, but may
This would involve direct
the segments they are
be used in conjunction with
provision from the Project
responsible for.
another method.
Partners.
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4.1.2 Components of providing the BRT infrastructure
Different procurement options are applicable to different elements of the project, and/or have a different
scope in terms of what is actually being procured.
Table 37 outlines the key components of the project and
where decisions in relation to procurement need to be considered. We then consider how the different
procurement options could be applied, in the context of these project components.
Table 37. Project components
Component
Description / considerations
Financing
Mixture of debt and equity
Public sector or private finance
Cost of funds versus risk transferred
Design:
Development of fully documented designs for the BRT routes and stations
concept designs and
preliminary design to the point where the BRT options could be
project briefs
traditionally tendered
detailed design
full design required to enable the BRT option to be constructed
Construction
The main construction contract for the BRT option
Facilities management
Maintenance and renewals of BRT infrastructure (eg kerbs, road space,
services including for
traffic lights, signage)
example:
Maintenance and renewals of the stops and/or stations
asset maintenance
Day to day cleaning of the stops and/or stations
cleaning
Ownership
While underlying ownership is not being ‘procured’ it is included here as a
component of the BRT project that may be subject to a transfer of rights or
obligations. This includes underlying land ownership and any BRT stations
developed etc.
4.1.3 How the procurement models might work in the context of
BRT infrastructure
Having introduced the various procurement models, and outlined the various project components, we
consider options for how the project might be procured by deploying a specific option or combination of
options.
For simplicity and pragmatism this is not an exhaustive list. We have outlined the likely combinations, and
benefits and issues with their application. We have also assumed for the moment that:
the primary client/contracting party would be the Project Partners (either as individual
organisations or a joint working group of the Project Partners with requisite delegated authorities)
post construction ownership of the BRT infrastructure would sit with the public sector
where the procurement model involves retention of management by one of the Project Partners,
this may be provided by a wholly owned and independently managed company or subsidiary
organisation
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the procurement relates only to the physical assets of the BRT options and excludes the purchase of
the high capacity buses.
Table 38. Option 1 – DBB based procurement
Core components
Detailed design and construction, but under separate,
covered
consecutive contracts
Financing
Public sector debt via normal public sector processes/channels
Concept design and project
Separate contracts between the Project Partners and professional service
brief
advisors (architects, quantity surveyors, engineering etc)
Facilities management
Facilities management provided via the relevant Project Partner
Underlying ownership
The relevant Project Partner(s)
Comments
This is a traditional (and generally the default) procurement approach.
Specialist design and construction contracts are awarded sequentially.
The design team is able to offer advice to the client that is independent
from the construction contractor, and may enable a more competitive
construction tender process as design documentation is complete.
However, there are increased risks that the Project Partners have to absorb
risks of disputes between the design and construction contractors.
The sequential nature of the procurement means it is typically more time
consuming relative to a D&C contract.
Separation of design from construction contracts may enable the Project
Partners to have greater interface in the design process putting less
pressure on a locked-down design specification. However, this would likely
push costs into the design process, and the design team may be removed
from the latest construction costs and develop designs that are not cost
effective.
As the management responsibilities are separated from design and
construction, there is very limited opportunity to incentivise the
management of whole-of-life project risks or to spur additional innovation.
Table 39. Option 2 – D&C based procurement
Core components
Detailed D&C
covered
Financing
Public sector debt via normal public sector processes/channels
Concept design and project
Separate contracts between the Project Partners and professional service
brief
advisors (architects, quantity surveyors, engineering etc)
Facilities management
Facilities management provided via the relevant Project Partner(s)
Underlying ownership
The relevant Project Partner(s)
Comments
This is a traditional procurement approach. Specialist expertise is deployed
for the various components of the project separately.
As the management responsibilities are separated from D&C and finance,
there is very limited opportunity to incentivise the management of whole-
of-life project risks, optimise risk transfer or to spur innovation.
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Table 40. Option 3 – DCM based procurement
Core components
Detailed D&C and asset maintenance for 5-7 years
covered
Financing
As for D&C
Concept design and project
As for D&C
brief
Facilities management
Asset management service provided under core contract for 5-7 years.
Underlying ownership
The relevant Project Partner(s)
Comments
Similar to the D&C contract but with maintenance arrangements (for a
period) included. This shifts some maintenance risks to the contractor,
providing some incentive to D&C assets with lower whole-of-life costs.
However, the relatively short timeframe of the maintenance contract limits
these risks. In addition, the contractor’s risk is essentially limited to the
value of the maintenance contract, meaning they may walk away from a
more serious failure in the asset’s performance.
Table 41. Option 4 – ECI based procurement
Core components
Concept design, detailed design and construction
covered
Financing
As for D&C
Facilities management
As for D&C
Underlying ownership
The relevant Project Partner(s)
Comments
Relative to the D&C model, the ECI model enables more upfront
involvement by the contractor in the design specification process. This can
help in accessing contractor innovation in design and development.
This model is generally suited to complex projects where the cost, risks and
scope are difficult to define upfront, making a standard construction tender
process difficult. This is unlikely to be the case in respect of the
construction components of the BRT project. Because of this, it is unlikely
that any advantages from early involvement in design would outweigh the
loss in competitive tension associated with the construction contract.
This model may also result in a different risk allocation if the contractor, by
being involved during the development stage, is in a better position to
understand the Project Partners’ requirements and the project risks. As a
consequence, this model can also reduce the opportunity for successful
claims and variations compared with D&C only
Table 42. Option 5 – Alliance based procurement
Core components
Concept design, detailed design and construction
covered
Financing
As for D&C
Facilities management
As for D&C
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Underlying ownership
The relevant Project Partner(s)
Comments
Similar to the ECI model, the Alliance model involves upfront involvement
by the contractor in the design specification process.
Under this model a total cost is determined and agreed upfront, and risks of
construction cost overruns (or savings) are shared between the Project
Partners and the contractor on an agreed (pain/gain) basis.
This model is also suited to complex projects where the cost, risks and
scope are difficult to define upfront, making a standard construction tender
process difficult. This includes projects such as large mass rapid transit
with significant tunnelling components, where the client either can't specify
what it wants or there are certain risks (technology, underground
conditions) that no one can really understand until they commence the
project.
This is unlikely to be the case in respect of the construction components of
the BRT project.
Alliance can be an expensive form of procurement with a low level of cost
control. In an Alliance, the client is agreeing to share construction risk with
the contractor. It is difficult to see why that might be appropriate in this
case, where the project is relatively simple and the Project Partners can get
a fixed price, turn-key contract.
Table 43. Option 6 – Availability PPP based procurement
Core components
Financing, detailed design, construction, facilities and asset
covered
management services including asset maintenance and cleaning
services over a 25 year period
Financing
Financing capital and facilities management cost is the responsibility of the
PPP consortium
Facilities management
Primarily the responsibility of the PPP consortium
Underlying ownership
The relevant Project Partner(s), though the asset is essentially transferred
to a PPP consortium via a lease or license for 25 years
Comments
Supplementary income for a PPP consortium, from associated commercial
opportunities, is highly unlikely to be sufficient to fully fund the BRT
project. This means any PPP consortium would need to be paid an annual
fee of some kind to provide services, subject to them being provided to
some agreed standard.
This approach has the advantage of shifting risk for asset maintenance and
renewals to the same private sector party responsible for the asset’s D&C.
This incentivises the consortium to apply a whole-of-life cost approach to
D&C. It also encourages innovation that will drive cost effectiveness, as the
consortium will share in these benefits. With financial penalties for non-
performance and the equity and debt investment at stake, there is also
significant incentive to meet performance standards.
The PPP consortium takes D&C, maintenance and lifecycle risks for the life
of the project. Maintenance and lifecycle costs are significant costs that can
be difficult to predict, and can drive cost issues for a significant number of
projects.
In addition, as the Project Partners specify outcomes or outputs, the PPP
consortium takes D&C risk based on this specification rather than a design
put forth by the Project Partners. So, for instance, if it turns out that some
key performance metric is not met, then the Project Partner(s) can reduce
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payments until such time as it has been remedied. This could mean that the
consortium would need to invest additional funds for which they will not be
repaid. The opposite applies under a traditional procurement ECI and
Alliance models.
Finally, the consortium takes all risks of cost overruns. Given the amount of
their debt and equity in the project they will be incentivised to scope and
manage the project to ensure it is on time and on budget.
Private sector cost of capital will be higher than public sector cost of capital
as it will be based on the risk profile of the investment rather than on
government or council borrowing rates. There will also be PPP specific
costs. PPP seeks to offset this higher cost via savings achieved through
innovation and allocating risks to the party best placed to manage them.
While a PPP might have a number of advantages, its applicability as a
procurement option for the BRT project is questionable. A PPP is a
complex procurement method. It can take longer to implement than a D&C
approach and involve significant transaction costs for the private sector
bidders and the procuring agency.
4.1.4 Procurement model evaluation and discussion
Table 44 summarises the suitability of each of the procurement options considered above.
Table 44. Feasibility and suitability of different procurement options
Option
Comment
Feasibility /
suitability
DBB
Traditional procurement model. Widely recognised and understood. Yes
Commonly used for this type of project.
D&C
Traditional procurement model. Widely recognised and understood. Yes
Commonly used for this type of project.
DCM
Less common than above models, but still well understood and
Yes
applicable to this type of construction project.
ECI
Generally suited to complex projects where the cost, risks and scope Unlikely
are difficult to define upfront, making a standard construction
tender process difficult. This is a reasonably standard construction
project, meaning ECI is unlikely to be suitable for the construction
components of this proposal.
Alliance
Suited to complex projects where the cost, risks and scope are
Unlikely
difficult to define upfront, making a standard construction tender
process difficult. This is a reasonably standard construction project
meaning Alliance is unlikely to be suitable for the construction
components of this proposal.
Availability
This procurement method is being established in the New Zealand
Unlikely
PPP
market. BRT will be a relatively small and reasonably
uncomplicated construction project. The value of using PPP
procurement for BRT will need careful consideration.
The most appropriate procurement model for BRT will be determined in the detailed business case.
Factors that will impact the assessment of the procurement approach will include:
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Implementing BRT could be relatively straight forward with well-defined objectives and tangible
outcomes. There might be few identifiable factors that would of themselves suggest a change from a
traditional procurement model.
The BRT project is likely to be funded through standard methods by the Project Partners.
The BRT project is not overly complex. Costs, risks and scope can be well defined. Traditional
models fare better in these situations, and there are not likely to be factors which would prohibit
traditional models from being applied.
There are three Project Partners. However, this can be well managed as roles and responsibilities
are clearly defined, for example continuing existing policy delineating local roads, state highways
and PT operations. The BRT project should be able to follow existing policy.
The cost of designing and constructing the BRT infrastructure will vary considerably depending on
the preferred option chosen. Option 3 is a low cost for an infrastructure project. Option 5 is far
more substantial and expensive.
The practicalities, or otherwise, of bundling the design and construction of the BRT infrastructure
with the delivery of BRT services (and allied services as appropriate).
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4.1.5 Evaluation criteria
Table 45 sets out a range of evaluation criteria which are typically used when selecting a procurement
model and could be applied in any subsequent DBC. We would expect that a working group could
determine if weights are appropriate for the criteria and the value of the weights.
Table 45. Possible evaluation criteria for procurement options in a DBC
Criteria
Comments
Rationale
Cost
Ensuring achievement of efficient pricing
Ensuring tension in the market, given
competitiveness/
through a competitive procurement
the predicted resource scarcity in the
Value-for-Money
process, but also maximising the chances
medium term
of private finance
Time and
Ability of procurement model to meet
Need to provide a strong and early
establishment
construction deadlines.
market signal of progress
Flexibility/
Ability to deliver a project that will meet
Ensuring the project is completed on
control
the need for a design that integrates with
time but dynamic as the situation and
the surrounding areas
scenario may change (eg timeframe
for the Basin development is not
confirmed at this stage)
Risk transfer and
Ability to deliver a project that will meet
cost certainty
public transport objectives
Innovation/
Effectiveness of model at transferring risk
Ensuring the BRT project is funded
opportunity
from the Project Partners, through design, and the likelihood of cost overruns is
construction and building life, enabling
minimised
greater certainty of costs
4.2 Commercial development opportunities
There is the opportunity to develop BRT station infrastructure along the Central spine, Newtown and/or
Kilbirnie branches and recover costs from the project from future developments.
New BRT infrastructure can be aligned to a broader urban redevelopment programme. Capital injected
into a new, high quality BRT station can spur a wider programme of urban development on the land
surrounding the station, with new retail and commercial space being developed (privately). A key driver of
this activity is the increased foot-traffic around the station. Retailers meet the needs of users of the BRT
stops and as a result, there can be increased commercial activity in the area. Britomart station, in Auckland,
is an example, albeit at a different scale. The land surrounding Britomart station has been extensively
redeveloped into a vibrant centre over the last decade, since the station opened.
Two areas are prime targets for redevelopment along the proposed BRT route. The existing Wellington
Railway Station and Kilbirnie town centre, and the surrounding local areas, have been identified as areas
for revitalisation and redevelopment. This could occur after leading BRT infrastructure is put in place.
There are opportunities to recover some of the BRT infrastructure costs via future activity around the
station (eg air rights, targeted rates) as businesses will benefit from the increase in pedestrian activity in the
area. This could be one way to bridge the funding gap.
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5. Management case
5.1 Integration with other corridor projects
As discussed in the strategic case, the physical BRT infrastructure considered in this IBC is just one element
of the full BRT solution proposed for Wellington’s PT Spine. The other elements include:
the introduction of high-capacity buses (including the removal of trolley buses)
integrated fares and ticketing
operational and user technology improvements
roading improvements that BRT will leverage off, such as the Basin Bridge and Mt Victoria tunnel
duplication.
These other elements are currently subject to their own assessment and implementation processes.
In addition, there are a number of other projects proposed for the PT Spine, and the wider Ngauranga to
Airport corridor. These include:
other roading improvements
the addition of new of cycle infrastructure, and enhancement of existing infrastructure, including
along Adelaide Road and Kent and Cambridge Terraces
possible stormwater improvements along Kent and Cambridge Terraces.
5.1.1 Sequencing and programming
There are a number of important dependencies amongst these projects. Furthermore, in some cases
multiple projects involve physical works on the same piece of road. In order to ensure the most efficient
delivery and implementation of these projects, it will be important to ensure that there is effective
coordination between the various project teams. The project teams will need to work together to develop
an optimal approach to sequencing and integrating the implementation of this suite of projects.
To this end, GWRC, WCC and the Transport Agency have recently appointed an external consultant to lead
a coordination workstream for the Ngauranga to Airport corridor projects. The purpose of the workstream
is to develop a plan for sequencing and programming the implementation of each project, and ensuring
good coordination between the teams where appropriate. Representatives from the BRT project are part of
this workstream.
At the moment, it is sufficient for BRT to be part of this sequencing and programming workstream.
However the exact sequencing of BRT with other projects, and any coordination of delivery, will need to be
determined during any subsequent DBC.
We note that some elements of the physical BRT infrastructure are dependent on the RONS projects. In
particular, the Kilbirnie branch of BRT cannot be constructed without the successful duplication of the Mt
Victoria tunnel (and associated widening of Ruahine St), and that tunnel duplication will not occur without
the Basin Bridge or a solution of similar effectiveness. In addition, while the Newtown branch can be
implemented without the RONS, journey time savings will only be maximised when travel around the Basin
Reserve can occur without material congestion.
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5.1.2 Coordination of delivery
Aside for the sequencing issues discussed above, it is possible for the physical BRT infrastructure to be
delivered separately of the other projects, or combined with others. Below we set out three possible
approaches to delivering BRT with and without other projects. In our view, all of these approaches are
possible in practice.
The preferred approach will be selected during the DBC. We expect that the merits of each approach may
depend on the outcomes of the sequencing and programming workstream discussed above. In particular,
whether it makes sense to combine delivery of BRT with another project is likely to be dependent on what
other projects are being delivered at around the same time.
Note that we do not consider it appropriate to split up the design of the BRT solution, only the delivery. It
seems preferable to design the full BRT solution together, regardless of how it is delivered. We also note
that integrated designs for all models along a particular part of the route may be the most effective
approach. For example, designing BRT and cycling improvements along Kent and Cambridge Terraces
seems likely to be more effective than designing them in isolation.
1. Deliver BRT all together in one go by itself
This the simplest approach. The physical BRT infrastructure is consented in one go. It is then procured
and delivered in one go, with no explicit integration of delivery with other projects.
2. Deliver BRT in separate pieces
This approach is useful if staging the implementation of the physical BRT infrastructure is desired – eg to
do the most congested areas first, or to do the areas not dependent on the RONS projects first.
The physical BRT infrastructure would be delivered in stages. For example, the Golden Mile could be
delivered first, then Kent and Cambridge Terraces, and the Newtown and Kilbirnie branches at later dates.
The separate stages would be separately procured and delivered.
The consenting could still all be done in one go, as in approach #1. Alternatively, separate consents could
be obtained for each stage.
3. Deliver BRT in separate pieces, with some pieces combined with other projects
As in approach #2, BRT could be delivered in stages. But under this approach, some elements of the BRT
infrastructure are procured and delivered with other projects.
For example, the implementation of dedicated bus lanes along Kent and Cambridge Terraces could be done
at the same time as additional cycling infrastructure is added. Both involve physical changes to the road,
and it may be more efficient to deliver both sets of changes together. At this early stage, combining the
delivery of BRT with the delivery of cycling infrastructure seems like a very useful idea. They are
complementary projects, and could involve the efficient delivery of a multi-modal improvement to large
parts of the BRT route.
Another possibility is combining the widening of Ruahine St, to be undertaken as part of the RONS project,
with the creation of dedicated bus lanes.
The consents for each project could be obtained separately. Alternatively the consenting processes for each
project could be combined.
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5.2 Next steps for delivery of BRT
5.2.1 Next assessment phase
Detailed business case phase
As discussed in the strategic case, this IBC is one stage in the assessment process for BRT. In particular,
the key roles of the IBC are to provide the strategic rationale for BRT, and an
indicative assessment of the
economics of a range of options. The aim is to reduce the number of options, so that the more detailed
work can concentrate on a smaller set of possible options.
The BRT IBC is midway through the Transport Agency’s Business Case Approach, as shown i
n Figure 7.
Figure 7. Transport Agency business case approach
BRT next stage is
BRT is here
here
Point of Entry
Strategic case
Programme
Indicative
Detailed
Implement
Business Case
Business Case
Business Case
• Low cost and
• 1a strategic
• Identify
• Individual
brief in nature
• Detailed
assessment,
programme of
activities are
analysis of
problem
• Detailed
work and
progressed
•
costs, risks, and
Decision to
definition,
planning and
activities that
benefits
enter BCA
identify
design
deliver benefits
• Strategic case
undertaken on
process
benefits
revisited –
the preferred
•
• Property
Identify
does it fit?
•
option
1b strategic
acquisition
alternatives
context
• Preferred
• Design and
•
• Consents and
Evidence
option(s)
•
assessment
2 Funding
designations
collection and
identified
advanced,
application to
technical
through
informed by
proceed
• Construct and
reporting
assessment
technical
operate
reports
Key items not undertaken at the IBC stage, that must be completed in the DBC phase, are:
concept and preliminary design and optimisation of BRT options
detailed transport modelling, and identification of wider effects, of BRT options
fully quantifying all the costs and benefits of the BRT options
detailed development of the financial requirements, the funding, procurement and management
plans, and the consenting and property strategies.
The Transport Agency’s business case approval process (based on the Treasury’s Better Business Cases)
requires a DBC to be undertaken, after this IBC, before any funding can be approved.
A key decision is whether the different elements of the detailed assessment should be undertaken together
or separately. The entire DBC, including all the design work and estimation of effects, could be procured
and undertaken as one project. This would likely require a consortium of providers, to fully cover all the
required capabilities. Alternatively, it could be split into multiple pieces and undertaken in stages using
specialist resources as needed – the detailed design of options could be undertaken as a first step, followed
by detailed transport modelling and effects estimation of those options, and then finally the DBC document
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itself could be developed using the outcomes of the first two steps as inputs to the business case
development process.
It is recommended that a staged delivery model, but one which encompasses or references as much of the
wider BRT solution as possible to maintain integration of all the elements that make up the BRT solution.
The DBC stage will follow a series of steps.
Figure 8 shows two key inputs into a DBC and what subsequent
steps the stage will cover after that. The DBC phase will be complete once public consultation feedback has
been collated, reviewed and incorporated, and final approvals complete.
Figure 8. Potential stages for a detailed business case phase
Preliminary Design
for infrastructure
elements (includes
network effects
modelling, costs)
Develop
Make changes and
Scoping and
detailed
Public
End of
Decision
update detailed
procurement
business
consultation
stage
business case
BRT detailed
case
operating and
service delivery
model
Other BRT elements are sequenced and progressively delivered and transitioned
Continuous stakeholder engagement (integrated with PT Transformation and Ngauranga to Airport communications)
The following deliverables are in-scope for the detailed business case phase.
a detailed scoping step
a physical solution design (for one or more preferred roading options) and costs for road layout,
stop/stations/interchanges
detailed network effects traffic and intersection modelling to support option selection
preferred intersection priorities
detailed Impacts identified and assessed including any land requirements confirmed, detailed
impacts on general traffic, impact on parking, impact on walking
safety requirements and assessment
a wrap-around detailed business case, updated again after formal public consultation,
a BRT operating and service delivery model, detailed business requirements
continuous stakeholder engagement and communications
formal public consultation
approvals
consenting strategy confirmed, delivery strategy, next steps
construction sequencing within wider transports activities.
It is estimated that the DBC phase could take up to approximately 12-15 months, and cost in the order of
$1.5m. A high-level breakdown of costs is shown i
n Table 46. This price includes costs for carrying out one
geometric design, on options 3 and 4, as the roading design is the same on both options, but with network
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traffic modelling and detailed economic modelling undertaken for variants of both options. A detailed
scoping step at the beginning of the phase will refine the detailed scope.
Table 46.
Potential cost of a detailed business case phase
Work unit / activity
Potential cost ($)
1
Problem definition and option development.
750,000
Includes: detailed scoping, procurement,
transport assessments modelling and
economic assessments, model interpretations
and reporting, peer review.
2
Readiness and assurance.
750,000
Includes: stakeholder engagement and public
consultation, business case development,
peer reviewing, delivery stage planning.
Total cost
1,500,000
Governance arrangements
This project comes under the wider scope of the Ngauranga to Airport corridor programme, and its
governance arrangements. These arrangements have worked well to date. This IBC is being jointly run by
the Project Partners, with the Transport Agency acting as the host agency. Representatives from each
organisation have been part of the BRT Working Group established to develop the IBC.
At this time, we see no reason to change these governance arrangements for any subsequent stage in the
assessment process. We consider that the only reason why a change should be considered is if there are
changes to the overarching Ngauranga to Airport corridor programme governance, and that this makes the
current arrangements difficult to continue.
5.2.2 Implementation
The DBC management case will develop a detailed plan for implementing BRT. In addition to the potential
coordination with other projects discussed above, this plan will need to include details regarding
consenting, timing, procurement, and construction/delivery.
This plan will also need to address resourcing. We recommend that a project implementation team be
established, either within one of the project partners or as a multi-entity team, and tasked with ensuring
the successful delivery of the physical BRT infrastructure (including integration with other elements of the
wider BRT solution). The DBC will develop the details of what that team should look like. Responsibility
for ongoing maintenance of the infrastructure will also need to be determined.
After the DBC is confirmed the project would then move into the consenting phase for which detailed
designs would be drawn up. These would also inform construction stages. These stages are often called
pre-implementation and implementation phases and come after the detailed business case phase.
Figure 9 below shows future phases once the detailed business case is confirmed. The process starts at the
resource consenting step and once complete moves through to detailed design. Traditionally procurement
and construction follow. Once all pieces are implemented the BRT solution is complete. A sequenced and
integrated approach to implementation is likely.
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Figure 9. Potential phases following a detailed business case phase
Resource
Detailed
consent
infrastructure
BRT
where
Procurement
Phased / sequenced construction
design, and detailed
complete
required
planning
Other BRT elements are sequenced and progressively delivered and transitioned
Continuous stakeholder engagement (integrated with PT Transformation and Ngauranga to Airport communications)
5.2.3 Important dates
It is too early to develop even an indicative timeline for delivery of a BRT solution. In particular, the timing
will depend on (i) the option (including delivery timing) which is ultimately chosen during any subsequent
DBC, and (ii) the outcomes of the Ngauranga to Airport corridor programming and sequencing
workstream.
Key dates of the delivery of the DBC are:
Q1 FY16 – Q1 FY17: BRT Detailed Business Case phase.
Q1 FY17: BRT Detailed Business Case presented to the Transport Agency, GWRC, and WCC for
approval/support and agreement to proceed to pre-implementation/implementation.
Other dates and time periods which will be important will become apparent when the timeline is
determined during any subsequent DBC. These include the following:
As discussed above, we expect that any subsequent DBC would take approximately 12-15 months.
There would be an approval process for each of the funding organisations immediately afterwards,
the length for which is difficult to predict.
As discussed above, elements of the project are dependent on successful completion of the RONS
projects in the Basin Reserve and Mt Victoria areas. The ultimate timing for the construction of the
Newtown and Kilbirnie branches will be dependent on the timing of the RONS.
As discussed in the financial case, the NLTP 2015-18 includes two BRT related activities, including
a BRT implementation plan beginning 2015-18 (intended to provide for the DBC phase).
5.3 Project risks
Table 47 sets out an initial risk assessment for implementing BRT.
Table 47. Initial assessment of project risks
Risk description
Mitigation activity
Approval phase
Failure to provide a convincing business case for Development of a robust IBC and DBC,
a BRT solution
including independent quality assurance
Robust identification of key network effects
Failure to convince the Wellington public of the
need for BRT
Development and delivery of a stakeholder
engagement and communication plan
Lack of political alignment and governance
Failure to secure Transport Agency funding /
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approval from councils
Failure to get resource and other consents as
necessary
Failure to adequately identify important effects
(eg traffic, transport, network)
Delivery phase
Inability to physically implement the option
Physical constraints of specific options
chosen
identified during detailed design stage
Preferred option(s) optimised at DBC to ensure
Inability to achieve sufficient land take without
deliverability
resorting to compulsory acquisition
Insufficient management capability to deliver
Current project team to ensure management
the project
capability is retained for subsequent processes
Many of these risks could lead to BRT not being fully delivered. However, in our view these should be able
to be adequately managed.
We do not consider that any of these risks should stop BRT proceeding to a DBC phase. However, ensuring
these (and any other identified) risks remain sufficiently mitigated will be a key component of the DBC
management case.
5.4 Monitoring achievement of benefits
The ILM workshop developed a number of KPIs for BRT. The intention is that KPIs will be used, following
the implementation of BRT, to assess whether BRT is achieving the desired benefits.
The KPIs developed at the workshop have been further refined to make them more specific to the BRT
investment. These KPIs are set out i
n Figure 10 below. These KPIs will be refined during any subsequent
DBC.
These KPIs can all provide reasonable evidence for whether the benefits are being achieved. They are all
readily measurable. In most cases they are also able to be measured such that the results can be largely
attributed to BRT. However, for the last two KPIs, it will difficult to completely attribute changes in land
use and population to PT improvements, given the various other developments which will occur along the
PT Spine over the same time period.
Figure 10 also shows the expected level of benefit from Options 3 and 4, for each KPI. For some KPIs, we
have information from the PTSS and the economic case which allows us to state the expected benefit from
these options. For others, we expect some benefit, but sufficient analysis has not been undertaken to be
able to articulate the magnitude of that benefit – this will occur at a DBC phase.
During a DBC phase, we expect that targets and baseline levels would be developed for each KPI. The
measures used would also be specified at a more detailed level. The expected levels of benefit, which will be
re-estimated at a DBC phase, would likely inform the choice of target.
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Figure 10.
Possible KPIs, and expected outcomes for Options 3 and 4
Anticipated level of benefit
Benefit
Possible KPI
Measure
from Options 3 and 4
Average bus travel time savings,
for peak trips from Newtown and
Improved PT travel time and
Kilbirnie, of 4.5 mins (Option 3) to
Improved
travel time reliability along the
Bus travel time data
6.5 mins (Option 4);
road and PT
PT Spine
Significant reduction in variability
network
of bus travel times
Increased corridor carrying
efficiency
Bus and private vehicle
capacity in peak periods along
capacity analysis
the PT Spine
Material increase in corridor
carrying capacity
Bus passenger, private
Increase in PT mode share, for
Higher PT mode share along
vehicle, and active travel
peak trips from Southern &
the PT Spine
Increased bus
counts
Eastern suburbs, of 1%-2%
patronage
Reduced PT operating cost per
Reduction in annual bus operating
passenger, for PT services
Bus operating costs
costs in 2031 of $2.9m (Option 3)
along the PT Spine
to $4.6m (Option 4)
Increase in customer
Customer survey
Material improvement in
satisfaction for existing users of
Improved bus
responses
satisfaction
bus routes along the PT Spine
user
experience
Increase in the ease of use of
Customer survey
Material improvement in ease of
bus services
responses
use
Material increase in land values;
Increased
Higher value land-use along the
Market land values; type
change in land use to alternative
economic
PT Spine corridor
of land use
uses
activity in
proximity to
Increased residential
Census population
the PT Spine
population along the PT Spine
counts, and other
Material increase in population
corridor
population estimates
In general, Options 3 and 4 (those considered most appropriate for further consideration) are expected to
address the current problems with Wellington's transport network, where buses compete with general
traffic and other buses along already congested corridors. Options 3 and 4 are expected to provide faster
bus travel times, improve travel time reliability, and increase the corridor carrying capacity along the PT
Spine by dedicating more road space to buses. Improved PT travel speeds and reliability will encourage
more people onto PT, helping grow patronage and increasing PT mode share. Options 3 and 4 are also
expected to improve PT customer satisfaction, primarily through improvements in reliability.
Options 3 and 4 are also expected to induce land use change along the PT Spine corridor. Improved
accessibility between Newtown and the CBD, as well as Kilbirnie and the CBD, is likely to draw people and
businesses to the area and along the PT Spine corridor. Options 3 and 4 would likely produce a smaller
effect than option 5 in this respect, but some change is expected.
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5.5 Conclusions
There are a number of projects along the PT Spine and wider Ngauranga to Airport corridor that the BRT
project needs to coordinate and integrate with. A separate workstream is currently underway, developing a
sequencing and programming plan for all the corridor projects. At the moment, it makes sense for the BRT
project team to continue to report through to this programme. However during any subsequent DBC the
specifics around timing and integration with other projects will need to be determined.
The physical BRT infrastructure could be delivered as a single project or in multiple stages. It could also be
combined with the delivery of other projects in the same location, including potentially combining the
consenting processes. There are a number of potential benefits from both staging the implementation and
combining it with other projects.
There are a number of project risks, many of which could lead to BRT not being fully delivered. However,
these should be able to be adequately managed.
There is nothing in terms of delivery which, at this stage, appears prohibitively difficult or likely to suggest
that this project should not proceed. There is nothing in this management case which suggests that the
next stage of more detailed assessment should not be undertaken.
The next step in the assessment process is a DBC. Key items not undertaken at the IBC stage include:
detailed design and optimisation of BRT options; detailed transport modelling of all options; fully
quantifying all the costs and benefits for all options (including peer review); and detailed development of
the financial requirements, and the funding, procurement and management plans. These will all be part of
a DBC.
A key decision to be made before any DBC begins is whether the different elements of the detailed
assessment are to be undertaken together or separately. The entire DBC, including all the design work,
could be procured and undertaken as one project. Alternatively, it could be split into multiple pieces and
undertaken in stages.
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Next steps
This IBC provides support for more detailed analysis of BRT to be undertaken in a detailed business case.
The economic analysis suggests that the options which are most appropriate for further consideration are
Options 3 and 4.
The majority of the travel time benefits can be achieved by providing additional priority to buses at
and around key intersections along the route. The economic analysis has shown that a more
targeted approach to BRT, than envisaged by the PTSS, could provide a more cost effective
improvement to bus services along the PT Spine.
Options 3 and 4 have indicative BCRs of 2.3 and 1.5. These are relatively high for a PT project. The
roadspace dedication of Option 3 could also be combined with the intersection priority of Option 4
to deliver even greater benefits.
It is possible to ultimately implement a solution which has elements of both Options 3 and 4. It is
also possible to implement Option 3 initially, and then move towards Option 4 over time.
Furthermore, nothing in the financial, commercial or management cases has indicated that a DBC should
not proceed. There are a number of items that will need to be addressed at that stage, such as approval of
funding, determining the appropriate sequencing and coordination with other projects, and determining a
procurement strategy. However none of these are sufficiently problematic that a DBC should not proceed.
Finding a solution to conflicting transport demands at the Basin Reserve is critical to the ability to
implement a high-quality BRT system. Without such a solution, the benefits yielded from duplicating the
Mt Victoria tunnel will likely be considerably lower, and the Kilbirnie branch of the proposed BRT solution
will not be able to offer the same benefits as envisaged with the RONS projects in place – and this reduces
the economic viability of the project considerably. We understand that the Transport Agency is committed
to finding such a solution, and it is recommended that the BRT project continue to proceed on that basis
(with additional consideration given during a DBC).
A DBC for BRT is recommended – of Options 3 and 4, or a combination of both, or Option 3
moving to Option 4 at a later date.
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Appendix A Investment Logic
Map
Figure 11 presents the ILM map from the ILM workshop held on 30 March 2015. This workshop was used
to develop the problem definitions, the desired benefits of BRT, and possible KPIs for the investment, as
discussed above in the Case for change section.
Figure 11.
ILM map
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Appendix B Options description
This appendix provides a detailed description of the options.
Option 1 – Improved bus priority and other modes
improvement
Description of option
This option is based on a detailed possible plan recently developed by WCC, for bus priority improvements
along the Central and Newtown branches.
Key points
Provides for additional bus lanes along the Central spine and Newtown branch. No additional bus
lanes are developed along the Kilbirnie branch.
Provides signal priority for buses at a greater number of intersections along the route. Priority will
occur through the ‘B phase’ method.
Improvements are also made to cycle infrastructure along the route.
Specific details
Where no bus lane currently exists, either general traffic lanes or on-street parking will be
converted to bus lanes.
Additional bus lanes will be located on the outside of the roadway.
Specifics for each road section:
o Railway Station to Courtenay Place:
shared bus lanes (both directions)
no general traffic lanes along southern Lambton Quay, Willis St and Manners St
some removal of parking on Courtenay Place
o Kent/Cambridge Terraces:
dedicated bus lanes (both directions)
additional cycling infrastructure on median
o Basin Reserve:
dedicated bus lanes (both directions)
assumes no Basin Bridge or similar RONS solution
additional cycling infrastructure through Basin Reserve
o Adelaide Rd to Riddiford St:
dedicated bus lanes (both directions)
separated cycle lanes (both directions)
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Other features
Cycles and taxis will be able to use some of the bus lanes, with details to be determined on a road-
by-road basis later.
Some additional lanes will only operate at certain periods, depending on inter-peak congestion
levels.
High-capacity buses will run at a frequency necessary to cater for demand and growth, as assumed
in the reference case.
Bus services can continue to other destinations on local roads.
Additional lanes implemented immediately (currently modelled as 2019).
Variants
As this option is designed to reflect a possible option developed by WCC, no alternative variants are
considered.
Option 2 – Bus lanes along the whole route, at peak
periods, with limited intersection priority
Key points
Provides for dedicated bus lanes along the Central spine, and Newtown and Kilbirnie branches.
These lanes would only operate at peak periods.
Buses will get signal priority over general traffic at intersections at peak periods. This will occur
through the ‘B phase’ method.
Specific details
Where no dedicated bus lane currently exists, either general traffic lanes or on-street parking space
will be converted to bus lanes at peak periods.
Exact location of lanes within the roadspace to be determined at a later date. But given only peak
usage, likely to be on the outside of the roadway.
Possible specifics for each road section:
o Railway Station to Courtenay Place:
dedicated bus lanes (both directions) at peak times
no general traffic lanes along southern Lambton Quay, Willis St and Manners St;
these bus lanes operate 24/7
some removal of peak time parking on Courtenay Place
o Kent/Cambridge Terraces:
dedicated bus lanes (both directions) at peak times
some removal of peak time parking
o Basin Reserve:
assumes Basin Bridge or similar RONS solution (as per do minimum)
o Adelaide Rd to Riddiford St:
dedicated bus lanes (both directions)
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some removal of peak time parking
o Mt Victoria tunnel to Kilbirnie:
buses mix with general traffic in duplicate Mt Vic tunnel
dedicated bus lanes (both directions) at peak times, on Ruahine St; which is
already widened through the RONS work
dedicated bus lanes (both directions) at peak times, on Kilbirnie Cres
Other features
Cycles and taxis may be able to use some of the bus lanes, with details to be determined on a road-
by-road basis later.
High-capacity buses will run at a frequency necessary to cater for demand and growth, as assumed
in the reference case.
Bus services can continue to other destinations on local roads.
Variants based on timing
Along with the core option, 2 additional variants of this option are assessed, based on different timing of
implementation for each branch. These are shown in
Table 48.
Table 48. Variants for Option 2
Assumed timing
Core option
Option 2a
Option 2b
To coincide with
Central spine
Immediately
Immediately
completion of RONS
To coincide with
To coincide with
To coincide with
Newtown branch
completion of RONS
completion of RONS
completion of RONS
To coincide with
To coincide with
Kilbirnie branch
Never
completion of RONS
completion of RONS
Note: (1) ‘Immediately’ assumes it is completed prior to 2019. (2) The RONS are assumed to be completed
prior to 2025.
Option 3 – Bus lanes in targeted locations, 24/7, with
full intersection priority
Key points
Provides for some dedicated bus lanes in selected areas along the Central spine, and Newtown and
Kilbirnie branches. The areas selected will be based on targeting key congestion areas and key
intersections.
The specific areas for dedicated lanes will be determined later are detailed investigation of how
congestion varies along the route. Buses may mix with general traffic in other areas.
Buses will get signal priority over general traffic at intersections, except at intersections where
there is no dedicated lane immediately prior to the intersection. This will occur through the ‘B
phase’ method.
Specific details
Where no dedicated bus lane currently exists, general traffic lanes will be converted to bus lanes.
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Exact location of any dedicated lanes within the roadspace to be determined at a later date.
The exact location of the new bus lanes will be determined at a later date. But possible specifics for
each road section are:
o Railway Station to Courtenay Place:
dedicated bus lanes (both directions)
no general traffic lanes along southern Lambton Quay, Willis St and Manners St
some removal of peak time parking on Courtenay Place
o Kent/Cambridge Terraces:
dedicated bus lanes (both directions) either side of Vivian St intersection
some removal of parking around Vivian St
o Basin Reserve:
assumes Basin Bridge or similar RONS solution (as per do minimum)
dedicated bus lanes, with signal priority, at entrances from Adelaide Road and the
Mt Victoria tunnel
o Adelaide Rd to Riddiford St:
dedicated bus lanes (both directions) either side of the John St intersection
some removal of parking around John St
o Mt Victoria tunnel to Kilbirnie:
buses mix with general traffic in duplicate Mt Vic tunnel
dedicated bus lanes (both directions) at peak times, on Ruahine St; which is
already widened through the RONS work
restricted general traffic turning movements at Wellington St / Kilbirnie Cres
intersection
no bus lanes on Kilbirnie Cres
Other features
Cycles and taxis may be able to use some of the bus lanes, with details to be determined on a road-
by-road basis later.
Dedicated lanes could potentially only operate during the day. This can be determined at a later
date.
High-capacity buses will run at a frequency necessary to cater for demand and growth, as assumed
in the reference case.
Bus services can continue to other destinations on local roads.
Variants based on timing
Along with the core option, 2 additional variants of this option are assessed, based on different timing of
implementation for each branch. These are shown in
Table 49.
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Table 49. Variants for Option 3
Assumed timing
Core option
Option 3a
Option 3b
To coincide with
Central spine
Immediately
Immediately
completion of RONS
To coincide with
To coincide with
To coincide with
Newtown branch
completion of RONS
completion of RONS
completion of RONS
To coincide with
To coincide with
Kilbirnie branch
Never
completion of RONS
completion of RONS
Note: (1) ‘Immediately’ assumes it is completed prior to 2019. (2) The RONS are assumed to be completed
prior to 2025.
Option 4 – Bus lanes along the whole route, 24/7, with
full intersection priority
Key points
Provides for dedicated bus lanes along the Central spine, and Newtown and Kilbirnie branches.
These lanes would operate at all times.
Buses will get signal priority at intersections. This includes both pre-emption of signals before the
bus arrives at the intersection, and the extension of phases.
Specific details
Exact location of lanes within the roadspace to be determined at a later date.
Where no dedicated bus lane currently exists, general traffic lanes will be converted to bus lanes.
Possible specifics for each road section:
o Railway Station to Courtenay Place:
dedicated bus lanes (both directions)
no general traffic lanes along southern Lambton Quay, Willis St and Manners St
some removal of peak time parking on Courtenay Place
o Kent/Cambridge Terraces:
dedicated bus lanes (both directions)
some removal of parking
o Basin Reserve:
assumes Basin Bridge or similar RONS solution (as per do minimum)
o Adelaide Rd to Riddiford St:
dedicated bus lanes (both directions)
some removal of parking
o Mt Victoria tunnel to Kilbirnie:
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buses mix with general traffic in duplicate Mt Vic tunnel
dedicated bus lanes (both directions) at peak times, on Ruahine St; which is
already widened through the RONS work
dedicated bus lanes (both directions) at peak times, on Kilbirnie Cres
Other features
Cycles and taxis may be able to use some of the bus lanes, with details to be determined on a road-
by-road basis later.
Dedicated lanes could potentially only operate during the day. This can be determined at a later
date.
High-capacity buses will run at a frequency necessary to cater for demand and growth, as assumed
in the reference case.
Bus services can continue to other destinations on local roads.
Variants based on timing
Along with the core option, 4 additional variants of this option are assessed, based on different timing of
implementation for each branch. These are shown in
Table 50.
Table 50. Variants for Option 4
Assumed
Option 4
Option 4a
Option 4b
Option 4c
Option 4ac
timing
To coincide
Immediately
To coincide
Central
Immediately
with completion
Immediately
with completion
spine
of RONS
of RONS
To coincide
To coincide
To coincide
To coincide
To coincide
Newtown
with completion with completion with completion with completion with completion
branch
of RONS
of RONS
of RONS
of RONS
of RONS
To coincide
To coincide
To coincide
To coincide
Kilbirnie
with completion with completion
Never
with completion with completion
branch
of RONS
of RONS
of RONS
of RONS
Note: (1) ‘Immediately’ assumes it is completed prior to 2019. (2) The RONS are assumed to be completed
prior to 2025.
Option 5 – Physically separated bus lanes along the
whole route, 24/7, with full intersection priority
This option is designed to be, in effect, the PTSS BRT option.
Key points
Provides for dedicated bus lanes, physically separated from general traffic lanes, along the Central
spine, and Newtown and Kilbirnie branches. These lanes would operate at all times. Physical
separation will be through a small curb or median.
Buses will get signal priority at intersections. This includes both pre-emption of signals before the
bus arrives at the intersection, and the extension of phases.
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Specific details
Exact location of lanes within the roadspace to be determined at a later date.
Where no dedicated bus lane currently exists, general traffic lanes will be converted to bus lanes.
Possible specifics for each road section:
o Railway Station to Courtenay Place:
separated bus lanes (both directions)
no general traffic lanes along southern Lambton Quay, Willis St and Manners St
some removal of peak time parking on Courtenay Place
o Kent/Cambridge Terraces:
separated bus lanes (both directions)
some removal of parking
o Basin Reserve:
assumes Basin Bridge or similar RONS solution (as per do minimum)
o Adelaide Rd to Riddiford St:
separated bus lanes (both directions)
some removal of parking
o Mt Victoria tunnel to Kilbirnie:
buses mix with general traffic in duplicate Mt Vic tunnel
separated bus lanes (both directions) at peak times, on Ruahine St; which is
already widened through the RONS work
separated bus lanes (both directions) at peak times, on Kilbirnie Cres
Other features
Only buses can use the dedicated lanes.
High-capacity buses will run at a frequency necessary to cater for demand and growth, as assumed
in the do-minimum.
Bus services can continue to other destinations on local roads.
Variants based on timing
Along with the core option, 4 additional variants of this option are assessed, based on different timing of
implementation for each branch. These are shown in
Table 51.
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Table 51. Variants for Option 5
Assumed
Option 5
Option 5a
Option 5b
Option 5c
Option 5ac
timing
To coincide
To coincide
Central
Immediately
with completion
Immediately
Immediately
with completion
spine
of RONS
of RONS
To coincide
To coincide
To coincide
To coincide
To coincide
Newtown
with completion with completion with completion with completion with completion
branch
of RONS
of RONS
of RONS
of RONS
of RONS
To coincide
To coincide
To coincide
To coincide
Kilbirnie
with completion with completion
Never
with completion with completion
branch
of RONS
of RONS
of RONS
of RONS
Note: (1) ‘Immediately’ assumes it is completed prior to 2019. (2) The RONS are assumed to be completed
prior to 2025.
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Appendix C Cost benefit
analysis technical appendix
Objectives of the economic evaluation
The Transport Agency’s chief objective for BRT’s economic case is to produce a robust and comprehensive
economic appraisal that includes sensitivity testing, in line with the EEM. The economic case in any
business case is about achieving two key outputs:
1. Assessing measurable economic returns that can be used to inform a wider discussion (linked to
strategic, commercial and financial analysis) on the viability of the project.
2. Assessing the best option or configuration of options: that is, to assess from a suite of possible
approaches, the one that generates the highest economic benefit compared to cost.
In considering these two objectives, it is critical not to view them in isolation of the other components of
the business case. For example, the ability to fund a project is a critical part of the business case, and
sometimes trade-offs need to be made between optimal economic performance (ie high net public benefits)
and budget constraints. Similarly, the interface between the economic case and the strategic case are
critical. An economic case may give an optimal economic timing for a project (often driven by discount
rates etc) that is later than wider strategic drivers, which are not fully monetised in the economic evaluation
procedures.
The scope of this economic evaluation is to identify and monetise the economic benefits and economic costs
of the BRT options, delivering an overall assessment of each options’ net benefits.
This report documents the assumptions and method for the economic evaluation of the BRT and
demonstrates the evaluation’s alignment with EEM procedures.
Approach to cost benefit analysis
Method
The economic evaluation of the BRT options have been based on procedures and parameters that represent
good practice and are defined in the EEM. The relevant procedure in the EEM for evaluating public
transport infrastructure and services is contained in Section 4.4 of the EEM.
There are five broad stages of analysis required, with several required steps at each stage:
1. Identify and describe the options to be evaluated, including a do-minimum and a preferred option.
2. Define the transport modelling process, including model inputs such as land use scenarios and
required model outputs.
3. Identify the streams of economic impacts accruing from the project and define the calculations that
must be completed in order to value them. The report defines in detail procedures for conducting
the core transport evaluation and discusses the integration with the wider economic benefits and
sustainability benefits valuations.
4. Identify any qualitative, or non-transport assessments that are required, including significant non-
monetised impacts and national strategic factors.
5. Calculate economic efficiency and how results will be reported for use in decision-making.
The scope of the BRT IBC involved no new transport modelling. As such, the transport model analysis from
the PTSS provided the base data for the economic analysis. Therefore we deviated slightly from the stages
of the analysis prescribed in the EEM but not in the application of assessing the benefits and costs.
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The economic evaluation was performed on an incremental basis, ie relative to the do-minimum. Therefore
benefits are estimated relative to the status quo in the do-minimum and costs are incremental costs over
and above what would be spent in the do-minimum.
Key assumptions
The analysis has been limited to transport model data already conducted as part of the PTSS. We have
assumed that the Bus Priority option, in the PTSS is broadly equivalent to Option 1 (without the Kilbirnie
branch) and the BRT option in the PTSS is broadly equivalent to Option 5.
Our key assumptions used in the analysis are outlined i
n Table 52 below.
Table 52. Key assumptions for the economic evaluation
Assumption
Value
Year of construction
-
Central Spine
2018 (or 2024 for option a)
-
Newtown branch
2024
-
Kilbirnie branch (if relevant)
2024
Year benefits begin
-
Central Spine
2019 (or 2025 for option a)
-
Newtown branch
2025
-
Kilbirnie branch (if relevant)
2025
Discount rate
6%
Cost escalation
Yes – refer schedule i
n Table 94
Year zero
2015
Key data
The key data for our economic evaluation is from the transport modelling completed for the PTSS. The key
data which underpins much of the economic analysis is outlined in this section.
Travel time savings
Travel time savings data is a key input to our analysis. The raw data from the analysis is from the PTSS
Option Evaluation Results Technical Note report.
Table 53 and Table 54 below show the travel time
savings along BRT routes.
Table 53. Travel time savings from Kilbirnie to the CBD (2031 am peak, min)
From Kilbirnie to:
Reference case
BP
BRT
Elizabeth St
13.9
-1.1
-7.6
Courtenay Pl
14.7
-1.1
-8.1
Willis St
19.3
-1.5
-9.5
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Rail Station
24.5
-2.7
-11.2
Source: PTSS Option Evaluation Results Technical Note
Table 54. Travel time savings from Newtown to the CBD (2031 am peak, min)
From Newtown to:
Reference case
BP
BRT
Elizabeth St
5.1
-1.4
-1.7
Courtenay Pl
8.5
-1.4
-3.3
Willis St
13.1
-1.8
-4.7
Rail Station
18.3
-3.0
-6.4
Source: PTSS Option Evaluation Results Technical Note
We converted the information as travel time savings per segment travelled, along the Newtown and
Kilbirnie branches and along the Golden Mile, as shown i
n Table 55 and Table 56 below.
Table 55. Travel time savings along the Kilbirnie route (2031 am peak, min)
Bus Priority
BRT
From
From
From
From
Elizabeth St to:
Kilbirnie to:
Elizabeth St to:
Kilbirnie to:
Elizabeth St
N/A
1.1
N/A
7.6
Courtenay Pl
0
1.1
0.5
8.1
Willis St
0.4
1.5
0.9
9.5
Rail Station
1.6
2.7
3.6
11.2
PwC calculations
Table 56. Travel time savings along the Newtown route (2031 am peak, min)
Bus Priority
BRT
From
From
From
From
Basin to:
Newtown to:
Basin to:
Newtown to:
Basin
N/A
1.4
N/A
1.7
Courtenay Pl
0
1.4
1.6
3.3
Willis St
0.4
1.8
3.0
4.7
Rail Station
1.6
3.0
4.7
6.4
PwC calculations
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To further facilitate the analysis, we made assumptions on the percentage of travellers from Newtown and
Kilbirnie alighting at different segments along the routes to generate the weighted average travel time saved
per route. This is because we did not believe that all travellers would be on the bus the entire length of the
journey to the Railway Station. Our demand weighting assumptions is listed i
n Table 57 below.
Table 57. Weights for travellers along the Newtown and Kilbirnie routes by destination
Newtown to
Per cent of
Kilbirnie to
Per cent of
travellers
travellers
Basin
10%
Elizabeth St
10%
Courtenay Pl
10%
Courtenay Pl
10%
Willis St
40%
Willis St
40%
Rail Station
40%
Rail Station
40%
This enabled us to generate weighted average travel time savings for Option 1 and Option 5 as outlined in
Table 58 below.
Table 58. Weighted average travel time savings (2031 am peak, min)
Travel segment
Option 1
Option 5
Newtown to CBD
2.2
4.9
Kilbirnie to CBD
1.9
9.5
Patronage
We also relied upon the patronage forecasts from the PTSS, outlined i
n Table 59 below.
Table 59. Local growth patronage to the CBD (2031 am peak)
Area
Reference case
Bus Priority
BRT
Miramar
1,320
+60
+170
Kilbirnie Lyall
680
+40
+80
Mt Vic/Hataitai
790
+20
-50
Island Bay
1,140
+20
+100
Newtown
790
+30
+90
Total
4,710
+170
+400
Source: PTSS Option Evaluation Results Technical Note
The transport modelling for the PTSS also modelled regional patronage in 2021, 2031 and 2041, which was
used as a basis to generate a time series of patronage along the Newtown and Kilbirnie routes. The growth
rate in regional patronage was used as a proxy growth rate for the Newtown and Kilbirnie routes.
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Table 60. Changes in regional patronage during morning peak
Year
Reference case
Bus Priority
BRT
2021 (regional)
35,600
+200 = 35,800
+700 = 36,300
2031 (regional)
34,000
+300 = 34,300
+800 = 34,800
2041 (regional)
35,200
+300 = 35,500
+900 = 36,100
Source: PTSS Option Evaluation Results Technical Note
Table 61 below shows the patronage figures converted to growth rates during the decade (not annual
averages).
Table 61. Decade growth rates in patronage
Growth rate
2021 to 2031
2031 to 2041
Reference case
-4.5%
3.5%
Bus Priority
-4.2%
3.5%
BRT
-4.1%
3.7%
PwC calculations
Note that the forecast regional PT patronage is expected to increase sharply in 2021 then decline slightly in
2031 and increase again in 2041.
Interpolation method for intermediate options
The travel time savings data and patronage figures for options 1 and 5 have been identified using the PTSS
modelling for the BP and BRT options. In order to determine the travel time savings and patronage figures
for the intermediate options, an allocation method was determined by GWRC using data from the Saturn
model. We have relied on this interpolation method to determine the intermediate options.
The primary assumption for the analysis was that Option 5 incurs no delays and assumes that the do-
minimum option incurs 100% of delays. The intermediate options incur a proportion of delays on certain
links / at certain intersections, dependent on the level of bus priority, signal pre-emption and segregation
being proposed. Each key intersection-option combination was given a factor between 1 = no improvement
on congested travel speeds and 0 = equivalent to free flowing travel speeds.
High-level assumptions and results
Table 62 captures the assumed level of priority at four key intersections and the assumed factor impact on
travel speeds at the intersections is captured i
n Table 63. A full list is GWRC’s assumptions by intersection
is captured afterwards.
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Table 62. Intersection priority assumed at key intersections
Key intersection
Reference
1
2
3
4ac
4
5ac
5
case
(except 4ac)
(except 5ac)
Bus lane but
not to stop
Segregated
Basin entry from
line, buses
Bus lane to
Bus lane to
Bus lane to
Bus lane to
Bus lane to
Nothing
stop line, B
stop line, B
stop line, B
stop line, pre-
stop line, pre-
bus lane to
Mt Vic
mix with GT20
stop line, pre-
phase
phase
phase
emption
emption
turning left,
emption
no B phase
Bus lane but
not to stop
Bus lane to
Bus lane to
Bus lane to
Bus lane to
Segregated
Segregated
Basin entry from
line, buses
bus lane to
bus lane to
Newtown
Nothing
mix with GT
stop line, B
stop line, B
stop line, pre-
stop line, pre-
stop line, pre-
stop line, pre-
turning left,
phase
phase
emption
emption
emption
emption
no B phase
Bus lanes to
Bus lanes to
Segregated
Segregated
Vivian Street
stop line, no B stop line, no B Bus lane to
Bus lane to
Bus lane to
bus lane to
bus lane to
Nothing
stop line, B
stop line, pre-
stop line, pre-
description
phase, no pre-
phase, no pre-
phase
emption
emption
stop line, pre-
stop line, pre-
emption
emption
emption
emption
Bus lane but
Bus lane but
not to stop
not to stop
Segregated
Segregated
Adelaide / John
Bus lane to
Bus lane to
Bus lane to
Nothing
line, buses
line, buses
stop line, B
stop line, pre-
stop line, pre-
bus lane to
bus lane to
Street description
mix with GT
mix with GT
stop line, pre-
stop line, pre-
turning left,
turning left,
phase
emption
emption
emption
emption
no B phase
no B phase
Source: GWRC
20 General Traffic (GT)
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Table 63. Key intersections along the Newtown and Kilbirnie routes and assumed impact of the option on the delay at the intersection
Intersection
4
5
Ref case
1
2
3
4ac
(except 4ac)
5ac
(except 5ac)
Basin Reserve approach
1
0.8
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.2
0.2
0
Adelaide / John Street
1
0.8
0.8
0.6
0.2
0.2
0
0
Basin approach (other side)
1
0.6
0.4
0.4
0.2
0.2
0
0
Vivian Street
1
0.6
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.2
0
0
Source: GWRC
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Following this, the factors were applied to existing Saturn travel time modelling output at the intersections
for each option and then aggregated across the whole route.
Table 64. Example calculation for Adelaide/John St
Ref
4
5
1
2
3
4ac
(except
5ac
(except
case
4ac)
5ac)
Improvement N/A
1
0.8
0.8
0.6
0.2
0.2
0
factor
Average
56
56
44.8
44.8
33.6
11.2
11.2
0
delay (sec)
Source: GWRC, PwC example calculations
As this was done for each option and at key intersections, the relative change in travel time savings could be
estimated between the options, benchmarked to Option 1 and 5.
The Saturn modelling output and interpolation method generated an alternative set of travel times for the
Newtown and Kilbirnie routes. After discussion with GWRC, it was considered that the PTSS transport
modelling was considered more accurate and more complete than the estimates for option 1. Therefore the
travel time estimates for BP and BRT were retained and set as the bookends. The additional Saturn
modelling output was only used to determine the interpolation percentages.
Table 65 below shows the percentage change improvements over the whole route.
Table 65. Travel time savings for intermediate options, relative to Option 5
4
5
Route
Ref case
1
2
3
4ac
(except
5ac
(except
4ac)
5ac)
Newtown
0%
35%
47%
55%
80%
80%
100%
100%
Kilbirnie
0%
12%
40%
42%
46%
80%
83%
100%
Golden
Mile
0%
18%
50%
50%
94%
94%
100%
100%
Source: GWRC
The method identified by GWRC was to use the percentages i
n Table 65 and apply them to the PTSS travel
time savings between BP and BRT, ie Option 2 provides 47% of the benefits of Option 5.
We calculated an overall weighted average for each option, based on the relative PT demand between the
Newtown and Kilbirnie branches.
Table 66 a
nd Table 67 below show the weighted average travel time
savings for the core options, and the ‘a’ and ‘b’ variants (the other variants are combinations of these).
Table 66. Weighted average travel time savings for core options and “a” variant (2031 am
peak, mins)
1
2 / 2a
3 / 3a
4 /4a
5 /5a
Time savings (mins)
1.4
4.3
4.5
6.5
7.6
Source: GWRC data, PwC calculations
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Table 67. Weighted average travel time savings for “b” BRT options (2031 am peak, mins)
2b
3b
4b
5b
Time savings (mins)
2.2
2.3
2.9
3.1
Source: GWRC data, PwC calculations
Figures for patronage were interpolated using the same method as the travel time savings.
Table 68 and
Table 69 below show the additional patronage for the core options and the ‘a’ and ‘b’ variants.
Table 68. Additional PT patronage for core options and “a” variant (2031)
1
2/2a
3 / 3a
4 / 4a
5 / 5a
Additional patronage
50
146
162
272
390
Source: GWRC data, PwC calculations
Table 69. Additional PT patronage for “b” BRT options (2031)
2b
3b
4b
5b
Additional patronage
65
77
112
190
Source: GWRC data, PwC calculations
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Detailed assumptions about level of priority at key intersections
Table 70. GWRC assumptions on level of priority for the options at key intersections
Key intersection
Reference
1
2
3
4ac
4
5ac
5
case
(except 4ac)
(except 5ac)
Turn priority
into / out of
Turn priority
Turn priority
Turn priority
KBC from
into / out of
into / out of
into / out of
KBC from SH1
KBC from
KBC from SH1
Segregation,
SH1 but no
Peak bus
pre-emption, but no pre-
SH1 with pre-
with pre-
full priority,
Kilbirnie to SH1
Nothing
Nothing
lanes
no bus lanes
emption, no
emption, no
emption, no
pre-emption,
bus lanes on
bus lanes on
bus lanes on
no GT in bus
on KBC,
priority
KBC, priority
KBC, priority
KBC, priority
lanes
around
around
around
around
Kilbirnie TC
Kilbirnie TC
Kilbirnie TC
Kilbirnie TC
Segregation,
Bus lanes on
Bus lanes on
Bus lanes on
Bus lanes on
Bus lanes on
full priority,
SH1 to Basin
Nothing
Nothing
Ruahine, no
Ruahine, no
Ruahine, no
Ruahine, plus Ruahine, plus
pre-emption,
pre-emption
pre-emption
pre-emption
pre-emption
pre-emption
no GT in bus
lanes
Segregation,
Segregation,
Newtown to
Bus lanes to
Bus lanes to
Bus lanes to
Bus lanes to
Bus lanes to
full priority,
full priority,
Nothing
stop line, no
stop line plus stop line plus stop line plus
stop line plus
pre-emption,
pre-emption,
Basin
B phase
B phase
B phase
pre-emption
pre-emption
no GT in bus
no GT in bus
lanes
lanes
Segregation,
Segregation,
Bus lanes to
Bus lanes to
Bus lanes to
Bus lanes to
Bus lanes to
full priority,
full priority,
Basin
Bus lanes
stop line, no
stop line plus stop line plus stop line plus
stop line plus
pre-emption,
pre-emption,
B phase
B phase
B phase
pre-emption
pre-emption
no GT in bus
no GT in bus
lanes
lanes
Segregation,
Segregation,
Bus lanes to
Bus lanes to
Bus lanes to
Bus lanes to
Bus lanes to
full priority,
full priority,
Kent Cambridge
As current
stop line, no
stop line plus stop line plus stop line plus
stop line plus
pre-emption,
pre-emption,
B phase
B phase
B phase
pre-emption
pre-emption
no GT in bus
no GT in bus
lanes
lanes
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Key intersection
Reference
1
2
3
4ac
4
5ac
5
case
(except 4ac)
(except 5ac)
Improved
Improved
Improved
Improved bus
bus lanes
bus lanes
bus lanes
Improved bus
lanes,
including
including
including
lanes, removal
of most
removal of
Segregation,
Segregation,
Courtenay Place
some
some
some
most parking
to Taranaki
As current
removal of
removal of
removal of
parking and
and access
full priority,
full priority,
Street
parking,
parking,
parking,
access
restrictions,
pre-emption,
pre-emption,
restrictions,
no GT
no GT
some B
some B
some B
pre-emption,
phase, GT
phase, no GT phase, no GT pre-emption,
no GT
allowed
at peak times at peak times no GT allowed
allowed
As current
As current
As current
As current
Improved bus
Improved bus Improved bus
Improved bus
(effectively
(effectively
(effectively
(effectively
bus only)
bus only)
bus only)
bus only)
lanes, pre-
lanes, pre-
lanes, pre-
lanes, pre-
Taranaki Street
emption, no
emption, no
emption, no
emption, no
to Willis Street
with no
with no
with no
with no
GT, effectively
GT, effectively GT, effectively
GT, effectively
signal
signal
signal
signal
priority /
priority /
priority /
priority /
fully
fully
fully
fully
pre-emption
pre-emption
pre-emption
pre-emption
segregated
segregated
segregated
segregated
No GT at
No GT at
No GT 24/7,
No GT 24/7,
pre-emption,
No GT 24/7,
No GT 24/7,
Willis Street
As current
As current
peak times,
peak times,
pre-emption,
effectively
pre-emption,
pre-emption,
no pre-
no pre-
effectively fully
effectively fully effectively fully
emption
emption
segregated
fully
segregated
segregated
segregated
General
traffic
No GT at
No GT at
No GT 24/7,
No GT 24/7,
No GT 24/7,
No GT 24/7,
Lambton Quay to
restrictions
pre-emption,
Wellington bus
As current
at peak
peak times,
peak times,
pre-emption,
effectively
pre-emption,
pre-emption,
station
times, shared no pre-
no pre-
effectively fully
effectively fully effectively fully
emption
emption
segregated
fully
segregated
segregated
bus lanes,
segregated
some b phase
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Key intersection
Reference
case
1
2
3
4ac
4
(except 4ac)
5ac
5
(except 5ac)
Bus lane but
not to stop
Bus lane to
Bus lane to
Bus lane to
Bus lane to
Bus lane to
Segregated bus
Basin entry from
line, buses
lane to stop
Mt Vic
Nothing
mix with GT
stop line, B
stop line, B
stop line, B
stop line, pre-
stop line, pre-
line, pre-
turning left,
phase
phase
phase
emption
emption
emption
no B phase
Bus lane but
not to stop
Segregated bus Segregated bus
Basin entry from
Bus lane to
Bus lane to
Bus lane to
Bus lane to
Nothing
line, buses
stop line, B
stop line, B
stop line, pre-
stop line, pre-
lane to stop
lane to stop
Newtown
mix with GT
line, pre-
line, pre-
turning left,
phase
phase
emption
emption
emption
emption
no B phase
Bus lanes to
Bus lanes to
Bus lane to
Bus lane to
Bus lane to
Segregated bus Segregated bus
Vivian Street
stop line, no
stop line, no
lane to stop
lane to stop
description
Nothing
B phase, no
B phase, no
stop line, B
stop line, pre-
stop line, pre-
line, pre-
line, pre-
pre-emption
pre-emption
phase
emption
emption
emption
emption
Bus lane but
Bus lane but
not to stop
not to stop
Segregated bus Segregated bus
Adelaide / John
Bus lane to
Bus lane to
Bus lane to
Street
Nothing
line, buses
line, buses
stop line, B
stop line, pre-
stop line, pre-
lane to stop
lane to stop
description
mix with GT
mix with GT
line, pre-
line, pre-
turning left,
turning left,
phase
emption
emption
emption
emption
no B phase
no B phase
Source: GWRC (direct correspondence)
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Table 71. GWRC factor assumptions on level of priority for the options at key intersections
Intersection
4
5
Ref case
1
2
3
4ac
(except
5ac
(except
4ac)
5ac)
Bay Road / Onepu
1
1
0.8
0.8
0.8
0.2
0.2
0
Bay Road / Kilbirnie Crescent
1
1
0.8
0.8
0.8
0.2
0.2
0
Kilbirnie Crescent / Wellington Road
1
1
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.2
0.2
0
Wellington Road / Ruahine Street
1
1
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.2
0.2
0
Wellington Road / Ruahine Street
1
1
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.2
0.2
0
Basin Reserve approach
1
0.8
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.2
0.2
0
Hospital
1
0.6
0.4
0.4
0.2
0.2
0
0
Adelaide / John Street
1
0.8
0.8
0.6
0.2
0.2
0
0
Hospital Road
1
0.6
0.4
0.4
0.2
0.2
0
0
Ped Xing
1
0.6
0.4
0.4
0.2
0.2
0
0
Basin approach
1
0.6
0.4
0.4
0.2
0.2
0
0
Basin exit
1
0.6
0.4
0.4
0.2
0.2
0
0
Vivian Street
1
0.6
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.2
0
0
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Intersection
4
5
Ref case
1
2
3
4ac
(except
5ac
(except
4ac)
5ac)
Elizabeth Street
1
0.6
0.4
0.4
0.2
0.2
0
0
GM Ped Xing
1
0.6
0.4
0.4
0.2
0.2
0
0
Tory Street
1
0.7
0.4
0.4
0.2
0.2
0
0
Taranaki Street
1
0.7
0.4
0.4
0.2
0.2
0
0
Cuba Street
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
Victoria Street
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
Willis Street / Boulcott
1
1
0.4
0.4
0
0
0
0
Willis / BNZ
1
1
0.4
0.4
0
0
0
0
Lambton Quay Signals 1
1
0.7
0.4
0.4
0
0
0
0
Lambton Quay Signals 2
1
0.7
0.4
0.4
0
0
0
0
Lambton / Bowen
1
0.7
0.4
0.4
0
0
0
0
Source: GWRC
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Value of time assumptions
A weighted average PT value of time was estimated based on EEM values of time and a trip breakdown
from GWRC, based off survey data. The weighted average was composed of three types of trip purposes:
work travel, commuting and other purposes (eg education, shopping) and was calculated to estimate the
value of time for the “average” PT user along the Central Spine.
Table 72. Values of time for seated bus and train passengers ($/hour, all road categories, all
time periods)
Trip purpose
2002 $/hr % of
Resource
Weighted
Weighted
Wellington
cost
average value of average value
PT trips
correction time
of time
factor
(2002 $/hr)
(2014 $/hr)
Work travel
21.70
4%
1.00
purpose
$5.74
$8.15
Commuting
4.70
73%
1.15
Other purposes
3.05
23%
1.15
Source: EEM, PwC calculations
The EEM values for traffic composition and travel purpose breakdown along urban arterial roads were used
to determine the value of time for car passengers, along the Central Spine, Newtown and Kilbirnie
branches. A weighted average value of time was estimated, for the ‘average’ car passenger along the Spine
Study routes.
Table 73 a). Value of time calculations for car passengers
Travel purpose
Vehicle type
Time
Road
and
Traffic
Vehicle
period
type
occupant
composition occupancy Work Commute Other
Car
85%
1.4
10%
50%
40%
Car passenger
10%
50%
40%
LCV
10%
1.4
65%
20%
15%
AM peak
Urban
LCV
arterial passenger
65%
20%
15%
MCV
2%
1.2
90%
5%
5%
HCVI
1%
1.2
90%
5%
5%
HCVII
2%
1.2
90%
5%
5%
Source: EEM, PwC calculations
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Table 75 b). Value of time calculations for car passengers
VoT by vehicle class and
travel purpose (2002
$/hr)
ART3
Vehicle
model
... by
Time
Road
type and
output
Person
vehicle
period type
occupant
category composition
class
Work Commute Other
Car
61.2%
64%
Car
passenger
24.5%
26%
Cars
$23.21
$7.24
$6.41
LCV
7.2%
8%
AM
Urban LCV
peak
arterial passenger
2.9%
3%
MCV
1.7%
40.0%
HCVI
HCVs
0.9%
20.0%
$18.83
HCVII
1.7%
40.0%
Source: EEM, PwC calculations
The overall weighted average value of time for car passengers was $12.08 per hour (in 2014 dollars).
Annualisation factors
The modelling data was for the two hour AM peak period, therefore annualisation factors were used to scale
up the benefits to an annual figure.
Table 74. Annualisation factors
Value
Source
Highway
490
AECOM (2013)
PT
583
AECOM (2013)
PT – peak only
500
Assumption based on 250 working days
per year and 2 peak periods per day
Bus (for bus VKT)
595
Estimating using data from GWRC
Standard benefits
Travel time savings benefits
The patronage and weighted average travel time were used as the basis for the travel time savings benefits.
As the modelling outputs were for the 2031 year, additional assumptions were required to determine the
profile of travel time savings and patronage over time.
As outlined earlier, regional BP and BRT patronage growth rates were used to proxy the profile of the
number of bus users long the Newtown and Kilbirnie routes over time. The travel time savings, over the
do-minimum, were not expected to stay constant over time. The do-minimum is expected to worsen over
time, so the travel time savings relative to the do-minimum is expected to increase over time.
A factor of 0.8 was applied to 2031 travel time savings to generate travel time savings in 2021. A factor of
1.2 was applied to travel time savings in 2031 to generate travel time savings in 2041. Travel time savings
were assumed to be constant after 2041. The rule of half was applied to new PT users.
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Table 75 shows the NPV of the travel time savings over 40 years for all BRT options.
Table 75 a). Travel time savings for core BRT options (NPV, 40 years)
1
2
3
4
5
Existing users
$5.9m
$15.1m
$18.7m
$27.3m
$31.7m
New users
$44.1k
$228.4k
$306.2k
$737.3k
$1.2m
Total
$5.9m
$15.3m
$19.0m
$28.1m
$32.9m
PwC calculations
Table 77 b). Travel time savings for BRT options (NPV, 40 years)
2a
2b
3a
3b
4a
4b
Existing
$14.0m
$8.5m
$17.5m
$10.5m
$25.5m
$13.6m
users
New
$214.6k
$87.8k
$289.1k
$127.0k
$695.9k
$230.7k
users
Total
$14.2m
$8.6m
$17.7m
$10.6m
$26.2m
$13.8m
PwC calculations
Table 77 c). Travel time savings for BRT options (NPV, 40 years)
4c
4ac
5a
5b
5c
5ac
Existing
$21.2m
$19.1m
$30.0m
$14.7m
$28.3m
$26.5m
users
New
$318.4k
$290.4k
$1.2m
$427.5k
$504.6k
$477.1k
users
Total
$21.5m
$19.4m
$31.2m
$15.1m
$28.8m
$27.0m
PwC calculations
Additional PT user benefits
Section A18 of the EEM identifies benefits associated with improving PT infrastructure and services. The
higher quality PT options, in terms of more priority, were also assumed to have better quality
infrastructure. We assumed that Options 3, 4 and 5 generated additional PT user benefits from the BRT
infrastructure, with attributes according to the following table, taken from EEM Table A18.5:
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Table 76. Value of benefit for PT infrastructure
Attribute
Sub-attribute
Value of benefit (IVT min)
Stop
Condition
0.1
Size
0.1
Seating
0.1
Cleanliness
0.1
Litter
0.2
Type
0.2
Ticketing
Roadside
0.1
Availability
0.2
Security
Security point
0.3
CCTV
0.3
Lighting
0.1
Information
Terminals
0.1
Realtime
0.8
Clock
0.1
Contact number
0.1
Timetable
0.4
Total
3.3
Factored down by 50% (per EEM procedures)
1.65
Source: EEM table A18.5
The total value is factored down by 50% to account for multiple features. We assumed that the benefits
only accrue in the second phase of construction, after the Basin Bridge is completed. Therefore the core
options and “a” options are equivalent.
Table 77 below shows the NPV of the additional PT user benefits over 40 years. The full value is applied to
existing PT users (who are assumed to benefit from the new infrastructure in its entirety as the
infrastructure is new) and the rule of a half is applied to new PT users.
Table 77 a). Additional PT user benefits for BRT options (NPV, 40 years)
1
2
3
4
5
Additional PT user
-
-
-
$5.8m
$6.0m
benefits
PwC calculations
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Table 79 b). Additional PT user benefits for BRT options (NPV, 40 years)
2a
2b
3a
3b
4a
4b
Additional
-
-
-
-
$6.1m
$2.4m
PT user
benefits
PwC calculations
Table 79 c). Additional PT user benefits for BRT options (NPV, 40 years)
4c
4ac
5a
5b
5c
5ac
Additional
$2.4m
$2.5m
$6.3m
$2.5m
$2.4m
$2.5m
PT user
benefits
PwC calculations
Reliability benefits
Reliability is a major issue for passengers, who value certainty about their trip. Section A18 of the EEM
outlines the calculation to determine the benefit associated with improved journey time reliability.
Reliability benefits are directly estimated, rather than relying on a rule of thumb.
Table A18.1 of the EEM provides the equivalent time to a minute late (EL) ratio for bus travellers. The
combined delay of 4.1 EL was used. The base vehicle travel time was taken from Table A4.2 of the EEM and
updated to 2014 dollars, the vehicle travel time is $24.28 per hour.
GWRC data on the average “lateness” of all Wellington bus services showed that the Island Bay to
Wellington Station route (which includes the Newtown to Wellington Station route) was on average 3.8
minutes late. Whereas the Karori to Courtenay Place route (covers the Kilbirnie branch) was on average
3.4 minutes late. The average across all routes was 3.5 minutes late.
We used this as a benchmark to determine the reliability benefits of the BRT options. Option 5 was
assumed to eliminate variability in travel times due to congestion reduced by the signal priority and the
segregated corridor. That is, we assumed that the reduction in average minutes late (AML) for Option 5
was 3.5 minutes. The intermediate options were also interpolated using the same method as the travel time
saving
s. Table 78 shows the average reduction in minutes late across the BRT options.
Table 78. Assumptions on average reduction in minutes late for BRT options.
1
2b
2 / 2a
3c
3 / 3a
4c /
4b / 4 / 5c /
5/5a/5b
4ac
4a
5ac
AML
.5
1.4
1.3
1.6
1.4
1.8
2.4
2.7
3.5
Source: GWRC data, PwC calculations
The rule of half was applied to new PT users.
As noted in section 18.1 in the EEM, trip reliability benefits cannot exceed the travel time savings. The
calculated journey reliability benefits exceeded the travel time savings for each option, so the value used in
the CBA was the value attributed the travel time savings.
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Health benefits
Health benefits arise from walking to PT stops and section A20.3 of the EEM outlines the procedure for
evaluating the economic benefits. We have assumed that new PT users shift travel mode from private
vehicle so walk the average distance from their homes to PT stops. Existing PT users also benefit from
walking further, in options3,4 and 5, as there are fewer BRT stops with wider spacing between them.
Table 79 outlines the key assumptions for the walk analysis.
Table 79. Key walking and bus stop assumptions
Bus Priority
BRT
Distance along Kilbirnie route
6km
6km
Distance along Newtown route
5km
5km
Number of stops (Kilbirnie route)
17
8
Number of stops (Newtown route)
14
8
Average distance between stops
350m
750m
(Kilbirnie route)
Average distance between stops
350m
625m
(Newtown route)
BRT stop catchment size
400m
800m
Average walk distance to stop
0.2km
N/A
(existing stops)
Extra walk to BRT stations
0.4km
0.2km
Walking benefits $ (2014) per
$3.08/km
$3.08/km
pedestrian km
Year benefits begin
2025
2025
We assumed BP stop distances for core Options 1 to 3 and BRT style stations for Options 4 and 5, with the
combination options a blend of BP and BRT station distances for the Newtown and Kilbirnie branches as
per option definitions. We also assume that the new stations along the Newtown and Kilbirnie branches do
not get constructed until after the Basin development, so benefits only accrue to PT users from 2025
onwards.
We assumed a grid road layout and estimated Manhattan distances for the average walk distances, as
illustrated i
n Figure 12 below. The Manhattan distance is based on horizontal and vertical path, ie the
distance 175m + 359m below. The average distance is half the Manhattan distance ie 267m.
In order to present a conservative value, in line with our broad approach to the analysis, we factored the
walking distances down by 25%.
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Figure 12.
Example walking distance calculation for the BRT options
Table 80 shows the estimated walking benefits for the BRT options over 40 years.
Table 80 a). Value of walking benefits for BRT options (NPV, 40 years)
1
2
3
4
5
Walking
$94k
$286k
$317k
$16.4m
$17.1m
benefits
PwC calculations
Table 82 b). Value of walking benefits for BRT options (NPV, 40 years)
2a
2b
3a
3b
4a
4b
Walking
$67k
$128k
$76k
$151k
$17.3m
$6.7m
benefits
PwC calculations
Table 82 c). Value of walking benefits for BRT options (NPV, 40 years)
4c
4ac
5a
5b
5c
5ac
Walking
$6.8m
$7.1m
$18.1m
$7.2m
$6.9m
$7.3m
benefits
PwC calculations
Emissions
The reduced frequency and improved travel times along the BRT routes result in fewer vehicle kilometres
travelled by the buses servicing these lines. The economic benefits associated with reducing bus emissions
have been included in our analysis.
We assumed that the type of buses is constant over all options, as high capacity buses are part of the do-
minimum. Therefore the source of the emissions benefits is due to the reduction in vehicle km travelled for
buses, rather than a change to the bus fleet configuration. We have assumed that the new buses will be of a
Euro 5 standard.
The energy efficiency of Euro 5 buses has been taken from previous analysis for GWRC.
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Table 81. Bus type assumptions for BRT options
Bus type
MJ/100km
kg C02 / MJ
Euro 5
1200
0.07325
GWRC estimated the bus vehicle km travelled (VKT) in 2031, using assumed headways and route lengths.
Table 82 shows the key data from GWRC on VKT in the am peak period in 2031.
Table 82. Data on bus frequencies and VKT for BRT options
Frequency
Number
Number of Kilbirnie VKT
Newtown VKT
(minutes per
of buses
buses
bus)
required
required
(Newtown)
(Kilbirnie)
Reference
2
30
23
360
360
BP
3
18
14
240
240
BRT
4
9
8
180
180
Source: GWRC
We interpolated the VKT across the options per the schedule i
n Table 83 below.
Table 83. VKT assumptions for BRT options
1
2
3
Combination 4
Combination 5
of 3 and 4
of 3 and 5
VKT
As per
Same as
Same as
Midway
Same as
Midway
As per
assumptions BP
1
1
between 3 and
5
between 4 and
BRT
4
5
In addition, we have assumed that bus VKT is constant over time. This implicitly assumes that when the
BRT begins there is sufficient passenger capacity to capture the growth in demand.
We annualised the figures based on an estimated bus VKT annualisation factor of 595, using data from
GWRC on total bus VKT travelled per year and bus VKT in the AM peak period.
Table 84 below shows the
monetised benefit for the reduction in bus VKT for the BRT options over 40 years, based on a cost of
carbon emissions of $40/tonne (section A9.6 of the EEM).
Table 84 a). Emissions benefits for BRT options (NPV, 40 years)
1
2
3
4
5
CO2
$103k
$268k
$275k
$334k
$433k
reduction
benefit
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Table 86 b). Emissions benefits for BRT options (NPV, 40 years)
2a
2b
3a
3b
4a
4b
CO2
$238k
$137k
$245k
$143k
$297k
$167k
reduction
benefit
PwC calculations
Table 86 c). Emissions benefits for BRT options (NPV, 40 years)
4c
4ac
5a
5b
5c
5ac
CO2
$299k
$265k
$390k
$217k
$356k
$314k
reduction
benefit
PwC calculations
Car user travel time (dis)benefits
The BRT options impact on other road users, due to reduced road space for general traffic and some
restrictions on turning (eg for options with physically separated bus lanes). The disbenefits to private
vehicles are estimated, in terms of worsening travel times.
The key data to estimating the disbenefits to car users is from GWRC’s modelling report for the PTSS. The
key data we have relied on i
s in Table 85 below.
Table 85. Travel time savings by car to the CBD (am peak, 2031, in minutes)
Reference travel
BP change from
BRT change from
time
reference
reference
Miramar
26.6
-0.3
-0.9
Island Bay
23.9
0
+0.5
Newtown
21.6
+1
+0.8
Hataitai
20
-0.3
+0.5
Kilbirnie
22.6
+0.2
-0.1
Source: PTSS Short List Evaluation - Modelling Report
The car travel time changes for the intermediate options were interpolated using the bus travel time
method.
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Table 86. Overall car demand for selected Wellington origins
Reference case
BP change in car
BRT change in car
demand from
demand from
reference
reference
Miramar
7502
-55
-121
Island Bay
4333
-22
-92
Newtown
4548
-30
-76
Mt Vic/Hataitai
3355
-20
37
Kilbirnie
4647
43
-77
Source: PTSS Short List Evaluation - Modelling Report
GWRC provided data on the percentage of trips to the CBD by origin, which was used to determine the
number of trips to the CBD directly affected by the BRT options. Table 34 shows the number of trips to the
CBD from each origin, which is the car demand in Table 33 multiplied by the percentage of trips to the CBD
by origin.
Table 87. Car trips to the CBD
% of trips to
Reference case
BP car trips to
BRT car trips to
CBD by origin
the CBD
the CBD
Miramar
23%
1,725
1,713
1,698
Island Bay
35%
1,517
1,509
1,484
Newtown
64%
2,911
2,892
2,862
Mt Vic/Hataitai
47%
1,577
1,567
1,594
Kilbirnie
26%
1,208
1,219
1,188
Source: GWRC, PwC calculations
The overall change in time (change per trip multiplied by the number of trips) was aggregated and then
annualised using an annualisation factor of 490.
To generate the profile over time, the travel times matched the expected change in travel times for buses
(2021 car travel times were multiplied by a factor of 0.8 and 2041 car travel times were multiplied by a
factor of 1.2 and were constant thereafter). Car demand over time was also based on PT regional patronage
figures and the average vehicle occupancy of 1.4 persons per car.
Table 88 a). Car travel time disbenefits for BRT options (NPV, 40 years)
1
2
3
4
5
Car travel
-$4.9m
-$4.4m
$4.3m
-$4.0m
-$3.7m
time
disbenefit
PwC calculations
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Table 90 b). Car travel time disbenefits for BRT options (NPV, 40 years)
2a
2b
3a
3b
4a
4b
Car travel
-$2.7m
-$5.0m
-$2.6m
-$5.1m
-$2.4m
-$5.1m
time
disbenefit
PwC calculations
Table 90 c). Car travel time disbenefits for BRT options (NPV, 40 years)
4c
4ac
5a
5b
5c
5ac
Car travel
-$4.2m
-$2.5m
-$2.9m
-$5.2m
-$-3.8m
-$2.3m
time
disbenefit
PwC calculations
Vehicle operating cost reduction benefits
The vehicle operating cost (VOC) reduction benefits is inclusive of reduced VOC for cars (due to mode
shift).
Table A5.1 gives the VOC (in cents per km) by speed and gradient. The road gradient was assumed to be
0%. A benefit update factor of 1.07 was used to convert the values from 2008 dollars to 2014 dollars.
Table 89 a). VOC reduction benefits for BRT options (NPV, 40 years)
1
2
3
4
5
Car VOC
$3.8m
$10.7m
$11.0m
$13.3m
$17.5m
reduction
benefit
PwC calculations
Table 91 b). VOC reduction benefits for BRT options (NPV, 40 years)
2a
2b
3a
3b
4a
4b
Car VOC
$11.2m
$5.5m
$11.6m
$5.7m
$14.0m
$6.6m
reduction
benefit
PwC calculations
Table 91 c). VOC reduction benefits for BRT options (NPV, 40 years)
4c
4ac
5a
5b
5c
5ac
Car VOC
$11.9m
$12.5m
$18.5m
$8.8m
$14.0m
$14.8m
reduction
benefit
PwC calculations
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Agglomeration benefits
The benefits associated with agglomeration economies have been assumed to be 15% of the travel time
benefits and is in line with other economic appraisals of transport projects.21 This is conservative but a
realistic proposition for a city such as Wellington, in which much of the employment is already
concentrated in the CBD.
Table 90 a). Agglomeration benefits for BRT options (NPV, 40 years)
1
2
3
4
5
Agglomeration
$0.9m
$2.3m
$2.8m
$4.2m
$4.9m
benefits
PwC calculations
Table 92 b). Agglomeration benefits for BRT options (NPV, 40 years)
2a
2b
3a
3b
4a
4b
Agglomeration
$2.1m
$1.3m
$2.7m
$1.6m
$3.9m
$2.1m
benefits
PwC calculations
Table 92 c). Agglomeration benefits for BRT options (NPV, 40 years)
4c
4ac
5a
5b
5c
5ac
Agglomeration
$3.2m
$2.9m
$4.7m
$2.3m
$4.3m
$4.0m
benefits
PwC calculations
Calculation of costs
Capital and operating cost values are also sourced from the PTSS. These were developed by AECOM and
peer reviewed. As with the transport effects, we apply the PTSS BP and BRT costs to Options 1 and 5, and
then interpolate to develop the costs for the other options.
Capital expenditure
Table 19 below shows the indicative costs of the bus priority and BRT options from the PTSS work.
Table 91: Capital expenditure of construction ($2013 m)
Bus Priority
BRT 2
Central spine
16.1
79.8
Newtown branch
5.9
29.4
Kilbirnie branch
14.1 1
25.6
21 A summary of examples of wider economic impact assessments is contained in Kernohan and Rognlien (2011)
Wider economic impacts of transport investments in New Zealand. Refer to Table 13.1. A 15% uplift sits
comfortably within the range of agglomeration impacts for bus projects listed in the table.
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General allowances
5.0
9.8
Design and construction
9.8
32.2
contingencies (20%)
Total construction cost
58.6 3
173.5
Source: Wellington Public Transport Spine Study Appendix E Option Cost Methodology
Note: (1) Option 1 does not include the Kilbirnie branch. However we use the PTSS value for this part of
the route to help interpolate the values for other options. (2) The BRT values exclude the amount included
in the PTSS for high-capacity buses, since these are part of the reference case for our analysis. (3) The
Bus Priority values exclude amounts for the Constable St part of the route, since this is not part of any
BRT option.
The interpolation method used for capital costs differed to that applied to journey times, given the different
drivers of the values. Our method uses professional judgement to determine the relative costs of each
option compared to the ‘bookends’. The approach used a different relative allocation for road
infrastructure and signalling and telemetry.
Table 92 shows the approach to interpolate the infrastructure assets and
Table 93 sets out the approach
used to interpolate the signalling and telemetry costs.
Table 92: Infrastructure cost allocation
Option 1
Option 2
Option 3
Option
Option 4
Option
Option 5
4c/4ac
5c/5ac
BP costs
Midway
BP costs plus Combination
Midway
Combination
BRT costs
between BP
25%
of Option 4
between BP
of Option 5
and BRT
and Option 3
and BRT
and Option 3
costs
by route
costs
by route
PwC assumptions
Table 93: Signalling cost allocation
Option 1
Option 2
Option 3
Option
Option 4
Option
Option 5
4c/4ac
5c/5ac
BP costs
Same as BP
Same as BP
Combination Same as BRT Combination
BRT costs
costs
costs
of Option 4
costs
of Option 5
and Option 3
and Option 3
by route
by route
PwC assumptions
Cost escalation was applied to the capex figures. The 2013 dollar values from AECOM were inflated one
year to generate 2014 dollars (to ensure the benefits and costs were aligned).
The values for the cost escalation were estimated using a combination of the forecast local government
capital expenditure price index and long run consumer price index according to the following table:
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Table 94. Cost escalation factors by year
Year
Local
Annual
Cumulative
Government
% change
cost
cost
capex price
% change
p.a. - LT
escalation
escalation
index
p.a.
CPI@2%
factor
factor
2014
1000
0.4%
-1.6%
0.9840
0.9840
2015
1021
2.1%
0.1%
1.0010
0.9850
2016
1045
2.4%
0.4%
1.0035
0.9885
2017
1072
2.6%
0.6%
1.0058
0.9942
2018
1100
2.6%
0.6%
1.0061
1.0003
2019
1130
2.7%
0.7%
1.0073
1.0076
2020
1161
2.7%
0.7%
1.0074
1.0151
2021
1196
3.0%
1.0%
1.0101
1.0254
2022
1233
3.1%
1.1%
1.0109
1.0366
2023
1273
3.2%
1.2%
1.0124
1.0495
2024
1317
3.5%
1.5%
1.0146
1.0648
2025
1366
3.7%
1.7%
1.0172
1.0831
Source: BERL, NZIER, PwC calculations
Operational expenditure
The annual operational expenditure was also sourced from AECOM work.
Table 95 below shows the
expected operational costs of the BP and BRT options. The operating costs relate to the bus operations (eg
fuel, vehicle maintenance etc) only. The PTSS did not specifically include costs for maintenance of the new
infrastructure. We have assumed that the maintenance costs of the whole roadway are materially similar as
the do-minimum scenario, on the basis that the segment of the road would need to be maintained anyway.
For example, if kerb-side parking is removed and converted to a bus-lane, the existing renewals budget
would have some proportion allocated to the road segment anyway.
Table 95. Operational expenditure estimates
Option
$/annum
Change from reference case
Reference case
$88.3m
N/A
Bus Priority
$88.0m
-$0.3m
BRT
$82.6m
-$5.7m
Source: PTSS Option Evaluation Results
In the BP and BRT options, the operating costs are less than the operating costs in the do-minimum.
Therefore, the BP and BRT options represent opex savings relative to the do-minimum.
We used the BP as the annual operating cost for Option 1 and BRT data for the annual operating costs for
Option 5.
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The operating costs for the intermediate options were also interpolating using the travel time percentage
method.
We also applied cost escalation to operating costs. A long run forecast of the producer price index and long
run forecast consumer price index were used to estimate a cost escalation factor for the operating costs.
This was calculated as 0.2% per annum. The PTSS operating costs also included a 10% contingency on the
total regional cost of providing public transport services.
Table 96 shows the expected total capex and annual opex (single year only) for each BRT option.
Table 96.
Expected total capex and annual opex for each BRT option ($2013 m)
Option
Total capex
Additional opex in 2031
Core options
1
30.9
- 0.3
2
95.7
- 2.6
3
58.8
- 2.9
4
127.2
- 4.6
5
173.5
- 5.7
Option variants:
2a
95.7
- 2.6
2b
70.3
- 1.3
3a
58.8
- 2.9
3b
37.8
- 1.4
4a
127.2
- 4.6
4b
101.9
- 2.0
4c
121.3
- 3.5
4ac
121.3
- 3.5
5a
173.5
- 5.7
5b
139.7
- 2.4
5c
160.8
- 5.2
5ac
160.8
- 5.2
PwC calculations
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Cost benefit analysis results
Core BRT options
Table 97 presents the estimated benefits, costs, and the benefit-cost ratios for the core BRT options. All
dollar values shown are net present values over 40 years.
Table 97. Costs, benefits and BCRs – core BRT options
$m NPV
1
2
3
4
5
Benefits:
Travel time benefits
$5.9m
$15.3m
$19.0m
$28.1m
$32.9m
Additional PT user benefits
$0.0m
$0.0m
$0.0m
$5.8m
$6.0m
Reliability benefits
$5.9m
$15.3m
$19.0m
$28.1m
$32.9m
Walking benefits
$0.1m
$0.3m
$0.3m
$16.4m
$17.9m
Emissions reductions benefits
$0.1m
$0.3m
$0.3m
$0.3m
$0.4m
Agglomeration benefits
$0.9m
$2.3m
$2.8m
$4.2m
$4.9m
Travel time (dis)benefits for car
users
-$4.9m
-$4.4m
-$4.3m
-$4.0m
-$3.7m
Reduction in vehicle operating cost
benefits
$3.8m
$10.7m
$11.0m
$13.3m
$17.5m
Total benefits
$11.8m
$39.7m
$48.0m
$92.2m
$108.1m
Costs:
Capex
$24.3m
$72.1m
$43.4m
$97.2m
$132.9m
Opex (savings)
-$2.4m
-$20.8m
-$22.8m
-$36.8m
-$45.4m
Total costs
$ 21.9m
$51.3m
$20.6m
$60.4m
$87.5m
Benefit-cost ratio
0.5
0.8
2.3
1.5
1.2
PwC calculations
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Other BRT variants
Table 98 presents the estimated benefits, costs, and the benefit-cost ratios for other BRT variants. All dollar
values shown are net present values over 40 years.
Table 98a.
Costs, benefits and BCRs – other BRT variants
$m NPV
2a
2b
3a
3b
4a
4b
Benefits:
Travel time benefits
$14.2m
$8.6m
$17.7m
$10.6m
$26.2m
$13.8m
Additional PT user benefits
$0.0m
$0.0m
$0.0m
$0.0m
$6.1m
$2.4m
Reliability benefits
$14.2m
$8.6m
$17.7m
$10.6m
$26.2m
$13.8m
Walking benefits
$0.1m
$0.1m
$0.1m
$0.2m
$17.3m
$6.7m
Emissions reductions benefits
$0.2m
$0.1m
$0.2m
$0.1m
$0.3m
$0.2m
Agglomeration benefits
$2.1m
$1.3m
$2.7m
$1.6m
$3.9m
$2.1m
Travel time (dis)benefits for car
-$2.7m
-$5.0m
-$2.6m
-$5.1m
-$2.4m
-$5.1m
users
Reduction in vehicle operating cost
$11.2m
$5.5m
$11.6m
$5.7m
$14.0m
$6.6m
benefits
Total benefits
$39.5m $19.1m $47.4m $23.8m
$91.7m $40.5m
Costs:
Capex
$61.2m
$55.9m
$37.6m
$30.0m
$81.4m
$81.1m
Opex (savings)
-$22.0m -$10.0m -$24.1m
-$11.4m
-$38.8m
-$15.5m
Total costs
$39.2m $45.9m $13.5m $ 18.6m $42.5m $65.6m
Benefit-cost ratio
1.0
0.4
3.5
1.3
2.2
0.6
PwC calculations
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Table 98b.
Costs, benefits and BCRs other BRT variants
$m NPV
4c
4ac
5a
5b
5c
5ac
Benefits:
Travel time benefits
$21.5m
$19.4m
$31.2m
$15.1m
$28.8m
$27.0m
Additional PT user benefits
$2.4m
$2.5m
$6.3m
$2.5m
$2.4m
$2.5m
Reliability benefits
$21.5m
$19.4m
$31.2m
$15.1m
$28.8m
$27.0m
Walking benefits
$6.8m
$7.1m
$18.1m
$7.2m
$6.9m
$7.2m
Emissions reductions benefits
$0.3m
$0.3m
$0.4m
$0.2m
$0.4m
$0.3m
Agglomeration benefits
$3.2m
$2.9m
$4.7m
$2.3m
$4.3m
$4.0m
Travel time (dis)benefits for car
-$4.2m
-$2.5m
-$2.9m
-$5.2m
-$3.8m
-$2.3m
users
Reduction in vehicle operating cost
$11.9m
$12.5m
$18.5m
$8.8m
$14.0m
$14.8m
benefits
Total benefits
$63.4m $61.6m $107.4m $46.1m $81.8m $80.5m
Costs:
Capex
$93.3m
$77.6m
$111.0m
$111.1m $124.7m $102.9m
Opex (savings)
-$28.2m -$29.8m
-$47.9m
-$18.8m -$41.2m -$43.5m
Total costs
$65.1m $47.8m
$63.1m
$92.3m $83.5m $59.3m
Benefit-cost ratio
1.0
1.3
1.7
0.5
1.0
1.4
PwC calculations
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Sensitivity testing
Higher value of time
A higher value of time for PT users was used to lift the values of time more in line with those used in the
PTSS economic evaluation, to make the results more comparable between studies. The values of time for
PT users were increased by an additional 25% for the sensitivity testing, making the weighted average value
of time for PT users $10.19 per hour.
Results presented below are for core BRT options only.
Table 99. Benefit-cost ratio for core BRT options with higher value of time
$m NPV
1
2
3
4
5
BCR – base case
0.5
0.8
2.3
1.5
1.2
BCR – higher value of time
0.7
0.9
2.8
1.8
1.5
PwC calculations
Higher construction costs
Higher capital costs (an extra 20%) were used to test the scenario in which construction costs are
significantly higher than expected.
Table 100. Benefit-cost ratio for core BRT options with higher construction costs
$m NPV
1
2
3
4
5
BCR – base case
0.5
0.8
2.3
1.5
1.2
BCR – higher costs
0.5
0.6
1.7
1.2
1.0
PwC calculations
Higher agglomeration benefits
A higher uplift was used to determine the agglomeration benefits of the BRT options. The standard benefit
ratio was 15% of travel time benefits, but 25% of all other benefits was used to align with the wider
economic benefits in the PTSS economic evaluation.
Table 101. Benefit-cost ratio for core BRT options with higher agglomeration benefits
$m NPV
1
2
3
4
5
BCR – base case
0.5
0.8
2.3
1.5
1.2
BCR – higher agglomeration
0.6
0.9
2.7
1.8
1.5
PwC calculations
Reduced reliability benefits
A lower value for the reliability benefits was used for all the BRT options and variants in this sensitivity
test. The standard reliability benefit was multiplied by a factor of 0.31 (ie the standard reliability benefits
was reduced by 69%, reflecting the percentage of buses on time arriving at all stops). It is noted that in
some circumstances, the EEM requirement to limit reliability benefits to be no greater than travel time
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benefits remains as a constraint. This suggests that the BRT options 3 and 4 are likely to improve PT
reliability a great deal.
Table 102. Benefit-cost ratio for core BRT options with reduced reliability benefits
$m NPV
1
2
3
4
5
BCR – base case
0.5
0.8
2.3
1.5
1.2
BCR – reduced reliability
0.4
0.8
2.3
1.5
1.2
PwC calculations
Reduced walking benefits
A lower value for the walking benefits was used for all the BRT options and variants in this sensitivity test.
The walking benefits for new PT users only was included in the sensitivity test, excluding the additional
distance that existing PT users walk when bus stops have a greater distance between them.
Table 103. Benefit-cost ratio for core BRT options with reduced walking benefits
$m NPV
1
2
3
4
5
BCR – base case
0.5
0.8
2.3
1.5
1.2
BCR – reduced walking
0.5
0.8
2.3
1.3
1.1
benefits
PwC calculations
Overall conservative sensitivity test
An overall sensitivity test combining the individual conservative sensitivity tests was used: including
additional costs, reduced reliability and reduced walking benefits. As shown below, options 3 has a BCR
greater than 1 and option 4 has a BCR equal to one.
Table 104. Benefit-cost ratio for core BRT options with reduced walking benefits
$m NPV
1
2
3
4
5
BCR – base case
0.5
0.8
2.3
1.5
1.2
BCR – conservative
0.4
0.6
1.7
1.0
0.8
PwC calculations
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Appendix D Detailed multi-
criteria analysis results
Scores for individual criteria
This section presents the scores for the individual MCA criteria, by objective. These scores were developed
and agreed by the project Working Group.
1. Increased economic activity
This objective reflects the effect of BRT on economic productivity and growth in Wellington.
Table 105 presents the scores assessed for each of this objective’s individual criteria.
Table 105.
Scores for criteria for ‘Increased economic activity’
Ref case
1
2
3
4
5
1.1 PT Spine corridor throughput
0
1
2
3
3
3
1.2 Ability to drive intensification
of development and economic
0
1
2
3
3
3
activity
1.3 Increase in the value of land
0
1
2
3
3
3
use along the PT Spine
1.4 Increase in residential
0
1
2
3
3
3
population along the PT Spine
2a
2b
3a
3b
4a
4b
4c
4ac
5a
5b
5c
5ac
1.1 PT Spine corridor
2
1
3
2
3
2
3
3
3
2
3
3
throughput
1.2 Ability to drive
intensification of development
2
1
3
2
3
2
3
3
3
2
3
3
and economic activity
1.3 Increase in the value of
2
1
3
2
3
2
3
3
3
2
3
3
land use along the PT Spine
1.4 Increase in residential
2
1
3
2
3
2
3
3
3
2
3
3
population along the PT Spine
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2. Improved multi-modal network efficiency
This objective reflects the effect of BRT on the efficiency of Wellington’s transport network.
Table 106 presents the scores assessed for each of this objective’s individual criteria.
Table 106.
Scores for criteria for ‘Improved multi-model network efficiency’
Ref case
1
2
3
4
5
2.1 Reduction in PT journey times
0
1
2
3
3
3
2.2 Increased reliability of PT
0
1
2
3
3
3
journeys
2.3 Reduction in vehicle
0
1
2
3
3
3
operating costs
2.4 Improvement in ability to
move goods and services around
0
1
2
3
3
3
the city
2.5 Operational resilience (level
0
0
0
0
0
-2
of interaction with other modes)
2a
2b
3a
3b
4a
4b
4c
4ac
5a
5b
5c
5ac
2.1 Reduction in PT journey
2
1
3
2
3
2
3
3
3
2
3
3
times
2.2 Increased reliability of PT
2
1
3
2
3
2
3
3
3
2
3
3
journeys
2.3 Reduction in vehicle
2
1
3
2
3
2
3
3
3
2
3
3
operating costs
2.4 Improvement in ability to
move goods and services
2
1
3
2
3
2
3
3
3
2
3
3
around the city
2.5 Operational resilience
(level of interaction with other
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-2
-1
-1
-1
modes)
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3. Improved accessibility
This objective reflects the effect of BRT on the ability for Wellingtonians to move around the city, and to
access key destinations.
Table 107 presents the scores assessed for each of this objective’s individual criteria.
Table 107.
Scores for criteria for ‘Improved accessibility’
Ref case
1
2
3
4
5
3.1 Increase in PT Spine corridor
0
1
2
3
3
3
carrying capacity
3.2 Improved options for mode
0
1
2
3
3
3
choice
3.3 Reduction in bus-on-bus
0
1
2
3
3
3
congestion
3.4 Reduction in PT journey
0
1
2
3
3
3
times
2a
2b
3a
3b
4a
4b
4c
4ac
5a
5b
5c
5ac
3.1 Increase in PT Spine
2
1
3
2
3
2
3
3
3
2
3
3
corridor carrying capacity
3.2 Improved options for
2
1
3
2
3
2
3
3
3
2
3
3
mode choice
3.3 Reduction in bus-on-bus
2
1
3
2
3
2
3
3
3
2
3
3
congestion
3.4 Reduction in PT journey
2
1
3
2
3
2
3
3
3
2
3
3
times
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link to page 144 link to page 144
Strictly confidential
4. Increased PT patronage
This objective reflects the effect of BRT on the number of people using Wellington’s PT system.
Table 108 presents the scores assessed for each of this objective’s individual criteria.
Table 108. Scores for criteria for ‘Increased PT patronage’
Ref case
1
2
3
4
5
4.1 Increase in PT patronage in
0
1
2
3
3
3
Wellington city
4.2 Increase in PT mode share in
0
1
2
3
3
3
Wellington city
2a
2b
3a
3b
4a
4b
4c
4ac
5a
5b
5c
5ac
4.1 Increase in PT patronage
2
1
3
2
3
2
3
3
3
2
3
3
in Wellington city
4.2 Increase in PT mode share
2
1
3
2
3
2
3
3
3
2
3
3
in Wellington city
5. Improved PT user experience
This objective reflects the effect of BRT on the user experience of PT users, and the perceived experience for
potential users.
Table 109 presents the scores assessed for each of this objective’s individual criteria.
Table 109.
Scores for criteria for ‘Improved PT user experience’
Ref case
1
2
3
4
5
5.1 Increase in PT user
0
0
1
1
3
3
satisfaction
5.2 Increase in ease of use of PT
0
0
1
1
3
3
2a
2b
3a
3b
4a
4b
4c
4ac
5a
5b
5c
5ac
5.1 Increase in PT user
1
1
1
1
3
1
3
3
3
1
3
3
satisfaction
5.2 Increase in ease of use of
1
1
1
1
3
1
3
3
3
1
3
3
PT
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6. Minimise emissions
This objective reflects the extent to which BRT affects the amount of emissions produced in Wellington.
Table 110 presents the scores assessed for each of this objective’s individual criteria.
Table 110.
Scores for criteria for ‘Minimise emissions’
Ref case
1
2
3
4
5
6.1 Assessment of emissions
0
0
0
2
2
2
(buses)
6.2 Assessment of emissions
0
0
0
0
1
1
(mode shift)
2a
2b
3a
3b
4a
4b
4c
4ac
5a
5b
5c
5ac
6.1 Assessment of emissions
1
0
2
1
2
1
2
2
2
1
2
2
(buses)
6.2 Assessment of emissions
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
(mode shift)
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7. Minimise impacts on physical environment / amenity
This objective reflects the extent to which BRT impacts amenity values or the physical environment.
Table 111 presents the scores assessed for each of this objective’s individual criteria.
Table 111. Scores for criteria for ‘Minimise impacts on physical environment / amenity’
Ref case
1
2
3
4
5
7.1 Land take
0
0
0
0
0
0
7.2 Construction effects
0
0
-2
-2
-2
-3
7.3 Visual effects
0
0
0
0
0
-1
7.4 Noise effects
0
0
0
0
0
0
7.5 Heritage effects
0
0
0
0
0
0
7.6 Loss of town belt
0
0
0
-1
-2
-2
7.7 Ecological effects
0
0
0
0
0
0
7.8 Safety impacts
0
0
0
0
0
1
7.9 Impacts on residential
0
0
0
0
0
-1
amenity
7.10 Localised urban centre
0
0
0
0
0
-1
commercial impacts
7.11 Loss of parking
0
0
-1
-1
-2
-2
7.12 Traffic and transport effects
0
-1
0
-1
-1
-2
2a
2b
3a
3b
4a
4b
4c
4ac
5a
5b
5c
5ac
7.1 Land take
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
7.2 Construction effects
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-2
-1
-2
-2
-3
-2
7.3 Visual effects
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-1
-1
-1
-1
7.4 Noise effects
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
7.5 Heritage effects
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
7.6 Loss of town belt
0
0
-1
0
-2
-1
-2
-2
-2
-1
-2
-2
7.7 Ecological effects
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
7.8 Safety impacts
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
7.9 Impacts on residential
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-1
-1
-1
-1
amenity
7.10 Localised urban centre
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-1
-1
-1
-1
commercial impacts
7.11 Loss of parking
-1
-1
-1
-1
-2
-2
-2
-2
-2
-2
-2
-2
7.12 Traffic and transport
0
0
-1
-1
-2
-1
-1
-2
-2
-2
-2
-2
effects
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8. Affordable / value for money
This objective reflects the cost of BRT, and the extent to which this is considered value for money.
Table 112 presents the scores assessed for each of this objective’s individual criteria.
Table 112.
Scores for criteria for ‘Affordable / value for money’
Ref case
1
2
3
4
5
8.1 Benefits
0
1
2
2
3
3
8.2 Capex
0
-1
-2
-1
-2
-3
8.3 Opex & maintenance
0
0
1
1
2
2
8.4 Rates impact
0
1
2
1
2
2
2a
2b
3a
3b
4a
4b
4c
4ac
5a
5b
5c
5ac
8.1 Benefits
2
1
2
1
3
2
2
2
3
2
2
2
8.2 Capex
-2
-2
-1
-1
-2
-2
-2
-2
-3
-3
-3
-3
8.3 Opex & maintenance
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
1
2
2
8.4 Rates impact
2
2
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
9. Alignment / integration with other infrastructure & services
This objective reflects the extent to which BRT is aligned with the strategic plans and priorities of relevant
councils and agencies, including other planned projects.
Table 113 presents the scores assessed for each of this objective’s individual criteria.
Table 113. Scores for criteria for ‘Alignment / integration with other infrastructure &
services
Ref case
1
2
3
4
5
9.1 Alignment with strategic
documents (eg GOS, RLTP, LTP,
0
0
1
1
2
3
Urban Growth Plan)
9.2 Alignment with specific
0
-1
2
2
2
1
projects (eg RONS, cycling)
2a
2b
3a
3b
4a
4b
4c
4ac
5a
5b
5c
5ac
9.1 Alignment with strategic
documents (eg GOS, RLTP,
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
2
3
2
3
3
LTP, Urban Growth Plan)
9.2 Alignment with specific
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
projects (eg RONS, cycling)
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Scores for each objective
The above scores are averaged for each objective, to derive scores for each objective.
Table 114 presents the scores for each objective.
Table 114. Scores for project objectives
Ref case
1
2
3
4
5
1. Increased economic activity
0
1
2
3
3
3
2. Improved multi-modal
0
0.8
1.6
2.4
2.4
2
network efficiency
3. Improved accessibility
0
1
2
3
3
3
4. Increased PT patronage
0
1
2
3
3
3
5. Improved PT user experience
0
0
1
1
3
3
6. Minimise emissions
0
0
0.5
1
1.5
1.5
7. Minimise impacts on physical
0
-0.1
-0.3
-0.4
-0.6
-0.9
environment / amenity
8. Affordable / value for money
0
0.3
0.8
0.8
1.3
1
9. Alignment / integration with
0
-0.5
1.5
1.5
2
2
other infrastructure & services
2a
2b
3a
3b
4a
4b
4c
4ac
5a
5b
5c
5ac
1. Increased economic activity
2
1
3
2
3
2
3
3
3
2
3
3
2. Improved multi-modal
1.6
0.8 2.4
1.6
2.4
1.6
2.4
2.4
2
1.4
2.2
2.2
network efficiency
3. Improved accessibility
2
1
3
2
3
2
3
3
3
2
3
3
4. Increased PT patronage
2
1
3
2
3
2
3
3
3
2
3
3
5. Improved PT user
1
1
1
1
3
1
3
3
3
1
3
3
experience
6. Minimise emissions
0.5
0
1
0.5
1.5
0.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
0.5
1.5
1.5
7. Minimise impacts on
physical environment /
-0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.5 -0.4 -0.6 -0.5 -0.8 -0.8 -0.9 -0.8
amenity
8. Affordable / value for
0.8 0.5 0.8
0.5
1.3
0.8 0.8 0.8
1
0.5
0.8 0.8
money
9. Alignment / integration
with other infrastructure &
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
2
1.5
2
2
2
1.5
2
2
services
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Strictly confidential
Appendix E Restrictions
This report has been prepared for the New Zealand Transport Agency (the Transport Agency), Greater
Wellington Regional Council (GWRC) and Wellington City Council (WCC), to set out the indicative
business case for Bus Rapid Transit in Wellington. This report has been prepared solely for this purpose
and should not be relied upon for any other purpose. We accept no liability to any party should it used for
any purpose other than that for which it was prepared.
This report has been prepared solely for use by the Transport Agency, GWRC and WCC and may not be
copied or distributed to third parties without our prior written consent.
To the fullest extent permitted by law, PwC accepts no duty of care to any third party in connection with the
provision of this report and/or any related information or explanation (together, the “Information”).
Accordingly, regardless of the form of action, whether in contract, tort (including without limitation,
negligence) or otherwise, and to the extent permitted by applicable law, PwC accepts no liability of any kind
to any third party and disclaims all responsibility for the consequences of any third party acting or
refraining to act in reliance on the Information.
We have not independently verified the accuracy of information provided to us, and have not conducted
any form of audit in respect of the Transport Agency, GWRC and WCC. Accordingly, we express no opinion
on the reliability, accuracy, or completeness of the information provided to us and upon which we have
relied.
The statements and opinions expressed herein have been made in good faith, and on the basis that all
information relied upon is true and accurate in all material respects, and not misleading by reason of
omission or otherwise.
The statements and opinions expressed in this report are based on information available as at the date of
the report.
We reserve the right, but will be under no obligation, to review or amend our report, if any additional
information, which was in existence on the date of this report, was not brought to our attention, or
subsequently comes to light.
We have relied on forecasts and assumptions prepared by the Transport Agency, GWRC and WCC about
future events which, by their nature, are not able to be independently verified. Inevitably, some
assumptions may not materialise and unanticipated events and circumstances are likely to occur.
Therefore, actual results in the future will vary from the forecasts upon which we have relied. These
variations may be material.
This report is issued pursuant to the terms and conditions applicable to our engagement letter dated 29
May 2014 and the change of scope letter dated 17 February 2015.
Bus Rapid Transit – Indicative Business Case
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